R USSIAN M ILITARY R EFORM

Tracking developments in the Russian military

Archive for the Russian Navy Category MVMS-2013 naval salon prompts more reflections on the future of the Russian navy
Posted in Russian military reform, Russian Navy, tagged Igor Zakharov, Ilya Kramnik, MVMS-2013, Prokhor Tebin, Russian Navy, Talwar frigate, United Shipbuilding Corporation on July 23, 2013 | 7 Comments

There have been a number of interesting articles written on the future of the Russian Navy in conjunction with the naval salon in St. Petersburg earlier this month. Ill try to summarize the interesting points without repeating material found in my earlier articles on this topic. The most recent bit of news is that the Russian navy is planning to order an additional three Talwar class (project 11356) frigates, on top of the six already in the works. The idea is that these are relatively capable ships that can be built and outfitted very quickly (at a rate of one per year for the construction). Three are currently under construction and according to the most recent reports, two more are to be laid down this year. These are well armed ships, comparable to the Sovremennyi class destroyers in armament, though more versatile. Whereas the original plan had been to deploy all six to the Black Sea Fleet, the current plan is to station the first three there while the next three would go to the Baltic Fleet. As Prokhor Tebin points out, this makes absolutely no sense. The Baltic Fleet should be the Russian Navys lowest priority, focused primarily on testing new ships and training. Both the BSF and the Pacific Fleet are in much greater need of new ships of this type. But that sort of thing can be changed once the ships are actually ready for commissioning. The truly significant news is that three more such ships will be built in the near future and, unlike the more complicated Admiral Gorshkov class frigates, are likely to be put to use quite quickly. Ilya Kramnik had an interesting summary of plans for the future that adds some information and analysis to what Ive already discussed. He mentions plans for a new attack submarine that is expected to become the mainstay of the fleet for the next several decades. This will be a smaller and cheaper submarine than the Yasen class. It will combine the usual missions of protecting Russian and tracking foreign SSBNs. In other words, if we thinking of the Yasen as the Russian Seawolf, then this new class will be the Virginia. Plans call for 20 such submarines to be built by the end of the 2020s, with construction of the first sub to start in the next 5-7 years.

So if all the submarine plans are carried out, by 2030 the Russian Navy will get a total of 35-36 new nuclear submarines, including 8 Boreis, 7-8 Yasens, and up to 20 of the new class. The total cost would be 1.5 trillion rubles at current prices, not including expenses for modernizing existing submarines. Personally, I think this is overly ambitious. Even if we assume that the design process will proceed without delays and construction and construction does start in 2018 or thereabouts, I highly doubt that the Russian shipbuilding industry is capable of building 20 new submarines in 10-12 years. I realize that the submarine-building sector is the healthiest part of the industry, but there is just no record even in the industrys Soviet history of building two nuclear submarines of the same type per year. Even one would be ambitious, given recent history. I suppose it would be possible if the Amur shipyard was pressed into service, though my understanding is that it is not building submarines any more. Even if it were, it would take a lot to get that shipyard up to speed. In addition to the new destroyer that we discussed last week, new plans for surface ships include a littoral combat ship. The design of the LCS has not been finalized and fairly non-traditional options such as a catamaran or trimaran are supposedly on the table. Industry representatives want to build 1-2 ships of the two best designs to test their capabilities and then select one for serial production. 35-40 such ships could be built for all four fleets, at a total cost of 250-280 billion rubles. Such pace of construction would be made possible by using multiple shipyards, including those in St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, Komsomolsk-na-Amure, Zelenodolsk and possible Krasnoe Sormovo. Discussions are still under way about the design of a potential new aircraft carrier. Photos of a model that represents current thinking show a classical design, equipped with a ski jump and a catapult, and with an estimated length of 320 meters and 80,000 tons displacement. While discussions continue, the Admiral Kuznetsov will remain in service. Its modernization, originally scheduled to begin in 2012 will be postponed until the second half of this decade. The main problem with all these plans is the continued weakness of the shipbuilding sector. In a separate article, Kramnik mentions the complexity of new equipment, including radars, control systems, hydroacoustics, and weapons. He notes that this has led to delays in construction of the Admiral Gorshkov class frigates and the Yasen class submarines, among others. (I would also add the Lada class diesel submarines to this list.) There are also complications resulting from the merger of many disparate plants, in varying condition and with different ways of doing business, into the United Shipbuilding Corporation. This has resulted in various problems with finances and personnel that presently can only be resolved through manual control.

Igor Zakharov, the vice president of United Shipbuilding Corporation, argues that the way to solve the sectors problems is to give the chief designer of any major shipbuilding projec t both personal responsibility before the client and the right to ensure that sub-contractors fulfill their obligations on time. He doesnt spell out what mechanisms would be used to ensure the latter, but he does call for the introduction of arbitration mechanisms to resolve conflicts between industry and the MOD over issues such as pricing. He also notes that Russian shipbuilding needs to adapt to the modern world, where hulls can last 50 years or more while electronics and armaments become outdated much more quickly. This requires ships to be built in a way that allows for easy modernization and replacement of weapons and equipment. Soviet ships, by contrast, did not consider the possibility of such updates, making their modernization in the new environment very costly and time consuming. New capital ships will be built in small series. Furthermore, rapid advances in electronics will require that even these series be divided into sub-series that will maintain unity of ship design while updating electronics and weaponry. Some systems and weapons can be used across ship classes. We are already seeing elements of these ideas in systems such as the multipurpose shipboard firing system () and in the modular construction of the latest classes of Russian corvettes and frigates. These are good ideas. The problem is the extent to which they are stymied by the conglomerate nature of United Shipbuilding and by the difficulty its personnel and business structures face in adapting to the new way of doing business. Over time, I imagine the shipbuilding industry will improve. But time is needed, while the navy is providing the industry with somewhat unrealistic timetables for the construction of new ships. The result will be more delays, though probably not as bad as in the recent past.

