CONCEPT AND ORIGIN OF TORT

Phoenix Construction v. IAC Facts: At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing the accident to respondents own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent. Issue: Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by respondents own negligence Held: We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane. Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts. Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the

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common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of society. We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.

INTENTIONAL TORT
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA VS. MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, FOR HERSELF AND IN BEHALF OF INGRID DLYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK DWIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE FACTS: Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann. In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located in Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471. Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The house was finished in the early 1980s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex. In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name. On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners[6] began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment. When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at school. ISSUE: Whether petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages, the same being contrary to law and evidence.

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

RULING: The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. While respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas. Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused. It is patent in this case that petitioners alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.

G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992 CONRADO BUNAG, JR., v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, REGALADO, J.: FACTS: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiffappellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license. Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendantappellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. ISSUE: Whether, since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.

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RULING: It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code. Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office. Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist.

Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.

G.R. No. L-7817.!!October 31, 1956. ALFREDO M. VELAYO, in his capacity as Assignee of the insolvent COMMERCIAL AIR LINES, INC. (CALI),!Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD.,Defendant-Appellee, YEK HUA TRADING CORPORATION, PAUL SYCIP and MABASA & CO., intervenors. FELIX,!J.: FACTS: The Commercial Air Lines, Inc., which will be hereinafter referred to as CALI, is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the Philippines laws and is previously engaged in air transportation business. The Shell Company of the P. I., Ltd., which will be designated as the!Defendant, is on the other hand, a corporation organized under the laws of England and duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Since the start of CALIs operations, its fuel needs were all supplied by the!Defendant. Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, its Credit Manager who extended credit to CALI, was in charge of the collection thereof. However, all matters referring to extensions of the term of payment had to be decided first by Mr. Stephen Crawford and later by Mr. Wildred Wooding, who represented in this country!Defendants Board of Directors, the residence of which is in London, England. As of August, 1948, the books of the!Defendant!showed a balance of P170,162.58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI. Even before August 6, 1948,!Defendant!had reasons to believe that the financial condition of the CALI was for from being satisfactory. On August 6, 1948, the management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors (excepting only the insignificant small claims) and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation. The persons present, including Mr. Desmond

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Fitzgerald, signed their names and the names of the companies they represented on a memorandum pad of the law firm Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing. What occurred in that meeting may be summarized as follows:! xxx. Then followed a discussion on the payment of claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the accounts due to the employees, the Government and the National Airports Corporation. The representatives of the latter Messrs. Vicente H. Liwag, C. Dominguez and Pacifico V. Agcaoili, contended that their accounts were preferred. The other creditors disputed such contention of preference. No understanding was reached on this point and it was then generally agreed that the matter of preference be further studied by a working committee to be formed. The creditors present agreed to the formation of a working committee to continue the discussion of the payment of claims and preferences alleged by certain creditors, and it was further agreed that said working committee would supervise the preservation of the properties of the corporation while the creditors attempted to come to an understanding as to a fair distribution of the assets among them. From the latter exhibit the following is copied: 4.!!Certain specific matters such as the amount owing to the Philippine Air Lines, Inc., and the claims of Smith, Bell vs. Co., (representing Lloyds of London) that its claim should be offset against the payments which may be due to CALI from insurance claims were not taken up in detail. It was agreed that these matters together with the general question of what are preferred claims should be the subject of further discussions, but shall not interfere with the consummation of the sale in favor of PAL. 5.!!The creditors present agreed to the formation of the working committee to supervise the preservation of the properties of the corporation and agreed further that Mr. Fitzgerald shall represent the creditors as a whole in this committee. It was understood, however, that all questions relating to preference of claims can be decided only by the creditors assembled. 6.!!It was the sense of the persons present that, if possible, the insolvency court be avoided but that should the creditors not meet in agreement, then all the profits from the sale will be submitted to an insolvency court for proper division among the creditors. To this working committee, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, Credit Manager, of the!Defendant, Atty. Agcaoili of the National Airports Corporation and Atty. Alexander Sycip were appointed. After the creditors present knew the balance sheet and heard the explanations of the officers of the CALI, it was their unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against this corporation but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets, although the management of the CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it would file insolvency proceedings. Mr. Fitzgerald did not decline the nomination to form part of said working committee and on August 9, 1948, the 3 members thereof discussed methods of achieving the objectives of the committee as decided at the creditors meeting, which were to preserve the assets of the CALI and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors. Atty. Sycip made an offer to Mr. D. Fitzgerald to name a representative to oversee the preservation of the assets of the CALI, but Mr. Fitzgerald replied that the creditors could

