Internal Conflict and Terrorism in Southeast Asia:

Regional Responses and U.S. Leadership

Carlyle A. Thayer *
[Paper to panel on Internal Conflict and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Assessing the Effectiveness of
Regional Responses and U.S. Leadership, 46th International Studies Association Annual Convention, Hilton
Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., March 1-5, 2005]
Abstract
In the aftermath of terrorist bombings on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001,
U.S. President George Bush called for a global war on terrorism. The United Nations Security Council
quickly rallied behind the U.S. and passed a resolution binding the UN’s members to prevent such acts
from occurring again. In Southeast Asia, political leaders uniformly condemned the terrorist attacks on the
United States and offered varying measures of support. This paper provides an overview of regional
responses to the emergence of internationally networked terrorism and U.S. efforts to provide leadership in
the war on terrorism. It concludes by offering an assessment of successes and shortcomings of the various
approaches adopted along three dimensions: preferences, capacity and leadership.
Introduction
In the aftermath of terrorist attacks on the United States on 11th September 2001
(hereafter (9-11), the United Nations Security Council, acting under the provisions of
Chapter VII of its Charter, adopted Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001. This
resolution reaffirmed the Security Council’s unequivocal condemnation of the 9-11
terrorist attacks and
“1. Decides that all States shall:
(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
(b) Criminalize the willful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds
by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge
that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who
commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of
entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on
behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from
property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities;
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any
funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or
indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the
commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of
persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;
2. Decides also that all States shall:
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved
in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the
supply of weapons to terrorists;

*
C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor, Southeast Asia Program, School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C. on leave as Director, UNSW Defence Studies
Forum, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University College, The University of New South
Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra.
 2

(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of
early warning to other States by exchange of information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe
havens;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective
territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration
of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other
measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and
regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal
investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including
assistance in obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls
on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting,
forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents.”
Resolution 1373 also called upon all members of the United Nations to:
“(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information,
especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or falsified travel
documents; traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by
terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;
(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on
administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;
(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to
prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts;
(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism of 9 December 1999;
(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);
(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and
international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the
purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of
terrorist acts;
(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the
perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not
recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists.”
In addition to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (1999), the “relevant international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism” include (see Appendix A):
• Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft
(Tokyo Convention, 1963)
• Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague
Convention, 1970)
• Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
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Aviation (Montreal Convention, 1971)

• Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons (1973)
• International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention,
1979)
• Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Nuclear Materials
Convention, 1980)
• Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988)
• Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, (1988)
• Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988)
• Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection
(1991) and the
• International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1997)
Finally, Resolution 1373 also established a Counter-Terrorism Committee, made up of all
fifteen members of the Security Council, to monitor the implementation of this resolution
by all members of the United Nations including ten Southeast Asian states grouped in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The following sections will review Southeast Asian responses to the events of 9-11 and
evaluate U.S. leadership in the global war on terrorism in a regional context.
Regional Responses
The events of 9-11. In response to the events of 9-11, the states of Southeast Asia almost
uniformly condemned the terrorist attacks on the United States, offered their sympathy to
the victims, and pledged varying degrees of support to the U.S. The Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, for example, prided itself on being one of the first to send
President Bush a message of sympathy. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir took the
unusual step of personally signing the condolence book at the U.S. Embassy in Kuala
Lumpur. President Megawati Sukarnoputri visited Washington, D.C. shortly after 9-11.
In a joint statement issued with President Bush on September 19th, she condemned the
terrorist attacks and pledged to strengthen Indonesia’s cooperation in combating
international terrorism. Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Tok Chong stated that Singapore
“stands with the United States” in the fight against terrorism, while his Thai counterpart,
Taksin Shinawatra, made a more equivocal statement of support. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo offered specific concrete assistance. She stated that the Philippines
would not only permit the use of its air space and military facilities for U.S. forces
transiting the area but would be prepared to deploy support and medical personnel and
combat forces – if requested by the United Nations.
 4

The heads of government of the five core founding members of ASEAN all visited
Washington, D.C. and reiterated their commitment to the war on terrorism: Indonesia
(September 2001), Philippines (November 2001 and May 2003), Thailand (December
2001 and June 2003), Malaysia (May and June 2002), and Singapore (May 2003 and May
2004). Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited the U.S. in May 2002 and terrorism
featured in his discussions with President Bush.
Multilateral responses.
One of the first multilateral anti-terror initiatives in Southeast Asia was undertaken by the
Philippines. Significantly this was outside the ASEAN framework (see below). On
September 26, 2001, President Arroyo initiated talks with Indonesia and Malaysia on
cooperation to combat terrorism. Among the ideas discussed was intelligence sharing on
Islamic extremism and ways to reduce the number of young men going overseas for
extremist religious education. On May 7, 2002, the three states also signed an Agreement
on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures” and agreed
to cooperate in some twenty projects including procedures for dealing with border and
security incidents. Thailand and Cambodia joined subsequently.
In July 2004, in response to a U.S. Regional Maritime Security Initiative (discussed
below), Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore signed a trilateral agreement to enable them
to conduct coordinated naval patrols in the Malacca Strait to combat piracy.
Multilateral responses – ASEAN
According to ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong, “ASEAN may not have been
very visible in this [counter- terrorism] campaign. We have many sensitivities to contend
with particularly not to aggravate the perception that Islam and Muslims are engaged in a
monumental struggle with modernization and the West.”
Following the terrorist attacks of 9-11, and immediately prior to the ASEAN summit in
Brunei, the third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime met in Singapore
in October 2001. This meeting included terrorism in its discussion of transnational issues
and agreed to convene special sessions of the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational
Crime (SOMTC) to discuss issues related to combating terrorism. In addition the
AMMCT decided to set up an Ad Hoc Experts Group to discuss terrorism.
ASEAN leaders addressed their support for the war on terrorism at their seventh summit
meeting held in Brunei in November 2001. There they adopted a Declaration on Joint
Action to Counter Terrorism (November 5, 2001) that condemned terrorism as “a
profound threat to international peace and security which require concerted action” and
“a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the
realization of ASEAN Vision 2020.” The ASEAN states agreed to suppress terrorism in
accordance with the UN Charter, UN resolutions and international law. Finally, the
ASEAN heads of government adopted nine measures:
1. Review and strengthen our national mechanisms to combat terrorism;
2. Call for the early signing/ratification of or accession to all relevant anti-terrorist conventions
including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism;
3. Deepen cooperation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and
sharing ‘best practices’;
 5

