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The aim of music: to communicate feelings.

(C&V) Music, with its few notes & rhythms, seems to some people a primitive art. But o nly its surface is simple, while the body which makes possible the interpretatio n of this manifest content has all the infinite complexity that is suggested in the external forms of other arts & which music conceals. In a certain sense it i s the most sophisticated art of all. (C&V) Understanding a musical phrase may also be called understanding a language. [Z 1 72.] Musical themes are in a certain sense propositions. Knowledge of the nature of l ogic will for this reason lead to knowledge of the nature of music. Soulful expression in music. It is not to be described in terms of degrees of lo udness & of tempo. Any more than is a soulful facial expression describable in t erms of the distribution of matter in space. Indeed it is not even to be explain ed by means of a paradigm, since the same piece can be played with genuine expre ssion in innumerable ways. (C&V) Structure & feeling in music. Feelings accompany our grasp of a piece of music a s they accompany events in our life. (C&V) This musical phrase is a gesture for me. It creeps into my life. I make it my ow n. (C&V) The proposition is a measure of the world. The proposition is not a blend of words. Nor is a tune a blend of notes, as all unmusical people think The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. [5.6] Art is a kind of expression. Good art is complete expression In art it is hard to say anything, that is as good as: saying nothing. (C&V) Within all great art there is a WILD animal: tamed. (C&V) Every artist has been influenced by others & shows (the) traces of that influenc e in his works; but what we get from him is all the same only his own personalit y. What is inherited from others can be nothing but egg shells. We should treat the fact of their presence with indulgence but they will not give us Spiritual n ourishment. (C&V) What cannot be imagined cannot even be talked about. [Cf. 5.61.] Imagination is voluntary, memory involuntary, but calling something to mind is v oluntary. (REMARKS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY) Consciousness that... may disturb me in my work; knowledge can't. (REMARKS ON TH E PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY) Well, why should a way of speaking not be responsible for an experience? (REMARK

S ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY) Instinct comes first, reasoning second. Not until there is a language-game are t here reasons. REMARKS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY) The tangled use of psychological words ("think", for example). As if the word "v iolin" referred not only to the instrument, but sometimes to the violinist, the violin part, the sound, or even the playing of the violin. (REMARKS ON THE PHILO SOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY) Nothing is more important for teaching us to understand the concepts we have tha n constructing fictitious ones. [Culture and Value (C & V)] You visit a tribe; they have a language; in this language you hear a word (a sou nd)--does it have one meaning, or several? How will you find out, how will you d ecide? (LAST WRITINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY) The 'atmosphere' of a word is a picture of its use. (LAST WRITINGS ON THE PHILOS OPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY) Our concepts are determined by our interest, and therefore by our way of living. (LAST WRITINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY) You enter new territory when you observe several languages and compare them with each other. (LAST WRITINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY) Untangling many knots, that is the philosopher's task. (LAST WRITINGS ON THE PHI LOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY) Distrust of grammar is the first requisite for philosophizing. Imagine someone pointing to his cheek with an expression of pain and saying "abr acadabra!"--We ask "What do you mean?" And he answers "I meant toothache".--You at once think to yourself: How can one 'mean toothache' by that word? Or what di d it mean to mean pain by that word? And yet, in a different context, you would have asserted that the mental activity of meaning such-and-such was just what wa s most important in using language. But--can't I say "By 'abracadabra' I mean to othache"? Of course I can; but this is a definition; not a description of what g oes on in me when I utter the word. (PI) If I say a piece of paper is pure white, and if snow were placed next to it and it then appeared grey, in its normal surroundings I would still be right in call ing it white and not light grey. It could be that I use a more refined concept o f white in, say, a laboratory (where, for example, I also use a more refined con cept of precise determination of time). What is there in favor of saying that gr een is a primary colour, not a blend of blue and yellow? Would it be right to sa y: "You can only know it directly by looking at the colours"? But how do I know that I mean the same by the words "primary colours" as some other person who is also inclined to call green a primary colour? No,--here language-games decide. ( REMARKS ON COLOUR) Why can't we imagine transparent-white glass,--even if there isn't any in actual ity? Where does the analogy with transparent coloured glass go wrong? Sentences are often used on the borderline between logic and the empirical, so that their meaning changes back and forth and they count now as expressions of norms, now a s expressions of experience. (For it is certainly not an accompanying mental phe nomenon--this is how we imagine 'thoughts'--but the use, which distinguishes the logical proposition from the empirical one.) (REMARKS ON COLOUR)

