Nasa Issues in Project Management

NASA SP-6101 (06)
ISSUES IN NASA PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT
edited by
Francis 1. Hoban
Program NASA Manager and Project Management Initiative Program
National
Aeronautics
and Space Administration
Office of Management Systems and Facilities Scientific and Technical Information Program Washington, DC 1993
Forsale bytheNational Technical Information Service Springfield, VA 22161
Issues
in NASA
Program
and Project
Management
Issues Summer 1993
A Collection National
PAGE
of Papers
on Aerospace
Management
Aeronautics
and Space Administration

TITLE
AUTHOR Joseph W. Hamaker
But What Will It Cost? The Evolution
of NASA Cost Estimatin_
A veteran cost estimator from the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center surveys the art of estimating from the days of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in the 1930s through Shuttle development, showing the NASA estimating community how to face new ideas and cultural changes. 13 SAM II - How We Did It Ed Mauldin, Reggie Holloway, Don Hedgepath, Ron Baker
Two decades ago this core engineering team began to develop the highly successful, first generation atmospheric research experiment, the Stratospheric Aerosol Measurement II, for the Nimbus-G observatory. Their technical approaches and management techniques are said to fit within today's Total Quality Management schemes. 20 Our National Space Science Program: Strategies to Maximize Science Return Greg S. Davidson
A program analyst for the Office of Space Science and Applications supporting the Astrophysics Division and coauthor of Economics for a Civilized Society (Norton, 1988) responds to an earlier Issues article by Robert Bless, "Space Science: What's Wrong at NASA" (Issues 4, Spring 1991). Davidson discusses more cost effective methods for science missions. 32 Human Needs. Motivation and the Results of the NASA Culture Surveys Mario H. Castro-Cedeno
This researcher from the Space Station Freedom Directorate of the NASA Lewis Research Center examines a variety of standard theories on human needs and motivation and applies them to the project management team. He shows survey results that indicate a great deal of pride and satisfaction among NASA employees but also a need for more recognition and better career planning. 49 Where Are the Real Engineers? G. Harry Stine
A consulting engineer and a prolific science writer (author of Space Doctor, Shuttle Down and 50 other books and novels) recalls Wemher yon Braun and Arthur C. Clarke. He wonders where all the "real," metalbending engineers have gone. 52 Resources for NASA Managers William M. Lawbaugh and aerospace professionals.
Book and video reviews on items of interest to program and project managers
SP-6101(06) Issues in NASA Program and Project Management is sixth in a series from NASA's Program and Project Management Initiative. This series is collected and edited by Francis T. Hoban with Dr. William M. Lawbaugh. Statements and opinions are those of the authors and do not represent official policy of NASA or the U.S. Government. Useful and enlightening material is welcome, and diversity of ideas is encouraged.
Inquiries Office of Human Resources
should be directed to Francis T. Hoban, Program Manager, and Education, Code FT, NASA Headquarters, Washington,
DC 20546-0001
But What Will It Cost? The Evolution of NASA Cost Estimating