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Alternative designs for the new Russian destroyer

Posted in Russian Navy, tagged destroyers, Ilya Kramnik on July 15, 2013 | 16 Comments

Just a quick note today. My friend and colleague Ilya Kramnik plots out four alternative designs for the new Russian destroyer currently in the works. 1) 7500-9000 tons, ~160 meters long, gas turbine CODAG propulsion, top speed of >30 knots Equipped with 1x1x130mm gun, 2 CIWS complexes, 32 universal shipboard firing complexes (Kalibr/Oniks) and 64 Redut shipboard missiles, 2 Paket-NK anti-submarine torpedo systems, 2 helicopters 2) 9500-11500 tons, ~190 meters long, gas turbine CODAG propulsion, top speed of approximately 30 knots Equipped with 1x2x130mm guns, 4 CIWS complexes, 48 universal shipboard firing complexes (Kalibr/Oniks) and 80 Redut shipboard missiles, 2 Paket-NK anti-submarine torpedo systems, 2 helicopters 3) 12,500-14,700 tons, ~200 meters long, either gas turbine CODAG or nuclear propulsion, top speed of approximately 30 knots Equipped with 2x2x152mm guns, 4 CIWS complexes, 64 universal shipboard firing complexes (Kalibr/Oniks) and 80 Redut shipboard missiles, 2 Paket-NK anti-submarine torpedo systems, 2 helicopters 4) 13,000-15,200 tons, ~210 meters long, either gas turbine CODAG or nuclear propulsion, top speed of approximately 30 knots Equipped with 1x2x152mm guns, 4 CIWS complexes, 16 universal shipboard firing complexes (Kalibr/Oniks) and 48 Redut shipboard missiles, 2 Paket-NK anti-submarine torpedo systems, 5 helicopters All four versions would have the Sigma-E combat management system and Poliment active phased array radar. The largest of these options is pretty close to a cruiser, I suppose.

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Russian military shipbuilding: an update (part 2)

Posted in Russian Navy, tagged CAST, Russian Navy, Severnaia Verf, Sevmash, shipbuilding on July 2, 2013 | 4 Comments

(Based on a report in Moscow Defense Brief. For a discussion of submarines and surface combat ships, see part 1)

Auxiliary ships
The Russian Navy is getting a number of new support ships in the near future. These include three Project 23120 9000 ton ocean-going logistics ships, the first of which was laid down at Severnaya Verf in November 2012. The ships are similar to civilian offshore hydrocarbon exploration ships and are to be delivered at a rate of one a year in 2014-16. The navy is also expecting to receive six Project 20180 support and weapons transport ships. Two of the ships are currently under construction, with delivery expected in 2014 and 2016. The ships, being built at the Zvezdochka shipyard, are modified versions of the Zvezdochka salvage tug commissioned in 2010. The Igor Belousov (project 21300S) large submarine rescue ship, which was laid down in December 2005 in response to the Kursk disaster, was finally launched in October 2012 after a long delay caused by the failure of a Russian design bureau to provide a deepwater diving complex for the ship. In the end, the navy has settled on a British design that is being built in Russia. The ship is due to be commissioned in 2014, with another three ships of this type likely to be ordered in the near future. In addition, the navy has ordered a large number of harbor support ships and tugboats, with around 80 expected to enter service by 2016.

Exports

Russian shipyards continue to have a thriving export business. The biggest customers in 2012 were India, Vietnam and Algeria. Vietnam has ordered six Improved Kilo class (project 06361) submarines from the Admiralty Shipyards. The first two submarines of this order were launched in 2012, while subs three and four were laid down last year. The first sub is expected to be delivered this year. The Vietnamese navy took delivery of two Svetlyak class (project 10412) patrol boats in October 2012. It also ordered two modified Gepard class (project 11661E) frigates, to be delivered in 2016 and 2017. These are in addition to two similar frigates delivered in 2011. Both ships are to be built in Zelenodolsk. Vietnam is also building, under license, a series of ten Tarantul V class (project 12418) corvettes, with the first two ships expected to be commissioned this year. Contracts with the Algerian navy are for modernization of existing ships, rather than the construction of new ones. These include the mid-life overhaul of a Kilo class (project 877EKM) submarine at the Admiralty Shipyards, which was completed in July 2012, and the ongoing modernization of a Koni class (project 1159TM) frigate and Nanuchka II class (project 1234EM) corvette at Severnaya Verf. Further surface ship modernization orders are expected once the current pair are finished. India remains the most important foreign military customer for Russian shipyards. In 2012, the Indian navy inducted the INS Chakra, an improved Akula class nuclear-powered attack submarine that was leased to India for a ten-year period. There is some speculation that a second submarine of the same type may be leased to India in the future. Yantar shipyard completed a second series of Talwar class (project 11356) frigates for the the Indian navy, with two ships delivered in 2012 and a third in June 2013. Negotiations are currently under way for another set of three frigates to be built. In January 2013, the Zvezdochka shipyard completed the mid-life overhaul of a Kilo class (project 877EKM) submarine for the Indian navy. This was the fifth Indian diesel submarine to be modernized at this plant. Finally, the long-term effort to modernize the former Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier for the Indian navy, which was due to be handed over in 2012, hit another snag because of problems with the main power plant, causing at least a one year delay in the project.

Analysis
Based on Boltenkovs summary and my own past research, it seems to me that the Russian shipbuilding industry has improved in recent years but remains in relatively poor shape overall. Yantar Shipyard in particular has been reported to be in fairly poor shape due to a lack of investment. On the other hand, the Severnaya Verf, Sevmash, and Zvezdochka shipyards are in relatively good condition. Russian shipyards are good at building ships that they have been building for some time, such as the

Talwar (modified Krivak) class frigates and improved Kilo class submarines. The implementation of new designs, on the other hand, has led to numerous problems and delays regardless of the type of ship and the shipyard building it. The construction of Admiral Gorshkov class frigates, Lada class submarines, and Admiral Gren amphibious ships have all been affected by construction delays and other problems. Construction of nuclear-powered submarines is proceeding, but at a much slower pace than hoped for by the Ministry of Defense. Frequent changes in requirements have resulted in a number of ship classes that have been cancelled after only one or two ships, which will have a negative impact on maintenance. Finally, the goal of renewing the Russian navys fleet of larger surface combat ships still seems a long way off, with a design for a new class of destroyers still several years away from completion.

