*****Cuba Embargo Aff

***1AC

Inherency
US embargo on CUBA is in full forceany changes have been superficial and dont solve the aff
Bandow 12senior fellow @ CATO Institute
Doug, Time to End the Cuba Embargo [http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo] December 11 //mtc

The U.S. government has waged economic war against the Castro regime for half a century. The policy may have been worth a try during the Cold War, but the embargo has failed to liberate the Cuban people. It is time to end sanctions against Havana. Decades ago the Castro brothers lead a
revolt against a nasty authoritarian, Fulgencio Batista. After coming to power in 1959, they created a police state, targeted U.S. commerce, nationalized American assets, and allied with the Soviet Union. Although Cuba was but a small island nation, the Cold War magnified its perceived importance. Washington reduced Cuban sugar import quotas

in July 1960. Subsequently U.S. exports were limited, diplomatic ties were severed, travel was restricted, Cuban imports were banned, Havanas American assets were frozen, and almost all travel to Cuba was banned. Washington also pressed its allies to impose sanctions. These various
measures had no evident effect, other than to intensify Cubas reliance on the Soviet Union. Yet the collapse of the latter nation had no impact on U.S. policy. In 1992, Congress banned American subsidiaries from doing business in Cuba and in 1996, it penalized foreign firms that trafficked in expropriated U.S. property. Executives from such companies even were banned from traveling to America. On occasion Washington relaxed one aspect or another of the

embargo, but in general continued to tighten restrictions, even over Cuban Americans. Enforcement is not easy, but Uncle Sam tries his best. For instance, according to the Government Accountability Office, Customs and Border Protection increased its secondary inspection of passengers arriving from Cuba to reflect an increased risk of embargo violations after the 2004 rule changes, which, among other things, eliminated the allowance for travelers to import a small amount of Cuban products for personal consumption. Three years ago, President Barack Obama loosened regulations on Cuban Americans, as well as telecommunications between the United States and Cuba. However, the law sharply constrains the presidents discretion. Moreover, UN Ambassador Susan Rice said that the embargo will continue until Cuba is free.

Plan
The United States federal government should end its economic embargo on Cuba.

Advantage 1Latin American Relations

US-Latin American relations are at a breaking pointfailure to act now guarantees long term collapse of cooperation
Shifter 12president of the Inter-American Dialogue
Michael, REMAKING THE RELATIONSHIP: The United States and Latin America [http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf] April //mtc If the United States and Latin America do not make the effort now,

the chance may slip away. The most likely scenario then would be marked by a con-tinued drift in their relationship, further deterioration of hemisphere-wide institutions, a reduced ability and willingness to deal with a range of common problems, and a spate of missed opportunities for more robust growth and greater social equity. The United States and Latin America would go their separate ways, manage their affairs independently of one another, and forego the opportunities that could be harvested by a more productive relationship. There are risks of simply maintaining the status quo. Urgent problems will inevitably arise that require trust and effective collaboration to resolve. And there is a chance that tensions between the United States and Latin America could become much worse, adversely affecting everyones interests and well- being. It is time to seize the moment and overhaul hemispheric relations.

Lifting the embargo solves Latin American relations by signaling new US postureunique opportunity for success because of changing political conditions
White 13senior fellow at the Center for International Policy
Robert, After Chvez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hopefor-good-neighbors-in-latin-america.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=1&&pagewanted=all] March 7 //mtc Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chvez of Venezuela

who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity. Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chvez used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the
United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Ral, Cubas current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress. An end to the Cuba

embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas. I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose to serve in Latin America in
the 1960s. I was inspired by President John F. Kennedys creative response to the revolutionary fervor then sweepin g Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic Fidel Castro, had inspired revolts against the cruel dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that had dominated the region since the end of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the 19th century. Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted democratic change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the Alliance for Progress, a kind of Marshall Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the same kind of results that saved Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions of dollars to this effort. In hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious, even nave, but Kennedys focus on Latin America rekindled the promise of the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations. Tragically, after Kennedys assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and la noche mas larga the longest night began for the proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism. During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran militarys responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fi red and forced out of the Foreign Service. The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes. After our

counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked its research institute, the RAND Corporation, what had gone wrong. RAND analysts found that United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the insurgents were rebelling against social injustice and state terror. As a result, we purs ued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for ends humiliating to the Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest. Over the subsequent quarter-century, a series of profound political,

social and economic changes have undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America and, with them, longstanding regional institutions like the Organization of American States. The organization, which is headquartered in Washington and which excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chvez. He promoted the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States which excludes the United States and Canada as an alternative. At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chvez
said that the most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of empire. Mr. Chvez was masterful at manipulating Americas antagonism toward Fidel Castro

as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy
of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and labor. Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the

magnitude of these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin Americas leading statesman at the time, Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba. Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been
since the very early years of the Castro regime. After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero. And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Ral Castros announcement that he will retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues. The fact that two of the three Cuban-American members of the Senate Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of Texas are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the potential for a recalibration of Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.) Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive? The re-

election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chvez, give America a chance to reassess the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades. The president and his new secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders
like President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and Jos Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization of American States. The message should be simple: The president is prepared to show some flexibility on

Cuba and asks your help. Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a
multilateral challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments. If,

however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.

Two impacts to relations First is democracycurrent relations risk democratic backslidingLatin America is a crucial symbol for global success
Hakim 6
Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue. Is Washington Losing Latin America?. Foreign Affairs 85 no1 39-53 Ja/F 2006. Wiley Online.

Even more troubling to U.S. officials has been the evolving political situation. Washington likes to tout Latin America as a showcase for democracy. Democratic politics are still the norm in the region; only Cuba remains under authoritarian rule. But in the past decade, nearly a dozen elected presidents have been forced from office, many by street protests or mob violence. Despite holding elections and plebiscites, Venezuela today barely qualifies as a democracy. The same is true

In Bolivia and Ecuador, fractious politics are reinforced by deep social, ethnic, and regional divisions. In Nicaragua, an alliance of corrupt
of Haiti, which more and more is coming to resemble a failed state. legislators from the left and the right has so paralyzed the government that next year's presidential election may restore to power Washington's nemesis Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega. And these are not the only countries in the region

where democracy is under stress and could deteriorate quickly. Although a majority of Latin American
citizens still consider democracy to be the best form of government, most hold a low opinion of their government and leaders.

In many places, the performance of public institutions, tainted by corruption, has been lackluster. Judicial systems in the region are mostly slow moving and unfair. Legislatures operate erratically. Political parties are weaker and less representative than ever. Only a few Latin American countries, most prominently Chile, have bucked the region's discouraging trends and made progress in consolidating democratic politics.

Latin American democracy solves global backliding

Fauriol and Weintraub 95 *director of the CSIS Americas program and **Prof of Public Affairs at the University of
Texas Georges and Sidney, The Washington Quarterly, "U.S. Policy, Brazil, and the Southern Cone", Lexis The democracy theme also carries much force in the hemisphere today. The State Department regularly parades the fact that all countries in the hemisphere, save one, now have democratically elected governments. True enough, as long as the definition of democracy is flexible, but these countries turned to democracy mostly of their own volition. It is hard to determine if the United States is using the democracy theme as a club in the hemisphere (hold elections or be excluded) or promoting it as a goal. If as a club, its efficacy is limited to this hemisphere, as the 1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Indonesia demonstrated in its call for free trade in that region, replete with nondemocratic nations, by 2020. Following that meeting, Latin Americans are somewhat cynical as to

whether the United States really cares deeply about promoting democracy if this conflicts with expanding exports. Yet this triad of objectives -- economic liberalization and free trade, democratization, and sustainable development/ alleviation of poverty -- is generally accepted in the hemisphere. The commitment to the latter two varies by country, but all three are taken as valid. All three are also themes expounded widely by the United States, but with more vigor in this hemisphere than anywhere else in the developing world. Thus, failure to advance on all three in Latin America will compromise progress elsewhere in the world .

Extinction
Diamond 95
Larry, Senior Fellow Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and

biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build w eapons of m ass d estruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who
organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are

the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Second is Latin America instabilitymultiple scenarios for state collapse, civil wars, refugee crisiss and terrorismrelations key to effective multilateral response
Noriega and Cardenas 12scholars @ American Enterprise Institute
Roger and Jose, An action plan for US policy in the Americas [http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defensepolicy/regional/latin-america/an-action-plan-for-us-policy-in-the-americas/] December 5 //mtc

Shared land and maritime borders make security in Western Hemisphere countries a permanent priority for the US government. The security challenges confronting Mexico, Central America, and Venezuela are more dramatic today than in recent memory. In the final
year of the George W. Bush administration, Mexico and the United States agreed on a $1 billion counter-narcotics assistance package. Yet, despite the enormous opportunity this presented to bring Mexico and the United States into a closer and mutually beneficial security cooperation, the aid was so slowly delivered that Mexicans have been left to wonder if their raging drug war is a priority for the United States. Conservative lawmakers who were the driving force behind Plan Colombia a decade ago have been less active on Mexico, focusing instead on border security as a means to fight illegal immigration and leaving Mexicans to square off with bloodthirsty cartels on their own. It is time for the United States to more fully recognize that Mexicos drug war is more accurately Americas drug war that Mexico is fighting. The US Department of Justice says that Mexicos drug-trafficking organizations are the greatest organized crime threat in the United States. The US must suppress demand for illicit drugs through education, treatment, and law enforcement, but helping Mexico sustain this fight is an indispensable responsibility as well. Moreover, increased US bipartisan political support may encourage the Mexican people and their new president, Enrique Pea Nieto, to sustain their antidrug efforts to advance the two countries common security, stability, and prosperity. The United States should also provide robust and innovative material support for these efforts and institutionalize law-enforcement cooperation and information sharing that are essential to the common fight against transnational criminal groups. In Central America, the institutions of government and the rule

of law have been overwhelmed by the onslaught of criminal gangs that have been displaced by Mexicos stepped-up law enforcement. Guatemalas state apparatus has been underfunded for decades, and the institutions of Honduras have been weakened by a succession of populist caudillo presidents, systematic corruption, and the expanding presence of organized crime. El Salvador confronts the unique challenge of hardened gang members deported from the United
States maintaining their ties to criminal networks in US urban centers. A public-security crisis in these countries has undermined popular confidence in elected officials and overwhelmed poorly trained and equipped security forces. Unless

the United States and neighboring countries organize an international response, several of these countries may soon become ungovernable territories, producing economic failure, civil strife, and refugee crises. This challenge requires a regional rescue plan (led by the United
States, Mexico, Colombia, Europe, and the multilateral development banks). The United States should encourage interested nations to organize a summit of governments and institutions to develop such a plan and agree on how it should be implemented and funded. But by far the greatest threat to security and stability in the Americas is the

narco-state that has taken root in Venezuela under the unaccountable regime of Hugo Chvez. This hostile regime is managed by Cubas security apparatus, funded by China, armed by Russia, and partnered with Iran, Hezbollah, and Colombian and Mexican narco-traffickers.
US law enforcement and federal prosecutors have gathered fresh, compelling evidence implicating senior Venezuelan officials and Chvez himself in narcotics trafficking in collusion with Colombian terrorist groups. Chvez has also forged an important strategic alliance with Iran to allow it to evade international sanctions and carry its asymmetrical threat against the United States to the countrys doorstep. Even as the international community implements new financial sanctions to deny Teheran the means to sustain a uranium enrichment program, the regime has established dozens of shadowy commercial enterprises and banks in Venezuela to launder as much as $30 billion through its petro-economy. Certainly the drug kingpins managing Venezuela today have everything to lose when Chvez succumbs to cancer. Several ruthless, anti-United States governments have a stake in trying to engineer a chavista succession, even as the government struggles with an unsustainable fiscal situation, a collapsing economy, social polarization, and a public-security crisis. In short, within

the next several years, Venezuela will become a manmade disaster that will impact regional security and energy supply. Americas current policy of evading responsibility for the implosion in Venezuela is untenable and dangerous. Every serious government in the Americas has a stake in addressing these issues before they become unmanageable. The crises in Central America and Venezuela will require US leadership, intelligent diplomacy, and resources to organize an effective multilateral response.

Latin American instability causes extinction

Manwaring 5
Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College, venezuelas hugo chvez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term

security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host evil
networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can

spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Perus Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that
recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities business incentives. Chvez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regimes credibility a nd capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chvezs intent is to focus his primary

attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of
upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new peoples democracies. In connection with the creation of new peoples democracies, one can rest assured that Chvez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer

dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and peoples democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

Advantage 2Iran Influence

Iran is increasing its sphere of influence in Latin America with non-friendly states
Berman 12
Ilan, Confronting Iran's Latin American Ambitions [http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilanberman/2012/12/04/confronting-irans-latinamerican-ambitions/] December 4 //mtc

Over the past year, policymakers in Washington have woken up to a new threat to U.S. security. Since October of 2011, when law enforcement agencies foiled a plot by Irans Revolutionary Guards to
assassinate the Saudi ambassador in the nations capital, U.S. officials have begun to pay attention in earnest to Irans growing activities and influence in the Western Hemisphere. What they have found has been deeply

worrisome. The Islamic Republic, it turns out, has made serious inroads into Latin America since the mid-2000s, beginning with its vibrant strategic partnership with the regime of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez. Today, Iran enjoys warm diplomatic ties not only to Venezuela, but to similarly sympathetic governments in Bolivia and Ecuador as well. It has begun to exploit the regions strategic resource wealth to fuel its nuclear program. And it is building an operational presence in the region that poses a direct danger to U.S. security. Exactly how significant this threat is represents the subject of a new study released in late November by the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee. That report, entitled A Line In The Sand, documents
the sinister synergies that have been created in recent years between Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand, and radical regional regimes and actorsfrom Venezuela to Mexican drug cartelson the other. Some of these contacts, the study notes, are financial in nature, as Iran seeks to leverage Latin Americas permissive political and fiscal environments to skirt sanction s and continue to engage in international commerce amid tightening Western sanctions. But these contacts could

easily become operational as well. The report suggests that the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation.

Now is keyIran is on track to gain a permanent foothold over the region

Fite 12researcher @ CSIS
Brandon, U.S. AND IRANIAN STRATEGIC COMPETITION: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States [http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf] April 4 //mtc Irans forays into Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere are the product of an aggressive

diplomacy geared towards alleviating the pressure of Western-led sanctions and more generally combating the present international order, which Tehran views as hostile to its interests. At present, Irans relationships with individual peripheral powers are not strong enough to achieve its goals, and
thus not of critical concern to the US. The present weaken ss of Irans alliance network is brought about by divisions within Iran and its targeted partners, but also by sustained engagement and pressure from the US. To prevent Iran from

strengthening its bonds with peripheral powers policymakers in Washington should consider the following three broad strategies: Engage with peripheral countries, but do not meddle. Some analysts have criticized the US for ignoring the periphery (especially Latin America) and thus allowing Iran to gain a foothold. As Irans ambitious and geographically unbounded strategy in seeking partners and allies demonstrates, the US cannot afford to completely ignore any region of the globe. That being said, in countries of limited strategic interest it is beneficial to engage without
overreaching, especially when considering that Iranian commitments have a tendency to eventually collapse under their own weight (e.g. Senegals Seniran Auto). US aid and commercial interests provide strong incentives for peripheral nations to hesitate from full cooperation with the IRI.

Plan creates regional pressure on non-friendly states to stop cooperating with Iranremoves their immunity from scrutiny
Hakim 13
Peter, Post Chavez: Can U.S. rebuild Latin American ties? [http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/03/27/post-chavez-can-u-srebuild-latin-american-ties/] March 27 //mtc

Recent developments suggest, however, that for Washington to regain clout in regional affairs, it must it end its standoff with Cuba. U.S. policy toward Cuba sets Washington against the views of every Latin American and Caribbean government. Long-standing U.S. efforts to isolate and sanction Cuba, have, counterproductively, brought every country in Latin America to Cubas defense with a general admiration of Havanas resistance to U.S. pressures. Because this U.S. policy is viewed as so extreme, no Latin America country is willing to criticize Cuba almost regardless of its words or actions. Chavez, with his close association with Cuba, possessed some of that immunity with his neighbors leaving him unaccountable for his violations of democracy, human rights and decency. His funeral made it clear that the United States has a lot of work to do to prevent that immunity from spreading.

Two scenarios to Iran influence First is prolifLatin America provides a market for uranium and blunts the effectiveness of international sanctions against Iran
Walser et al 12senior policy analyst @ Heritage
Ray, Douglas Farah senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, and Michael Shifter, Are U.S. Fears Over Iran's Ties to Latin America Overblown? [http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2834] January 9 //mtc A: Ray Walser, senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation: "The question is well-timed. On Sunday, Iranian President Ahmadinejad was scheduled to arrive in Caracas. He hopes to cement ties with the ALBA anti-

American bloc led by Chvez and the Castros. What does Iran seek in the Americas? It wants support against the United States and Western Europe as they impose tougher sanctions aimed at stopping its nuclear weapon drive. It wants outlets for its exports and sources of secure supply for its domestic market. Iran desires friends willing to buck the United States and lessen the bite of sanctions by hiding banking transactions, purchases and technology transfers. In geo-strategic
terms, Iran likely sees the Americas as a potential platform for waging asymmetric warfare or disruptive terror in the event of a direct conflict with Israel or the United States. Iran also colludes with Hezbollah, which aims to capitalize on South America's cocaine trade to fund its activities. Finally, Venezuela and others like Bolivia are positioned to

provide Iran with long-term access to strategic materials, particularly uranium, needed for a nuclear weapons program. The threats posed by Iran and Hezbollah are genuine. They may not be appear as
imminent or as destructive as drug and crime violence sweeping the Americas or require immediate military responses. The trajectory of the challenge, moreover, will be governed by events in the Middle East and by Iran's bid for nuclear power and the mantle of radical Islamist leadership. The Obama administration should make ties with Iran a litmus test in its bilateral relations. It should remove or withhold ambassadors, scrutinize aid assistance and loan requests and consider potential sanctions for those who align with the greatest threat to world peace." A: Douglas Farah, senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center: "There is a growing body of public evidence that Hezbollah is active in the Latin American cocaine trade, while Iran, its primary state sponsor, has been linked to attempted cyber attacks against the United States and the establishment of false front companies and banks in order to blunt the impact of international sanctions. The growing

Iranian diplomatic, intelligence and economic presence, particularly in the ALBA states (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua), is a significant danger because the alliance is primarily based on deep and public enmity toward the United States and it allies, including a common doctrine of asymmetrical warfare that explicitly embraces the use of weapons of mass destruction as a legitimate tool to defeat the 'Empire,' as the United States is usually called. While some attention has
focused on red herrings such as uranium mining, Iran has been quietly increasing its intelligence ties around the region, recruiting and training students in Iran, exchanging military attachs, building financial institutions through which to move money and working to extract other vital rare earth minerals for its missile and weapons programs. Hezbollah, with increasing ties to transnational criminal organizations in the region, is profiting, aiding Iran's ties to non-state armed actors and expanding the reach of Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organizations. President Ahmadinejad's trip will focus on showing Iran is not an international pariah. But he will also be focusing on strengthening relationships that will blunt sanctions and expand Iran's ability to operate in close proximity to the United States."

Second Iranian proliferation it spills over leads to Middle Eastern proliferation

Levi 11
Michael, senior fellow for energy and the environment and director of the program on energy security and climate change at the Council on Foreign Relations, Feb, Limiting Iranian Nuclear Activities, CFR Working Paper

Israel would also respond differently to a nuclear-armed Iran than to a nuclear-capable one.
Israel has long maintained that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Mid - dle East. Given that Israel is widely believed to already have a significant nuclear arsenal, this has been interpreted to mean that if another Middle Eastern state declared itself a nuclear power, Israel would do the same too. If Iran became openly nuclear

armed, then, Israel could be expected not only to declare itself a nuclear power, but also to pursue qualitative (and possibly quantitative) im- provements to its arsenal. Such a move would
further erode whatever (presumably small) legitima- cy the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty enjoys in the region; it would also put the United States in the awkward position of needing to decide whether to assist Israel in any way. Beyond the Middle East, an Iranian move from being nuclear capable to being nuclear armed would also

have big consequences for global nonproliferation efforts. The problem is simple: failing to prevent another state from acquiring nuclear weapons would severely damage the credibility of the nonproliferation regime. That would make it harder to gather support for preventing other states from acquiring nuclear weapons too. U.S. policymakers have been extremely
frustrated with many countries insistence that Iran has a right to continue developing its enrichment capacity, so long as i t adheres to IAEA rules. But one redeeming side effect of this has been that these countries can accept what Iran is

doing without weakening their attachment to nonproliferation. Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would shatter that peace.

Causes nuclear war and extinctiondeterrence theory doesnt apply

Edelman et al 11
Eric, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; he was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2005-9. Andrew F. Krepinevich is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Evan Braden Montgomery is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Jan-Feb, The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment, Proqeust Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three

or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed
states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However,

emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed
incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to

respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

Second scenario is nuclear terrorismIran will use Latin American terrorist networks to attack the US
Noriega et al 13scholars @ American Enterprise Institute
Roger F., Cresencio S. Arcos Jr., Otto Reich, Mark D. Wallace, Iran: A regional threat beyond the Middle East [http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/middle-east-and-north-africa/iran-a-regional-threat-beyond-themiddle-east/] January 14 //mtc

Against this backdrop of increasingly effective and broad economic pressure, however, is a curious anomaly. Several

countries in one region of the world are working to undermine international sanctions against Iran and some are even helping the Iranian regime engage in illegal activities such as money laundering and narco-terrorism. Surprisingly, these countries are not located in the Middle East, but rather in a region much closer to the United States: Latin America. It is time for the U.S. and other like-minded countries to acknowledge and confront this growing threat. The Iranian regime's effort to improve ties with Latin America is working. Consider that in 2005, Iran only had six embassies in the region. Today, the number has increased to ten. Far more concerning than its increasing formal diplomatic presence, however, is Iran's opportunistic effort to improve ties with some of the region's most notorious rogue state actors. The clearest and most publicized example of Iran
building inroads in the Western Hemisphere is its connection with Hugo Chavez's Venezuela. It is no secret that Venezuela and Iran enjoy a close relationship, with scores of Iranian companies establishing suspicious operations throughout the country. What is less well-known is that Chavez has provided active support for Hezbollah by

allowing it to establish a base of operations and provide terror training on Venezuelan territory. There is also ample evidence that the Chavez regime has facilitated cooperation between Hezbollah and Colombian and Mexican narco-traffickers. While Venezuela is Iran's most notorious enabler in the region, other countries are also ramping up their support for Tehran. The most recent and blatant
offender in this regard is Ecuador, which has been one of the most vocal proponents of Iran's development of so-called "peaceful nuclear energy." In July, Ecuador announced that it would defy international sanctions and purchase some $400 million of Iranian oil. Even more troubling, there is growing evidence that Ecuador's radical president Rafael Correa is actively facilitating Iran's illegal activities. For example, Ecuador plans to begin mining uranium in the next few years and in late 2009, signed an agreement with Iran "to boost closer and mutually beneficial relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran on a variety of fronts, among them mining and geology."The entire international community should clearly be concerned by the prospect of an Ecuador-Iran alliance cemented by a steady supply of uranium ore to Tehran. Like Venezuela, there are also growing concerns that Ecuador is helping finance Iran's illegal activities through money laundering. Iran intentionally avoided using Ecuador's Central Bank and instead used a small private bank, COFIEC, for financial transactions. The only plausible reason Iran would do this is to avoid scrutiny. Ecuador vociferously denies these reports but has refused to submit bank records for transparent analysis. Internal minutes from a meeting between COFIEC and Iranian officials that leaked earlier this year specifically stated that the two would cooperate to "facilitate trade" and seek to expand cooperation with other countries and financial institutions not currently under sanctions. Whether it is using drug cartel thugs

from Mexico to plan a bombing in the heart of our nation's capital or reengaging with Argentina
through diplomatic talks and developing ties with anti-American governments such as those of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Venezuela, it is clear that Iran has a strategy to increase influence in Latin America. The U.S.

ignores this growing regional threat at its own risk. It is time for the U.S. to wake up to the reality that some of its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere are actively cooperating and facilitating Iran's nuclear ambitions and terrorist activities. The manner in which the U.S. counters this growing threat will no doubt vary by country, but one salient point must come to the fore - continued indifference is akin to rolling out the welcome mat for Iran to further spread its dangerous influence in the region.

Attack on US soil causes the US to retaliatecauses extinction

Ayson 10 - Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria
University of Wellington Robert, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism,

could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist
groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if

it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The
correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread

over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out
Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if

the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear
terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its

own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating
response.