by Joseph Within two years of being chartered in 1958 as an W. Hamaker ing had been suggested in 1936 by T. P. Wright in the Journal of Aeronautical Science) Wright provided theory of curve. exploded equations which which came early could be used the to predict runs, learning had II, War a the cost of airplanes over long production
independent in aeronautics wholly
agency to conduct civilian pursuits and space, NASA absorbed either the people, facilities and
or partially
equipment of several existing organizations. These included, most notably, the laboratories the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) at Langley Research Center Ames Research Center in California, Research Center in Ohio; the Army Missile Agency (ABMA) Alabama, for which the Braun worked; and work Advanced Research
to be called years
By the time the demand in the
for airplanes of World
in Virginia, and Lewis Ballistic
industrial engineers were happily using Wright's learning curve to predict the unit cost of airplanes when thousands were to be built (and it's still used today though the quantities instead involved of thousands). of Defense studying should and mulare more likely In the late especially to be hundreds 1940s
at Redstone Arsenal team of Wernher yon of Defense (ARPA) and Agency
the Department Projects on big boosters) valuable in light space year probe and
the Department were
their ongoing These start cess
the U.S. Air Force
tiple scenarios were especially the new of the agency Soviet from resources Sputnik American to jump sucin the public of the shocking
of how the country
proceed
into the new age of jet aircraft, ets. The Air Force saw a need skilled cadre of analysts tion of these alternatives
missiles and rockfor a stable, highly
autumn
of the previous
the correspond-
to help with the evaluaand established the Rand California, as a it could turn for work represents systematic pubin the airplane
ing pressure to produce inheritances, engineering project
an impatient
some response. Along with these there came some existing systems and management practices, including This paper and the methodologies.
Corporation in Santa Monica, civilian "think tank" to which independent analysis. Rand's some of the earliest and most lished studies of cost estimating industry. Among studies the first assignments of first and second
cost estimating
will briefly trace the origins of those methods how they evolved within the Agency over past three decades. of the caused Art a demand
given generation
to Rand ICBMs,
were jet
_:_::_._'i_:% The Origins World aircraft War II had
fighters and jet bombers. While the learning curve was still very useful for predicting the for military behavior techniques material unit curve were cost ness cost of recurring other estimating might than cost, there were work-hour what to the still no and the first learning that far exceeddetailed input
in numbers
and in models
ed anything ined before. tary work tainly ric techniques
the aircraft While there from time
industry had even imaghad been some rudimenparametwas cercost, there
for projecting be (a key
to time 2 to develop
for predicting
equation). available associated in the early
Worse still, for estimating with research, (RDT&E). to mid-1950s,
no quick methods the nonrecurring development, In the defense RDT&E testbusihad sud-
no widespread
use of any kind of cost estiof work estimat-
mating beyond a laborious build-up hours and materials. A type of statistical
ing and evaluation
denly
become
a much
more
important
considera-
estimate
relatively new
quickly systems. the
and accurately Rand 1950s and were being
the cost the
tion for two reasons. First, a shrinking defense budget (between World War II and the Korean War) most had cut Air the number programs. had greatly The inability of production Second, magnified to nimbly costs units the cost estimate was a disof of Force
of proposed
extended
methods throughout 1960s the techniques applied to all phases Early
by the early acceptably 7
of aerospace Years
systems.
new technology development. RDT&E tinct problem. Fortunately, ment had Novick, was the
the cost of The NASA
and first unit production
In the spring of 1957 the Army Arsenal (ABMA) in Huntsville, a cost analysis in 19504 under into the job with any proved science literature and cost departDavid he experition of Wernher yon Braun, ies on a large and advanced could be used for large DOD conceptualized. 8 Numerous
Ballistic Missile under the direcdesign studbooster that then being options were promising team had
within Rand been founded was drafted one around only
initiated rocket payloads design
who
because
ence. This contributors sis-so cost nated credit basic much
group at Rand to the art and so that of the the
to be prolific of cost analyof aerospace i960s is domithat were deserve most the
under consideration and all of the most needed cost projections. Von Braun's long been cious little the scale drawing being
estimating
1950s
flying experimental rockets, but precost data existed, and none existed for of the rockets boards. With data that were coming estimates that together off the were Rand and Nevertheless,
by the scores 5 Novick
of Rand and
cost studies at Rand
published.
others
for developing tool of the cost
and improving the estimating discipline,
demanded.
the procedures was pieced
had used on aircraft,
cost estimating relationship (CER), and merging the CER with the learning curve to form the foundation today. 6 By 1951, Rand was devising CERs cost as a function of such variables range, tions for the data was altitude, were high-level Rand was segregated etc. Acceptable least doing comparisons by aircraft observed-at acceptable between types for aircraft as speed, correlaenough alternaWhen (e.g., the fightof aerospace estimating, which still stands
plotted against gross liftoff weight because this performance variable was known both for the historical mated. data points The resulting and for the concepts CERs were being estiat the total rockseparately and often by their based did not correla-
et level (engines being added mainly on contractor estimates) inspire much confidence of data either tion or their number Suddenly, Sputnik (carrying work vehicle
statistical
points. 9 the Soviets launched
in the fall of 1957
tives that
at the time.
I and then, four weeks later, Sputnik II a dog), and the Army's big booster new studies importance. inspired While by the configuration
ers, bombers, cargo aircraft), were discovered. Since each to different helped was Force Eventually, derived future levels of complexity, the that clarify
families of curves curve corresponded the stratification cost put to use trends. equations in Air
took on an entirely
development set of predictive quickly activities. and stratification
Soviet success continued at a rapid pace through 1958 and 1959, some momentous programmatic decisions agement Redstone ABMA was The tion, were made regarding the ultimate manrelationships between ABMA, the Army Project Arsenal (ARPA) and NASA. and yon Braun, however, such a super under ARPA sponsorship, Saturn. organizathey did beginning a massive rocket called parent that and was
a usable was planning
The use of the CERs breakthroughs RDT&E and cost analysts
were
basic
designing DOD, was coming
in cost estimating, first unit costs. For saw the promise
especially for the first time, able to
as ARPA's booster
to the conclusion
of being
not need
But What Will It Cost?
The Ewdution
of NASA
Cost Estimating
to withdraw ARPA and
support ABMA.
over the objections of both In the end, by autumn of
Houston, before
created
in mid-1962
but
operating responsibil-
that out of Langley,
was given
1959, both the Secretary of Defense and President Eisenhower had concluded that ABMA and the Saturn tion, should a new be transferred home was found to NASA. l In addifor the von Braun the bor-
ity for the payload, in this case the modules that would take the astronauts to the moon's surface and back. During organized, California, nization NASA the same period that MSFC was being
team by setting ders of Redstone
aside a complex within Arsenal in Huntsville. Space
By early fall of 1960, the Marshall Center (MSFC) was operational. NASA's Congress program etary first 10-year plan had been
Flight
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in in business as an Army research orgasince the 1930s, was transferred to the Army. JPL had already built the an ABMA rockfirst successful its association role the As JPL began
from
submitted
to
Explorer satellite that had ridden et into orbit as the country's response for Agency to Sputnik. by being planetary several JPL began with NASA designing Ranger series Surveyor assigned projects.
in February of Earth orbital larger
1960 and called satellites, vehicles lunar launch
for a broad and planmanned and
the lead center probes, including
probes,
flights to Earth orbit and around the moon. The cost, estimated by analogies, intuition and guesses, was given as $1 billion to $1.5 billion per year. H With early the Kennedy planning Administration for a manned President Kennedy were both interested of the Soviets, in office lunar by
planetary
series of lunar spacecraft, the planetary of Mariner spacecraft and the Lunar spacecraft, they were dependent primarquotes for purchased hardwork-hour and material esti-
ily upon contractor ware and their own mates for inhouse
1961,
landing
work. picked the up, they began Space estimating. Saturn Planners to weightIn 1967, I-C mana to
project continued. President Johnson for moving working American turn ahead
and Vice in options was an the have after
As the pace use based ager, new an Air
of planning Force for space a former tool,
and NASA
on a set of plans that could on the lunar surface shortly The orbiting
Guide, _2 a chapter CERs Bill Ruhland,
of which project
is devoted
of the decade.
of Yuri Gagarin questions from about the costs
Chrysler
in April 1961 caused immediate the Administration and Congress of accelerating Administrator, cost estimates Prudently, the plans. had been associated
went to work at JPL and contracted with company called Planning Research
Jim Webb, the NASA briefed on $10 billion with the moon project. rope himself some
Corporation (which had been started by some former analysts who had worked on the Space Planners stuck NASA's spacecraft leveraged Guide) to improve and the CERs) 3 Ruhland went on to become for planetary with estimating, preeminent
he decided
to give
and gave Congress a $20 to $40 billion range. (The program was to cost about $20 billion ultimately.) Despite the magnitude of the cost projections, in his State of the Union address in May 1961, President Kennedy established a lunar mission before the NASA was off and running. sibility for the new Manned his famous goal of end of the decade. MSFC took responthe in
estimator
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. PRC its beginnings with JPL and Ruhland contracts with most and dominating the models for the next
by establishing cost modeling of the other NASA centers development 25 years. In March 1961, with launch of NASA cost
vehicles,
manned
Saturn launch vehicles, and Spacecraft Center (MSC)
capsules and planetary spacecraft work underway, NASA established the Goddard Space Flight
The Evolution
of NASA
Cost Estimating
Center GSFC orbital drawing
(GSFC)
as another
development
center.
mates.
Second,
during that 30 days the
the
preceding for
three programs gave
years, had
was assigned responsibility science satellites and soon board a number of spacecraft The the the were needed. Observatory, Observatory all started other early projects significant and in the cost
for Earth had on the for which Orbiting Orbiting properiod at the GSFC
the pace of the Gemini so accelerated issued tractors cians only by the government had any hope
and Apollo Requests typically
Proposals the conin this parametri-
cost estimates Astronomical Geophysical grams time, were and, like most experienced
to respond-only
of preparing
a response
Nimbus 1959-60 growth.
short amount cost overrun
of time. Third, because of growing problems, NASA cost reviews had and the reviewers were looking some basis in historical a prescription for parametric
in the Agency
increased notably for costs with actuals-essentially cost estimating. At both MSC
organized a cost group to improve the estimates, first under Bill Mecca, and later managed by Paul Villone. where In 1967 Werner Gruhl numerous In later years joined the office he implemented methods. improvements he joined the as Headquarters
and
MSFC,
the
cost
estimating
to the GSFC Comptroller's NASA's chief Among during the the
office at NASA estimator. improvements
function was placed ning organization.
in an advanced mission planAt MSC, it was embodied Engineering _6 and at MSFC and it was
within Max Faget's Development Directorate, to GSFC were: 1) 1970s within Herman Gemini believer strong who,
creditable early
late
1960s
and
the Future Projects Office Koelle? 7 Faget, an incredibly left his imprint
headed by gifted engi-
spacecraft cost models that were sensitive to the number of complete and partial test units and the quality estimating expansion of the test units; 2) models through devoted and to of spacecraft of the database instruments; 3) the to docustandard (WBS)
neer, had already
on the Mercury,
and Apollo programs, and was a strong in an advanced planning function with cost analysis. Koelle, a German engineer team, not a member of the original
the practice
though
contracting with the prime ment the cost in accordance parametric work 14 of NASA's upon breakdown and approaches. By 1965 ing their which estimate most
contractor with NASA structures
had later competent in fact,
joined von Braun, and very interested along with his deputy
was also extremely in cost. Koelle had, William G. Huber,
contractors to cost design the
were engineers
revisto that
assembled the very first NASA cost methodology in 1960, published first in an inhouse report TM and then in 1961 as a handbook that Koelle edited for budding Out space engineers._9 of the Apollo the MSFC and to regroup in capability. Lockheed a more modeling. hurricane the MSC for the cost per-
traditional relied costs,
approach
estimating,
had
replacing
it with an approach
of the eye both
created a new job position-that of trained parametric cost estimators whose job it was to obtain data from the design into cost was being engineers estimates elevated and using the same translate time, this cost disciinformation procedures. estimating established
moment,
sonnel now sought make improvements contracted Dynamics sophisticated vehicle life with
and attempt to In 1964 MSFC and General and was for launch effort rigorous This
15 At essentially
2o to develop cost modeling cycle cost
to a separate
capability
pline within NASA NASA field centers. mating factors. design resources First, it was
Headquarters and at the This trend toward cost estiwas caused the interest, by several that the and skills unrealistic had to expect
as a specialization engineers necessary
led by Terry Sharpe of MSFC's Future Projects Office. Sharpe, an Operations Research specialist interested in improving process, led the MSFC managed the contractor's the rigor of the estimating estimating group as they development of the
to put together
good cost esti-
model and then brought it in-house and installed the model on MSFC mainframe computers. Through about 1965 the only computational estimators By the sup-
in 1971
and
is still
operational
today,
supporting
Agency-wide cost activities. The contract was originally awarded to PRC and, under Rutledge's management, throughout MSFC developed the 1970s and numerous 1980s. cost estimatand manmodels
port in use mechanical
by NASA calculator.
was the Freidan mid-1960s main-
frame time was generally available, and by the late 1960s the miracle of hand-held, four-function electronic apiece-one Throughout calculators could be had for $400 rule. calcuper office was the general the early 1970s the hand-held
also established within laboratories.
a grassroots the MSFC This
ing organization Engineering
Science was
group
lator ruled supreme. By the middle 8080 8-bit microcomputers made ance. sonal more genius Finally, computer than any by the late 1970s had dawned. other breed,
1970s IMSAI their appearprobably saw the and
aged by Rod Stewart for a number of years. After his retirement from NASA, Stewart, along with his wife Annie, authored an outstanding series of cost estimating Dynamics also books, z_ In 1966, activities, capability. improved under Mandell, Initiative MSC, working with their cost manto Station in parallel General spacecraft group agement play and Space activities. By 1967 ties during to the MSFC estimating significantly this period role contracted The their who cost was Space MSC able
the age of the per-
Estimators, immediately
z2 and Rand 23 to improve
of the Apple
II, the IBM PC and the amaz-
capabililater
ing spreadsheets: Visicalc, Supercalc Lotus 1-2-3. Civilization had begun. The for resulting the time, capability taking was extremely into account
the very
of Humboldt Exploration
a leading
in the Shuttle,
ambitious of cost. and
estimating
a multitude life cycle notoriety,
variables affecting launch vehicle The model received significant once might launch a higher colonel. The away runs the CIA inquired if the
both
the MSC
and
MSFC
cost
estimatthe of on by
MSFC
estimators
make a series of runs on a set of Soviet vehicles. Busy with their own work, the demurred. The CIA pressed the case to level manager, a retired Air Force Suddenly the MSFC estimators discovhad been made mistaken and the CIA about priorities. went were analysts
ing organizations were beginning to obtain first historical data from the flight hardware the Apollo the Saturn stage, and program. This IB and Saturn on the Command included V launch cost data vehicles
estimators
and Service
Module
ered that they happy.
(CSM) and the Lunar at the major subsystem
Excursion Module (LEM) level. Fairly shallow data somewhat who had three-data
by today's standards, it was considered of a windfall to the NASA estimators been struggling along with twoand
Later in 1964 of the MSFC Rutledge who group for more built the MSFC generally strongest One cost
after a reorganization, cost office was taken went on to lead the
management over by Bill MSFC cost
point CERs at the total system level. The Project Offices at MSC and MSFC compiled the data between 1967 and 1969 and documented the resuhs group mented useful in the unpublished today by paying compile for parametric in the Eventually the CSM the data cost "Apollo JSC and this prime estimating. report points Cost MSFC was contractor 24 Despite in 1967 for cost only one Study" cost to suppleformat (preserved
than 20 years. Rutledge steadily cost group's strength until it was in the more late within outstanding cost 1960s the as the Agency. and and begun organization
recognized
databases).
of Rutledge's
innovations to expand database was
retroactively
in a WBS
was the acquisition maintain develop Data new models. and
of a contractor The
an Agency-wide Retrieval)
REDSTAR database
(Resource
these improvements, one Rand laments that the number of data estimating was "depressingly
Storage
low..,
subsystem and "this
contains paucity
more
than
four
data
points"
once,
then
the next
thrust
would
be in low Earth to all 1969 for
of data precludes
the application
of statistical techniques either in the development of the CERs themselves, or in the establishment of confidence levels for the predictive erated by the CERs. ''25 While aged (Ames, managed managed mission, most of the science and programs the "research were time also to time. values gen-
orbit transportation as a first building block the rest. A task force was assigned in March to study further ment the problem space and recommend called shuttle system options that study. 26 This report of a new performance Many options two-stage
for the developcould
were
mangiven Ames
meetcertain objectives. fully reusable
and cost-per-flight were examined, but the was the preferred choice
out of JPL and GSFC, Langley, projects from
centers"
Lewis)
development
because it seemed cost. Concurrently ments, design) Dynamics, North For most four parallel studies American of 1969
to offer the lowest recurring with these inhouse assessPhase been A (i.e., awarded conceptual to General Douglas proceeded and apace, International). had
the Pioneer planetary probes, Langley the Lunar Orbiter and the Viking Mars and LeRC managed the Centaur using project. models estimated
Lockheed, (today's these
McDonnell Rockwell studies
Generally, the costs were from the other Centers. The Low By 1968 Shuttle Cost the nation the Era:
Promise
of
churning out massive stacks of paper designs, along with cost numbers that gave the impression that all was well. For around $10 billion in development costs, the most reusable costs Shuttle of only configua few miland the the As the Phase A studies neared completion in late began with (OMB) budget that con1969, however, two cost-related problems to emerge. First, NASA's communications the was Office of Management that the The outlook projections and for the Budget NASA showed revealed rations offered recurring lion dollars per flight.
was the
immersed Vietnam Society.
in social War, and Though
political attempt
turmoil, to build
Great
accomplishment was not to occur get that NASA ous year and flows of money since its creation that the dream able Earth tinuing mounting immediate By early Saturn orbital
of the first manned until the following received was lower trend the
lunar landing year, the budthan the previincreasing
broke
of ever
that the Agency had enjoyed a decade before. NASA realized directly space lunar on the expendbuilding conand stations, surface were vehicle orbital of the technology,
not good.
of building and lunar
launch
tinued reductions in NASA's funding were inevitable; the lower budget numbers did not match the amount needed to fund the favored Shuttle designs. Second, as NASA reviewed contractor's cost estimates for the Shuttle compared became the clear could numbers that had to their own in the handle estimates, on what no one a good industry the and it the or the
exploration an expedition plans. 1969, while
to Mars
not in the
the ongoing
Apollo
program
government Shuttle reusable
prepared for the Apollo 11 mission to the moon on which humans would land for the first time, future scaled step. planning back Space from activities within NASA had been broad crucial set next misthe overly to focus moon ambitious, on the bases
be expected had
to cost. 27 The problem data. A winged, been built before being based on such as the C-5, landing thrust (for crew gear, sysstructure, by the never
with the estimates spaceship
was analogous
of space
activities stations,
and all the cost estimates were extrapolations from large aircraft B-52, etc.), etc.) tems). B-70 from The (for wings, fuselage, capsules the Saturn problem (for tanks, was
and Mars
sions all needed from the Earth's budget realities
low-cost, routine transportation surface to low Earth orbit. If the precluded doing everything at
and from
the Apollo
compounded
scope designs
of the being
estimating contemplated that NASA of NASA and
job.
All
the
various the esti-
Mathematica see. over Heiss
to develop turned protEgE
the data the named
OMB
wanted analysis Heiss.
to
overloaded
Morgenstern to a young put together
economic Klaus
mating resources entire complement lead centers (JSC eight people, key variables cerning Because
had at the time. The estimators at the two numbered only
an impressive
study 3 that
MSFC)
yet cost was to be one of the most in the decision making process con-
compared the costs launch ments
the life cycle costs of the Shuttle with of the equally capable expendable One of the more case was cost considerably a notion estimating 31 This study, and methodology, conclusion. payloads actually wrong that important that payloads that was based study done a classic arguon on for for its
vehicles. would
the Shuttle. 28 the magnitude systems NASA of the upfront had not yet been proceeded costs of the B in
for the Shuttle on expendables, cost by Lockheed. originality an exactly now
the Shuttle loads NASA scope, reached fully reusable ly estimated, mid-1970 the bones negotiations budget lower. realistic adequatean extensive
less than pay-
into Phase
with the intent of putting of the skeletal designs. with OMB continued and the numbers the cost estimates B studies
more meat on Meanwhile, concerning the got lower and became more were nearing
nevertheless
outlook, Slowly, just
It is known
Shuttle
as the Phase
cost more than those that fly on expendable launch vehicles due to the strenuous safety review process casted about tages chiefly for a manned that offered thought the 40 percent vehicle. But Lockheed would the from foresave advanwere high payload of their to be that: developers costs
completion in the summer of 1971. The studies were extended so that cost cutting measures could be investigated. First, expendable substituted for reusable interior flyback booster was scrapped, able liquid solid rocket tions each made change development flight. 29 But OMB dogging Gemini without the Shuttle peak year For funding versus the rocket boosters, boosters. Taken it possible within had added the drop tanks were tanks. Then the first for expend-
by the Shuttle.
The advantages 1) the relatively and payload would allow
then for expendable together, these reducfit the Shuttle's guidelines, cost but per OMB
weight lifting performance ume offered by the Shuttle
bay volpayloads
to barely
to the recurring
to ease up on lightweighting and miniaturization, which are cost drivers; 2) the Shuttle would allow retrieval and refurbishment of satellites instead of buying additional copies as was necessary with expendable national launch system allow standardization rockets; and 3) a single such as the Shuttle would of payloads instead of multhe plethora of Finally, it was requirethey ultiand flights Klaus analyAt the and
budget
cap was
not the only money
cost question Mercury, had flowed to show When the in 1969 as
the Shuttle. and Apollo any requirement
the mandated for the Agency
programs,
tiple designs configured for expendable vehicle interfaces. Aerospace's ments mately flight Heiss and job to determine produce traffic the need the Shuttle both flawed a discounted savings
the payload models, payload for 60 Shuttle assumptions, cost benefit billions.
economic justification for the projects. idea of a Shuttle system was floated
forecasted rates were constructed asserted
part of NASA's plans after Apollo, the OMB decided that such an expensive undertaking ought to show some economic benefits that outweighed the costs. nomic NASA port Because the analytical skills for an ecoand supthe justification did not exist inhouse thought it wise to have "independent" for the Shuttle, the Agency hired
per year.32 While
benefits
sis that
in the
least, the Aerospace, Lockheed, Mathematica work sent the OMB accountants to murmuring. President Shuttle's Nixon detailed finally design gave began the nod, and the of
Aerospace Corporation, Lockheed mist Oskar Morgenstern and
and the econohis company
in the summer
1972 tractor,
under North
contract over 1973 the
to the
winning
prime
con33 in
thinking reduced runs underway expected. Meanwhile, guide the interfaces, integrate was seen analysis
concerning complexity to breed ate up the
off-the-shelf proved more funds overruns other
hardware
and
American-though worthiness was NASA
this did very
not end
unrealistic,
and overas projects had
the debate All through
of the project. involved
began
projects
extensive "capture/cost" analyses to produce data to answer Congressional, GAO and OMB inquiries These about analyses done The the Shuttle's were NASA economic inhouse forecasts. extensions and of the as of most cost
as NASA overall foster and
Headquarters
continued
to
of the work Aerospace. resources well They
by Mathematica, studies consumed and program JSC
Lockheed groups
programs, handle the political other external relations, and the Agency budget, a need to cost the in
defend
of the MSFC
as Headquarters compared
office
personnel. costs
to strengthen the Washington function. 34 Having moved Comptroller's Office
the discounted
life cycle
Headquarters
from GSFC
"capturing" the Shuttle The Shuttle 14 percent of benefits as the final commitment. N Once Declining Shuttle
the NASA and DOD payloads with versus expendable launch vehicles. case was finally determined to yield a internal rate of return and $14 billion (in 1972 dollars). This data was used reinforcement of the Shuttle program
1970, Werner Gruhl set up an independent capability under Mal Peterson, an assistant Comptroller. constant Gruhl aggressively championed improvement of the database.
review to the the and
GruhI
Peterson's greatest contribution their relentless urging for realistic also initiated an annual symposium estimators establish (NARs)
was probably estimates. They for all NASA
Budgets, development
Rising was
Costs underway
and were instrumental in helping to a process for Non-Advocate Reviews for potential was each and new projects. as a required project panel before had milestone to prove forward. its man-
safely
by 1974, most of the estimating talent of the Agency was turned to various kinds of scientific satellite economies spacecraft more cles) craft article The money. against a state more estimating. As NASA's budget declined such in the 1970s, both JPL and GSFC pioneered
The
NAR
instituted major cost new
in which maturity agement
to an impartial experts
of technical, going
as the use of the protoflight concept in development. Before the 1970s NASA most which building approach, which spacecraft served the only serves one flight (i.e., built one or test artiIn the spacetest saves article. as ground article. complete
As part of the NAR process, Peterson and Gruhl, working with a relatively small staff of one to three analysts, undertook Peterson to perform largely devoted independent for to himself estimates of most of the major new candidates
had prototyped prototypes before is built, protoflight
authorization.
protoflight
first as the ground as the flight theoretically
penetrating reviews of the technical and programmatic readiness, the underpinning of the cost estimate. Gruhl, using mostly models of his own developed from the REDSTAR ed his own estimates. Together dab4e overrun without Another team and undoubtedly what problem from the NAR. significant during Model. database, they were reduced it would generata formithe have cost been
and is then refurbished approach
However, these savings must be balanced the cost of refurbishing the test article into ready rigid for flight, configuration to insure the cost control of maintaining of the flight ground worthiness,
test article
its eventual
and the increased Other much attempts success.
risk of having were Low
less hardware. without wishful
milestone
in cost
estimating
made to lower cost estimates based on
that occurred of the Price by Frank
the 1970s was the emergence First developed within RCA the model began to be market-
Freiman,
The Evolution
of NASA
Cost Estimating
ed in 1975 model. gle most estimating development governed handful
by RCA
as a commercially was arguably was occurrence
available the sincost
future
projects
needed
to account of NASA
for the steadily projects.
Freiman's innovative ever. and
brainchild His genius production
increasing _."',_ Recent Once NASA the
complexity Years Space
in parametric costs
to see hardware as a process between a feeling his
by logical interrelationships of key variables. Probably
Shuttle
had once
begun again
operations, to defining A in
turned
its attention
way with intuition and engineering experience more than hard data, Freiman derived a set of algorithms resulting that model modeled could these then relationships. The be calibrated to a par-
a Space Station. After Pre-Phase A and Phase studies had analyzed several configurations, 1983 NASA ran a Washington-based, the Configuration multi-cenDevelopment ter team called
ticular organization's essentially running
historical the model
track record by backward to disvariables the model the cost gave the could be and proof future to to aeroto market him with observing its
Group (CDG) CDG was led MSFC Powell tor from
to lead the Phase by Luther Powell,
B studies. The an experienced
cover what settings for the known cost. Once calibrated, run forward grammatic projects. a wide space, using factors While range the model to predict
project manager. For his chief estimator, chose O'Keefe Sullivan, a senior estimathe MSFC cost group. Sullivan had just
a rich set of technical models
the Price of industries first
are applicable
completed managing the development of the PRC Space Station Cost Model, 38 an innovative model that created a Space historical Orbiter, Station data points Apollo WBS from by cleverly parts of the unmanned was disPackage combining Shuttle
in addition Freiman provided after
found
use in the aerospace
industry. NASA encouraged his invention, and actually data for calibrating the model potential in Shuttle of the Price model several cation other to hardware, 1970s
modules,
spacecraft and other projects. tributed and used by all four Centers parametric Work responsibility and Package was cost probably model ever 1 (WP-1) for the Station
This model of the Work the was most developed modules;
cost estimating. 35 The success inspired the development of cost models with applisoftware and the life cycle. the cost
satisfactory by NASA. with was WP-2
commercial
at MSFC,
By the late
and into the mid-1980s,
at JSC with responsibility RCS and C&DH; WP-3 responsibility for power;
for truss structures, was at LeRC with and WP-4 was at GSFC
of NASA projects was a serious problem. It was now obvious that Shuttle payloads cost more, not less, than payloads Overruns were worse databases, better on unmanned vehicles. than ever despite better better estimators, and
with responsibility for platforms. Sullivan used the model to estimate the project at between $11.8 and $14 billion (in 1984 included dollars). The concapability, space platwith addithe program tent of this estimate the initial
models,
more stringent Headquarters reviews. It seemed that NASA was in danger of pricing itself right out of business. 36 At JSC, Hum Mandell, assisted by Richard Whitlock and Kelly Cyr, initiated use culanalyses of this problem. Making imaginative of the Price model, 3v they found that NASA's ture drives projects advanced to NASA cost and that the complexity steadily increasing, argued a change for expensive he argued by Gruhl. management Mandell had been
eight-person, 75-kilowatt station and forms at two different orbital locations, tional dollars required 9 Administrator with Under Beggs the OMB pressure committed later to grow to full capability) Meanwhile, been thing
NASA
Jim Beggs for support to propose to Congress
had to in
of NASA an idea also persuasively in culture
negotiating affordable,
start the project.
some-
from the exotically At the same time,
to the affordable. that estimates of
September 1983 that a Station could be constructed for $8 billion, a rather random number in light of the known estimates and the fact that the con9
The Evolution
of NASA Cost Estimating
ceptuaI extent
design necessary
had
never
settled
down
to an
As this is being
written,
NASA
is actively
design-
for a solid
definition
and cost
estimate. Nevertheless, the Agency pushed ahead with the Phase B studies and by fall 1987, needing to narrow being debated group (CETF), manager called Ray the options in configurations still between the Centers, established a the Critical Hook Evaluation and led Bill brought Task Force at LaRC by LaRC Rutledge
ing and estimating the future programs including System, the National Space Exploration of these programs, before new them, set of cost
cost of several major the Earth Observation System and the
Launch
Initiative, among others. Each like most NASA programs unto itself and presents At the a estimating challenges.
is unique
quartered Hook.
in from MSFC to lead the cost analysis effort, and Rutledge assembled a team made up of estimators representing Headquarters LaCroix, intense weeks, the and Dave they Work Bates). Package Richard Over Centers Whitlock, a period and Tom (Bill Hicks,
same time, the recent resources that NASA
years of growth in budget has enjoyed seems to have
run its course. In an era of relatively level budget authority, NASA is seeking ways to maximize the amount of program obtainable. New ideas on this topic abound. Total to Cost, Concurrent other solution the NASA dle. Armed cultural Quality Management, Design Engineering and a number of are being suggested cost. as a of high community from the past, to estimate As usual, somethey But
of a few requireat least
generated
the cost of the new
baseline, which, even after significant ments had been cut, still totaled $14 billion. NASA Seeking reluctantly to inspire took this cost attitude
changes
to the problems estimating with data be adapted
is in the midwhich question: the future,
to the
OMB. the
how must
a can-do
among
CETF team, NASA management passed out buttons containing the slogan "We Can Do It!" One senior estimator, who had seen it all before, modified his but/on to read "We Can Do It For $20 Billion! Station contractor istically tions ''40 Amid was great political given costs than turmoil, the Space Despite unrealevaluaawarded managed FY 1988 steadily of requirethe purchase nonrecurring had always finally a go-ahead. that were usual, more were the source
attempt to answer what will it cost? So brief a treatment
the all important
of the history
of NASA
cost
estimating leaves so much unsaid that apologies are in order. Nothing was mentioned of the aeronautical of projects than the Kennedy costing NASA without was Skylab, Telescope, others) had side of NASA, space Space projects Center yet they estimate focused facilities upon and the cost here. The that are no less important to the nation operations nothing been sent much Space and Even many when (Viking,
proposed optimistic
were completed
and contracts
for the four work packages. The project to survive several close calls in the through escalating ments cost FY cutbacks only, 1991 budgets, several price though iterations Like NASA includes with costs and
was not mentioned, though has sent to space could have them. Whole about Galileo, projects cost Centaur-G, Magellan, unexplored. from estimating Hubble Ulysses
which
learned
and redesigns. sticker
Spacelab,
of a car, the
and this is the cost
to be left
quoted Congress for new projects, including the Space Station. During the long and winding road of gaining Congressional Station, NASA was asked such as Station costs, growth, and and operations growth authority for the to include other costs Shuttle other launch costs, more costs, which cost
touched upon, many barest of treatments, studies. unfairly another labored ness names
subjects were the expansion
given only the left for other
various charges occurred.
Finally, and worst of all, while this paper singles out a dozen or so individuals, few score men and women who have hard in the crucial and controversial busicost estimating will not see their anyway. here. They are saluted
led to confusion
of even
of NASA
than actually
l0
But What Will It Ctrst? The Evolution
of NASA
Cost Estimating
iii
References
16 17 18
Mandcll, Sharpe. Herman
pp. 30-31.
1 See Roger E. Bilstein, Stages To Saturn, A Technological ttistory Of The Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles, NASA, Washington D.C., 1980, Chapter 2, for a discussion of how NASA was formed from these and other organizations. 2 Keith Burbridge, A Touch of ttistory, Mountain View,
H. Koelle
and William
G. Huber, 28, 1960.
Economy
of
Space Flight, NASA 19 Koelle, Herman
MSFC, October Heinz,
Handbook
of Astronautical
Engineering,
NY, 1961.
CA: BFH Parametrics, 3 T.P. Airplanes," 1936. Wright, Journal
1984, passim. the Cost of Vol. 3, No. 2,
"Factors Affecting of Aeronautical Science,
2o General Dynamics Corporation, Launch Vehicle Systems Cost Model, Contract NAS8-11283, Fort Worth, TX, May 5, 1964. 21 See, for example, the following books, all by Stewart, Rodney D., and published by John Wiley & Sons, NY: Cost Estimating (1982), Cost Estimator's Reference Manual (1987), Proposal Preparation (1984) and Managing Millions (1988). 22 Brents, T., Manned Spacecraft Dynamics, TX, July 18, 1966. Cost Model, General
4 David Novick, "A History of Military 1950-1961," in National Estimator, Journal Estimating Society, Spring 1981, p. 18.
Cost Analysis: of the National
5 Humboldt C. Mandell, Jr., "Assessment of Space Shuttle, Program Cost Estimating Methods" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado Graduate School of Public Affairs, 1983), pp. 315-328. This is a particularly good listing of the aerospace cost analysis literature through 1983. 6 For the earliest treatment of the new methods, see:
23 Campbell, Harry G. and D. J. Dreyfuss, Spacecraft Cost Estimating Relationships, Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, March 1967. 24 Rockwell Space Division, Technical Characteristics April 30, 1971.
25
Manned The Rand
David Novick, Weapon System Cost Analysis, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, January 24, 1956. 7 8 Mandell, Bilstein, p. 93. Stages To Saturn, p. 25. Terry H. Sharpe, NASA
CSM Cost, Schedule Study, Downey,
and CA,
Manned Spacecraft Cost Estimating Relationships, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, March 1967. 26 NASA Space Shuttle Task (Washington, July 31, 1969). 27 A llistory of Washington 28 Mandell, Mandell, p. 48. p. 33. Group Report,
The
9 Author's interview with MSFC, November 19, 1991. 10 Bilstein, Stages To Saturn,
NASA
pp. 38-42.
11 Bilstein, Roger E., Orders Of Magnitude: the NACA and NASA, 1915-1990, NASA, D.C., 1989, p. 49. 12 Space Planners Guide, United States Force Systems Command, July 1965. 13 Author's interview of Bill Ruhland,
Air Force,
Air
29 Mandell, p. 49 and passim of the design and cost iterations and B studies. 30 Economic Contract Analysis of Space
for a complete description during the Shuttle Phase A
NASA
JPL,
Transportation May 1971.
Systems,
November 14
27, 1991. interview (retired), of Werner 21, 1991. Gruhl, NASA
NASA
No. NASW-2081,
Author's
Headquarters
November
31 Payload Effects Analysis Study, Lockheed Space Company, Report No. LMSC-A990556, 32 Integrated Operations/PayloadFleet Report, Aerospace Corporation, Report I, August 1971.
Missiles and June 1971.
15 Estimator's Cost Analysis tlandbook, The Boeing Company, Seattle, WA, Numbered 2-81254-1, Revision F, 1965, p. 2.
Analysis Final No. ATR72(7231)-
11
The Evolution
of NASA
Cost Estimating
33 Nor is the debate over today. For an insightful analysis of the decision to build the Shuttle, see: John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?", Science, May 30, 1986. 34 Gruhl. Gray and Bob Breiling,
37 RCA Price Systems Division, Equipment Cost Effects Study, Cherry Hill, NJ, November 38 Space Corporation, Station NASA Cost MSFC, Model, 1984. Planning
Specification 30, 1976. Research
35 Author's interview of Frank RCA Price, November 21, 1984. 36 Author's interview (retired), of
39 Author's interview of O'Keefe MSFC, November 21, 1991.
Sullivan,
NASA
Tom
Newman,
NASA
Headquarters
November
21, 1991.
40 Author's interview with Bill Rutledge, NASA MSFC (retired), November 27, 1991, and author's interview with Bill Hicks, NASA MSFC, November 29, 1991.
12
Sam II - How We Did It

by Ed Mauldin, Reggie Holloway, Don Hedgepeth and Ron Baker
SAM
II is a very
successful
first-generation
empowered making as TQM. Middle advice, line
us to speak
with
their
authority
in
atmospheric research experiment developed for the Nimbus 7 observatory by the Langley Research Center. It came into existence within tight resource and short schedule constraints by a core project team of four engineers. Even though SAM II has been in orbit for over 14 years, it continues SAM II to meet was scientific mission by in January the objectives. American 1991-earning recognized Society Investigator,
real time decisions.
Today,
this is known
managers
helped
us with
technical for
but we dealt
with the upper
managers
all management-related issues. They took a keen personal interest in SAM II and in our efforts. They visited the University of Wyoming (UWY) and Ball Aerospace on many our contractor counterparts. even vided Error error They making helped several Analysis budget. probably some could mistakes, judged gained from have prevented used us from restraint the would analysis, us with that technical we used analyses, occasions and knew When asked, they advice. the They proAliasing
Meteorological the Principal
Dr. M. E McCormick,
the Jules G. Charney Award for "... outstanding contributions to satellite sensing through development of solar occultation instruments for elucidation of the nature which neous h01e. Today's ule, and spaceflight past concepts today. This are central chemistry of Polar that causes Stratospheric the Antarctic Clouds" ozone to understanding the heteroge-
including
in our instrument
but wisely that in the final these
and correctly spiraling large cost, long development estimates begs if they technical to develop a close review approaches schednew of experience provide porary made without twice They main We began knew ject. Only experience. relatively inexperienced when and none of us any of the others selected for the proresource
mistakes
instruments to determine paper describes
a greater long-term benefit than the temsetbacks caused by them. And when we mistakes, trying as hard offered benefit we accepted to pass until virtually the buck, unlimited full and responsibility then worked corrected. as needThe
are applicable
and management techniques used during the period from 1973 to 1978, many of which fit within today's TQM initiatives.
we had the problem support
ed from
the line organizations of the close
at the Center.
relationship
of the SAM
II team with upper management was the tremendous boost in team morale derived from having their trust, confidence, things Each this our way without SAM II team with support, and freedom to do interference. member mentors, to have had maintained and each a major II success. strong considers positive and techniWe also
half of the team had flight hardware All were GSll/12 engineers. Given
the high visibility of the Nimbus program, the risks involved with development of a sophisticated, first-generation instrument, and the limited experience of the project team, Langley management could have micromanaged us to death. Instead, they accepted the risk and let us do our jobs without resources and the accountability interference. They gave us the the responsibility and we accepted for SAM II's success. They
relationships relationship influence cal skills
on development necessary
of personal
for SAM
strongly advocated and succeeded in getting our contractor and subcontractor to provide mentors for their young engineers. 13
_-'#, Adherence to Phased Project Planning

