"The Underdetermination of Theory"

Outline: Baconian view :: Quine-Duhem Thesis (pragmatism --! the underdetermination of theory and affiliated pro"lems (the need for philosophy# the danger of circularity# and the threats to scientific realism and the "hypothetical-deductive" method of science# the method enshrined in$$$ %opperian &alsificationism 's Underdetermination a (yth) %ragmatism and *ealism

Baconian view :: Quine-Duhem Thesis (pragmatism The "naive Baconian" view of science: ...science as the straightforward gathering of "facts" and their systematic organization into useful collections of facts. The idea is that nature will tell us what the facts are, provided we learn how to listen to nature properly. We perform our experiments, and nature rules on the outcomes. We simply have to be sharp enough to devise the right sorts of experiments to distinguish the true facts from the false con ectures. ! central presumption of the native Baconian view is that "crucial" experiementation is the hallmar" of science. ! crucial experiement would be an e+periment that unambiguously favored one or the otehr of two competing hypotheses under test, no matter the outcome. #$%& While an attractive and compelling view ' almost no one is a Baconian anymore. (n particular, %ierre Duhem #french physicist, philosopher of science, early )*th ct.& "...argued around the turn of the twentieth century that crucial experiments are not possible in physics. The philosopher ,$-$O$ Quine, at least during one period of his distinguished career, too" the radical view that crucial experiments are forthcoming in no domain of scientific in+uiry, indeed, -uine in his more radical moments can be viewed as maintaining that crucial experimentation is a fairy tale of logic nowhere realizable no matter how smart human in+uirers are. #$.& ''/ the Quine-Duhem Thesis: #0lee1s version&: Any seemingly disconfirming observational evidence can always be accomodated to any theory. (n other words, the -uine'2uhem Thesis denies that the disconfirmation of a theory can be forced upon a practitioner by the evidence itself. 3ature does not rule, we do,

we do in the sense that our re.ection of the theory under test on the "asis of evidence is an inferential decision made "y us# not nature. 4or, if we really wanted to, if we were willing to change enough of our other beliefs, we could render the evidence in +uestion consistent with the theory under test. #$5, emphasis added, 67& (n other terms we have used: nature may "ic" bac" ' but that doesn1t force us to change our theory. !ll this follows straightfowardly if we move from the positivist view of theory to a holistic view ' one that claims that the terms and laws of a theory form one interdependent networ". !n important and obvious conse+uence of this is that it is always a large chun/ of a theory that faces an e+perimental test# never one isolated prediction. (t follows that a piece of seemingly disconfirming o"servational evidence never contradicts a single isolated claim, it contradicts the large chun/ of theory that the claim that otherwise appears to "e directly under test is part of....8bviously, therefore, we could "save" the claim that the context might seem to suggest is directly under test by ad usting other claims in the large chun" of theory with which it is connected. #$5, emphasis added, 67& (t is important, on 0lee1s view, not to overstate the point here ' as, for example, 9arry 9audan does, by ta"ing it to mean that "...there are no defensible, rational grounds for re ecting one theory on behalf of another where the competing theories are all consistent with the observational data." #$5& 4or 0lee, this is not -uine1s point: :is point was a logical one, or, put another way, his point was a metaphysical one: :ow theories are ad usted in the light of contrary observational evidence is a human affair, a decision that we, and not nature, ma"e. ;o, as a matter of mere logical consistency, it would always be possible to render consistent any theory with any seemingly disconfirming evidence by ma"ing enough ad ustments in other beliefs. -uine was concerned to insist on this as an expression of his deep commitment to pragmatism. :ow we ad ust theories to accomodate contrary observational evidence is a highly pragmatic affair: We ad ust so as to maximize fertility of the resulting theory in generating new predictions, to maximize consistency with as much of our former system of beliefs as possible, to maximize the overall simplicity of the resulting theory, and to maximize the theory1s modesty so that its claims are as narrowly drawn as possible. #$5f.& <see additional text here p. $$ ' for these as necessary conditions, according to pragmatists, if we are to "trac" the truth".= There are supporting examples ' first of all, in the history of physics ' which support this claim, e.g., the shift from 3ewtonian physics to 7insteinian physics: ...the observational evidence for the relativity of space and time did not logically falsify 3ewtonian absolute space and time, for absolute space and time could be saved by postulating the existence of bizarre "universal forces" that bend light rays, shrin" measuring rods, and slow down cloc"s, forces which by their intrinsic nature are

