Belief is Not the Issue: A Defence of Inference to the Best Explanation

Gregory W. Dawes
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Abstract
Defences of inference to the best explanation 7IBE8 fre9uently associate IBE with scientific realis", the i!ea that it is reasonable to belie0e our best scientific theories$ I argue that this lin2age is unfortunate$ IBE !oes not warrant belief, since the fact that a theory is the best a0ailable explanation !oes not show it to be 7e0en probably8 true$ :hat IBE !oes warrant is acceptance: ta2ing a proposition as a pre"ise in theoretical an!#or practical reasoning$ :e ought to accept our best scientific theories since they are the theories that are "ost li2ely to lea! to the goal of science, which is that of 2nowle!ge$ In support of this clai" I in0o2e Bill 3ycan6s ;anglossian reflections regar!ing <other Nature$%

I a" grateful to Alan <usgra0e for !iscussions, often o0er lunch, regar!ing the sub'ect of this paper$ :hile I !on6t expect hi" to accept "y conclusions, I loo2 forwar! to further li0ely !ebates$

Intro uction
A fre9uent pattern of reasoning, both in the sciences an! in e0ery!ay life, is that 2nown as =inference to the best explanation6 7IBE8$ >ere6s an e0ery!ay exa"ple$ =I hear a scratching in the wall, the patter of little feet at "i!night, "y cheese !isappears ? an! I infer that a "ouse has co"e to li0e with "e6$ - Each of these pheno"ena ? the scratching, the patter, the !isappearance of the cheese ? coul! ha0e another explanation$ There "ight e0en exist a single, alternati0e explanation that co0ers the" all$ But for a 0ariety of reasons, such as si"plicity, econo"y, an! plausibility, the "ouse hypothesis see"s to be the best$ >ere6s another exa"ple$ In %@.+ /harles Darwin publishe! On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection $ In that wor2 he cites a 0ariety of pheno"ena ? the geographical !istribution of species, the existence of ho"ologous anato"ic structures an! 0estigial organs, the rese"blance of e"bryos of !iffering species, an! the fossil recor! ? an! suggests they are better explaine! gi0en his theory of natural selection than on the alternati0e 0iew of special creation$ >is conte"poraries woul! ha0e !escribe! this as a =consilience of in!uctions6, in which a range of !ifferent pheno"ena are seen to be explicable by reference to the one causal principle$ , But particularly since Darwin was contrasting this potential explanation with another ? that of special creation ( ? it is "ore helpfully 0iewe! as an inference to the best explanation$ 1ince this pattern of explanation was gi0en its "o!ern na"e by Ailbert >ar"an in %+).,. its significance has been !ispute!$ Bust what, if anything, shoul! be the conclusion of an inference of this
, ( .
Bas /$ 0an Craassen, The Scientific Image /laren!on 3ibrary of 3ogic an! ;hilosophy 7Dxfor!: /laren!on ;ress, %+@&8, pp$%+?-&$ Bohn 3osee, A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science ,r! e!ition5 Dpus Boo2s 7Dxfor!: Dxfor! Eni0ersity ;ress, %++,8, p$%,,$ Neal /$ Aillespie, Charles Dar in and the Problem of Creation 7/hicago: Eni0ersity of /hicago ;ress, %+*+8, pp$)*?@%$ Ailbert >$ >ar"an, =The Inference to the Best Explanation6, The Philo! sophical "e#ie *( 7%+).8, pp$@@?+.$

2in!F Does the fact that so"ething is the best a0ailable explanation gi0e us a!e9uate reason to belie0e in the existence of the entities that it "entionsF Dr shoul! we withhol! belief, since the explanation in 9uestion "ay be nothing "ore than =the best of a ba! lot6F ) In!ee!, is there any 0alue in this line of reasoning at allF Is it, perhaps, nothing "ore than a !resse!-up 0ersion of the fallacy of affir"ing the conse9uentF A notable feature of these !iscussions is that they are associate! with wi!er !ebates regar!ing scientific realis"$ Do we ha0e a!e9uate reason to regar! our best scientific theories as 7approxi"ately or partially8 true, e0en when they spea2 of entities we coul! ne0er obser0eF Dr shoul! we conclu!e "erely that our best theories are =e"pirically a!e9uate6, offering a correct account of the obser0able regularities of our worl!F As it happens, "ost !efen!ers of IBE ha0e been scientific realists, who refuse to belie0e =that a false theory woul! explain, in so satisfactory a "anner G se0eral large classes of facts6$* <any opponents, on the other han!, ha0e been non-realists, who oppose the i!ea that IBE warrants belief, particularly belief in unobser0able entities$ It is wi!ely ac2nowle!ge!, e0en by realists, that the non-realists ha0e a point$ After all, to belie0e a theory "eans hol!ing it to be true, an! we cannot si"ply assu"e that the best a0ailable explanation will be the true one$ The proble" here is twofol!$ Cirstly, the true explanation "ay be one we ha0e not yet !isco0ere!$ 1econ!ly, at least so"e of the criteria by which we 'u!ge an explanation to be the best a0ailable 7such as si"plicity8 are not clearly truth-in!icati0e$ But shoul! the !ebate regar!ing IBE be so closely relate! to that regar!ing realis"F <y argu"ent is that this lin2age has been unfortunate$ It is focuse! attention on the 9uestion of whether IBE gi0es us a!e9uate reason to belie0e a theory, that is to say, to hol! it to be true$ It is this focus on belief that I shall argue is unhelpful$ The i") *
Bas /$ 0an Craassen, $a s and Symmetry 7Dxfor!: Dxfor! Eni0ersity ;ress, %+@+8, p$%(,$ /harles Darwin, On the Origin of Species -n! e!ition 73on!on: Bohn <urray, %@)&8, pp$(@&?@%$