rely on Col. Lambert. Atty. Pacifico Agcaoili promised to refer the arguments adduced at the second meeting to the General Manager of the National Airports Corporations and to obtain the advice of the Corporate Counsel, so the negotiation with respect to the division of assets of the CALI among the creditors was left pending or under advice when on that very day of the meeting of the working committee, August 9, 1948, which Mr. Fitzgerald attended,!Defendant effected a telegraphic transfer of its credit against the CALI to the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., assigning its credit, amounting to $79,440.00, which was subsequently followed by a deed of assignment of credit dated August 10, 1948, the credit amounting this time to the sum of $85,081.29. ISSUE: (1)!!Whether or not under the facts of the case, the!Defendant!Shell Company of the P. I., Ltd., taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALIs airplane C-54 at the Ontario International Airport within the Country of San Bernardino, State of California, U. S. A., (Which knowledge it acquired:!first at the informal luncheon-meeting of the principal creditors of CALI on August 5, 1948, where its Credit Manager, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, was selected to form part of the Working Committee to supervise the preservation of CALIs properties and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets among the creditors and thus avoid the institution of insolvency proceedings in court;! and Subsequently, at the meeting of August 9, 1948, when said Mr. Fitzgerald met the other members of the said Working Committee and heard and discussed the contention of certain creditors of CALI on the accounts due the employees, the Government and the National Airports Corporation who alleged that their claims were preferred), acted in bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of the other creditors of CALI present in said meeting by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., for the sum of $79,440 which was subsequently followed by a deed of assignment of credit dated August 10, 1948, amounting this time to the sum of $85,081.28 (Exhs. Z), thus defeating the purpose of the informal meetings of CALIs principal creditors end depriving the!Plaintiff, as its Assignee, of the means of obtaining said C-54 plane, or the value thereof, to the detriment and prejudice of the other CALIs creditors who were consequently deprived of their share in the distribution of said value;! and (2) Whether or not by reason of said betrayal of confidence and trust,!Defendant!may be made under the law to answer for the damages prayed by the!Plaintiff; and if so, what should be the amount of such damages. We see that!Plaintiff, as Assignee of the Insolvent CALI, had personality and authority to institute this case for damages, Whether the payment of damages sought to be recovered from!Defendant!may be ordered under the Law and the evidence of record. RULING:

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IF ANY PERSON, before the assignment is made, having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced, embezzles or disposes of any money, goods, chattels, or effects of the insolvent, he is chargeable therewith, and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be embezzled or disposed of, to be received for the benefit of the insolvent estate. The writer of this decision does not entertain any doubt that the!Defendant! taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them, and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it was really the case schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States, where CALIs plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvents property depriving the latter and the Assignee that was latter appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane. In addition to the aforementioned Section 37, Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides the following: Art 19.!!Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. It maybe said that this article only contains a mere declarations of principles and while such statement may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the following: Art. 21.!Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to; another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The Code Commission commenting on this article, says the following: Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. But, it may be asked, would this proposed article obliterate the boundary line between morality and law? The answer is that, in the last analysis, every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from those principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. If this premises is admitted, then the proposed rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause damages. When it is reflected that while codes of law and statutes have changed from age to age, the conscience of man has remained fixed to its ancient moorings, one cannot but feel that it is safe and salutary to transmute, as far as may be, moral norms into legal rules, thus imparting to every legal system that enduring quality which ought to be one of its superlative attributes. Furthermore, there is no belief of more baneful consequence upon the social order than that a person may with impunity cause damage to his fellow-men so long as he does not break any law of the State, though he may be defying the most sacred postulates of morality. What is more, the victim loses faith in the ability of the government to afford him protection or relief.

A provision similar to the one under consideration is embodied in article 826 of the German Civil Code. The same observations may be made concerning injurious acts that are contrary to public policy but are not forbidden by statute. There are countless acts of such character, but have not been foreseen by the lawmakers. Among these are many business practices that are unfair or oppressive, and certain acts of landholders and employers affecting their tenants and employees which contravene the public policy of social justice. Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which compels the return of a thing acquired without just or legal grounds. This provision embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries. It is most needful that this ancient principles be clearly and specifically consecrated in the proposed Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of another. The German Civil Code has a similar provision (art. 812). (Report of the Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 40- 41). From the Civil Code Annotated by Ambrosio Padilla, Vol. I, p. 51, 1956 edition, We also copy the following: A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: Even if an act or event causing damage to anothers property was not due to the fault or negligence of the!Defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited., with mere much more reason the!Defendant!should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. It may be argued that the aforequoted provisions of the Civil Code only came into effect on August 30, 1950, and that they cannot be applicable to acts that took place in 1948, prior to its effectivity. But Article 2252 of the Civil Code, though providing that: Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may be prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall have no retroactive effect. implies that when the new provisions of the Code does nor prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation and it cannot be alleged that in the case at bar!Defendant!had any vested or acquired right to betray the confidence of the insolvent CALI or of its creditors said new provisions, like those on Human Relations, can be given retroactive effect. Moreover, Article 2253 of the Civil Code further provides: !But if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which may give rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin. and according to Article 2254, no