Although ject we had no text to follow we followed on phased pro-
QA
issues,
nor the number be strongly
of test cycles-factors with flight
that must hardware. princi-
addressed
planning,
all the classical
ples and covered all the bases in today's writings on project include: instrument Phase cepts mance, that 1) establishing and performance could deliver a clear then sion requirements
that are contained life cycles. These set of science these during misinto PreconperforA; 3)
Many design EM fabrication failure elevation by three was ots during
flaws were discovered and test phase. The testing. design This
during the most notable flex pivin an used resulted
that of the elevation vibration redesign,
gimbal
convening
gimbal subsequent
including
development instruments.
requirements potential the necessary during
of an isolation
grommet
that has been
A; 2) exploring lifetime
instrument Phase
solar occultation
and reliability
[]
Early
Risk Management
in the SAM II project, and we conducted status a sur-
conducting technology surveys to select the most feasible candidate concepts, performing tradeoff studies to evaluate relative merits of candidate concepts, and evaluating technology state-of-theart and performing cepts in Phase B; subsystems hardware Model selected fabricating, fication (EM) concepts phase concepts testing have by risk analysis 4) selecting and building Phase testing, during the current C/D and of candidate cona system and then moving testing to the an Engineering to qualify 5) qualiC; and finally, and flight Phase D. on
vey of the availability that would be required ment. We did not take approach and and unproven spect, ment we used in accepting given and
of technologies developtechnical many new In retrojudgthat
for successful a conservative to accept approaches.
quickly
were willing designs and extraordinary some
engineering approaches others
to do development during of hardware written performance
high-risk
succeeded would have risk designs
and in rejecting
that in hindsight
us problems. approaches
Many of the highthat were selected in today's conserv-
We could project ware
textbook built
probably would be questioned ative environment. We identified and ranked able effort into reducing catastrophic aggressively that usually problems. pursued included For risks those
life cycle quickly
principles. Phase
We moved
to hardan alland put considerthat could cause designs, we
during
up Engineering Model that proved to be a major key to our success. The EM was thoroughly evaluated (PFM) problems failure testing. quick and tested, during to meet evaluation and many ProtoFlight from and testing Model unforeseen or from during endandesign refinements fabrication performance of potential came
high-risk
a risk reduction program fabrication of test articles,
requirements bed" fixes without
The EM gave
us a "test
that allowed
qualification testing, life testing, evaluation of results, and assessment of residual risk. Decisions were not based on a "hunch" or even an "educated guess," risk/payoff ment required, development were first generation approach success. played but were based on doing the a lot developof homework, identifying
gering flight hardware. problems were quickly with permanent Analyses design permitted are solutions good tools, beyond
All of our significant identified and corrected using the EM hardware. proof of a which Also, test limits, the EM but the real flight
and then conducting the necessary program. The problems incurred as one a major would role expect in the from SAM a II design, and this risk management
not as severe
is in hardware testing
performance.
helped to evaluate margin. Our EM
reliability, lifetime, and safety testing was not constrained by
14
_:::_i_'i_il_ Strong Approach Another major
Systems
Engineering
included vibration
recovery testing
from that
a flex-pivot by itself
failure
during
caused
a 30-week
key
to the
SAM
II success
was
delay in the CDR and EM delivery. We actually recovered all but one month of lost PFM schedule, but then lost a month ity sun in Boulder, the final Baseline Systems waiting Test. schedule of the her on for a high-qualto perform Colorado needed
effective systems engineering. We believed that with effective systems engineering, the project management Mauldin, role described responsibility neering. consisted keep vide process as Instrument as a part-time was optics would take care of itself. had Ed Manager, Manager, job and since the closest
to that of a Project
but this can be his full-time engi-
Maintenance of this excellent working can be attributed to Lillian Henry University PERT and Project
radiometric
His project management efforts mainly of administrative tasks necessary to in order; MIC reports reporting and and tasks to proto status reviews
of Wyoming, who developed technical skills while working at the University
Hawkeye
of Iowa.
the books monthly
Lillian kept an up-to-date of us at all times. PERT efficient guide on how
PERT schedule in front was used to provide an to get from here to there, failing to by teleand Ball
Langley Research Center Flight Center management; activities Although mechanical, used such as planning picked and
Goddard Space and coordination reviews.
for the design
not to point out that the contractor was keep schedule. We had weekly reviews conference (including Langley, UWY, teams) review and in which all critical
to cover optics, electronics, control system disciplines, we approach for design and problem
PERT was used as a tool to and near-critical path activities to find schedule efficient slip period paths focused, were when in the were of peofre-
a systems
conduct
brainstorming to minimize For due
solving. Thus, an optimized design was developed that has changed very little in the SAGE, SAGE II, and SAGE III instruments that have followed. This strong systems engineering approach eliminated many formed a "checks potential problems and also and balance" relationship each forced the to defend a design to the other team and looked
workarounds problems middle parallel arose.
a significant all subsystem to were revisions
of the program, critical PERT delivery.
implementation increments
workarounds. ple oriented, until PFM
activities PERT
and broken
out into daily
among team members where other to do homework in order or problem members. solving We became approach
quently made to reflect the current ment of the most efficient sequence We even first week ation, hunters. since included of hunting many was PERT the Wyoming contractors as a daily reporting season of our used
best assessof activities. and Colorado considerwere tool. comput(PMS) avid
interchangeable
out for all disciplines when only one of us was in the contractor's plant to review a design, discuss concerns and problems, or operate the instrument an during a test. We were also outstanding systems engineer _ii, ii_!_ Effective Much of our Schedule success working of the SAM can blessed in having at Ball Aerospace. and Cost Control to having every unforedritwo This had
as a PERT
management
tool as opposed Cost control erized
to a monthly was very simple
by today's System
Performance
Measurement
be attributed
standards-yet very effective. When one of us visited UWY or Ball, one of our first activities was to meet with the Project Manager and review cost and schedule. We wanted to see which activities had been completed since our last review and which were in progress, with the names of individuals attached. We wanted to see how many 15
an excellent subsystem
schedule.
Although
II instrument
seen problems that were vers, the PFM delivery months after the originally
significant schedule was shipped only contracted date.
hours
these
individuals Then, asked
had
charged went such
to the SAM to the indias analyses com-
led to quick the project delay. Our
and permanent to move forward
solutions
that allowed of
II account. vidual and completed, pleted, rocket
we personally to see results, completed,
with a minimum
drawings
fabrication
testing scientists' were
completed, etc. It did not take skills to find the soft spots, and found, we had meetings and asked with the for (and supervisors
ad hoc team
members,
most
of whom eager occasions
came to help to work they
out of research us. We never on SAM II even
organizations, had to persuade though
were
when these responsible
any of them
on most
received) explanations and remedial action. As shown in the table below, the system worked very effectively. Even without a PMS type system, our and cost-to-complete we did not have proved reasonably accurate any financial surprises.
were very busy and had to push their regular activities aside. This approach resulted in a considerable manpower savings at the Center and a cost savings Although to the project. strangers to each other when SAM II
COST AND SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE SAM II PLAN Langley inhouse cost estimate: $2.4M Original budget (including contingency): $3.5M Original ProtoFlight Model delivery: 32 months after C/D start SAM I1 ACTUALS Contract signed for: $2.177M Contract cost runout: $3.165M Contract cost overrun: $0.482M SAM II instrument total cost (11/9/77): $3.250M Delivery: 34 months after C/D start
began, we immediately developed and close personal relationships,
strong bonds and we remain
lifelong friends. We spent many hours together professionally and socially. However, the close personal relationships did not stifle strong debates on the issues, for each of us was very outspoken as we aired ings. cism. grill And The positive our concerns these critiques fact that concerns in frequent were always to personal engineer without team meetas criticould the taken
as opposed a mechanical engineer
an optical
on optics
optical engineer versa for other strong among us.
taking it personally (and vice team members) testifies to the relationships that existed
interpersonal
Small
We operated nical Thus, zations rapid often when go experts
Core
Team
team backed the by tech-
_
Early
Communication
in the SAM
Barriers
II development, situation with not we were faced
as a small core from within
line organizations. for all line organiII, which technical permitted issues. support, not required channels We and to for
we were a clearinghouse participating response used we needed line specialists support, on SAM to contractor
with a very difficult nication channels Contractually, Ball since they UWY Moreover, subcontract very "thin" and UWY covering performed statement. an adequate were
regarding commuUWY and Ball. deal directly with of UWY. an adequate the staff was
we could could
a subcontractor not perform role because
for ad hoc we were
monitoring
through
organization
approval. two-other or two.
Some efforts only took a day or efforts seldom took longer than a week Significant problems, such as the flexintensively the focused with tiger activities
and totally immersed with their work, did not have experienced engineers all the necessary rope act disciplines role. To would to perform say that we be an undermonitoring a tight
pivot failure, were attacked teams. On these occasions,
16
Our
relationship learned by
with from Langley
UWY Project with with First,
and
Ball employed a satellite to the as a dealt
ing tests
at Ball,
performing
instrument
problem
lessons developed University major
Hawkeye, a contract Ball
troubleshooting, etc. We spent nearly as many hours in the clean room with the instrument as did the Ball and UWY engineers, and were treated more like Ball employees when in the plant than as "customers." UWY and Ball team members soon equals removed. great side information. learned and Good to respect all "us benefit-we against rapport us as being them" with UWY always technical were barriers had
of Iowa
Aerospace
subcontractor.
we aggressively
with UWY to define could feel comfortable
a program that our team with, and one which proof success. This in the early days to assure the necnegotiaUWY barriers After we folwith the trust, our support. Ball, possessed After nurtured and and with from of where these
vided acceptable confidence included some tough negotiation regarding ourselves essary tions and lowed blessing to develop and the were instill the project and staffing; enthusiasm. we that the UWY skills completed, to remove mutual same a clear approach team
and Ball had a up-to-date
we needed
relationships we had gained
communication
Using this concept, we were able to develop SAM II for a much smaller cost than would have been incurred since increased if we had used technical and very little the monitoring was energy was approach, significantly wasted in at team manpower
cooperation approach We strived picture we wanted
their confidence
of UWY.
the beginning we were going
hiding agendas and playing the traditional Government vs. contractor game of staying arm's length. A testimony to the success balancing tail Ball accused
to use to get there.
of our
The emphasis was always on what was best for SAM II. Personal gain was never in the forefront. On tive there teams together Differences each team many occasions, with get one do were member the bumps to we let the contractor which us, and the job from united best gave then time them great we rolled to time, team, job all for the SAM take incenup our three II. of be in
act is the fact that we were able to curand UWY feelings of meddling and and were never seriously of these negative SAM for behaviors. II team members continuously, status, was in elimiand be
micromanagement credit sleeves for our ideas, to work were to help became
One of the Langley the contractor's nating These concerns relayed arriving the trips need of all by the team
completed.
Although working
plant
almost
an on-site so that team At least important checkout
representative. issues could
overlapped, instrument departing member.
subsystems member one
resolved
by the dedication would
to the
and each organization to do what II. teams
to make
of us was
the necessary sacrifices the best interest of SAM Often, itoring used Government role in which to evaluate
always present during subsystem and system and qualification Boulder nearly with the EM testing Mauldin
events, such as and performance
project contractor
perform
a monand to
testing. the entire assembly,
Don Hedgepeth lived in summer of 1976 helping checkout, performance
technical
experts performance
are mainly
serve as consultants to help solve problems. We did not monitor our contractor and subcontractor counterparts, responsibilities had a significant but worked side-by-side to share in all phases of the project. We "hands on" role that included
and flight qualification testing. Ed was once in Boulder for 30 days, waiting sun to run the final Baseline with the contracfacilities to assess inspections. This of vendor-
for a high-quality
Systems Test. We also traveled tor and subcontractor to vendor status and perform hardware allowed an independent related issues.
participating in design activities, qualifying hardware at Langley, writing procedures and perform-
assessment
17
Regarding beginning
change
orders,
we made
clear from saw
the
The Langley/Goddard
new projects not owned including start take out the
Partnership
sister-center way. rela-
that unless
the contractor
a direccomnot to Today, tionship ed. Goddard grams, between Langley and Goddard that for grantproat "He this
tive in writing from the Contracting Officer, ments heard in brainstorming sessions were
be interpreted as directives. All directives went through the Contracting Officer to the prime contractor, UWY. Before a directive was issued, the Langley team reviewed it thoroughly with UWY until we were sure that the directive was clearly understood. We did not direct the subcontractor, Ball Aerospace, but directives from UWY. they did receive similar
It did
Traditionally, in their require-
all requirements instrument
performance
ments. An early Goddard reminded who has the gold, lopsided relationship as an equal partner. define a boundary our role. explaining development
Nimbus project manager us of the Golden Rule: rules." We did not accept
and insisted on being treated First, we worked diligently to between centers, including and negotiof the authority, ownership
Complementary Relationship Principal Investigator

We were fortunate Investigator a clear to have a very
with
responsibilities, Then, until Langley
we aggressively
ated with Goddard supportive Pat objecPrincipal provided in Dr. Pat McCormick. set of science
SAM II requirements and development approach was affirmed. Goddard retained ownership of spacecraft mission interface requirements, requirements such we were relationship and top-level orbit as spacecraft
and concise
tives during Pre-Phase A. He provided a major support role in instrument concept development, such as data inversion simulations to establish instrument performance requirements. instrument us conduct Pat concerns. problems we were Pat helped during studies of our us evaluate potential Phase A an'd helped during Phase progress, issues and stood the engineering provided relief when concepts tradeoff informed
parameters. Eventually, and the inter-center ruffled. Again, ples should produce lished inter-center this illustrates now linked their then be given
treated as peers became un-
how
we insisted those doing
on princithe work to for estab-
B. We kept
to TQM: The
He fully underwe faced, and technolwe refined the C from a solar scanning instruand
the responsibility products. flight remain
and authority rules in effect today
ground
up against
essentially space
ogy barriers in Phase C. Together, instrument concept during Phase tracking ment-a significantly sion. Neither team dently, would but instrument design improved have the to a solar that simplified the engineering arrived team's
development
programs.
_ii Spacecraft
In the beginning, ed of nine required cation initial 1975, which contract Sensor (SIRD).
Interface
the Nimbus adherence spacecraft established observatory instruments to the initial resources. on March consistthat alloThese 10,
the instrument team
the accuracy
of data invernor the science indepenin an resulted
sophisticated
flight
at this design synergism
a stringent of the limited budgets were by the Nimbus was less than award. Interface A five-phase
optimized instrument concept that is still used in current solar occultation instrument design. Both science in which their very and instrument trusted teams the other In short, had a relationship SAM II each to give
Project Office at Goddard, two months after SAM II document of interface was the materiRequirements delivery Document
The controlling
best effort.
Pat was our great-
est supporter.
18
als
was
required
by the
SIRD,
with
each
phase could March of all
requiring substantiation stay within its allocated 10, Goddard resources. At one point had allocated had removed gency, Thus, tions cepts, resource were within The from required
that an instrument resources. After monthly review
Engineering elements Attentive Strong
model
as early
proof-of-design
risk management systems engineering approach
very
early
in the program, and power
Goddard and was contincontinued. Small core team backed by experts in the line organization Close-knit Removal contractors II Frequent visits to contractors for directing relationship contractors with the principal project team barriers with Effective schedule and cost control
all weight the
resources
no contingency but adherence weight and in selection and parts
at all. One payload to initial
instrument
to recover budgets
power were major consideraof technologies, design conin SAM and were tight able II. Despite when resource to deliver not havthe early configuration
used
ing an instrument allocation we all spacecraft used placed,
of communication
constraints SAM
budgets. by a small the SAM core team to sucwhich
concepts
Clear
procedures
cessfully
develop
II instrument,
has performed summarized other the concepts, ones
in orbit since October below. We could have but did not want were most important.
1978, are mentioned Many of
Complementary investigator Well-defined Attentiveness Use of
to risk obscuring Langley/Goddard to spacecraft learned" partnership interface from previous
we felt
these concepts are now basic principles of TQM, but were chosen at the time because they simply made common sense: Management Adherence and Phase empowerment to Pre-Phase C/D principles of the project A, Phase team B,
"lessons
projects Mentor relationships
A, Phase
19
Our National Space Science Program: Strategies to Maximize Science Return

by There lessons grappling is a concern science at NASA community. of: to learn Greg the been S. Davidson ror have tators, been while fodder other for comedians difficulties such and commenas those with
from
of the past and to respond with the problems small simple missions spacecraft
to the concerns We have
of the space
hydrogen leaks on the Space Shuttle, or the rash of problems overcome on the Astro mission, have helped to create strategies a perception for conducting of serious space problems. astrophysics our strategy It is always matic appropriate to review and to develop our program-
Big versus Multiple servicing A culture Unrealistic Institutional Linkage
versus
spacecraft
in light of experience,
of risk avoidance budget planning
for the future. So let us briefly note the recent scientific output of our space astrophysics program, and then discuss the areas of concern identified above. _.','_','-_ Status of Astrophysics 1991 Explorer mission complete in
and political
forces space program astro-
January Cosmic
to the manned
Background
As we are in a very dynamic physics, our discussion text of current events. have arrive. been More launched new
time for space
(c_ogenically cooled November 1990) A smooth No later Unrivaled Hubble (checkout big bang bangs data
must be placed in the conThe missions of the 1980s and data is beginning missions to were
astrophysics
expected to be launched between 1991 and the end of 1993 than in the decade of the 1980s. With the greater emphasis into several of new data several astrophysics years, on should has long-term continue exceeded operations missions, to grow. in funding inflation the Over for by for the designed supply the last space roughly science growth There NASA Congress, ence of these recent the growth
from the infrared
background
Space
Telescope beginning science verifica-
complete,
tion and operations) Potential black hole in nearby ring around galaxy 1987a
15 percent, and the growth in funding and data analysis is keeping up with in science has also public data, been and tremendous program some Problems criticism from members the
"Circumstellar of the media, scimir High-resolution Storms
Supernova
on Saturn imagery of Pluto and Charon
astrophysics community.
of the
with the Hubble
2O
Roentgen
Satellite - U.S. observation time begun
(survey complete February) 80,000
During the next several areas of substantial Advanced X-ray Timing Probe-B
years, some of the other work will include the Facility, the X-ray
Astrophysical
new X-ray
sources ultraviolet sources
Explorer, the Shuttle test of the Gravity instrument, the Submillimeter Wave Satellite, additional mission, mission Program, HST support and the replacefor the instruments for the European Japanese
Astronomical 1,000 new extreme ment X-ray Astro/BBXRT (mission analyzed) Results Recent and to come... Upcoming Science Missions complete December 1990-data being Russian VLBI
instruments, Multi-Mirror Radioastron Space
Observatory
and definition
work on the Space Infrared Telescope Facility, the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy, Explorer. ly flown will continue, and the Far Ultraviolet Rocket, missions. balloon and as will data analysis Spectroscopic activities previousfrom airborne
Gamma
Ray Observatory
(1991) Imaging Sensors
F _.,,_ Big
The and small
and Small
rationale missions is that
Space
Missions
Array of Low-Energy (1991) Extreme Ultraviolet X-ray
X-ray
scientific
for a mix of big, moderate in a balanced there program of is no optimal mission
Explorer
(1991) (1991) Far
astrophysics
Solar-A/Soft
Telescope/ISAS
size to address the incredible variety phenomena we wish to investigate. mission size is scaled down to the required unique sions that to fulfill require the science the largest goals. in its capability to conduct
of scientific In practice, lowest level The science U.S. is but mis-
ASTRO-SPAS/Orbiting and Extreme (1992) Diffuse X-ray Ultraviolet
and Retrievable Spectrometer/ESA
observatories,
Spectrometer (1992)
(1992)
these observatories are balanced efforts in our overall program physics research. to develop to carry a variety A diversity and out maintain scientific Diversity helps today supports
by many smaller of space astroof missions our also institutional size
KONUS/WlND Solar, Particle Anomalous, Explorer
capability and Magnetospheric (1992) X-ray (1993) and Planetary Camera II
investigations in mission strategies,
and in the future.
of implementation
Astro-D/Spectroscopic Observatory/ISAS HST Wide (1993) Spectrum-X-Gamma/USSR All-sky Stellar monitor X-ray Field
and it helps establish a broad portfolio of missions that can help weather unanticipated and adverse external events. The temas we use to describe perspective categorizes which and budget, physics, Congress space programs to mission the entire includes payload may size. preIn
sent a misleading one sense, (1993) and physics, astronomy
physics astromis-
Shuttle
Polarirneter
sion management,
as a single
item in the budget.
21
The Congress holds NASA to an operating that has the Explorers as a single activity, even within are the other seen parts of NASA project. nature the Explorers sensible as a single
plan and Small diver-
for this class of mission are currently budgeted for the decade of the 1990s. It is analytically useful to think of the combination of Delta-class Explorers ments and observatory class replacement of mission. instruas a single In assessing
To get a of each
understanding activity
of our real mission and not on
sity, we focus astrophysics categorization. Small loads tages. able missions provide Similar on the
on the fundamental
a bureaucratic
scientific priorities, it may whether $100 million spent
be useful to compare on another instrument
for the HST or AXAF focal plane will provide more or less benefit than the next mission in the such as the Small with balloon Explorers and rocket and payadvanavailand Explorer missions transfer From queue. (In actuality, these are funded from different is not likely.) this perspective, to small In order it appears missions to penetrate that the benefits can come in big the fundamental we must sharpen What precisely do Is it opportuniat small institunumber of science maximum access possible two types accounts, of so
suborbital
activities
special opportunities and opportunities are currently Kuiper Airborne be available Observatory Observatory, for
they will eventually Stratospheric
on the moderate Infrared
attributed packages.
Astronomy (SOFIA) mission. Small missions are more readily suitable for rapid and flexible response provide to unforeseen continuity opportunities, to a given for training and new help sciand stability science
issue underlying this discussion, our definition of big and small. we want from our small ties for hardware development tions? Is it to fund a greater subdisciplines? to space Is it providing data astrophysics
missions?
discipline and opportunities entists and instrumentalists.
to the widest
However, bigness and smallness es of the same mission. Recently, tional have opportunities been pursued on major to support
may be attributseveral internaforeign small missions American
range of the science community? Is it the ability to respond rapidly to unexpected scientific opportunities? Is it to increase launch rate? Figure 1, a representation of the current reflects by the diversity
teams with unique technical abilities, to the benefit of both the American space science community and to the international a whole. NASA support scientific community as of the activities associat1987a demonbig, moderate pursue an For observasupport on IUE with suborbital system was which
in astrophysics efforts, categorizing missions development While hardware the budget. HEAO
the difficulties in size of their total
ed with the study of Supernova strated the coordination of many and small mission assets unanticipated scientific opportunity.
missions the current
required it does archival
large-scale not make data activ-
to rapidly
development
efforts,
sense to categorize
tion of SN1987a, and Astro-C/Ginga observations, from the Gamma flown on a balloon!
guest observer was combined use Ray Observatory,
ities on HEAO as a big mission. How then should data archive activities on Hubble or GRO be characterized? While there is no debate that XTE is a moderate mission and does this $100-million-class not a large one, how instrument devel-
including
of a detector
In the $100-million-plus sions are the Delta-class
class
of moderate such
misas
oped to be installed on-orbit on the Explorer Platform differ from the $100-million-class Hubble replacement instruments? Some have suggested that the issue of small activities spacecraft might is one of risk: a large number all dependent on a single all be destroyed by a single
Explorers
EUVE, XTE, and FUSE, as well as replacement instruments for HST such as the NICMOS and STIS. 22 Approximately six to eight opportunities
Our National
Space Science
Program:
Strategies
to Maximize
Science
Return
BIG HARDWARE DEVELOPMENT