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Russian military shipbuilding: an update (part 1)

Posted in Russian Navy, tagged Admiral Gorshkov frigate, Borei, Bulava, CAST, Lada submarine, Russian Navy, shipbuilding, Steregushchii, Yasen on June 26, 2013 | 3 Comments

The cover article of the brand new issue of Moscow Defense Brief (subscription required) from the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, examines developments in Russian military shipbuilding in 2012, written by Dmitry Boltenkov. Since the article is not publicly available, I thought it might be useful to provide a brief summary. Part 1 covers submarines and surface ships. Part 2, coming soon, will cover auxiliary ships, export contracts, and provide some analysis.

Submarines

Construction of Borei-class (project 955) submarines progressed significantly in 2012. The navy took delivery of the Yury Dolgoruky, the first sub of this class, at the end of 2012. After some training exercises, the sub is expected to enter regular service by the end of 2013. The second sub, the Alexander Nevsky, is expected to be commissioned in the fall. The third sub, whose construction started in 2006, was launched in January 2013, while construction of the fourth started in July 2012. Two more subs are to be laid down this year. Given the 7-8 year construction times on these submarines, it seems unlikely that all eight will be completed by the 2020 target date. 2023 seems to be a more realistic goal. Furthermore, the lack of new tests on the Bulava missile in 2012 is concerning, though additional tests are expected this autumn most likely using a new automated missile launch control system. The Yasen-class (project 885) nuclear attack submarines are being built far more slowly, with the first submarine in the class (the Severodvinsk, which was laid down back in 1993) currently undergoing tests and expected to enter the fleet later this year. The Kazan (the second submarine of this class) will be commissioned in 2015 at the earliest, with the third to be laid down in July. Again, the chances of all 8 contracted subs being completed by 2020 is virtually nonexistent. Diesel submarines are also being built, including the recently restarted, but still troubled, Lada class. The first sub in this class, the St. Petersburg, entered sea trials in 2004. Problems with its propulsion systems have prevented its commissioning and led the project to be suspended indefinitely several years ago. The project was restarted in 2012, but the St. Petersburg still has not been commissioned. Construction on the two other subs in this class that were laid down before the suspension has resumed and they are expected to be ready for sea trials in 2015 and 2016, respectively. MDB reports that the second boat may be equipped with new lithium-ion batteries, while the third may have airindependent propulsion. It seems unlikely that any more subs of this class will be built, which means the navy will get three essentially different boats, each with its own maintenance needs. This is precisely the sort of the thing the Russian military has been trying to get away from. The hope is that a fifth-generation conventional sub currently being designed by Rubin Design Bureau will soon be ready for construction, obviating the need for the Lada class. In the meantime, the navy will have to depend on old and new Kilo-class submarines. The first of a set of six improved Kilos is expected to be launched later this year. Two more are under construction and another is to be laid down by the end of 2013. All six are expected to be in service by 2016.

Surface ships

The first of the two Mistral-class ships ordered from France is currently under construction, with the second to be laid down sometime in 2013. Both ships are to be completed and delivered to Russia by the end of 2015. Boltenkov reiterates that both will be assigned to the the Pacific Fleet. Furthermore, he notes that the Russian Navy has ordered four assault-landing boats from STX LOrient in France. The fate of the third and fourth Mistral-class ships, which were to be built entirely in Russia starting in 2016, remains unresolved. Two types of frigates are being built for the navy. The first of the Admiral Gorshkov class (project 22350) frigates is expected to enter sea trials in late 2013. Two others are under construction, with a fourth to be laid down later this year. Two more ships of this class have been ordered, with hopes of completion by 2020. MDB reports that the project is facing serious delays with its primary PolimentRedut SAM weapon system, which is being developed by Almaz-Antey (a company that has had many problems successfully completing the development of new weapons systems in recent years). The second type of frigate (project 11356R) is essentially the Talwar class previously built for the Indian Navy. This is an updated version of the Soviet Krivak class. Russian defense industry is much better at building updated versions of tried and tested designs than at building something completely new. Its therefore not surprising that construction on these ships is proceeding quite quickly, with three ships already under construction and another to be laid down this year. The first ship of this class, the Admiral Grigorovich is expected to be launched this summer and to enter service in 2014. The navy is also receiving some smaller combat ships. Construction on various versions of the Steregushchiy class (projects 20380 and 20385) of corvettes continues, with two in service, one in sea trials, one expected to begin sea trials later this year, three under construction and another to be laid down in July. Severnaya Verf is building these ships in about three years, while Amur shipyard is taking much longer. Various sources indicate that contracts have been signed to build another 10 of these corvettes, which would bring the total number in service to 18 by the time the program is complete. Several types of ships are being built expressly for the Caspian Flotilla. The Dagestan missile ship, equipped with Kalibr-NK long-range cruise missiles, was commissioned into the Caspian Flotilla in November 2012. No further ships of this type are planned, however. Two Buyan-class (project 21630) small artillery ships were commissioned into the flotilla in 2012. An updated version of this class (project 21631), to be armed with Kalibr-NK cruise missiles, has been ordered. Five ships are now under construction with an estimated completion date of 2015. A contract for three more of these ships was signed in January 2013. The Caspian Flotilla is also expected to receive three Serna class

(project 11770) high speed air-cavity landing craft this year, built according to an existing late Soviet design. Finally, the navy is building a number of specialized surface ships, including the Admiral Gren (project 11711) large tank landing ship, which has been under construction since 2004 and was finally launched in May 2012. Completion will be no earlier than 2014 and initial plans to build another 4-5 of these ships have been shelved. Four Dyugon class (project 21820) high speed amphibious landing craft are also under construction, though Boltenkov reports that problems with the design mean that no more ships of this type will be built once these four are completed. The first ship of the Aleksandrit class of minesweepers (project 12700) is under construction as well, with three more expected to be built in the near future. Two Grachonok class (project 21980) anti-sabotage boats were commissioned in 2012, with two more expected to be completed by the end of 2013 and another four currently under construction. A total of about 20 are expected to built in the next few years.