4. Study relevant international conventions on terrorism with the view to integrating them with
ASEAN mechanisms on combating international terrorism;
5. Enhance information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on
terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movement and funding, and any other information
needed to protect lives, property and the security of al modes of travel;
6. Strengthen existing cooperation and coordination between the AMMTC [ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting on Transnational Crime] and other relevant ASEAN bodies in countering, preventing and
suppressing all forms of terrorist acts. Particular attention would be paid to finding ways to
combat terrorist organizations, support infrastructure and funding and bringing the perpetrators to
justice;
7. Develop regional capacity building programmes to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN
member countries to investigate, detect, monitor and report on terrorist acts.
8. Discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives to increase ASEAN’s role in and involvement
with the international community including extra-regional partners within the existing frameworks
such as the ASEAN + 3, the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
to make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavor.
9. Strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional, and international levels in combating terrorism in a
comprehensive manner and affirm that at the international level the United Nations should play a
major role in this regard.

This Declaration became the basic template of ASEAN initiatives to counter terrorism in
Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s stance was reiterated at its 8th summit meeting in Phnom Penh
where members adopted another Declaration on Terrorism (November 3, 2002). This
meeting endorsed the following activities:

• the International Conference on Anti-Terrorism and Tourism Recovery in Manila

(November 2002);
• the establishment of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Center in Kuala Lumpur
(November 2002);
• the Regional Conference on Combating Money-Laundering and Terrorist
Financing in Bali (December 2002);
• the Intersessional Meeting on Terrorism of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Kota
Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia (March 2003);
• the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime with ministerial
counterparts from China, Japan and the Republic of Korea in Bangkok (October
2003 or January 2004);
It should be noted that ASEAN’s modus operandi is to include terrorism as a security
issue along with transnational crime. This is in deference to members states with a large
Muslim population who are sensitive to any linkage between Islam and terrorism. For
example, a Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism met in Kuala Lumpur in
May 2002 and adopted the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime. A
separate “Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat
Transnational Crime” was adopted to monitor the implementation of the Plan of Action
by its members. The Work Programme included six major areas: (1) information
exchange, (2) cooperation in legal matters, (3) cooperation in law enforcement matters,
 6

(4) institutional capacity building, (5) training, and (6) extra-regional cooperation. The
counter-terrorism component focused on trafficking in small arms, illegal drugs, money
laundering, and creating a regional data base on laws, regulations and treaties.
ASEANAPOL officials met in January 2003 and agreed that each member would set up
an anti-terrorism task force. ASEAN officials are currently studying a regional
convention to combat terrorism.
ASEAN has also issued joint statements with a number of countries on counter-terrorism,
or, in the case of China “non-traditional security issues”:
• ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat
International Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, (August 1, 2002) 1
• Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-
Traditional Security Issues, Phnom Penh, (November 4, 2002).
• Joint Declaration on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism, 14th ASEAN-EU
Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, (January 27, 2003).
• ASEAN-India Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism, Bali,
October 2003.
• Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the Member
Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of
Non-traditional Security Issues (January 10, 2004).
At the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Jakarta in July 2004, ASEAN reached
similar counter-terrorism agreements with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the
Russian Federation. 2
Finally, ASEAN has extended its multilateral activities to include the “Plus Three”
countries – China, Japan and South Korea as well as other regional states. In January
2004 the first ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime was held
in Bangkok. ASEAN members also attended the Bali Regional Meeting on Counter-
Terrorism co-hosted by Indonesia and Australia in February 2004. This meeting was
attended both foreign affairs and law enforcement ministers, or their representatives, from
Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, Fiji, France, Germany, India, Japan, Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, South Korea, Russian
Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam, United Kingdom, United States,
and representatives of the European Union, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, APEC
Secretariat, ASEAN Secretariat and senior representatives from the United Nations.

1
The United States adopted an ASEAN Cooperation Plan (ACP) to support ASEAN’s efforts at regional
integration, addressing transnational issues including counter-terrorism, and support for the ASEAN
Secretariat. The first ASEAN-U.S. consultation on the ACP was held in Hanoi in June 2003. A three-point
Work Plan on Counter-Terrorism was adopted, it included information sharing, capacity building and
border control.
2
The Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN and Russian Federation on the Partnership for
Peace and Security, and Prosperity and Development in the Asia Pacific Region (Phnom Penh, June 2003)
identified terrorism as one of the principal threats to regional security.
 7

Multilateral responses – the ASEA N Regional Forum

The ASEAN Regional Forum is an unwieldy group of twenty-three members. It is
primarily a “security dialogue forum”. The business of the ARF is conducted through a
number of inter-sessional groups and meetings. A Statement of Measures Against
Terrorist Financing was adopted at an ARF-sponsored meeting held in Honolulu in
March 2002. Workshops on the Prevention of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism
Measures were held in April and October 2002, respectively. The reports of these
workshops were filtered upwards through senior officials and then to the responsible
ministers for their consideration.
At the ninth ARF meeting in Brunei in July 2002, it was agreed that members would
strengthen their commitment to bilateral, regional and international cooperation to
combat terrorism. This meeting adopted the ARF Statement on Measures Against
Terrorist Financing (July 30, 2002). Five measures were highlighted:
• freezing terrorist assets in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373;
• implementation of international standards through the adoption of the UN
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the UN
Convention Against Transnational Crime; and cooperation with the a number of
international financial institutions, such as the Financial Action Task Force, to
tackle the issue of terrorist financing;
• international cooperation in the exchange of information and outreach activities as
directed by UN resolutions including the establishment of Financial Intelligence
Units;
• technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and
Asian Development to assist in capacity building; and
• compliance and reporting in accord with international obligations to support the
activities of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Financial Action Task
Force (self-assessment and eight measures to combat money-laundering).
In July 2002, it was also decided to establish an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-
Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISMCTTC) to be co-chaired by Malaysia and the
United States. It was within the framework of the ISMCTTC that the ARF has addressed
the issue of terrorism. The first meeting of the ISMCTTC was held in Sabah in March
2003.