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portant issue, as far as IBE is concerne!, is not whether we ha0e a!e9uate reason to belie#e a theory, but whether we ha0e a!e9uate reason to accept it$ Acceptance, I shall argue, will often go han!-inhan! with belief, but it nee! not !o so$ Nor is it i"portant that it shoul!$ It is sufficient for the progress of science, that scientists shoul! accept the best a0ailable explanation, whether or not they happen to belie0e it$ <ore i"portantly, we ha0e excellent reasons to accept the best a0ailable explanation, e#en if 7as non-realists argue8 we ha0e little or no reason to hol! it to be true$ Belief, in other wor!s, is not the issue$

1. Acceptance an Belief
<y argu"ent, therefore, relies on being able to "a2e a clear !istinction between acceptance an! belief$ I a" not basing this !istinction on the way in which these ter"s are actually use!, in e0ery!ay speech$ It "ay be the case that in e0ery!ay usage, acceptance is often synony"ous with belief$ :hat I a" arguing is that these ter"s can be use! to capture a real !istinction in propositional attitu!es$ To accept a proposition is not necessarily to belie0e it, e0en if the two often go together$ There is nothing special about "y use of the wor! =acceptance6 here$ The !istinction coul!, perhaps, be capture! by using another wor!, such as =assent6$ @ But tal2 of acceptance an! belief is a helpful way of i!entifying two propositional attitu!es that are !istinct e0en if co""only con'oine!$ A nu"ber of recent authors ha0e also atte"pte! to !istinguish between belief an! acceptance$ + But they ha0e !one so for a 0ariety of purposes an! in a 0ariety of ways$ 1o"e !efinitions of what it
@
:illia" ;$ Alston, =Belief, Acceptance, an! Heligious Caith6, in %aith& %ree! dom& and "ationality' Philosophy of "eligion Today , e!ite! by B$ Bor!an an! D$ >owar!-1ny!er 73on!on: How"an I 3ittlefiel!, %++)8, pp$,?-*, at p$@$ These inclu!e inclu!ing :illia" Alston, <ichael Brat"an, 3$ Bonathan /ohen, Jeith 3ehrer, Bohn ;erry, Hobert 1talna2er, an! Bas 0an Craassen: see ;ascal Engel, =Intro!uction6 in (elie#ing and Accepting, e!ite! by ;ascal Engel, ;hilosophical 1tu!ies 1eries @, 7Dor!recht: Jluwer, -&&&8, pp$%?,&, at p$@, as well as the literature cite! below$

"eans to accept a proposition "a2e acceptance in!istinguishable fro" belief$ D$ 1$ /lar2e, for instance, insists that acceptance actually entails belief, but assu"es a broa! 0iew of acceptance that I shall shortly re'ect$%& 1i"ilarly, ;aul >orwich argues that acceptance is functionally i!entical with belief, but assu"es an instru"entalist 0iew of acceptance ? =belie0ing 'ust the obser0able conse9uences of a theory6%% ? that I also re'ect$ Dne can also !efine belief in ways that un!er"ine this !istinction$ >er"an !e Hegt, for instance, !efines belief as =a !isposition to act6$ %- But if one !efines belief in ter"s of a !isposition to act, then it is practically in!istinguishable fro" what I shall call =acceptance6$

1.1 Assu$ptions %egar ing Belief

1o what I nee! for the purposes of "y argu"ent is a wor2able concept of acceptance$ I shall spen! little ti"e on what I "ean by belief$ I a" assu"ing that to belie0e so"ething is to consi!er it to be true, the =so"ething6 here being concei0e! of as a proposition, an utterance, or so"e other bearer of "eaning$ En!erstoo! in this way, belief is not to be thought of as a !isposition to act, nor e0en as a !isposition to assert$ It can be !efine! as a !isposition, but its "ost characteristic feature is a ten!ency to experience a certain 2in! of "ental state$ Belief is, as 3$ Bonathan /ohen writes,
a !isposition, when one is atten!ing to issues raise!, or ite"s referre! to, by the proposition that p, nor"ally to feel it true that p an! false that not-p, whether or not one is willing to act, spea2, or reason accor!ingly$%,

%& D$ 1$ /lar2e, =Does Acceptance Entail BeliefF6, American Philosophical )uarterly ,% 7%++(8, pp$%(.?.., at p$%(+$ %% ;aul >orwich, =Dn the Nature an! Nor"s of Theoretical /o""it"ent6, Philosophy of Science .@ 7%++%8, pp$%?%(, at p$,$ %- >er"an /$ D$ A$ !e Hegt, =To Belie0e in Belief: ;opper an! 0an Craassen on 1cientific Healis"6, *ournal for +eneral Philosophy of Science , -eits! chrift f.r allgemeine /issenschaftstheorie ,* 7-&&)8, pp$-%?,+, at p$,,$ %, 3$ Bonathan /ohen, An 0ssay on (elief and Acceptance 7Dxfor!: /laren!on ;ress, %++-8, p$($