The modernization of Russias nuclear submarine forces

Posted in Equipment modernization, Russian Navy, tagged Borei, Bulava, oxford analytica, submarines, Yuri Dolgorukii on April 25, 2013 | 3 Comments

Yet another Oxford Analytica brief. This one from January. Planning to resume new posts in June, though there will be a couple more OA briefs posted in May. The nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Yury Dolgoruky officially became part of the Russian navy on January 10, more than a decade after it was initially contracted. It is the lead vessel of the Borey class, equipped with the new marine-launched ballistic missile system (SLBM) Bulava, which has a maximum range of over 8,000 kilometres. The Yury Dolgoruky was commissioned soon after the launch of SSBN Vladimir Monomakh, the third submarine in the series, in late December. These developments have led to conjectures that Russia may again pose a serious security threat to the United States and its NATO allies. Impacts

Work on the Borey and Bulava projects will help Russia assess quality control issues and improve production in other areas.

The Russian defence budget will continue to prioritise nuclear weapons, limiting Moscows ability to modernise its conventional military.

Moscows defence upgrades will not have a major impact on US-Russian relations, which are increasingly focused on other issues.

ANALYSIS: In February 2011, Russias former deputy minister of defence announced the launch of the State Armament Programme 2020, stressing that the modernisation of Russias strategic nuclear weapons would be a top priority. Motivating factors Moscows decision to focus on nuclear modernisation is motivated by several practical and strategic considerations:

Outdated nuclear arsenal: The bulk of the arsenal is approaching the end of its service life.

Insufficient conventional forces: Russias non-nuclear forces cannot, on their own, deter potential conflicts with major powers.

Protection: A solid nuclear arsenal would help protect Russias interests, including its economic stakes in the Arctic.

Superpower status: Nuclear forces are one of Russias few remaining claims to a prominent position in the international system.

Critically, modernisation efforts should not be misinterpreted as a serious new threat to NATO. Strategic naval forces The Russian navy currently operates a fleet of six Delta IV and three Delta III SSBNs. Outdated fleet The older Delta IIIs, based in the Pacific Fleet, are armed with 16 SS-N-18 missiles per boat, carrying three warheads each. These submarines first entered service in the late 1970s and are now approaching the end of their lifespan. The Delta IV SSBNs, which are based in the Northern Fleet, are each armed with 16 SS-N-23 Sineva missiles carrying four warheads per missile. They entered service in the mid-1980s and are gradually being overhauled in order to extend their lifespan by an additional ten years. The oldest submarines will be decommissioned in 2019 and the last of the class is expected to be retired by 2025. Because of the overhaul schedule, in recent years, between six and seven strategic submarines were on active duty at any one time. Modernisation The Delta IIIs are slated to be replaced by three Borey-class submarines, which are expected to be commissioned over the next two years. Following the commissioning of Yury Dolgoruky, the first of these SSBNs, earlier this month, the navy will be commissioning the Aleksandr Nevsky later in 2013 and the Vladimir Monomakh in 2014. Each of the nuclear-powered submarines will contain 16 launch tubes for the Bulava missile. Subsequent hulls known as Project 955A will be modified to carry 20 Bulava missiles. According to the State Armament Programme, another five modified Borey submarines will be commissioned by 2020, bringing the total number of next generation SSBNs to eight. Since the six

Delta IV submarines are slated to retire between 2019 and 2025, the construction schedule for the new submarines can be extended by up to five years without forcing the Russian military to reduce its current active fleet of eight SSBNs, which it perceives as the necessary minimum for maintaining Russias strategic deterrent capability. Expansion In the longer term, there is a chance that Russia will increase its SSBN fleet from eight to ten units either through the procurement of two additional modified Borey submarines or the construction of a new class of SSBNs. The ultimate decision to expand will depend on the availability of funding as well as the successful completion of the Bulava missile tests. Missile problems The Bulava is the sea-based version of the SS-27 and RS-24 missiles. In contrast to its land-based prototypes, its development ran into serious obstacles during the initial testing phases. In eight of the first twelve flight tests, the Bulava suffered critical failures. Bulava problems rectified? According to the weapons lead designer, the problems were due to lack of necessary equipment and insufficient oversight. Moreover, the Russian industry was unable to provide Bulava manufacturers with the necessary components in a timely manner. The production team has recently increased control over the production process, which appears to have paid off: since October 2010, there have been seven consecutive launches of the Bulava, all of them successful. Further production issues In July 2011, the Ministry of Defence announced its plans for the serial production of the Bulava. The next launch was expected to take place in October 2012. However, it was postponed until July 2013 because of unresolved problems with automated control systems for the launch mechanism. As a result, the Yury Dolgoruky submarine was commissioned with 16 empty missile containers. Without the missiles, the submarine has little practical value, which places a great deal of pressure on the defence industry to solve the outstanding problems as quickly as possible. Implications Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear arms have become largely peripheral to US-Russian relations. Instead, issues such as energy security, international terrorism and the future of newly independent

states on Russias periphery have taken centre stage. The ongoing dispute with NATO concerning plans to erect a missile defence shield over the alliances territory appears to be primarily due to Russias perception of having been excluded from the European security infrastructure, rather than to fears of a nuclear attack by the United States or its allies. CONCLUSION: The defence industry will endeavour to resolve the remaining technical problems with the Bulava, indispensable to the new generation of strategic submarines, which were designed simultaneously with the missile system. The missile will likely be fully operational by the end of 2013. Given that the new submarines are primarily intended to replace existing SSBNs that are nearing the end of their lifespan and that the role of nuclear arms has become less prominent in the US-Russian security relationship over the past decades, SSBN modernisation should not be misinterpreted as a new threat to NATO.

Carrier Killers for the Russian Navy: The Strategic Environment

Russian soldiers standing in file.