The ARF has also included terrorism in its work program related to piracy and “other
threats to maritime security.” Once again, the conflation of several transnational security
threats serves to mute any imputation that there is a linkage between terrorism and Islam.
In 2002, the ARF adopted a Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy and Other Threats
to Maritime Security that committed members to working with the International Maritime
Organization and the International Maritime Bureau.

At the Tenth ARF Ministerial Meeting held in Phnom Penh in June 2003, the participants
adopted an ARF Statement of Cooperative Counter-Terrorist Action on Border Security.
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U.S. Leadership
In the aftermath of 9-11 President George Bush called for the creation of a global
coalition to prosecute the war on terrorism. Senior officials including the president
himself have visited the Southeast Asia in an effort to fashion an effective regional
counter-terrorism coalition. In March 2002, for example, Robert Mueller, the director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) toured Southeast Asia and offered U.S.
assistance in locating, apprehending and extraditing al Qaeda members. In July/August
2002 Secretary of State Colin Powell attended the annual ASEAN dialogue partner
consultations and annual meeting of the ARF in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. As a
result of his diplomatic intervention ASEAN and the United States adopted the Joint
Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism (August 1, 2002). This
was the first time an entire region had committed itself to counter-terrorism cooperation
with the United States. During the course of Secretary Powell’s trip he also visited
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. President Bush attended
the APEC Summit in Bangkok in October 2003 and visited Indonesia, the Philippines and
Singapore.
Since 9-11, the United States has pursued a multidimensional approach towards
Southeast Asia including hefty military aid to the Philippines, financial support to
Indonesia and other forms of financial and technical assistance to enhance regional and
individual state law enforcement capabilities including the police, customs, and financial
officials. U.S. assistance is provided directly through the State and Defense Departments
(Pacific Command) as well as to international organizations such as the Asian
Development Bank.
In 2004, the United States began emphasizing the importance of maritime security in the
Asia Pacific Region and in the Straits of Malacca in particular. In March, Admiral
Thomas Fargo, U.S. Pacific Commander, unveiled a Regional Maritime Security
Initiative (RMSI) in testimony before Congress (discussed below). In May, the U.S.
tabled a plan to increase maritime security in the Asia Pacific at the ASEAN Senior
Officials Meeting in Yogyakarta. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld underscored the
importance of maintaining security in the Malacca Straits in remarks to the Shangri-la
Dialogue in Singapore in June. Secretary Powell followed through in July when he
attended the annual ASEAN-U.S. dialogue partner consultations in Jakarta and urged
Southeast Asian states to work with the U.S. to strengthen maritime security in the
region.
The United States has sought to enlist the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum
(APEC) in counter-terrorism. The U.S. initiated a fund to set up financial intelligence
units and to upgrade customs security at the October 2003 APEC Summit in Bangkok. In
mid-November 2004 at the APEC summit in Chile, President Bush successfully included
anti-terrorism measures as part of its program. The Santiago Declaration included
provisions to combat terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In
particular, APEC members pledged to take further measures to deny terrorists access to
the international financial system. APEC also approved an embargo on the sale of “man
portable” shoulder fired missiles.
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Bilateral responses – The Philippines.

Prior to 9-11, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo indicated her government’s desire to

expand security cooperation with the United States. In a speech given on July 12, 2001,
for example, she stated that her country’s military alliance with the U.S. was a “strategic
asset.” After 9-11, President Arroyo promised “all out support” to the U.S. and sought
assistance in eliminating the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines. As a
result of the Philippines’ commitment to the U.S.-led global war on terrorism, it became
the largest recipient of economic and military assistance in Southeast Asia. According to
the U.S. Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, “Philippine President
Macapagal-Arroyo has been Southeast Asia’s staunchest supporter of the international
counterterrorism effort, offering medical assistance for Coalition forces, blanket over
flight clearance, and landing rights for US aircraft involved in Operation Enduring
Freedom.” In August 2003, the Philippines sent a ninety-six member Philippine
Humanitarian Contingent to Iraq to assist in reconstruction efforts.

President Arroyo has twice visited the United States. On her first visit in November 2001,
President Bush promised $100 million in security assistance over a five-year period and
one billion dollars in trade benefits. During her second visit in May 2003, President Bush
offered a substantial new military and economic aid program valued at $100 million. In
addition, President Bush designated the Philippines as a “major non-NATO ally.”
President Bush stopped in Manila briefly on October 18, 2003 and addressed a joint
session of the Congress. President Bush announced an additional aid package of $340
million.

In 2002 the annual combined military exercise, Balikatan, was modified to include U.S.
training in counter-terrorism with a specific focus on the Abu Sayyaf Group on Basilan
island. 3 At the conclusion of Balikatan 02, 660 U.S. forces remained in-country to advise
and train members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in modern counter-
terrorist technology and techniques. In November 2002 the U.S. and the Philippines
signed a ten-year Mutual Logistics Support Agreement.