forever and ever undetectabl#because they affect any experiemental device desightedto detect them in such a way as to remain undetectable&. :ere was a case of two incompatible theories each consistent with all actual and possible observational evidence. <but the evidence did not force a choice between the two theories= #$$& <We have also seen the debate between >tolemy and 6opernicus as an e+ually classic case of this situation ' i.e., where two competing theories explain the same data?observation?phenomena, so that the data do not force us to choose between the two.= This situation is described by physicists as the underdetermination of theory by the observational evidence, "..$the evidence cannot "y itself determine that some one of the host of competing theories is the correct one." #$$, emphasis added, 67& 'f this is correct ' then we1re forced to turn to additional methodological principles "to brea" the competitive deadloc" between the evidentially e+uivalent competing theories." #$$& !s we have seen, -uine proposes his pragmatic principles ' but we have also seen the effort to use 8c"ham1s razor, etc. 0s we have also seen, introducing such additional principles, however, inevitably forces us to ma"e both metaphysical and epistemological assumptions about "nature" which underlie these principles ' which a& runs us into the domain of philosophy #as the domain that argues competing metaphysical and epistemological claims&, and b& confronts us immediately with the danger of circularity: at issue: which theory gives us the best "picture" or account of "nature?reality"@ but: the observational evidence does not force us to choose, so that ... we turn instead to methodological principles which rest in turn on philosophical assumptions about "nature?reality" #metaphysics?ontology& as well as how we are to "now that "nature?reality" #epistemology&, BAT: if we use a given set of philosophical assumptions about "nature?reality" to decide ' via specific methodological principles ' between competing theories about "nature?reality" ' T:73: the resulting theory of "nature?reality" issues from what we already assumed to be true about "nature?reality" in the philosophical assumptions about "nature?reality" at wor" in our choice of the methodological principles needed to brea" the deadloc" between "evidentially e+uivalent competing theories." (n other terms: we run the danger of using our assumptions about nature?reality #on the philosophical and then the methodological level& to decide what theory about nature?reality we are to believe #when the evidence does not force a choice&. <We have seen examples of this throughout the history of science ' e.g., 7instein assuming local reality in his development of the 7>B paradox which see"s to demonstrate the truth of local reality and disprove the assumption of nonlocal reality in +uantum mechanics.= 4or 0lee, moreover, the underdetermination of theory and the -uine'2uhem thesis regarding what we do when theory is not decided straightforwardly by appeal to

observation and data also threaten two specific positions within the philosophy of science: scientific realism #to be dealt with in ch. C*& the "so-called hypothetical-deductive method#" affiliated with 1arl %opper2s falsification criterion$ (34 %opperian &alsificationism %opper, wor"ing out of the Dienna 6ircle and positivism, developed his falsification criterion, as we have discussed, in order to meet a central problem in both the effort to confirm scientific hypotheses and to demarcate natural science from various pseudo' sciences #first of all, Earxism, 4reudian psychoanalysis, and !dlerian psychology&. There is a central problem, as we have seen, with the effort to appeal to experience?e+periment to "demonstrate" or "prove" a hypothesis ' i.e., it falls into the fallacy of affirming the conse+uent: (f : <:ypothesis= is true, then 7 <experimental results= should follow. 7 follows Therefore, : is true. BAT: how about if we turn this approach upside'down, and loo" for falsifying or disconfirming evidence@ >opper1s claim was that science is legitimate "nowledge only if it can be falsified or disconfirmed, following the deductive form of modus tollens: (f : <:ypothesis= is true, then 7 <experimental results= should follow. 7 does not follow. Therefore, : cannot be true. !s attractive as >opper1s effort to save the positivist program from criti+ues of the sort raised by the -uine'2uhem thesis may be #and as useful as this version of "the scientific method" may be as a simplified introduction to science@& ' 0lee1s example of the e+periment to determine whether or not there are natural "iller #30& cells in a mammalian immune system ma"es the point that >opper1s theory of science is too simple, and this in at least two ways: a& >lato was right: you can1t "move down" from a general principle #the hypothesis& to a specific deductive conse+uence #the observable prediction& without a se+uence of intervening steps: The immune surveillance theory of cancer does not by itself imply any observational prediction, and even %opper admitted as much about any general theoretical hypothesis #that is, he admitted that no general hypothesis by itself implies anything about an actual particular state of affairs. #F)& <To state it baldly: we cannot establish the first line of the modus ponens/modus tollens argument ' the move from a general principle #hypothesis& to a specific observable #e+periment& ' without additional assumptions...= "What implies an observational prediction is that theory together with a myriad of interdependent beliefs, presumptions, guesses, and other theories." #F)&

