An IED has five components: a switch (activator), an initiator (fuse), container (body), charge (explosive), and a power source

(battery). An IED designed for use against armored targets such as personnel carriers or tanks will be designed for armour penetration, by using either a shaped charge or an explosively formed penetrator. IEDs are extremely diverse in design, and may contain many types of initiators, detonators, penetrators, and explosive loads. Antipersonnel IEDs typically also contain fragmentation-generating objects such as nails, ball bearings or even small rocks to cause wounds at greater distances than blast-pressure alone could. IEDs are triggered by various methods, including remote control, infra-red or magnetic triggers, pressuresensitive bars or trip wires (victim-operated). In some cases, multiple IEDs are wired together in a daisy-chain, to attack a convoy of vehicles spread out along a roadway. IEDs made by inexperienced designers or with substandard materials may fail to detonate, and in some cases actually detonate on either the maker or the emplacer of the device (these unintended early detonations are known as pre-detonations, "own goals," or "self-resolving bomb-tech removal" if the placer is killed in the detonation). Some groups, however, have been known to produce sophisticated devices that are constructed with components scavenged from conventional munitions and standard consumer electronics components, such as mobile phones, washing machine timers, pagers, or garage door openers. The sophistication of an IED depends on the training of the designer and the tools and materials available. IEDs may use artillery shells or conventional high-explosive charges as their explosive load as well as homemade explosives. However, the threat exists that toxic chemical, biological, or radioactive (dirty bomb) material may be added to a device, thereby creating other lifethreatening effects beyond the shrapnel, concussive blasts and fire normally associated with bombs. Chlorine liquid has been added to IEDs in Iraq, producing clouds of chlorine gas. A vehicle borne IED, or VBIED, is a military term for a car bomb or truck bomb. These are typically employed by insurgents, and can carry a relatively large payload. They can also be detonated from a remote location. VBIEDs can create additional shrapnel through the destruction of the vehicle itself, as well as using vehicle fuel as an incendiary weapon. The act of a person's being in this vehicle and detonating it is known as an SVBIED suicide. Of increasing popularity among insurgent forces in Iraq is the HBIED or House Borne IED, coming out of the common military practice of clearing houses, insurgents will rig an entire house to detonate and collapse shortly after a clearing squad has entered. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are rudimentary bombs that generally consist of commonly found non-military materials. Although common IED threats include roadside bombs, suicide bombers are another emerging problem in the IED arena. Suicide bombers carrying personal-borne IEDs (PBIEDs) are extremely hard to detect or stop. Because no IED emplacement is necessary, a suicide bomber can quickly strap on an IEDladen vest and move to the kill zone. Placed in the proper urban environment, this weapon is capable of inflicting serious structural damage and killing hundreds of people in mere seconds. Research has been done to detect magnetic materials used in IEDs in urban environments using a

wireless sensor network. Using the magnetic detectors in the wireless sensor nodes, magnetic behaviors and patterns are analyzed to differentiate a person carrying an IED and a person possessing magnetic material like jewelry or keychains.
By trigger mechanisms Wire

Command-wire improvised, explosive devices (CWIED) use an electrical firing cable that affords the user complete control over the device right up until the moment of initiation.[38]
Radio

The trigger for a radio-controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) is controlled by radio link. The device is constructed so that the receiver is connected to an electrical firing circuit and the transmitter operated by the perpetrator at a distance, A signal from the transmitter causes the receiver to trigger a firing pulse that operates the switch. Usually the switch fires an initiator; however, the output may also be used to remotely arm an explosive circuit. Often the transmitter and receiver operate on a matched coding system that prevents the RCIED from being initiated by spurious radio frequency signals.[38] An RCIED can be triggered from any number of different mechanisms including car alarms, wireless door bells, cell phones, pagers and encrypted GMRS radios.[38]
Cell phone