An attempt to expand the scope of military cooperation in 2003 foundered on domestic

opposition to any hint that U.S. forces would be engaged in a combat role. Such a role is
expressly forbidden by the Philippines’ constitution. Major combined exercises,
Balikatan 03 were held on Luzon in April-May and September 2003. Combined exercises
planned for Jolo, in Mindanao, were postponed because of difficulties in drafting the
Terms of Reference. Meanwhile U.S. military advisers continued to train a 500-man elite
AFP counter-terrorist commando unit. The U.S. and the Philippines conducted Balikatan
04 in February-March 2004 in Palawan and Bantanes provinces. A counter-terrorism
combined exercise was carried out in July in North Cotabato province, a stamping ground
for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

3
The United States first designated the ASG as a terrorist group in 1997. The ASG was involved in the
kidnapping of U.S. citizens, two of whom where held captive in 2002.
 10

Overall, as a result of stepped up cooperation in the war on terrorism, effective bilateral

military cooperation between the United States and the Philippines has reached its highest
point in over a decade. U.S. military assistance to the Philippines in the post-9-11 period
was estimated at $400 million in March 2004. Substantial military equipment, including
helicopters, has been turned over to the AFP. In November 2004, in a vote of confidence
in the Arroyo government, President Bush successfully nominated the Philippines to head
APEC’s Counter-Terrorism Task Force.
There have been several irritants in the bilateral relationship. It was noted above that
there is continuing domestic sensitivity over matters of national sovereignty that has
served to constrain proposals for an expanded U.S. military role in the Philippines. A
potentially serious development occurred in 2004 when the Philippines, responding to the
demands of Iraqi terrorists holding Filipino hostages, prematurely withdrew 51 police and
military personnel. This episode was quickly passed over. On August 7, 2004 the U.S.
and the Philippines reaffirmed their joint commitment to “the campaign against
international terrorism”; while the Philippines reiterated the importance of its “strategic
partnership” with the United States. The Philippines has also resisted U.S. pressures to
designate the MILF as a terrorist organization. The Arroyo Administration is engaged in
delicate negotiations with the MILF; the United States has attempted to encourage a
peaceful resolution of this conflict by offering (and then withdrawing) $30 million in
financial assistance to develop Mindanao.
One area of major weakness in counter-terrorism in the Philippines relates to its poor
regulatory environment and inability to enact money-laundering legislation that is
acceptable to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s Financial
Action Task Force (FATF). The Philippines continues to remain on the list of non-
cooperating countries and territories.
The Philippine Congress passed the Anti-Money-laundering Act of 2001 on September
29th (and related regulations in March 2002). The Act criminalized money laundering and
created the Anti-Money-Laundering Council (AMLC). The FATF has identified three
major areas of weakness: the reporting threshold, the requirement for a court order to
freeze accounts, and bank secrecy provisions. In March 2003, the Anti-Money-laundering
Act was amended to grant the Central Bank direct access to deposit accounts. In practice
there are several logistical and technical impediments that hinder effective cooperation
between the AMLC and law enforcement agencies. This in turn impedes successful
prosecution of money-laundering cases. In summary, the Philippines will not be removed
from the list of non-cooperating countries until it adopts and implements an effective
anti-money laundering implementation plan.
More generally, the Philippines lacks an effective overall regulatory environment.
According to the Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003: “Major
evidentiary and procedural obstacles in the Philippines hinder the building of effective
terrorism cases, such as the absence of a law defining and codifying terrorist acts and
restrictions on gathering of evidence. Generic problems in the law enforcement and
criminal justice systems also hamper bringing terrorists to justice in the Philippines.
Among them: low morale, inadequate salaries, recruitment and retention difficulties, and
lack of cooperation between police and prosecutors.”
 11

Bilateral relations – Singapore.

Singapore stands with the Philippines as one of the two staunchest supporters of United
States leadership in the global war on terrorism. On September 23, 2001, Prime Minister
Goh Tok Chong declared that Singapore “stands with America” in the fight against
international terrorism. Singapore provided its own KC-135 tankers to refuel U.S. aircraft
flying from continental United States to Diego Garcia. In May 2002, Senior Minister Lee
Kuan Yew was received in the White House where he personally pledged Singapore’s
support. Prime Minister Goh visited Washington and met with President Bush; they
initialed a new Free Trade Agreement. The U.S. also agreed to sell AMRAAM missiles
for its F-16s. In October 2003, President Bush paid a return visit to Singapore; both sides
agreed to negotiate an expanded defense and security cooperation framework agreement. 4
Prime Minister Goh also visited Washington in May 2004.

Of all the states in Southeast Asia Singapore has the best internal security and defense
capabilities. The Monetary Authority of Singapore has been proactive in directing banks
and financial institutions to identify suspected terrorist financial transactions and money-
laundering. In September 2001 the government established a National Security
Secretariat, an inter-ministerial task force, to take the lead in counter-terrorism.
Singapore’s internal security apparatus has been effective in uncovering and disrupting
local terrorist networks. Fifteen terrorist suspects were arrested in December 2001, and
another 21 suspects were apprehended in September 2002. In January 2003, the Ministry
of Home Affairs issued a White Paper that provided details of the Al Qaeda-Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) network operating in Southeast Asia.

Singapore has been at the forefront of efforts to ensure security of maritime

transportation. Singapore naval ships provide escort for selected oil tankers transiting the
Malacca Straits. In June 2002, Singapore reached agreement with U.S. Customs to permit
American inspectors based in Singapore to screen cargo containers bound for U.S. ports.
Singapore became the first country to join the U.S. Coast Guard’s International Port
Security Program. Singapore is also a participant in the U.S. Proliferation Security
Initiative. In June 2004, the U.S. and Singapore held a ten-day combined exercise in
Singapore’s territorial waters focused on conventional threats. Singapore was only
country on the Malacca Strait littoral to publicly endorse the U.S. Regional Maritime
Security Initiative. In short, Singapore-U.S. security cooperation is very close and
“virtually seamless.”

Singapore and the United States have established a Regional Emerging Disease
Intervention Center in the island republic. The center is to develop the capacity to
monitor and respond to health threats such as SARS, Avian flu and biological terrorism.
Singapore has also contributed to regional counter-terrorism activities by hosting a major
conference on terrorism and transnational issues. Singapore also hosts the Shangri-la
Dialogue, an annual meeting of senior defense officials. Singapore has provided
intelligence information to neighboring states that has been instrumental in the arrest of
4
This agreement will include bilateral cooperation in counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, combined
military exercises and training, policy dialogues and defense technology.
 12

leading terrorist operatives. Singapore and Australia are also cooperating closely to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and developing the
capacity to respond to WMD attacks.

Bilateral relations – Malaysia.