But this further means that... b& ...the modus ponens part of the >opperian model of scientific method involves a complex conditional," ' i.e., not : implies 7 #or, as 0lee puts it, theory T implies observational prediction 8& but rather : plus theory B plus theory E plus belief B plus assumption ; plus assumption G plus hunch 6 plus... imply observational prediction 8. But this means that ...the modus tollens part of the >opperian model of scientific method is logically undermined. 4rom the falsity of observational prediction 8 we can no longer automatically infer that it is theory T that is false. !ll we may legitimately infer, as a matter of logic alone, is that at least one of T, B,E, B, ;,G,6, ... is false, and that is ust what the underdetermination of theory by evidence is all about....#F)& >art of the further point is that this biological example suggests that the -uine'2uhem thesis is not limited to physics... 's Underdetermination a (yth) 0lee points out ' and will examine in chs. H and I ' what he ta"es to be a misuse of the -uine'2uhem thesis and the recognition of underdetermination ' namely, the re ection of any demarcation between science and non'science #including, in his example, "The 3ew !ge ;ociety for ;ublime 6onsciousness"&, and various forms of social constructivism, postmodernism, etc., which use the thesis and the problem of underdetermination to build a case that "science" depends on a variety of nonevidential and "irrational" factors. 9arry 9audan, in particular, attempts to attac" the -uine'2uhem thesis in order to prevent ust such problems. (f such an attac" were to succeed, obviously, then the various worries that follow from the thesis would be undermined. !s might be expected #remember the famous Eedieval motto: when in trouble, ma"e a distinctionJ& ' 9audan1s criti+ue involves first of all ma"ing some important distinctions, i.e., between: ,ea/ underdetermination 5trong underdetermination descriptive normative the simple claim that scientists are psychological such ad ustments are inclined to hold onto a theory ustifiable, even rational, in in the face of disconfirming the effort to "save" a theory evidence by ad usting other beliefs deductive "the evidence does not deductively entail a single correct theoretical account of the phenomena in +uestion" #F.& ampliative even if we include deductive?probabilistic inference ' the evidence still fails to imply a single correct theoretical account

compati"ilist underdetermination K "any theory can be rendered logically consistent with any evidence that otherwise would seem to contradict it #by ad usting suitably elsewhere&." #F.& nonuni6ue

entailing in addition to achieving logical consistency ' "evidence underdetermines theory in the sense that any theory can be made so as to entail logically any evidence that otherwise would seem to contradict it." #F.&

egalitarian given any theory and body of evidence ' "there will be at "...there will be an infinity of least one other theory such competing logically incompatible with theories....!ll theories are the first theory which also is epistemologically e+ual." either compatible with or #F5& logically entails that evidence." #F5& 9audan argues that radical criti+ues and re ection of science, resting on the -uine' 2uhem thesis, must assume the stronger sort of underdetermination. 0lee argues, however, that critics, while holding to egalitarian underdetermination, do not hold to the stronger version of the first three categories #see F5f.&. !s he points out, this raises the possibility that 9audan is attac"ing a straw person. #F$& -A(37 #remember -uine@&, however, holds to the wea"er versions ' descriptive, compatibilist, and nonuni+ue: and he leaves indeterminate whether he holds to deductive or ampliative underdetermination. (n any case, the wea" forms of underdetermination are apparently harmless for the claim that science constitutes ob ective, reliable, universally valid "nowledge. (n particular, the nonuni+ue #vs. the egalitarian& view is harmless "because it cannot support the sorts of global attac"s on scientific methdology that critics of science mount against it....<where these attac"s amount to= the claim that science is a 1waste of time1 in the sense that is methods cannot in the end guarantee a rationally ustified choice between rival Theories of 7verything."#F$& 0lee also sees that 9auden appears to agree with -uine in his characterization of the compatibilist version of underdetermination as trivial ' that is, compatibilist underdetermination does not lead to the "anything goes" model of scientific practice: on the contrary, -uine is not an epistemological anarchist. -uine held that we apply pragmatic principles of choice to pare down competing theories....<e.g.,= simplicity, fertility, modesty, and conservativism. #FF& !s well,

!s a pragmatist -uine thin"s that answering the +uestion of whether our scientific theories accurately represent an in+uiry'independent reality can be postponed anyway. What matters in the present is that we have a canon of methods, an epistemology of daily practice, which underwites enormous condifence in the claims of mature scientific theories....<(ndeed= -uine thin"s that those who believe that science truthfully represents an in+uiry'independent reality have good cause to be encouraged even in the face of the -uine'2uhem Thesis. #FF& This hope rests in...