Russia is redoubling its efforts to boost its naval nuclear deterrence and blue water capabilities. Such moves reflect Moscow's growing interest in safeguarding its natural resource interests in the Arctic and the growing military power of the Asia-Pacific region, argues Vladimir Karnazov. By Vladimir Karnazov for Defence Review Asia / Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter

The growing military potential of Japan and China - and continuing territorial disputes over the Kuril island chain and Arctic Shelf - is causing Russia to increase spending on her naval nuclear deterrent and blue-water forces. In November 2011 the Russian Ministry of Defence firmed up orders for four Project 955A Borey-A strategic missile underwater cruisers (submarines) and five Project 885M Yasen-M cruise-missile submarines. In early 2012 decisions were made to refit and modernization the Project 1144 nuclear powered cruisers and Project 949A cruisemissile submarines. By rough estimates, these commitments combined amount to US$ 10 billion. In January 2012 Russia handed over the K-152 Nerpa fast attack submarine to the Indian navy on a ten-year lease, the deal reportedly worth US$ 0.9 billion. These and other recent moves may lead to changes in the current balance of forces in the AsiaPacific region. Where will the enemy be? The period between late 2011 and early 2012 brought news of the highest-ever level of orders for naval equipment placed by the Kremlin since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Also during this period Moscow started to deliver on obligations to New Delhi on

helping the long-standing ally and customer build national nuclear-deterrent and atomicpropulsion forces. In addition, this period was marked by the Kremlin leaders expressing their dissatisfaction with the deployment of US antimissile systems in Europe and promising an asymmetric reply. This reply calls for keeping Russian nuclear deterrent forces intact and able to meet new challenges. In late 2011 Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin made it clear who are these forces are: the US and NATO. In the Kremlins eyes, the missile interceptor shield being created in Western Europe destroys the exisiting strategic balance between US and Russia. So, the nuclear deterrent forces shall be upgraded according to these new realities. Construction of strategic submarines, along with refit and modernization of inservice nuclear assets is a move in this direction. Whatever great ideas on a new arms-race might be in minds of Kremlin strategists, the current indifferent state of the national economy and the run down military-industrial complex will not allow Russia to immediately restore the lost strategic balance of naval forces with the US and its NATO allies. Besides this, the Kremlin leaders have made certain promises to the West. These include arrangements in return for financial help from Western countries on scrapping decommissioned nuclear submarines in the frame of CTR (common threat reduction) and other such programs. CTR has been important for both Russia and NATO. In the course of Perestroika, the Russian navy halved its personnel numbers and decommissioned more than 50% of its warships in the five year period between 1992 and1997. In two years alone, 1990 and 1991, 91 and 33 submarines respectively went out of commission. In 1996 Russia had over 150 decommissioned submarines tied up in harbors with their nuclear fuel rods and used fuel still inside their reactors. With Western help, Russia built additional facilities for warship disassembly and, as of October 2006, had scrapped 137 nuclear submarines. That time the number of decommissioned n-subs reached 197, of which 25 were being processed and another 32 waiting their turn. By now, the warship disassembly facilities in Severodvinsk have reached the annual capacity of six n-subs. The capacity of another plant, Zvezda in the Far East, is probably half of that. While the issue of decommissioned submarines has largely been solved, Russia may still need Western financial help and technical assistance for used nuclear fuel.

According to the recently published book Soviet navy submarines 1945 -1991 by Yuri Apalkov, in 2007 the Russian navy kept in its bases 21,000 boxes of used nuclear fuel. The issue of their processing is still far from being completely solved. For these and other reasons, the Kremlin has been trying not to run into a direct confrontation with US and NATO. At the same time, it has been trying to defend longterm national interests and widen access to western technologies and financial resources - both much needed for renovation of Russias struggling economy. The US, too, has been interested in Moscow as a supporter of the War on Terror. Washington and Moscow share views on Afghanistan and other hot spots. The two have common interests, including those in the global economy and Asia. Obviously, the White House and Kremlin are in agreement on the oil-and-natural-gas issue: increasing Russian export of fossil fuels shall help decrease the impact on the economies of the US and allied countries following EU ban on Iranian oil purchases. With above considerations taken into account, it seems more likely that the recent naval equipment orders are aimed primarily at maintaining the Russian navys power above those of the growing Asian tigers. Both China and Japan have made great progress recently in strengthening their navies. Shipbuilders at Dalian have now finished work on PLANs first aircraft carrier, the Shi Lang. She had sea trials for the first time in the second half of 2011. China has declared plans for the eventual construction of several carriers. Beijing continues the development and manufacture of nuclear submarines. Without Russian permission, China has launched into production of the J-11, a clone of the Sukhoi Su-27 land-based fighter, and the J-15, a clone of the Su-33 deck fighter. Local shipbuilders produced copies of Project 636 diesel-electric submarines. Japan has been even more disturbing and challenging in its expansion of capabilities. Her self -defense forces have commissioned a number of very advanced blue-water assets of previously unknown classes. Japan has built a series of AIP-equipped large conventional submarines and is working on more advanced ones featuring extended sea autonomy and stealthiness through use of high-power Stirling closed-cycle engines. The DDG177 Atago and DDG178 Asigara destroyers with full displacement of 10,000 tons entered service in 2007-2008. The DDH181 Hyuga and DDH182 Ise helicopter

destroyers with full displacement of 18,000 tons went into commission in 2009 and 2011 respectively. The JMSDF is soon be adding the even larger Shirane class to the growing arsenal. The latter three ships carry helicopters, but suggestions have been made that their size and systems allow for deck operations of the F-35 Lightning II fighter. India, too, has been investing heavily in blue-water forces. This year the INS Vikramaditya aircraft carrier shall be inducted and become the largest combat vessel of all time in the national inventory. In addition, India is building home grown Arihantclass nuclear powered submarines. Moscow has been helping these and other programs on a commercial basis. Participation in these activities has helped Russian shipbuilders and naval missile makers survive the difficult period of transition from a command to a market-driven economy, and keep skills needed for the development of advanced combat systems. Territorial disputes Modern submarines with nuclear propulsion can reach almost any given oceanic point. When launching atomic submarines into mass production in the 1950s, the Soviet Union wanted its underwater cruisers to always follow USN carrier groups and destroy them in case of war. Todays plans are different. Moscow wants its underwater atomic warships to serve in protection of Russias vast possessions in the North and the East against would-be aggressors. These possessions contain huge natural resources, which, as the Kremlin strategists think, may one day be challenged by economically strong, but resourcelimited neighbors. In their view, the Chinese and Japanese forces must be countered for that reason. In 2007 and 2008 the Kremlin had to make steps towards Beijing and ease the longstanding territorial dispute over lines of the Sino-Russian land border. The two countries signed agreements under which the Russian border guards withdrew from some of the disputed lands, leaving them with their Chinese counterparts. This allowed both parties to claim that the issue has been finally removed from the agenda. However, not everyone is happy about the deal, and so some sort of tension remains.