&

A person who has such a !isposition will, if she is acting rationally an! has no reason to !o otherwise, be incline! to act in ways that are consistent with her belief$ 1he will also be incline!, other things being e9ual, to assert the truth of that which she belie0es$ 7Belief can be regar!e! as a comple1 !ispositional state$8 But belief, as I un!erstan! it, shoul! not be defined in ter"s of a !isposition to act or to assert$ After all, one coul! ha0e a !isposition to assert p or to act as if p were true, without belie0ing that p$ Dne coul!, for instance, be !isse"bling, "erely preten!ing to belie0e$ %(

1.! A Broa Definition of Acceptance

=Acceptance6, howe0er, is not so easily !efine!$ The proble" here is that the ter" is so"eti"es use! in a broa! sense, which !istinguishes acceptance an! belief so sharply as to !eny that there is any relation between acceptance an! truth$ An!rei Buc2areff, for instance, spea2s of =non-!oxastic acceptance6, an! argues that while =belief ai"s at truth, G acceptance ai"s at utility or success6%. >e also argues that while beliefs are such that they ought to for" a coherent set ? new beliefs a!!e! to the set shoul! be consistent with the ol!%) ? acceptance is not sub'ect to such a constraint$ %* But on "y 0iew of acceptance, acceptance has truth rather than so"e other 2in! of utility as its ai" 7see %$,8 an! the propositions that we accept ought 7at least i!eally8 to be consistent with one another 7see -$%8$ 3$ Bonathan /ohen6s !efinition of acceptance is also broa!er than the one I wish to e"ploy$ =To accept that p6, /ohen writes,
is to ha0e or a!opt a policy of !ee"ing, positing, or postulating that p ? that is, of going along with that proposition 7either for the long ter" or for i""e!iate purposes only8 as a pre"iss in so"e or all contexts for one6s own an! others6 proofs, argu"entations, in-

%( Alston, =Belief, Acceptance, an! Heligious Caith6, p$*$ %. An!rei Buc2areff, =Acceptance Does Not Entail Belief6 International *ournal of Philosophical Studies %@ 7-&%&8, pp$-..?)%, at p$-..$ %) Engel, =Intro!uction6, p$,$ %* Buc2areff, =Acceptance Does Not Entail Belief6, p$-..$

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ferences, !eliberations, etc$, whether or not one assents an! whether or not one feels it to be true that p$%@

This broa! !efinition of acceptance captures 9uite accurately, for instance, the sense in which a lawyer shoul! =accept6 the innocence of his client or a 'ury shoul! =accept6 the innocence of the accuse!$ Both shoul! act as if they belie0e! hi" to be innocent$ The proble" is that the reasons that rightly "oti0ate acceptance 7in this sense8 "ay bear no relation to the goal of truth$ A lawyer, for instance, "ight choose to accept that his client is innocent, %+ but he !oes not !o so with the ai" of !isco0ering whether he really is innocent$ In!ee!, he "ay alrea!y be utterly con0ince! that he is guilty an! this belief "ay re"ain unchange! throughout the trial$ But this "a2es no !ifference to his act of acceptance, un!erstoo! in /ohen6s sense$ There is another i"portant !ifference here$ Acceptance in the sense offere! by Buc2areff an! /ohen "ay be entirely contextual$ Dne "ay accept a proposition, in their sense, only in a particular setting, while being un!er no obligation to accept it outsi!e that setting$ The lawyer, for instance, is oblige! to accept the innocence of his client only for the !uration an! purposes of the trial$ If he has "aintaine! this particular attitu!e throughout the trial ? if he has spo2en an! acte! in a way that assu"es the innocence of his client ? he has not breache! his obligation to the client if he later a!"its 7perhaps to his colleagues an! after a con0iction8 that he always belie0e! his client to be guilty$ But in "y narrower sense of acceptance, it is a global attitu!e: to accept a proposition is to accept it in any context in which it is appropriately e"ploye!$ As I note! earlier, the legiti"acy of IBE is "ost co""only !iscusse! with regar! to the philosophy of science$ But although there are contexts in which the broa! !efinition of acceptance e"ploye! by Buc2areff an! /ohen is useful an! appropriate, the philosophy of science is not one of the"$ As those authors point out, there are ti"es when we accept a proposition, in the sense of acting on it, for entirely prag"atic reasons$ But this !oesn6t see" to be the sense in
%@ 3$ Bonathan /ohen, =Belief an! Acceptance6, Mind +@ 7%+@+8, pp$,)*?@+, at p$,)@$ %+ /ohen, =Belief an! Acceptance6, p$,)+$

which scientists accept the best a0ailable explanation of so"e puKKling pheno"enon$ :hether or not we ha0e a!e9uate reason to regar! any scientific theory as true, the sciences !o see" to ha0e as their goal the pursuit of 2nowle!ge, which 7at least on any tra!itional account8 entails truth 7see 1ection ,8$ If this is correct, then a conception of acceptance that !oes not ha0e truth as its ai" will be inappropriate$-&