My whole tendency and, I believe, the tendency of all men who ever tried to writ e or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. (A Lec ture on Ethics) In philosophy we give rules of grammar wherever we encounter a difficulty. To sh ow what we do in philosophy I compare playing a game by rules and just playing a bout. We might feel that a complete logical analysis would give the complete gra mmar of a word. But there is no such thing as a completed grammar. However, givi ng a rule has a use if someone makes an opposite rule which we do not wish to fo llow. When we discover rules for the use of a known term we do not thereby compl ete our knowledge of its use, and we do not tell people how to use the term, as if they did not know how. Logical analysis is an antidote. Its importance is to stop the muddle someone makes on reflecting on words. (Lectures on Philosophy) When we understand a statement we often have certain characteristic experiences connected with it and with the words it contains. But the meaning of a symbol in our language is not the feelings it arouses nor the momentary impression it mak es on us. The sense of a sentence is neither a succession of feelings nor one de finite feeling. If you want to know the meaning of a sentence, ask for its verif ication. I stress the point that the meaning of a symbol is its place in the cal culus, the way it is used. Of course if the symbol were used differently there m ight be a different feeling, but the feeling is not what concerns us. To know th e meaning of a symbol is to know its use. (Lectures on Philosophy) Of course there isn't a philosophical grammar and ordinary English grammar, the former being more complete since it includes ostensive definitions such as the c orrelation of "white" with several of its applications, Russell's theory of desc riptions, etc. These are not to be found in ordinary grammar books; but this is not the important difference. The important difference is in the aims for which the study of grammar are pursued by the linguist and the philosopher. One obviou s difference is that the linguist is concerned with history, and with literary q ualities, neither of which is of concern to us. Moreover, we construct languages of our own so as to solve certain puzzles which the grammarian is not intereste d in, e.g., puzzles arising from the expression "Time flows". We shall have to j ustify calling our comments on such a sentence grammar. If we say time flows in a different sense than water does, explaining this by an ostensive definition, w e have indicated a way of explaining the word. And we have left the realm of wha t is generally called grammar. Our object is to get rid of certain puzzles. The grammarian has no interest in these; his aims and the philosopher's are differen t. We are pulling ordinary grammar to bits. (Lectures on Philosophy) The similarity between new and old uses of a word is like that between an exact and a blurred boundary. Our use of language is like playing a game according to the rules. Sometimes it is used automatically, sometimes one looks up the rules. Now we get into difficulties when we believe ourselves to be following a rule. We must examine to see whether we are. Do we use the word "game" to mean what al l games have in common? It does not follow that we do, even though we were to fi nd something they have in common. Nor is it true that there are discrete groups of things called "games". (Lectures on Philosophy) You cannot prescribe to a symbol what it may be used to express. All that a symb ol can express, it may express. This is a short answer but it is true! The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all s tnnd to one another in that pictorial intemal relation, which holds between lang

uage and the world. To all of them the logical structure is common . . . In the fact that there is a general rule by which themusician is able m d the symphony out of the score, and that there is a rule by which one could reconslruct the sy mphony from the line on a gramophone record and from this again -by means of the first rule- construct the score. herein lies the intemal similarity between the se things which at first sight seem to be enlirely different. And the rule is th e law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of the musical score. It is the rule of translation of this language into the language of the gramophone record. The translation of a lyrical poem. . . is quite analogous to a mathematical prob lem If a pattern of life is the basis for the use of a word then the word must conta in some amount of indefiniteness. The pattern of life, after all, is not one of exact regularity. [LWPP I 211] This is a very one-sided way of looking at language. In practice we very rarely use language as such a calculus. For not only do we not think of the rules of us age of definitions, etc. while using language, but when we are asked to give such r ules, in most cases we aren t able to do so. We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use; not because we don t know their real definition, but because there is no real definition to them. To suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules. [BB p. 25] The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language. [PI] Let the use of words teach you their meaning. (Similarly one can often say in ma thematics: let the proof teach you what was being proved.) [PI p. 220] We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. . . The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging wh at we have always known.129 [PI 109] At some point one has to pass from explanation to mere description. [OC 189] When I think in language, there aren t meanings going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought. [PI 329] Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and square s, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight, regular streets and uniform houses. [PI 18] Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way a bout; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about. [PI 203] Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented

to us so clearly. [PI 11] If I say I saw a chair in this room, I can mostly recall the particular visual imp ression only very roughly, nor does it have any importance in most cases. The us e that is made of the sentence bypasses this particular feature. [Z 25] The concept of understanding is a fluid one. (PG) The explanation of the purpose or the effect of a word is not what we call the e xplanation of its meaning. (PG) If I want to say "I understand it like that" then the "like that" stands for a t ranslation into a different expression. Or is it a sort of intransitive understanding? (PG) The case of our language could be compared with a re used to stand for sounds, and also as signs of of punctuation. If one conceives this script as a patterns, one can imagine someone misinterpreting mply a correspondence of letters to sounds and as mpletely different functions. (PG) script in which the letters we emphasis and perhaps as marks language for describing soundthe script as if there were si if the letters had not also co

The common behavior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language. [PI 206] . . . commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our n atural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing. [PI 25] Our concepts, judgements, reactions never appear in connection with just a singl e action, but rather with the whole swirl of human actions. [LWPP II p. 56] How could human behavior be described? Surely only by sketching the actions of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. What determines our judgment, our con cepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action. [Z 567] Might we say: A child must of course learn to speak a particular language, but n ot to think? (PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS) In a certain sense, the use of language is something that cannot be taught. (PR) If you exclude the element of intention from language, its whole function then c ollapses. (PR) Language can only say those things that we can also imagine (PR) While I am looking at an object I cannot imagine it. [Z 621] Is calculating in the imagination in some sense less real than calculating on pa per? It is real -- calculation-in-the-head.--Is it like calculation on paper? -I don't know whether to call it like. Is a bit of white paper with black lines on it like a human body? (PI)

The mental picture is the picture which is described when someone describes what he imagines. (PI) How does one teach anyone to read to himself? How does one know if he can do so? How does he himself know that he is doing what is required of him?(PI) "A plan as such is something unsatisfied." (Like a wish, an expectation, a suspi cion, and so on.) (PI) Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments. Now perhaps one thinks that it can make no great difference which concepts we employ. As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet and inches as well as in metres and centimetr es; the difference is merely one of convenience. But even this is not true if, f or instance, calculations in some system of measurement demand more time and tro uble than it is possible for us to give them. (PI) The feeling of confidence. How is this manifested in behaviour? (PI) One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own belief. (PI) Two uses of the word "see". The one: "What do you see there?"--"I see this" (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: "I see a likeness between th ese two faces"--let the man I tell this to be seeing the faces as clearly as I d o myself. (PI) ('Thinking' and 'inward speech'--I do not say 'to oneself'--are different concep ts.) (PI) But the question now remains why, in connexion with this game of experiencing a word, we also speak of 'the meaning' and of 'meaning it'.--This is a different k ind of question.--It is the phenomenon which is characteristic of this languagegame that in this situation we use this expression: we say we pronounced the wor d with this meaning and take this expression over from that other language-game. Call it a dream. It does not change anything. (PI)

A question denotes a method of searching. (PR) The stream of life, or the stream of the world, flows on and our propositions ar e so to speak verified only at instants. (PR) There is not--as I used to believe--a primary language as opposed y language, the 'secondary' one. But one could speak of a primary posed to ours in so far as the former would not permit any way of reference for certain phenomena over others; it would have to be, bsolutely impartial. (PR) to our ordinar language as op expressing a p so to speak, a