***Case

Relations AdvDemocracyRelations Key

Latin American liberalism is backsliding US is key
Allen 9
Michael, Editor of Democracy Digest, Latin America: democracy on a high, but backsliding seen in authoritarian drift, Democracy Digest, Factiva Latin America faces a revelatory moment, in the wake of the Honduran constitutional crisis, writes Jorge G. Castaeda. The episode confirmed a remarkableand certainly transformative fact: that the United States is no longer willing, or perhaps even able, to select who governs from Tegucigalpa, or anywhere else in the region for that matter. He is concerned that a U.S. retreat from the Monroe Doctrine entails a passivity that could undermine the

hard-won consensus on the need to anchor Latin Americas democracy in a strong, intrusive, and detailed legal framework, while resisting the threat of populist authoritarianism. Support for democracy is at its highest level since the late 1990s, according to the latest
Latinobarmetro poll taken in 18 countries and published by The Economist. The survey reveals growing trust in democratic institutions, an increase in governments legitimacy, and greater social liberalism. But concerns remain about the

robustness of Latin Americas democratic institutions. Backsliding is always a threat, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said this week, citing developments in the Americas where we are worried about leaders who have seized property, trampled rights, and abused justice to enhance personal rule. Three U.N. human rights experts this week accused Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez of creating a
climate of fear following the arrest last week of a woman judge who ordered the conditional release of imprisoned banker Eligio Cedeno. There was a time that judges who failed to follow Chvezs instructions risked being removed from the bench, said Robert Amsterdam, one of Cedeos lawyers. Judicial independence had been on life support, but sadly, it is now officially dead. Alberto Arteaga Sanchez, a criminal law professor at Venezuelas Central University,

condemned the unacceptable pressure being put on the judicial branch by the executive branch. Its a case that demonstrates the weakness of Venezuelas democratic system, he said. It is imperative that the U.S. remain actively engaged with the institutions that buttress the emerging but fragile democratic consensus, Castaeda argues, including the American Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. These structures have great potential, but they have yet to address some
key questions.

Relations AdvDemocracySolves War

Democracy solves all disadvantages empirical studies prove democratic governments resolve conflicts peacefully
Ndulo, Professor of Law @ Cornell, 3
Muno Ndulo, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Zambia; Professor, Cornell Law School; Director, Institute for African Development, Cornell University, 2003, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Lexis A 1993 study of 233 internal conflicts around the world, concluded that democracies had a far

better record of peacefully managing such conflicts than alternative systems. 54 The empirical
fact that democracies are far less likely to go to war with each other than other regimes further substantiates the relationship between poverty and conflict, and their impact on the democratization process. Authoritarian or totalitarian systems

simply do not have the institutions by which conflicts in society can be peacefully expressed and resolved. Dictatorships generally try to deal with conflicts by ignoring or denying them, or by suppressing them using state coercive apparatus. While such methods may indeed control conflicts (albeit usually at a severe cost), they [End Page 323] generally cannot resolve them. 56 The implication of fundamental issues such as identity and cultural integrity in such conflicts means that almost nothing
short of mass expulsions or genocide will make the conflicts disappear. It is generally believed that the ethnic conflict that erupted in the former Yugoslavia in 1990, for example, had been suppressed for almost fifty years during the years of communism, but was always present and unresolved. 57 An authoritarian system can present an illusion of

short-term stability through its use of coercive state power to suppress dissent, but is unlikely to sustain that stability over the long term. In contrast, it is argued that under a democracy, disputes that arise are likely to be processed, debated, and reacted to, rather than resolved definitively and permanently. 58 In short, democracy operates as a conflict management system. As
Harris and Reilly have observed, it is this ability to handle conflicts without having to suppress them or be engulfed by them that distinguishes democratic governance from authoritarian rule. 59 This does not by any means suggest that democracy is perfect, or that the mere establishment of democratic governance will itself lead to the settlement or prevention of conflicts. There are a number of cases in which democratic institutions are hastily "transplanted" to post-conflict societies without taking root or with a subsequent resumption of hostilitiesas in the cases of Burundi, Cambodia and Liberia. 60 But it is equally true that these cases offer many lessons as to how deals are struck and which choices are of crucial importance to building a sustainable outcome. 61 Democracy is often messy and difficult, but it is also the best hope for building sustainable solutions to most conflicts in the world. However, democratic institutions have to be strong enough to function effectively and fairly. They can only be strong where the economic conditions are such that they can be sustained.

Relations AdvStabilityAT No Escalation

Latin American wars go global even absent escalation, they collapse hegemony and encourage counterbalancing
Rochin, Professor of Political Science, 94
James, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University College, Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America, pp. 130-131 While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region which had some credibility in 19791984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring

in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worstcase scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena a concern expressed by the director of research for Canadas Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in
efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Iran AdvNow Key

New window of opportunity to solve Latin American relationslifting the embargo jumpstarts relations across the region
Tisdall 13
Simon, Death of Hugo Chvez brings chance of fresh start for US and Latin America [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latin-america/print] March 5 //mtc Hugo Chvez's departure furnishes Barack Obama with an opportunity to repair

US ties with Venezuela, but also with other Latin American states whose relations with Washington were adversely affected by Chvez's politics of polarisation and the Bush administration's viscerally unintelligent reaction. In particular, the change of leadership in Caracas could unlock the deadlock over Cuba, if the White House can summon the requisite political will. Possibly
anticipating a transition, Washington quietly engineered a diplomatic opening with Caracas last November after a lengthy standoff during which ambassadors were withdrawn. Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, telephoned Nicols Maduro, Venezuela's vice-president and Chvez's preferred successor, and discussed, among other things, the restoration of full diplomatic relations. "According to US officials, the Venezuelan vice-president offered to exchange ambassadors on the occasion of the beginning of President Barack Obama's second term. Jacobson, in turn, is said to have proposed a step-by-step approach to improve bilateral relations, starting with greater co-operation in counternarcotics, counter-terrorism and energy issues," Andres Oppenheimer reported in the Miami Herald. There is much

ground to make up. "Relations between the United States and Venezuela have ranged from difficult to hostile since Chvez took office in 1999 and began to implement what he calls 21st-century socialism,"
wrote a former US ambassador to Caracas, Charles Shapiro. "Chvez blamed a failed 2002 coup against him on the United States (not true), nationalised US companies, insulted the president of the United States and blamed 'the empire' his term for the United States for every ill In foreign affairs, the government actively supports the Assad regime in Syria, rejects sanctions on Iran and generally opposes the US at every turn." Despite such strains, economic self-interest always prevented a complete rupture. The US remained Venezuela's most important trading partner throughout Chvez's presidency, buying nearly half its oil exports. Caracas is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the US. In fact, the US imports more crude oil annually from Mexico and Venezuela than from the entire Persian Gulf. This shared commerce now provides a formidable incentive and a launch platform for a fresh start. Whether the opportunity is grasped depends partly on Maduro, a Chvez loyalist but a reputed pragmatist with close ties to Ral Castro in Cuba. Yet it depends

even more on Obama, whose first term, after a promising start, ended up perpetuating Washington's historical neglect of Latin America. He now has a chance to do better. The political climate seems propitious. Economic and cultural ties are also strengthening dramatically. Trade between the US and Latin America grew by 82% between 1998 and 2009. In 2011 alone, exports and imports rose by a massive 20% in both directions. "We do three times more business with Latin America than with China and twice as much business with Colombia [as] with Russia," an
Obama official told Julia Sweig of the US Council on Foreign Relations. Latinos now comprise 15% of the US population; the US is the world's second largest Spanish-speaking country (after Mexico). Despite this convergence, high-

level US strategic thinking about the region has continued to lag, Sweig argued. "For the last two decades, US domestic politics have too often driven Washington's Latin America agenda whether on issues of trade, immigration, drugs, guns or that perennial political albatross, Cuba, long driven by the supposedly crucial 'Cuban vote' in Florida," she said. Obama could change this dynamic if he tried and one way to do it would be to unpick the Cuban problem, which continues to colour the way Latin Americans view Washington. "Having won nearly half of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 2012, a gain of 15 percentage points over 2008, Obama can move quickly on Cuba. If he were to do so, he would find a cautious but willing partner in Ral Castro, who needs rapprochement with Washington to advance his own reform agenda," Sweig said. A move by Obama to end travel restrictions and the trade embargo on Cuba would be applauded across the region, explode old stereotypes about gringo oppressors, and help build confidence with Venezuela, the Castro regime's key backer, she suggested.

Iran AdvAT Squo Solves

Squo doesnt solvethe Countering Iran Act is only symbolic
Berman 12
Ilan, Confronting Iran's Latin American Ambitions [http://www.forbes.com/sites/ilanberman/2012/12/04/confronting-irans-latinamerican-ambitions/] December 4 //mtc The U.S. response, meanwhile, is still nascent. To date, only one piece of Congressional

legislationthe Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012has seriously taken up the issue of Irans penetration of the Americas, and the potentially adverse implications for U.S.
security. Fortunately, the Act has found a receptive ear among many in Congress, and is now likely to pass the Senate with only minor modifications during the current lame duck session of Congress. Yet, in and of itself, the Act does not

constitute a comprehensive strategy for competing with Iran in the Americasor for diluting its influence there.

Iran AdvProlifAT Stabilizing

No offense new proliferators wont take steps to stabilize their arsenal
-leads to unauthorized theft and use

Edelman et al 11
Eric, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; he was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2005-9. Andrew F. Krepinevich is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Evan Braden Montgomery is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Jan-Feb, The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment, Proqeust Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from

unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

Iran AdvTerrorismAT No Threat

Top security analysts agree that the threat is real
Ogilvie-White 6 PhD, senior lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences, teaching on the subjects of foreign
policy and international organisations Preventing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism: Nuclear Security in Southeast Asia, http://www.issr.uq.edu.au/sites/default/files/1%20-%20Preventing%20Nuclear%20and%20Radiological%20Terrorism%20%20Nuclear%20Security%20in%20Southeast%20Asia.pdf In the worst-case scenario the theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon - hundreds of thousands of lives

could be lost from a single blast, with immediate property damage running into many billions of dollars. 6 The medium and long-term impact would also be devastating, with radioactive contamination potentially causing long-term health effects and hundreds of billions of dollars in lost economic activity and property damage. 7 Given these estimates, and reports that Osama Bin Laden considers the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by Al Qaeda a duty, it is not surprising that the global threat of nuclear terrorism is considered extremely grave, to the extent that prominent, highly

regarded security analysts have called it the most serious threat facing the world .

Iran AdvTerrorismAT No Motivation

Terrorists have motivation
Ogilvie-White 6 PhD, senior lecturer in the School of Social and Political Sciences, teaching on the subjects of foreign
policy and international organisations Preventing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism: Nuclear Security in Southeast Asia, http://www.issr.uq.edu.au/sites/default/files/1%20-%20Preventing%20Nuclear%20and%20Radiological%20Terrorism%20%20Nuclear%20Security%20in%20Southeast%20Asia.pdf In June 2004, Mohamed ElBaradei, the usually circumspect Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), described the threat of nuclear terrorism as real and imminent, and talked of a race against time to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear and radioactive materials. 1 While the probability of nuclear terrorism remains much smaller than the likelihood of terrorism involving conventional means of violence, the

danger of high-end terrorism involving chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological (CBNR) weapons is growing, and has been of increasing concern to states and organizations around the world for the past decade. Well before the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, terrorism experts pointed to a disturbing trend in international terrorist incidents that called into question the established wisdom that non-state actors possessed neither the capabilities nor the motivation to carry out their destructive acts using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 2 In
particular, the March 1995 nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, challenged such assumptions, leading some observers to conclude that a new brand of terrorism was emerging, representing a very different

and potentially far more lethal threat than the more traditional types of ideological, ethnic/nationalist and separatist terrorism of the past. 3 The attacks of 9-11 and the subsequent discovery that the Al Qaeda network has been actively engaged in efforts to acquire CBNR weapons has confirmed the worst fears of terrorism experts and injected a new sense of

urgency

to an already highly charged debate.

*****Cuba Embargo Neg

***AT Latin American Relations

RelationsAlt Cause
War on drugs outweighs
Winter 11-9
Brian, Analysis: Obama faces Latin America revolt over drugs, trade, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/09/us-obamalatinamerica-idUSBRE8A80ZS20121109 President Barack Obama will face an unprecedented revolt by Latin American countries against

the U.S.-led drug war during his second term and he also may struggle to pass new trade deals as the region once known as "America's backyard" flexes its muscles like never before. Washington's ability to influence events in Latin America has arguably never been lower. The new reality is as much a product of the United States'
economic struggles as a wave of democracy and greater prosperity that has swept much of the region of 580 million people in the past decade or so. It's not that the United States is reviled now - far from it. Although a few vocally anti-U.S. leaders like Venezuela's Hugo Chavez tend to grab the media spotlight, Obama has warm or cordial relations with Brazil, Mexico and other big countries in the region. Most Latin American leaders were rooting, either privately or publicly, for his re-election on Tuesday. That said, even close allies are increasingly emboldened to act without worrying

about what "Tio Sam" will say or do. Nowhere is that more evident than on anti-narcotics policy. In 2012 as never
before, many governments challenged the four-decade-old policies under which Washington has encouraged, and often bankrolled, efforts to disrupt the cultivation and smuggling of cocaine, marijuana and other drugs in the region.

The

reason s for the unrest: Frustration with what many perceive as the pointless bloodshed caused by the "war on
drugs," plus a feeling the United States has not done enough to reduce its own demand for narcotics - if, that is, it's even
possible to curb demand.

DemocracyAT LA Democracy
Democracy now
Jones 12 Professor of Political Science @ Rice
Mark, The Diversity of Latin American Democracy, World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11751/the-diversity-of-latin-american-democracy The recent collapse of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring provides a backdrop to reflect on Latin America's democratic transitions from authoritarian rule during the "Third Wave of Democratization" as well as to review the current health of the region's democracies. Compared to the paucity of democracies in Latin America at the start of the Third Wave in

the mid-1970s, the near-universal

presence of democratic regimes today highlights the tremendous democratic progress made in the region over the past three-dozen years. Nevertheless, within this broader regional success exists
considerable country-by-country variation in democratic experience and quality. This article will first review the stark differences in the foundations upon which the region's Third Wave democracies were constructed, with particular focus on the nature of the democratic transition and prior experience with democratic elections and governance. It will then discuss the evolution of democracy in the region over the past three and a half decades. Next it will examine the considerable variance in the degree of democratic consolidation and democratic quality in the region as of 2012. A final section will draw some general conclusions about some of the most significant factors that drove the democratization of Latin America. The article will concentrate on the 19 former Spanish and Portuguese colonies of the region -- Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela -- while excluding a discussion of democratic transitions and democracy in the region's former British, Dutch and French colonies. This latter group is dominated by the dozen ex-British colonies, which with the exception of Guyana have avoided any serious democratic breakdowns since achieving independence between 1962 and 1983, and at present all possess robust democratic systems. Democracy and Dictatorship in Latin America at the Dawn of the Third Wave In January 1977, only two of the 19 former Spanish and Portuguese

colonies could truly be classified as democracies. Costa Rica and Venezuela were islands of consolidated
democracy within a sea of dictatorship, with the former continuously democratic since 1953 and the latter since 1958. A third country, Colombia, was in the midst of a democratic transition following the end in 1974 of its experience with a quasidemocratic power-sharing pact between the Liberal and Conservative parties, which had been established in 1958 as a means to help end a decade-long civil conflict. The remaining 16 countries were governed by military or civilian dictatorships of diverse stripes. In many cases the dictatorship was relatively institutionalized, with the presidency and other key posts regularly changing hands, while in others the lion's share of power lay in the hands of a single personalist dictator who had governed -- or would continue to govern -- for decades. Examples of the former set of countries include Brazil and Mexico. In Brazil, different generals occupied the presidency for a fixed term during most of the dictatorship. In Mexico, a new president from the country's omnipotent Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) assumed office every six years. Nicaragua and Paraguay are examples of the latter type of country. Nicaragua was governed in 1977 by Anastasio Somoza Debayle, who had assumed control in 1967 following the death of his brother, who had in turn taken the place in 1956 of their assassinated father, Anastasio Somoza Garca, whose tenure had begun in 1936. In Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner had held the reins of power continuously since 1954 and would continue to do so until his removal by a military coup in 1989. The Third Wave Democratic Transitions Between 1977 and 1994, 15 of these 16 nondemocratic Latin

American countries would embrace democracy, with the exception being totalitarian Cuba. The nature of
the initial transitions from authoritarian to democratic governance, however, varied tremendously among the 15 countries that became democracies during the post-1977 period. Several countries experienced gradual, managed

transitions, with Brazil and Mexico two examples of this model. In Brazil, where restricted elections had been held to
select national legislators and local officials throughout most of the 1964-1985 military dictatorship, these elections became increasingly free and fair over time. This gradual democratic transition in Brazil, often referred to as the process of "political decompression," culminated with a fully democratic election in 1986 of national legislators who would go on to draft the country's 1988 constitution.

Latin American democracy is resilient

Fingar 1
Thomas Fingar, Statement by Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, February 7, 2001. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/terrorism/t_0031.htm That said, Latin American democracies have proved resilient in the face of economic crises,

and all ideological alternatives to democratic government remain discredited. Fragile democratic institutions in countries such as Ecuador and Paraguay remain under great pressure to respond to legitimate mass needs, but few consider military rule a feasible alternative. Latin American militaries know that overt intervention risks international opprobrium and

sanctions. They will, therefore, favor

solutions that maintain at least a semblance of constitutional legitimacy. To date, popular support has sustained President Chavez's political revolution in Venezuela, but the swift, dramatic fall of former Peruvian President Fujimori indicates that there are limits to the appeal of populist authoritarians. The OAS-managed hemispheric reaction to suspect elections in Peru in mid-2000 underscored the strength of the prevailing pro-democracy consensus. In none of the other major countries of Latin America-- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico-- is democracy threatened in the short or medium term. Indeed, the election of Vicente Fox to the Mexican presidency, ending peacefully the long reign of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, is a major step forward for democracy in Mexico and throughout the hemisphere.

DemocracyAT Solves War

The democratic peace theory is obsolete
Henderson 2
Errol Henderson, Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science at the University of Florida, 2002, Democracy and War The End of an Illusion?, p. 145 I n this chapter, I summarize the main findings of the study and briefly discuss their research and policy implications. The main finding resulting from the statistical analyses is that democracy is not significantly associated with a

decreased likelihood of international wars, militarized disputes, or civil wars in postcolonial states. There does not appear to be a dyadic democratic peace or a monadic one. To the extent that a democratic peace obtains, it does for extrastate wars, which are more than likely relics of a bygone era;
nevertheless, even for these wars, while democracies in general are less likely to become involved in them, Western states especially Western democracies are more likely to fight them. These findings result from analyses using straightforward research designs, similar data, and identical statistical techniques as those found in research supporting the DPP. They suggest that politico-economic factors in the postwar era greatly contributed to the

phenomenon that is erroneously labeled the democratic peace. Further, they imply that foreign policy strategies aimed at increasing the likelihood of peace in the future by spreading democracy are likely to be ineffective, at best, or conflict exacerbating, at worst.

No democratic peaceother domestic political factors are more important than regime type for determining war and peace decisions
Elman 97
Miriam Elman, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Arizona State University, 1997, Paths to Peace Is Democracy the Answer?, p. 483

MISSING DOMESTIC-LEVEL VARIABLES. The

democratic peace theory presents a truncated view of domestic politics in general, and democratic politics in particular. Specifically, the theory ignores the role of leaders; underemphasizes norms that are not associated with domestic political ideology; obscures the role of political parties; and discounts how civil-military relations can concentrate or disperse war powers. First, the theory requires us to believe that it matters little who controls the state; that is, the democratic peace theory suggests that regime type predominates, hence the identity and beliefs of the governing coalition do not matter. We suggest that this is a very misleading and apolitical argument. For example, in Chapter 1, Layne argues that individual leaders made a difference in determining whether Anglo-French relations were conflictual or cooperative. The presence of Lord Palmerston in the British Foreign
Office increased cross-Channel friction. Palmerstons replacement, Lord Aberdeen, had a more collegial diplomatic style. Thus, it is not surprising that in the 1840s Anglo-French relations shifted toward increasing conciliation and cooperation. Instead of changes of regime type, changes in foreign policy leadership made the difference. Similarly, Kacowicz (Chapter 8) finds that domestic changes within regimes can bring to power new and moderate leaders, thus facilitating the resolution of militarized disputes. For example, leadership changes in Peru can explain why its conflict with Colombia was resolved short of war. In addition, in Chapter 7, I suggest that democracies will be more likely to initiate conflicts and use force if ruling coalitions favor the use of force to solve

In Israel, since the two main political partiesLabor and the Likud had different views regarding the legitimacy of using force, changes in leadership dramatically affected Israels war-proneness. These intra-regime changes led to changes in Israels foreign policy toward Lebanon even though Israels regime typedemocracyremained constant. In short, the important consideration may not be whether a country is democratic or not, but whether its ruling coalition is committed to peaceful methods of conflict resolution. By focusing solely on domestic regime type, the democratic peace theory obscures the extent to which hard-line leaders are often a prerequisite for war.14 Second, the democratic peace theory obscures the fact that war and peace decision making often reflects normative and cultural factors that have little to do with different political ideologies. For example, in Chapter 2, Rock suggests that beliefs in a common racial identity led Britain to retreat from the brink of war with the United States during the Venezuelan crisis. Anglo-Saxonism also explains the great rapprochement between the United States
international conflicts. and Britain at the turn of the century; the British perceived the United States as less menacing than Germany because of the racial and cultural affinity they felt for Americans. Furthermore, public expressions of Anglo-Saxonist sentiment were loudest when diplomatic relations between the United States and Britain were at their worst, suggesting that AngloSaxonism was not merely a consequence of Anglo-U.S. reconciliation, as neorealists would argue. Ganguly (Chapter 6) also argues that the norms that drive foreign policy may only partly be related to political organization and regime type

. In

the war between Pakistan and India in 1971, political ideologysupport for democracy

and democratizationwas less important than ensuring Indias secular way of life. Similarly, Freedman (Chapter 5) argues that while democratic peace theorists are right to emphasize the importance of norms in explaining a states foreign policy choices, political ideology is not necessarily the most powerful normative justification for war or peace decisions. Consistent with the dyadic democratic peace argument, Freedman finds that support for democratic norms goes far in explaining Britains decision to reoccupy the Faildand Islands by force. Argentinas regime type was a permissive condition for war: a military response was a more acceptable and feasible option than it might have been had Argentina been a liberal democracy. Nevertheless, Freedman points out that Britain justified its war decision on the grounds

that it was upholding the international principle of self-determination, and not rewarding aggression. Instead of liberal ideology and the nature of the Argentine regime, these international rights were crucial in the British decision making calculus. Third, the democratic peace theory discounts the fact that it is not regime typedemocracy versus nondemocracy that explains war and peace decisions, but particular attributes of democracy, such as the nature of political parties. According to John C. Matthews Ill (Chapter 11), the democratic peace is not a result of democracy, but of strong parties. Strong parties that favor the use of force only as a last resort can screen out more radical actors from the foreign policy making process. Finally, the democratic peace theory ignores civil-military relations. The institutional argument for the democratic peace phenomenon asserts that democracies are less war-prone because the power to wage war is not concentrated in the hands of one person. But even democracies delegate war powers, increasing the

chances that war and peace decisions will reflect the views of a small group of civilian and military figures. For example, in Chapter 7, I argue that due to the nature of civil-military relations in Israel, Defense Minister Sharon was able to direct and control the war in Lebanon. The cabinet was presented with faits
accomplis that escalated actions in Lebanon and incrementally led to the implementation of a far larger military initiative than the cabinet had originally approved. Similarly, Layne (Chapter 1) suggests

Britains Lord Palmerston had a great deal of power to decide war and peace issues due to the way m which foreign policy was delegated. In sum, like democratic peace proponents, we argue that
that

internal characteristics of the state are relevant for predicting whether states will or will not fight each other. However, we reject the claim that crude attributes of states domesti c political systemsdemocracy versus nondemocracyprovide sufficient information about the domestic sources of foreign policy. While domestic politics matters, it is not

regime type that crucially accounts for variations in foreign policies, but other variables that may be present or absent in democracies (and nondemocracies).