%ragmatism and Bealism #as epistemological commitments undergirding specific philosophies of science& !re there 30 cells in the immune systems of mammals@ >ragmatism is a philosophical view that would answer this +uestion with a hypothetical statement: There are 30 cells in the immune systems of mammals if positing the existence of such cells maximally simplifies, renders maximally fertile, conservative, and modest, the sensory experiences #and our theoretical reflections on them& which we undergo in our immunological in+uiries, as compared to what would result on those same criteria if we did not posit their existence. (n other words, there are 30 cells if the 30'cell hypothesis "wor"s." 3ature, after all, pushes bac" against our theorizing, and if a hypothesis fails to do the wor" for us that we want it to do <i.e., explain and predict LinstrumentalismM and perhaps accurately describe "reality" LrealismM=, that is a rational ground for becoming suspicious that the hypothesis might be bar"ing up the wrong tree, ontologically spea"ing. #FF& This leads us #surprise, surprise& to the thorny philosophical issues of epistemology and ontology ' and specifically to the issues of instrumentalism vs. realism. -uine, as 0lee points out, uses the term "posit" as a verb, derived from its noun usage. 4or -uine, ( "posit" #or, as 0lee suggests as a rough e+uivalent, postulate& an entity such as an electron as part of a long'term process of theory'building which is chec"ed by how well it "wor"s" #this is left somewhat vague by 0lee, if not by -uine&. >osits which fail to wor" are discarded. But what does this mean@ 0lee points out that pragmatists argue that the notion of posits "wor"ing" consistently as "the only evidence there could be that there are such things as electrons, that they exist as in+uiry'independent entities that push bac" against our theorizing." #FH& 0lee implicitly ac"nowledges the ambiguity of what "wor"ing" might mean ' we must determine more precisely what we expect of a theory when we say it "wor"s" or doesn1t #the function of the following chapter&. ;till, at this stage we can note that this pragmatist point is at least partly correct: but notice carefully the argument involved: 'f there are real, independent realities "N", and if ( posit a theoretical description of such "N" which, in the context of a larger theory, leads to observable predictions <: ''/ 8= then my capturing these independent realities in my theory #e.g., electrons& will lead to the #real& observable results predicted by the theory which posits these realities.

<Asing 0lee1s example: if electrons really exist ' and if ( accurately posit such entities in my theory ' then my theory should predict results that follow precisely because my theory has succeeded in "capturing" "reality."= ;o far, no +uarrel, +uite true. But this is +uite distinct from the claim that: if my observations are consistent with what my theory has predicted #i.e., it "wor"s"& ' ( can conclude that the posits?hypotheses upon which my theory rests are real #ontological realism& and true #epistemological realism&. (ndeed, as we have seen, such a claim is the classical fallacy of affirming the conse+uent. ;till more broadly: the fact that a theory and its posits may "wor"" does not commit us necessarily to realism #as the pragmatist might wish&, but only to instrumentalism #( can only say the theory "wor"s" as a successful "map" for predicting events ' ( cannot ustifiably claim that it further represents a complete and accurate "picture" of "reality"&. 0lee ac"nowledges ust this point as he characterizes pragmatism as attempting to ma"e "an end run" around ust the +uestion of whether science provides us with a realist "picture" of "an in+uiry'independent reality." #FH& "(t all comes out in the doing," the pragmatist claims. We learn by doing, we "now by doing, we believe by doing, so only by doing will these "metaphysical" +uestions be answered. What we must resist is the attempt to freeze "nowledge in its current imperfect state while we try to read off of it what the ultimate Theory of 7verything will contain. But a critic will wish of course to challenge the pragmatist1s seemingly simplistic e+uation of what wor"s with what is the case. ;uppose some theory T wor"s in all the senses that a pragmatist li"e -uine thin"s count. Why should that be ta"en as a ground for thin"ing T is a true representation of some in+uiry'independent reality@ Why assume that wor"able theories trac" the ob ective truth@ ....<(n contrast with -uine1s misconstrual of the point here,= The critic is claiming that wor"able theories don1t have to wor" because they trac" the truth: They could do good wor" for us and still be false. #FI& (n short ' so far, there1s nothing in the pragmatist account that pushes us towards realism, away from instrumentalism.