The situation is similar with Japan, which does have strong claims to the Kuril island chain and the island of Sakhalin. In the course of World War II and shortly after the Japanese unconditional surrender to the Allies in 1945, the Red Army took Sakhalin and the Kuril chain in a rapid and overwhelming military operation. The dispute between Russia and Japan regarding sovereignty over the South Kuril islands came on the agenda in the 1950s, when Tokyo tried to revise peace agreements signed under extreme pressure. The disputed area goes from the Kamchatka peninsula all the way down south to Kunashir near Hokkaido. The islands in question are washed by the Sea of Okhotsk on the west and North Pacific Ocean on the east. Among other considerations, a good reason for keeping the Kurils is that this island chain effectively blocks entry to the Sea of Okhotsk for USN anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces, and thus provides relative safety for Russian underwater missile cruisers on deterrent patrols in this large area. In Gorbachevs time the Kremlin hinted it could give up claims to the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai in return for Japans promises on the non-military status of those. This did not help the situation and since then everything remained as it was. In February 2010 Russias President Dmitry Medvedev ordered substantial improvements to Kuril defenses, including refurbishing of two airfields and the deployment of S-400 long-range SAM systems. The move was made after Japan had protested against visits to the islands of high ranking Russian leaders including Medvedev himself and Minister for Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, calling them provocative. Meantime, during these visits the [Russian and native] population of the islands strongly rejected the idea of Japanese sovereignty and asked the Kremlin for protection. According to the Moscow-based Kommersant newspaper, the Russian army units on the disputed [South Kuril] islands include the 18th Machine-gun/Artillery Division made up of two regiments. The 46th Regiment is stationed on Kunashir, and the 49th Regiment on Iturup. In addition, there is an independent tank regiment on Kunashir (during 2010 its 92 outdated T-55 main battle tanks were replaced by a non-specified number of more modern T-80s) and an independent motorized infantry battalion on Iturup. The newspaper gives the following [incomplete] list of weapons in the possession of the above-mentioned units: 18 BM-21 Grad multiply rocket launchers, 36

Giatsint-B towed cannons and 18 D-30 towed howitzers, 12 Buk and 12 Strela-10 SAM launchers, 12 ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled and 8 ZSU-23-2 towed anti-aircraft gun systems. The 39th motorized infantry brigade on Sakhalin Island supplements these forces. Interestingly, the newspaper does not mention the 451 Missile Brigade. Reportedly, the brigade was formed in the early 1990s to unite under a single command separate units stationed on Sakhalin and Kuril islands, including four missile regimens which at that time were armed with the Rubezh (P-15M) and Redut (3M44 Progress) anti-ship missile systems. Last year the Russian defense ministry spoke of plans to further strengthen Kuril defenses with the Bastion system (3M55). The Arctic Shelf is one more part of the Earth whose sovereignty is currently being discussed. The Kremlin wants to have a greater part of it, while the US, Canada, Norway and other NATO members have different views. Today, Russia is worlds largest possessor of natural resources, whose value is estimated at US$ 140 trillion, roughly ten times US GDP and some 200 times greater than its own. Russian share in the worlds known oil reserves is 23%, natural gas 33%, coal 50% and timber 23%. The annual income from oil exports alone is estimated at US$ 300 billion. Through exploration of the vast territories, the Kremlin wants to keep its world leadership in the development and exploitation of natural resources. A capable navy is essential to provide protection of these territories from would-be aggressors. Nuclear shipbuilding: current state According to official statistics, in 1955-1993 the Soviet Union [and then Russia] constructed 234 nuclear powered submarines falling into three generations. These included 123 n-subs made in Severodvinsk, 56 in Komsomolsk, 39 in St. Petersburg and 25 in Nizhny Novgorod. Russia now continues at a much slower rate. The lead vessel of the Project 955 class, the Yuri Dolgorukiy, became the 1001-th [armed] submarine constructed in Russia since October 1917. After collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's nuclear shipbuilding industry has been transformed into something much smaller. Key enterprises on the Black Sea coast appeared to be on the territory of now-independent Ukraine - which proclaimed nonnuclear status. Admittedly, these enterprises had little to do with nuclear propulsion technology, except for some ambitions in the late 1980s when the Soviet navy planned the construction of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.

Nuclear activities in the city of St. Petersburg have been diminishing for a number of reasons. Under current international agreements, the Baltic Sea has a non-nuclear status. The Russian navy does not deploy atomic warheads on warships and does not place orders for the construction of nuclear-powered vessels in the area. The Admiralty Shipyards completed their last Project 671RTMK fast attack submarine, the K-448 Tambov, in 1992. Since then the enterprise has been completely focused on diesel-electric submarines. The last nuclear powered surface combatant built in St. Petersburg was the Peter the Great of Project 1144.2. The 23,800-tonne cruiser, forth and the last in the Atlant series (after Ushakov, Lazarev and Nakhimov) was commissioned in 1998, and serves with the Northern Fleet. Saint Petersburg shipbuilders continue working on civil projects. They have completed one floating nuclear electric power generation station known as Project 20870 with displacement of 21,500 tons. Six more such stations and five nuclear-powered icebreakers are on order. However, this business is under heavy criticism as not suitable and potentially very dangerous for a city with a population of five a million. The Red Sormovo yard in Nizhny Novgorod built a number of unique submarines, including the titanium-hulled Project 945, which are still in service. Under the Kremlins orders, this enterprise was restructured in the 1990s and no longer works for the military. The Amur Shipbuilding Plant (ASP) is located in Komsomolsk. The Amur river runs through the city and into Pacific Ocean. ASP has suffered during the transition of Russias economy from command to market driven principles. If not for the Indian deal for Project 971 fast attack submarines, this enterprise would have closed down. In 2008 ASP completed the K-152 Nerpa. After sea trials and Indian crew training, the vessel was handed over to the Indian navy on 23 January 2012. But even with the Indian customer in existence, ASP is unlikely to go further than completion of one or two more Project 971 ships. This leaves Russia with only one fully-fledged enterprise capable of nuclear shipbuilding in the longer term. This is Sevmash Dockyards (SMP) in Severodvinsk, located near the far northern border with Finland. The company had difficult times in the period 19982003 when orders ran low. However the companys management refused massive laid -