($500m+ total) (40% of FY 1991) HST Operations (45) HST Servicing (40) GRO Develop (22) ^AXAF(125) SIRTF studies (8)
MODERATE HARDWARE DEVELOPMENT ($50-$500M total) (21% of FY 1991) EUVE/Platform (26) HST WFff'C II (25) HST NICMOS (-15) HST STIS (-15) HST ORU (5) XTE (16) STORE/GP-B (23) 64CE studies (1) ^FUSE studies (1) SOFIA studies (1)
SMALL HARDWARE DEVELOPMENT (<$50M total) (12% of FY 1991) KAO (10) Rockets (3) Balloons (3) ORFEUS (.5) ORFEUS-Jenkins SAMPEX (14) CRIE (.2) Astro-D (3) SXT (3) SXG/MOXE (1) SXG/SXRP (1) ^Radioastron (1) XMM (6) LAGEOS-3 (. l) KONUS (.2) AFAS'I" (8)
NON-HARDWARE ACTIVITY
(27% of FY 1991)
(.2)
^SWAS (6)
IR Tech/SIRTF (6) ^HETE (.6) ATD (2) Atlas-FAUST {.2}
Grants Programs (14) Long Term Program (4) Theory (4) Data Program (6) Data Systems (2) ^HST Data Analysis (20) HST DADS (11) HST Institute (34) ^GRO MO&DA (16) HEAO MO&DA (2) IUE MO&DA (7) IRAS/IPAC MO&DA (7) COBE MO&DA (10) ASTRO/BBXRT {5} Ginga MO&DA (.5) Hipparcos MO&DA (.3) ROSAT MO&DA (7) IRTS (.4) SXG/EUVITA (.1) ISO co-I's (.2) KONUS (.2) Cassini Gravity Exp. {.ll
^ = 50% or more growth planned for FY 1992 (#) = FY 1991 funding in millions Program in italics = Astrophysics not primary science {$} = not funded by Astrophysics Division
Figure meteoroid. big versus secondary concern. Many physics ered such of the types by small as HST.
1. Astrophysics upon
Program which the
Diversity-FY astronomers)
1991 "Snapshot" than ever before. Even with the
If this is the true pivot
small issue turns, then size becomes a matter and risk becomes our key
problems to date, and on-orbit plete, Hubble demonstrated versatility space when as a long-term it captured
checkout not compart of its planned asset in recent storm.
observational Saturn's
of opportunities to make
in space
astro-
that we wish
available
are deliv-
Finally, the value of increased launch rate must be assessed in the context of risk management and single versus multiple spacecraft conduct scientific missions. Our current program combines non-serviceable observatories small Explorer and moderate-sized plus support program, strategies to
missions and by a large mission A moderate mission program is replacement instruments,
embedded allowing disciplines Hubble of small archival physics
in Hubble
for new teams from different science to build and fly new instruments. brings grants research community a massive for increase in the number and astroamateur guest observations a broader
serviceable in concert missions for missions
and with in the of
to support
(including
opportunity: rocket, balloon grams. Existing technology
and aircraft prodevelopment,

23
Our National Space Science Program: Strategies

I
to Maximize Science Return
research
and analysis,
guest
observer
and archival
The comparison
above
points
to two strategic
rea-
research programs able astrophysics
round out the currently availopportunities. While the diveris not entirely under our that this combination of the community to us. Are we correct
sons to use a single, serviceable achieve long life, and to reap the sharing The critical infrastructure. of a single the required costs further. spacecraft But mission complexity
spacecraft to benefits from at what raises cost? costs time,
sity in scale of missions control, we do believe meets the wide range as they have been
of needs
expressed
and increases which increases While nerable a single
development
in this assessment? Some are asking for a greater emphasis on smaller missions in the future. What type of service, product, opportunity or efficiency should be pursued? We welcome further discussion of this issue. E[ Single vs. Multiple Missions and benefit in which by a single simpler tradeoffs missions complex spacecraft. associated are designed spacecraft The most Spacecraft in
approach system
is more
vulfail-
to an irreparable
single-point
ure, servicing provides a programmatic means to regularly repair subsystem failures. The only previous astrophysics missions on a scale even roughly analogous to HST were Astrophysical Observatory (OAO) Energy Astrophysics Observatory the Orbiting and the High (HEAO) series.
Conducting There are cost
with the strategy to be conducted rather than several
Two of the four OAO spacecraft failed, one from a launch failure and another on the second day of the mission the HEAO from missions a power were problem. launched All and three operated of
cogent examples of the single missions are HST and AXAF,
complex spacecraft and since they rep-
successfully for approximately two years. Of course, it was expensive to build serviceability into HST and to purchase the first set of replacement hardware, but the cost to build, launch and operate in the early 1960s The would life cycle equal costs $2.4 billion in 1993 dollars. of HST,
resent half of the Great Observatories, questioning the fundamental strategy they embody could provide HST plex enormously and AXAF are important insights. large and com-
not merely they reflect
observatories, They
but
are also a strategy
serviceable to provide
including is a little parative through million.
six Shuttle flights at $350 million each, over three times that amount. For compurposes, the two Is there the years HEAO lifecycle was that cost $130 of operations
observatories.
15 years of on-orbit lifetime through regular replacement of instruments and other hardware. In contrast, orbit lifetime Satellite Observing of a series basis. The the strategy for the System System intent to provide Tracking (TDRSS) (EOS) of the and and a similar Data the onRelay Earth
disagreement
the expected
15-year scientific return of HST will easily surpass that of HEAO and OAO, even in the context of a much the-art? Multiple numbers" numbers we had faulty way roughly second rors would advanced technological state-of-
involves spacecraft servicing
development on a regular strategy is to
of replacement
optimize costs for long-term missions that require an expensive spacecraft (such as HST or AXAF with their operate requires requires have AXAF large precise optics), and that can also orbit. orbit TDRSS analogous TDRSS and EOS or nor EOS to HST in a Shuttle-accessible a geosynchronous a polar optics. orbit. elements Neither
missions provide a certain for launch vehicle or other provide likely no easy have fix to generic HSTs, been distorted built two simple
"safety flaws, failures.
in but If mir-
both primary
by the same one
null corrector. to build multiple
Since
the most cost-effective is to have
spacecraft
structural
one to two years ahead of the other, the Hubble in this example would have been
24
Our National
Space Science Program: Strategies to Maximize Science Return
essentially identified mirror and menting We must surrogate Launching ment rate, does egy rather lower yield measure each
completed in orbit. ground
at the time the problem In that scenario, easily fixes repairing take we are could as the
was the
Risk-taking
and
Risk
Avoidance to support the a level It
on the today also five
as long imple-
Can we change of risk-taking efficiency would be almost
the environment that will space increase science that
be as expensive
long-term state-of-thebe 100
for the real HST. be careful for have simpler in using scientific Hubbles resulted of launch launch rate as a
of our
expenditures? we could
impossible so reliable
to make
art spacecraft
measure might
productivity. with one instruin a higher vehicles flight by itself in a stratspacecraft spacecraft is a itself does not for some other that is correlat-
percent certain that there are no technical risks, and even if we could do this, the last bit of reliability more provide would probably is to design additional cost our a lot. that difficult A cheaper NASA missions and has to that practical approach capability
but the of flying
number single
not increase
productivity.
Implicit
employed
multi-instrument
or flexibility
than many single-instrument launch rate. Since a launch science, we have to look of scientific productivity
enables us to survive unanticipated problems. If we then can build that mission cheaper, we are getting However, ing has ures more science for the dollar. that includes some risk-takfailstrate-
ed with flight rate. What are the appropriate ways to measure scientific value: launch rate, number of instruments, tion new time, data knowledge? with slow programs is that we do not weight returned, of instruments, refereed observapublications,
a strategy one critical
implication-sometimes with risk-taking
happen.
The problem
gies is that NASA, Congress, nity, and the general public to accept failures. NASA American successes science budget
the science commuare usually unwilling provides a symbol of thus, NASA that exceeds receives the
A problem
reap critical information this is of most concern also how our hinders first to conduct strategy, more space
for many years. While in the scientific arena, it of our knowledge HST spacecraft it will wind benefit HST weekof is science with missions.
technological excellence; and failures have a context return for the dollar. partly of members but NASA's cost-benefit that the NASA that it does because
the expansion
of this symbolof Congress and stature also comanalysis. strategy Imagine to yield
experiment than
a planned
ism in the minds their constituents, plicates an airline our simple that
servicing up costing
and as a pathfinder programs
that can
decided
from Hubble's servicing lessons learned. was begun in an environment where almost ly Shuttle flights were anticipated.
the most cost-effective transportation for the dollar would be to reduce safety to the expected fatality happen The level associated could with driving a car. Even what if this decision be implemented, would
Throughout
the development period, as we have learned about the Shuttle and what it can do, the HST servicing strategy has shifted and adapted. After less than a year on-orbit, we have a small but real database on actual mission events and the programmatic flexibility them. solar enough arrays servicing will and optics, provides enable to accommodate key fixes to HST an advantages Adopting Servicing to justify
after the first crash? mirror aberration was tragic, but it
Hubble
was also typical of many spacecraft that it was from an utterly unexpected unlike egy vides previous missions, the HST On-orbit flexibility was failure-resilient.
failures in source. But program servicing stratprowhich
but are these expenses?
the extra
the programmatic
through
empirical approach, let's see the data, let's discuss it, and let's see what we can learn from it.
even this utterly can be addressed
unexpected technical and corrected. From
problem a program
25
OurNational
Space Science Program: Strategies
to Maximize Science Return