What belongs to the essence of the world cannot be expressed by language. (PR) Human beings are entangled all unknowing in the net of language. (PG) When I am sorry for someone else because he's in pain, I do of course imagine th e pain, but I imagine that I have it. (PR) The grammar of a language isn't recorded and doesn't come into existence until t he language has already been spoken by human beings for a long time. Similarly,

primitive games are played without their rules being codified, and even without a single rule being formulated. (PG) Imagine that someone were to explain "Language is whatever one can use to commun icate". What constitutes communication? To complete the explantation we should have to descri be what happens when one communicates; and in the process certain causal connect ions and empirical regularities would come out. But these are just the things th at wouldn't interest me; they are the kinds of connection I wouldn't hesitate to make up. I wouldn't call just anything that opened the door a "key-bit", but on ly something with a particular form and structure. (PG) The symbol for a class is a list. (PG) What does people's agreement about accepting a structure as a proof consist in? In the fact that they use words as language? As what we call "language". (REMARK S ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS) When I say: "I don't know my way about in the calculus"--I do not mean a mental state, but an inability to do something. It is often useful, in order to help cl arify a philosophical problem, to imagine the historical development, e.g. in ma thematics, as quite different from what it actually was. If it had been differen t no one would have had the idea of saying what is actually said. (REMARKS ON TH E FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS) Is there harm in the contradiction that arises when someone says: "I am lying.-So I am not lying.--So I am lying.--etc."? I mean: does it make our language les s usable if in this case, according to the ordinary rules, a proposition yields its contradictory, and vice versa?--the proposition itself is unusable, and thes e inferences equally; but why should they not be made?--It is a profitless perfo rmance!--It is a language-game with some similarity to the game of thumb-catchin g. Such a contradiction is of interest only because it has tormented people, and because this shews both how tormenting problems can grow out of language, and w hat kind of things can torment us. (REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS) By accepting a proposition as self-evident, we also release it from all responsi bility in face of experience. (REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS) What interests me is not having immediate insight into a truth, but the phenomen on of immediate insight. Not indeed as a special mental phenomenon, but as one o f human action. Yes: it is as if the formation of a concept guided our experienc e into particular channels, so that one experience is now seen together with ano ther one in a new way. (As an optical instrument makes light come from various s ources in a particular way to form a pattern.). Imagine that a proof was a work of fiction, a stage play. Cannot watching a play lead me to something? (REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS) By being educated in a technique, we are also educated to have a way of looking at the matter which is just as firmly rooted as that technique. (REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS) Can one row of letters have two reverses? Say one acoustic, and another, optical , reverse. Suppose I explain to someone what the reverse of a word on paper is, what we call that. And now it turns out that he has an acoustic reverse of the w ord, i.e., something that he would like to call that, but it does not quite agre e with the written reverse. So that one can say: he hears this as the reverse of the word. As if, as it were, the word got distorted for him in being turned rou nd. And this might perhaps occur if he pronounced the word and its reverse fluen tly, as opposed to the case of spelling it out. Or the reverse might seem differ ent when he spoke the word forwards and backwards in a single utterance. It migh