1." Acceptance with the Goal of )nowle ge

Cor this reason, I shall a!opt a narrower !efinition of acceptance, which does ha0e a relation to what see"s to be the goal of the sciences$ The first part of "y !efinition rese"bles that offere! by /ohen: to accept a proposition is to e"ploy it as a pre"ise in one6s reas oning, whether theoretical or practical, in any !o"ain to which it "ight apply$ But it a!!s a con!ition that I ha0e ta2en fro" the wor2 of Jeith 3ehrer$ Acceptance, argues 3ehrer, is to be !efine! by reference to its purpose or goal$ An! the goal or purpose of acceptance is that of =attaining truth an! a0oi!ing error with respect to the 0ery thing one accepts6$-% 1o, on "y 0iew, to accept a proposition is to em! ploy it as a premise in one2s reasoning& hether theoretical or prac! tical& in any domain to hich it might apply& ith the goal of attain! ing 3no ledge4 It follows that the person accepting a proposition, in this sense, an! the person belie0ing it ha0e the sa"e goal$ They are both ai"ing at 2nowle!ge, which entails truth$ The !ifference is that the person belie0ing a proposition assu"es ? howe0er pro0isionally an! with !ue 9ualifications ? that she has attaine! that goal$ After all, that is what belief "eans: it "eans hol!ing so"ething to be true$ But to accept a proposition is not to assu"e that the goal has been reache!, since one can accept a proposition without belie0ing it, e0en pro0i-& Dne can !escribe this 0iew of science as =axiological realis"6$ It hol!s that scientific theories ai" at truth, whether or not we ha0e any reason to belie0e they ha0e achie0e! their ai"$ 1ee Ti"othy D$ 3yons, =Towar! a ;urely Axiological 1cientific Healis"6, 0r3enntnis ), 7-&&.8, pp$%)*?-&(, at p$%)*$ -% Jeith 3ehrer, Theory of 5no ledge -n! e!ition 7Boul!er, /D: :est0iew ;ress, -&&&8, p$%,$

sionally$-- In accepting a scientific theory, one "ight e0en hope that it is true5 one "ight hope that on this occasion the goal of 2nowle!ge has in fact been reache!$ But the act of accepting the theory !oes not co""it one, e0en i"plicitly or tentati0ely, to the i!ea that it has$ E0en on this narrow !efinition of acceptance ? ta2ing to be true in the course of one6s reasoning with the goal of attaining 2nowle!ge ? acceptance re"ains !istinct fro" belief$ In particular, acceptance 7as I un!erstan! it8 !oes not entail belief$ -, Cro" =S accepts that p6 one cannot 0ali!ly infer that S belie0es that p$ >ere6s an exa"ple$-( /onte"porary physicists generally accept the theory of 9uantu" "echanics !e0elope! in the %+-&s by Erwin 1chrL!inger, :erner >eisenberg, an! <ax Born$ This inclu!es the intuiti0ely surprising uncertainty principle: the i!ea that it is i"possible to !eter"ine both the position an! the "o"entu" of a subato"ic particle$ A physicist coul! accept this theory, on the groun!s that it has been enor"ously successful, while also failing to belie0e it$ In!ee! on the 0iew I a" !efen!ing, a scientist ought to accept this theory, as the best a0ailable explanation of the beha0iour of subato"ic particles$ 1he ought to e"ploy it as a pre"ise in any further reasoning in the rele0ant !o"ain$ But we cannot infer fro" the fact that a particular physicist accepts this principle that she belie0es it$ 1he "ay, for instance, fin! it i"possible to belie0e that there is not so"e hi!!en 0ariable that, if 2nown, woul! allow for a precise pre!iction of both 9uantities$ 1he "ay regar! it as the best a0ailable theory, an! therefore the one to be wor2e! with, without regar!ing it as true$ If acceptance has 2nowle!ge as its goal an! if 2nowle!ge entails truth, this "ight see" to entail that one cannot accept a proposition that one belie0es to be false$ If we are !ealing with si"ple propositions, this see"s correct, but if we are !ealing with scientific theor-- :illia" Alston 7=Belief, Acceptance, an! Heligious Caith6, p$%%8 also outlines a !istinction that rese"bles "y own, but then i"perils it by arguing that =to accept that p is to regar! it as true6$ -, Alston, =Belief, Acceptance, an! Heligious Caith6, p$%&$ -( Cor other exa"ples, see 3ehrer, Theory of 5no ledge, %-. an! Alston, =Belief, Acceptance, an! Heligious Caith6, pp$%%?%-$