A radio-controlled IED (RCIED) incorporating a cell phone that is modified and connected to an electrical firing circuit. Cell phones operate in the UHF band in line of sight with base transceiver station (BTS) antennae sites. In the common scenario, receipt of a paging signal by phone is sufficient to initiate the IED firing circuit.[38]
Victim-operated Victim-operated improvised explosive devices (VOIED) are designed to function upon contact with a victim; also known as booby traps. VOIED switches are often well hidden from the victim or disguised as innocuous everyday objects. They are operated by means of movement. Switching methods include tripwire, pressure mats, spring-loaded release, push, pull or tilt. Common forms of VOIED include the under-vehicle IED (UVIED) and improvised landmines.[38] Infrared

The British accused Iran and Hezbollah of teaching Iraqi fighters to use infrared light beams to trigger IEDs. As the occupation forces became more sophisticated in interrupting radio signals around their convoys, the insurgents adapted their triggering methods.[40] In some cases, when a more advanced method was disrupted, the insurgents regressed to using interruptible means, such as hard wires from the IED to detonator; however, this method is much harder to effectively conceal. It later emerged however, that these so-called "advanced" IEDs were actually old IRA technology. The infrared beam method was perfected by the IRA in the early '90s after it

acquired the technology from a botched undercover British Army operation. Many of the IEDs being used against Coalition forces in Iraq were originally developed by the British Army who unintentionally passed the information on to the IRA.[41] The IRA taught their techniques to the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the knowledge spread to Iraq.[42]
Surgically implanted

In May 2012 American counter-terrorism officials leaked their acquisition of documents describing the preparation and use of surgically implanted improvised explosive devices.[43][44][45] The devices were designed to evade detection. The devices were described as containing no metal, so they could not be detected by xrays. Security officials referred to bombs being surgically implanted into suicide bomber's "love handles".[43] In August 2009 Abdullah al-Asiri, the younger brother of Ibrahim al-Asiri, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's chief bomb-maker tried to assassinate a Saudi prince with bomb inserted up his anus. That effort was a failure, inflicting relatively slight wounds on the prince. According to The Daily Mirror UK security officials at MI-6 asserted that female bombers could travel undetected carrying the explosive chemicals in otherwise standard breast implants.[46] The bomber would blow up the implanted explosives by injecting a chemical trigger.[45]

Detecting Improvised Explosive Devices in Urban Areas

Detecting Improvised Explosive Devices in Urban Areas Wednesday, April 01 2009 Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are rudimentary bombs that generally consist of commonly found non-military materials. Although common IED threats include roadside bombs, suicide bombers are another emerging problem in the IED arena. Suicide bombers carrying personal-borne IEDs (PBIEDs) are extremely hard to detect or stop. Because no IED emplacement is necessary, a suicide bomber can quickly strap on an IEDladen vest and move to the kill zone. Placed in the proper urban environment, this weapon is capable of inflicting serious structural damage and killing hundreds of people in mere seconds. Research has been done to detect magnetic materials used in IEDs in urban environments using a wireless sensor network. Using the magnetic detectors in the wireless sensor nodes, magnetic behaviors and patterns are analyzed to differentiate a person carrying an IED and a person possessing magnetic material like jewelry or keychains. Using wireless sensor nodes instead of standard metal detectors enables the detectors to remain