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vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the right of others. In case of Juan Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Company, (82 Phil., 359;! 47 Off. Gaz., [5] 2023), one of the question at issue was whether or not the provisions of the New Civil Code of the Philippines on moral damages should be applied to an act of negligence which occurred before the effectivity of said code, and this Court, through Mr. Justice Briones, sustaining the affirmative proposition and citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1941, and November 14, 1934, as well as the comment of Mr. Castan, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Spain, about the revolutionary tendency of Spanish jurisprudence, said the following: We conclude, therefore, reaffirming the doctrine laid down in the case of Lilius (59 J. F. 800) in the sense that indemnity lies for moral and patrimonial damages which include physical and pain sufferings. With this (doctrine), We effect in this jurisdiction a real symbiosis 1 of the Spanish and American Laws and, at the same time, We act in consonance with the spirit and progressive march of time (translation) The writer of this decision does not see any reason for not applying the provisions of Section 37 of the Insolvency Law to the case at bar, specially if We take into consideration that the term any person used therein cannot be limited to the officers or employee of the insolvent, as no such limitation exist in the wording of the section (See also Sec. 38 of the same Act), and that, as stated before, the!Defendant!schemed and affected the transfer of its credits (from which it could derive practically nothing) to its sister corporation in the United States where CALIs plane C-54 was then situated, succeeding by such swift and unsuspected operation in disposing of said insolvents property by removing it from the possession and ownership of the insolvent. However, some members of this Court entertain doubt as to the applicability of said section 37 because in their opinion what!Defendant!in reality disposed of was its own credit and not the insolvents property, although this was practically the effect and result of the scheme. Having in mind this objection and that the provisions of Article 37 making the person coming within its purview liable for double the value of the property sought to be disposed of!constitute a sort of penal clause which shall be strictly construed, and considering further that the same result may be obtained, by applying only the provisions of the Civil Code, the writer of this decision yields to the objection aforementioned. Articles 2229, 2232, 2234, 2142, and 2143 of the Civil Code read as follows: Art. 2229.!!Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Art. 2232.!In contracts quasi-contracts, the Court may award exemplary damages if the Defendant!acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Art. 2234.!!While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the!Plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages should be upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the!Plaintiff!must show

that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages. Art. 2142.!!Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. Art, 2143.!!The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not exclude other quasicontracts which may come within the purview of the preceding article. In accordance with these quoted provisions of the Civil Code, We hold!Defendant!liable to pay to the!Plaintiff, for the benefit of the insolvent CALI and its creditors, as compensatory damages a sum equivalent to the value of the plane at the time aforementioned and another equal sum as exemplary damages. There is no clear proof in the record about the real value of CALIs plane C-54 at the time when!Defendants credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States. RESOLUTION July 30, 1957 FELIX,!J.: ISSUE: Whether Plaintiffs right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and consequently that he is stopped from pursuing another theory and is not entitled to damages under the provisions of the New Civil Code. RULING: As to the fifth question raised by counsel for!Appellee!in the course of his oral argument at the hearing in the City of Baguio of his motion, i.e., that!Plaintiffs right of action was based and prosecuted in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and he is, therefore, stopped from pursuing on appeal another theory under which he might be entitled to damages in consonance with the provisions of the new Civil Code, We may invoke the decision in the case of Dimaliwat vs. Asuncion, 59 Phil., 396, 401. In that decision We said the following: Vicente Dimaliwat contends that Esperanza Dimaliwat has no right to claim the ownership of the property in question to the exclusion of the children of the third marriage, under the foregoing provisions of the Civil Code, because the case was not tried on that theory in the lower court. We find no merit in that contention. The decision cited are not in point. Articles 968 and 969 of the Civil Code are rules of substantive law, and if they are applicable to the facts of this case they must be given effect. The same thing can be said in the case at bar. Articles 19, 21, 2229, 2232, 2234, 2142 and 2143 of the new Civil Code are rules of substantive law, and if they are applicable to the facts of this case, which We hold they do, they must be made operative and given effect in this litigation. x x x!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!x x x!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!x x x

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

It maybe seen from the foregoing that the above mentioned grounds on which the motion for reconsideration of the!Defendant!Shell stand, are not well taken. However, and despite this finding, We insist to delve in the question of whether the exemplary damages imposed in this Court upon!Defendant!Appellee, which the latters counsel contends to be inequitable and unfair, may be modified. It will be remembered that this case was looked into from the point of view of the provisions of Section 37 of the Insolvency Law. The writer of the decision was then and still is of the opinion that the provisions of this section were applicable to the case, and accordingly, that!Defendant!Shell was liable in this action instituted by the Assignee for double the value of the property disposed of, to be received for the benefit of the Insolvent estate. However, some of the members of this Court, for the reasons already stated in the decision, entertained some doubt as to the applicability of said Section 37, and yielding to their objections the writer of the decision turned his eyes to the provisions of the new Civil Code, inasmuch as the same result could be achieved. In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that: Defendant! taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent assets among them, and believing as most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding, as it was really the case- schemed and effected the transfer of its credit to its sister corporation in the United States where CALIs plane C-54 was and by this swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvents property depriving the latter and the Assignee that was later appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane. These acts of!Defendant!Shell come squarely within the sanction prescribed by Congress by similar acts and no reflection can be reasonably cast on Us if in the measure of the exemplary damages that were to be imposed upon!Defendant-Appellee, We were influenced by the provisions of Section 37 of the Insolvency Law. In this connection it is to be noted that, according to the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition of the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages Art. 2229, and that the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved (Art. 2234), for it is left to the sound discretion of the Court. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a majority of this Court was of the belief that the value of CALIs plane C-54, at the time when!Defendants credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the United States, might result quite high, and that exemplary damages should not be left to speculation but properly determined by a certain and fixed amount. So they voted for the reconsideration of the decision with regard to the amount of exemplary damages which this Court fixed at P25,000.00.