Illll I I I
perspective,
we will have
an observatory
that will
not yet know unique that yield the part grassroots aggregate rate groups
how they are going associated is usually and
to overcome the
the
be less than expected remaining 12 years potential. fabrication impact Congress
for three years, but for the should live up to its full
challenges There
with science some
missions on for a
the state-of-the-art of the engineers,
we are usuoptimism
Nevertheless, the failure in the mirror has had a profound and fundamental community, the public, the and on all of us here. to have does a strategy that involves in one of are best on the level missions only the
ally pursuing.
it is difficult
on the science
estimate to properly account effect of complex interactions working on difficult tasks.
for the of sepaSo in par-
It is still possible risks, and NASA of several
designate depending
payloads
allel with a grassroots estimate, a parametric estimate is made using statistical inference based on previous sion type mission (such experience. weight as cryogenically By using cooled, factors and missuper such as subsystem lightweight instrument developed. The grassroots and parametric from budget estimates estimate are then is is develor complexity
categories
risk deemed appropriate. Planetary Class A, with requirements to use possible parts and the greatest level cy. Recently, the AXAF exceptions) was deemed in part because of the vided by servicing. Shuttle Columbia, attached mission. payloads,
of redundan-
spacecraft (with a few to be a Class B mission, additional flexibility pro-
planetary probe, or low Earth orbiting platform), a budget estimate is
The recent Astro flight on the like many other Shuttlewas developed as a Class C
compared, presented,
the information and a single
both estimates
oped for the project. This budget estimate (along with the associated technical and scientific plan for accomplishing by a team plans the mission) are then reviewed who scrutinize the as well underof "non-advocates" parametric
We agree that failure-resilient strategies should be pursued. So how are we going to change the environment so that there will be support for these strategies? In the abstract, few would disagree. The challenge is to look for ways to enlist and maintain cannot the support even failures accept for programmatic after rise. and Risk of something NASA starts NASA is known required, who people that out and as a level and will do Strategies to a failure flexibility occurs. If we and risk-taking
and assumptions
of the new project, estimates
as the grassroots and lying the assumptions. Given tory, Office requests chance chance
all of this knowledge, what budget a very estimate high of Management and budget,
some should we
of it contradicbe sent increase to the the If NASA
of any sort, the cost of mis-
sions will inevitably _ Budget Optimize
Budget?
"Realism" Financial
that we will look good later, because the of overrun is reduced. There is less stress
How do you estimate has never been done with several contract "grassroots people these ical simultaneous engineers estimate," their estimate estimates to have
the cost before?
on NASA managers when you have a lot of money for your project. At the same time, there is probably some price at which a program is too expensive to be funded (although it is hard to know what that really is). Another problem is that NASA funding. a tempting on your budget. budgets are a matter large of public know budget to fit knowledge, can become find the effort the available and so all of the contractors A comfortably target, mission your program's
approaches. what effort in which own from
develop
the working Although
are aggregated. the input there
it is critproblems
the people Those
and so you may growing
actually inherent
do the job,
are also some
in a grassroots
estimate.
26
Our Nathmal Space Science Program: Strategies to Maximize Science Return
The
balance
to be struck
is to propose
a budget
which is achievable and then to monitor this original baseline.
without being comfortable, and track all changes from Over time, your initial
mentally over the life of the missions. Every year our information gets better on what each mission needs towards ware cation and what learning and is possible about to accomplish. and are Most of the hardfabria minor our effort, and that of our contractors, the mission it-the of spacecraft is dedicated
baseline (based on grassroots and parametric estimates) will be modified by contractor bids and negotiated ence with of the other settlements, fabrication, activities design assembly associated reviews, experiand test, and all with conducting
that can accomplish assembly
materials,
part of our expenses. If our management at NASA Headquarters is to be based on the science and engineering fundamentals of the missions we are conducting, our management and budgeting must also be a continuous and incremental process. budget in one Of course, as our projects not mean and contractors will tell you, this does that we treat
a space science mission. Increases in cost will be of two sorts. Where we have misestimated costs, we request what is known at NASA as a "reprice"-more money Contractor overruns are to do the same work. a subset of repricings,
because programs tend to budget for more than the dollar value of the contract to protect against overrun. Only when these reserves are depleted will the program request a repricing to cover a contractor overrun. Sometimes in the development of a mission, funds we learn that a new activity or that spendcapability a new is required to accomplish the mission, to develop
growth kindly. We must treat an increase area as if it were a cut to another, because that is exactly what we have to do. towards which a is
sometimes
We must also counter the tendency focus on the short term, an orientation
ing additional
shared by the stock market and indeed with much of our current national character. Congress votes NASA private bank its budget one year at a time. Unlike the sector, we cannot borrow money from a even if it will The money concern (which yield an enormous of funds in one towards mission benefit in a given is to only source from another.
may yield sufficient return to justify the investment. Additional funds to do new work is refen'ed to as an augmentation Twice budgets every year or as additional NASA formally scope. reviews the pend-
downstream. year take year's a of all of our missions to anticipate the
for a new
requirement is drawn
Consequently, the current and the
ing problems, to assess problems that have been identified, and to look for areas where new scope might bring large benefits. It is not entirely zero-sum additional competition between these programs for funds, but the pressure to make tradeWithin some programs and no additional funds we must for additional funds. the are It
everyone's
budget
we are spending),
next year's budget (which is at OMB or Congress where tradeoffs are being considered). Funding for the next four years OMB, these but there "outyears." beyond that is controlled not our to focus overall at on scimade When is a tendency Unfortunately,
offs is always there. tradeoffs are internal, requested. tize any annual
If this is not possible, requests
priori-
entific productivity throughout the life
depends on choices cycle of our missions.
might look better if there were never for additional funding-hypothetically, would price quote to quote? a price and come keep back with a spacecraft. of the program we could ask But how would We could
any requests NASA years later what parts
we develop missions for 15 years of operational life, and 30 years of data analysis to follow, a short-term We have perspective a sign on will not work. the wall around here: "If
we know
eliminating
to fit within the initial estimate, or for a high enough budget that we
everyone eventually one this else means
keeps saying 'screw the we will all live in outyears has screwed." we must For expand long-term our
outyears,' that somemissions, vision even 27
could afford anything. The way the process works now, we make those choices, but we do so incre-
beyond planning.
the five-year The science
horizon return
typically on our
used
for
financial AXAF budget from what HST,
risks
across
the
board.
In
1988,
while
missions and if of the trade-
must be weighed against life cycle costs, we only focus on the narrow window development period, we are likely to make
was sent to Capitol
as a new start in the Hill, we turned down for $50 million activity. level for the
proposed a request We took of risk on pending
the HST project we felt was
of addition-
al reserves
on development an appropriate of concerns
offs that optimize costs in the short run but are a net loss overall. We have learned the value and insights ning the we plan vision operations necessarily implications lifetime, as good I would that come 15-year on on AXAF. from Hubble Today's this perspective operational the estimates same in planand of scope lifetime,
independent
AXAF decision. If we had insisted extra reserves as insurance, it may vented correct effort modate that us from in our starting assessment AXAF the extra benefit that HST
on having the well have predevelopment to accomwith at and is usu-
implementing
that year. We were reserves
for AXAF
in the period from 1998 to 2013 must be soft, but by attempting to track the of today's decisions decisions across a mission we hope to make that will look
did not require the problems but the time,
they were concerned to astrophysics
in retrospect also like
as they do in formulation. to raise the controversial of budget planof appropriate is analogous coverage. to If on on
space science from this type of risk-taking ally not as visible as the costs. One negative aspect of a risk-sharing
strategy
is
premise that part of the "realism" ning depends on an assessment financial we could risk-taking. reduce the The problem the question of optimizing
that the severe across a range
problems in one mission spread of programs. A defining attribute projects usual for
insurance
of the Explorer program is that individual have reserves that are much lower than other NASA flight are accommodated development mid-1980s Explorer sion Explorer, acceptable? flight rate mance also wait under programs, and within queues.
number
of programs
under
development and thereby increase the reserves each, we could reduce the odds of an overrun each of our missions. Indeed, the incentive
that problems The mission
on the
and launch vehicle have stretched out queue to the point development, was selected If not, should more strongly longer before the 14 years
problems of the the Delta-class the X-ray next misTiming
individual managers who are responsible for a single project is to be as conservative as possible-to take no financial risks. But at Headquarters our job is different. Our goal is to maximize science return for the dollar. This creates a natural dynamic: mize on Headquarters and levels the project behalf of risk. makes manager tradeoffs is looking mission, between cutting to optiwhile missions and of a specific
where
ago. Is this delay
we begin to emphasize above science perforShould Explorers funding we to starting
in Delta-class
developments? that stable
If we are always
increase the likelihood available? A particular strategy decimate fear
will be
delaying every program, the level of risk is too high. If we never have to make a tradeoff between programs, the level of risk we are taking raises the question: risk? costs of taking the by The funded thus quick taking is probably too low. This ing the wrong Unfortunately, risks are very are benefits response stripping 28 Are we tak-
concerning
this
risk-sharing
is that problems in one big project can many other small projects. Put differentis not appealing to the many if
level of financial while visible not
ly, risk-sharing
the downside (project 1987a cuts traceable.
there is one elephant and a lot of mice. However, the existence of several observatories at different stages of their life cycles so sensible creates a separate field for elephants, risk-sharing is now pos-
or slips),
as easily flexibility
to Supernova funding
was and
sible. In FY 1991 Congress provided an additional $30 million for HST, but also levied a similar
reduction
that was
borne
by AXAF.
It was deeply
disturbing to have to upset the AXAF baseline; we are aware of the inefficiency that funding changes can cause. Nevertheless, we cannot afford to regularly carry reserves to insure against major unanticipated crises such as the HST spherical aberration. If we had carried an extra $30 million or four wastefully been spent available). sufficient AXAF Were of reserves years, idle these for Hubble funds yet, over they the past three have remained have would would
were truly tragic cuts that caused real damage individual scientists and teams. Psychologically, the The impact actual of these level cuts resonates was very of reduction 8 percent
to
deeply. of
non-Hubble astrophysics in 1983 and 1984, and there has not been a hit on small missions caused by big ones and since, but the concern force remains is such our a because powerful cognition We believe large make sharing, science the "slaughter of risks. that by establishing and another to make yields Inside the one risk pool missions, use amount pool, for we of the a major of the innocents"
psychological
in shaping
(or worse
inefficiently merely because they were We had low reserves on Hubble but funding to support several years work. time sound. our We of definition the right and development choices? risk At the appeared
missions which
for small efficient maximum risk
mirror these
it possible productivity
of risk-
without a single
threatening
assessment
of financial
"innocents."
also recognize that this is not a clear-cut case because, as events unfolded, we were hit by a more overall b_, these questions pessimistic science choices. are scenario in retrospect productivity In terms such strategies, whether the than has more financial we had been planned that the increased inquiry for. Nevertheless, we believe
unanticipated problem such as the HST aberration threatens AXAF, but future AXAF problems may also be weighed to have a general ue to need has time, created tional ating ity. happened the HST more against concern and Science of NASA in favor we want more HST funding. that Hubble funding, occasions. Institute was to counter to underinvest to provide so that they It is natural will continbecause At the that same
of the broader
on several
of operating
fundamental risk-based furthe
specifically the instituin operactivsufficient can accomIn our insurance pessimistic do occur to in the same tradeoffs in (and regu-
as part of a strategy tendency missions
strategies are appropriate, and if so, are there ther principles or guidance to improve process? The problem risk-based broad human cally more of financial strategy, There of risks than positive risk-sharing,
of new development
In general,
reserves as with any to take bias empirifar and a in is that it is difficult is a cognitive which has been events ones. McCray
to our programs
modate a nominal range of problems. assessment, it is not efficient to provide in the form scenarios. occasionally, trade of reserves Since we will to cover sometimes missions very pessimistic between scenarios
perspective. judgment demonstrated. loudly
Negative
resonate
be forced
off priorities
Stern ["NASA's Space Science Program: The Vision and the Reality" (1991)] express a concern that the cost of accommodating tion on HST "may raid small, gator has groups a basis of development in the memory spherical individual funds." of the aberrainvestiThis fear
risk pool. We intend to make these the context of the priorities established larly reiterated) Should reserves tunities our risk with the science risk fewer averse?
community. Holding higher to opporRemember, that can
we be more means and posture starting
so-called
responding is not the
less quickly missions. only factor
"slaughter of the innocents" in 1983 and 1984 when Hubble development problems were solved by cuts primarily and from other small science mission disciplines. efforts in astrophysics These
influence funding. These have been our choices to date, but we welcome dialogue on this issue.
29
]W
Institutional and C on st raints/Forces constraints
Political
specifically the science
identified administrator
and
countered. who
Otherwise, a pro-
proposes
Institutional
sometimes
prevent
gram of space research that includes fewer large missions and more small missions is likely to lose in the competitive existing budget arena to others and who cater to the tendencies. While missions science, the bureaucratic political
NASA from achieving the best possible science for the dollar. While we do not have the authority to change many of the rules under which we operate, it is worthwhile to discuss the institutional setting of NASA space science because solutions may exist; The which budget more we may just not see them. process takes about two years, NASA of by
current
complement
of space
science
presents a diversity of large and small it is possible that it is not the right mix. and political process is shaped
The
institutional
than half is activity
outside
Congress experience are
and the Administration. has shown that reliable difficult to make 10 percent However, and then a substantial
Space science cost estimates until you have of the developif we wait until
by the actions and contributions of both public and private space scientists, engineers and managers. The process from the scientific begins with mission proposals community and ends with If the specific system has a bias changes can we to support the missions? What shall we plan to
frequently
already invested about ment cost in definition. that level process, program. of definition we are adding And once
Congressional approval. towards bigness, what make optimal actions address _ or promote
begin
the budget delay to the into the
to get the system
a program
is inserted
budget process, that is no guarantee it will emerge successfully. We have adopted and implemented a strategy which starts focus dates embodied tries for a period our resources and reduce in the OSSA Strategic major Plan new to prioritize and sequence
size diversity for space can we take today? How this issue over time? to the Manned
Linkage Program
Space
of several years in order to on a few key mission candithe complexity within avoids time of tradeoffs once the budget process. some types of ineflags remain in the
There
is a major missions,
role
in space Smaller launch the their
science Explorers vehicles,
for of the have as do of the have the of
unmanned
and we take advantage
missions are proposed This strategic planning ficiency, system. National and private political forces but inevitable
opportunities always used even teaches Space smaller Shuttle, shaped of
available. expendable rocket about science to optimize possibilities.
experiments. mission The
As experience strategies mission within experience
us more
capabilities
sometimes mission. pursuing
favor As
highly public
been
visible-thereby
large-space individuals
envelope
government-sup-
ported space science, we are in a bind. The Executive and Congressional process by which the vides our U.S. jobs. approves At the scientific same time, investigations we have institutions proto do and the fundamental legitimacy
Challenger and the evolution arena since that time have Shuttle for larger redesigned is generally not
of the space launch taught us that the launcher
an appropriate
Explorers. COBE and EUVE had to be for launch on expendable vehicles, at cost. XTE is planned on-orbit installation based platform on our is still the XTE options, way the servicing for Shuttle on EUVE's cur,'ent strategy mission. the most investembodcostFUSE
processes can tend towards certain results by virtue of their structure. If in fact there is an institutional predisposition towards large missions then must in the be
a significant launch and Explorer ments effective and
Platform;
the space mission approval process, sources of that structural preference
ied in a reusable
to pursue
3O
is further
downstream, Platform
and the continuation strategy should
of and are
load of the costs fleet
bay
and
mission
timeline.) depend
The We are upon
value also which
of not our
this Explorer ly assessed, the existence planned
be careful-
opportunity amortizing above
cost would
on the importance of the Shuttle is based), which in our because in costmis-
based on our experience to date of alternatives. Other Explorers vehicles.
payload (nor
to be replaced. that of ICBMs vehicles principle should choices:
the development
for unmanned
of expendable economic today's way
Despite the changes in the Shuttle the initiation of HST development,
program since that on-orbit
the final making effective sions The
we are pursuthe most
ing is that sunk costs
not be considered the science
observatory is poised to take full advantage of the manned space program in pursuing its 15-year science Facility Shuttle experience phenomenon Infrared mission. (SIRTF) attached The was Space originally When Infrared designed Shuttle the Telescope to be a flight Shuttle into a
we want
of accomplishing
we are pursuing. dialogue should not stop here. We are
payload. oxygen Facility
indicated (atomic Telescope
the existence glow), was
of an orbital changed
attempting to pursue better operating strategies to address some of the important problems that have been raised by members of the space astrophysics community. As want to examine improve not lems should swered, what working. appear these efforts progress, we will their effectiveness, adopt and and issues and change remain what unanprobwe is Other inevitable key
free-flying spacecraft to fulfill the mission needs. Later study has revealed that a 100,000-kilometer orbit optimizes the SIRTF mission return, and so now the current baseline is for launch on a Titan IV unmanned resistance ue making science vehicle. launch There was no institutional to continof on the basis to this change, vehicle priorities and we intend choices
is successful, some
and while be wary
of the institutional unchangeable,
of complaisance.
If we are doing
and cost effectiveness.
something we should ence the
that can be done better another way, try the better way. America's space sciyields of the challenges benefits universe to all of us, and it is with conducting with them. science two and a for the this our to grapple entrusted
Current budgeting policy does not charge differential costs to account for the differences between expendable Shuttle. Shuttle calculate terms cific launch Unfortunately, is not expendable the appropriate of the expendable effort, vehicles the makes fuels and very the fact it very Space that hard flight. flights the to In in
program
duty of those
exploration common Efforts return
and surmount and Over
cost of a single six Shuttle
to understand have continued.
to maximize the past
used and flight-spe-
the cost of flying
a year instead of five is very small (closer to $40 million than the $600 million cost estimate that some used). greater is due cost. SIRTF some some members of the science community have In economic terms, the variable costs are when compared to the fixed costs. A share of the cost of using a Shuttle flight to another economic concept: opportunity If we were inside other payloads to change our minds we would only partial and launch to push (Of course, a Shuttle, require have
half years both XTE Shuttle smaller, schedule December factors missions ate bias wider pursue
since this was written, the strategy and AXAF has been changed from mode, with AXAF
servicing
split into two
insignificant
cheaper spacecraft. HST remains on for Shuttle servicing missions in 1993 and March 1997. Institutional now appear large to be shifting ones. but an exchange rather towards this small trend of a we can over Hopefully,
will not be simply variety
of one inapproprian opening which from
for another, the optimum.
payload
off the manifest.
of alternatives
use of the pay-
31
Human the Results

by An organization is defined by
Needs, Motivation, and of the NASA Culture Surveys

Mario H. Castro-Cedeno et al. produce pate unhappy employees of their goals who will not participotential in achieving This loss of 300). If
Mondy
(p. 198) as two or more in a coordinated manner When ergism Through members run well, to the activities
people working together to achieve group results. will provide synand efforts of its members.
to the extent is called
the organization's interest
and mission.
an organization
"demotivation"
(Mondy,
division of labor and can contribute their
specialization, the individual skills, goals single proorgani-
the dissatisfaction pervades inefficient use of the human poor organizational manager must demotivators. understand
an organization, the resources will lead to Thus, minimize a project these and
performance.
expertise and effort that are far beyond individual. jects would Modem
toward accomplishing the capability of any research and engineering without large
not be possible
zations because both specialization and cooperation are essential in addressing the complex and interdisciplinary Unfortunately, limit individual problems of the modem world. or and are to
But even eliminating sources of dissatisfaction, vated employees. the desire to put forth
all
the demotivators, or may not result in motiwhich is defined as in pursuit of organi-
Motivation, effort
the act of organizing behavior, working
can inhibit conditions
zational objectives (Mondy, 292), is a higher goal than avoiding dissatisfaction. What causes motivation must also be understood because maintaining employee tant project
g_
job satisfaction. Sometimes easy to see or discover and understand. and office and rank, because interactions. That space. they are Wage is the case In other the result scales more and
the limitations are not difficult with cases, working such
morale management
and motivation duty.
is an impor-
hours
as status to interpret cultural that
_ Scientific
systematic It had
Management
study its origins of the factors is called in the work of this century. systematizing the scientific problems application that enhance manageHe and his work to ana-
they are much
difficult of complex
The ment. Taylor
the apportionment
workplace
efficiency
scientific
of fringe benefits are examples of limitations have both a cultural and an economic origin. The limitations that an organization encounters in the workplace may experience into policies that has been corporate sometimes from give codified and and procedures.
of Frederick efficient
at the beginning advocated by using
followers member come from formalized procedures
method
lyze management In a classical
and situations. of scientific manageof He outthen
Or they may be part culture and folklore. arise when responsithe corporate up some entity to organizations, of their good. imposes and on may indi-
of the unwritten Limitations may bilities members viduality The its representatives.
are transferred voluntarily and freedom that can
ment, Taylor studied the pig iron operation 13ethlehem Steel Company (Taylor, 41-47). used what are now known as time-and-motion studies put was prescribed to determine 12.5 tons more that the average per person work methods worker He per day.
In all effective
for the common an organization dissatisfaction
efficient
and stan-
limitations
dardized rest periods. The result was that average output rose to 48 tons per person per day. The additional efficiency, combined with a new incen-
its members 32
cause
Human
Needs,
Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Culture
Surveys
tive both from
pay
system daily
that
he also and
proposed, $1.15
increased Thus, benefited
by exercising depend vation.
authority.
The
method
used
will
the worker's Taylor's
pay from
to $1.85.
the organization work.
its members
on their beliefs about the causes of motiBy widening their knowledge of this sub-
ject, managers can use the appropriate motivating technique and will make their workers and the embraced his methods and that to What causes motivation and what diminishes it espehave been the subjects of much research. Most theories are based on observations of human nature. Keep and Mayo and others perat the Western Electric on Chicago's at how and where mainoutput. of rest Illumination study looked brightness, to the point Table the in mind impossible 1 lists that some human theories science behavior It varies widely accepted within management to generalize. and depends theory community. is complex from persituaorganization more productive and efficient. time it was thought
Taylor's techniques, scientific improve
followers management the efficiency
and for some
was all that was needed of any organization,
cially those involved in manufacturing. They performed time-and-motion studies to develop efficient work procedures and labor-saving then directed employees in a rational tific way. Beginning in 1924, Elton formed a series of studies Company's west was then lighting first it was plant affects side (Mondy, increased reduced tools, and and scien-
son to person tion. No single Douglas propose
on the particular
will be valid Theory either
all the time. Theory work Y and
in Hawthorne, 68). One productivity.
McGregor's that people
X and dislike
worker
to extreme in stages
responsibility (Theory X) or enjoy and achievement (Theory Y). Chris Theory Y behavior "mature poses that only lack initiative. people healthy Argyris conform work sees
self-direction Argyris calls He pro-
behavior."
materials could tained or even Similar periods, The results supervision
hardly be seen. Workers exceeded their original were obtained length and of the work led Mayo for wage frequency week.
immature people are passive and Both authors believe that most to Theory Y assumptions in a
incentive,
styles, and length
environment. an unhealthy by a rigid work chain environment that of command, as limits or
Hawthorne
study
to speculate
that
characterized self-expression,
by overspecialization
something other than the variables under investigation was having an effect on worker productivity. While he noticed experiment improved and The influence behavior and as the Hawthorne motivation are physical workers. _I! environment observing that they and interviewing merely felt special. the workers, in the morale Their by participating
by an overpowering ment workers have day. They and are servient According must
leader. In such an environlittle control over their work to be passive a short time an unhealthy and work subenvihave perspective.
expected
that caused productivity to go up. that researchers can have on the they study is now that known morale as the to effect. and It is proof the tools
to the theory,
of the people
ronment will cause the worker to cope by escaping (e.g., leaving the firm or seeking promotion or transfer), by fighting (e.g., joining a union or seeking a way of exerting pressure on the organization), or by adapting indifference, and developing or cynicism. an attitude Flight, fight of apathy,
at least
as important
available
Motivation may
Theories attempt to motivate and their workers or
or fatigue, Argyris judges the last option to be the worst choice for the worker's mental health. Theory X and Theory lines for all situations. Y do not provide guideThey do not explain situa33
Managers by using
rewards,
punishment,
charisma,
Human
Needs,
Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Culture
Surveys
Table
Theory Thcory X Theory Y
1. Motivation
Theories
Description
People dislike work and need to be coerced People enjoy work, will self-direct succeed in the workplace. theory theory People will attempt
or bribed to do their jobs. and will strive to
if allowed,
Self-fulfilling Reinforcement
to fulfill their leader's
expectations. when faced with situations
People become motivated or demotivated similar to past experiences. People needs. become motivated
Needs theories
when they attempt
to fulfill their unmet
Equity theory
People become demotivated when, in their assessment, other employees are being rewarded beyond their contributions to the organization. People become motivated achieving desirable goals. when there is a high probability of
Expectancy
theory
tions where good leadership can change the performance of a worker or an organization. One explanation for the change in behavior from Theory X to Theory Y is the self-fulfilling theory of human behavior (Cf. J. L. Single). This is the idea that positive or negative worker a unique managers expectations behavior. characteristic is their ability that will Thus, of to the significantly according superior influence to the theory, leaders and
environment looking thinking Some
and
is external fact who control
to the person,
over-
the simple entities theories
that people
are rational,
their own actions. motivation as
attempt
to explain
the drive to satisfy called needs theories pares pose four that of these motivation to satisfy they will
personal needs. They are of motivation. Table 2 comtheories. occurs the lowest perceive These theories proneed. jobs the as need when unsatisfied their to satisfy a person
create high performance workers fulfill. Another ple's theory based
expectations
attempts dangerous,
For example, on innate human in terms Thus, behavior that peoof posi-
if workers
attempt
is the reinforcement behavior tive or negative
theory.
It proposes
for safety and thus will be motivated to change their environment to make it safer. They will concentrate unfulfilled any higher according two lower point where their efforts need) in activities before that satisfy their need for a safer environment attempting Most (the lowto fulfill
can be explained past outcomes.
by rewardwhat is not control the B.F. peouse of punstill feel-
ing desired behavior and punishing wanted, managers can supposedly behavior Skinner ishment of their even and rewards workers. over and suggests that by making a period shaped
est unsatisfied
need for creativity. to Abraham Maslow, needs (physiological their focus
U.S. workers,
Psychologist of years, while
have satisfied the and safety) to the to the higher and self-
has shifted self-esteem,
ple can be controlled ing free. Although tion for managers behavior
this theory practicing it has
is strong justificaorganizational been criticized as
needs (belongingness, actualization). According of motivation, hygiene needs to Frederick human
modification,
Herzberg's needs
needs
theory into do
being manipulative and autocratic (Mondy, 296). It also assumes that motivation comes from the
can be grouped Hygiene needs
and motivators.
34
Human Needs, Motivation, and the Results of the NASA Culture Surveys
Table Frederick Herzberg's
2. Comparison Abraham
of Needs
Theories Clayton
of Motivation AIderfer's David McClelland's
Maslow's
Hygiene(demotivators) Pay Status Working conditions Fringe benefits Policies and regulations Interpersonal relations Motivators Meaningful and challenging work Recognition for accomplishments Feeling of achievement Increased responsibility Opportunity for growth andadvancement
Physiological Air, water, food, etc. Safety and security Danger and job security Belongingness and love Group acceptance Self-esteem Achievement recognition, and status Self-actualization Use of creative talents
Existence Air, water, food, and safety Relatedness Interpersonal relations
Need for affiliation Friendship and social activities
Growth Promotions, salary, and autonomy
Need for achievement Challenge and goal oriented Need for power Influence and domination
not motivate, and can thus
but they be strong
can create demotivators.
dissatisfaction Managers
my, but a preference for affiliation would dictate team involvement. Hence, if a brilliant researcher with high achievement ipate in committee such a request the committee's nization. out of place responsibility as firing cases pursue persons those needs work, is required may to particnot see he or she
must be constantly alert to ensure that these are not hurting the organization. On the other hand, motivators mance gism. for that The using can will leader these encourage result or manager motivators the superior perforsynerthe in organizational to benefit
as beneficial or desirable even if function is important to the orgaa strong team player may feel with such of team leadership personnel actions evaluation. needs may
is also responsible
Similarly,
organization. In McClelland's needs theory of motivation,
in a position for difficult performance with
and
In both eagerly
different
everyone has three needs: achievement, affiliation and power. But for each person, one of these needs a high is relatively need stronger than the others, have best the Entrepreneurs and salespeople, for achievement, for example, whereas
responsibilities. in addition other proposed. Adams, The states to theories equity that theory, people based on
Nevertheless, human have needs, been
explanations
for motivation credited base their per-
managers have more moderate achievement needs (Cf. M. J. Stahl). A strong need for achievement may Also, actually needs impede effective need delegation as in Japanese for affiliation of tasksl workthan may be cultural,
to J. Stacy performance situations. formance Thus, "hard"
on the correctness
of their perceived
They do this by comparing their and rewards with those of others. may someone with less decide else to stop may get This
ers having a stronger U.S. workers. The relevance
a worker because rewards
working similar inequity perit is and or
of McClelland's needs, For may
theory incentives example, more
is that, may be a strong autono-
greater ception important
effort.
depending effective need
on a person's or ineffective.
may or may
not be real,
but it is the person's Hence, fair to have
that motivates
or demotivates.
for achievement
require
for an organization
35
Human
Needs, Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Culture
Surveys
open
reward
and promotion
systems.
It is also the
ties to their those These
professional
peers
are stronger
than
important to communicate to all employees specific reasons for promotions and rewards. Another cy theory modified research theory of motivation known
to their employers. professionals are motivated by different
as expectanVroom and dominated 1970s. The
was developed by Victor by Barry Staw. It has in this field since the early
needs parts, sonnel found and agers
than those of their including managers (see that variety Table technical from of work
organizational counterand other support persurveys get work, but have the most autonomy, that man-
3). Numerous professionals challenging assignments primarily
theory states that people probability of achieving explain motivation, formula:
are motivated by the desirable goals. To theorists use the
satisfaction
expectancy
are challenged
by the opportunity Managers, by trainand tech-
for promotion = E x V x I
(Cf. Resnick).
Motivation where effort valence, rewards The
ing and personality traits, prefer predictability control in their areas of responsibility, but nologists technical thrive in a challenging environment. and
changing
E denotes expectancy, the probability that will lead to performance; V denotes the desirability of the predicted outcome; that instrumentality, the perception
and I denotes
Table 3. Motivators: Rewards Most Valued High Technology Professionals