DemocracyAT Environment
Biodiversity is not critical survival of ecosystems.
Grime 97
J.P. Grime, biologist at the University of Sheffield. Science Vol. 277. August 29, 1997. Biodiversity and ecosystem function: the debate deepens Academix OneFile

This view that "biodiversity begets superior ecosystem function" is not shared by all ecologists[5, 6]. There are obvious conflicts with published evidence from work on natural rather than synthesized ecosystems. As early as 1982, Leps et al.[7] had suggested that ecosystem processes were determined primarily by the functional characteristics of component organisms rather than their number. The same conclusion was drawn by MacGillivray et al.[8] who showed that differences between five
adjacent ecosystems in northern England in their responses to frost, drought, and burning were predictable from the functional traits of the dominant plants but were independent of plant diversity. This edition of Science (pages 1296, 1300, and 1302) includes three contributions[9-11] to this important debate. One is a report of results from the Cedar Creek synthesized plant assemblages, whereas the two others describe biodiversity-ecosystem studies conducted on natural systems (mediterranean grassland in California and northern forest in Sweden). In all three, variation in ecosystem properties is found to be related to differences in the functional characteristics, especially resource capture and utilization, of the dominant plants, and

there is no convincing evidence that ecosystem processes are crucially

dependent on higher levels of biodiversity. The evidence presented by Wardle et al.[10] is particularly compelling because it involves an extensive study of ecosystem properties on 50 relatively pristine forested islands of varied size and plant biodiversity. It is clearly shown that
a suite of ecosystem properties -- including higher microbial biomass, high litter quality, and more rapid rates of litter decomposition and nitrogen mineralization -- coincide with the lower botanical diversity and the earlier successional state of the vegetation on larger islands (both consequences of the higher incidence of lightning strikes and more frequent fire history of larger islands). On small islands, succession proceeds uninterrupted to more species-rich

vegetation, but here the dominant plants, Picea abies and Empetrum hermaphroditum, are extremely stress tolerant and produce litter of poor quality, thereby slowing the rates of ecosystem processes. This strongly supports the contention of MacGillivray et al.[8] that it is the biological characteristics of the dominant plants rather than their number that control ecosystem productivity and biogeochemistry. This same conclusion is prompted by the new data presented by Tilman et
al.[9] and Hooper et al.[11]. Both of these groups have adopted a more experimental approach and created ecosystems in field plots where they can control both the functional composition and species richness of the vegetation. Here again, there is strong evidence that productivity and nutrient cycling are controlled to an overwhelming extent by the functional characteristics of the dominant plants, and evidence of immediate benefits of species-richness within

functional groups remains weak.

StabilityAT War
Latin American conflicts wont escalate no vacuum of power.
Fettweis 11 Professor of Political Science @ Tulane
Christopher, Professor of Political Science @ Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 85 The trend is apparent on every continent. The only conflict raging in the entire Western Hemisphere in

2010 was the ongoing civil war in Colombia, and even that was far less bloody than a decade prior. Cruise ships have returned to Caratagena. Despite the fact that there are no nuclear weapons south of the United States, the states of Central and South America act as if they do not fear an attack from their neighbors. The rules of realpolitik no longer seem to apply.
Europe, which of course has been the most war-prone of continents for most of human history, is entirely calm, without even the threat of interstate conflict. More than one scholar has noted the rather remarkable fact that no serious war planning now goes on among the European powers.'; All over Europe and the Americas," John Keegan has observed, "armies are withering away."" The situations in Bosnia and Kosovo, while not settled, are at least calm for the moment. And in contrast to 1914, the great powers have shown no eagerness to fill Balkan power vacuums; to the contrary, throughout the 1990s. they had to he shamed into intervention, and were on the same side when they eventually did so. International reactions to turmoil in the Balkans in 1914 and in 1992 demonstrate the extent to which the international system had changed. Today's power vacuums seem to repel far more than they attract.

No underlying triggers of interstate conflict in Latin America

Hofmeister '08
Wilhem, PhD, "International Security: A European-South American Dialogue" Conference Report, 11/20/08, Konrad-AdenauerStiftung, www.kas.de/bruessel/en/publications/15122/, AD 5/22/12 Security is one main concern of Latin -Americas citizens. For them, it is not only a question of carefreeness with regard to general risks, but a question of protection against violence and crime. Compared to international standards, most Latin-American countries show a relativly elevated degree of intra-state violence. In Brazil, for example, more than 40.000 people fall victim of criminal violence each year. This extent of intra-state violence seems to contrast with another phenomenom: In an international comparison, Latin-America is considered the region with less inter-state conflicts and the one,

who in proportion to its gross national product (GNP), spends less in military expenses. The subcontinent lacks any major territorial dispute, as well as religious or ethnical conflicts . Besides, Latin-America is the only region in the world where all countries pronounce openly against the aquisition and posession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, central topics on the agenda of international
security, as the fight against terrorism or the issue of non-proliferation, dont have an immediate impact on Latin-American countries and thus, within the continent, the interest and comprehension of these topics remain rather limited. Accordingly, the disposition of politicians, media and a broader part of civil society to support the fight against terrorism and the constriction of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, is situated on a low level. This tendency is strengthened by the widely spread critique against the Bush-Administration and the presence of the armed forces of the USA in Colombia. On the other hand, the countries of Latin-America by no means have a cohesive position with regard to matters of international security. They neither have a common view of security problems nor does there exist a coordinated collective strategy in international forums. These countries are more or less free riders with regard to questions on security. Many times, the proximity to the United States is not se en as protection against threat; on the contrary many countries feel threatened by the hegemon.

No risk of war in Latin America.

Barshefsky et al. 8
Charlene Barshefsky and James T. Hill, Chairs and Shannon K. ONeil, Project Director. U.S. -Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality. Council On Foreign Relations. Independent Task Force Report No. 60. 2008. Online.

Cross-border threats among countries of the region are much diminished today, thanks to the end of military governments in the region, relatively low levels of defense spending, few significant external threats, the settling or tabling of most major border disputes, the influence of the United States and other members of the international community, and improving mechanisms for regional cooperation through the OAS and other regional and sub-regional bodies. Of concern, however, are Venezuelas international arms purchases, which increased from an estimated $71 million
between 2002 and 2004 to $4 billion between 2005 and 2007, expenditures not included in the countrys official military budget.26 While aggregate defense expenditures in Latin Americaremainamongthelowest regionallyin theworld as a percentage of GDP, such substantial Venezuelan increases should be watched.

***AT Iran Influence

Solvency
Iran sphere of influence inevitableLatin American countries wont give up partnerships even with improved US relations
Fernandez 13
Yusuf, Why Latin America will not bow to US pressure over Iran [http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/01/10/282761/waning-usinfluence-in-latin-america/] January 10 //mtc However, Latin American people know well that for over a hundred years it was the United

States, and not another country, which wrought terror, war, poverty and repression throughout Latin America in the form of CIA-orchestrated military coups and support of paramilitary crimes, terrorism and dictatorial regimes. Military found guilty of the worst violations of human rights in Latin American countries were trained in the notoriously famous School of Americans by US officers. Actually, the Act is another evidence that US influence in Latin America is rapidly waning. Latin American countries have developed their own policies and set up independent blocks - ALBA, UNASUR and CELAC - while the Organization of American States, which includes the US and Canada, has been declining due to its submission to US policies on issues such as Cubas participation in its summits. Iran has been seeking to increase its relations with Latin America in a bilateral way and in the framework of the NonAligned Movement and other international organizations. This has irritated Washington, which still seems to consider Latin American countries as vassals not having the right to pursue an independent foreign policy or seeking its own friends and partners. Any agreement between Latin American states and Iran - or Russia and China - always arouses suspicion in the US. Several Latin American countries have enhanced their diplomatic and trade ties with Iran

in recent years, while their relations with the US have been downgraded amid popular demands for an end to dependence on Washington. Although the United States is still the largest economic partner of many Latin American countries, its economic and financial crisis has adversely affected them. This has led some nations, such as Mexico, to announce their intention to diversify their commercial partners in the next years. As international partner, the Islamic Republic is one of the best positioned to help Latin American countries develop their economies and their scientific and technological skills in many fields. The Iranian industry is highly developed. It has remarkable expertise in oil and gas exploitation and other sectors including health, defence, agriculture and space technology. Iran has helped Venezuela build unmanned drone aircraft as part of their military cooperation. Referring to a Spanish media report that US prosecutors were
investigating drone production in Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez said: Of course we are doing it, and we have the right to. We are a free and independent country. In a televised speech to military officers at Venezuelas Defense Ministry, Chavez said the aircraft only had a camera and was exclusively for defensive purposes. He said that Venezuela planned to soon begin exporting the drone. Moreover, Iran and Venezuela have mutual investment of about five billion dollars in factories to make cement, satellites and tractors and the Iranians have helped the Latin American country build 14,000 houses. Tehran has forged significant economic and political relations with the government of Evo

and with that of Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Irans links with Argentina, where Zionist also rapidly improving, as the government of President Cristina Fernandez is promoting a more conciliatory line towards Tehran. Latin American countries, especially those that follow an independent foreign policy, trust Iran because they know that the Iranians cannot be pressured into betraying an agreement that disturbs the US or its allies. This is a main reason of Irans rising popularity in Latin America despite the propaganda of ZionistMorales in Bolivia circles have unsuccessfully tried to blame Iran for the AMIA attack in 1994, are owned media outlets and the US political and diplomatic actions. Hispan TV, the Spanish-language channel similar to the English-language Press TV channel, is also feared by the US establishment and Zionist circles because it is giving Latin American audiences accurate information about the Middle East and international developments that exposes the lies of Zionist-controlled agencies and media. The recent expulsion of Hispan TV from the Spanish-owned Hispasat channel is, in this sense, a desperate attempt to prevent the channel from reaching mass audiences. However, this move, as other similar ones in the past, is doomed to failure. Therefore, Latin American nations wont allow the US to dictate

their foreign policy on the issue of their relations with Iran or anything else. In fact, Washington has already had a sign of this when it tried to pressure these countries to vote against Palestines bid to gain the status of a non-member state at the United Nations. Only

one country, Panama, whose government has strong links with Israel and the local Zionist lobby, voted against it.

Squo Solves
Irans Latin America efforts are failing
AFP 13
Agence France-Presse Iran's influence 'waning' in Latin America: US general [http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130319/irans-influence-waning-latin-america-us-general] March 19 //mtc

Iran is "struggling" to cultivate ties with Latin American countries that are wary of the United States, and Tehran's influence in the region is on the decline, a top US general said Tuesday. "The reality on the ground is that Iran is struggling to maintain influence in the region, and that its efforts to cooperate with a small set of countries with interests that are inimical to the United States are waning," General John Kelly, head of US Southern Command, told lawmakers. In
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Argentina, Iran has sought to expand diplomatic and economic links to counter international sanctions and to promote anti-US sentiment, Kelly told the Senate Armed Services Committee. But the bid has only been "marginally successful" and the broader region "has not been receptive to Iranian effort s," the general said.

New bill solves Iran influence in Latin America

RT News 12
Global News Syndicate, Obama signs law countering Iranian sway in Latin America [http://rt.com/news/obama-iran-latin-america091/] December 30 //mtc US President Barack Obama enacted a law on Friday targeting Iran's alleged influence in Latin

America. This comes as Washington already wages a covert war against Iran, according to researcher Soraya Sepahpour-Ulrich. The act also calls on the Department of Homeland Security to bolster surveillance at US borders with Canada and Mexico to prevent operatives from Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, its Quds Force, Hezbollah or any other terrorist organization from entering the United States. The Islamic Republic has been expanding its cooperation with Latin America in recent years and has described it as the one of its major foreign policy strategies. The anti-Iran law comes amid growing tensions surrounding Iran and its nuclear program. The US and its allies
suspect Iran of developing nuclear weapon, while it insists on the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

ProlifAT Iran Irrational

Iran prolif doesnt cause escalationregime is rational and cautious
Schramm 11-- program associate at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Madison, Hey America, Iran still isn't threat No. 1, 2k11, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/1012/Hey-AmericaIran-still-isn-t-threat-No.-1 Iran's nuclear program is a strategic, not a direct, threat. Despite Mr. Ahmadinejad's annual performance at the UN General Assembly,

the leadership in Tehran is rational and would be highly unlikely to actually deploy nuclear weapons. Doing so would ensure the obliteration of Iran, and the leadership in Tehran is eccentric, not suicidal. In September, Ahmadinejad offered to stop uranium enrichment
at 20 percent enrichment (90 percent is considered weapons grade) if Iran were guaranteed fuel for a medical research reactor. Yes, Iran has almost hit the nuclear capable mark, at which point it would possess the technical expertise and materials to move quickly to create a weapon. But if Iran manages to cross that threshold, it will be in the company of the estimated 40 states already in the nuclear capable club. Were the Iranians to gain capability and then to

arm, Washington would need to prepare for some muscle flexing not Armageddon. The
United States is also concerned that a nuclear capable Iran would be emboldened to further support Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist organizations in the region. But Israels superior conventional military (ranked 6th internationally in military expenditures),

nuclear weapons capability, and unwavering support from the United States would counterbalance any extremes on this front. Further, both Hamas and Hezbollah
hold elected positions. They may get military support from Iran, but Iran doesnt have the power to unilaterally dictate term s.

ProlifAT ME Arms Race

No Arms Race
Schramm 11-- program associate at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Madison, Hey America, Iran still isn't threat No. 1, 2k11, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/1012/Hey-AmericaIran-still-isn-t-threat-No.-1 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned that Iran will instigate an arms race, but the

arms race in the Middle East began in the 1960s when Israel armed. Since then, over half a dozen countries in the Middle East have sought nuclear capability, but Israel is the only country that has succeeded. A nuclear Iran could very well accelerate an arms race, but it could be contained. By leveraging US patronage to the region and continuing to supply Gulf states with conventional weapons, the US could dissuade other countries from joining the race.

No Middle East arms race.

Lindsay and Takeyh 10
James M Lindsay, Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. After Iran Gets the Bomb. Foreign Affairs. New York: Mar/Apr 2010. Vol. 89, Iss. 2; pg. 33. ProQuest. An Iranian nuclear bomb could change these calculations. The U.S. National Intelligence Council concluded in a 2008 report that "Iran's growing nuclear capabilities are already partly responsible for the surge of interest in nuclear energy in the Middle East." And nuclear energy programs can serve as the foundation for

drives for nuclear weapons. But it would not be easy for countries in the region to get nuclear weapons. Many lack the infrastructure to develop their own weapons and the missiles needed to deliver them. Egypt and Turkey might blanch at the expense of building a nuclear arsenal. The Pakistanis were willing to "eat grass" for the privilege of joining the nuclear club, as the Pakistani leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto once famously put it, but not everyone is. Cost considerations aside, it would take years for nuclear aspirants to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities. They would need to build nuclear reactors, acquire nuclear fuel, master enrichment or reprocessing technologies, and build weapons and the means to deliver them. While they tried, the United States and other states would have ample opportunity to increase the costs of proliferation. Indeed, the economic and security interests of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, unlike those of Iran, are tied to the United States and the broader global economy, and developing nuclear weapons would put those interests at risk. Egypt Would jeopardize the $1.5 billion
in economic and military aid that it receives from Washington each year; Saudi Arabia, its implicit U.S. security guarantee; and Turkey, its place in nato. Given their extensive investments in and business ties to the United States and Europe, all three countries would be far more vulnerable than Iran is to any economic sanctions that U.S. law imposed, or could impose, on nuclear proliferators. States seeking nuclear weapons might try to sidestep these technological

and political hurdles by buying, rather than making, the weapons. Saudi Arabia's clandestine
acquisition of medium-range ballistic missiles from China in the 1980s suggests that even countries that depend on U.S. security guarantees might be tempted to buy their way into the nuclear club. Although neither the five

acknowledged nuclear powers nor India would be likely to sell nuclear weapons to another state, Pakistan and North Korea could be another matter. Both countries have a history of abetting proliferation, and Pakistan has warm ties with its fellow Muslim-majority countries. But selling complete nuclear weapons would come at great political cost. Pakistan might forfeit U.S. foreign assistance and drive the United States into closer cooperation with India, Pakistan's mortal enemy. North Korea would endanger the economic aid it gets from China, which the regime needs to stay in power. If a buyer did manage to find a seller, it would have to avoid a preventive strike by Israel - which would be likely if the sale became known before the weapon was activated - and then handle the inevitable international political and economic fallout. (In 1988, Saudi Arabia avoided a major rift with Washington over its missile deal with China only by
finally agreeing to sign and abide by the npt.) Furthermore, any country that bought a nuclear weapon would have to worry about whether it would actually work; in global politics, as in everyday life, swindles are possible. Obtaining a

nuclear weapon could thus put a country in the worst of all worlds: owning a worthless weapon that
is a magnet for an attack.

ProlifAT Sanctions
The sanctions strategy should be abandonedleaders motivated by conservative domestic factions, sanctions entrench opposition
Takeyh and Maloney '11
Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at CFR and Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, "The Self-limiting success of Iran sanctions," International Affairs November 2011, available http://www.cfr.org/iran/self-limiting-success-iran-sanctions/p26715, AD 3/28/12 Economic sanctions are typically intended to influence both the cost benefit analysis of decision-makers and the ability of their government agencies to implement problematic policies. It seems self-evident that 30 years of American economic restrictions and broad export controls on military materiel have imposed functional constraints on Irans capacity to cause trouble in its region. But on the arguably more important plane of leadership choices, sanctions have thus far failed

to dissuade Tehran from pursuing its most objectionable policies, particularly its efforts to develop a vast nuclear infrastructure. During the tenures of Rafsanjani and Khatami, the Iranian approach to the world was
conditioned by tensions between pragmatism and revolutionary values.But it has undergone a marked change over the course of the past decade. Under the auspices of the Supreme Leader, a war generation with imperial ambitions

and an austere Islamism has come to power, redefining the parameters of Irans international relations and pressing its perceived advantages to their uppermost limits. Iran is well along the path to achieving a nuclear weapons capability while emerging as the most important state in the Middle East. As long as Iranian leaders perceive themselves to be under siege from a domestic insurrection orchestrated by their longstanding enemies, they may be reluctant, and less able, to negotiate in a serious and sustained fashion with the international community, particularly on the nuclear programmean issue that they have identified as critical to the security of the regime and the state. Moreover, regional developments are almost certainly undermining the ultimate objective of the Obama administrations approach, namely to pressurize or persuade Irans leader to bargain this nuclear programme away.
The current approach is minimally sufficient for dealing with Iran, in the sense that it has successfully impe ded Irans most problematic policies without actually generating much progress towards reversing them or altering the regimes political calculus. But without a viable endpoint, Washingtons strategy is simply too heavily reliant on

economic sanctions, a tool whose efficacy progressively declines, to resolve successfully the most urgent American concerns about Iranian policies. Even though the sanctions succeed on a purely economic basisthat is, in imposing significant costs on the regime and exacerbating public frustration over economic hardshipsthey appear to be backfiring by further entrenching Iranian intransigence . Under such
circumstances, the policy of economic sanctions as a means of producing reliable interlocutors must be reconsidered.

TerrorismNo Risk
Claims of an existential risk from terrorism are irrational
Fettweis, Professor of Political Science, 10
Chris, Professor of Political Science @ Tulane,Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival, 52:2 Conventional war, much less outright assault, is not the leading security challenge in the minds of most Americans today. Instead, irregular or non- state actors, especially terrorists, top the list of threats to the West since 11 September 2001. The

primary guiding principle of US foreign policymaking, for better or worse, is the continuing struggle against terrorism. President Bush repeatedly used the term Islamofascists to describe the enemy that he
re-oriented the US defence establishment to fight, transforming al-Qaeda from a ragtag band of lunatics into a threat to the republic itself. It is not uncommon for even sober analysts to claim that Islamic terrorists

present an existential threat to the United States, especially if they were ever to employ nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Perhaps it is Parkinsons Law that inspires some analysts to compare Islamic fundamentalists with the great enemies of the past, such as the Nazis or the Communists, since no rational analysis of their destructive potential would allow such a conclu- sion. Threat is a function of capabilities and intent; even if al-Qaeda has the intent to threaten the existence of the United States, it does not possess the capability to do so.

Terrorism doesnt pose an existential risk

Fettweis, Professor of Political Science, 10
Chris, Professor of Political Science @ Tulane,Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival, 52:2

Even terrorists equipped with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons would be incapable of causing damage so cataclysmic that it would prove fatal to modern states. Though the prospect of terrorists obtaining and using such weapons is one of the most consistently terrifying scenarios of the new era, it is also highly unlikely and not nearly as dangerous as sometimes portrayed . As the wellfunded, well-staffed Aum Shinrikyo cult found out in the 1990s, workable forms of weapons of mass destruction are
hard to purchase, harder still to synthesise without state help, and challenging to use effectively. The Japanese group managed to kill a dozen people on the Tokyo subway system at rush hour. While tragic, the attack was hardly

the stuff of apocalyptic nightmares. Super-weapons are simply not easy for even the most sophisticated non-state actors to use.31 If terror- ists were able to overcome the substantial obstacles and use the most destructive weapons in a densely populated area, the outcome would of course be terrible for those unfortunate enough to be nearby. But we should not operate under the illusion that doomsday would arrive. Modern industrialised countries can cope with disasters, both natural and man-made. As unpleasant as such events would be, they do not represent existential threats.

TerrorismAT Retal
Even Ayson concedes a terror attacks is unlikely and the response by Nations is just guessing.
Ayson 10 Centre for Strategic Studies @ Victoria University
Robert Ayson, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7 July 2010 , pages 571 593. InformaWorld It is just possible that a terrorist nuclear attack could catalyze an inter-state nuclear war. The likelihood of a

terrorist group gaining access to nuclear weapons is lower than some fear, and terrorists might not use a nuclear weapon as soon as they had acquired one. But if a terrorist group was to
explode a nuclear device in a country that was itself armed with nuclear weapons, and especially if that country was in a conflict-prone relationship with another nuclear-armed state, the broader consequences of even a single terrorist nuclear detonation could be much more serious than some assume. To consider what might follow the terrorist use

of a nuclear weapon upon an industrialized country, and especially on a country that is itself armed with nuclear weapons, is to engage a whole cosmos of uncertainties and assumptions. Moreover, in order to acquire a nuclear weapon in the first place, the terrorist group in question would need to surmount considerable hurdles. Having done so, the successful delivery and detonation of the nuclear device is no automatic process. And even once past this second set of obstacles, there remains a battery of questions, likelihoods, and interactions regarding what might happen once the world's first dramatic act of nuclear terrorism has occurred. It is all too easy, as Mueller has explained, for the discussion of catastrophic terrorism to descend into exaggeration and alarmism.1 But the strategic consequences of nuclear terrorism deserve attention for at least two
reasons. First, no matter how improbable, the terrorist use of a nuclear weapon could have even wider and more harmful implications than some might suppose. The detonation of a single weapon by a terrorist group could certainly be locally catastrophic in and of itself. But it is also important to consider whether that initial explosion might just spark a general nuclear exchange between states with much larger arsenals than the terrorists could ever hope to acquire and use. Either by accident or design is it possible that a terrorist nuclear detonation could ultimately result in a catastrophe of truly intercontinental proportions? Second, even though it is unclear whether these much graver developments have any real likelihood of occurring, the analytical consideration of this possibility presents an intellectual challenge that tests strategic imaginations, and that indicates that, at least in theory, even terrorists cannot escape the logic of the nuclear age. Before it considers the ways in which a terrorist nuclear detonation might just lead to such a wider strategic conflagration involving the arsenals of two or more of the world's nuclear weapons states, this article addresses the significant obstacles

standing in the way of the possession, deployment, and detonation of a nuclear weapon by a terrorist group. After considering the possible motivations behind these actions, it then canvasses the range of
responses that an attacked country might adopt following the initial nuclear explosion on its territory. These options span a spectrum from relative inaction to the substantial use of force and brings the article to the heart of the argument. Recalling early Cold War concern about the possibility of minor nuclear powers setting off a major exchange between the superpowers, the remainder of this preliminary study considers the possibility that a terrorist group might set off a wider nuclear exchange either inadvertently or by design.

Most likely response would be conventional 9/11 proves.

Ayson 10
Robert Ayson, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington. After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7 July 2010 , pages 571 593. InformaWorld.