G.R. NO.!146322, DECEMBER 06, 2006 ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING AND RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. ERNESTO QUIAMCO, RESPONDENT . CORONA, J.:

FACTS: Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of law and order in society. In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan,[2]!Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery[3]!filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside respondent's business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible to the public. It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.[4] When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner corporation's collector, Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent's men." Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, [5]!went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle." On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in his residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back

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to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitching's instruction and over the clerk's objection, took the motorcycle. On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law[6]!against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City.[7]!Respondent moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint[8]!and denied petitioner Uypitching's subsequent motion for reconsideration. Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Branch 37.[9]!He sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and integrity. ISSUE: Whether the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs in favor of respondent. Petitioners' suggestion is misleading. They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from respondent's establishment in an abusive manner. Correctness of the Findings of the RTC and CA As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to respondent[14]!but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have accepted the correctness of such findings. This alone was sufficient to hold petitioners liable for damages to respondent. Nevertheless, to address petitioners' concern, we also find that the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the filing of the complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith. Petitioners themselves in fact described their action as a "precipitate act."[15]!Petitioners were bent on portraying respondent as a thief. In this connection, we quote with approval the following findings of the RTC, as adopted by the CA: x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the complaint before the City Prosecutor's Office] because Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching knew or ought to have known as he is a lawyer,

that there was no probable cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity against [respondent]. Atty. Uypitching had no personal knowledge that [respondent] stole the motorcycle in question. He was merely told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill collector of Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Verao[,] that Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the remaining installment(s) for the motorcycle because the motorcycle was taken by the men of [respondent]. It must be noted that the term used by Wilfredo Verao in informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay for the remaining installment was [']taken['], not [']unlawfully taken['] or 'stolen.' Yet, despite the double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not only executed the [complaintaffidavit] wherein he named [respondent] as 'the suspect' of the stolen motorcycle but also charged [respondent] of 'qualified theft and fencing activity' before the City [Prosecutor's] Office of Dumaguete. The absence of probable cause necessarily signifies the presence of malice. What is deplorable in all these is that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle, did not accuse [respondent] or the latter's men of stealing the motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed] to file a case for qualified theft before the authorities. That Atty. Uypitching's act in charging [respondent] with qualified theft and fencing activity is tainted with malice is also shown by his answer to the question of Cupid Gonzaga[16]![during one of their conversations] - "why should you still file a complaint" You have already recovered the motorcycle..."[:] "Aron motagam ang kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a lesson to the thief of motorcycle.")[17] Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA. Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s) Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporation's exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken. True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure,!he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.[18] Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent's establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a

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search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement. No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners' acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations. The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides: Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 19, also known as the!"principle of abuse of right,"!prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability.[19]!It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.[20]!The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. [21]!Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners' instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners' exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners' actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.[22]

NEGLIGENT TORT
Air France v Carrascoso Facts: Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat because there was a "white man" who had better right to the seat. As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and exemplary damages. Issue: Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the damages awarded. Held: Yes to both. To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not." Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France to present its manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist class just to give way to another passenger whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct, injurious language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. *Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose

Professional Services Inc. (PSI) v. Natividad and Enrique Agana Natividad and Enrique Agana v. Juan Fuentes Miguel Ampil v. Natividad and Enrique Agana 2007 / Sandoval-Gutierrez / Petition for review on certiorari of CA decisions Standard of conduct > Experts > Medical professionals FACTS Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City because of difficulty of bowel movement!and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from!cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil performed an!anterior resection surgery!on her, and finding that the malignancy spread on her left ovary, he obtained the consent of her husband, Enrique, to permit Dr. Fuentes to perform!hysterectomy!on her. After the hysterectomy, Dr. Fuentes showed his work to Dr. Ampil, who examined it and found it in order, so he allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil was about to complete the procedure when the!attending nurses made some remarks on the Record of Operation: "sponge count lacking 2; announced to surgeon search done but to no avail continue for closure" (two pieces of gauze were missing). A "diligent search" was conducted but they could not be found. Dr. Ampil then!directed that the incision be closed. !!!!!!!!!!A couple of days after, she complained of!pain in her anal region, but the doctors told her that it was just a natural consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. After months of consultations and examinations in the US, she was told that she was free of cancer. Weeks after coming back, her daughter found a!piece of gauze!(1.5 in) protruding from her vagina, so Dr. Ampil manually extracted this, assuring Natividad that the pains will go away. However, the pain worsened, so she sought treatment at a hospital, where another 1.5 in piece of gauze was found in her vagina. She underwent another surgery. ! ! ! ! ! Sps. Agana filed a!complaint for damages!against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, alleging that the latter are liable for!negligence!for leaving 2 pieces of gauze in Natividad's body, and!malpractice!for concealing their acts of negligence. Enrique Agana also filed an!administrative complaint!for gross negligence and malpractice against the two doctors with the PRC (although only the case against Dr. Fuentes was heard since Dr. Ampil was abroad). Pending the outcome of the cases,!Natividad died!(now