Reward Professional Motivator Opportunity
By
are tied to performance. theory gives the managers motivation useful of their
to work with top-
expectancy
guidelines
for improving
workers. First, training may be used to increase expectancy. Second, any of the needs theories listed in Table 2 will For provide example, guidelines people for with
Job content
increasing
valence.
high security needs will value pension job security guarantees, whereas those actualization assignments maintain reward needs instrumentality system must between may require environment. at a high management or a creative
plans and with selfFinally, level, to the and
challenging
be fair and open,
with good
Carper
communication workers. Today's
flight professionals Freedom to make own decisions Intellectually stimulating work environment Forward-looking organizational goals Ability to affect national goals and policy Productive atmosphere Flexible work hours Long-term project stability Opportunity to address important human needs Patriotic projects Prpjects of altruistic nature
Work for a leading-edge company Diverse opportunities for personal growth and advancement Opportunity for self-expression Opportunity to play a role in the company's future Opportunity to participate in technological breakthroughs Desirable location
high-technology
professionals
have
been
characterized as highly educated, autonomy seeking, and career motivated rather than company dedicated pect, search in their and (Cf. Glinow). they are quick (Bailyn of technical work Their allegiances or more They are susin
Social status
to change
employers autonomy expect
challenge
and Raelin).
to
or prestige
Financial
be rewarded for their work and expertise, and they abide by ethics dictated by their professional groups 36 and not by their employers. In short, their
Open-door management Recreational facilities

Twice-yearly salary reviews Compensation for unused leave Cash bonuses
Human
Needs, Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Culture
Surveys
_iii_ Motivators and Demotivators Scientists and Engineers

The rewards related listed in Table 3 address and
for
and With
has
more
than
one
area the
of specialization. enhanced to the perfornumber of
muhiple
specialties, proportional
mance motivators or hygiene needs as defined factors by Herzberg. to security Demotivators
is directly
specialties. formance simultaneous tasks Similar and ing may ciencies
With multiple continues until functions result in over
tasks the enhanced perthe researcher has four or projects. commitment Additional and ineffi-
affiliation
have been identified by Resnick-West and Von Glinow and are listed in Table 4. Demotivators arise times because conflict the needs with of the organization somethe needs of the professional.
that results
will be detrimental plot the performance as a function including supervisor,
to performance. of scientists project man-
engineers sources
of the decision-mak-
If a proper balance between these two diverging sets of needs is not found, both the organization and the professionals will suffer. Culture Clashes
agers, peers, and upper ness correlates strongly sion-making consider. This appears sources
management. Effectiveto the number of decithe researcher has to
Table 4. Demotivators: Between

Category Experts clash
Professionals
Organization
and Organizations
Professional Exert control ("Let experts
to contradict will perform Apparently,
the
theory
that from of
Hierarchical control ("The boss is right") Company policies/rules Company secrecy Company loyalty
researchers distractions. ideas sible
best when isolated the cross-fertilization relationships is involved more than a decision, goal
&'cidc")
Professional standard.s Dissemination of information Loyalty to profession Desire for autonomy
Stan "dards clash
and interpersonal when a researcher of projects before should with making
that are posin a limited one source of has a positive This research
number direction,
Ethics clash
and desirable synergism organization. Additional
influence
on his or her output. of any
be the
Commitment clash Autonomy clash
research
by Pelz
illustrates
the nature
Organizational decision-making
of goal-setting synergism. Performance is higher for scientists when the goals are set by the scientist in conjunction with their supervisors than when they are set by the supervisor alone or by scientists alone. For engineers, effectiveness is maintained of with peers. uct-oriented lessons when achieve appear the goal it with even work when working may reflect from such alone or only prodTwo First, will This result evident is clear, the more research. workers
Donald what that sources
C. Pelz made degree
conducted
research
to determine He concluded between sources
researchers and
productive. security
some
of creative
tension and
of stability
disruption was needed to raise researchers' productivity. Table 5 summarizes the eight creative tensions that he identified. These tensions allow researchers to question and gauge the usefulness of their work in the real world. Data supporting the influence ductivity Pelz's neers each of these this. shows their more that scientists and engiwhen tensions on researcher proconfirms research increase performs
performed
by engineers.
motivated the help
or without
of manage-
ment. Second, when results are achieved the worker shows that conducive pendence reinforces jointly although to high the theory
the goal is not clear, the best when both the manager and the task. little More complete either. Again, research is not indethis too autonomy
define
productivity, that
technical than one
contributions
is not the optimum
task simultaneously
interaction
is a neces37
Human
Needs,
Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Culture
Surveys
Table 5. Eight SECURITY Tension

(None listed in the literature)
Creative [
Tensions CHALLENGE Tasks
1- Multiple
Effective scientists and engineers in both research and development laboratories did not limit their activities either to pure science or to application but spent some time on several kinds of R&D activities, ranging from basic research to technical services.
Tension
Effective scientists their or self-reliant; valued freedom.
2 - Interaction
But they did not avoid other people; colleagues interacted vigorously. they and their
were intellectually independent they pursued their own ideas and
Tension
3 - Multiple
Skills
(a) In the first decade of work, young scientists and engineers did well if they spent a few years on one main project. (b) Among mature scientists, high performers had greater self-confidence and an interest in probing deeply.
But young non-Ph.D.s also achieved if they had several skills, and young Ph.D.s did better when they avoided narrow specialization. At the same time, effective older scientists to pioneer in broad new areas. wanted
Tension
4 - Autonomy
More effective were those persons who experienced stimulation from a variety of external or internal .sources.
(a) In the loosest departments having minimum coordination, the most autonomous individuals with maximum, security and minimum challenge were ineffective. (b) In departments having moderate coordination seems likely that individual autonomy permitted search for the best solution... it a
..
to important
problems
faced by the organization.
Tension
5 - Influence
and
Goal
Setting
other positions
Both Ph.D.s and engineers contributed most when they strongly influenced key decision-makers..,
... but also when persons in several had a voice in selecting their goals.
Tension
6 - Interaction
... but they differed style and stratcgy. from colleagues in technical
High performers named colleagues with whom they shared similar sources of stimulation (personal support) .. ,
Tension
R&D teams were of greatest use to their organizations at that "group age" when interest in narrow specialization had increased to a medium level...
7 - Teams
... but interest disaplrmred. in broad pioneering had not yet
Tension
In older groups that retained vitality the members preferred each other as collaborators..,
Interaction
... yet their technical remained intellectually strategies differed combative. and they
38
Human Needs, Motivation, and the Results of the NASA Culture Surveys
sary ingredient in achieving research environment. These research results seem to agree
high productivity
in a
Their
performance As group
decreases members
because
interaction each
decreases. with Rensis Likert's deal He on
get to know
other, interactions become predictable, reducing the need for consultation and idea exchange. Old groups should may run out of new ideas. be on the lookout for teams overhauling. are consistent work 2 for an aerospace with the research by Management and commit-
in service in setting
organizations. their own
He concluded goals but that the
that high performers of influence higher noticed
felt that they had a great
tees that need These Vollmer ures laboratory laboratory, chart, results 1 and
echelons had much influence also. that there was more total influence
high performers than on low performers. This observation conflicts with some older theories of organizational behavior that assume a fixed quanmanagepropose more total tity of influence to be shared between ment and workers. These older theories that if workers has less. influence The clear Likert have and more Pelz influence, propose that
et al. Their
is summarized industry
in Figresearch
and for a government defense research respectively. The vertical axis in the job satisfaction, contains the
general
management
is possible message
and desirable. in these observations higher is that in of the the mes-
hygiene factors; the horizontal axis, professional productivity, contains the motivation factors. The charts are constructed so that issues can be evaluated for their effect on satisfaction For (hygiene) example, and productivity (motivation). in both
research
organizations,
performance
requires interaction between members organization. Additional research repeats sage and shows clearly better than less frequent sion also applies
cases, productivity and satisfaction are associated with freedom to influence the choice of research assignment. productivity tion. An isfaction Clearly, Adequate but may inadequate will salary not salary salary produce is not a factor dissatisfaccauses satsatisfaction. in be a factor in job satisfac-
that daily interactions are interactions. This concluespecially in the
will cause more factor.
to projects,
tion, but salary
in excess is a hygiene
of that which
early stages of concept definition. Finally, the research shows that the best interactions are consensus mines and influence where as opposed the manager to autocratic alone determanagement, the goals
/_iiiii Motivation To study
of NASA
Employees theories The
of the workers. the validity previously, of NASA of the motivation the results were organization teams. members can be in comof concurteams that to marketing, discussed surveys of two culture analyzed.
Interaction encouraged mittees rent include
between
by promoting
participation The practice requires research,
employees
and project representatives
engineering,
for example, from
responses in the surveys were compared with the theories to determine which theories best explain the results. December mented The 1986 first and survey the Agency was performed in the spring in of culsecond to change
engineering, Carter and interaction group allows
production, Baker. The by these quick
and others, according fast and unconstrained in a small of key
1989. In the interim, new procedures way. ture in a positive The results from
management
imple-
specialists identification
work issues
the NASA
and agreement on the best solutions. reduced development time for new Sprague Further become et al.). research less shows that with work the
The resultis products (Cf.
the
surveys 3 describes A maximum A rating
are
included the rating
in systhat
Figures groups tend to sible
3 to 11. Figure for each question.
tem for the questions. effective passage of time. the statement
of 5 was posof 1 means by the per39
is not perceived
as true
Human
Needs,
Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Illll II
Culture
Surveys
PROFESSIONAL IS ASSOCIATED
Freedom of choice in research
PRODUCTIVITY IS NOT
Opportunity
WITH
assignments on research field
ASSOCIATED
to do interdisciplinary
WITH
research of
G E N E R A L
Consultation decisions Opportunity
with management for promotion
Opportunity to do research own discipline Opportunity Adequate Adequate s,,dary technical assistance Opportunity positions Freedom Opportunity for promotion
with members
in own research
to do basic research
into management activities
in dayto-day
research
to do applied
research
Opportunity to keep up-to-date on scientific developments Adequate funds to support individual research interests None Adequate laboratory equipment sponsor to support with meetings findings and - Opportunity research Recognition re.search Opportunity to persuade
J O B
Figure 1. Incentive in Relation General Job Satisfaction
by name in connection to attend professional to publish research
Opportunity to Professional for Applied
Productivity Researchers
S A T I S F A C T
IS ASSOCIATED
Freedom of choice in research
WITH
assignments
IS NOT
Opportunity Recognition research Opportunity Opportunity positions Freedom Opportunity
ASSOCIATED
to do applied research by name in connection to attend professional for promotion
WITH
Opportunity
to do basic research
with meetings
into management
in day-to-day
activities research of with members on research on scientific and laboratory research
to do interdisciplinary
Opportunity to do research own discipline Consultation decisions
with management
None
Opportunity to keep up-to-date developments Adequatc technical equipmcnt Adequate interests Adequate assistancc
I O N
funds to support salary to publish
individual
Opportunity Opportunity Figure 2. Incentive General in Job Relation to Satisfaction Professional for Staff
research
findings field
for promotion Productivity Scientists
in own research and
40
Human
Needs,
Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Culture
Surveys
son answering the question. A rating of 5 means that the statement is perceived as completely true. The aggregate responses in the figures represent such a large number tions are significant ple, a response of responses that small variaand meaningful. For examtrue than 4.2.
Proud to work for NASA Satisfied w/job[ Satisfied w/NASA *Satisfied w/Center *Optimistic about NASA's future Satisfied w/work unit * New Item
_,_._ [ _5___h_
[ 3.82 I 3.78 3.77 3.71 3.75
4.44 4.43
of 4.3 is more
l___,_-_, [ _\_.._
Each rated
item in the Culture Questionnaire using the 5-point scale below:
was
_._:.x:)-
3.64
I
1 Not Descriptive
I
2
I
3 Somewhat Dcscriptive
I
4 Descriptive
I
5 Very
|_%_ ,_ _._._ _ _h,_ __x] 3.63 i ............................................... ] 3.63
I
Figure 3. Culture Surveys Rating System
1
I
2 Time 2
I
3
I
4 1
I
5
["---7 Time
Figures 4 to 6 present about work satisfaction, NASA employees culture. are Figure very
the ratings for questions work unit climate, and 4 shows proud that NASA for the to work
Figure
4. Survey
Results:
Work
Satisfaction
Agency. The rating is 4.4 out of a possible 5.0. But the responses are not as high for the Center, the work unit and the job. Although the ratings are significantly higher than "somewhat descriptive," there is a steady decline from NASA to the Center, This to the work situation unit, to the job. an opportunity and a
Members
of my work unit: ri_ii_!!_!i_i_;.,:_._i..,.'.._i_,;.,:._N!_%.'_,_.--:_ 3.97
Strive to do their best Work cooperatively w/other units in Center Trust one another
__:+:..,:,.. _1
3.91 3.99
represents
_i_._:i:_i!i_?...`..i!N_:!!_!_:!_!_!i_:_.::!!_!_N 3.76 [ I 3.74
challenge to Agency management. The goal should be to raise the level of employee satisfaction with the job, the work unit, and the Center to the level of satisfaction association with NASA. employees are favorably Agency. The solution aware of the situation to fulfill their of satisfaction a successful isfaction and pride resulting from This is possible because disposed is to make and to give to work for the unit managers them the skills
Have sufficient clarity re: cxpcctauons
_!i_!_::i:.::_::ii:::i_:_ii::!:::::i!:::_!i::i!iiiii_i:.!i_::_i_:::.i::::`_ii:_i_i I 3.56 [ 3.61
Areinincluded making decisions Are properly recognized for performance
[iiii_iii_iii_i_:_!iii_iii_iiiii_i_i_i_ii_i_!_!_i_!ii_i`..```_!_i_.`:i_;i_._ 3.54 I 3.15
workers' expectations. If the issue is addressed at the work unit level, will be felt in increased the Center and NASA. sat-
" "............... 3.28 [.................... :........... .,. ...................... I ] 3.24
outcome
I
1
I
2
I
3
I
4
I
5
with the job,
Figure
5. Survey
Results:
Work
Unit
Climate
41
Human
Needs,
Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Culture
Surveys
COMPARATIVELY
Value highquality work Org. effect based on goals & world leadership Loyalty to NASA Senior mgmL emphasis on public image Career development
HIGH
4.10 3.99 3.96
COMPARATIVELY
LOW
I _i_i_!_!_J!i_
Decision making at higher level than necessary Roles & missions of Centers are clear "Bad news" passed up formal channels Senior mgmt. emphasis on technical expertise Senior mgmt. can be expected to do the "right thing"
I__.,=_
.....
3.49 3.52
I 4.04
_:.._.:._ _%_.,.% _
3.19
i_..:=,..._ _ _i_...'..i_ p...._i!i_::!_!_!_! _ ] _ii_i]
3.92 3.89 3.54 3.92
_ _1
3.01 2.87
::_!iiiiiiii_..."_.:,_,'.] 3.35 I 3.27
_:_-__;-_ [ _
3.01 3.17
Problem
solving
I_:':_..':_i_!;_i_;i_iit I
3.22 3.29
|_:_:!_:::::_:_':::_3_1 [ ]
2.94 2.83
I
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
I
5 Efficient reward and recognition Innovation perceived as too risky [::!::_!::_i!!_!_i'._i_:,._%._ 2.89 I I 2.65 _i_ii!_i!_-.._':i!___'.._,_ I |::_ii_'.-:-'._] 2.87 2.65 2.87 2.74
Time 2
[-"-'1 Time
Power is shared
I
* New Item
I I
2
1
l
I
3 4
Figure Both surveys and indicate that employee emerges
6. Survey satisfaction about force
Results:
NASA
Culture the NASA culwere successful participation
is high
that employees A picture satisfied,
are optimistic of a work 5 shows people considered,
Apparently, the efforts to change ture after the Challenger accident and have resulted in more low-level in the decision-making Figure that world ceived nificant cient the 6 deals Agency as being drop reward process.
the future. is materially
that and
all things
feels secure in its jobs. Figure work is accepted, and that respect clarity. more question in making rating second, their Also, recognition "Members decisions was 3.15 a large coworkers goals members for their that unit but not communicating and
that teamtrust and is with to get
with perceptions values Loyalty part is noted
of the NASA work is also culture.
culagree and per-
that management expectations would Note their like
ture. It is not surprising leadership.
that most responses high-quality to NASA
work. affect
that on the work" the
of the NASA for "career rating
A sig-
of my work
unit are included and 3.54 in the
development" for "suffithese in important Therefore,
and an even two areas
lower and
was recorded as being
in the first survey improvement.
recognition."
are not perceived
42
Human Needs, Motivation, and the Results of the NASA Culture
Surveys
the NASA esteem employees management The ment "power orated takes rating, Figures perceive column and
culture. and offer
Both
areas
address needs
the selfof the for NASA
es value lence" address "Sufficient
"high-quality demonstrate fulfillment individual issue.
work"
and
"value
excel-
self-actualization an opportunity to motivate increase be improved yielded
pride in the work of self-actualization reward "Maintain expertise
done and needs. is within of subis an
the work force. in participative further. a 2.87 that rating, manageto is which
and recognition"
a self-esteem significant could Responses
NASA" probably contracting certain Agency policy and dards clash. "Clear clash. The work" Both standards "what is"
refers to the practice tasks. Subcontracting can be classified roles" is also clashes
is shared" by place which the
less than "somewhat at higher
descriptive." levels
This is corrobdecision-making a 3.49
as a stana standards
perception is "somewhat
are demotivators. "value high-quality 7 are in
than necessary, descriptive." what NASA
responses excellence"
and "value
in Figure
7 to 11 compare
employees
to what they think should "what is," the high quadrant higher ranked
be. Under the lists respons-
agreement "what is" needs,
with "what should be." However, the column also includes some hygiene long NASA to NASA career" (safeand loyalty (belonging-
such as "expect
es with ratings rant lists items should responses be"
than 3.5 and the low quadlower than 3.5. The "what gives the percentage includes motivaresponsof culthat item. For the NASA
ty and security)
high quadrant that listed
ness). That these needs do not appear in the "what should be" column indicates that hygiene needs have cient ranked should ceased to concern reward NASA and employees. recognition." need apparently motivator. 10. A disof "suffiIt is is connect in Figure individual be." met This and 7 is the importance
ture (Figure 9), the "what should be" three self-esteem and self-actualization tors and two standards-clash issues. The
low in the "what would
is" and high in the "what be a strong in Figure
self-esteem is repeated addresses
WHAT IS: Value high quality work Value excellence H

I
WHAT SHOULD BE: Value high-quality work - 66% Maintain expertise within NASA - 60% Value excellence - 57% Sufficient individual reward/recognition- 50% Clear roles/missions of NASA installation - 43% ::-::_:
;:
not being
This same message Figure shows "what typical ranked research "what delegating ._:_
"2
8, which
decision-making, an experts clash. The budget and scheduling,
Expect IongNASA
career
a strong demotivator, is" column includes management "what should not politics," is" column. to technical
G H
Base effectiveness on image as world leader Employees very loyal to NASA
concerns. But the highest be" is "decisions based on which is ranked the low in the by authority and schedcan be addressed budget
This clash for meeting
personnel
Sufficient individual reward and recognition L O W Agency senior management can be expected to do the right thing People willing to share power Clear roles and missions of NASA installations Figure 7. NASA
and accountability ule constraints. Figure 9, which clash
addresses observed
power
sharing,
repeats quiis be
the experts
in the decision-making management) and "authority clash too and can
process: "people (presumably etly hold onto their power,"