ies, the situation is "ore co"plex$ There are at least two proble"s here$-. The first is that scientific theories co""only in0ol0e i!ealiKations or approxi"ations, which woul! be true only un!er con!itions that !o not actually obtain$ 1urfaces are treate! as though they are frictionless, e0en though no such surfaces exist$ Clui!s are treate! as though they were continuous, e0en though they are "a!e up of !iscrete "olecules$ An! so on$ Dne can accept a scientific theory as a whole, e0en though one recogniKes that so"e of its assu"ptions are, when ta2en at face 0alue, false$ -) A relate! proble" is that scientists "ay accept, in the sense of choosing to wor2 with, a theory that has at least one in!isputably false obser0ational conse9uence$-* In this situation, the theory cannot be true, at least as it stan!s$ It "ay, of course, be partially true, in the sense of "a2ing true pre!ictions within a certain !o"ain, un!er certain con!itions, or as a li"iting case$ -@ But it cannot be regar!e! as true tout court, that is to say, without so"e such 9ualification$ In these circu"stances a scientist will be reluctant to say that he or she belie#es the theory$-+ But she "ay consi!er herself to ha0e excellent reason to accept it$ 1uch cases pro0i!e further e0i!ence of the nee! to !istinguish belief an! acceptance$ But they !o not un!er"ine the i!ea that the acceptance of scientific theories has 2nowle!ge as its goal$ A scientist "ay a!"it that partial truth "ay be the best we can achie0e at the
-. In fact, there exists a thir! proble", which has to !o with the acceptance of inconsistent theories, but I shall !eal with that shortly 7-$%8$ -) I a" grateful to 3ucy :eston-Taylor for re"in!ing "e of this$ -* I a" grateful to an anony"ous referee for !rawing "y attention to this fact$ -@ Alan <usgra0e, =He0isiting /ritical Hationalis": /ritical Hationalis", Explanation, an! 1e0ere Tests6, in 0rror and Inference' "ecent 01changes on 01perimental "easoning& "eliability& and the Ob6ecti#ity and "ationality of Science e!ite! by Deborah A$ <ayo an! Aris 1panos 7New 4or2: /a"bri!ge Eni0ersity ;ress, -&%&8, pp$@@?%%-, at pp$%&%?,$ -+ Ernan <c<ullin, =A /ase for 1cientific Healis"6 7%+@(8, in Philosophy of Science' Contemporary "eadings e!ite! by 4uri Balasho0 an! Alex Hosenberg5 Houtle!ge /onte"porary Hea!ings in ;hilosophy 73on!on: Houtle!ge, -&&-8, pp$-(@?@%, at p$-*.$

1,

present "o"ent or that an i!ealiKe! law ? such as one that ignores friction ? is the best way of wor2ing towar!s successful pre!ictions$ But this !oes not "ean that she has aban!one! goal of =attaining truth an! a0oi!ing error with respect to the 0ery thing MsheN accepts6$,& Aalileo Aalilei see"s to ha0e been the first scientist to propose laws of "otion that ignore! 7for the "o"ent8 =the resistance of the "e!iu"6$,% To accept such laws is not to aban!on the goal of truth: Aalileo, after all, 0igorously re'ecte! instru"entalist interpretations of science$,- It is to recogniKe 7as he !i!8 that the path to that goal "ay be in!irect$

! Inference to the Best Explanation

:hat, then, can we "a2e of inference to the best explanation 7IBE8F I shall begin with a pro"ising account of IBE, which fran2ly ac2nowle!ges the non-realist6s ob'ection$ It hol!s that although the fact that so"ething is the best a0ailable explanation !oes not show it to be 7e0en probably8 true, it !oes "a2e it reasonable for us to be lie0e it$ I shall then set out "y own 0iew, by way of contrast$ It will !iffer in two respects$ Cirst of all, it will suggest that IBE warrants acceptance rather than belief$ 1econ!ly, it will set out this conclusion in ter"s of an =ought6$ Hather than saying that it is reasonable to belie0e the best a0ailable explanation, it will argue that we ought to accept it$

!.1 IBE an Belief

In the context of a 0igorous !efence of scientific realis", Alan <usgra0e offers a no0el !efence of IBE$ This in0ol0es a re'ection of what
,& 3ehrer, Theory of 5no ledge, p$%,$ ,% Aalileo Aalilei, Dialogues Concerning T o Ne Sciences MDiscorsi e di! mostra7ioni matematiche intorno a due nuo#e scien7e N 7%),@8 translate! by >enry /rew an! Alfonso !e 1al0io 7New 4or2: Do0er ;ublications, %+%(8, pp$-.%?.,$ ,- Aalileo Aalilei, =/onsi!erations on the /opernican Dpinion6 7%)%.8, in The +alileo Affair' A Documentary History, translate! an! e!ite! by <aurice A$ Cinocchiaro5 /alifornia 1tu!ies in the >istory of 1cience 7Ber2eley, /A: Eni0ersity of /alifornia ;ress, %+@+8, pp$*&?@), at pp$*@?*+$

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he calls ='ustificationis"6, the 0iew that =a 'ustification for belie0ing "ust be a 'ustification for the belief6$ ,, The 2ey !istinction here is that between the act of belie#ing an! the content of the belief$ <usgra0e argues that we "ay ha0e a!e9uate reason for an act of belie0ing that fall short of an argu"ent for the truth of what we belie0e$ As we ha0e seen, critics of IBE argue that the fact that so"ething is the best a0ailable explanation !oes not !e"onstrate it to be 7e0en probably8 true$ <usgra0e agrees, but on the basis of this !istinction he argues that IBE nonetheless warrants an act of belie0ing$ >is gui!ing principle here is the i!ea that we acting reasonably in belie0ing the best a0ailable explanation, e0en if the fact that it is the best a0ailable explanation !oes not show it to be 7e0en probably8 true$ It follows, on <usgra0e6s 0iew, that the for" of inference to the best explanation is as follows$
7a8 The surprising fact 0 is obser0e!$ 7b8 >ypothesis H woul! be a satisfactory explanation of 0$ 7c8 No a0ailable co"peting hypothesis woul! 0 as well as H !oes$ 7!8 It is reasonable to belie0e the best a0ailable potential explanation of any fact, pro0i!e! that explanation is a satisfactory one$ 7e8 Therefore it is reasonable to belie0e H$