The events of 9-11 provided the catalyst for a dramatic improvement in Malaysia’s
relations with the United States. As noted above, Prime Minister Mahathir visited the
U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur to sign the condolence book. Malaysia granted the U.S.
over flights and had provided intelligence information on terrorist networks. President
Bush met Mahathir at the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Shanghai in October 2001. In May
the following year, Mahathir visited Washington and signed an anti-terrorism agreement
that included provisions for cooperation in intelligence, border security and money-
laundering. In mid-2003 U.S. customs inspectors were permitted to enter Malaysian ports
to inspect container cargo bound for the U.S. for chemical and radiological emissions.
Mahathir’s successor, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi reaffirmed Malaysia’s
collaboration with the U.S. during a visit to Washington in July 2004 when he met
President Bush. In August 2004, the U.S. and Malaysian navies conducted combined
exercises in the South China Sea. Most significantly, Malaysia agreed to the
establishment of a U.S.-funded Regional Center for Counter-Terrorism. At Malaysian
insistence, the center will be administered by a Malaysian.

Malaysia has served as a base for international terrorists. In January 2000, for example,
terrorists met in Kuala Lumpur to discuss the bombing of the USS Cole and the attacks on
the World Trade Center. In October 2003, the Scomi Oil and Gas company, based in
Malaysia was implicated in the manufacture of parts for a centrifuge that was sent to
Libya as part of the A. Q. Khan black market network in nuclear materials. In May the
following year Malaysia arrested B.S.A Tahir a Malaysian-based member of the
underground network. Malaysian internal security organs, like their Singapore
counterparts, have been effective in uncovering and arresting regionally focused
terrorists. By July 2002, Malaysia had arrested a total of sixty-two terrorist suspects.

Not all has been smooth sailing in U.S.-Malaysia relations with respect to the U.S.-led
war on terrorism, particularly while Prime Minister Mahathir was in office. Senior
Malaysian officials have dissented from U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and the
war in Iraq. Mahathir has been particularly critical of the Bush doctrine of preemption.
Senior Malaysian officials have argued that American “boots on the ground” in Southeast
Asia are likely to fuel sympathy for the terrorist cause. Also, Malaysia has been prickly in
defense of its national sovereignty. While cooperating in intelligence sharing on terrorist
networks, Malaysia has refused to extradite terrorist suspects held under its Internal
Security Act. Malaysia has objected to its citizens being included in new stringent
application procedures in order to visit the United States. Finally, Malaysia was quite
vocal in rejecting the U.S. proposal for a Regional Maritime Security Initiative. When the
U.S. modified its position, Malaysian leaders stated their willingness to consider the
proposal. Meanwhile Malaysia has reached agreements with its neighbors to conduct
joint patrols in the Malacca Straits – without the United States. But the bottom line
 13

remains that despite at times strident criticism in public Malaysia has continued to pursue
effective cooperation on the operational level.

Bilateral relations – Thailand.

Although Thailand is a long-standing ally of the United States, its Prime Minister,
Thaksin Shinawatra, initially adopted an equivocal line in his support for the U.S.-led
global war on terrorism. Thaksin promised general support for the United States but was
evasive about whether he supported U.S. air strikes on Afghanistan or whether Thailand
would make its military facilities available to the United States. He argued that ASEAN
approval was needed. On October 8, 2001, however, Thaksin endorsed U.S. air strikes
against the Taliban but only because they had been approved by the United Nations. U.S.
military aircraft were permitted to refuel at U-Tapo airbase. That same month Thailand
declined to approve a U.S. request to station supply ships in the Gulf of Thailand. In
2004, Thailand joined Indonesia and Malaysia in rejecting an active U.S. military
presence in the Straits of Malacca as part of the U.S.’ Regional Maritime Security
Initiative.

Prime Minister Thaksin visited Washington in December 2001 and achieved little in the
way of economic or political assistance. This stood in contrast to the reception given his
counterparts from the Philippines and Singapore. In 2003 Thailand declined to co-
sponsor the U.S.-U.K.-Spanish Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in
Iraq. Prime Minister Thaksin refused to publicly support U.S. intervention in Iraq as well.
Nonetheless, Thailand engaged in other cooperative but low-profile security activities
with the United States particularly in the field of law enforcement, money-laundering and
intelligence exchanges. Thailand hosts annually a major combined military exercise
known as Cobra Gold; in 2002 and 2003 it included a counter-terrorism component.

Prime Minister Thaksin, like his counterpart in Indonesia, initially denied the existence of
internationally and regionally networked terrorists on Thai soil. There was growing
evidence to the contrary. Early in 2002, leading terrorist Hambali 5 was reported to have
held a planning meeting in southern Thailand where the decision to attack “soft targets”
such as nightclubs, hotels and schools was made. In 2002 southern Thailand began to
experience a resurgence of attacks on police and soldiers in the southern provinces. In
June 2003 Thai authorities arrested several terrorist suspects who were planning to bomb
the U.S. and other western embassies in Bangkok.

It was not until June 9-13, 2003, during the course of an unofficial visit to Washington,
that Prime Minister Thaksin publicly declared for the first time that Thailand was an ally
in the global war on terrorism. He now acknowledged the presence of JI in Thailand. His
defense minister, Thanarak Isarangura, stated Thailand’s readiness to cooperate with the
U.S.-led war on terrorism. In August 1993, in a major development, Thai police arrested
Hambali and turned him over to the United States for interrogation. In the wake of this
development, Prime Minister Thaksin issued two executive decrees amending the

5
Riduan Isamuddin; Hambali is an alias.
 14

Criminal Procedure Code and Anti-Money Laundering Act to permit detention without
trial.

Thailand’s volt face did not go unnoticed in Washington. In October 2003, President
Bush attended the APEC summit in Bangkok. In a separate meeting with his Thai
counterpart, President Bush now designated Thailand’s as Southeast Asian’s second
“non-NATO ally.” Thailand is now eligible for significant military assistance including
arms sales.