Even if the actual perpetrators of the nuclear violence and any leaders of the terrorist group were identified and could be targeted militarily, it does not necessarily follow that such a reaction would need to be enormously violent. One possible option would be an attempt to seize the terrorist leadership alive and have them tried for crimes against humanity, even if some sort of retrospective international legal arrangements might be needed to cover the actions of a non-state group. Another option would be a surgical strike, including perhaps by the use of drones, if the attacked country still felt it
necessarily to highlight an asymmetry between the indiscriminate and illegitimate violence of the attackers and the carefully crafted response of the attacked country. Any violent action against states that had been harboring or assisting the terrorists might also be limited so as to protect the international reputation of the victim. The importance of limiting the use

of force might grow if there was some uncertainty about the identity of the attacking group and their state (and non-state) supporters, to reduce the political costs should that identification

later prove to have been erroneous. Alternatively if the terrorist group was thought to possess additional nuclear
weapons, some might counsel a cautious military response in case any violent response led to further attacks. However, one would expect this last argument to get fairly short shrift: few would want to be accused of appeasing proven nuclear terrorists. Of course the state victim of the nuclear attack might well decide to use much higher levels force against the terrorist group and any of its state supporters, (and especially if any of the latter were considered to have helped the group acquire the nuclear weapon that had been used). If the leadership of the terrorist group that authorized the attack were thought to be operating from a particular overseas location, one might expect aerial bombing and missile attacks, the deployment of a battle group task force offshore (depending on the geography) and then perhaps the insertion of larger numbers of regular forces. Of course, this begs the assumption that the state victim was a country such as the United States whose armed forces do have the global reach these options could require (although there is also the very real possibility that the United States might respond in this way even if it had not been the direct victim of the nuclear terrorist attack). Indeed, the precedent of the international response

to the 9/11 attacks suggests that a large international military coalition in support of the state victim could be organized reasonably quickly. But it is not obvious that this coalition would be presented with a carbon copy of the Al Qaeda-Taliban nexus as a readily available target for its mission. In any case, it is likely that a number of governments would want to join together in what would amount to a significant show of force.

*****China DA

***Neg

1NC
China economic influence in Latin America is gaining massive momentum but can still be disrupted
Sarmiento-Saher 13
Sebastian, China and Latin America: Big Business and Big Competition [http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china-and-latinamerica-big-business-and-big-competition/] March 14 //mtc Despite a slowdown in Chinas impressive economic growth, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) now ranks as the worlds second largest economy. A byproduct of this rapid expansion has been Chinas search for new

markets and resources to sustain its economic growth. While there has been much analysis of its activity in Africa and Central Asia, another region of growing importance for China is Latin America. It is not without serious challenges or difficulties that Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are gradually emerging as a region of stable economic development. Although LAC is not a single country, many of its independent states have an abundance of natural resources and emerging manufacturing and service sectors that are projected to achieve solid growth in the coming years. Latin Americas prospects have attracted serious attention, especially from Chinese firms and policymakers keen to benefit from growing opportunities and access to raw materials in LAC.
Under President Hu Jintao China deepened its ties with Latin American countries through initiatives like the 2008 AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Lima, Peru. Chinas new President, Xi Jinping, is also no stranger to the region after having made several state visits there as vice president. According to Barbara Stallings, Chinese exports

to Latin America grew substantially from U.S. $6.9 billion in 2000 to U.S. $69.7 billion in 2008; while LAC exports to China increased from U.S. $5.3 billion in 2000 to U.S. $70.3 billion in 2008. However, despite
these dramatic increases of 910 percent and 1,226 percent, the United States and the EU are still ahead of China in terms of trade flows with Latin America. China is quickly catching up to many of LACs traditional trading

partners, however. Already Chinas trade numbers with LAC have surpassed those of Japan, the previously dominant Asian trading partner for Latin America. What is most significant about these developments overall is how rapidly Chinese businesses and organizations have expanded their activity in the region a trend that continues to grow. In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI),
a study by Enrique Dussel Peters found that Latin America received 11.41 percent of total Chinese FDI from 2000-2011 making the region the second largest recipient of Chinese FDI behind only Hong Kong. Echoing the speed of the trade increases above, Chinese investment in Latin America jumped from 1 to 9 percent of total FDI in LAC from 2008 to 2010; thus making the PRC the third largest investor in Latin America behind only the Netherlands and the United States that year. These investments come in addition to massive loan credits which, according to a report by researchers at Tufts University, have topped U.S. $75 billion since 2005 and may account for approximately half of the PRCs lending abroad from 2009 2010. The results of this expanded Sino-Latin American economic relationship have been mixed. Much of the trade, investment, and loans from the PRC have been focused on the countries, companies, and infrastructure that underpin the extraction of natural resources and other commodities in the region. This has been good news for the large agricultural, mining, and energy industries of Latin America, as well as for countries like Chile and Venezuela. On the negative side, however, this has raised questions about Latin American dependence on resource exports and the specter of Dutch disease. Another adverse effect is the growing resentment among some Latin Americans in some sectors that have been increasingly displaced by Chinas industrial or manufacturing exports to LAC. Mexico has been among the hardest hit among countries in the Western hemisphere as its large industrial base has struggled to compete with Chinese manufacturing in a diminished, post-financial crisis U.S. market. Chinese exports to Mexico have also undercut indigenous industry and resulted in a substantial trade deficit. Chinas competitiveness has complicated the Sino-LAC honeymoon period in recent years. Most notably, Brazils government has been forced to manage a sensitive balancing act, fostering lucrative relations with China while addressing the frustration of Brazilian manufacturing industries that struggle against cheaper Chinese goods. Labor movements and environmental groups have also begun to take a stand against the extractive industries of countries like Peru and Chile, whose exports and growth are tied closely to the PRCs demand for resources. Despite these issues, recent external and internal developments may be creating an opportunity for the region to balance its growing economic relations with China. Notably, Chinas comparative advantage may be eroding due to increased

production costs and Beijings desire to lead its economy toward higher-end manufacturing and domestic consumption. If this trend continues, it would help beleaguered Mexico, whose security and political problems may finally start to improve and give Mexican industries a chance to compete on the global stage. Using targeted policies, other countries with manufacturing sectors may benefit from Chinas economic
restructuring. In terms of development overall, alarmism about China keeping LAC economies dependent on natural resources is overblown. As Latin America continues to grapple with deficits in infrastructure, education, and social mobility, the question about whether growing economic ties with the PRC will be a burden or a key opportunity lies in the actions of

Latin America, not China. The central issue is about governance: those countries that benefit over the long term from the current commodity boom will be the ones most judicious when it comes to future investments and industrial policy. Fighting corruption is difficult anywhere, and Latin America is no exception. As democracy deepens and middle classes emerge in the region, new stakeholders will hold governments accountable. As Latin America continues to develop,

China will undoubtedly play a significant role in its progress and advancement. There will continue to be cases of cooperation and competition between LAC countries and the PRC as their relations mature but as long each side has much to offer the other, the people of both Latin America and China have a lot to look forward to in the evolution of their South-South relations.

Plan shuts out Chinaeconomic relations in Latin America are zero sum
Watson 7strategy professor @ National War College
Cynthia, Chinas Presence in Latin America [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf] But, the inability of Washington to consider anything beyond the concerns about terrorism spreading around the world, and trying to salvage a peace of some sort without nuclear weapons in the Middle East, is having consequences for U.S. interests in other parts of the world. For cultural and geographic reasons, the ties between the United States and Latin

America ought to be stronger than those between China and the Latins. Expectations of the
strength of Latin AmericaU.S. ties have probably always been unrealistic and frankly ahistorical; the two parts of the world actually have a number of fundamental differences. But the distance between Latin Americas experiences and those of China are even vaster, ranging from religion to ethnic homogeneity to historical roles in the world. Washington must make

a more concerted effort to act as a genuine partner with the region, rather than relegating it to the position of secondary or tertiary thought that assumes absolute U.S. leadership. The United States and
China claim that each is serious about adopting the economic philosophy that undergirds capitalism: economic growth is a net benet for all, not a zero sum game. If true, China, Latin America, and the United States bene t from the greater Chines e engagement in this region because it creates competition. Pure economic theory, however, always runs up

against political philosophies, leading to trade con icts, protectionism, and all-too-often a zero sum view based on the international relations theory of realpolitik: whats good for my adversary must be bad for me. The risks of arousing realpolitik in the United States, particularly as the nation
faces increased frustration with the reality of the Middle East, is signi cant, probably more than the PRC bargained for whe n it began engaging more with Latin America over the past decade. It appears unlikely that Beijing will seriously accelerate its involvement in the region because of the number of Congressional hearings, public conferences and assessments, and other warnings alerting the United States to China having discovered Latin America. To accelerate its involvement would risk the relatively strong relations with Washington at a time when other trade problems and overall concerns about Chinas growing power are already rising in the United States. At the same time, Washingtons ability to focus equally on all area s of the world is not possible. With U.S. interests directed elsewhere, it seems highly likely that Beijing

will be able to maintain the level of involvement in the region it already has, without Washington
raising too great a ruckus. Indeed, Beijings best outcome from its current balance of involvement in the area is probably going to be the long-term development of trust and ties over several decades with the leaders of this region, rather than immediately creating crucial, highly public ties between itself and Latin American leaders. As so often appears true in the international system, probably the old tale of the tortoise and hare applies here, where Chinas biggest gain will be accomplished over a long time of getting to know the region, rather than showing up repeatedly in the rock star role which is too soon and too rash for a long-term, stable set of ties. Washington seems likely to worry about the rock star phenomenon, rather than attempting to manage the emergence of another state becoming a long-term partner with its Latin American neighbors.

Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy and regime stability preventing US influence key
Chinese influence key to the global economy and Chinese stability--

Ellis 11national security studies assistant professor @ the National Defense University
R Evan, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America [http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf] //mtc
Access to Latin American Markets. Latin

American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication
equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups

of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country
who could call President Chvez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of

China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by
Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China

has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the
course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chvez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the

PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur.The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the countrys sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, Chinas attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used against Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

Decline causes nuclear war Harris and Burrows 9

Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the

lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as
they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms

appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting organizational structures, command and
control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets

that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced

drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict
if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may

place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating

crises.

2NC UQChina Influence

Big Chinese plans for economic expansion in Latin America
Regenstreif 13
Gary, COLUMN - The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America [http://www.trust.org/item/20130612201137-eda5t] June 12 //mtc In Obama's first term, however, the administration was widely viewed as neglecting Latin

America. And China has moved in fast. China built its annual trade with the region from virtually nothing in 2000 to about $260 billion in 2012. In 2009, it overtook the United States as the
largest trading partner of Brazil, the region's powerhouse - largely through massive purchases of iron ore and soy. Other data is telling: In 1995, for example, the United States accounted for 37 percent of Brazil's foreign direct investment. That dropped to 10 percent in 2011, according to the Council of the Americas, which seeks to foster hemispheric ties. Washington's renewed ardor is at least partly because of the fear that China will repeat in Latin America the economic success it has built in Africa. China has been able to present itself as a benevolent partner there, which has played well against the West's history of meddling in domestic affairs. "It's about influence and leverage," said Eric Farnsworth, vice president of the Council of the Americas, " The region matured and expects to be treated in real partnership rather than [in the] patronizing way it happened in the past." The challenges facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each approaches the region. Washington confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional interference, stretching back to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing desire to mix business with policy - which muddies its approach to trade and investment. Washington's domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and a host of global crises, also serve as distractions that could keep its actions in Latin America from matching its words - as has happened before. China, meanwhile, is largely viewed in the region as unencumbered by ideology. It approaches opportunities almost exclusively on commercial terms there. Biden, in a May 29 speech in Rio de Janeiro, gushed about the progress made by Latin America and trumpeted the region's growing international stature. "In the U.S.," Biden said, "the discussion is no longer what it was when I was first elected as a young man: What could we do for the Americas? That's long since gone. The issue now is: What can we do together? We want to engage more. We think there's great opportunity. We're optimistic." As with many new starts, a recognition of past mistakes is in order. "For many in Brazil," Biden said, "the United States doesn't start with a clean slate. There's some good reason for that skepticism. That skepticism still exists and it's understandable. But the world has changed. We're moving past old alignments, leaving behind old suspicions and building new relationships." China has particular interest in Mexico, the region's

second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with Mexico City - investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms that would open the oil industry to foreign investment. There are obstacles ahead. One irritation that President Enrique Pe?a Nieto shared with Xi is that though Mexico posted a trade surplus with its global partners, it ran a big deficit with China. China is looking for even more however. It is eager to pursue a free trade agreement with Mexico, but Mexico City said last
week it was too soon. Meanwhile, Mexico's trade with the United States continues to flourish and it is due to displace Canada as the largest U.S. trade partner by the end of the decade, according to the Dialogue. China is also considering

joining negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, which aims to boost trade among the Americas, Asia and Australia. The talks include the United States, Canada and other major economies on the Pacific rim.

Chinas economic influence in Latin America is increasing

Menndez 13
Fernando, The Counterbalance in Americas Backyard [http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-counterbalance-inamericas-backyard-2/] May 28 //mtc In the early 15th century, Admiral Zheng He sailed the Indian Ocean as far as east Africa in ships said to dwarf those of Europe at the time. The voyages were meant to make the world aware of Chinas greatness, superiority and presence. Likewise, Chinas current expanding economic presence in Latin America is raising

awareness of its potential role as a counter-weight in a region long designated as Americas backyard. At least four critical factors are discernable in analyzing Chinas rise in Latin America since 2000. First, Chinas expanding economy, averaging ten percent growth per year, has created enormous worldwide demand for natural resources and commodities. The countries of Latin America, long enjoying comparative advantages in commodity exports, have reaped benefits from the high prices China pays for soybeans, cooper, iron ore, petroleum and other products. Second, as Chinas global trade expanded, its bilateral trade with the region exploded at an annual rate of 40 percent since 2003. According to a Latin Business Chronicle analysis of data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Chinese
exports to Latin America surged to $88.3 billion in 2010, by 62 percent, while imports increased to $90.3 billion, tracking a

42 percent gain. Last year, China began supplanting the U.S. as top trading partner of several countries in the region. In contrast, U.S. exports to Latin America have dropped from 55 percent of the regions total imports in 2000 to 32 percent in 2009, according to United Nations figures. By 2014 it is estimated that China will overtake the European Union as the second largest trade partner in the Americas. Third, Chinas vast financial resources have allowed it to

provide loans for infrastructure projects guaranteeing the flow of commodities. According to
journalists Henry Sanderson and Michael Forsythe, in their new book Chinas Superbank, China Development Bank (CDB) commands nearly a trillion dollars in assets and its total loans reach $876 billion. Increasing amounts of those loans are being allocated overseas, mainly to help develop infrastructure in Africa and Latin America. Bridges, ports, airports,

roads and railroads are being constructed to insure the flow of vital resources fueling the vibrant Chinese economy. Finally, as China spreads its cash around the region, its firms are making headway into Latin American markets. CDB loans are often tied to contracts with Chinese companies. For
instance, Chinas largest power supplier, State Grid Corp., has contracted to build power transmission facilities in Caracas, Venezuela, and ZTE, a telecommunications firm, is building an offshore underwater cable. In Venezuela, Chinese companies represent fully one fourth of CDBs lending to that country or about $11.6 billion.

China engagement increasing quickly

Xiaoyang 13
Chen, A New Chapter on China-Latin American Cooperation [http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/a-new-chapter-onchina-latin-american-cooperation/] June 1 //mtc

In the past few years, China-Latin America relations have registered much faster growth, with frequent exchanges of high-level visit, higher positions of the other side in each others strategy, extended Chinese strategic partnership with Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Venezuela and Mexico and adoption by multiple Latin American countries of a China strategy or Asia Pacific strategy in which China is the focus of attention. Furthermore, the Chinese and Latin American economies are high complementary. China is now the second largest trading partner of and a leading source of investment in Latin America. It is the largest trading partner of Brazil and Chile. Even amidst European debt crisis and global economic downturn, trade between China and Latin America has grown fairly rapidly. In 2012, bilateral trade reached 261.2 billion US dollars, an 8.1% increase year-on-year. China has signed free trade agreements with Chile, Peru and Costa Rica. Bilateral economic exchanges are moving from trade-dominated to greater balance between trade and investment. Cooperation has also expanded into the fields of agriculture, science and technology, aerospace and humanities. Cooperation mechanism has been improved innovatively by ways of earmarked funds
and forums. In global affairs, the two sides have made use of APEC meetings, BRICS summits, G20 summits and UN Conference on Sustainable Development to exchange views and coordinate positions. It is particularly eye-catching that since the new Chinese leadership took office high-level exchanges with Latin America have been even more frequent. In April, Xi met Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto and Peruvian President Ollanta Humala Tasso at the Boao Forum for Asia. In May, President Jose Mujica of Uruguay had a successful visit to China. Built on a decade of rapid expansion of China-Latin America relations, President Xis visit will certainly create a new momentum for bilateral cooperation.

2NC UQAT US Engagement Increasing

US economic engagement claims are just rhetoric
Padgett 13
Tim, Why China Is Behind Fresh U.S. Moves In Latin America [http://wlrn.org/post/why-china-behind-fresh-us-moves-latinamerica] May 27//mtc There are of course skeptics. I asked Robert Pastor, a former White House national security

advisor for Latin America and now an international relations professor at American University in Washington, D.C., if he thinks the U.S. is doing enough to keep itself relevant in the Americas. No its not, he says. President Obamas trip (to Mexico and Central America) is a good first step, but he needs to do a lot more to open up and show Americas interest in re-engaging with the rest of South America. Pastor has a point: for decades, Latin America has heard a lot of rhetoric from the U.S. about engagement -- the kind Biden offered the Council of the Americas in Washington recently,
when he declared that the hemisphere matters more (to the U.S.) today because it has more potential than any time in American history.

2NC Link
Renewed US economic engagement undercuts Chinas influence
Ghallager 13
Kevin, U.S. running out of time to reset Latin American economic approach [http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/economy/economy-lab/us-running-out-of-time-to-reset-latin-american-economic-approach/article12420989/] June 7 //mtc The Obama administration and U.S. media have made much ado about the U.S. pivot to Asia. What has largely

escaped their attention, however, is that China has been lining up economic allies in the erstwhile backyard of the United States. Just as serious competition ought to awaken ones creative juices in business, it is time for the United States to step up a suitable economic policy for Latin America before it is too late. The difference in approaches by the United States and China in Latin America were brought into focus this past
week, when U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping made tours of Latin America. The United Statess principal offer to its Latin American neighbours is the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The TPP offers access to the U.S. market to Latin American and Asian nations, on the basis of a triple form of conditions. First, they must deregulate their financial markets; second, adopt intellectual property provisions that give preferences to U.S. firms; and third, allow private U.S. firms to directly sue governments of countries that sign up to the TPP for violating any of its conditions. Talk about a heavily conditioned offer. So whats the Chinese approach? On his visit to the region, Chinas President Xi Jinping offered more than $5.3-billion (U.S.) in financing, with few conditions attached, to its new-found Latin American friends. These offers will need to be confirmed, but according to press reports, the Chinese have signed deals on this trip for: $3-billion in commitments to eight Caribbean countries for infrastructure and energy; $1.3-billion to Costa Rica in loans and lines of credit, including a $900-million loan from the Chinese Development Bank for upgrading a petroleum refinery and a $400million line of credit for road infrastructure from the Chinese Ex-Im Bank; and A $1-billion credit line from the China ExIm bank to Mexico for its state-owned oil company PEMEX. Making available this financing comes on top of the $86billion in financing already provided by China to Latin American governments since 2003. To put it into proper perspective, consider this: Since 2003, Chinas policy banks have provided more finance t o Latin America than their counterparts at the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the U.S. Export-Import Bank. If anything ought to awaken the United States from its past slumber and its taking Latin America essentially for granted, that comparison ought to do it. Simply put, the United States and the array of largely Western-dominated international financial institutions have been outgunned by Chinas financial muscle. Welcome to the brave new world. But its not just a matter of sheer numbers. Unlike U.S. trade treaties or the finance from the international financial institutions largely under U.S. control, China offers up its loans come with few strings attached. In a region that is understandably very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the IMF and the World Bank, China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditions. That said, the Chinese dont lack a strong commercial focus. Often the Chinese provide a tied offer requiring that Chinese firms will be hired to conduct a bulk of the envisioned project work. What is more, the U.S. offer of a Trans-Pacific Partnership to all of the Latin American countries in the TPP process doesnt amount to much in the real world. They already have tr ade treaties with the United States that grant them access to the U.S. market. In just a few years, China has become the number one (in the case of Brazil and Chile) or number two trading partner (for Peru and Mexico). These arent just any countries. They are the most important economies in Latin America. Of course, the United States is still the most important economic partner for the region overall. However, it cannot continue to take the region for granted. For too long, the United

States has relied on a rather imperial mechanism just telling Latin America what it needs. Compare that with Chinas approach: It offers Latin America what it wants (in the form of
financing and trade from China). When President Obama took office, he and his team pledged to hit the reset button with the region and rethink its trade regime with Latin America. It hasnt worked out that way. Thus far, reset has essentially mean t making the same old offer, but via new faces. In addition, too much of the interaction with regional governments has been on such efforts as concentrating on drug interdiction. Those countries rightfully dont see that as much of a growth -enhancing development approach, but rather as a foreign-based, defensive mechanism to protect the U.S. homeland. It is high time

for the U.S. government to undertake a true rethink of its economic policy toward Latin America. Very soon, it may be too late.

US economic engagement with Latin America cuts of Chinese access

Pham 10
Peter, China's Strategic Penetration of Latin America: What It Means for U.S. Interests. American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 32 Issue 6, p363-381 (Nov/Dec) //mtc All of this led to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton telling an audience of Foreign Service officers during a town hall meeting at the State Department last year that she

found the gains that China was making in Latin America quite disturbing. She went on to add, I mean they are building very strong eco- nomic and political connections ... . I dont think thats in our interest. 85 How then, in the face of Chinas growing commercial and political relationships across the region, might American interests be secured and, indeed, advanced?
First, U.S. policymakers need to acknowl- edge that Americas Latin American and Caribbean neighbors matter to the

United States not only for its traditional security inter- est in limiting the influence of outside powers in the Americas but also because globalization has accelerated the momentum for the increased integration of all of the nations in the Western Hemisphere and regional cooperation is required to meet a whole host of transnational challenges ranging from spur- ring economic growth to illegal immigration to narcotics trafficking to environmental issues. Hence it is in the interests

of the United States to renew relations with the countries to its south by developing and articulating a compre- hensive strategy that clearly puts to rest the legacy of benign neglect of the region. Second, rather than lament the passing of an era when the United States unilaterally dic-
tated the terms of engagement with its Latin American neighbors, the fact that the region is shaping its future far more than it shaped its past 86 ought to be welcomed. Engaging Latin American governments and peoples on mutu- ally agreeable terms is by far a more sustainable foundation for what ought to be the goals of U.S. policy in the region: the stability, security, and, ultimately, prosperity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. When the trends to greater ownership by the countries of the region of their own individual destinies are added to the limitations that the current fiscal crisis and the burdens of other challenges impose upon U.S. policy, it becomes apparent that American interests are best advanced by more modest expectations and better targeting of available resources. In its engagements with its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors, the United States should privilege building institutional capacity over the mere provision of aid. Third, despite Chinas efforts to secure access to Latin Americas natural resources and markets, the region remains an important source of energy and other commodities for the United States as well as a major market for American goods and services. About 25 percent of U.S. energy imports come from Central and South American countries and the region buys 20 percent of all of U.S. exports, more than the European Union. Thanks to proximity as well as longstanding familiarity, U.S. businesses still have a comparative advantage over over- seas

competitors in the markets of the Western Hemisphere. 87 Thus the administration must recommit itself to building on those solid foundations to reinforce and expand Americas economic ties with its neighbors to the south. In his 2010 State of the Union address, Presi- dent Obama
singled out Colombia and Panama as key partners with which he promised to strengthen trade relations. 88 Yet absent proac- tive White House leadership, the free trade agreements with those two countries have still not been ratified, while the North American Free Trade Agreement that came into force under President Bill Clinton was undermined by last years enactment of a measure canceling a pilot program that allowed carefully screened Mexican trucks to carry cargo in the United States. Movement to repeal U.S. tariffs on Brazilian ethanol and to settle a dispute over cotton subsidies with the South American giant would not only promote trade but would also clear the air between Washington and Brasilia, especially since the World Trade Organization has already ruled the subsidies illegal and, in a rare move, authorized the imposition of puni- tive sanctions against American products.

2NC I/LLatin America K/T China Econ

Access to Latin America key to sustain Chinese growthraw resources and exports
Ferchen 12resident scholar @ Carnegie
Matt, Chinas Latin American Interests [http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latin-american-interests/a7av] April 6 //mtc China-Latin America relations, especially economic ties, have boomed in the last decade. Between 2000 and 2010 China-Latin America trade expanded over 1,500 percent, and between 2008 and 2010 alone Chinas investment in the region expanded more than 180 percent. This boom in economic relations has been primarily driven by

strong Chinese demand for South American mineral, agricultural, and energy resources like copper, iron ore, soybeans, and oil. At the same time, Latin America has become an important destination for increasing amounts of Chinese manufactured-good exports ranging from modems to motorcycles.