If this is correct, IBE is 'ustifie! not because we can assu"e that the best a0ailable theory is true, but because it is reasonable to belie0e such a theory$ This is an attracti0e 0iew, for a 0ariety of reasons$ Its central proble" has to !o with pre"ise 7!8$ As opponents of realis" argue, the fact that proposition p is the best a0ailable explanation of so"e fact !oes not show it to be e0en probably true$ But if this is the case, it is !ifficult to see what reason one has to belie0e it, that is to say, to regar! it as true$ I shall argue in a "o"ent that the fact that a pro position 7or theory8 is the best a0ailable explanation !oes gi0e us
,, Alan <usgra0e, =;opper an! >ypothetico-De!ucti0is"6, in Handboo3 of the History of $ogic& 8ol 9:' Inducti#e $ogic , e!ite! by Do0 <$ Aabbay, Bohn :oo!s, an! 1tephan >art"ann 7A"ster!a": Else0ier, -&&+8, pp$-&.?,(, at p$--)$

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goo! reasons to accept it$ But acceptance, I ha0e suggeste!, is not i!entical with belief$ There is another reason to re'ect <usgra0e6s pre"ise 7!8$ It is the fact that scientists so"eti"es see" 'ustifie! in accepting inconsistent theories$,( Aeneral relati0ely an! 9uantu" "echanics are apparently inconsistent theories, yet both are wi!ely accepte!$ This is, of course, also a proble" for "y 0iew of acceptance, since I ha0e insiste! that one shoul! not accept inconsistent propositions$ Dne shoul! not accept a proposition p if one has alrea!y accepte! another proposition ; that entails not-p$ The !ifficulty here rese"bles that !iscusse! earlier, na"ely that scientists can accept a theory that entails at least one false obser0ational conse9uence 7see %$,8$ But as I argue! on that occasion, recogniKing this fact !oes not entail aban!oning the i!ea that the goal of acceptance is 2nowle!ge 7an! therefore truth8$ If scientists !o accept inconsistent theories, their acceptance is "erely pro0isional, in the hope that one !ay the inconsistencies "ay be resol0e!$ E0en gi0en this 9ualification, "y 0iew see"s preferable to <usgra0e6s$ Dne can "a2e so"e sense of the i!ea that scientists coul! pro0isionally accept inconsistent theories$ But it is !ifficult to "a2e sense of the i!ea that scientists coul! belie#e inconsistent theories, e0en in so"e pro0isional sense$ They coul! certainly belie0e each of two inconsistent theories, if they !i! not realiKe they were inconsistent$,. But it is !ifficult to see how they coul! continue to belie#e both theories, once they graspe! the inconsistency$ At least on the tra!itional assu"ption that inconsistent propositions cannot both be true, to belie#e inconsistent theories woul! "ean regar!ing both as true, e0en though one 2nows that one of the" is false$ A !efen!er of <usgra0e "ight respon! that scientists can choose to wor2 with inconsistent theories ithout belie0ing the"$ But to =wor2 with6 a theory ? to ta2e it as a pre"ise in one6s reasoning within the rele0ant !o"ains ? is precisely what I "ean by accept,( <ar2 /oly0an, =The Dntological /o""it"ents of Inconsistent Theories6, Philosophical Studies %(% 7-&&@8, pp$%%.?-,, at pp$%%)?%*$ ,. Bohn N$ :illia"s, =Inconsistency an! /ontra!iction6, Mind +& 7%+@%8, pp$)&&?-$

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ance$ The response recogniKes the 0ery !istinction between belief an! acceptance on which "y argu"ent rests$ The sole !ifference in the case of inconsistent theories is that one accepts the theories in the hope that one !ay the inconsistency will be resol0e!$

!.! IBE an Acceptance

>ow, then, !oes "y 0iew of IBE !iffer fro" that offere! by <usgra0eF <o!elling "y sche"a on his, I can for"ulate "y pattern of inference to the best explanation as follows$
7a8 The surprising fact 0 is obser0e!$ 7b8 >ypothesis H woul! be a satisfactory explanation of 0$ 7c8 No a0ailable co"peting hypothesis woul! explain 0 as well as H !oes$ 7!8 :e ought to accept the best a0ailable potential explanation of any fact, pro0i!e! that explanation is a satisfactory one$ 7e8 Therefore we ought to accept H$

I ha0e alrea!y !iscusse! the !istinction between acceptance an! belief$ But so"e co""ent is in or!er on the !eontological character of pre"ise 7!8$ :hy ha0e I chosen to cast this 2ey pre"ise in ter"s of an =ought6 rather than, as <usgra0e !oes, in ter"s of =reasonable6 beliefF Dne reason for a0oi!ing tal2 of =reasonable6 belief 7or acceptance8 is that the i!ea of the reasonable can be regar!e! as a "erely per"issi0e$ It i!entifies, fro" a range of options, what one "ay belie0e or accept, not what one ought to belie0e or accept$ ,) There are occasions when a per"issi0e notion of rationality see"s applicable$ Ta2e, for instance, the situation in which a scientist woul! be acting rationally in accepting either of two inco"patible theories$ This woul! be the case, for instance, if it were si"ply unclear which is the better$ Differing 'u!ge"ents here "ight be e9ually !efensible$ ,* Dne "ight 'u!ge that theory A is the best a0ailable, while another "ight 'u!ge that theory ( is the best a0ailable$ But so"ething stronger
,) Oan Craassen, $a s and Symmetry, pp$%*%?*- $ ,* Alan <usgra0e, 0ssays on "ealism and "ationalism 1eries in the ;hilosophy of Jarl H$ ;opper an! /ritical Hationalis" %- 7A"ster!a": Ho!opi, %+++8, p$-.& n$-+%$