The United States and Thailand have been cooperating closely through a joint Counter-
Terrorism Intelligence Center that was established prior to 9-11. In 2004 three southern
provinces witnessed the revival of violent separatist attacks directed against police, the
military and local schools. In January, for example, a series of coordinated attacks
resulted in the burning of twenty government school and the looting of a military armory.
In April, there was another upsurge in violence in which over one hundred insurgents
were killed in simultaneous attacks on police posts. Prime Minister Thaksin placed the
affected three provinces (Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) under martial law and adopted a
hard-line policy or suppression. In October, Thai security forces fired into a crown of
protesters, killing nine. Another eighty died of suffocation while being transported in
police vans. Prime Minister Thaksin uncompromising approach to this issue has
provoked expressions of concerns by senior U.S. officials including Secretary of State
Colin Powell.

Bilateral relations – Indonesia.

President Megawati Sukarnoputri visited Washington a week after the events of 9-11.
She offered her government’s support in the war on terrorism in a joint statement issued
with President Bush. The United States pledged extensive economic support amounting
to between $530-$650 million including $130 million in FY 2002. These funds are to be
used for development assistance in conflict areas (Aceh and Moluccas), police training,
and a new security dialogue. The U.S. also removed restrictions on the sale of non-lethal
military items and promised to seek Congressional funding for educating Indonesian
civilians in defense matters. Otherwise the Bush Administration was constrained by U.S.
legislation prohibiting military to military assistance until certain conditions were met
(punishment of those involved in human rights violations in East Timor, and a good faith
investigation into the murder of American civilians in Papua).

U.S. attempts to enlist Indonesia’s cooperation in the war on terrorism have been
problematic. Indonesian government officials condemned the U.S. bombing of
Afghanistan and the war in Iraq. These leaders reflect widespread public opinion that the
United States is waging a war on Islam. President Megawati warned that the U.S. war on
terrorism did not give one country the right to attack another. In November 2001,
Megawati urged the U.S. to stop bombing during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

During her term in office President Megawati has not been particularly cooperative with
the United States in counter-terrorism. Up until the Bali bombings in October 2002,
 15

senior government officials either denied outright that terrorist networks existed in the
country or openly sided with groups and individuals that outside observers considered
extremist. The United States and Indonesia, for example, openly disagreed about whether
or not Jemaah Islamiyah was a regional terrorist group and the role played by Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir, its “spiritual leader.” Vice President Hamzah Haz publicly dined with Ba’asyir
and declared there were no terrorists in Indonesia. In October 2003 President Bush
stopped briefly in Bali enroute to the APEC summit in Bangkok. The President’s attempt
to promote U.S. educational assistance for religious curriculum reform was promptly
condemned by the Secretary General of the Indonesian Council of Ulemas as interference
in Indonesia’s internal affairs.

Probably no episode has rankled U.S. officials than Indonesia’s refusal to proscribe
Jemaah Islamiyah as a terrorist organization (JI is listed as a terrorist organization by the
United Nations) and the perceived “special treatment” give to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.
Ba’asyir was indicted in April 2003 on charges of treason, immigration fraud and
involvement in terrorist activities. On September 2, the Central Jakarta District Court
found him guilty on treason and immigration charges but stated there was insufficient
evidence to convince them of JI’s existence, its goal of overthrowing the Indonesian
government and Bashir’s involvement with the group. Ba’asyir was given only a four
year sentence which he (and the prosecution) promptly appealed. In November, the
Supreme Court reversed the treason charge but upheld his conviction for document fraud
and immigration violations. His sentence was reduced to three years including time
served.
In July 2004, Indonesian prosecutors dropped charges against Ba’asyir after the
Constitutional Course ruled that the counter-terrorism law passed after the Bali bombings
could not be applied retrospectively. Ba’asyir nevertheless remained detained on charges
of leading a terrorist organization. Subsequently, Ba’asyir was charged with possession
of explosives used in the bombing of the Marriott hotel. A verdict is expected sometime
in early March 2005.

The Bali bombings on October 12, 2002, in which 202 persons were killed, marked a
major turning point. The Megawati government, previously paralyzed by denial and
political in-fighting now openly acknowledged the existence of internationally linked
terrorists for the first time. Megawati issued a decree instituting measures contained in a
draft anti-terrorism law that had become stalled in parliament; she also welcomed foreign
assistance. Indonesian police entered into a close and continuing cooperative relationship
with the Australian Federal Police. As a result of their joint efforts many of those
responsible for the Bali bombings were identified, arrested and brought to trial. Similar
cooperation ensued after the bombing of the Marriott hotel on August 5, 2003 and the car
bombing outside the Australian Embassy on September 9, 2004. Australia provided funds
for a Counter-Terrorism Center. Indonesia has apprehended and imprisoned more
terrorists than any other country in Southeast Asia.

Because of Congressional legislation, U.S. assistance to Indonesia’s military has been

relatively modest. In 2002, for example, the U.S. provided $12 million to establish a
national police counter-terrorism unit, $4.9 million for police training, and additional
 16

funds for training finance intelligence units, border security, banking regulators and
immigration officials. In July 2002, Secretary of State Colin Power announced a
terrorism package valued at $47 million; of this amount only $4 million was allocated to
the military and it was to be used for training purposes only. In 2003 Congress approved
a small training program under IMET; but this was suspended until the FBI reported on
whether or not the Indonesian military was involved in the murder of American citizens
in Papua. Under this program Indonesian military officers are to be offered counter-
terrorism fellowships. In August 2004, the United States announced it would be
providing $468 million over five year in assistance to Indonesia. Of this amount, $236
was earmarked mainly for school curriculum reform. In September 2004, the FBI cleared
the Indonesian armed forces of any involvement of the murder of American citizens in
Papua. This cleared the way for the announcement by the State Department in late
February 2005 that the International Military Education and Training program for
Indonesia would be resumed; the program has been suspended since 1992. 6

Indonesia’s national police have taken active and effective steps against domestic
terrorist networks. Over one hundred 100 key JI operatives have been arrested including
national leaders, regional and sub-regional commanders, instructors, financiers, and the
key operatives who planned and executed the Bali and Marriott bombings. On the legal
front, in March 2003, Indonesia adopted a comprehensive antiterrorism law that defined
acts that constituted terrorism and that provided the police and prosecutors with enlarged
powers such as extended pretrial detention and the use of electronic evidence in court.
Indonesia has strengthened its capacity to interdict terrorist finances by amending its anti-
money-laundering law in September 2003 and by establishing a Financial Intelligence
Unit (with U.S. assistance).