hidden to outside observers. The small nodes easily blend into the indigenous environmental settings to provide stealth. All IEDs require a power source to initiate the weapon. Most initiators are battery- operated electrical devices, but there are other means of initiation. Spring-loaded initiators require no electrical power to function. The IED initiator detonates the weapon and begins the bombing sequence. Common initiators are blasting caps and fuse igniters. Electrical initiators can be triggered in various ways, including a button, radio frequency, and optical. The IED switch arms the weapon after the initiator sequence begins. The switch could be an arming switch, fuse, or both for redundancy. Once the IED is armed, the internal circuit is complete and detonation occurs shortly thereafter. One of the first solutions to detect IEDs was to detect the frequency spectrum used by the IED initiator devices. By correctly analyzing the frequency spectrum used by the remote triggers, troops successfully jammed the frequencies and prevented IEDs from being triggered. Electromagnetic pulse jamming also destroyed IED circuitry. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) use mounted cameras to take pictures of probable IED areas and then come back for more images. The Buckeye camera mounted on a UAV uses an electrooptical sensor capable of producing threedimensional images. Using imagery software or the human eye, the pictures are analyzed against pictures from the same area, but taken at a different time. Scrutinizing the images to the nearest pixel, experts can determine if suspicious IED activity has occurred in a region. Magnetic Wireless Sensor Networks A wireless sensor network (WSN) is formed from a series of wireless network nodes or motes, generally in an ad-hoc configuration. Each node contains a small processor to handle sensing duties. Nodes are able to relay information using a predetermined routing protocol such as ZigBee. Due to the wireless constraints, each WSN node needs a self-contained power source such as batteries. A standard WSN uses the nodes for their physical sensing capabilities in conjunction with a base station, which receives information from the nodes and passes it to another source to process the data. Since the base station receives input from the WSN nodes, it has higher power requirements and must always coordinate data delivery out of the network. Each node contains sensing capabilities appropriate for the network application and needs. Nodes cannot process or analyze the information, but can forward information to either another node or the base station. The mesh-networking feature of the motes allows them to communicate with each mote in the network. Additional motes can be added to the network or motes can be removed from the network seamlessly. The magnetic detection capability within the motes uses a twoaxis magnetic

field sensor to detect electronic voltage perturbations around the sensor. The passive infrared sensors detect dynamic changes in the thermal radiation environment within immediate vicinity of the sensor. The mote also contains a dormant microphone to detect acoustic changes within its environment. Each mote contains four magnetic and passive infrared sensors placed within a cubicle housing to provide nearly 360-degree coverage. Placing a WSN by entry and exit points of urban buildings provides a stealthy means of detecting IED materials. The accuracy of the mote detectors allows observers to distinguish normal routines from suspicious IED activities. The WSN can be set up to alert security officials of possible IED activity, and used in conjunction with standard surveillance methods to provide a more complete and accurate depiction of actual activities taking place in real time. WSN Deployment In IED detection, the network looks for patterns of activity that appear suspicious and raises alerts when a certain level of confidence has been achieved in the prediction. Ferrous materials compose a large number of IEDs, making magnetic sensors a logical choice for detecting IEDs. However, magnetic sensors alone may not be sufficient in confirming IED presence because the network may be susceptible to false positives (the network falsely detecting IEDs) or false negatives (failure of the network to detect IED). Using a combination of different sensor modalities could mitigate both possibilities. The urban environment presents many challenges. Large crowds provide many variables unbeknownst to the planning process. For example, the presence of a metal shopping cart in a grocery store is a common occurrence; thus, another reason to use metallic sensors in conjunction with other detection characteristics. Another issue is the emplacement of the wireless sensor nodes. Although relatively small, they must be carefully placed to avoid accidental detection. To find the optimum deployment scenario, various tests were conducted using the motes, 18" orange safety cones to elevate the motes from the ground, and steel buckets and staples to simulate metallic IED material. The initial setup kept the metal bucket in a fixed position and the mote was walked along a straight-line path over the bucket. The spacing was too great and the motes had trouble detecting magnetic material unless extremely close to the mote. To test if large amounts of metal at a specified distance would give the same magnetic reading as smaller amounts of metal at a closer distance, a keychain was placed 6" from the mote. The keychain gave readings just as strong as a bucket placed 3' away from the mote. Another test used a basic rectangular configuration of motes placed at fivemeter intervals. A steel bucket was traversed through various paths around the motes. These various paths often produced dead spots. The mote was then placed 1.5' away from a wall. Metal was placed at varying heights of the wall to determine how high the metal could be detected by the sensor

mote. Results showed that a 2.5' height was the maximum distance that still provided consistent results. In another test, two motes represented an entrance or doorway to an urban building. The motes were placed at 2' intervals. This interval was later increased to 4, 8, and 12'. A subject carrying a metal bucket traversed the network. Final tests were conducted with two and three subjects traversing the network with differing amounts of metal. The 2 and 4' configurations were tested as a means of providing network redundancy and avoiding blind spots inside the mote area. The motes were able to detect strong magnetic signals from the bucket and provided many data points for detection by the mote software. The mote intervals were then expanded to 8 and 12'. The 8' configuration still provided reliable and consistent results. The 12' configuration showed some readings, but was not consistently able to detect metal from 6' away. So, an 8' interval between motes was optimal for the six-mote network, providing redundancy of motes while avoiding blind spots within the network (see figure).