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

substituted by her children).!RTC found PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence and malpractice. PRC dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes. CA dismissed only the case against Fuentes. ISSUE AND HOLDING WON CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice.!NO; DR. AMPIL IS GUILTY WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability.!NO WON PSI may be held solidarily liable for Dr. Ampil's negligence.!YES

requirement of proof of negligence. Requisites for the applicability of!res ipsa loquitur Occurrence of injury Thing which caused injury was under the!control and management of the defendant [DR. FUENTES]!--!LACKING SINCE!CTRL+MGT WAS WITH DR. AMPIL Occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper care Absence of explanation by defendant Under the!Captain of the Ship!rule, the!operating surgeon!is the person!in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. That Dr. Ampil discharged such role is evident from the following: He called Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy He examined Dr. Fuentes' work and found it in order He granted Dr. Fuentes permission to leave He ordered the closure of the incision HOSPITAL OWNER PSI SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH DR. AMPIL [NCC 2180], AND DIRECTLY LIABLE TO SPS. AGANAS [NCC 2176] Previously, employers cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of its professionals. However, this doctrine has weakened since courts came to realize that modern hospitals are taking a more active role in supplying and regulating medical care to its patients, by employing staff of physicians, among others. Hence,!there is no reason to exempt hospitals from the universal rule of!respondeat superior. Here are the Court's bases for sustaining PSI's liability: Ramos v. CA!doctrine on E-E relationship o For purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an!employer-employee relationship!in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. [LABOR LESSON: power to hire, fire, power of control] Agency principle of!apparent authority / agency by estoppel o Imposes liability because of the actions of a principal or employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists [see NCC 1869] o PSI publicly displays in the Medical City lobby the names and specializations of their physicians. Hence, PSI is now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory, leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.

RATIO DR. AMPIL IS LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MALPRACTICE His arguments are without basis [did not prove that the American doctors were the ones who put / left the gauzes;!did not submit evidence to rebut the correctness of the operation record (re: number of gauzes used); re: Dr. Fuentes' alleged negligence, Dr. Ampil examined his work and found it in order]. !!!!!!!!!!Leaving foreign substances in the wound after incision has been closed is at least!prima facie!negligence by the operating surgeon.!Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was required to leave a sponge in his patient's abdomen because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his!legal duty to inform his patient within a reasonable time by advising her of what he had been compelled to do, so she can seek relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit. What's worse in this case is that he misled her by saying that the pain was an ordinary consequence of her operation. Medical negligence; standard of diligence To successfully pursue this case of medical negligence, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something [or did something] which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done [or wouldn't have done], and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient. Duty!- to remove all foreign objects from the body before closure of the incision; if he fails to do so, it was his duty to inform the patient about it Breach -!failed to remove foreign objects; failed to inform patient Injury!- suffered pain that necessitated examination and another surgery Proximate Causation!- breach caused this injury;!could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite information given by the attendant nurses that 2 pieces of gauze were still missing; what established!causal link:!gauze pieces later extracted from patient's vagina DR. FUENTES NOT LIABLE The!res ipsa loquitur![thing speaks for itself]!argument of the Aganas' does not convince the court. Mere invocation and application of this doctrine does not dispense with the

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If doctors do well, hospital profits financially, so when negligence mars the quality of its services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability for its agents' acts. Doctrine of!corporate negligence / corporate responsibility o This is the judicial answer to the problem of allocating hospital's liability for the negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support the application of!respondeat superior. o This provides for the duties expected [from hospitals]. In this case, PSI failed to perform the duty of exercising!reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment.!PSI failed to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the note of the count nurse, and this established PSI's part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes. ! PSI has actual / constructive knowledge of the matter, through the report of the attending nurses + the fact that the operation was carried on with the assistance of various hospital staff o It also breached its duties to!oversee or supervise all persons who practice medicine within its walls!and!take an active step in fixing the negligence committed PSI also liable under!NCC 2180 It failed to adduce evidence to show that it exercised the!diligence of a good father of the family!in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil
!

cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City. !!!!!!!!!!! The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Of the six (6) trucks route to Balagtas, Bulacan, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo. !!!!!!!!!!! Later on, the said truck, was recovered but without the copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount ofP1,903,335.39. After the investigation, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount ofP1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity. !!!!!!!!!!! R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss." !!!!!!!!!!! On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision!holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees against R&B Insurance. !!!!!!!!!!! Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA. !!!!!!!!!!! On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered that the appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by appellee Loadmasters. Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to determine their liability for the loss of the subject cargo. RULING: The petition is!PARTIALLY GRANTED. Judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732.! For as stated and well provided in the case of Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc.,!a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.

LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC., vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION, / G.R. No. 179446 / January 10, 2011 FACTS: !!!!!!!!!!! The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision!of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822. !!!!!!!!!!! On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date. !!!!!!!!!!! Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the

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Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property or rights.!With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. The Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. For under ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse. Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated destination. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of!force majeure!is unavailing. For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable grounds. "Equity, which has been aptly described as a justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure."!The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who has been at fault or negligent.