2NC MPXEconAT No Escalation

Accesses all great power hotspots
Green and Schrage 9 Senior Advisor and Japan Chair @ CSIS and Associate Professor @ Georgetown University AND
CSIS School Chair in International Business and Former Senior Official with the US Trade Representatives Office (Michael J. and Steven P., Its not just the economy, State Department and Ways & Means Committee, Asia Times, 3/26, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/asian_economy/kc26dk01.html Facing the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, analysts at the World Bank and the US Central Intelligence Agency are just beginning

to contemplate the ramifications for international stability if there is not a recovery in the next year. For the most part, the focus has been on fragile states such as some in Eastern Europe. However, the Great Depression taught us that a downward global economic spiral can even have jarring impacts on great powers . It is no mere coincidence that the last great global economic downturn was followed by the most destructive war in human history. In the 1930s, economic desperation helped fuel autocratic regimes and protectionism in a downward economicsecurity death spiral that engulfed the world in conflict. This spiral was aided by the preoccupation of the United States and other leading nations with economic troubles at home and insufficient attention to working with other powers to maintain stability abroad. Today's challenges are different, yet 1933's London Economic Conference, which failed to stop the drift toward deeper depression and world war, should be a cautionary tale for leaders heading to next month's London Group of 20 (G-20) meeting. There is no question the US must urgently act to address banking issues and to restart its economy. But the lessons of the past suggest that we will also have to keep an eye on those fragile threads in the international system that could begin to unravel if the financial crisis is not reversed early in the Barack Obama administration and realize that economics and security are intertwined in most of the critical challenges we face. A disillusioned rising power? Four areas in Asia merit particular attention, although so far the current financial crisis has not changed Asia's fundamental strategic picture. China is not replacing the US as regional hegemon, since the leadership in Beijing is too nervous about the political implications of the financial crisis at home to actually play a leading role in solving it internationally. Predictions that the US will be brought to its knees because China is the leading holder of US debt often miss key points. China's currency controls and full employment/export-oriented growth strategy give Beijing few choices other than buying US Treasury bills or harming its own economy. Rather than creating new rules or institutions in international finance, or reorienting the Chinese economy to generate greater long-term consumer demand at home, Chinese leaders are desperately clinging to the status quo (though Beijing deserves credit for short-term efforts to stimulate economic growth). The greater danger with China is not an eclipsing of US leadership, but instead the kind of shift in strategic orientation that happened to Japan after the Great Depression. Japan was arguably not a revisionist power before 1932 and sought instead to converge with the global economy through open trade and adoption of the gold standard. The worldwide depression and protectionism of the

1930s devastated the newly exposed Japanese economy and contributed directly to militaristic and autarkic policies in Asia as the Japanese people reacted against what counted for globalization at the time. China today is similarly converging with the global economy, and many experts believe China needs
at least 8% annual growth to sustain social stability. Realistic growth predictions for 2009 are closer to 5%. Veteran China hands were watching closely when millions of migrant workers returned to work after the Lunar New Year holiday last month to find factories closed and jobs gone. There were pockets of protests, but nationwide unrest seems unlikely this year, and Chinese leaders are working around the clock to ensure that it does not happen next year either. However, the economic slowdown has only just begun and nobody is certain how it will impact the social contract in China between the ruling communist party and the 1.3 billion Chinese who have come to see President Hu Jintao's call for "harmonious society" as inextricably linked to his promise of "peaceful development". If the Japanese example is any precedent, a sustained economic slowdown has the potential to open a dangerous path from economic nationalism to strategic revisionism in China too. Dangerous states It is noteworthy that North Korea, Myanmar and Iran have all intensified their

defiance in the wake of the financial crisis, which has distracted the world's leading nations, limited their moral authority and sown potential discord. With Beijing worried about the potential impact of
North Korean belligerence or instability on Chinese internal stability, and leaders in Japan and South Korea under siege in parliament because of the collapse of their stock markets, leaders in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang have

grown increasingly boisterous about their country's claims to great power status as a nuclear weapons state. The junta in Myanmar has chosen this moment to arrest hundreds of political dissidents and thumb its nose
at fellow members of the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Iran continues its nuclear program while exploiting differences between the US, UK and France (or the P-3 group) and China and Russia - differences that could become more pronounced if economic friction with Beijing or Russia crowds out cooperation or if Western European governments grow nervous about sanctions as a tool of policy. It is possible that the economic downturn will make these dangerous states more pliable because of falling fuel prices (Iran) and greater need for foreign aid (North Korea and Myanmar), but that may depend on the extent that authoritarian leaders care about the well-being of their people or face internal political pressures linked to the economy. So far, there is little evidence to suggest either and much

evidence to suggest these dangerous states see an opportunity to advance their asymmetrical advantages against the international system. Challenges to the democratic model The trend in East Asia has been for developing economies to steadily embrace democracy and the rule of law in order to sustain their national success. But to thrive, new democracies also have to deliver basic economic growth. The economic crisis has hit democracies hard, with Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro's approval
collapsing to single digits in the polls and South Korea's Lee Myung-bak and Taiwan's Ma Ying Jeou doing only a little better (and the collapse in Taiwan's exports - particularly to China - is sure to undermine Ma's argument that a more accommodating stance toward Beijing will bring economic benefits to Taiwan). Thailand's new coalition government has an uncertain future after two years of post-coup drift and now economic crisis. The string of old and new democracies in East Asia has helped to anchor US relations with China and to maintain what former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice once called a "balance of power that favors freedom". A reversal of the democratic expansion of the past two decades would

not only impact the global balance of power but also increase the potential number of failed states, with all the attendant risk they bring from harboring terrorists to incubating pandemic diseases and trafficking in persons. It would also undermine the demonstration effect of
liberal norms we are urging China to embrace at home.

2NC MPXEconRoyal
Statistical evidence supports our impact
Royal 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense
Jedediah, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises?, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215 Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external

conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and
the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are

associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately,
Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits

from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined to use force to gain
access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn

internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. 'Diversionary theory' suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg,
Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are

statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such, the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

2NC AT MPX TurnChinese Aggression

China not using Latin America as a political cardonly for economic growth
Shixue 11
Jiang, The U.S. Factor in Sino-Latin American Relations [http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-worry-factor-insino-latin-american-relations/] November 3 //mtc The U.S. concerns are unnecessary and unfounded. First, both China and Latin America

have been opening to the outside world. In the age of globalization, both should cooperate to promote SouthSouth collaboration. As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This outcome would certainly be welcomed by the United States. Second, it is well-known that Latin America has been implementing reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market to stimulate growth. As a result, China is only one of the economic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with. Third, Chinas relations with Latin America are for economic purposes, not for political outcomes to be used against the U.S. China well understands that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so there is no need for it to challenge American influence. Fourth, Chinas cooperation with Latin America in military and security fields is not targeting any third party and it is hardly a secret issue. Chinas first policy paper on Latin America, published in November 2008,
openly set aside one section to deal with the issue. It said: The Chinese side will actively carry out military exchanges an d defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries. Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides, as well as personnel exchanges, will be enhanced. Moreover, Chinas military relations

with Latin America are undertaken according to the following principles: 1) to gain better understanding of the
Latin American military; 2) to improve professional expertise by learning from each other; 3) never target any third party; and 4) never harm regional and hemispheric stability. These principles are not counter to

U.S. national interest and dominance in the western hemisphere. Finally, China does not wish to be used as a card against the United States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin American relations.

2NC AT MPX TurnAmazon

No risk of offenseamazon will just regenerate
WND 9
1/31/09 (World Net Daily, pg. http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=87552) Moore explains that, in the 20 years of warnings about deforestation, "only 10 percent of the Amazon has been converted to date from what was original forest to agriculture and settlement." The report also tells the story of miners,

who in 1982 cleared a large tract of land in Western Brazil. Once finished, they hired scientists to reforest the territory. Studies done 15 years later showed that the rejuvenated forest is virtually indistinguishable from its original form and 95 percent of the original animal species returned. Brazilian Brigadier Gen. Thaumaturgo Sotero Vaz, who spent 39 years in the military, 18 of them in the heart of the Amazon, finds it humorous that anyone would doubt the jungle's ability to recover. "That's very funny," he says. "They don't know the Amazon, believe me. Because all these lands in the north, west, it's almost untouchable because of this great capacity of regeneration," he explains. The
Times report attributes much of the newly recognized, spontaneous secondary growth to farmers who have moved from rural areas on the edges of the forests to settlements and cities. The forests, in turn, have reclaimed the land the

farmers had once cleared.

2NC AT MPX TurnUS China Relations

Squo bilateral talks prevent any misperceptions
Haibin 13Research Fellow @ Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
Niu, Latin Americas Rising Status in the Sino-US Relationship [http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/latin-americas-risingstatus-in-the-sino-us-relationship/] June 23 //mtc In fact, both countries demonstrated their pragmatic spirit and economic-oriented approach

during their recent engagements with Latin America. The most cited achievement about President Xi's
visit to Mexico was that China agreed to resume imports of Mexican pork and to import tequila. Similar review was also given to President Obamas visit to Mexico by arguing the trip was to focus on economic cooperation rather than drug issues. This is a good posture considering that no Latin American country wants to choose side between the US and China. Ultimately, Latin American countries benefit from cooperation with the worlds two largest markets. Although both countries are trying to avoid geopolitical competition, it is important to manage their interaction in Latin America. At the

bilateral level, the United States and China have held several strategic dialogues on Latin American affairs since 2006. The purpose of the dialogue is to enhance mutual trust and prevent miscalculations by interpreting their engagements with Latin America. This continual dialogue can help interpret why the US government holds a positive attitude to Chinas increasing ties with Latin America despite some very conservative and suspicious attitudes in the US. The US has showed its support to both Chinas permanent observer status in the Organization of American States and Chinas membership at the InterAmerican Development Bank.

2NC AT MPX TurnUS China War

No US China war deterrence checks
Glaser 11
(Charles, Professor of PoliSci and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies @ George Washington University, Will Chinas Rise Lead to War? March/April Foreign Affairs) What does all this imply about the rise of China? At the broadest level, the news is good. Current international

conditions should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other. Nuclear weapons make it relatively easy for major powers to maintain highly effective deterrent forces. Even if Chinese power were to greatly exceed U.S. power somewhere down the road, the United States would still be able to maintain nuclear forces that could survive any Chinese attack and threaten massive damage in retaliation. Largescale conventional attack by China against the U.S. homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United States and China are separated by the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, across which it would be difficult to attack. No foreseeable increase in Chinas power would be large enough to overcome these twin advantages of defense for the United States. The same defensive advantages, moreover, apply to China as well. Although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon be able to build a nuclear force that meets its requirements for deterrence. And China should not find the United States massive conventional
capabilities especially threatening, because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics, and support lie across the Pacific. The overall effect of these conditions is to greatly moderate the security dilemma. Both the United States

and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through any potential rise of China to superpower status. This should help Washington and Beijing avoid truly strained geopolitical
relations, which should in turn help ensure that the security dilemma stays moderate, thereby facilitating cooperation. The United States, for example, will have the option to forego responding to Chinas modernization of its nuclear force. This

restraint will help reassure China that the United States does not want to threaten its security - and thus help head off a downward political spiral fueled by nuclear competition.

Economic interdependence checks

Perry and Scowcroft 9
William (Michael and Barbara Berberian professor at Stanford University.) and Brent (resident trustee of the Forum for International Policy.) US Nuclear Weapons Policy. 2009. Council on Foreign Relations. Online.

Economic interdependence provides an incentive to avoid military conflict and nuclear confrontation. Although the United States has expressed concern about the growing trade deficit with China, the economies of the two countries have become increasingly intertwined and interdependent. U.S. consumers have bought massive quantities of cheap Chinese goods, and Beijing has lent huge amounts of money to the United States. Similarly, Taiwan and the mainland are increasingly bound in a reciprocal economic relationship. These economic relationships should reduce the probability of a confrontation between China and Taiwan, and keep the United States and China from approaching the nuclear brink, were such a confrontation to occur. On other nuclear issues, China and the United States have generally supported each other, as they did in the sixparty talks to dismantle North Koreas nuclear weapons programs. Here, the supportive Beijing-Washington relationship points toward potentially promising dialogues on larger strategic issues.

***Aff

AffUQChina Engagement Decreasing

China losing economic influence in Latin America
Tulchin 13
Joseph, Chinas appeal in Latin America weakens [http://www.worldreview.info/content/chinas-appeal-latin-america-weakens] June 4 //mtc The important market for China, however, was in South America involving Chinese direct investment in the exploitation of oil, infrastructure, and in the exchange of manufactured goods or loans on favourable terms for commodities. But China has fallen out of favour in the last few years. Almost none of the

megadeals announced with great fanfare with Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and other countries has materialised, particularly as prices of commodities on the international market have levelled off and some, including copper, have fallen over the past two years. Only Ecuador has benefited, with loans from China in return for the sale of large amounts of oil. The downside for Ecuador is that China has become Ecuadors principal creditor, holding sovereign debt worth 25 per cent of the nations GDP. Chinas deal with Brazil, where enormous quantities of grain was bought on favourable terms on the condition that the Brazilian market would be open to Chinese manufactured goods, became complicated as they ran into political problems, with Brazils domestic manufacturing sector demanding greater protection from Chinese competition. Argentina is the most striking example of disillusionment with China. The Argentines saw China as an
easy way to re-establish their position in world affairs during the 2003-2007 government of the late President Nestor Kirchner, husband of the current President Cristina Kirchner. Politically significant infrastructure projects were negotiated with the Chinese, including a bullet train linking the city of Buenos Aires with the interior capitals of Rosario and Cordoba. But the project was never started. The project to replace the subway cars in Buenos Aires was accomplished only as a straight market deal, with no discounts and no loans. A senior official in the Argentine ministry of commerce suggested in a recent interview that the Argentine government had lost its enthusiasm for deals with the Chinese. This

disillusionment with China complicates matters for the nations of Latin America. As the
Chinese economy slows, it buys less. This has put significant downward pressure on the international price of commodities as diverse as soy and oil. The result is less money for governments, such as Venezuela and Argentina, which rely on commodity export windfalls to pay for their social programmes. Failure to complete so many large infrastructure projects in Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina and Peru has also fuelled growing disillusionment with China. It is forcing countries

to rethink their strategic plans and to re-engage with the United States and European countries.

AffUQUS Engagement Increasing

The administration is increasing Latin American economic engagement in the squo
Goodman 13
Joshua, Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/biden-circlesxi-as-u-s-duels-china-for-latin-america-influence.html] May 29 //mtc Bidens tour, which began May 26 in Colombia, included a frank and at times brutal discussion about

trade, economic growth and security with 15 Caribbean leaders in Trinidad yesterday, Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said, without giving more details. The leaders signed an accord to boost investment and economic cooperation. Our country is deeply invested and wants to be more deeply invested in the region, Biden said in Port of Spain. Yesterdays accord will give us all a vehicle to overcome special, specific, practical barriers to trade and investment. Our goal is not simply growth, but growth that reaches everyone. In Colombia, Biden said a one-year-old free-trade agreement between the two countries is just the beginning, citing
a doubling of the period for which entry visas are valid and efforts to expand trade ties further.

AffNo LinkAT Zero Sum

Latin America influence not a zero sum gameboth countries admit
Global Times 13
China, US not competing over Latin America: expert [http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UcTMEesTF-U] May 31//mtc

Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a
good thing for Latin America.

AffMPX TurnAmazon
China economic engagement creates unsustainable economic cycles and destroys the Amazon
Ghallager 13
Kevin, Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon [http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon] May 30 //mtc But there are risks. While the Chinese do not attach policy conditions to their loans, they have required

that borrowers contract Chinese firms, buy Chinese equipment, and sometimes sign oil sale agreements that require nations to send oil to China in exchange for the loans instead of local currency. Chinese investment accentuates the deindustrialisation of Latin America. Large scale, capital intensive commodities production is not very employment-intensive, nor does it link well with other sectors of an economy. Dependence on commodities can cause a "resource curse" where the exchange rate appreciates such that exporters of manufacturing and services industries can't compete in world markets and thus contribute to deindustrialisation and economic vulnerability. Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental risk. Many of China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's most environmentally sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and
the Andean highlands, conflict over natural resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods have been rife for decades.

The Amazon is reaching a tipping point collapse causes extinction

Gatto 8
Tim. 4/25/8. http://agonist.org/timgatto/20080425/the_tipping_point_and_critical_mass_are_we_there_yet. Just how many issues are facing critical mass while lingering at the tipping point? The way I see it, the

volume of critically important decisions that must be made, and made soon, dwarfs any other period I have seen in my lifetime. The facts are that issues, problems and crisis are merging together to make a perfect storm that will affect the entire human race, sparing no one. While this may appear to be frightening to many, because of the threats that these issues pose to humanity, they cannot be ignored, and not dealing with these problems is no longer an option. These issues threaten our very existence as a species. Just what are these issues that are such a threat to mankinds continued existence? While many people and governments attempt to remain blithely
ignorant of the situation, global climate change threatens to destroy upwards to half of all species of life on this planet. The irresponsible behavior of mankind towards the Earth is criminal in nature. The Amazon rain forest, which

supplies twenty percent of the planets oxygen as well as removing nearly the same amount of carbon dioxide, is being destroyed at a rate which translates to an area the size of Belgium, being destroyed yearly. The Amazon rainforest which can be likened to the lungs of our planet can never be replaced. The discharge of fresh water from the mouth of this largest of rivers, makes up twenty percent of the fresh water discharged into the oceans. In fact, one minute of fresh water discharge from the Amazon into the Atlantic could provide New York City with its entire water needs for sixty years. The habitat of plants that havent yet been discovered, plants that could contain medicinal properties and cure disease, are being destroyed before scientists can evaluate their properties and possible uses. Once a species is gone from the Earth, it is gone forever. In this regard, there is no second chance.

AffMPX TurnUS-China War

Strong China influence in Latin America causes US-China war
Menndez 13
Fernando, The Counterbalance in Americas Backyard [http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-counterbalance-inamericas-backyard-2/] May 28 //mtc Chinas foreign policy has long sought stable and positive relations with the U.S. in order to ensure optimal conditions for domestic economic growth. Economic considerations often proved paramount to its foreign policy, avoiding tensions where possible. Nevertheless, as China projects itself in the Americas, conflicts with the United States are

likely. As the U.S. loses market share, faces higher costs for raw materials, as American investors find fewer opportunities, and especially if Latin American nations try to entangle China in regional tensions, U.S. political and military moves in East Asia may raise Chinas cost of doing business in the Americas. Similarly, perceived or actual ties between some Chinese companies and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) will undoubtedly raise concerns from Americas national security apparatus. So far the rise of China and its growing stature in Latin America has not upset the prevailing paradigm in the continent. China still has a long way to go to displace U.S. power and influence. Nevertheless, the speed and enormity of
Chinas entry suggests a period of profound change and uncertainty. It must have seemed that way to those who first saw Admiral Zhengs fleet off the coastline.

US-China war goes global interdependence doesnt check

Feffer 9
John. Co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus. 3/24/9. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/the-next-cold-war_b_178589.html. But the naval confrontation in the South China Sea could be the most dangerous indication

of them all. For all their senseless violence, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan remain regional wars. A confrontation between China and the United States, however unlikely it might seem given the economic interdependence of the two countries, would necessarily be global. Let's hope that these two imperial boats passing in the night manage to negotiate an equitable distribution of global
power with more aplomb than they showed earlier this month.

AffAT MPXEcon
Dense economic linkages make conflict impossible
Jervis 11 Professor of Political Science @ Columbia
Robert, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, Force in Our Times, Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403 -425 Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a

worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable .

Empirical studies show no causal relationship between economic decline and war
Miller 1 prof of economics
Morris Miller 2001, Professor of Economics, Poverty: A Cause of War?, http://archive.peacemagazine.org/v17n1p08.htm Library shelves are heavy with studies focused on the correlates and causes of war. Some of the leading scholars in that field suggest that we drop the concept of causality, since it can rarely be demonstrated. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to look at the motives of war-prone political leaders and the ways they have gained and maintained power, even to the point of leading their nations to war. Poverty: The Prime Causal Factor? Poverty is most

often named as the prime causal factor. Therefore we approach the question by asking whether poverty is characteristic of the nations or groups that have engaged in wars. As we shall see, poverty has never been as significant a factor as one would imagine. Largely this is because of the traits of the poor as a group - particularly their tendency to tolerate their suffering in silence and/or be deterred by the force of repressive regimes. Their voicelessness and powerlessness translate into passivity. Also, because of their illiteracy and ignorance of worldly affairs, the poor become susceptible
to the messages of war-bent demagogues and often willing to become cannon fodder. The situations conductive to war involve political repression of dissidents, tight control over media that stir up chauvinism and ethnic prejudices, religious fervor, and sentiments of revenge. The poor succumb to leaders who have the power to create such conditions for their own self-serving purposes. Desperately poor people in poor nations cannot organize wars, which are exceptionally costly. The

statistics speak eloquently on this point. In the last 40 years the global arms trade has been about $1500 billion, of which two-thirds were the purchases of developing countries. That is an amount roughly equal to the foreign capital they obtained through official development aid (ODA).
Since ODA does not finance arms purchases (except insofar as money that is not spent by a government on aid-financed roads is available for other purposes such as military procurement) financing is also required to control the media and communicate with the populace to convince them to support the war. Large-scale armed conflict is so expensive that governments must resort to exceptional sources, such as drug dealing, diamond smuggling, brigandry, or deal-making with other countries. The reliance on illicit operations is well documented in a recent World Bank report that studied 47 civil wars that took place between 1960 and 1999, the main conclusion of which is that the key factor is the availability of commodities to plunder. For greed to yield war, there must be financial opportunities. Only affluent

political leaders and elites can amass such weaponry, diverting funds to the military even when this runs
contrary to the interests of the population. In most inter-state wars the antagonists were wealthy enough to build up their armaments and propagandize or repress to gain acceptance for their policies. Economic Crises? Some scholars have

argued that it is not poverty, as such, that contributes to the support for armed conflict, but rather some catalyst, such as an economic crisis. However, a study by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik shows that this hypothesis lacks merit. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin American and Asia since World War II, they concluded that much of the conventional thinking about the political impact of economic crisis is wrong: "The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... or (in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling
elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another)."

Royal is a noobstudies all vote neg

Boehmer 7 associate prof of poly sci @ UT-El Paso
Charles Boehmer, Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science @ University of Texas at El Paso. The Effects of Economic C risis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict. Pol itics and Policy. Volume 35, Issue 4, Pages 774-809. Wiley InterScience. December 7, 2007. Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the

diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. "Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent
variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states" (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we

should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict.

*****Condition CP

***Neg

1NC
The United States federal government should end its economic embargo on Cuba on the condition that the government of Cuba make appropriate economic and political reforms. Only conditioning removal of the embargo on continued reform prevents Castro from backsliding on status quo reforms
Sanguinetty 13
Jorge, Who benefits and loses if the US-Cuba embargo is lifted? [http://devresearchcenter.org/2013/04/08/who-benefits-and-losesif-the-us-cuba-embargo-is-lifted-by-jorge-a-sanguinetty/] April //mtc The answer depends on the conditions under which the embargo is lifted. I focus on the expected distribution of benefits (and costs) between the government and the Cuban population. A unilateral move by the US Government,

without any quid pro quo by the Cuban government can be expected to yield significant benefits to the official establishment with benefits of an unknown magnitude to the population at large. I posit
that the magnitude of the latter depends on the degree of internal liberalization of the Cuban economy. Until Raul Castro took over, the centralized command of the Cuban economy was subject to a set or constraints arguably more restrictive than the US embargo. What I have called the internal embargo consisted in the Cuban government outright prohibition for Cubans to own enterprises, freely employ workers or trade domestically and internationally. To many Cubans, probably a majority, such constraints were the main cause of the country s secular economic crisis. Lifting the US embargo under such circumstances was reasonably expected to yield most of the economic and political benefits to the Cuban government and limited economic and no political benefits to the population. With the recent partial economic (not political) liberalization

policies implemented by Raul Castro, we can expect that the distribution of economic benefits would be more favorable to the Cuban people. Such new economic freedoms carry a dose of informal political freedoms as Cubans are able to develop relationships among themselves that were tightly constrained until recently, like freedom of assembly, to communicate, and to make transactions and agreements without the tutelage of the government. To wit, as the private sector develops because the government is forced to reduce the inflated payrolls of its enterprises, the authorities lose control on those newly liberated workers. Nonetheless, the system might have reached a point of equilibrium under which an unconditional lifting of the US embargo might still accrue enough economic benefit to the Cuban government that it leads to a roll back of some recent reforms in order to cut loses in the political, albeit informal, arena. This will be a strong reason to oppose an unconditional lifting on the embargo for those who care about the wishes for freedom and welfare of the Cuban people. Many international observers
oppose the US embargo on the basis of several debatable assumptions. One is the belief that the embargo has served the Castro government as an excuse for its economic failures, and once lifted the excuse will disappear. Another assumption is that Cubans dont know that the embargo might have constrained their economy, but not as much as the restrictions of virtually all economic activity by the Cuban government. There are also many Cubans that believe that the

US embargo is the only leverage left to pressure the Cuban government to lift internal restrictions in both the economic and the political fronts. It is doubtful that, under the current conditions, a non-negotiated lifting of the US embargo is likely to bring about democracy in Cuba.