Motes placed at 8' intervals proved optimal for the six-mote network, providing redundancy of motes while avoiding blind spots within the network. Overall, a wireless sensor network using only magnetic detection is not a complete solution for the IED problem. The strengths of a WSN include low power requirements, adaptability, and relative ease of use. For controlling entrances to buildings such as shopping malls, places of worship, or office buildings, a cost-effective WSN implementation would be possible. It would require a configuration that leaves no holes in detection and provides redundancy to prevent network failure.

This article was written by Lieutenant Matthew P. H. OHara of the United States Navy. For more information on the Navys IED detection technologies, click here.

Detecting Improvised Explosive Devices in Urban Areas

Wednesday, April 01 2009 Page 1 of 2 advertisement:

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are rudimentary bombs that generally consist of commonly found non-military materials. Although common IED threats include roadside bombs, suicide bombers are another emerging problem in the IED arena. Suicide bombers carrying personalborne IEDs (PBIEDs) are extremely hard to detect or stop. Because no IED emplacement is necessary, a suicide bomber can quickly strap on an IEDladen vest and move to the kill zone. Placed in the proper urban environment, this weapon is capable of inflicting serious structural damage and killing hundreds of people in mere seconds. Research has been done to detect magnetic materials used in IEDs in urban environments using a wireless sensor network. Using the magnetic detectors in the wireless sensor nodes, magnetic behaviors and patterns are analyzed to differentiate a person carrying an IED and a person possessing magnetic material like jewelry or keychains. Using wireless sensor nodes instead of standard metal detectors enables the detectors to remain hidden to outside observers. The small nodes easily blend into the indigenous environmental settings to provide stealth. All IEDs require a power source to initiate the weapon. Most initiators are battery- operated electrical devices, but there are other means of initiation. Spring-loaded initiators require no electrical power to function. The IED initiator detonates the weapon and begins the bombing sequence. Common initiators are blasting caps and fuse igniters. Electrical initiators can be triggered in various ways, including a button, radio frequency, and optical. The IED switch arms the weapon after the initiator sequence begins. The switch could be an arming switch, fuse, or both for redundancy. Once the IED is armed, the internal circuit is complete and detonation occurs shortly thereafter.

Motes placed at 8' intervals proved optimal for the six-mote network, providing redundancy of motes while avoiding blind spots within the network. One of the first solutions to detect IEDs was to detect the frequency spectrum used by the IED initiator devices. By correctly analyzing the frequency spectrum used by the remote triggers, troops successfully jammed the frequencies and prevented IEDs from being triggered. Electromagnetic pulse jamming also destroyed IED circuitry.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) use mounted cameras to take pictures of probable IED areas and then come back for more images. The Buckeye camera mounted on a UAV uses an electrooptical sensor capable of producing threedimensional images. Using imagery software or the human eye, the pictures are analyzed against pictures from the same area, but taken at a different time. Scrutinizing the images to the nearest pixel, experts can determine if suspicious IED activity has occurred in a region.
Magnetic Wireless Sensor Networks

A wireless sensor network (WSN) is formed from a series of wireless network nodes or motes, generally in an ad-hoc configuration. Each node contains a small processor to handle sensing duties. Nodes are able to relay information using a predetermined routing protocol such as ZigBee. Due to the wireless constraints, each WSN node needs a self-contained power source such as batteries. A standard WSN uses the nodes for their physical sensing capabilities in conjunction with a base station, which receives information from the nodes and passes it to another source to process the data. Since the base station receives input from the WSN nodes, it has higher power requirements and must always coordinate data delivery out of the network. Each node contains sensing capabilities appropriate for the network application and needs. Nodes cannot process or analyze the information, but can forward information to either another node or the base station. The mesh-networking feature of the motes allows them to communicate with each mote in the network. Additional motes can be added to the network or motes can be removed from the network seamlessly. The magnetic detection capability within the motes uses a twoaxis magnetic field sensor to detect electronic voltage perturbations around the sensor. The passive infrared

sensors detect dynamic changes in the thermal radiation environment within immediate vicinity of the sensor. The mote also contains a dormant microphone to detect acoustic changes within its environment. Each mote contains four magnetic and passive infrared sensors placed within a cubicle housing to provide nearly 360-degree coverage.