However, Indonesia suffers from deficiencies in national leadership and a plethora of

institutional weaknesses. According to the U.S. Department of State’s Patterns of Global
Terrorism 2003 concludes “[the Indonesian government] has been unwilling to ban JI,
saying the organization never formally applied for recognition and thus cannot be
prohibited. The absence of such a prohibition has impeded police and prosecutors in
arresting and trying suspected terrorists and will most likely further hamper prosecutors’
efforts to put JI leaders behind bars.” In 2004, Indonesia’s new president, Sisilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, indicated his willingness to submit legislation to Parliament banning JI but
only if proof is provided that the organization exists. Indonesia’s institutional weaknesses
include a weak rule of law, a poorly regulated financial system and serious problems on
internal coordination. They have combined to prevent Indonesia from freezing any
terrorist assets, for example.

6
Agence France-Presse, “U.S. to Resume Training of Some in Indonesia Military,” The New York Times,
February 27, 2005. According to State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, “Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice has determined that Indonesia has satisfied legislative conditions for restarting its full
International Military Education and Training program.” Boucher said Secretary Rice had concluded that
the Indonesians were determined to continue their cooperation with the F.B.I. in a murder case involving
American citizens “and thus have fulfilled the requirements articulated in the legislation to allow for
resumption” of the training program.
 17

Conclusion
Preferences. This review of Southeast Asian responses to terrorism post-9-11 and U.S.
leadership in the global war on terrorism clearly reveals that there are different
preferences among the major actors. The United States seeks to disrupt and destroy the
global terrorist network that is a threat to its national interests. The U.S. thus focuses on
al Qaeda and its network of affiliates. Singapore, while capable of dealing with its
domestic terrorist network, supports the United States because of its economic
interdependence with the U.S. and its dependency on secure maritime sea-lanes.
Indonesia clearly views countering separatism, in the form of the Aceh Freedom
Movement (GAM), as its main priority. Due to domestic political and religious
sensitivities it is extremely reluctant to proscribe and take repressive measures against
Jemaah Islamiyah. The Philippines has targeted the Abu Sayyaf Group, a terrorist group
that has occasionally conducted operations in Indonesia but which clearly does not have a
global reach. Thailand has attempted to insulate itself from external pressures while
dealing with the threat of revived armed separatism in its southern provinces. Malaysia
prefers to downplay the threat posed by JI in favor of targeting “Muslim militants”
including those associated with the opposition Islamic party, PAS.
There are also differences in the preferred institutions to deal with the threat of
international terrorism. All states prefer to have the sanction of the United Nations to
underpin their counter-terrorism policies. Yet not all states are willing to carry out the
resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council (as Table A makes clear). Indonesia
and Malaysia prefer multilateral approaches through ASEAN and the ARF. Yet the
United States and Singapore pointedly omitted the ARF from their list of preferred
multilateral institutions in their joint statement of October 21, 2003.
Malaysia has been adamantly opposed to U.S. efforts to broaden APEC’s agenda beyond
trade liberalization to include security matters. The Philippines willingly accepted the
chair of the APEC Task Force on Terrorism after nomination by the U.S.
Indonesia and Malaysia, while supporting the war on terrorism, have reservations about
what they perceive as a U.S. “blind spot” – its failure to address the root causes of
terrorism and America’s pro-Israel stance. In matters of domestic terrorism and regional
piracy both countries prefer to take the matter in their own hands; they view a U.S.
military presence as problematic if not counter productive. Both Indonesia and Malaysia
have objected to U.S. travel advisory statements and immigration procedures that appear
aimed at a Muslims wishing to enter the United States.
Indonesia and Malaysia prefer to address terrorism (whether on land or at sea) within the
broader context of combating transnational threat to their security. This has a double
motivation. First, as noted above, these states do not share the same priorities as the
United States. Old-fashioned piracy is viewed as a greater threat than maritime terrorism.
Singapore differs with its regional neighbors and views maritime terrorism as a major
threat. Secondly, Indonesia and Malaysia are very keen not to adopt counter-terrorism
policies that can be perceived by domestic constituencies as anti-Islamic.
Capability. The capability of the United States to conduct a global war on terrorism is
unequalled. U.S. funds and technology have helped improve the capability of regional
 18

states to monitor financial transactions that might be related to terrorism or money

laundering. Computers and other devices have also assisted regional states in customs
and border control and the discovery of document fraud. Crucially, the United States can
provide assistance in logistics, management and strategic planning. The United States
provides assistance to several ARF members in the form of technical support for counter-
terrorism measures, post-blast and forensic investigations, swift response teams, border
security software, detection of fraudulent documents and terrorist interdiction programs.
But U.S. counter terrorism capability is not unlimited. While countering international
terrorism is America’s highest priority, Congressional legislation serves to constrain the
Bush Administration in providing military aid to Indonesia, for example. Section 660 of
the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (amended 1973) prohibits foreign assistance
funds for training police without a specific congressional waiver. The U.S. has a legacy
of a complex web of waivers on its books that govern the operations of five federal
departments providing security assistance to foreign law enforcement bodies. This is a
major impediment to a coherent “whole of government” approach.
The United States intelligence community, embracing some fifteen institutions, is not all
knowing. The United States needs inputs and assistance from the intelligence agencies of
all regional states, particularly human intelligence. Singapore and Malaysia have proved
their worth in providing accurate information to Indonesia, Thailand and Cambodia about
terrorist networks and operatives on their soil. On the other side of the coin, the U.S. has
unparalleled technical assets that can be deployed to counter-terrorism. These assets
include overhead satellites used by Thailand over its southern provinces, equipment to
enable Filipino helicopter pilots to fly at night and technical means to monitor mobile
(cell) phones.
The United States has inaugurated a Container Security Initiative (CSI) to prevent
smuggling of terrorist weapons to the United States. Under the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-T-PAT) all U.S. bound cargo must be effectively
scrutinized and documented. The CSI also includes a twenty-four hour Automated
Manifest System in which a ship’s manifest must be lodged before loading or departing.
Several Southeast Asian states lack the financial capability to fund port security measures
that the United States has imposed under these requirements.
Indonesia and the Philippines both suffer from weak institutions and legal systems. While
their security forces may be effective in rounding up terrorist subjects, other crucial
aspects of counter-terrorism, such as an effective court and penal system, erode the
overall effort.
Leadership. It is common in the literature reviewing the security architecture in Southeast
Asia to note its weak institutionalism. Although ASEAN has adopted a wide variety of
declaratory policies to address the threat of international terrorism, ASEAN can only
monitor and not enforce compliance. States are free to choose and pick which policies to
implement. The same holds true for the ASEAN Regional Forum. Leadership in ASEAN
passes alphabetically from one country to another on an annual basis. ASEAN decision-
making is on a consensus basis. This means that the ASEAN-United States agreement on
countering-terrorism can only be implemented on a national basis.
 19