.; z"
highly addressed ability
centralized." by delegating to lower NASA levels
This
authority of the
account-
organization. is not delegating 43
Culture
Comparison
Apparently,
management
Human
Needs,
Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Culture
Surveys
WHAT Budget pressures affect decisions
IS: greatly
WHAT
SHOULD
BE:
less with
satisfied NASA.
with
the
unit
and that
the the
Center
than The
It appears is that
supervisormust be sensi-
H I G H
Schedule pressures greatly affect decisions
Decisions based on research, data, technical criteria; not politics - 39% Decisions based on open discussion/debate19% Implementors involved in decisions - 14% Mgmt. communicates decisions and rationale employees - 9% to
employee implication
interaction
is one of demotivation. unit managers needs need of their employees. is career satisfaction.
tized to the human A significant unmet
In
Figure 11 the "what should be" responses present the message that clearly defined career paths are expected. fied. The "managers and "there visory "what third These expectations are not always are satisfollowing take time are viable two disconnects present:
Decisions delegated to lowest possible level
to discuss career planning" career paths for non-super-
L 0 W
Decisions based on research, not politics Management communicates decisions and rationale to employees Decisions based on open discussion and debate
employees" are both ranked high in the should be" and low in the "what is." The disconnect, "higher level manager taking interest," can also be explained as a of the same desire for formal and clear
personal reflection career
paths.
WHAT
IS:
WHAT
SHOULD
BE:
Figure
8. Decision-making
Comparison
H People with technical knowledge can get things done People quietly hold onto their power and authority Authority is highly centralizcg Employees are treated fairly and equitably People are willing share their power to People are willing to share their power - 39% People with technical knowledge can get things done - 23% Employees are treated fairly and equitably -21%
enough to satisfy the high expectations of the work force even though progress was made during the time between Figure esteem should 10 covers need. be," The stands which surveys. the subject "what is," in sharp of rewards, stating contrast Clearly, a self-
G
H
that rewards with "what NASA manL 0 10 is W for individual
are political, and work
is recognition
unit performance.
agement can enhance the morale of the work force and encourage mance Another by upgrading disconnect the reward that appears
and motivation better perforsystem. in Figure
the statement
that "people
orientation
is important
for advancement." This is ranked high in the "what should be" and low in the "what is." This may explain the previous finding that people are
Figure
9. Power-sharing
Comparison
44
Human Needs, Motivation, andtheResults oftheNASACulture Surveys
WHAT
IS:
WHAT
SHOULD
BE:
WHAT
IS:
WHAT
SHOULD
BE:
H I
Real reward is work itself Getting rewarded political is
For individual performance there is recognition and reward - 40% People orientation is important for advancement17% For work unit performance there is recognition and reward - 14% Real reward is work itself- 12%
H
I G
Higher level manager taking personal interest is important for advancement Managers are encouraged to attend formal development activities Career management shared responsibility both employee and manager is of
Career management is shared responsibility of employee and manager 39% Managers take time to discuss career planning with their people - 19% There are viable career paths for nonsupervisory managerial employees14%
G
H
People orientation important for advancement
is
_.
L 0 W
Managers take time to discuss career planning with their people There are viable career paths for nonsupervisory/managerial employees There are people at the Center who provide careerguidanceand counsel
L 0 W
For individual performance there is recognition/reward For work unit performance there is recognition/reward PA system provides useful discussion of work performance
Figure
11. Career
Satisfaction
Figure
10. Rewards
Comparison
ees,
NASA
managers
must needs.
address
self-esteem are bet-
and self-actualization recognizing
Two possibilities and establishing
accomplishment
_
Table from the
Conclusions
6 lists needs some theories lessons First, that have been learned that
ter and clearer career growth paths. The first addresses self-esteem and the second, self-actualization. More consistent use of these motivators would result in a more productive surveys NASA organization. employees is being planning. done sent in This
this research.
it can be concluded especially
of motivation,
Herzberg's and Maslow's, agree with the results of the NASA culture surveys. The responses to the surveys appear are satisfied to satisfy for The most to indicate self-esteem significant that NASA needs and is and their employees are striving ization that have the needs. need in their hygiene
In the two culture a clear the areas message
that not enough and career
of recognition
and self-actualobservation NASA With
deficiency should be remedied because recognition and career growth are the most important sources of satisfaction and motivation for older and need motion more not experienced mean to higher a move where grades know option, workers. into are Career growth The for proto nonis impormanagement. available What
belonging
is satisfied.
employees
are proud
to be part of the Agency of their coworkers.
a high opinion
dual-ladder supervisors, toward
opportunities
belonging needs satisfied, NASA enjoy a greater degree of employment than the general population (Cf. The consequence is that to motivate
employees satisfaction Mondy, 298). their employ-
is a good
alternative. that goal.
tant is that employees a desirable
they are moving
career
45
Human
Needs,
Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Culture
Surveys
Table THEORY
1. Needs theories
6. Motivation AND
describe
of Employees: RESULTS
of NASA
Lessons
for NASA
Managers
SURVEY
the behavior
LESSON
Continue present practices in areas of safety,job security, and team building.
employees: NASA employees have satisfied their hygiene needs (safety, security, and affiliation). NASA employees strive to satisfy self-image and self-actualization needs. Managers should not confuse hygiene and motivation needs
Address self-image with awards; address selfactualization with career planning. Note that pay and performance appraisals are hygiene factors and will not motivate. Use professional growth as a motivator. Identify and address the needs of employees.
Needs theories give an indication (i.e., desirability of the outcome) expectancy theory. Motivation = E x V x I
of valence in the
Employee training is important because expectancy E (i.e., the effort leads to performance). Motivation = E x V x I
of
Continue
and expand training programs.
Communication instrumentality performance).
is important because of I (i.e., rewards are tied to --- E x V x I
Use newsletters and awards ceremonies celebrate significant accomplishments.
to
Motivation
.
NASA employees are dissatisfied with the lower levels of the organization. Employees want people-oriented managers. NASA has made progress in implementing participative management, but practices are still below employee expectations. Work groups are desirable because they promoted interaction. But groups in existence for long period of time lose effectiveness, More outside autonomy, influence is better than complete
Make unit managers more sensitive to the needs of employees. Develop training programs.
Expand man ager "s awareness
and training.
7.
Use concurrent engineering, quality circles, and teamwork. Reorganize teams and committees periodically and add new members. Negotiate goals and objectives between and employee. Review periodically. manager
8.
An important theories salary tant,
consequence
of accepting money
the needs on fairly the after factors peris impor-
formance effective reviews for opportunity having
and excellence. approaches. are performance
Thus, Similarly,
reliance overlooks good
on "pay more reasons the to and it is
of motivation as a motivator.
is a reduced Of course
dependence
for performance"
as a motivator Some reviews of the
performance include
and workers efforts
that are not compensated can be unhappy theory of motivation, But other superior
not motivators. for the manager the goals to state
for their As stated perception important acceptable
and demotivated. can be an
by the equity of fairness factor compensation effective
to communicate organization own. But their
in compensation is reached, in promoting
the employee for the process unreasonable
in demotivation.
employees to be a source
to expect
the performance of motivation.
appraisal
can be more
46
Human
Needs, Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Culture
Surveys
The expectancy tant extension expectancy the causes
theory
of motivation theory. V, and
is an imporBy proposing I as practicto to gives
to the needs E, valence
the design and development of a new computer. Although all the technical goals were achieved in record time, the feat was accomplished at great cost to the organization because one year after the new computer was introduced, all the members of the design team had left the company.
instrumentality
of motivation,
the theory
ing managers a good indication of what needs be done to motivate subordinates. In addition addressing support awarding the basic training promotions human and be needs, fair managers and open
must when Although this may be an extreme example, anyone with project experience can give examples of poorly motivated people working well below their capabilities. If management truly believes that employees are the organization's most valuable resource, The track and surveys must ogous this situation allows team, and, signal a project is not acceptable. project managers to
and rewards.
The responses to the surveys show that NASA employees are unhappy with the lower levels of the agers and organization. must they Specifically, people job more they oriented. of career to make These issues training want Unit unit manmanagers to be more do a better must do a reality.
counseling participative can programs
use of surveys the status system. are the The
of their trends,
the human results therefore, The the survey attitudes in a control manager
portion of these surveys is analsystem. and An in can take
management
of their
important
should be addressed for supervisors.
through
be repeated
periodically. monitoring
to the feedback of a team,
Lessons for NASA Managers

work groups are
Project
By continuously motivation
Finally, encouraged
good such
and
should
be and be
a proactive approach to problem solving. example of an attitude survey is included Figure frequency 12; it is kept short to compensate of survey, repetition.
as much and
as possible. meetings.
The same as project They
is true
for the
for all kinds task used reviews by
of interactions, staff
should interaction
management employees. are high-intensity,
to promote
between Projects
Employee
Satisfaction team.
goal-oriented activities
endeavthe proall to to
ors. In the course ject manager the demands the project.
of day-to-day
1. I'm proud to be a part of the NASA 2. I'm proud of my Center. 3. I'm proud to work in the project. Motivation 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
and staff must continuously rank on the limited resources available In such an environment it is easy
rank employee more immediate cost targets. assumption porary
needs and motivation below other concerns, such as schedules and and the are temgoal. needs and An
This is not done on purpose, usually is that the sacrifices to achieve a short-term employee importance organization. host
and needed
At work I'm performing at my full capability. I have the proper training to do my job. At NASA rewards are tied to performance. In my Center rewards are tied to performance. In the projects rewards are tied to performance. In my branch rewards are tied to performance. The following motivate me: job security, challenging work, money, a safe workplace, teamwork. Goals ! 1. 12. 13. 14. 15. The goals of projects are well defined and clear. The goals of my branch are well defined and clear. My goals are well defined and clear. I participate in setting my goals. I participate in setting the project goals.
Unfortunately, morale mental as issues to the
designating of secondary project's
is detri-
example of this was reported New Machine (Kidder, 1981).
in The Soul of a The book records
Figure
12. Sample
Survey
47
Human
Needs,
Motivation,
and the Results
of the NASA
Culture
Surveys
References
Raelin.
J. "The
Basis
for the Professional's ttuman Resources 1985, pp. 147-176. Von Glinow.
Resistance Management,
to
Adams. J.S. "Inequity in Social Exchange." Advances In Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 2, L. Berkowitz, ed.. Academic Press, Washington, 1965, pp. 267-.300. Adams, J.S. "Toward an Understanding Social of Inequality." vol. 67,
Managerial Control." vol. 24, no. 2, Summer Resnick-West,
S. and M.A.
"Beyond
the
Journal of Abnormal Nov. 1963, pp. 422-436. Alderfer, C.P. Existence. Needs in Organizational 1972. Argyris, Between 1957.
Psychology,
Clash: Managing High Technology Professionals." Managing Complexity in High Technology Organizations, M.A. Von Glinow and S.A. Mohrman, eds., Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, p. 237. Resnick, S.M. Pride in Xerox: A Study of Employee Attitude and Morale. Technical Report. Xerox Corporation, E1 Segundo, 1985.
Relatedness. and Growth: Human Settings. Free Press, New York,
C. Personality and Organization: The Conflict System and the Individual. Harper, New York,
Roethlisberger, F.J., H.A. Wright; and W.J. Dickson: Management and the Worker. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1939. Single, J.L. "The Power of Expectations: Productivity and the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy." Management World, vol. 9, Nov. 1980, pp. 19-38. Skinner, B.F. Beyond York, 1971. Freedom and Dignity. Knopf, New
Bailyn, L. "Autonomy in the Indusmal R&D Lab." Human Resources Management. vol. 24, no. 2, Summer 1985, pp. 129-146. Carter D. and B.S. Baker. Concurrent Engineering: The
Product Development Environment for the 1990's. Wesley Publishing Co., Reading, 1992. Herzberg, F. Work and the Thomas Y. Crowell, New York, 1966. Kidder, Boston, Likert, T. The Soul of a New 1981. R. "New Patterns Nature of
Addison
Man.
Sprague, R.A., K.T. Singh and R.T. Wood. "Concurrent Engineering in Product Development." IEEE Design Test Computing, vol. 8, no. 1, March 1991, pp. 6-13. Stahl, M.J. "Achievement Power and Managerial Motivation: Selecting Managerial Talent With the Job Choice Exercise." Personnel Psychology, vol. 36, Winter 1983, p. 786. Staw. Learning B. Intrinsic Press, and Extrinsic Motivation. 1976. Management. General
Machine.
Little,
Brown,
of Management,"
Ch. 4:
Communication, Influence, and Organizational Performance, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1961, pp. 44-60. Maslow, A. The Human York, 1954. McClelland, Motivator." Side of Enterprise. Harper, New
Morristown,
New Jersey, of Scientific
Taylor, F.W. The Principles New York, 1967.
D.C. and D.H. Burnham "Power ls the Great Harvard Business Review, vol. 54, no. 2, Mar.-
Apr. 1976, p. 103. McGregor, D. The Human Hill, New York, 1960. Side of Enterprise. McGraw-
Vollmer, H.M., et al. Adaptations of Scientists Organizations : A Comparative Analysis. Stanford Institute, Menlo Park, 1964. Von Glinow, M.A. The New Professionals: Today's High-Tech Employees. Ballinger Company, Cambridge, 1988. Vroom, 1964. V.H. Work and Motivation, Wiley,
in Five Research
Managing Publishing
Mondy, R.W., A. Sharplin Management Concept, Practices, Bacon. Boston, 1991. Pelz, D.C. "Creative Development Climate." 1967, pp. 160-165.
and S.R. Premeaux. and Skills. Allyn and
New
York,
Tensions in the Research Science. vol. 157, no. 3785,
and July
"Concurrent Engineering." Computer Aided (special issue), vol. 10, no. 10, Oct. 1991.
Engineering
Pelz, D.C. and F.M. Andrews. Scientists in Organizations. The University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, 1976.
48
Where
are the Real Engineers?

by G. Harry Stine
are now managers) the project. and fresh-caught engineers
Recently, names rough any point Maybe
I have because
been project. of the purpose
involved
as a consultant
on
an engineering on some event, fingers the
I'd prefer people
not to mention to get a little with. isn't In to
tackled
this column
is likely
I worked column it. a disturbing
of this
but
to reveal
trend.
The old-time engineers had to battle two decades of on-the-job experience. Tattooed on their brains was the dictum: "Thou shalt not fail, it must work the first time, and thou hast no room Well, that that way. attitude It's not can be handled for just for error." because them whomp and these to shift that up a That's
something
can be done about
The goal of the project was to build something and test it. The device did not exist, although a lot of studies written was ciple and many build piece out to the was really always and then technical and operate papers The have been about prototype. it in the last 40 years. This would and some first goal and dirty using It would questionable out in the if the the items best to proceed offbe
older engineers mental amounts boilerplate passes gears
remember and get back hell,
the time when
it wasn't
too difficult let's
to the old method
to design,
a proof-of-prin-
to: "Well, test model the smoke
be a cheap hardware. of the find discover even company
of this puppy
see if it
off-performance the-shelf used approaches approach that are designs, to check
of ironmongery
test when
we plug it in!"
technology
what engineering used to be all about, of the factors that made it fun. Engineering "Experience amount Then stuff worth you need used gained to operate is directly ruined." ahead bust. to design Prototypes them. yourself on the
and it's one
solution, workable,
principle, to the
overlooked allow the
proportional
of equipment you that could would forge not
with the pre-production device degree of confidence and a lowered
with a higher level of risk.
and were
build not not
Furthermore, it had to be done on a total budget that was embarrassingly small and on a time schedule Briefly, that was impossibly this approach new short. old-hat, every-
a damn would
unless
you busted at all. principle was it did on.
Otherwise, and did
underestimate
the prototypes that minds ancient
is standard, and different.
Once the project
reestablished management, not make
in the it any
day engineering to do something right? In this Wrong! particular to make had had
that you use when
you are trying No big deal,
of the engineering fun. But The
became kept
less stressful. deadlines industry, a mistake to work no one in the last had been time. switch
lack of big money
and the short see the (of engineers
the pressure
I could
allowed Everything Everything
30 years. the
gradual metamorphosis of the older which "I are one," too). The real problems who had recently their received came
perfectly pushed. experience old-time
the first when
to be a success
with the young the last degrees.
engineers ten The years) young
was flipped It has way been both
or the button a fascinating experienced
(within
engineering
to watch engineers
the (who
engineers were brilliant when it came work. They knew how to run computer
to design analyses 49
Where
are the Real Engineers?
until were But been could This
the floor was covered whizzes with CAD. they had never "bent for
with
printouts.
They
The engineering technologists have had to make the damned the design has been approved! nothing against why
are the ones product work
who after
tin."
They
had
never that (I have degree inventors scientists. something In fact, works make my after is in physics, to explain conceive not engineering. it and engineers products far more Scientists it work.
responsible
designing supposed Then
something
be built and was puzzled
to do something. I figured out what
are needed me at first. had happened. Fifteen years ago, my son decided he wanted to be an engineer so he could become a product designer. versities facilities, So we went to several colleges and unito see what their engineering and teaching staff amounted something had changed curricula, to. in Engine
Yes, some modern science lab. But from inventors.) Robert A. Heinlein,
have sprung from the of them have come
an engineer
himself
as well
as an eminently in The Rolling finicky figures
practical Stones for months
scientist, put it very well in 1962: "Fiddle with on end-and what have
Turns out that School. Two career
you got? A repair dock. Or a stamping mill. And who cares?" Hazel Stone missed one of the existential joys of engineering: Pride to. one of the best real in making it work the way it is supposed von Braun was
paths
existed
(and
still
exist)
for
engineers. Dr. Wernher An engineering degree now consists of an engineers neering nicians. why. Von Braun Technology, On the other elor's close degree hand was the path leading technology." that this I discovered to a bachUpon poor Cal Tech. in "engineering studied As part at Charlottenburg equivalent of his education, Institute of MIT he of and was I have When ever known. I saw him do engiwith the techI understood
extremely strong emphasis on scientific mathematics, and computer technology. practically venerated
theory, And
right out on the test stands I read his biography,
no hands-on laboratory work! The engineering degree has been converted in applied science!
into a degree
Germany's
investigation,
apprenticed to the Borsig Werk. There, an old foreman handed him a chunk of iron about as large as a child's file and pointed "Here cube. perfectly are Make your every head. He also gave von Braun a to a bench vise. He was told, tools. angle Make this into a perfect every face a right angle,
stepchild of modern undergraduate study was indeed the sort of hands-on, practical engineering curriculum that I was familiar with back at midcentury. But it no longer lowly turned out "engineers." technologists." of the modem and operation! by scientists, engineers, have finished. are prodThey not It graduated Aha! "engineering that some
flat and smooth, later, von
and every
side equal." the chunk
No wonder design, essentially The after called along
Five
weeks into the
Braun
had filed
ucts of engineering in their have, now come engineers!
seemed been real the
to be less than elegant
construction,
of iron become been lathe,
the required perfect cube that had size of a walnut. But size had not Borsig then put him 'o work on a in the foundry, in the forge,
designed
specified!
grubby-handed technologists," "engineers"
on a shaper,
"engineering
and finally Von Braun
in the locomotive assembly sheds. later recalled that he had gotten more
5O
Where are the Real Engineers?