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NEGLIGENCE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and VIRGILIO J. BORJA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS ISSUE HELD

omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done." Such fault or negligence is called quasi-delict. Under the second article, this obligation is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible." Petitioner's assertion that defendants were negligent was not upheld by the Court. It was proven that there is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death. It has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency. The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. Thus, after he was placed at the edge of the pool, lifeguard Abao immediately gave him manual artificial respiration. Soon thereafter, nurse Armando Rule arrived, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who brought with him an oxygen resuscitator. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however came late because upon examining the body he found him to be already dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death. Moreover, petitioners claim that defendants be held liable pursuant to the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance has no leg to stand on. The doctrine never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury. In this case, since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after

Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District; Torts and Damages Facts: Plaintiffs spouses seek to recover damages from defendant, a government-owned corporation, for the death of their son Dominador Ong in one of the swimming pools operated by defendant. Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a nominal fee of P0.50 for adults and P0.20 for children is charged. Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to defendant's swimming pools. This was not the first time that the three brothers had gone to said natatorium for they had already been there four or five times before. They arrived at the natatorium at about 1:45 p.m. After paying the requisite admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools where the water was shallow. However, Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. After a few hours, the bathers observed that somebody was swimming in the pool's floor for a long time. The bathers, including the victim's brother called the attention of the lifeguards. The latter immediately responded and rescued the victim. Despite the medical attention that was given to him, Dominador still died. Thus his parents filed a case against defendants. Issue: Whether or not defendants were guilty of negligence so as to warrant the award of damages to petitioners. Ruling: No. Petitioner's hinges their claim for damages by invoking Article 2176 in relation to Article 2080 of the new Civil Code. The first article provides that "whoever by act or

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retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee. PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. 74431, November 6, 1989

Mirandas heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house. Article 2183 reads as follows: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. Thus, in Afialda vs. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretakers duty to prevent the Carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself. Purita Vestils testimony that she was not in possession of Mirandas house is hardly credible. She said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him (one way or the other) and maintained them- selves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on which, how- ever, she did not elaborate). She mentioned as many as ten of such relatives who had stayed in the house at one time or another although they did not appear to be close kin. She at least implied that they did not pay any rent, presumably because of their relation with Vicente Miranda notwithstanding that she herself did not seem to know them very well. There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house were board- ers (or more of boarders than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning in the said house for its occupants. Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita herself, categorically declared that the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a dog. Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. And although Purita denied paying the water bills for the house, the private respondents submitted documentary evidence of her application for water connection with the Cebu Water District, which strongly suggested that she was administering the house in question. While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Mirandas estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of

et

al.

FACTS: Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died because she was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they had nothing to do with the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now before us. They ask us to set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court. On July 29, 1975, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later due to vomiting of saliva. The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of Andoy, the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was appealed. It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorneys fees. In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of

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Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness, there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the death certificate declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo: COURT: I think there was mention of rabies in the report in the second admission? A: Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I referred to Dr. Co earlier in the morning and then the father, because the child was asking for water, the father tried to give the child water and this child went under the bed, she did not like to drink the water and there was fright in her eyeballs. For this reason, because I was in danger there was rabies, I called Dr. Co. Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia? A: Yes, sir. As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumo-nia, the doctor had the following to say under oath: A: Now, as I said before, broncho-pneumonia can result from physical, chemical and bacterial means . . . It can be the result of infection, now, so if you have any other disease which can lower your resistance you can also get pneumonia. xxxxxxxxx Q: Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of complication which is bronchopneumonia? A: Yes. Q: For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown the witness is known as CURRENT DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT, 1968 by Henry Brainerd, Sheldon Margen and Milton Chaton. Now, I invite your attention, doctor, to page 751 of this book under the title Rabies. There is on this page, Prognosis as a result of rabies and it says: Once the symptoms have appeared, death inevitably occurs after 2-3 days as a result of cardiac or respiratory failure or generalized paralysis.

After a positive diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a suspected animal if the animal cannot be observed or if the bite is on the head, give rabies vaccine (duck embryo). Do you believe in this statement? A: Yes. Q: Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies may die of respiratory failure which leave in the form of broncho-pneumonia? A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies. On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison vs. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the childs hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioners contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should escape or be lost and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an implied rejection of their original posture that there was no proof that it was the dog in their fathers house that bit Theness. According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which they are entitled. WRIGHT V. MANILA ELECTRIC (1914) L-7760 October 1, 1914 Lessons Applicable: Intoxication (Torts and Damages)

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FACTS: August 8, 1909 night time: Wright who was intoxicated drove in his calesa and as his horse leap forward along the rails of the Manila Electric company and it fell Wright was thrown and got injured that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street RTC: both parties were negligent, but that the plaintiff's negligence was not as great as defendant's and under the authority of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. apportioned the damages and awarded Wright a judgment of P1,000 ISSUE: W/N Wright's negligence contributed to the 'principal occurrence' or 'only to his own injury (NOT contributory) thereby he cannot recover HELD:NO. Affirmed Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one. Manila Electric or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the rails and a part of the ties uncovered in a street where there is a large amount of travel If the Wright had been prudent on the night in question and had not attempted to drive his conveyance while in a drunken condition, he would certainly have avoided the damages which he received Both parties were negligent and both contributed to the resulting damages, although the Wright, in the judgment of the court, contributed in greater proportion to the damages no facts are stated therein which warrant the conclusion that the Wright was negligent It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described It having been found that the plaintiff was not negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss the question presented by the appellant company with reference to the applicability of the case of Rakes vs. A. G. & P. Co. and we do not find facts in the opinion of the court below which justify a larger verdict than the one found. Dissenting Opinion by Carson: if the case is to be decided on the findings of fact by the trial judge, these findings sufficiently establish the negligence of Wright The fact finding of the RTC judge, the fact that there is negligence though not fully sustained should be assumed that there were evidentiary facts disclosed which were sufficient to sustain that there is negligence