ASEAN consensus decision-making blunted a detailed Indonesian proposal to form an

ASEAN Security Community by 2020. Indonesia’s proposal for various forms of security
cooperation was watered down by fellow members despite Indonesia’s position as chair
of the ASEAN Standing Committee at the time.
U.S. regional initiatives outside the ASEAN framework are not always successful, as a
review of the fate of Regional Maritime Security Initiative illustrates. In the face of
opposition from Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, the U.S. was forced to set back from
direct involvement in the Malacca Straits to a support role. The U.S. attempt to take the
leadership role on this issue was supported only by Singapore and resulted in a counter-
initiative by Malaysia and Indonesia (and including Singapore) to conduct their own joint
patrols. A similar fate befell a U.S. initiative to set up a regional center for counter-
terrorism. Malaysia agreed to host the center but only on condition that administration be
left in local hands. But the U.S. was far more successful in APEC in expanding its agenda
to cover security issues despite Malaysia’s objections.
Finally, one must observe that ethic politics plays a role. Singapore is the most capable
state in the region to undertake and lead counter-terrorism activities. But because
Singapore is overwhelmingly an ethnic Chinese city-state, and is perceived as such by its
neighbors, Singapore has to play a behind-the-scenes role with in ASEAN.
Net assessment. The al Qaeda regional network in Southeast Asia has been broken up and
disrupted as a consequence of the global war on terrorism. JI cells have been eliminated
in Singapore and Malaysia. Several long planned operations have been disrupted as a
result of police action in these two countries. Counter terrorism action by Malaysia and
Singapore has knocked the wind out of the sails of the regional JI network dedicated to
establishing an archipelagic Islamic state.
The round up of terrorist suspects in Indonesia after the Bali and Marriott bombings has
also degraded JI’s operational capabilities in that country. Nearly 200 suspected JI
members in Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia have been arrested or
detained. Despite this generally upbeat assessment, the threat of political terrorism
remains. There are several hundred JI members at large in the region who retain the
motivation and capacity to conduct terrorist outrages such as JI bomb makers Azahari
Hussein and Noordin Mat Top. As noted, there has been an upsurge in violence in the
predominately Muslim provinces in the south of Thailand. Training linkages still remain
between JI and the MILF. The most recent International Crisis Group report on terrorism
in Indonesia notes “Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into
irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by DI's [Darul Islam’s] history
and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life.
If the pattern outlined in this report holds, Indonesia will not be able to eradicate JI or its
jihadist partners, even if it arrests every member of the central command but, with more
attention to a few key measures, it ought to be able to contain them.” 7

7International
Crisis Group, Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy
Bombing, Asia Report No. 92. Brussels, February 22, 2005.
 20

Appendix A
ASEAN Signatories to United Nations Conventions Relating to Terrorism

Country International Convention Number of

for the Suppression of the Conventions as
Financing of Terrorism Signatory (N =12)

Brunei na na

Burma yes 7

Cambodia yes 4

Indonesia yes 4

Laos no 7

Malaysia no 6

Philippines yes 12

Singapore no 6

Thailand yes 4

Vietnam na na

Source: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003.

 21

Appendix A
ASEAN Statements on Countering Terrorism in Southeast Asia

ASEAN Standing Committees Chairman's Letter to US Secretary of State Colin Powell

on Terrorists Attack, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, (September 13, 2001)

Statement by the Chairman of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on the Terrorist Acts
of the 11th September 2001, Bandar Seri Begawan (October 4, 2001)

Joint Communiqué of the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime

(October 11, 2001)

ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (November 5, 2001)

Joint Communiqué of the Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, Kuala

Lumpur, (May 20-21, 2002).

ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (2002)

Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational

Crime, Kuala Lumpur, (May 17, 2002).

ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat

International Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, (August 1, 2002)

ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing (July 30, 2002).

Statement by the Chairman of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on the Tragic
Terrorist Bombing Attacks in Bali (October 16, 2002).

Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit, Phnom Penh, (November 3, 2002).

Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional

Security Issues, Phnom Penh, (November 4, 2002).

Joint Declaration on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism, 14th ASEAN-EU Ministerial

Meeting, Brussels, (January 27, 2003).

ASEAN Efforts to Counter Terrorism (2003)

Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the Member Countries of

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Government of the
People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security
Issues (January 10, 2004).
 22

Joint Communiqué of the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime

(AMMTC), Bangkok (January 8, 2004).

Joint Communiqué of the First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational
Crime (AMMTC+3), Bangkok (January 10, 2004).

Co-Chairs' Statement of the Bali Regional Ministerial Meeting on Counter-Terrorism

(February 5, 2004).

Joint Communiqué of the 24th ASEAN Chiefs of Police Conference, Chiang Mai,
Thailand (August 16-20, 2004).

Statement by H.E. Somsavat Lengsavad, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Lao’s People Democratic Republic, Chairman of the 38th ASEAN
Standing Committee in connection to the terrorist bombing in Jakarta on 9th September
2004.
 23

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