Reforms the only way to prevent Cuba collapse and Caribbean instability
Ashby 13Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Timothy, Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States The Importance of Trading with StateOwned Enterprises [http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/] March 29 //mtc

Cuba under Ral Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation. Reforms instituted within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles, and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel

abroad. Stating that it was time for the gradual transfer of key roles to new generations, President Ral Castro
announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the time of the Cuban Revolution. [1] The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may

accelerate or retard the process. The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. This could bring social chaos, especially among the islands disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for U.S. national and regional security. To maintain Cubas social
and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned. The collapse of Cubas tottering economy could

seismically impact the United States and neighboring countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and
mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows: Avoid one or more mass migrations; Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere; Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade; Avoid Cuba becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States. [2]

Caribbean instability causes bioterrorism and LNG explosions

Bryan 1 (Anthony T., Director of the Caribbean Program North/South Center, and Stephen E. Flynn, Senior Fellow Council
on Foreign Relations, Terrorism, Porous Borders, and Homeland Security: The Case for U.S. -Caribbean Cooperation, 10-21, http://www.cfr.org/publication/4844/terrorism_porous_borders_and _homeland_ security.html) Terrorist acts can take place anywhere. The Caribbean is no exception. Already the linkages between drug

trafficking and terrorism are clear in countries like Colombia and Peru, and such connections have similar
potential in the Caribbean. The security of major industrial complexes in some Caribbean countries is vital. Petroleum refineries and major industrial estates in Trinidad, which host more than 100 companies that

produce the majority of the worlds methanol, ammonium sulphate, and 40 percent of U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas
(LNG),

are vulnerable targets. Unfortunately, as experience has shown in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, terrorists are likely to strike at U.S. and European interests in Caribbean countries. Security issues become even more critical when one considers the possible use of Caribbean countries by terrorists as bases from which to attack the U nited S tates. An airliner hijacked after departure from an airport in the
northern Caribbean or the Bahamas can be flying over South Florida in less than an hour. Terrorists can sabotage or seize control of a cruise ship after the vessel leaves a Caribbean port. Moreover, terrorists with false passports and visas issued in the Caribbean may be able to move easily through passport controls in Canada or the United States. (To help counter this possibility, some countries have suspended "economic citizenship" programs to ensure that known terrorists have not been

countries are as vulnerable as anywhere else to the clandestine manufacture and deployment of biological weapons within national borders.
inadvertently granted such citizenship.) Again, Caribbean

LNG tanker explosions cause catastrophic damage outweighs nuclear war

Lovin 1 (Amory B., Chief Scientist of the Rocky Mountain Institute, and L. Hunter Lovin, President National Capitalism and
Co-Founder Rocky Mountain Institute, Brittle Power: Energy Strategy for National Security, http://verdilivorno.it/doc_gnl/198204_Brittle_Power_intro_GNL_note.pdf) About nine percent of such a tankerload of LNG will probably, if spilled onto

water, boil to gas in about five minutes. 3 (It does not matter how cold the water is; it will be at least two hundred twenty-eight Fahrenheit
degrees hot- ter than the LNG, which it will therefore cause to boil violently.) The result- ing gas, however, will be so cold that it will still be denser than air. It will therefore flow in a cloud or plume along the surface until it reaches an

ignition source. Such a plume might extend at least three miles downwind from a large tanker spill within ten to twenty
minutes. 4 It might ultimately reach much fartherperhaps six to twelve miles. 5 If not ignited, the gas is asphyxiating. If ignited, it will burn to completion with a turbulent diffusion flame reminiscent of the 1937

Hindenberg disaster but about a hundred times as big. Such a fireball would burn everything within it, and by its radiant heat would cause third-degree burns and start fires a mile or two away. 6 An LNG fireball can blow through a city, creating a very large number of ignitions and explosions across a wide area. No present or foreseeable equ ipment can put out a very large [LNG]... fire. 7 The energy content of a single standard LNG tanker (one hundred twenty-five thousand cubic meters) is equivalent to seven-tenths of a megaton of TNT, or about fifty-five Hiroshima bombs.

2NC Say Yes

Cuba will say yesnew leadership
Oppman 12
Patrick, Raul Castro again says Cuba willing to talk with U.S. [http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/26/world/americas/cuba-us-talks] July 26 //mtc Havana, Cuba (CNN) -- On Cuba's main holiday honoring the island's revolution, President Raul Castro declared

once again that his government is ready to enter into talks with the United States. "The table is set. If they want to discuss the problems of democracy, as they say, freedom of speech, human rights, the things they have invented for years, we will discuss them," he said. But he
added that the Cuban government has its own grievances.

2NC Theory
Condition counterplans are good ( ) key to check aff side bias the aff has structural advantages like the first and last speech, infinite prep time, and the right side of the literature condition counterplans are key to getting the neg back to ground zero ( ) key to test resolved resolved is a definite course of action and condition counterplans question whether immediate action is best ( ) neg flex the negative is already at a disadvantage on this topic because of the literature base condition counterplans are key to checking unpredictable add-ons and affirmatives ( ) literature checks abuse we have evidence about a net benefit and evidence about the objects benefit from the counterplan this proves its predictable and educational ( ) err neg on theory aff gets 1st and last speech and infinite prep

2NC UQReforms Now

New leadership already participating in massive HR and economic reform
Sweig and Lee 12senior fellow for LA studies @ CFR, and senior production editor @ CFR
Julia and Brianna, The Frozen U.S.-Cuba Relationship [http://www.cfr.org/cuba/frozen-us-cuba-relationship/p27510] February 28 //mtc The second point is what's happening in Cuba. It's not realistic to expect the United States to undertake a series of unilateral moves toward normalization; it needs

a willing partner. I believe we have one in Havana but have failed to read the signals. Raul Castro has now been in office since the beginning of 2008. Raul holds the reins on both foreign policy and domestic policy, and, domestically, the politics of implementing a fairly wide range of economic and political and social reforms are his priority. In a deal that was coordinated with the help of the Cuban Catholic Church and Spain, he released all of the political prisoners in Cuba. He also is taking a number of steps that imply a major rewriting of the social contract in Cuba to shrink the size of the state and give Cuban individuals more freedom-economically, especially, but also in terms of speech--than we've seen in the last fifty years. He has privatized the residential real estate and car market[s], expanded much-needed agrarian reform, lifted caps on salaries, and greatly expanded space for small businesses. He also is moving to deal with corruption and to prepare the groundwork for a great deal more foreign investment. He's moving in the direction of the kind of reforms that every administration over the last fifty years has called upon Cuba to make, albeit under the rubric of a one-party system.
There's a broad range of cooperation--neighborhood security in the Gulf of Mexico, as Cuba has just started drilling for oil, counternarcotics, and natural disasters--between the two countries that is still not happening, and that gives me the impression that the United States has been unwilling to take "yes" for an answer and respond positively to steps taken by Cuba.

2NC AT No Impact
LNG terrorism will cause an explosion larger than Hiroshima studies prove
Husick and Gale 5 (Lawrence A. Husick and Stephen Gale, 2005 (Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institutes
Center on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Homeland Security. Stephen Gale, Ph.D., is co-chair of FPRIs Center on Terrorism, Planning a Sea-borne Terrorist Attack, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20050321.americawar.husickgale.seaborneterroristattack.html) Consequences of an Attack Despite van der Lindes and other warnings, and the examples of several cases of earlier accidental releases that have resulted in the detonation of LNG, the consequences of a rupture of an LNG tanker and subsequent ignition of the gas were not thoroughly studied by United States government security agencies until 2004. In the 2004 study by Sandia National Laboratories, the resulting report (quietly released on 21-Dec-2004), estimated

that an intentional attack on an LNG tanker would result in a vapor cloud of explosive gas spread over a radius of almost 2 miles from the ship. Any source of ignition within that vapor cloud would instantly cause an explosion of devastating proportion and horrific effect. The US militarys largest non-nuclear weapon is the so-called daisy cutter bomb, (designated BLU-96), disperses 2,000 lbs. of a flammable hydrocarbon, has a blast zone of over 500 feet in radius, and consumes all available oxygen within that zone, and for some distance beyond. Compare this with the 130,000 cubic meters of LNG contained in a typical tanker: 3,237,472.7 MMKJ (million kilo joules) of energy, or the equivalent of 775 kilotons of TNT. (N.B. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima yielded 15 kilotons of TNT equivalent.[6]) Keep in mind that the conflagration zone envisioned by Sandia for an LNG tanker attack extends outward for as much as three miles from the ship. In this zone, everything is exposed to searing temperatures, and all of the oxygen is consumed by the explosion, thus suffocating all living things. Beyond this zone, massive damage results from the shock wave. For cities that have large buildings with glass facades, for example, nearly universal destruction of the glass in the zone beyond three miles creates a killing field both inside and outside the structures, as glass, propelled by the shock wave propagating outward at over 775 mph from the explosion zone, is rained on citizens from above.

2NC AT Unilateral SolvesPocket It

Lifting the embargo doesnt cause government reformCubas government will take advantage of it
Cave 12
Damien, Easing of Restraints in Cuba Renews Debate on U.S. Embargo [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/world/americas/changes-in-cuba-create-support-for-easing-embargo.html?pagewanted=all] November 20 //mtc Any easing would be a gamble. Free enterprise may not necessarily lead to the embargos goal

of free elections, especially because Cuba has said it wants to replicate the paths of Vietnam and China, where the loosening of economic restrictions has not led to political change. Indeed, Cuban officials have become adept at using previous American efforts to soften the embargo to their advantage, taking a cut of dollars converted into pesos and marking up the prices at state-owned stores.

Unilateral concessions like the plan will just be pocketed

Suchlickiprofessor/director @ Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies @ University of Miami
Jaime, Ignore Ral Castros siren song [http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/01/3025115/ignore-raul-castros-siren-song.html] October 1 //mtc

The Cuban leadership in Havana continues to try to woo the U.S. administration into providing unilateral concessions to Cuba. The embargo and the travel ban will be ended, they believe, as a result of internal pressures and a more accommodating Obama administration. The latest attempt comes via Louis Farrakhan, the Muslim-American leader who met this month with Gen. Ral Castro in Havana. Ral Castro asked me, said Farrakhan, to let the world know that Cuba is ready to talk with the U.S. authorities. The same statement has been repeated recently by several Cuban officials. Yet the issue is not about talking. The avenues for engagement between Cuba and the U.S. have never been closed. The U.S. and Cuba signed antihijacking and migration accords. They talk at the U.N., in Washington, and at cocktail parties. For the U.S. to change its policies there has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions in the area of human rights and political change. No country changes its policies without a substantial quid pro quo from the other side. We seem to cling to an outdated economic determinism in trying to understand events in other societies and the motivations of their leaders. Despite economic difficulties, Ral Castro does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a U.S.-Cuba normalization. He may release and exile some political
prisoners; he may offer more consumer goods and food to tranquilize the Cuban population; but no major structural reforms that would open the Cuban economy and no political openings. Rals legitimacy is based on his closeness

to Fidel Castros policies of economic centralization and opposition to the U.S. He cannot now reject Fidels legacy and move closer to the U.S. A move in this direction would be fraught with danger. It would create uncertainty among the elites that govern Cuba and increase instability as some advocate rapid change while others cling to more orthodox policies. The Cuban population also could see this as an opportunity for mobilization to demand faster reforms. Ral is also unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the U.S. At a time when the U.S. is seeking
regime change in the Middle East, Rals policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly frien dly to the U.S. and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid. Ral is no Deng Xiaoping and no friend of

the U.S. He has been the worlds longest-serving (48 years) minister of defense. He presided over the worst periods of political repression and economic centralization in Cuba and is responsible for numerous executions after he and his brother assumed power. While in Mexico and the Sierra Maestra before reaching power, Ral also executed several enemies. Ral has been a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidels anti-American policies and military interventions in Africa and elsewhere. In 1962 Ral and Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev conspired to surreptitiously introduce

nuclear missiles into Cuba. Ral supervised the Americas Department in Cuba approving support for terrorist, guerrilla and revolutionary groups throughout Latin America. In 1996 he personally ordered the shooting down of two Brothers to the Rescue unarmed civilian planes in international waters, killing three U.S. citizens and one Cuban-American resident from Florida. I try to teach my students that not all problems in international relations can be solved. Some require the use of force; others, significant patience; still others, diplomacy and negotiation. In the case

of Cuba, we should wait for the passing of the gerontocracy in power now and hope for a new, more flexible leadership later.

Lifting the embargo wont cause Cuba to cooperatestrong anti-American alliances

Suchlickiprofessor/director @ Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies @ University of Miami
Jaime, Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro [http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cubawill-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/] March 4//mtc Similarly, any serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the near future. It would mean the

rejection of one of Fidel Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin America and elsewhere. Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from Cuba in return for generous aid. Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible concessions for a U.S. - Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the past, public statements and speeches are politically motivated and directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious negotiations on important issues are not carried out in speeches from the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic avenues
open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington and the United Nations or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement between the United States and Cuba. Raul remains a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel's anti-American policies. The issue

There has to be a willingness on the part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions - in the area of human rights and political and economic openings as well as cooperation on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction - for the United States to change it policies.
between Cuba and the U.S. is not about negotiations or talking. These are not sufficient.

***Aff

AffSay No
Cuba will say nothey want the us to unconditionally remove the embargo
AP 9
Associated Press, Cuba wants US embargo lifted unilaterally but won't make any concessions in return [http://news.ca.msn.com/world/cp-article.aspx?cp-documentid=21751280] September 16 //mtc HAVANA, Cuba - Cuba will not make any political or policy concessions to improve

relations

with the U.S. - no matter how small, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez said Wednesday, snubbing Washington's suggestions that some reforms could lead to better ties. He told a news conference that the United States must lift its 47-year-old trade embargo without waiting for anything in return.
Rodriguez said U.S. trade sanctions have cost the island $96 billion in economic damage since they took their current form in February 1962 as part of the Trading with the Enemy Act. "The policy is unilateral and should be lifted

unilaterally," Rodriguez said. He called President Obama "well-intentioned and intelligent" and said that his
administration has adopted a "modern, less aggressive" stance toward the island. But Rodriguez shrugged off the White House's April decision to lift restrictions on Cuban-Americans who want to visit or send money to relatives in this country, saying those changes simply undid a tightening of the embargo imposed by President George W. Bush. "Obama was a president elected on a platform of change. Where are the changes in the blockade against Cuba?" Rodriguez asked. Cuban officials have for decades characterized American trade sanctions as a blockade. Obama has suggested it may be time for a new era in relations with Cuba, but has also said he will not consider lifting the embargo. On Monday, he signed a measure formally extending the policy for one year. U.S. officials have said for months that they would like to see

the single-party, communist state accept some political, economic or social changes before they make further modifications to Cuba policy, but Rodriguez said it was not up to his country to appease Washington.

AffEmbargo Useless
Embargo doesnt solvelast 50 years prove
Bandow 12senior fellow @ CATO Institute
Doug, Time to End the Cuba Embargo [http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo] December 11 //mtc

It is far past time to end the embargo. During the Cold War, Cuba offered a potential advanced military outpost for the Soviet Union. Indeed, that role led to the Cuban missile crisis. With the failure of
the U.S.-supported Bay of Pigs invasion, economic pressure appeared to be Washingtons best strategy for ousting the Castro dictatorship. However, the end of the Cold War left Cuba strategically irrelevant. It is a poor

country with little ability to harm the United States. The Castro regime might still encourage unrest, but its survival has no measurable impact on any important U.S. interest. The regime remains a humanitarian travesty, of course. Nor are Cubans the only victims: three years ago the regime jailed a State
Department contractor for distributing satellite telephone equipment in Cuba. But Havana is not the only regime to violate human rights. Moreover, experience has long demonstrated that it is virtually impossible for

outsiders to force democracy. Washington often has used sanctions and the Office of Foreign Assets Control currently is enforcing around 20 such programs, mostly to little effect. The policy in Cuba obviously has failed. The regime remains in power. Indeed, it has consistently used the embargo to justify its own mismanagement, blaming poverty on America. Observed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end
to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasnt happened in Cuba in the last 50 years. Similarly, Cuban exile Carlos Saladrigas of the Cuba Study

Group argued that keeping the embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hardliners.

AffImpact Defense
LNG explosion would have a minimal impact.
Lloyd's Register 4
Leading participants in the safety and verification of LNG facilities around the world, Statement on LNG risks from Lloyd's Register North America, Inc. 9-23-2004, http://www.lr.org/News+and+Events/News+Archive/2004/Statement+on+LNG+risks+from+Lloyds+Register+North+America+I nc.htm LNG. The real risks In the US, regulators and other interested parties have identified as key concerns the possibility of a terrorist attack involving an LNG terminal or an LNG carrier, and the consequences for the surrounding population and infrastructure. Global terrorism is certainly a major threat and all reasonable measures should and must be taken to mitigate the risks and consequences of any actions, however, commentators and observers are incorrect if they

believe that a terrorist attack on an LNG carrier would have the impact of a nuclear explosion. There are several technical reasons which bear this out: 1. LNG is transported globally in insulated tanks on specialised ships. These tanks provide four physical barriers and two layers of insulation between the LNG and the outside environment. Further, the separation between the inner and outer hulls of an LNG carrier is typically over two meters. These two factors combined mean that LNG cargo carried at sea has a very high inbuilt level of protection from external blast sources. 2. In the event of an attack, even if a one-meter hole
were to be formed in the inner hull, the resultant holes in the primary containment barrier would be significantly smaller due to the increased separation distance from the blast source combined with the pressure absorption properties of the secondary containment barrier and insulation materials. 3. It is unrealistic to imagine that the entire cargo of any

ship can be instantaneously released. To mount an attack on an LNG carrier that would result in the instantaneous release of all of its cargo would require the equivalent of a full scale military operation, not a clandestine terrorist operation like those carried out against the USS Cole and the Limburg. 4. The idea that LNG carriers are potential nuclear devices is erroneous. There is a lot of energy in LNG and natural gas, as in any hydrocarbon. However, the 'nuclear explosion' statement describes the total energy an LNG carrier contains, not the rate
at which the energy would be released in an incident. For example, a lump of coal contains lots of energy, but when set on fire, its energy doesn't all come out instantly like a bomb. Instead, the coal burns over a period of time releasing its energy as it goes. Similarly, LNG carriers contain large quantities of energy, but the energy can only be

released slowly in the event of a spill or a fire. 5. An LNG spill in open air will not result in a bomb-like explosion. This has been consistently demonstrated in experiments. Not everything that is ignited explodes like a bomb. For example, when a match is lit, it burns but does not
explode. Similarly, the natural gas vapour that could result from an LNG carrier spill also falls under the category of substances that will burn but not explode like a bomb. Reason and caution Paul Huber, Director of LRNA, says: "There are risks associated with the transport and storage of LNG, as there are with any hydrocarbon energy source, and these are precisely the reasons that the LNG industry operates with extensive international and national regulations which govern the safety of LNG transport and storage. The effectiveness of these regulations is apparent in the LNG

shipping sector, which has an unblemished safety record spanning 40 years - a track record which is unrivalled by any other maritime sector and most land-based industries. It should also be remembered that LNG itself is one of the cleanest-burning and most environmentally friendly energy sources currently available on a global scale. "While the shadow of terrorism hangs over us, we have to do as much as we can to protect ourselves and our borders, but it is misleading to state, as some have, that an attack on an LNG carrier would be similar to a nuclear event. It is difficult for us to know the rationale behind the assertion contained in the speech to the Houston Forum, but it is clear that it is not supported by fact.

No impactthe worst case scenario kills 8,000

Kaplan 6
Eben, Associate Editor of the Council on Foreign Relations, Liquefied Natural Gas: A Potential Terrorist Target? February 27, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9810/ Are LNG ships and terminals potential terrorist targets? Yes, because of LNG's explosive potential, experts say. Al-Qaeda, for example, has specifically cited LNG as a desirable target, says Rob Knake, senior associate at Good Harbor Consulting, LLC, a homeland-security private consulting firm. Pipelines are not as attractive because the flow of gas can quickly be cut

off and an explosion easily contained. Terminals make better targets because an attack could result in a massive fire that could potentially kill scores of people. They are also good targets because "if you take out those terminals, you could have a significant disruption [in the U.S. gas supply,]" Knake says. But an attack on an LNG terminal might not be

so damaging. Terminals are equipped with emergency fire detection mechanisms designed to minimize the impact of fires resulting from terrorist attacks or accidents. The most attractive targets are the boats: 1,000-foot tankers with double hulls and specially constructed storage tanks that keep the LNG cold. A report, put out by Good Harbor Consulting assessing the risk of a proposed LNG terminal in Providence, Rhode Island, concluded that a successful terrorist attack on a tanker could result in as many as 8,000 deaths and upwards of 20,000 injuries. It is important to keep in mind that this is the worst case scenario. A report on LNG safety and security by the University of Texas' Center for Energy and Economics explains LNG "tanks require exceptionally large amounts of force to cause damage. Because the amount of energy required to breach containment is so large, in almost all cases the major hazard presented by terrorists is a fire, not an explosion."

AffUnilateral Solves
Cuba embargo fails to create reformlifting it unilaterally key to create prerequisite conditions
Birns and Mills 13director and senior research fellow @ Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Larry and FrederickBest Time for U.S. Cuba Rapprochement Is Now [http://www.coha.org/best-time-for-u-s-cuba-rapprochementis-now/] January 30 //mtc The anti-Castro lobby and their allies in the US Congress argue that the reforms coming out of Havana are too little too late and that political repression continues unabated. They continue

to see the embargo as a tool for coercing either more dramatic reforms or regime change. It is true that the reformist tendency in Cuba
does not include a qualitative move from a one party system to political pluralism. Lamentably, Cuba reportedly continues to use temporary detentions and the occasional jailing of non-violent dissidents to limit the parameters of political debate and total freedom of association. The authors agree that no non-violent Cuban dissident should be intimidated, detained or jailed.

But continuing to maliciously turn the screws on Havana has never provided an incentive for more democracy in any sense of the word nor has it created a political opening into which Cuba, with confidence, could enter. The easing of tensions between Washington and Havana is more likely to contribute to the evolution of a more democratic form of socialism on the island, the early stages of which we may presently be witnessing. In any case
the precise form of such change inevitably should and will be decided in Cuba, not in Washington or Miami.

AffTheory
( ) Not reciprocal: the aff doesnt get the choice of conditioning their aid because the possibility that the nation would say no would make every aff probabilistic and thus conditional in the theoretical sense. ( ) conditional: nations could say no this destroys the affs ability to generate stable offense based on the CPs function because they can always just read evidence that nations would say no. ( ) not predictable predictable: there are a huge number of conditions that could be placed on aid and the literature base on them is simply too big to research all of. We wouldnt have to carry a tub of reasons why specific conditions are bad. This kills clash, which is key to education. ( ) Its a PIC: PICs moot aff ground and are completely unpredictable. ( ) Artificially competitive: the CP garners its net benefits via simply doing something that the plan doesnt do, not based on an offensive link to the plan. This makes it impossible for us to access anything but impact turns in order to answer the net benefit as well as forcing us to perm the CP, thus making the counterplan conditional in most debates.