Detecting Improvised Explosive Devices in Urban Areas

Wednesday, April 01 2009 Page 2 of 2 advertisement:

Placing a WSN by entry and exit points of urban buildings provides a stealthy means of detecting IED materials. The accuracy of the mote detectors allows observers to distinguish normal routines from suspicious IED activities. The WSN can be set up to alert security officials of possible IED activity, and used in conjunction with standard surveillance methods to provide a more complete and accurate depiction of actual activities taking place in real time.
WSN Deployment

In IED detection, the network looks for patterns of activity that appear suspicious and raises alerts when a certain level of confidence has been achieved in the prediction. Ferrous materials compose a large number of IEDs, making magnetic sensors a logical choice for detecting IEDs. However, magnetic sensors alone may not be sufficient in confirming IED presence because the network may be susceptible to false positives (the network falsely detecting IEDs) or false negatives (failure of the network to detect IED). Using a combination of different sensor modalities could mitigate both possibilities. The urban environment presents many challenges. Large crowds provide many variables unbeknownst to the planning process. For example, the presence of a metal shopping cart in a grocery store is a common occurrence; thus, another reason to use metallic sensors in conjunction with other detection characteristics. Another issue is the emplacement of the wireless sensor nodes. Although relatively small, they must be carefully placed to avoid accidental detection. To find the optimum deployment scenario, various tests were conducted using the motes, 18" orange safety cones to elevate the motes from the ground, and steel buckets and staples to simulate metallic IED material. The initial setup kept the metal bucket in a fixed position and the mote was walked along a straight-line path over the bucket. The spacing was too great and the motes had trouble detecting magnetic material unless extremely close to the mote. To test if large amounts of metal at a specified distance would give the same magnetic reading as smaller amounts of metal at a closer distance, a keychain was placed 6" from the mote. The keychain gave readings just as strong as a bucket placed 3' away from the mote.

Another test used a basic rectangular configuration of motes placed at fivemeter intervals. A steel bucket was traversed through various paths around the motes. These various paths often produced dead spots. The mote was then placed 1.5' away from a wall. Metal was placed at varying heights of the wall to determine how high the metal could be detected by the sensor mote. Results showed that a 2.5' height was the maximum distance that still provided consistent results. In another test, two motes represented an entrance or doorway to an urban building. The motes were placed at 2' intervals. This interval was later increased to 4, 8, and 12'. A subject carrying a metal bucket traversed the network. Final tests were conducted with two and three subjects traversing the network with differing amounts of metal. The 2 and 4' configurations were tested as a means of providing network redundancy and avoiding blind spots inside the mote area. The motes were able to detect strong magnetic signals from the bucket and provided many data points for detection by the mote software. The mote intervals were then expanded to 8 and 12'. The 8' configuration still provided reliable and consistent results. The 12' configuration showed some readings, but was not consistently able to detect metal from 6' away. So, an 8' interval between motes was optimal for the six-mote network, providing redundancy of motes while avoiding blind spots within the network (see figure). Overall, a wireless sensor network using only magnetic detection is not a complete solution for the IED problem. The strengths of a WSN include low power requirements, adaptability, and relative ease of use. For controlling entrances to buildings such as shopping malls, places of worship, or office buildings, a cost-effective WSN implementation would be possible. It would require a configuration that leaves no holes in detection and provides redundancy to prevent network failure. This article was written by Lieutenant Matthew P. H. OHara of the United States Navy. For more information on the Navys IED detection technologies,