offs, instead trying to keep workers in place by serving free dinners during working hours to all staff and distributing food to their families. This helped save a core of the enterprises competent staff until the financial situation improved. Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin have been frequent visitors to Severodvinsk, helping the city and local businesses ease their financial, technological and social problems. Today, Sevmash directly employs 27,000 people, with average monthly salary slightly above US$ 1,000. The management considers this figure as sufficient to keep the employees families above the poverty line. With recently won orders for Project 955 and Project 885 submarines, the share of domestic military orders in the companys portfolio has risen above 70%. Visiting Severodvinsk in February, deputy premier of the Russian Government in charge of defense industry Dmitry Rogozin said the local shipbuilders are contracted to build eight fourth-generation nuclear submarines by 2020, and that more orders are coming. He further said the earlier program for scrapping third-generation submarines is being revised so that these vessels will get newer missiles and be subjected to a series of repair efforts enabling them to serve for another seven years. Pricing In November 2011, the Russian defense ministry awarded Sevmash orders for construction of four Project 955A Borey-A strategic underwater cruisers armed with the Bulava intercontinental ballistic missiles. This order comes after construction of three Project 955 Boreys (Yuri Dolgorukiy, Aleksander Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh) now undergoing acceptance trials. The customer also ordered five Project 885M Yasen-M fast attack submarines, in addition to the head vessel, the K-329 Severodvinsk, now undergoing sea trials. The exact sum of these contracts has not been made public. It is only known that the Alexander Nevsky was built under contract worth Rouble 23 billion, which equates to US$ 0.75 billion. In 2012 Sevmash expects additional orders for the completion of certain thirdgeneration submarine hulls laid in the mid-1990s, as well as for the refit and modernization of earlier commissioned submarines and large surface combatants. Why did the MoD place so many orders with Sevmash and its key industrial partners only

recently? Why did the ministry not act in a similar way during a few preceding years? We can suggest an answer to these questions. The big orders of late 2011 early 2012 were preceded by a long process of MoD and industry working out a completely new pricing calculation system. When current defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov took his position in 2007, he called for a new approach to contracts with industry that would prioritize the price-efficient series production of modern weapons. As he put it, that approach had to be worked out and needs to remain in place until 2020. Local shipbuilders were not ready for this change in the governments procurement policy. Only in 2011 - after a series of structural changes - was the industry was able to resume talks with the customer. In the middle of 2011 the sides formulated mutually agreeable principles and proceeded with the calculation of contract values for a selected range of naval products. The Project 955 served as a guinea pig on which the new price calculation methods were tried. This product had already been mastered by industry, while the MoD wanted to procure more such ships. In September October the calculations were made and submitted to the defense minister for approval. This enabled the November 2011 contract signing. The gist of the new system is to encourage industry to continually reduce manufacturing expenses and improve resource management. Manufacturer profits are made directly dependant on savings it achieves during the series production of modern weapons. This requires more effective resource management, cutting manufacturing costs and making production more economically efficient. Figuratively speaking, Serdyukovs role in the transformation of the Russia n military defense complex is similar to that of Robert McNamara in the US. But pricing considerations are only one part in the answer to the above questions. Also, there is the Factor 2012: the presidential elections in March, which Putin won. On the eve of the elections, the Kremlin increased military spending in the hope of getting more support from voters employed by large defense enterprises and citizens of the cities where these enterprises situate.

Aviation threat evaporated In February the Russian air force spokesman said the service intends to upgrade about 30 Tu-22M3 swing-wing supersonic bombers during the next eight years. Reportedly, between 50 and 60 such big jets are airworthy. Today, the Tu-22M3 is the only effective aviation asset available to combat carrier groups and naval task forces formed around modern cruisers and destroyers. The aircraft inventory of Russias Naval Aviation suffered 78% numerical reduction during the period 1992-1997. It further dwindled until mid-2011, when most of the Naval Aviations large airplanes were transferred to the Air Force. Effectively, the navy has lost its aviation anti-carrier component. The move was controversial, and yet there was a good reason behind it. The most powerful and complex aircraft types in service with the Air Force and Naval Aviation became so small in numbers that their separate operations and maintenance lost combat worthiness and economic sense. This particularly applies to the Tupolev bombers and reconnaissance planes. Surface warships of little account With the Tu-22M3 no longer in its possession, the Russian Navy has to completely rely on its warships when it comes to countering enemy carriers. The Navy does have some surface combatants, but these can do little in the face of the potential enemys air superiority and larger ship counts. The most they can do is to assist submariners during joint operations. The 2005 shipbuilding program calls for construction of 30 corvettes, 20 frigates and six destroyers. By displacement, ability to operate in rough seas and duration of autonomous operations these ships are no match for in-service cruisers. The Russian MoD has scheduled the Admiral Nakhimov for refit and modernization in 2013. Her builder Severnoye PKB was asked to prepare an appropriate documentation package by April 2012. The third Project 1144 nuclear-powered cruiser was commissioned in 1988. She stands in Severodvinsk harbor awaiting repairs. The destiny of her sister ship completed in 1984, the Admiral Lazarev, will be decided later, while the earlier Admiral Ushakov was decommissioned long ago and is due for scrapping.