*****Neolib K

***Neg

1NC
US economic engagement with Latin America is tool to prop up the global neoliberal systemallows the US to crush local movements and ensures market access to further expand neoliberalism
Petras 4
James, Neoliberalism and Class Politics in Latin America [http://www.counterpunch.org/2004/11/13/neoliberalism-and-classpolitics-in-latin-america/] November 13 //mtc

Imperialist power is exercised through a chain of economic and political linkages, which are sustained by tactical adaptations to specific political conjunctures in order to sustain strategic interests. The key theoretical point is that this new wave of electoral neo-liberal politicians, formerly aligned with the major extra-parliamentary movements, has been able to temporarily channel political support behind regimes, which embrace the imperial agenda. The result is a deep disenchantment of the mass base of these movements (as in Ecuador), the political co-optation of some movement leaders (Bolivia), the division of the movements (Argentina) and a serious temporary decline in movement capabilities. No major national confrontation has taken place since the
ascendancy of these new neo-liberal regimes took power though, over time, sectoral strikes and major demonstrations have re-started everywhere, and a new wave of uprisings especially in Bolivia is likely. While the US works with Latin

American generals, the commanders of paramilitary groups, and agro-business and banking elites, its most significant political victories have accrued thanks to its linkages with the petit bourgeois electoral parties and politicians. They have been far more effective in demoralizing the masses than all the mass media propaganda outlets; they have been more effective in dividing and weakening the movements than all the "counter-insurgency" programs; they
have been more effective in co-opting leaders and beheading movements than all the para-military death squads. One should neither underestimate nor overestimate the significance of this imperialist-electoral petit bourgeois link. The link is not a simple imposition on the ex-center-left, but a result of the internal dynamics of a rightward shift of these parties and leaders as they strive for greater social mobility, family wealth, political influence and social status. The "pressures of

imperialism" reinforce reactionary tendencies inherent among upwardly mobile petit bourgeois electoralists. The link however is not sustainable over the medium run - as the neoliberal policies erode initial popular support; disillusionment with some movement leaders leads to the emergence of new leaders and new movements; and some movement leaders, who are compromised with
the failed electoral policies, return to the bases and revive the politics of direct action. A new cycle of mass mobilization extends throughout Latin America was visible by mid-2004 in several countries (Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil). However, these emerging struggles are mostly focused on short-term demands, through they could escalate in the near future. Globalization or Imperial Re-Division of the World The large-scale, long-term movement of capital into every region of the world has led many writers to speak of "globalization" - a phenomenon which is said to describe a new historical phase in capitalists or imperialist development. A few writers even speak of an interdependent, post-imperial world. The magnitude and deepening of social economic inequalities of nations, classes, races and gender however and the enormous concentration of military power (and its use in wars of conquest) has led to an increasing number of writers to turn to the theory of imperialism. This is a theoretical and empirical advance in clarifying the nature of interstate and class relations. While the recognition that imperialism is the driving force of the current epoch - and conversely, anti-imperialist movements are the major challenge - there is little clarity on the significance and principle impact of imperialism. The single most significant fact about imperialism (in all of its manifestations, whether old US imperialism, revived European and Japanese imperialism or newly emerging Chinese imperialism is

the re-division

of the world. We are in the midst of a major struggle among the major and minor, old and new imperialisms, to seize control of regions, regimes, energy and strategic resources, through wars (unilateral and multilateral), "regional or bilateral free trade agreements", military alliances and economic associations. The several imperial powers are engaged everywhere in incorporating former communist and nationalist countries within their empires. Eastern Europe is incorporated into
the European Union economic empire while the US incorporates the same countries under its tutelage via NATO and wartime "coalitions" as mercenaries in their empire. In Latin America, the US works to incorporate

liberalized economies and regimes into its empire via trade and investment agreements,
while European investments and buyouts of privatized enterprises enters to carve up sectors of the economies. Europe seeks to seize sectors of the Mercosur market via a new trade/investment pact, while the US advances its colonial scheme via ALCA. In the Caucasus, Europe and the US compete to carve out enclaves of control: the US via client regimes and military

bases and the Europeans via corporate buyouts of energy resources and bribes to corrupt rulers. In the Middle East, Europe aims for investment/trade enclaves with comprador and rentier regimes, while the US moves toward direct military-colonial conquest to establish colonial regimes. The difference between US and European tactics in the Middle East is greatly influenced by Israeli influence over US Mid East policy, especially through its Zionist agents in the Pentagon. In Africa, the Great Powers compete to carve up the oil and mineral rich states, fomenting regional wars in Sudan, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and elsewhere. Religious, tribal and ethnic identities are instrumentalized by each imperial center to undermine central governments and create mini-states, run by clients for major corporate interests. We are in a period similar to the Great Re-division of Africa in the 1870s and 80s when the major European powers carved out their colonial territories. Today, on a much grander scale, we are witnessing a similar process accelerated by the forced disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and the Pan Arab movement. Russia is being divided through imperial-sponsored "separatist movements". The aggressive military moves by the US in the Middle East are abetted by the Zionist sub-imperialist vision of a coprosperity sphere. The aim is to monopolize strategic oil countries. This has led to the opposition of excluded European imperial powers. Carving up nations and regions, and the need to consolidate the newly incorporated clients into their respective empires requires an expanded military presence, and a more or less rapid deployment military force. Subsequently it is essential to fix an election of a puppet regime to satisfy the citizens of the imperial country and to quiet the noisy but inconsequential dissident social democrats and liberals. Insofar as the US and Europe are electoral systems, the citizens who vote for the imperialist regime are also responsible for imperialist genocide. The carving up of the world is the dominant characteristic of empire expansion in the contemporary period. It is carried out by agreements among the imperial powers (multi-lateral consultations, Security Council agreements, and coalitions), and with the acti ve and passive acquiescence of a majority of its voters. Imperial agreements, however, do not preclude competition over regional spheres of influence, colonial reconstruction contracts, oil exploitation permits and takeovers of privatized state resources. Carving up the world

by unilateral force maximizes the potential advantages to the imperial power (it monopolizes the client relationships and resources) but it increases the risks of political isolation, prolonged and costly colonial wars. This may weaken imperial capacity to act in other regions of the world. This is best illustrated
today by the US colonial power grab in Iraq. Each imperial country attempts to weaken its rivals by characterizing their activities as "imperialist", "illegitimate" and against "international law" especially in times of unilateral colonial occupation. Thus the high moral position adopted by Europe in relation to the US colonial war in Iraq. However in the case of Haiti, Afghanistan, and Sudan where both major imperial centers decided collectively to share influence, they issue joint solemn declarations of high moral principles in favor of colonial wars. Carving up the World: Latin America The imperial

struggle to "carve up Latin America" has several particularities. One is the long-term imperial presence of the US in the region and the consequent long-standing and deep ties to the ruling class and military. The re-entry of Europe over the past two decades, particularly but not exclusively
Spain, has led to competitive but not highly conflictual rivalries over control of strategic sectors of the privatized economy. The prolonged and inconclusive negotiations between the European Union and MERCOSUR are less the result of US obstruction and more the result of European refusal to sacrifice minority agricultural sectors to gain access to Latin American industrial, service, financial and commercial sectors. Similar problems have emerged in negotiations between the US and Latin America over ALCA. The carving up of Latin America takes place among some countries

which have a substantial industrial base or a large peasant and Indian subsistence agricultural sector - all of which are obstacles to colonial exploitation based on maquiladora export platforms, financial pillage via debt payments and large-scale agro-exports based on agrobusiness corporations linked to giant imperial trading corporations. The consequences of successfully carving up Latin America will be to convert the region into an agrobusiness, agro-mineral, cheap labor manufacturing export platform capable of sustaining perpetual debt payments. This is a huge task that requires sustained efforts by the political class of electoralist
politicians capable of deflecting and fragmenting inevitable popular resistance to this "roll-back" of 100 years of history. From the imperial perspective there are numerous positive signs - the New Right politicians headed by Lula have taken important steps toward integrating Brazil into ALCA, while moving toward an agreement via MERCOSUR with the European Union. In a sense Brazil will be the first joint colony of the two major imperial powers. Similar processes are at work in the Andean countries of Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. Venezuelas opposition to the carving up process has resulted in joint US and European support for a violent colonial restoration. So far the carving up of Latin

America proceeds through the "legal channels" of elected petit bourgeois politicians, not through wars or
ethnic separatist movements. The principle obstacles to the re-division of Latin America are the class-based national resistance movements and the insurrectionary potentialities of class-based popular movements, as well as revolutionary socialist regimes like Cuba and nationalist governments like Venezuela. Latin Americas carving up does not

occur in the midst of severe inter-imperial conflict - but via joint and competitive activities of US and European corporations and governments. The major strength and weakness of the imperial "carving up" process is found in the political link facilitating the process. The petit bourgeois electoralists
promote colonial re-division but become severely compromised and rapidly deteriorate faced with mass opposition and uprisings. Unlike other regions, colonial carving up has led to heightened class warfare which links

vital class issues of social-economic transformation with anti-imperialist struggles. In that

sense Latin America provides a powerful reference point for the toilers of the world suffering from the imperial re-division of their countries.

Extinction is inevitable neoliberal globalizations coding of the produces multiple trends for extinction can only address these problems by transforming consumption levels
Ehrenfeld 5 Professor of Ecology @ Rutgers
David, Dept. of Ecology, Evolution, and Natural Resources @ Rutgers University, The Environmental Limits to Globalization, Conservation Biology Vol. 19 No. 2, EBSCO The known effects of globalization on the environment are numerous and highly significant. Many others are undoubtedly unknown. Given these circumstances, the first question that suggests itself is: Will globalization, as we see it now, remain a permanent state of affairs (Rees 2002; Ehrenfeld 2003a)? The principal environmental side effects of

globalizationclimate change, resource exhaustion (particularly cheap energy), damage to agroecosystems, and the spread of exotic species, including pathogens (plant, animal, and human)are sufficient to make this economic system unstable and short-lived. The socioeconomic consequences of globalization are likely to do the same. In my book The Arrogance of Humanism (1981), I claimed that our ability to manage global systems, which depends on our being able to predict the results of the things we do, or even to understand the systems we have created, has been greatly exaggerated. Much of our alleged control is science fiction; it doesnt work because of theoretical limits that we ignore at
our peril. We live in a dream world in which reality testing is something we must never, never do, lest we awake. In 1984 Charles Perrow explored the reasons why we have trouble predicting what so many of our own created systems will do, and why they surprise us so unpleasantly while we think we are managing them. In his book Normal Accidents, which does not concern globalization, he listed the critical characteristics of some of todays complex systems. They are highly interlinked , so a change in one part can affect many others, even those that seem quite distant. Results of some processes feed back on themselves in unexpected ways. The controls of the system often interact with each other unpredictably. We have only indirect ways of finding out what is happening inside the system. And we have an incomplete understanding of some of the systems processes. His example of such a system is a nuclear power plant, and this, he explained, is why system -wide accidents in nuclear plants cannot be predicted or eliminated by system design. I would argue that globalization is a similar system, also subject to catastrophic accidents, many of them environmentalevents that we cannot define until after they have occurred, and perhaps not even then. The comparatively few commentators who have predicted the collapse of globalization have generally given social reasons to support their arguments. These deserve some

consideration here, if only because the environmental and social consequences of globalization interact so strongly with
each other. In 1998, the British political economist John Gray, giving scant attention to environmental factors, nevertheless came to the conclusion that globalization is unstable and will be short-lived. He said, There is nothing in todays

global market that buffers it against the social strains arising from highly uneven economic development within and between the worlds diverse societies. The result, Gray states, is that The combination of [an] unceasing stream of new technologies, unfettered market competition and weak or fractured social institutions has weakened both sovereign states and multinational corporations in
their ability to control important events. Note that Gray claims that not only nations but also multinational corporations, which are widely touted as controlling the world, are being weakened by globalization. This idea may come as a surprise, considering the growth of multinationals in the past few decades, but I believe it is true. Neither governments nor giant corporations are even remotely capable of controlling the environmental or social forces released by globalization, without first controlling globalization itself. Two of the social critics of globalization with the most dire predictions about its doom are themselves masters of the process. The late Sir James Goldsmith, billionaire financier, wrote in 1994, It must surely be a mistake to adopt an economic policy which makes you rich if you eliminate your national workforce and transfer production abroad, and which bankrupts you if you continue to employ your own people.... It is the poor in the rich

countries who will subsidize the rich in the poor countries. This will have a serious impact on the social cohesion of nations. Another free-trade billionaire, George Soros, said much the same thing in
1995: The collapse of the global marketplace would be a traumatic event with unimaginable consequences. Yet I find it easier to imagine than the continuation of the present regime. How much more powerful these statements are if we factor in the environment! As globalization collapses, what will happen to people, biodiversity, and ecosystems? With respect to people, the gift of prophecy is not required to answer this question. What will happen depends on where you are and how you live. Many citizens of the Third World are still comparatively self-sufficient; an unknown number of these will survive the breakdown of globalization and its attendant chaos. In the developed world, there are also people with resources of selfsufficiency and a growing understanding of the nature of our social and environmental problems, which may help them bridge the years of crisis. Some species are adaptable; some are not. For the non- human residents of Earth, not all news will be bad. Who would have predicted that wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo), one of the wiliest and most evasive of woodland birds, extinct in New Jersey 50 years ago, would now be found in every county of this the most densely populated state, and even, occasionally, in adjacent Manhattan? Who would have predicted that black bears (Ursus americanus), also virtually extinct in the state in the mid-twentieth century, would now number in the thousands (Ehrenfeld 2001)? Of course these

recoveries are unusualrare bright spots in a darker landscape. Finally, a few

ecological systems may survive in a

comparatively undamaged state; most will be stressed to the breaking point, directly or indirectly, by many environmental and social factors interacting unpredictably. Lady Luck, as always, will have much to say. In his book The Collapse of Complex Societies, the archaeologist Joseph Tainter (1988) notes that collapse, which has happened to all past empires, inevitably results in human systems of lower complexity and less specialization, less centralized control, lower economic activity, less information flow, lower population levels, less trade, and less redistribution of resources. All of these changes are inimical to globalization. This less-complex, less-globalized condition is probably what human societies will be like when the dust settles. I do not think, however, that we can make such specific predictions about the ultimate state of the environment after globalization, because we have never experienced anything like this exceptionally rapid, global environmental damage before. History and science have little to tell us in this situation. The end of the current economic system and the transition to a postglobalized state is and will be accompanied by a desperate last raid on resources and a chaotic flurry of environmental destruction whose results cannot possibly be told in advance. All one can say is that the surviving species, ecosystems, and resources will be greatly impoverished compared with what we have now, and our descendants will not thank us for having adopted, however briefly, an economic system that consumed their inheritance and damaged their planet so wantonly. Environment is a true bottom lineconcern for its condition must trump all purely economic growth strategies if both the developed and developing nations are to survive and prosper. Awareness of the environmental limits that globalized industrial society denies or ignores should not, however, bring us to an extreme position of environmental determinism. Those whose preoccupations with modern civilizations very real social problems cause them to reject or minimize the environmental constraints discussed here ( Hollander 2003) are guilty of seeing only half the picture. Environmental scientists sometimes fall into the same error. It is tempting to see the salvation of civilization and environment solely in terms of technological improvements in efficiency of energy extraction and use, control of pollution, conservation of water, and regulation of environmentally harmful activities. But such needed developments will

not be sufficientor may not even occur without corresponding social change, including an end to human population growth and the glorification of consumption , along with the elimination of economic mechanisms that increase the gap between rich and poor. The environmental and social problems inherent in globalization are completely interrelatedany attempt to treat them as separate entities is
unlikely to succeed in easing the transition to a postglobalized world. Integrated change that combines environmental awareness, technological innovation, and an altered world view is the only answer to the life-threatening problems exacerbated by globalization (Ehrenfeld 2003b). If such integrated change occurs in time, it will likely happen partly by our own design and partly as an unplanned response to the constraints imposed by social unrest, disease, and the economics of scarcity. With respect to the planned component of change, we are facing, as eloq uently described by Rees (2002), the ultimate challenge to human intelligence and self-awareness, those vital qualities we humans claim as uniquely our own. Homo sapiens will either. . .become fully human or wink out ignominiously, a guttering candle in a violent storm of our own making. If change does not come quickly, our global civilization will join Tainters (1988) list as the latest and most dramatic example of collapsed complex societies. Is there anything that could slow globalization quickly, before it collapses disastrously of its own environmental and social weight? It is still not too late to curtail the use of energy,

reinvigorate local and regional communities while restoring a culture of concern for each other, reduce
nonessential global trade and especially global finance (Daly & Cobb 1989), do more to control introductions of exotic species (including pathogens), and accelerate the growth of sustainable agriculture. Many of the needed technologies are already in place. It is true that some of the damage to our environmentspecies extinctions, loss of crop and domestic animal varieties, many exotic species introductions, and some climatic change will be beyond repair. Nevertheless, the opportunity to help our society move past globalization in an orderly way, while there is time, is worth our most creative and passionate efforts. The citizens of the United States and other nations have to understand that our global economic system has placed both our environment and our society in peril, a peril as great as that posed by any war of the twentieth century. This

understanding, and the actions that follow, must come not only from enlightened leadership, but also from grassroots consciousness raising. It is still possible to reclaim the planet from a self-destructive
economic system that is bringing us all down together, and this can be a task that bridges the divide between conservatives and liberals. The crisis is here, now. What we have to do has become obvious. Globalization can be scaled back to manageable proportions only in the context of an altered world view that rejects materialism even as it

restores a sense of communal obligation. In this way, alone, can we achieve real homeland security, not just in
the United States, but also in other nations, whose fates have become so thoroughly entwined with ours within the global environment we share.

Text: The judge should vote negative to reject the affirmatives neoliberal knowledge production Neoliberal governmentality has taken control of knowledge production, forcing its economic understanding of the world upon the the population and producing them as human subjects- only a prior rejection of the affs neoliberal-based approach can open new avenues for understanding a new strategy
McMurty 96, (John, Prof. of Philosophy @ U of Guelph, The Cancer Stage of Capitalism, CCPA Monitor, July/August 1996,
http://www.islandnet.com/plethora/mai/cancer.html) The essential problem of any life-threatening cancer is that the host body's immune system does not effectively recognize or respond to the cancer's challenge and advance. This failure of our social immune system to recognize and

respond to the cancerous form of capitalism is understandable once we realize that the surveillance and communication organs of host social bodies across the world, as they now function, are incapable of recognizing the nature and patterns of the disease. That is, capitalistorganized media and information systems select for dissemination only messages that do not contradict the capitalist organization of social bodies. Consequently, whatever exposes the systemic
disorder of this social organization's structure (such as this essay) is normally refused transmission through its communications media. In this way, our social immune system has been gravely compromised

by the

accelerating control of multinational capital conglomerates over most of the recorded information produced and exchanged around the world--mass communications, the production of textbooks and
educational resources for higher learning, and the biotechnology for reproducing and adapting life-forms themselves.

Because of this subordination of social systems of research and communication to transnational capital control, whatever does recognize the capitalist cancer is normally rejected. This social immune suppression is now global, with over 90% of all foreign news output, for example, controlled by five U.S. and European multinational news agencies. Cancerous takeovers of lifesystems only prevail if they are not recognized by their hosts. This is our predicament today. Lifebodies recover when the immune system recognizes and responds to the systemic disease that is attacking them. At this stage of money capital's mutation and invasion, signs of disease are increasingly evident. Even capitalist-organized mass media display the life-danger in sporadic, partial recognitions of
biospheric and social-structural breakdowns, and even the decoupling of money-capital circuits from productive life functions. These eruptions, however, are not linked to the underlying disease pattern. As on any level of complex life-organization, the

social immune system must recognize the disease agent before it can effectively respond to its invasion. Only when this recognition is clear can an effective defense be mounted. On the macro-level of carcinogenic invasion, effective response now

minimally requires a global determination to resist, regulate and beat back the lethal, uncontrolled growth and metastasis of cancerous capitalism. This could be a transformation of the world's now failing political and economic systems which nothing short of a global cancer could effectively bring about.

2NC Framework
You should frame your decision in terms of pedagogical impact- even if there is no alternative to neoliberalism, using the debate space to criticize it expands the boundaries of our consciousness and creates research practices that are more sensitive to slow, everyday violence- thats a pre-requisite to effective use of science and empiricism
Nixon 11
(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 14-16) How do we bring home-and bring emotionally to life-threats that take time to wreak their havoc, threats that

never materialize in one spectacular, explosive, cinematic scene? Apprehension is a critical word here, a crossover term that draws together the domains of perception, emotion, and action. To engage slow violence is to confront layered predicaments of apprehension: to apprehend-to arrest, or at least mitigateoften imperceptible threats requires rendering them apprehensible to the senses through the work of scientific and imaginative testimony. An influential lineage of environmental thought gives primacy
to immediate sensory apprehension, to sight above all, as foundational for any environmental ethics of place. George Perkins Marsh, the mid-nineteenth-century environmental pioneer, argued in Man and Nature that "the power most important to cultivate and at the same time, hardest to acquire, is that of seeing what is before him." Aldo Leopold similarly insisted that "we can be ethical only toward what we can see.'?' But what happens when we are unsighted, when what extends before us-in the space and time that we most deeply inhabit-remains invisible? How, indeed, are we to act ethically toward human and biotic communities that lie beyond our sensory ken? What then, in the fullest sense of the phrase, is the place of seeing in the world that we now inhabit? What, moreover, is the place of the other senses? How do we both make slow violence visible yet also challenge the privileging of the visible? Such questions have profound

consequences for the apprehension of slow violence, whether on a cellular or a transnational scale. Planetary consciousness (a notion that has undergone a host of theoretical formulations) becomes pertinent here, perhaps most usefully in the sense in which Mary Louise Pratt elaborates it, linking questions of power and perspective, keeping front and center the often latent, often invisible violence in the view. Who gets to see, and from where? When and how does such empowered seeing become normative? And what perspectivesnot least those of the poor or women or the colonized-do hegemonic sight conventions of visuality obscure? Pratt's formulation of planetary consciousness remains invaluable because it allows us to connect forms of apprehension to forms of imperial violence." Against this backdrop, 1want to
introduce the third central concern of this book. Alongside slow violence and the environmentalism of the poor, the chapters that follow are critically concerned with the political, imaginative, and strategic role of environmental writer-activists.

Writer-activists can help us apprehend threats imaginatively that remain imperceptible to the senses, either because they are geographically remote, too vast or too minute in scale, or are played out across a time span that exceeds the instance of observation or even the physiological life of the human observer. In a world permeated by insidious, yet unseen or imperceptible violence, imaginative writing can help make the unapparent appear, making it accessible and tangible by humanizing drawn-out threats inaccessible to the immediate senses. Writing can challenge perceptual habits that downplay the damage slow violence inflicts and bring into imaginative focus apprehensions that elude
sensory corroboration. The narrative imaginings of writer-activists may thus offer us a different kind of witnessing: of sights unseen. To allay states of apprehension-trepidations, forebodings, shadows cast by the invisible-entails

facing the challenge, at once imaginative and scientific, of giving the unapparent a

materiality upon which we can act . Yet poor communities, often disproportionately exposed to
the force fields of slow violence-be they military residues or imported e-waste or the rising tides of climate change-are

the

communities least likely to attract sustained scientific inquiry into causes, effects, and potential redress. Such poor communities are abandoned to sporadic science at

best and usually no science at all ; they are also disproportionately subjected to
involuntary pharmaceutical experiments. Indeed, when such communities raise concerns, they

often become

targets of well-funded antiscience by forces that have a legal or commercial interest in manufacturing and disseminating doubt." Such embattled communities, beset by officially unacknowledged hazards, must find ways to broadcast their inhabited fears, their lived sense of a corroded environment, within the broader global struggles over apprehension. It is here that writers, filmmakers, and digital activists may play a mediating role in helping counter the layered invisibility that results from insidious threats, from temporal protractedness, and from the fact
that the afflicted are people whose quality of life-and often whose very existence-is of indifferent interest to the corporate media.