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see"s to be re9uire! when a theory has been i!entifie! as the best explanation$ In such circu"stances, the scientist is not "erely per! mitted to accept it5 she ought to !o so$ :hat 2in! of an =ought6 is thisF There are se0eral possibilities$ In a !iscussion of the ethics of belief, Hichar! Cel!"an argues that the =ought6 in such !iscussions is best regar!e! as a role ought$,@ It is co"parable, in this respect, to the =ought6 in the sentence, =A goo! pianist ought to be able to play Beetho0en6s <oonlight 1onata6$ <y own preference is for a slightly !ifferent 0iew: that the =ought6 in 9uestion is that which arises in !iscussions of practical reasoning$ It is co"parable to the =ought6 in the sentence, =If you want to beco"e a goo! pianist, you ought to practise !aily6$ If you will a goal, then on pain of irrationality you ought to will the "eans that is "ost li2ely to lea! to that goal$,+

" Why We -ught to Accept the Best Explanation

The 2ey pre"ise, then, in "y re0ise! ab!ucti0e sche"a is pre"ise 7!8: the clai" that we ought to accept the best a0ailable potential explanation of any puKKling fact, on con!ition that it is itself a satisfactory one$ /an this be !efen!e!F :hy should we accept the best a0ailable potential explanationF I a" assu"ing that the goal of the sciences is 2nowle!ge, an! that it is 2nowle!ge rather than si"ply truth$ (& Dn this 0iew, science ai"s not "erely at true beliefs, but at true beliefs for which we ha0e a!e9uate reasons$ :hat I a" arguing here is that if we are co""itte! to the extension of our 2nowle!ge, then we ought to accept the best a0ailable explanation of whate0er puKKling fact it is we are atte"pting to explain$ The principle upon which I a" relying is a prin,@ Hichar! Cel!"an, =The Ethics of Belief6, Philosophy and Phenomenological "esearch )& 7-&&&8, pp$))*?+., at p$)*)$ ,+ Both 0iews a0oi! the =belief 0oluntaris"6 ob'ection, base! on the i!ea that we cannot 7!irectly8 choose what we belie0e$ But this ob'ection is e0en less applicable to acceptance, since e0en if we cannot choose what we belie0e, we can surely choose what we accept$ (& Alexan!er Bir!, =:hat is 1cientific ;rogressF6, No<s (% 7-&&*8, pp$ )(?@+, at p$)*$

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ciple of practical reason: it hol!s that if we are co""itte! to a goal, then un!er pain of practical irrationality, we are also co""itte! to the best "eans of attaining that goal$ An! the reasons why we shoul! accept the best a0ailable explanation are prag"atic: they ha0e to !o with a!opting the best a0ailable "eans to an en!$ As I suggeste! earlier, one of the proble"s facing !efen!ers of IBE is that it is notoriously !ifficult to establish a lin2 between explanatory 0irtues an! truth$ Nor are we "uch further ahea! if we argue 7with <usgra0e8 that IBE warrants "erely reasonable belief, for belief entails regar!ing so"ething as true$ Cortunately, it is easier to establish a plausible lin2 between explanatory 0irtues an! what it is reasonable to accept$ In an illu"inating !iscussion of these issues, Bill 3ycan suggests that one cannot offer a defence of the 2in!s of explanatory 0irtues to which inference to the best explanation appeals$ :e cannot show, against the sceptic, that theories possessing these 0irtues are true or e0en probably true$ All we can offer, he argues, is an e1planation of why it is that we !o fa0our theories of this 2in!$ >is explanation ta2es the for" of what he hi"self calls =;anglossian reflections6 regar!ing a bene0olent "other nature$ (% 3ycan begins by noting our custo"ary rules of theory-preference, which rely on the i!ea that there exist certain =explanatory 0irtues6$ Ai0en any two theories, T% an! T-, the following rules are custo"arily e"ploye!$
%$ Dther things being e9ual, prefer T- to T% if T- is si"pler than T%$ -$ Dther things being e9ual, prefer T- to T% if T- explains "ore than T%$ ,$ Dther things being e9ual, prefer T- to T% if T- is "ore rea!ily testableG ($ Dther things being e9ual, prefer T- to T% if T- lea0es fewer "essy unanswere! 9uestions behin!G .$ Dther things being e9ual, prefer T- to T% if T- s9uares better with what you alrea!y ha0e reason to belie0e$((% :illia" A$ 3ycan, *udgement and *ustification /a"bri!ge 1tu!ies in ;hilosophy 7/a"bri!ge: /a"bri!ge Eni0ersity ;ress, %+@@8, p$%(,$ (- 3ycan, *udgement and *ustification, p$%,&$