t be that the exact mirror-image of a profile, seen immediately after it, was ne ver pronounced to be the same thing, merely turned in the other direction; but t hat in order to give the impression of exact reversal, the profile had to be alt ered a little in its measurements. But I want to say that we have no right to sa y: though we may indeed be in doubt about the correct reverse of, for example, a long word, still we know that the word has only one reverse. (REMARKS ON THE FO UNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS) Suppose that one gives a particular lion (the king of lions) the name "Lion"? No w you will say: But it is clear that in the sentence "Lion is a lion" the word " lion" is being used in two different ways. (Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. 1) But can't I count them as one kind of use? But if the sentence "Lion is a lion" is used in this way: shouldn't I be drawing your attention to anything, if I drew y our attention to the difference of employment of the two "lion"s? One can examin e an animal to see if it is a cat. But at any rate the concept cat cannot be exa mined in this way. Even though "the class of lions is not a lion" seems like non sense, to which one can only ascribe a sense out of politeness; still I do not w ant to take it like that, but as a proper sentence, if only it is taken right. ( And so not as in the Tractatus.) Thus my conception is a different one here. Now this means that I am saying: there is a language-game with this sentence too. I magine a language in which the class of lions is called "the lion of all lions", the class of trees "the tree of all trees", etc.--Because people imagine all li ons as forming one big lion. Then it would be possible to set up the paradox tha t there isn't a definite number of all lions. And so on. (REMARKS ON THE FOUNDAT IONS OF MATHEMATICS) To use the word without a justification does not mean to use it wrongfully. (REM ARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS) A new word is like a fresh seed thrown on the ground of the discussion. (C&V) I once said, & perhaps rightly: The earlier culture will become a heap of rubble & finally a heap of ashes; but spirits will hover over the ashes. (C&V) Culture is like a great organization which assigns to each of its members his pl ace, at which he can work in the spirit of the whole, and his strength can with a certain justice be measured by his success as understood within that whole. In a time without culture, however, forces are fragmented and the strength of the individual is wasted through the overcoming of opposing forces & frictional resi stances; it is not manifest in the distance travelled but rather perhaps in the heat generated through the overcoming of frictional resistances. But energy is s till energy & even if the spectacle afforded by this age is not the coming into being of a great work of culture in which the best contribute to the same great end, so much as the unimposing spectacle of a crowd whose best members pursue purely private ends, still we must not forget that the spect acle is not what matters. -- Even if it is clear to me then that the disappearan ce of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value but simply of certain means of expressing this value, still the fact remains that I contemplat e the current of European civilization without sympathy, without understanding i ts aims if any. So I am really writing for friends who are scattered throughout the corners of the globe. (C&V) I am not interested in erecting a building but in having the foundations of poss ible buildings transparently before me. (C&V) Each sentence that I write is trying to say the whole thing, that is, the same t hing over and over again & it is as though they were a views of one object seen fr om different angles. (C&V) Telling someone something he does not understand is pointless, even if you add t

hat he will not be able to understand it. (That so often happens with someone yo u love.) (C&V) If I say that my book is meant for only a small circle of people (if that can be called a circle) I do not mean to say that this circle is in my view the lite of mankind but it is the circle to which I turn (not because they are better or wo rse than the others but) because they form my cultural circle, as it were my fel low countrymen in contrast to the others who are foreign to me. (C&V) We are struggling with language. We are engaged in a struggle with language. (C& V) What you have achieved cannot mean more to others than to you. (C&V) I never more than half succeed in expressing what I want to express. Indeed not even so much, but perhaps only one tenth. That must mean something. My writing i s often nothing but "stammering". (C&V) The pleasure I take in my thoughts is pleasure in my own strange life. Is this j oi de vivre? (C&V) Talent is a spring from which fresh water is constantly flowing. But this spring loses its value if it is not used in the right way. (C&V) I must be nothing more than the mirror in which my reader sees his own thinking with all its deformities & with this assistance can set it in order. (C&V) Nothing is so difficult as not deceiving yourself. (C&V) Don't play with what lies deep in another person! (C&V) People have sometimes said to me they cannot make any judgement about this or th at because they have never learnt philosophy. This is irritating nonsense, it is being assumed that philosophy is some sort of science. And people speak of it a s they might speak of medicine.--What one can say, however, is that people who h ave never carried out an investigation of a philosophical sort, like most mathem aticians for instance, are not equipped with the right optical instruments for t hat sort of investigation or scrutiny. Almost, as someone who is not used to sea rching in the forest for berries will not find any because his eye has not been sharpened for such things & he does not know where you have to be particularly o n the lookout for them. Similarly someone unpractised in philosophy passes by all the spots where difficulties lie hidden under the grass , while someone with practice pauses & senses that there is a difficulty here, e ven though he does not yet see it.--And no wonder, if one knows how long even th e practised investigator, who realizes there is a difficulty, has to search in o rder to find it. -- If something is well hidden it is hard to find. (C&V) The philosopher is someone who has to cure many diseases of the understanding in himself, before he can arrive at the notions of common sense. (C&V) In philosophy the winner of the race is the one who can run most slowly. Or: the one who gets to the winning post last. (C&V) Is it just I who cannot found a school, or can a philosopher never do so? I cann ot found a school, because I actually want not to be imitated. In any case not b y those who publish articles in philosophical journals. (C&V) Phenomena akin to language in music or architecture. Significant irregularity--i n Gothic e.g. (I have in mind too the towers of St. Basil's Cathedral.) Bach's m usic is more like language than Mozart's & Haydn's. The double bass recitative i