CORLISS vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO. FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base. The jeep he was driving while accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company (MRC) close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the hospital the next day, while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries and burns. In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that the deceased in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own miscalculation. The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by the lower court, satisfactory proof to that effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the concept of damages reaching the sum of P282,065.40. ISSUE: WON the lower courts decision is erroneous HELD: The decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint, is affirmed. The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great respect. In the absence of compelling reasons, [the factual] determination is best left to the trial judge why had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor on the witness stand. But more importantly, this action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the damage done. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that MRC was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. The crucial question, therefore, is the existence of negligence. Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo and United States v. Barias. Cooley formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to be: The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury.

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There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus: Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to MRC and the action of Corliss must necessarily fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion that the liability sought to be fastened on MRC had not arisen. Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands.

also ignorant of the fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit. The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:

CANGCO v. MANILA RAILROAD CO. 30 Phil 768 On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down. It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop. ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages. HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was

NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured. The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.

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Vinculum Juris: (def) It means an obligation of law, or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law. La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-20761, 27 July 1966, 17 SCRA 739) Facts: Plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their three minor daughters (Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old and Fe, 2 years old) boarded the Pambusco at San Fernando Pampanga, bound for Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. Such bus is owned and operated by the defendant. They were carrying with them four pieces of baggage containing their personal belonging. The conductor of the b us issued three tickets covering the full fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe, since both were below the height which fare is charged in accordance with plaintiff s rules and regulations. After about an hours trip, the bus reached Anao where it stopped to allow the passengers bound therefore, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. Mariano Beltran, carrying some of their baggage was the first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and children. Mariano led his companion to a shaded spot on the left pedestrian side of the road about four or five meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his paying, which he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter followed him unnoticed by his father. While said Mariano Beltran was on he running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one its seats near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed in a complete stop, it had traveled about 10 meters from point where plaintiffs had gotten off. Sensing the bus was again in motion; Mariano immediately jumped form the running board without getting his bayong from conductor. He landed on the side of the road almost board in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and his children. At that time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together her parent. For the death of the said child, plaintiffs comment the suit against the defendant to recover from the latter damages.

Issue: Whether or not the child was no longer the passenger of the bus involved in the incident, and therefore, the contract of carriage was already terminated? Held: There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for his bayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner remained subsisting. The relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after alighting from the car aids the carriers servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car. It is a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease the moment the passenger alights from the carriers vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers premises. The father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel must have followed her father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he had jumped down from the moving vehicle. It was that this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carriers agent had exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its passengers. The driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the engine. He started to run the bus even before the conductor gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggage of the passengers Beltran and family. The presence of the said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of carriage.

EQUITABLE BANK v. ARCELITO TAN Facts: Issue: Held: PNB vs. CHONG Facts: Issue: Held:

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

SPOUSES PACIS VS. MORALES G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010 FACTS: petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent Morales. Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store. On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head. A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC. By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF. Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial courts Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition. ISSUE: Was Morales negligent? HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial courts Decision reinstated. YES

This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. ** Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own negligence. Article 2176 states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled. Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care. As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms. Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.

Vda. da Bataclan v. Medina Facts: The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the neighbourhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals forwarded the case to the Supreme Court due to the amount involved. Issue: What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other passengers? Held: We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows: . . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the

Teodora Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co. G.R. No. L-33380. 17 December 1930. Malcolm, J.: Facts: In August, 1928, a young man by the name of Juan Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected with an electric light pole situated near Sta Lucia Gate, Intramuros, in the City of Manila. Shortly thereafter, the mother of the deceased instituted an action in the CFI Mla to secure from the defendant, Manila Electric Company, damages. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Issue: WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to render it liable for damages. Ruling: The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages. It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence. Such companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be. In the case at ber, the cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated wire.

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

Interference in Contractual Relations

Gilchrist v. Cuddy G.R. No. L-9356 February 18, 1915 Lessons Applicable: Interference with Contractual Relations (Torts and Damages) Laws Applicable: Article 1902 (old law) FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar April 24: He rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for a week for P125 A few days to the date of delivery, Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist Cuddy rented the film to Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga P350 for the week knowing that it was rented to someone else and that Cuddy accepted it because he was paying about three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist but they didn't know the identity of the other party Gilchrist filed for injunction against these parties Trial Court and CA: granted - there is a contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy ISSUE: W/N Espejo and his partner Zaldarriaga should be liable for damages though they do not know the identity of Gilchrist