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:e can explain our preference for these rules by assu"ing, for a "o"ent, that we were !esigne! by =a s2illful an! bene0olent <other Nature6, who wante! us to for" beliefs of the "ost useful 2in!$ (, :hat 2in!s of theories woul! this bene0olent !esigner ha0e !esigne! us to preferF Cirstly, she woul! ha0e built us to prefer si"pler hypotheses$ The reasons she woul! ha0e !one so are practical ones: such theories are "ore efficient to wor2 with an! run a lesser ris2 of error$ 1econ!ly, an! for si"ilar reasons of efficiency, she woul! ha0e built us to prefer hypotheses of greater explanatory power$ Thir!ly, she woul! ha0e le! us to prefer theories that ha0e i"plications that are rea!ily obser0able in our interactions with our en0iron"ent$ 1he woul! not, in other wor!s, ha0e wante! us to a!opt theories whose falsity woul! ne0er beco"e e0i!ent to us$ Courthly, she woul! ha0e le! us to prefer =neater syste"s of beliefs to "essy ones full of pathways that lea! nowhere6, (( since beliefs are li2e "aps: gui!es to action that shoul! help us fin! our way aroun!$ Cifthly, she woul! ha0e built us to be conser0ati0e in "atters of belief, not ra!ically altering our beliefs "ore than necessary, since such alteration has costs in ter"s of energy an! resources$ 1uch consi!erations, 3ycan argues, explain the episte"ic preferences that we !o, in fact, ha0e$ :e shoul! not rea! too "uch into the way 3ycan has for"ulate! his argu"ent$ >is tal2 of a bene0olent "other nature is "erely a !e0ice$ It "ay be regar!e! as a fanciful way of !escribing the effects of natural selection, but it nee! not be so regar!e!$ E0en if it were entirely a fiction, it woul! highlight so"e i"portant facts about the utility of theories that !isplay these explanatory 0irtues$ 1uch theories, it suggests, ha0e features that can ai! us in our search for the truth$ If truth is our goal, we shoul! prefer those theories that are si"ple, ha0e great explanatory power, an! are testable, co"prehensi0e, an! consistent with what we alrea!y 2now$ 3ycan rightly argues that such features !o not gi0e us a!e9uate reason to belie0e that a theory will be true, or e0en probably true$ But they can pro0i!e us with a !efence of IBE, if we un!erstan! IBE as warranting nothing "ore than acceptance$ I ha0e argue! for a
(, 3ycan, *udgement and *ustification, p$%(&$ (( 3ycan, *udgement and *ustification, p$%(-$

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0iew of acceptance that has truth, or 7"ore precisely8 2nowle!ge as its goal$ :hat 3ycan6s ;anglossian reflections show is that theories exhibit these features are "ore li2ely to bring us to our goal$ They are the theories that are "ost li2ely to contribute to the growth of our 2nowle!ge$ This is not a reason to belie0e such a theory, but it is a reason to accept it, at least until a "ore satisfactory theory e"erges$ At this point, a rea!er "ight ob'ect that I ha0e fallen bac2 into the 0ery prag"atic notion of acceptance that I pre0iously clai" to ha0e re'ecte!$ The ob'ection is un!erstan!able$ There is a sense in which acceptance, as I un!erstan! it, is "oti0ate! by prag"atic consi!erations, for the consi!erations that weigh in fa0our of IBE are in!ee! prag"atic$ :hat is i"portant is that it is a prag"atis" that is narrowly focuse!: it has 2nowle!ge, rather than so"e other 2in! of utility, as its goal$ :hen we accept a theory, it is because it is li2ely to lea! us closer to this goal$ 1o unli2e Buc2areff an! /ohen, I ha0e not se0ere! the lin2 between acceptance an! truth$ The fact that a theory is the best a0ailable explanation "ay not gi0e us a!e9uate reason to regar! it as true, but if our goal is 2nowle!ge 7an! therefore truth8, it !oes gi0e us excellent reason to accept it$ It follows that "y 0iew of scientific theories is not =instru"ental6 in the tra!itional sense$ It !oes not regar! a scientific theory as co"parable to a tool, such as a ha""er, which in no sense =represents6 the things it pro!uces$(. E0ery analogy li"ps, but we "ight say that on "y 0iew, a!opting a theory "ore closely rese"bles choosing the best route up a "ountain$ If our ai" is to reach the su""it, we are acting rationally in choosing the route that see"s "ost li2ely to ta2e us there$ In!ee! on pain of practical irrationality we ought to choose the "ost li2ely route$ But the route is itself part of the "ountain an!, for all we 2now, once we ha0e reache! the top of this particular path, we "ay be at the su""it$

(. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science' Problems in the $ogic of Scientific 01planation 73on!on: Houtle!ge an! Jegan ;aul, %+)%8, p$%,&$

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.onclusion
:e are not, I ha0e argue!, warrante! in belie0ing a theory ? in hol!ing it to be true ? because it is the best a0ailable explanation$ But the fact that it is the best a0ailable explanation "eans that we ought to accept it: we ought to ta2e it as a pre"ise in our theoretical an! practical reasoning in any !o"ain to which it applies, whether or not we happen to belie0e it$ The reasons for this are prag"atic$ A theory that !isplays the 9ualities that we tra!itionally 0alue ? such as si"plicity, explanatory power, a high !egree of testability, an! consistency with what we are alrea!y belie0e ? is li2ely to be a useful tool in the tas2 of increasing our 2nowle!ge of the worl!$ Do we e0er ha0e reason to thin2 that our 2nowle!ge of the worl! has been increase!F That is another 9uestion5 the answer "ay be that we !o not$ But if our goal is 2nowle!ge, then not only is it reasonable to accept the best a0ailable explanation of any puKKling fact5 we ought to !o so$ =ni#ersity of Otago& Dunedin& Ne gregory4da es>otago4ac4n7 -ealand

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