IIIII Illll II I
insight
into
practical period
engineering
during
that
wisely to build
and do our best to succeed studying things and bust some prototypes.
rather
than fail. Time
apprenticeship in the university. Today,
than he had in any semester
Be we have been
too much.
von Braun
would
have
received
a degree
We have have I
got to stop studying
things make
to death. things
We that
in engineering And
technology, involved
not engineering. today in the project
got to be willing
to bust prototypes.
We have
the engineers
to get out there in the world, work, and produce them. t
used as a nameless way what engineers ate work They They are and their having
example are learning the hard used to learn in undergradufirst few years in the field. can to bend tin against a schedule. they
I had a friendly controversy going on with Arthur C. Clarke, whom I had known for more than 40 years. going minals I kept being telling creative him, and "Arthur, of our we are not all computer terwith is still attach, to sit around in front
are having
to make
do with what
get off the shelf. for R&D. They Register. through They junk
They do not have one thin dime are learning to read Thomas' are learning to find how something to scrounge cheap that
communicating
one another in the global village. Someone going to have to milk the cows!" (Or remove, Another begins clean, friend and repair of mine, book, the milking L. Sprague The Ancient
yards
machines.) de Camp, Engineers,
will do the job. They are good enough is the enemy
facing a world where of the best, where an more important
adequate solution today is far than a perfect solution tomorrow. I am convinced pups them from project teams that both the old hands
his excellent
and the young
thusly: "Civilization, as we know it today, owes its existence to the engineers. These are the men who, down the long centuries, have learned to exploit power We do America. the properties for the benefit not need of matter and the sources of of mankind." more scientists I think in it is
will do just fine on the to destroy the prototypes that. And they are going of the proud best history money as one
project. I expect but also to learn to come out of the engineering they work for gadgets and I will
damned
to educate more
in the industry. work, making to tell
The company
We need
engineers.
has a long and the customer, will not have know. Now,
of building
for the company in service they for decades. are; you
time we ended the experiment applied scientists "engineers" back to what we know works:
of calling educated and transitioned Educating ears old more and and
and staying
you who
grubby-handed "engineers with hairy long and woolly britches," as the unprintable ditty goes. need to adopt
what are we going
to do about
this dichotoMaybe his/her we also name the European to place Then cusbefore tom of permitting a real engineer "Ing." changing
my of engineers
and engineering
technologists.'?
If I wanted again the challenge of putting together an engineering team to do things, I think I would be partial to hiring engineering technologists. States before One of our problems in the United chant to study things to death careers ness on the real possibility Yes, we have less of whether deal. is our penrisking our regard-
the honorific,
turn them
loose to continue for centuries. Originally of Analog reprinted
the world
as they have
published Science
in the December Fiction & Fact
1992 magazine
issue and
of a failure,
it is an engineering
job or a busi-
here with permission
of the author.
got to use our resources
51
IIll
Resources
for NASA
Managers
by William What's New in the Program/Project Management Library Collection

Following is a list of books that have most recent-
M. Lawbaugh
A Kick in the Seat of the Pants .V579 1986
by Roger yon Oech Call number: BF408 Total Quality
ly been added to the PPM Library of the materials may be borrowed
Collection. All through interli-
Training .T'/T46 1992
brary loan from your Center Library. Call Jeffrey Michaels at (202) 358-0172 for further information. Leadership Jazz 1992
by Brian Thomas Call number: HF5549.5 The Wisdom of Teams
by Jon Katzenbach Call number: HD66 TQM Field Manual
.K384
1993
by Max Depree Call number: HD57.7.D47
Beyond Race and Gender by R. Roosevelt Thomas Call number: HF5549.5 .M5 T46 Zapp! The Lightning by William C. Byham Call number: HD58.8 The Age of Unreason by Charles Handy Call number: HD58.8 The Goal by Eliyahu Goldratt Call number: PR9510.9 A Great Place to Work .U5 L385 .G64 G6 .H362 1989
by James Saylor Call number: HD62.15 1991 Still More Games
.$29
1991 Play 1991
Trainers
of Empowerment .H362 1989
by Edward E. Scannell Call number: HM133 .$314 100 Training Games .K76 Control .G82
by Gary Kroehnert Call number: T65.3 Guide to Quality
1991
by Kaoru Ishikawa Call number: TS156 Completeness:
1982 for the 21st Century
1986
Quality
by Philip B. Crosby Call number: HD62.15 1988
.C76
1992 for
by Robert Levering Call number: HP5549.2 Enlightened by Ed Oakley Call number: A Whack Leadership HD57.7.023
Benchmarking: A Practitioner's Guide Becoming and Staying Best of the Best by Gerald J. Balm Call number: HD58.9 .B345 1992
i991 Continuous Improvement Quality .K56 1992 and Measurement for Total
on the Side of the Head .V58 1983
by Roger yon Oech Call number: BF408
by Dennis C. Kinlaw Call number: HD62.15
52
Resources
for NASA
Managers
Mining
Group
Gold .K39 1990 Transformation 1991
The courage
to stay alive
he saw there
convinced perform-
by Thomas Kayser Call number: HD66 Managing the Total
him that the "focus ers was not external In 1979 with research nature Germany, Garfield
of control" for peak but internal. meeting who There and the
Quality
he had a chance psychologists of his about study. Bulgaria
in Milan, doctors from Union used
Italy, and East told
by Thomas Berry Call number: HF5415.157 Are You Communicating? by Donald Walton Call number: P90 .W24 Beyond the Hype:
Soviet-bloc
physiologists, changed experts Soviet
.B47
the whole
the "psychophysics"
by their reserves They can and be presays
1989 the Essence
Olympic athletes to access their hidden and "actualize their human potential." explained dictably. Garfield. After engaged himself how "My peak heart performance systematically started to pound," learned-deliberately,
Rediscovering
of Management by Robert Eccles Call number: HD31 .E27 1992
_
Peak
Book Reviews
Performers: Heroes Garfield of American (New York: Business William Morrow
some lifting
relaxation 365 pounds
techniques, exercises, of barbells
Garfield imagining confidently. the same
in visualization actually
The New by-Charles
He then and exhilaration
did it, with their Apollo.
encouragement
to his amazement.
He experienced
& Co., 1986) "To me, Apollo a peculiar author against Charles Aerospace being A. form of Peak 11 represented Performers, a temporary "the end to says discrimination the
he felt during
of discrimination,"
Over the years as a clinical psychologist, Garfield isolated six factors that constitute peak performance
arts.
in athletics,
business,
government
and
the
the best you can be." Garfield worked Island for Grumman when "going
Missions
that
motivate.
As
JFK
did
for
on Long
in 1967
to work there every for one of the great novice computer the Lunar and build 11. There "missions the enced After matics
morning was like signing up adventures on Earth." As a he helped Module design

.
Apollo, someone gives the call to action that pulls people together for a common achievement. Results the route meaning, merit. Some call it "inspiration." in real time. to the goal satisfaction Intangible or a sense rewards along such as
programmer, Excursion
for Apollo
and then Garfield decided to study that motivate" and find out more about achievement program.
.
of a mission,
of improve-
high-level
he saw
and
experi-
in the Apollo Apollo, and
Self-management. tery towards it "discipline." Team building.
Self
control
and goal.
self Some
mascall
Garfield
left
his career in clinical
in mathepsycholoward these
.
a clearly
defined
pursued
a Ph.D.
gy. Along the way he interned in the cancer of a California medical center, thinking patients formers
Empowering call
others
after
selfa
were the exact opposite of the peak perhe met at Grumman and NASA. Wrong.
mastery. buzzword
Some simply of the 1990s.
it "teamwork,"
53
Resources for NASA Managers

I
5. Course critical
correction. path. Change by peak management. expectations and constant
Finding performers. This
and
navigating inevitable
a but
The
Seven
Habits Character
of Highly Ethic & Schuster,
Effective
People:
is not only
Restoring by Stephen (New
anticipated 6. Change learning, rehearsals These
R. Covey 1989) a discipline which would
York: Simon
involves
lifelong mental Jim Fletcher says this book dealing "suggests for our personal attribbe undoubtedly think about it." derful synthesized and presented the with people
of success, renewal. not the only but they are
six factors
are perhaps
valuable if people stopped to Charles Garfield calls it "a wonHe adds: of our in a powerful "Dr. highest way." Covey has habits achievers Lavish read widely
utes of peak researched
performance, and confirmed
the ones
contribution." them
by Garfield
as he stud-
ied people at their best. He gives examples and anecdotes to describe each factor in each successive chapter. In the they end are he says peak and performers that the know condition who is
praise for what has became success book of the 1990s. It all began when
the most
the Brigham
Young
University to Oahu, fell upon
instinctively,
dynamic, not static. He quotes psychologist Carl Rogers: "The good life is not any fixed state... nor contentment, nor nirvana, nor happiness," thus Rather, debunking "The good a host of American dreams. So, life is a process, not a state of
management professor Hawaii. At the college a single paragraph rest of my life." "basicalIy gap contained or a space we use matter
took a sabbatical library, "my eyes
that powerfully The unquoted the single idea stimulus
influenced the paragraph that there and is a response, words, good it or
between that what
being. It is a direction, not a destination." too, is the attitude of a peak performer. Peak Performers was published in 1986.
and that the key to both our growth is how doesn't space." happens
and happiness to us,
In other
Since
then much has happened in the world, especially in the former Soviet Union. We can chuckle when Garfield quotes because years." Nevertheless, vant light readers thing, bottle does and and enjoys clear Garfield's a renewed enough book is still read, quite releIt is praises Jane's People's breed that Express for example: of military superpower airline "The astronauts, skirmish25 or U.S. Spaceflight, a new fear is 'almost
bad-what really matters is how events in our lives. They either break us down. The BYU of "success Franklin's calls finds centered "Character superficial, professor notes
we react to the build us up or
that the first beginning centered The Ethic" manipulative,
150 years with Ben he or so Covey
is developing ing in space
literature," autobiography, Ethic." clearly on "Personality
generals
on what which
inevitable'
in the next
past 50 years
intimidat-
ing and even deceptive. These behavior change later success style, books tried to change says outward real for a
level
of interest. is in search
as a beach
but most of
get the idea magical but whether is doubtful. seem very
that the author and elusive. He's
and
but Covey "inside-out."
the only He calls
something
on to some-
is internal,
he has captured it or put it in a That he has tried, however,
important.
"principle-centered paradigm shift" buzzword of the 1980s) from "get schemes and "wealth without work"
(echoing the rich quick" to self-evi-
54
dent
principles
derived
from
"natural
laws"
such
4,
Think
Win/Win. a paradigm
This involves
a shift in think(I win, you
as fairness, Yet, when
service, Covey
quality lists and
and integrity. describes the seven
ing from
of competition
lose) to one of cooperation or solutions are mutually satisfying." Covey
where "agreements beneficial, mutually of cooperation
synthesized differ little
habits or regularized principles, they if any from the Dale Carnegie-Earl Drucher-Tom literature the habits The habits will reader are Peters-Charles author describes. not hurt anyone less "a
.
is speaking
Nightingale-Peter Garfield success Certainly trying however, that only holistic, the that seven to succeed.
in the workplace, leaving All-American Competition for the marketplace. Seek attribute of Peace" "empathic Since oral First to Understand, Although it derives from of Francis listening," communication Covey from Then does to Be not it
seven these
is not convinced, much to provide approach
Understood.
are the top seven, needed principle-centered
this habit,
the "Prayer calls empathy. 10 percent
of Assisi.
Covey
integrated,
the term is only
for solving Nevertheless, they include: 1. Be
personal and professional problems." they are interesting and useful, and
by words, 30 percent by sounds by body language, this empathic for listening with your ears, heart
.
and 60 percent listening calls and your
your eyes connect.
Proactive. man [and
"Between woman]
stimulus has the freedom
and to do not rather
or soul. Then Another
you really '80s
response,
choose," says Covey. Proactive people blame others or make excuses, but choose deliberately and turn failures
Synergize. digm"
buzzword, of
like "parasynergism
or "empower".
As described,
into learn-
ing opportunities. Eleanor Roosevelt once said: "No one can hurt you without your consent." 2. Begin with the End in Mind. This is the
is the third alternative views-not the dichotomous but both/and, His free up with or as Covey win/win. ergistic came mission tions
two opposing either/or stance, would have it,
business associates, through synassociation and brainstorming, their mission people increase statement: and their "Our perforthe book organiza-
book's longest chapter, perhaps because it is the most derivative. Covey here asks every potential leader to write a personal family and work group mission statement and visualize it. "One of the research Charles astronauts alizers. showed," Garfield, They and then affirm main things his
.
is to empower to significantly
mance capability," which is abbreviated as EC. Sharpen renewal. habits the Saw. Here Covey of the into a seventh of Renewal
throughout
says Covey, referring to "was that almost all of the peak performers feel it; they are visuexperibegin
Principles
of balanced produces alone:
selfthe six the Four physi-
and other
tries to synthesize but actually book. can stand His marvelous
see it; they
ence it before they actually with the end in mind." 3. Put First Things quoted the right "Organize discipline First.
do it. They
best chapter Dimensions
In the previous and right; things
chapter Bennis:
cal (invigorating tion as a source sic a week, al (in service keep
exercise), of power), a journal)
spiritual (meditamental (read a clasand social/emotion-
Covey is doing advises: ties, and adroitly."
Drucher is doing
"Management
leadership
to others
for true happiness). especially by Over all, The is nicely
things." In this chapter, he and execute around priorito say no or delegate
This chapter should be read first, those who are interested in TQM. Seven Habits of Highly Effective
People
55
written poor, for (There's even Covey Covey readers buying managers. Readings
but hardly and some even more
original. lists
The
documentation are bewildering.
is
NASA
Systems
Engineering et al.
Handbook
and charts plus and
an 800 number charts, Center
where a catalog
you can call from the
By Robert Shisko and Robert G. Chamberlain, PPMI "This mental Publication-Draft handbook concepts was
September written
1992 the fundaengi-
Leadership
a list of upcoming Some at it as are still and to bring and techniques of systems
seminars, retreats and newsletters.) swear by this book; others look success book. A lot of people better it, hoping to become
just another
leaders
neering to NASA personnel in a way that recognizes the nature of NASA systems and the NASA environment," the authors say. That's no easy illustask, but the 120-page trated and well written. As the authors indicate, handbook is amply
in Systems
Engineering and
Ed. by Francis
T. Hoban
William M. Lawbaugh NASA SP-6102 Washington, The core of this collection approaches to systems specially commissioned
the content
as well
as the
1993 of 17 widely divergent
style of Handbook because taught Program The
the NASA Systems Engineering shows a teaching orientation. That's covers Project many of the Management topics and
engineering consists of papers from the NASA
the book in NASA's Control
courses. consists of four main sections and
Alumni League. Owen Morris, Chuck Mathews, John Hodge, John Naugle, Kranz and Kraft, Yardley and Wensley, and Bob Aller are all repretheir and sented here, along with people who made mark on systems engineering in government industry. The collection begins with the classic formulation
handbook
three helpful appendices. tions and descriptions while Cycle project Center which The the second from Phase section
Part one includes definiof systems engineering, takes the NASA Phase F, plus The material Project fundon the
A through
ing and product of systems engineering A. Frosh. His common tone for the next dozen on a difficult and techniques as well, failures reaction duced subject. are mission. given in 1969 by Robert sense approach sets the or so analyses Not just and and slants tools but the third and successful discussed, 1 and being Skylab
development.
cycle is drawn from the work of the InterSystems Engineering Working Group, met periodically in 1991. section covers
lengthiest in Systems
described The book
"Management including the Plan (SEMP) planning, ment, "Systems includes risk reviews
Issues
Engineering,"
in particular
1978 Seasat
ends with a jovial introago. 25 years
Systems Engineer Management the WBS, scheduling, resource management, and reports. baseline Section four manageis called
to this discipline in one of the NASA
as it was Centers
Readings in Systems Engineering but readable and clearly presented.
is 218 pages, Designed pri-
Analysis and Modeling Issues." It the Trade Study Process, cost modeling, measures and handling uncertainty.
effectiveness
marily for the next generation of systems engineers, the book shows the richness of diversity in an increasingly discipline. important emerging management
The appendices consist of the inevitable acronym list, a unit called "Use of the Metric System" with a handy conversion table and, best of all, a set of
56
eight pies,
systems including
engineering three
templates
and
exam-
The Design
biggest
section
is devoted and covers
to "Mission activities
techniques
of functional
Activities"
the basic
analysis. Currently the handbook is being tested out in
and tools from requirements to technical performance measurement for familiar and new technologies. In discussing cost, mance and risk, the authors between absorb that They robustness changes) permit emphasize and (the flexibility schedule, performake distinctions of a system (design but often will always features on orbit). forgotten: result in a to
NASA's Program/Project and is under review from
Management Initiative experts in the field. The
ability
NASA Systems Engineering Handbook is not a substitute for a Center handbook, but the two are, or should be, complementary. No footnotes are used to clutter the narrative; sidebars are used instead. Two foldout charts in the second section are referred Cycle. Mission Design Process Design, Phases Council to in the discussion of the NASA
workarounds extensions
in problems
the obvious,
"Any schedule cost increase." The subsequent
Project The
sections
cover
Pre-Phase
A (con-
NASA
ceptual design) studies, Phase sis) and Phase C/D (execution)
A (mission analybut not launch nor E a
An Engineering Mission Analysis, NASA Engineering December 1992 Shortly Council emerged
Guide
to the Conceptual
and Definition Management
mission operations, often described as Phase and E A brief closing section on "Conducting Compressed tions lined, design Study" meetings suggests held that daily communicastreamand lines be shortened, decision-making
the list of
after the NASA Engineering Management (EMC) was formed in 1991, the need for a clear, compact definition of the 64-page doccompendium knowland projects
activities be prioritized. They mum utilization of existing ware" for a compressed Mission EMC study.
also advise "maxidesigns and hard-
mission design process. This slight, ument is described as a "reference of proven edgeable aerospace approaches and technology." document, consisting to be used experienced in NASA
by those
The NASA from the Ryschkewitsch, Center. ,_..,_:_ Video a International Lessons
Design Process is available or from Dr. Michael G. 704, Goddard Space Flight
Code
It is a handy including compact detailed design
of six sections, and several the flow of
Reviews Ultraviolet Explorer Shared
a detailed
glossary
in the introduction, at the end, to display
list of acronyms charts and tables activities.
Learned
and Experiences Management
in NASA Project 1992:30 min.
"Implementing shows how guidelines The ment authors costs"
and Managing the Study Process" a study team is formed and offers thorough percent to mission study design. effort. They suggest "6-10 of the develop-
of the necessary, be allocated
On January 26, 1978, a three-stage Delta rocket carried what the narrator, Carter Dove, calls "the world's most productive astronomical satellite" into a low elliptical orbit. general-purpose research NASA. IUE was one of the first facilities launched by
say cost problems during Phase C/D will be minimized, but if less is spent, "larger margins and contingencies definition must be maintained" and systems. until proper of requirements
57
Resources for NASA
Managers
Dr. much
Albert
Boggess, success
Project to good
Scientist,
attributes
of the
communications
Project Manager Jerry Madden is an advocate for MBWA, management by walking around or wandering about. "You've got to know the base of the or two, but pyramid," you can miss an engineer these technicians "make it work." Deputy explains schedule two hats Operations Project Manager Dr. Stephen
among project. explained ings built the placed Charles
scientists, Project how
engineers Manager managers and
and managers on the Gerry Longanecker would Europe conference alternate while calls and ESA meetBritain supplied were
between solar
the U.S. Weekly
the four onboard arrays. at a prescribed Freschsel,
cameras
Paddock in on wore
time to England. IUE Operations Manager,
the teamwork that brought and under budget. John as Systems Manager, Manager while
ISEE-3 Hraster and
Mission Manager
Experiment
points to the "complete ments" and "thorough while Kenneth IUE's describes
and unambiguous requiretesting" as key ingredients, Spacecraft onboard Manager, for contracts cost-plus substantial computer
Martin Davis describes the flexibility needed to coordinate 12 instruments from Goddard Space Flight Space Manager Center, other NASA Centers, the European Agency, industry and academia. Spacecraft Don Miller, the rookie on the team, tells
Sizemore, unique
attitude control. He says that fixed-price were used for off-the-shelf items while was better development. The weight telescope resolved early saved big management restrictions and manufacturers. IUE's hydrazine challenges delays from A dedicated temperature and for the gyros, which needed
how the cost-plus award fee contract took more time but was suitable for the integration and testing of subsystems manufactured inhouse. for younger authority proand
were the
Delta British
Jerry ject
Madden managers.
has lots of advice First
of all, delegate
engineer problems
give others plenty of resources but "never tell them how to do it." Also, no surprises or shocks for them Headquarters: of any to open, "you for much major more inform potential them, problems, money other warn them and in advance invite projects someone
in the project. the day for IUE. video
Tradeoffs
workarounds
meetings.
An unexpected for your
This half-hour pices of Hoffman Headquarters
was produced
under
the aus-
request means
PPMI Program and is available Library.
Manager Edward from the NASA
hurt some
project..,
else has to pay for your mistakes." Like the IUE video, the ISEE-3 The ends with a list of Carter video the ICE, PPMI
The International Explorer-3 Lessons Mission Learned
Sun Earth and Experiences Shared
about Dove, will
a dozen indicates feature
"lessons." that the follow-on
narrator,
a subsequent project,
in NASA Project Management March 1991: 30min. In 1978, from wind design longer ISEE-3 was launched Air to study gave three on a Delta Force Station Its ISEE-3 years. the effect rocket on of solar flexible a much a
International Cometary Explorer, which evolved from this one. The PPMI Librarian at NASA Headquarters PPMI video librarians. Library can provide this and other productions through Center
Cape on
Canaveral mission Earth's contingencies
930,000-mile and
magnetosphere.
life than the expected
58

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NASA SP-6101 (06)

ISSUES IN NASA PROGRAM AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT

and Space Administration

Forsale bytheNational Technical Information Service Springfield, VA 22161

and Space Administration

AUTHOR Joseph W. Hamaker

But What Will It Cost? The Evolution

of NASA Cost Estimatin_

Inquiries Office of Human Resources

But What Will It Cost? The Evolution of NASA Cost Estimating

independent in aeronautics wholly

By the time the demand in the

for airplanes of World

in Virginia, and Lewis Ballistic

at Redstone Arsenal team of Wernher yon of Defense (ARPA) and Agency

the Department were

their ongoing These start cess

the U.S. Air Force

of how the country

missiles and rockfor a stable, highly

ing pressure to produce inheritances, engineering project

_:_::_._'i_:% The Origins World aircraft War II had

ed anything ined before. tary work tainly ric techniques

the aircraft While there from time

industry had even imaghad been some rudimenparametwas cercost, there

for projecting be (a key

equation). available associated in the early

Worse still, for estimating with research, (RDT&E). to mid-1950s,

use of any kind of cost estiof work estimat-

mating beyond a laborious build-up hours and materials. A type of statistical

ing and evaluation

But What Will It Cost? The Evolution of NASA Cost Estimating

quickly systems. the

and accurately Rand 1950s and were being

the cost the

methods throughout 1960s the techniques applied to all phases Early

by the early acceptably 7

the cost of The NASA

and first unit production

within Rand been founded was drafted one around only

initiated rocket payloads design

ence. This contributors sis-so cost nated credit basic much

group at Rand to the art and so that of the the

by the scores 5 Novick

cost studies at Rand

for developing tool of the cost

and improving the estimating discipline,

the procedures was pieced

had used on aircraft,

points. 9 the Soviets launched

in the fall of 1957

development set of predictive quickly activities. and stratification

a usable was planning

The use of the CERs breakthroughs RDT&E and cost analysts

designing DOD, was coming

in cost estimating, first unit costs. For saw the promise

especially for the first time, able to

But What Will It Cost?

to withdraw ARPA and

over the objections of both In the end, by autumn of

that out of Langley,

team by setting ders of Redstone

aside a complex within Arsenal in Huntsville. Space

in February of Earth orbital larger