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

HELD: YES. judgment is affirmed That Cuddy was liable in an action for damages for the breach of that contract, there can be no doubt. the mere right to compete could not justify the appellants in intentionally inducing Cuddy to take away the appellee's contractual rights Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill and credit. He has no right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria(loss without injury), unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach. liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the

damage do done There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages An injunction is a "special remedy" which was there issued by the authority and under the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in order cases where equitable relief is sought, to cases where there is no "plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law," which "will not be granted while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done," which cannot be compensated in damages, and where there will be no adequate remedy, and which will not, as a rule, be granted, to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into that of another whose title has not been established by law irreparable injury not meant such injury as is beyond the possibility of repair, or beyond possible compensation in damages, nor necessarily great injury or great damage, but that species of injury, whether great or small, that ought not to be submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other; and, because it is so large on the one hand, or so small on the other, is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact that the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had counted upon as his feature film It is quite apparent that to estimate with any decree of accuracy the damages which Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an event would be quite difficult if not impossible So far as the preliminary injunction issued against the appellants is concerned, which prohibited them from exhibiting the Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion that the circumstances justified the issuance of that injunction in the discretion of the court the remedy by injunction cannot be used to restrain a legitimate competition, though such competition would involve the violation of a contract

Separate Opinion: MORELAND, J., concurring: The court seems to be of the opinion that the action is one for a permanent injunction; whereas, under my view of the case, it is one for specific performance. The very nature of the case demonstrates that a permanent injunction is out of the question. The only thing that plaintiff desired was to be permitted to use the film for the

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

week beginning the 26th of May. With the termination of that week his rights expired. After that time Cuddy was perfectly free to turn the film over to the defendants Espejo and Zaldarriaga for exhibition at any time. No damages are claimed by reason of the issuance of the mandatory injunction under which the film was delivered to plaintiff and used by him during the week beginning the 26th of May. DAYWALT v LA CORPORACION DE LOS PADRES AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS

Daywalt and discouraged her from conveying the entire tract. Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos on the ground that it unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of the land in question and to withhold delivery of the Torrens title. Daywalts claim for damages against the Recoletos was for the huge sum of P 500000 [in the year 1919], since he claims that because of the interference of the Recoletos, he failed to consummate a contract with another person for the sale of the property and its conversion into a sugar mill. Issue: whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt?

Facts: in 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P 4000. They agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as Endencias title to the land was perfected in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens title issued in her name. When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out that the property measured 1248 hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because of this, she became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so large an amount and that she had been misinformed as to its area. Daywalt filed an action for specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the entire tract to Daywalt. Meanwhile, La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a religious corp., w/c owned an estate immediately adjacent to the property sold by Endencia to Daywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz, the representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence and ascendancy over Endencia, who was a woman of little force and easily subject to the influence of other people. Fr. Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts with

Held: No, it is not liable. The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the non-performance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermediates. Hence, in order to determine the liability of the Recoletos, there is first a need to consider the liability of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt from Endencia cannot be recovered from her, first, because these are special damages w/c were not w/in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and secondly, these damages are too remote to be the subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to Daywalt, neither can the Recoletos be held liable. As already suggested, by advising Endencia not to perform the contract, the Recoletos could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principal in the contract.

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

SPOUSES PACIS VS. MORALES G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010 FACTS: petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent Morales. Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store. On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head. A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC. By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF. Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial courts Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition. ISSUE: Was Morales negligent? HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial courts Decision reinstated. YES This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. ** Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of

the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own negligence. Article 2176 states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled. Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care. As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms. Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.

Torts and Damages (Midterms) - Dean Albano

[G.R. No. 152033, March 16, 2011]! FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS, BENITO JOSE DE LOS SANTOS, MARIA ELENA DE LOS SANTOS AND CARMINA VDA. DE LOS SANTOS, RESPONDENTS. PERALTA, J.: FACTS: !On September 30, 1984, Teresa Elena Legarda-de los Santos, the wife of respondent Wilfredo de los Santos was fetched by Wilfredos brother Armando, husband of respondent Carmina Vda. de los Santos, from Rizal Theater to after Teresas theater performance. Armando drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma, a company car assigned to Wilfredo. Two other members of the cast of production joined Teresa Elena in the Galant Sigma. Around 11:30 p.m., while travelling along the Katipunan Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma collided with the shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner Filipinas Synthetic Corp. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12 meters from the point of impact, across the White Plains Road landing near the perimeter fence of Camp Aguinaldo, where the Galant Sigma burst into flames and burned to death beyond recognition all four occupants of the car. A criminal charge for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple homicide was brought against Mejia, which was decided in favor of Mejia (shuttle driver). A consolidated civil case was filed by the families of the deceased against Mejia. The RTC ruled in favor of herein respondents. !After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the CA and the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition stating that the respondent court erred in finding Mejia negligent, such not being supported by evidence on record. ISSUE: Whether Mejia was negligent HELD: Petitioner argues that the RTC admitted that De los Santos made a turn along White Plains Road without exercising the necessary care which could have prevented the accident from happening.!According to petitioner, the sudden turn of the vehicle used by the victims should also be considered as negligence on the part of the driver of that same vehicle, thus, mitigating, if not absolving petitioners liability. However, the said argument deserves scant consideration. It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by law, specifically Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136. Under the New Civil Code,!unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in the present case, Mejias violation of the traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise

ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered!which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. A closer study of the Police Accident Report, Investigation Report and the sketch of the accident would reveal nothing but that the shuttle bus was traveling at such a reckless speed that it collided with the car bearing the deceased.! WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby!DENIED. Consequently, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 15, 2001, is hereby!AFFIRMED!with the MODIFICATION!that the moral damages be reduced to P50,000.0027Torts CD.pages