2NC Link
US economic engagement with Latin America ensures neoliberal dominance
Phillips 5
Nicola, U.S. Power and the Politics of Economic Governance in the Americas Latin American Politics & Society 47.4 (2005) 1-25 //mtc

A central dimension of the hemispheric project in the Americas is the construction of a regional economic regime, encapsulated primarily in the putative Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and
defined in that context by a complex interaction of multilateral, hemispheric, subregional, and bilateral processes. Its construction remains tentative, its likely shape highly uncertain, and the process of its negotiation politically fraught. Indeed, the project for a comprehensive and encompassing FTAA gave way in late 2003 to an accelerating proliferation of bilateral trade negotiations as the primary avenue toward the realization of a trade and investment regime in the region, although the relationship of these bilateral processes to existing subregional projects and the multilateral trade agenda is still unclear. Yet in essence, whether pursued via the hemispheric or the bilateral route, the regional economic project aims to

call forth a set of trade and investment structures that are envisaged to act as the cornerstone of a broader process of hemispheric cooperation, underpinned by the Summits of the
Americas. That project, moreover, must be understood as aiming to foster the articulation of a system of economic governance in the Americas and the entrenchment of a particular approach to the governance of regional economic activity. Understood in this way, the project alerts us immediately to the very specific nature of economic governance in the Americas. In the European [End Page 1] Union, the principal laboratory and reference point for academic debates about regional economic governance, issues of economic "governance" are usually taken to refer to questions of supranational institutionalization, regional-level regulation, and the forms of "multilevel governance" that involve a significant degree of "decisional reallocation" to supranational and subnational governance structures (Hooghe and Marks 2001). The economic project in the Americas invites a rather different conceptualization of economic governance. It is not of a sort that envisages the construction of genuinely regional-level regulatory structures, or of supranational regulatory bodies comparable to those that are emerging, slowly and often contentiously, in the European arena. The challenges of economic governance in the Americas are also substantially different from those encountered in the EU, given that the scope and depth of integration in the latter, both projected and actual, significantly exceed those of the FTAA process or the Americas project more broadly conceived. The challenges of governance in the Americas relate instead to the construction of a regime of rules, associated at the most basic level with the negotiation and enforcement of the myriad dimensions of trade and investment agreements, and, furthermore, with the construction of appropriate institutional mechanismsfor the governance of a regional economic regime of this nature. They are also associated with the negotiation of the broader shape of the economic regime and the ways the various parts of the region will be gathered together within it. In this respect, the core governance challenges stem primarily from the huge diversity among the states and subregions in the Americas, the extent of which is unique among the regions of the world. Indeed, recent statistical calculations reveal that the differences in size and levels of development among the 34 countries participating in the FTAA negotiations (Cuba being excluded) are several times larger than those found among the member countries of the now-enlarged EU (Bustillo and Ocampo 2003, 45). Given the scale of the disparities in economic size and across the full gamut of development indicators, the construction of an economic regime in the Americas throws up a very particular set of economic governance challenges associated with the management of both national and subregional adjustment to the envisaged regime and the developmental consequences of participation in it. The key challenges thus lie most notably in the range of areas associated with special and differential (S&D) treatment for smaller and poorer economies, along with the management of such issues as labor and environmental standards. The term governance, in this sense, is advanced here as referring broadly to the myriad processes and strategies associated with the construction of a viable economic regimein the Americas and the management of the various economic processes on which it rests. [End Page 2] The central concern of this article is to address the question of what sort of approach to economic governance is emerging in the region, and what its implications are for the shape of the economic regime itself and the broader regional political economy. This essay argues that by far the dominant approach is based on the assertion of U.S. power in

the region, and has taken a form peculiarly in line with the distinctively U.S. interests served by that exercise of power. The political and economic projects associated with the hemispheric agenda must be recognized, in this respect, as being fundamentally of an ideological nature, and part and parcel of the neoliberal project that underpins the global hegemonic project of the United States. That is to say, the political and economic objectives encapsulated in the regional project are intrinsically informed and molded by the broader ideologicalneoliberalfoundation of U.S. hegemony and the world order associated with it. The ideological dimensions of the regional project are often overlooked in a focus on the technical details of trade
negotiations and the political bargaining processes under way in the region, but they are crucial to an understanding of the nature and the politics of the emerging regional economic regime. More specifically, this article argues that the U.S.-led

approach to governance in the Americas has been fostered by the systematic orientation of U.S. trade strategies to the construction of a distinctly "hub and spoke" set of regionalist arrangements, as a key means by which to capture control of the governance agenda and to

ensure that the regional economic regime takes a form consistent with U.S. interests and preferences. The growing prioritization of bilateralism has become the predominant strategy to this end. The leverage
afforded to the United States by the bilateral negotiation of trade agreements acts to situate primary influence over the shape of the rules that constitute the regime, and the primary functions associated with the task of its governance, firmly in the agencies of the U.S. state.

2NC Perm
The permutation ensures co-option- political action is only possible if it directly engages existing hegemonic coordinates, they ensure collapse of the transition
Zizek 11
(Slavoj, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, Occupy first. Demands come later, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/26/occupy-protesters-bill-clinton) What one should resist at this stage is precisely such a quick translation of the energy of

the protest into a set of concrete pragmatic demands. Yes, the protests did create a vacuum a vacuum in the field of hegemonic ideology, and time is needed to fill this vacuum in a proper way, as it is a pregnant
vacuum, an opening for the truly new. The reason protesters went out is that they had enough of the world where recycling your Coke cans, giving a couple of dollars to charity, or buying a cappuccino where 1% goes towards developing world troubles, is enough to make them feel good. After outsourcing work and torture, after the marriage agencies started to outsource even our dating, they saw that for a long time they were also allowing their political

engagements to be outsourced and they want them back. The art of politics is also to insist on a particular demand that, while thoroughly "realist", disturbs the very core of the hegemonic ideology: ie one that, while definitely feasible and legitimate, is de facto impossible (universal healthcare in the US was such a case). In the aftermath of the Wall Street protests, we should definitely mobilise people to make such demands however, it is no less important to simultaneously remain subtracted from the pragmatic field of negotiations and "realist" proposals. What one should always bear in mind is that any debate here and now necessarily remains a debate on enemy's turf; time is needed to deploy the new content. All we say now can be taken from us everything except our silence. This silence, this rejection of dialogue, of all forms of clinching, is our "terror", ominous and threatening as it should be.

2NC Alt
Collapse of neoliberalism is inevitable because of economic and environmental trends multiple structural trends make resuscitation impossible, which means its try-or-die for the alt
Li 10
(Minqi, Chinese Political Economist, world-systems analyst, and historical social scientist, currently an associate professor of Economics at the University of Utah The End of the End of History: The Structural Crisis of Capitalism and the Fate of Humanity, Science and Society Vol. 74, No. 3, July 2010, 290305) In 2001, the U. S. stock market bubble started to collapse, after years of new economy boom. The

Bush administration took advantage of the psychological shock of 9/11, and undertook a series of preemptive wars (first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq) that ushered in a new era of intensified inter-state conflicts. Towards the end of 2001, Argentina, which was regarded as a neoliberal model country, was hit by a devastating financial crisis. Decades of neoliberalism had not only undermined the living standards of the working
classes, but also destroyed the material fortunes of the urban middle classes (which remained a key social base for neoliberalism in Latin America until the 1990s). After the Argentine crisis, neoliberalism completely

lost political legitimacy in Latin America. This paved the way for the rise of several socialist-oriented governments on the continent. After the 2001 global recession, the global economy actually entered into a minigolden age. The big semi-peripheral economies, the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) became the most dynamic sector. The neoliberal global economy was fueled by the super-exploitation of the massive cheap labor force in the semi-periphery (especially in China). The strategy worked, to the extent that it generated massive amounts of surplus value that could be shared by the global capitalist classes. But it also created a massive realization problem. That is, as the workers in the emerging markets were deprived of purchasing power, on a global scale, there was a persistent lack of effective demand for the industrial output produced in China and the rest of the semi-periphery. After 2001, the problem was addressed through increasingly higher levels of debt-financed consumption in
the advanced capitalist countries (especially in the United States).

The neoliberal strategy was

economically and ecologically unsustainable . Economically, the debt-financed

consumption in the advanced capitalist countries could not go on indefinitely. Ecologically, the rise of the BRICs greatly accelerated resource depletion and environmental degradation on a global scale. The global ecological system is now on the verge of total collapse. The world is now in the midst of a prolonged period of economic and political instability that could last several decades. In the past, the capitalist world system had responded to similar crises and managed to undertake successful restructurings. Is it conceivable that the current crisis will result in a similar restructuring within the system that will bring about a new global New Deal? In three respects, the current world historical conjuncture is fundamentally different from that of 1945. Back in 1945, the United States was the indisputable hegemonic power. It enjoyed overwhelming industrial, financial, and military advantages relative to the other big
powers and, from the capitalist point of view, its national interests largely coincided with the world systems common and long-term interests. Now, U. S. hegemony is in irreversible decline. But none of the other big

powers is in a position to replace the United States and function as an effective hegemonic power. Thus, exactly at a time when the global capitalist system is in deep crisis, the system is also deprived of effective leadership.4 In 1945, the construction of a global New Deal involved primarily accommodating the economic and political demands of the western working classes and the non-western elites (the national bourgeoisies and the westernized intellectuals). In the current conjuncture, any new global New Deal will have to incorporate not only the western working classes but also the massive, non-western working classes. Can the capitalist world system afford such a new New Deal if it could not even afford the old one? Most importantly, back in 1945, the worlds resources remained abundant and cheap, and there was still ample global space for environmental pollution. Now, not only has resource depletion reached an advanced stage, but the world has also virtually run out of space for any further environmental pollution.

2NC AT Extinction First

You should privilege everyday violence for two reasons- A) social bias underrepresents its effects B) its effects are exponential, not linear which means even if the only causes a small amount of structural violence, its terminal impacts are huge
Nixon 11
(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3) Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethinkpolitically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow

violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his
proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however,

requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental
calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but

also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.

Prioritizing everyday violence is key- responding to it later causes error replication and movement burn out, only re-orienting focus away from macro-level violence produces sustainable political coalitions
Cuomo 96
(Chris, Prof. of Political Science @ U of Cincinnati, War is not just an event: reflections on the significan ce of everyday violence, Hypatia, vol. 11, no. 4 Fall (1994)) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or

address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists
in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime . Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current

Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The
ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence

finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisisdriven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all
of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.

***Aff

AffExtinction First
Extinction firstexistential risks require unique risk calculus
Bostrom 12
(Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and winner of the Gannon Award, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/) Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human

extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by

society . Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even
exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century. Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them. Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that

existential

risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering . Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that
counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it
doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have

that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation

has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do .
There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of

realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like
eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

AffNo Root Cause

Claims of Root Causality are Silly Oversimplifications That Explain Nothing
May 2
Collin May 12-18-2002 http://innocentsabroad.blogspot.com/2002_12_15_innocentsabroad_archive.html#90069170 Unfortunately for our scholarly friends, there is a problem with root causes. Root causes assume something that is rarely mentioned. Root

causes assume that humans can escape their moral obligations by standing outside the normal world. It assumes humans can abstract themselves from reality and go romping through history looking for the all-powerful distant cause that will explain each and every aspect of our current situation. Then, having discerned the historical secret, the wily scholar can, with a gentle wave of his hand, dismiss all those silly concerns about morality, responsibility and honor, while providing the road map for solving all our social ills. That this approach, which is really none other than the methodology of the social sciences, is simplistic in the extreme, reducing human decisions to little more than unthinking reactions to a single dominant stimulus, means little to its proponents. They accept all this because the root cause provides an immediate and simplistic explanation to impress the gullible and justify the foolish.

No single cause of conflict

Barnett et al 7
Michael, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene ODonnell, Laura Sitea, Global Governance, Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?, Questia Because there are multiple contributing causes of conflict, almost any international assistance

effort that addresses any perceived or real grievance can arguably be called "peacebuilding." Moreover, anyone invited to imagine the causes of violent conflict might generate a rather expansive laundry list of issues to be addressed in the postconflict period, including income distribution, land reform, democracy and the rule of law, human security, corruption, gender equality, refugee reintegration, economic development, ethnonational divisions, environmental degradation, transitional justice, and on and on. There are at least two good reasons for such a fertile imagination. One, there is no master variable for explaining either the outbreak of violence or the construction of a positive peace but merely groupings of factors across categories such as
greed and grievance, and catalytic events. Variables that might be relatively harmless in some contexts can be a potent cocktail in others. Conversely, we have relatively little knowledge regarding what causes peace

or what the paths to peace are. Although democratic states that have reasonably high per capita incomes are at a reduced risk of conflict, being democratic and rich is no guarantor of a positive peace, and illiberal and poor countries, at times, also have had their share of success. Second,
organizations are likely to claim that their core competencies and mandates are critical to peacebuilding. They might be right. They also might be opportunistic. After all, if peacebuilding is big business, then there are good bureaucratic reasons for claiming that they are an invaluable partner.

AffAlt Fails
No transition institutional complexity and impersonal nature of systems cause cultural assimilation only growth can solve social conflict
Barnhizer, 6
David, Prof of Law, Cleveland State U, Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream, Geo Intl Envtl L Rev, pg. l/n

Devotees of sustainability pin their hopes on an awakening by an enlightened populace that will rise up and insist that business and government behave in ways that reflect the idea that "[a] sustainable society is one that can persist over generations, one that is far-seeing enough, flexible enough, and wise enough not to undermine either its physical or its social systems of support." n81 This awakening is not going to happen . There will never be a populist revolution in the way humans value the environment, social justice, and other matters of moral consequence. We frequently "talk the talk," but rarely "walk the walk." n82 This discrepancy is partly an individual failure, but it is even more a result of the powerful forces that operate within our culture. Residents of Western cultures are shaped by the system in which they live. They will never possess either the clarity of agenda or the political will essential to a coherent and coordinated shift in behavior due to a combination of ignorance, greed, sloth, and inundation by political and consumerist propaganda. This combination means there will be no values shift welling up from the people and demanding the transformation of our systems of production and resource use. Paul Tournier captured the essence of the cultural forces when he observed: [People] have become merely
cogs in the machine of production, tools, functions. All that matters is what they do, not what they think or feel. . . . [T]heir thoughts and feelings are . . . molded by propaganda, press, cinema and radio. They read the same newspaper each day, hear the same slogans, see the same advertisements. n83 Feeling helpless in the face of inordinate complexity

and vast impersonal forces causes us to flee from our personal responsibility and become absorbed into the systems of institutions. The price of the required allegiance includes accepting (or appearing to accept) the institution's values as our own. We become a contributing part of the same system that oppresses us and steals our humanity and idealism . This assimilation allows us to avoid the harshest application of the system's power while reaping the rewards of collaboration. We become, in the [*629] words of Pink Floyd, "just another brick in the wall." n84 When we attempt to talk about
the need to do such things as internalize costs that are now allowed to remain external to the entities generating the harms and shifting to a system of low or no impact on the Earth's natural systems, we are talking about fundamental, non-voluntary changes in entitlements and lifestyle. Even Alan Greenspan drew severe criticism when he recently suggested that social security benefits should be reduced. n85 Jacques Chirac's party in France has seen its public support plummet due to efforts to reduce social spending. n86 Germans have taken to the streets in the hundreds of thousands to protest their leaders' efforts to develop plans to gain control of the German welfare stat e. n87 It

is impossible to generate the political will that would be required to change the system we have constructed into one that satisfies the demands of sustainability. This is not surprising because the clear message is that we need economic growth . The situation we face is akin to
Bangladesh where I was part of a group urging the country's Planning Minister to take potential environmental harms and ecosystem impacts into greater account in his planning. He responded that the ideas were admirable in theory but that he had to worry about generating jobs and food for 160 million people. He indicated that while he respected the arguments for sustainability his more immediate needs were to ensure jobs and food for Bangladeshis. In a similar context, while teaching international environmental law in St. Petersburg, Russia, my discussion with Russian academic colleagues related to water pollution in the area, radioactive materials dumping, and the raw air pollution from Lada cars running on 76 octane gasoline and other uncontrolled emitters of air pollution that fouled the air of this most beautiful city. At the end of the course one of my Russian colleagues said, "I found it all fascinating. But you know we have other problems with which we must deal before we can begin to worry about the environment. Perhaps in fifteen years or so we will be ready." I found myself unable to disagree with the speakers in either Bangladesh or Russia. Return to the idea of our inability to generate the political will that would be required to achieve fundamental change if we decided that the Agenda 21 type of sustainable development ideas were good social and economic strategies .

Even if [*630] they were desirable, they are "impossible dreams" because the people and institutions who set policy and decide on actions in the business and governmental arenas will never accept them as guides for behavior or as requirements for decisionmaking. This impossibility exists because we are not free and independent individuals but creatures of habit, dominated by the culture in which we exist. We desire to behave according to the dictates of the
powerful systems that govern our lives and culture.

AffPerm
Perm solves the worst excesses of their neoliberalism impacts, while retaining benefits of globalization on human welfare.
Bovill and Leppard 6
Catherine Bovill and Margaret Leppard, Centre for Academic Practice, Queen Margaret University College. Population policies and education: exploring the contradictions of neo-liberal globalization. Globalisation, Societies and Education. Vol. 4, No. 3, November 2006, pp. 393414. EbscoHost.

Alternative voices commonly stand in polar opposition to neo-liberal globalisation and view this paradigm as a blanket evil, yet they ignore any potential benefits of this paradigm including, for example, the increase in family planning services in many areas of the world
(there may be limited choice where before there was no choice). Nevertheless, evidence from previous population programmes demonstrates the severe damage caused by neo-liberal influence on global population policies. Opening

debate within the middle ground involves acknowledging that there are lessons to learn from global neo-liberalism. It involves moving away from polar extremes where on principle opposing camps reject outright the stance of the other to a wider reflexive space in which to devise more creative and realistic alternatives that have greater possibility of reaching a winwin outcome. It involves choosing to learn lessons from what many perceive to be a polar extreme rather than discarding these lessons and beginning again with a blank sheet. Even where alternative approaches to population policies try to distance themselves from neoliberalism the influence of the paradigm remains. Crucially therefore, assumptions and prior learning derived from this paradigm need to be made explicit. There have been some attempts at finding alternatives to neo-liberal domination. However, Anthony Giddens Third Way does not challenge the dominance of neoliberalism (Giddens, 1999), and Wilhelms Fourth Way ignores neo-liberalism, arguing the need to start from scratch (Wilhelm, 1999 ). The effects

of neo-liberal globalisation cannot be erased, indeed the lessons of neo-liberalism are valuable and many authors acknowledge the important role of economic growth in conjunction with increased commitment to social, health and education goals necessary for successful development (Mehrohtra, 1997; Ghai, 2000). A challenge for middle ground alternatives is to promote both socially positive elements of neo-liberalism and state intervention but also to limit their worst excesses. For example, the middle ground might call for the state and civil society to adopt greater
control of social goods such as health care that are poorly distributed using the market mechanism.

AffNeolib Good
Frame the alternative within consequentialism neoliberalism is most ethical because all practical alternatives are worse and cause violecne
Richards 9 PhD in Philosophy @ Princeton
Jay Richards, PhD with honors in Philosophy and Theology from Princeton, Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism Is the Solution and Not the Problem, pg. 31-32 Myth no. 1: The Nirvana Myth (contrasting capitalism with an unrealizable ideal rather than

with its live alternatives) But the myth can have subtle effects even if we reject utopian schemes. To avoid its dangers, we have to resist the temptation to compare our live options with an ideal that we can never realize. When we ask whether we can build a just society, we need to keep the question nailed to solid ground: just compared with what? It doesnt do anyone any good to tear down a society that is unjust compared with the kingdom of God if that society is more just than any of the ones that will replace it. Compared with Nirvana, no real society looks good. Compared with utopia, Stalinist Russia and America at its best will both get bad reviews. The differences between them may seem trivial compared to utopia. Thats one of the grave dangers of utopian thinking: it blinds us to the important differences among the various ways of ordering society. The Nirvana Myth dazzles the eyes, to the point that the real alternatives all seem like dull and barely distinguishable shades of gray. The free exchange of wages for work in the marketplace starts to look like slavery. Tough competition for market share between companies is confused with theft and survival of the fittest. Banking is confused with usury and exploitation. This shouldnt surprise us. Of course a modern capitalist society like the United States looks terrible compared with the kingdom of God. But thats bad moral reasoning. The question isnt whether capitalism measures up to the kingdom of God. The question is whether theres a better alternative in this life. Those who condemn the immorality of liberal capitalism do so in comparison with a society of saints that has never existedand never will. Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works If were going to compare modern capitalism with an extreme, we should compare it with a real extremelike communism in Cambodia, China, or the Soviet Union. Unlike Nirvana, these experiments are well within our power to bring about. They all reveal the terrible cost of trying to create a society in which everyone is economically equal. If we insist on comparing live options with live options, modern capitalism could hardly be more different, more just, or more desirable than such an outcome. That doesnt mean we should rest on our laurels. It means we need to stay focused on reality rather than romantic ideals. So how should we answer the question that began this chap- ter: cant we build a just society? The answer: we should do everything we can to build a more just society and a more just world. And the worst way to do that is to try to create an egalitarian utopia.

AffNeolib GoodHuman Welfare

Neoliberalism improves human welfare.
Gerring and Thacker 8 Professors of Political Science and IR @ Boston University
John Gerring, Boston University Department of Political Science and Strom C. Thacker, Boston University Department of International Relations. Do Neoliberal Economic Policies Kill or Save Lives?. Bussiness and Politics Volume 10, Issue 3 200 8. http://people.bu.edu/jgerring/documents/IMRpolicy.pdf While far from exhaustive, the robustness tests undertaken in this study suggest that the main

findings are not likely to be an artifact of arbitrary model specifications or estimation techniques. On balance, there appears to be a strong relationship between neoliberal economic policies and improved human welfare, as measured by infant mortality rates. It is important to note that this
relationship persists even while controlling for level of economic development. This is an interesting finding, since we tend to think of neoliberal economic policies operating upon human development primarily in an indirect manner. According to proponents, market-friendly policies should enhance growth, which should, in turn, improve human wellbeing. The fact

that, independent of their effect of economic development, these neoliberal economic policies are still significantly associated with improved human welfare suggests that an even stronger overall causal relationship may be at work. If, that is, neoliberal policies have a tendency to promote long-term growth, then we may presume that their net effect on IMR is even stronger than measured by
coefficients on key neoliberal variables in Tables 1 and 2, given that economic development is, itself, a major factor in the reduction of infant mortality. We do not attempt to model the precise nature of this indirect causal relationship because this would require strong assumptions about neoliberalisms causal effect on growth performance, a contentions topic that lies beyond the scope of this study.

Neoliberalism is associated with better human welfare.

Tracy et al. 9
MELISSA TRACY, Doctoral student, Department of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, University of Michigan, MARGARET E. KRUK, Assistant Professor of Health Management and Policy, School of Public Health, University of Michigan, CHRISTINE HARPER, Research Assistant, Department of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, University of Michigan, SANDRO GALEA, Professor of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, Director, Center for Global Health, University of Michigan, Neo-liberal economic practices and population health: a cross-national analysis,19802004. Health Economics, Policy and Law. 2009. http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64035/1/Tracy_neo%20liberal_2009.pdf

Three central findings emerge from our results. Access to sound money had the single-most robust association with lower under-five mortality across countries in all analyses. Protection of property rights was also associated with lower under-five mortality in all countries in the more parsimonious analyses (not adjusting for income inequality, social capital or female literacy). Both these policy areas can theoretically be linked with better economic prospects for households that may, in turn, lead to improved health outcomes. Among more developed countries (i.e. those with average incomes above approximately US $3000), less market regulation was also associated with lower child and adult male mortality. It is plausible that in these countries, the majority of which already have basic infrastructure and other
determinants of health (e.g. closed sewers, treated water systems, quality health care) in place and thus relatively good population health, a more robust private enterprise may further improve health.

AffNeolib GoodWar
History is on our side globalization and neoliberal economic policies has limited major conflicts.
Gresser 7
Edward Gresser, Director of the Project on Trade and Global Markets @ Progressive Policy Institute. "Is 'Free Trade' Working?". Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Interstate Commerce, Trade and Tourism. April 18, 2007. http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=108&subid=206&contentid=254256 Most important, the crisis of the 1930s has never been repeated and economic integration seems

to be fulfilling its hopes as a guarantor of peace. No two great powers have come into conflict since the 1960s -- the longest such period I know of; and a major study last year found wars rarer than at any time since the 1820s, suggesting that this is in part because the world is more open: "an open global trading regime means it is nearly always cheaper to buy resources from overseas than to use force to acquire them."

Every relevant example in the last thirty years suggests that neoliberal market policies dramatically decrease violence
Tures 3 Associate Professor of Political Science @ LaGrange College
John A. Tures, Associate Professor of Political Science at LaGrange College, 2003, ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND CONFLICT REDUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1970S, 1980S, AND 1990S, Cato Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3. http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22n3/cj22n3-9.pdf

The last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of market-based reforms and the profusion of economic freedom in the international system. This shift in
economic policy has sparked a debate about whether free markets are superior to state controls. Numerous studies have compared the neoliberal and statist policies on issues of production capacity, economic growth, commercial vol- umes, and egalitarianism. An overlooked research agenda, however, is the relationship between levels of economic freedom and violence within countries. Proponents of the statist approach might note that a strong gov- ernment can bend the market to its will, directing activity toward policies necessary to achieve greater levels of gross domestic product and growth. By extracting more resources for the economy, a pow- erful state can redistribute benefits to keep the populace happy. Higher taxes can also pay for an army and police force that intimidate people. Such governments range from command economies of totali- tarian systems to autocratic dictators and military juntas. Other eco- nomically unfree systems include some of the authoritarian Asian tigers. A combination of historical evidence, modern theorists, and statis-

tical findings, however, has indicated that a reduced role for the state in regulating economic transactions is associated with a decrease in internal conflicts. Countries where the government dominates the commercial realm experience an increase in the level of domestic violence. Scholars have traced the history of revolutions to explain the relationship between statism and internal upheavals. Contemporary authors also posit a relationship between economic liberty and peace. Statistical tests show a strong connection between economic freedom and conflict reduction during the past three decades.