n the 4th movement of Beethoven's 9th Symphony. (Compare too Schopenhauer's rema rk about universal music composed to a particular text.) (C&V) In Mendelssohn. All great art has primitive human drives as its ground bass. The y are not the melody (as they are, perhaps, in Wagner), but they are what gives the melody depth a & power. In this sense one may call Mendelssohn a 'reproductive' artist.-- (C&V) In Beethoven's music what one might call the expression of irony is to be found for the first time. E.G. in the first movement of the Ninth. With him, moreover, it is a terrible irony, that of fate perhaps.--In Wagner irony reappears, but t urned into something bourgeois. You could no doubt say that Wagner & Brahms, eac h in his own way, imitated Beethoven; but what with him was cosmic, is earthly w ith them. The same expressions are to be found in him, but they follow different laws. In Mozart's or Haydn's music again fate plays no sort of role. That is no t the concern of this music. That ass Tovey says somewhere that this, or somethi ng similar, is connected with the fact that Mozart has no access to literature o f a certain sort. As though it were established, that only books had made the mu sic of the masters what it was. Naturally, books & music are connected. But if M ozart found no great tragedy in his reading, does that mean that he did not find it in his life? And do composers always see solely through the spectacles of po ets? (C&V) The measure of genius is character,--even if character on its own does not amoun t to genius Genius is not 'talent and character', but character manifesting itself in the fo rm of a special talent. Where one man will show courage by jumping into the wate r, another will show courage by writing a symphony. (This is a weak example.) Th ere is no more light in a genius than in any other honest human being--but the g enius concentrates this light into a burning point by means of a particular kind of lens. (C&V) One might say: "Genius is courage in one's talent". (C&V) One cannot speak the truth;--if one has not yet conquered oneself. (C&V) The poet too must always be asking himself: 'is what I am writing really true th en?' which does not necessarily mean: 'is this how it happens in reality?'. (C&V ) Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at the right tempo. My sentences are all to be read slowly. (C&V) The revolutionary will be the one who can revolutionize himself. (C&V) Words are deeds. (C&V) To go down into the depths you don't need to travel far; you can do it in your o wn backgarden. (C&V) Appreciating music is a manifestation of human life. How could it be described t o someone? Well, above all I suppose we should have to describe music. Then we c ould describe the relation human beings have to it. But is that all that is nece ssary, or is it also part of the process to teach him to appreciate it for himse lf? Well, developing his appreciation will teach him what appreciation is in a d ifferent sense, than a teaching a that does not do this. And again, teaching him t o appreciate poetry or painting can be part of an explanation of what music is. (C&V) I think that, in order to enjoy a poet, you have to like the culture to which he

belongs as well. If you are indifferent to this or repelled by it, your admirat ion cools off. (C&V) Do not forget that a poem, even though it is composed in the language of informa tion, is not used in the language-game of giving information. [Z] William James: The thought is already complete at the beginning of the sentence. How can one know that? -- But the intention of uttering the thought may already exist before the first word has been said. For if you ask someone: "Do you know what you mean to say?" he will often say yes. [Z] "I had the intention of ..." does not express the memory of an experience. (Any more than "I was on the point of ...".) Intention is neither an emotion, a mood, nor yet a sensation or image. It is not a state of consciousness. It does not h ave genuine duration. [Z] The "philosophy of as if" itself rests wholly on this shifting between simile an d reality. [Z] (I have never yet read a comment on the fact that when one shuts one eye and "on ly sees with one eye" one does not simultaneously see darkness (blackness) with the one that is shut.) [Z]

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