The MoD is seeking a cost effective way for the Project 1144 upgrade. This involves keeping their machinery and replacing older missiles by more modern ones. The P-700 Granit anti-ship system employing the 3M45 cruise missiles is no longer in production and considered outdated. The KR-93 turbojet engine accelerates the 7-tonne, 10-meter-long missile with a 750kg warhead (cumulative, vacuum or nuclear charge) up to Mach 2.5. For effective employment at maximum advertized ranges of 500-600km, the Granits missiles need target designation either from aircraft or spacecraft. The Russian Navy no longer operates the dedicated designator airplane Tu-95RTs (all of 53 such aircraft have been grounded). The Legend-M satellite constellation was in full strength in 1983, but has degraded since then. In theory, vulnerable Kamov deck helicopters can provide targeting at longer ranges than the ships own radar. This particularly applies to the most recent Ka-31 with its long-range Oko radar. The Russian Navy operates three Project 1166 cruisers with gas-turbine propulsion the Moscow, Varyag and Ustinov. These are armed with the Bazalt or Vulcan anti-ship systems in service since 1975 and 1982 respectively. Their 3M70 missile with maximum firing range of 700km shares Granits targeting problems. Cruise-missile submarines Along with upgraded cruisers, the nuclear-powered submarines will remain the most powerful assets in the Russian inventory. Today, the navy operates dedicated carrierkillers of the third generation in the form of the Project 949A submarines armed with the P-700 Granit systems. It also operates nearly twenty third-generation fast attack submarines of the Project 971, Project 945 and Project 671RTMK able to fire Tomahawk-alike missiles from torpedo tubes. In late 2012 the navy expects the commissioning of the K-329 Severodvinsk. This lead vessel of the Project 885 is considered to be of the fourth generation. The K-329 is outfitted with eight vertical SM-346 silos (10m-long, diameter 2m) each capable of housing either four Onix or five Caliber missile containers. The P-800 Onix (the export version is called Yakhont) employs 3M55 ramjet-powered missiles. These weapons are nearly 9 meters long and weigh 3 tons without booster [air launched version, also known as the Alfa] or 4 tons with it. The missile accelerates to

750m/sec and has a firing range of 150-300km depending on altitude profile. It has a radar homing head able to detect a cruiser at a distance of 75km. The Onix provided the platform for the development of Indo-Russian BrahMos PJ-10. The Caliber is non-exportable version of the Club-N/S that already equips the Indian navy Project 1135.6 Talwar-class frigates and Project 877EKM submarines. Both are able to employ three baseline missile types: the 91R antisubmarine (carries a torpedo, either APR-3M or MPT-1UM), 3M54 anti-ship and 3M14 land-strike. In addition, the non-exportable system can also fire longer-range RK-55 Granat missiles (Russias Tomahawk) and their derivatives, the Biruza. Compared to the exportable 3M14, the non-exportable Granat has much longer firing ranges. The Granat became operational in 1984 with 3M10 missiles fired from torpedo tubes of fast attack submarines. The 1.7-tonne turbojet weapon had a range of 3,000km. The 3M54 differs in having a third stage (in addition to booster and cruise turbojet) running on solid-fuel and accelerating to 1,000 m/sec. This version can be fired from either surface ship or submarine if her torpedo tubes can house this 8.2m-long weapon. Without the third stage, the 3M54 weighs 1.8 tons instead of 2.3 and has length of 6.2 meters. The K-329 went to sea for trails on two occasions in 2011, and successfully performed tests using dummy Caliber missiles. Throughout 2012 the submarine shall continue testing Caliber and Onix systems. To complete customer acceptance trials, the K-329 is required to spend a total of 180 days at sea. The next in the series, the Kazan, is being built to the improved design [Project 885M] and is due for completion later in the year. The design documentation for the refit and modernization of the Project 949A has been prepared. It calls for replacement of the Granit by the Onix and Caliber. No changes to the submarines original load bearing structures are required. Three Onix or four Caliber missile containers can be squeezed into one Granit launch site the latter will be reworked accordingly. The submarine will receive an improved combat system able to employ the newer missiles. With a standard displacement of 15,000t, the Project 949A is one of the most complex and difficult-to-maintain n-subs in the world. So far, extensive repairs were successfully conducted only in Severodvinsk, while such attempts in the Far East proved ineffective.

According to open sources, the Northern fleet operates the K-119 Voronezh and the K266 Orel. The Voronezh completed a major overhaul in November 2011, which made numerous but unspecified improvements to missilery and onboard equipment. This enabled the Northern Fleet to send the K-410 Smolensk for repairs in late 2011. The K525 and K-206 have been scrapped. The K-148 Krasnodar and K-173 Krasnoyask have been decommissioned and await their turn for disassembly. The Pacific Fleet keeps the K-456 Tver, K-186 Omsk and K-150 Tomsk on duty, while the K-132 Irkutsk has been undergoing overhaul since 2005. The status of the K-442 Chelaybinsk is unclear. The K-139 Belgorod is at a high degree of completion (over 70%) at Sevmash, but the customer has continued to change its views about whether to complete her. In February the Russian Navy commander Admiral Vysotsky said the Belgorod will be commissioned as a submarine for special operations. If the Kremlin stays with its current naval development plans, the Russian navy will have a potent force of dedicated nuclear powered carrier-killers by the year 2020. In the foreseeable future this kind of weapon systems will continue to be the most important element of Russian deterrence in relation to economically and militarily growing Asian neighbors with limited natural resources but reviving empire ambitions

Russian Navy receives carbon fiber stealth ship

October 9, 2012 Alexei Mikhailov, Izvestia

The Russian-built Admiral Gorshkov class stealth frigate is the first large naval vessel to be made out of carbon fiber. While there are questions regarding the performance and durability of the composite material, the frigate is set to undergo trials in the Barents Sea this November.

Russia to develop an a new air-cushion icebreaker Russian scientists return to Antarctic Modern zeppelins may help develop Russias regions

Electric cars emerge in Russias oil-fueled economy

Opinion on the Admiral Gorshkov ship have been mixed. Navy officers say carbon fiber is useless, since it is weaker than vessel-grade steel; they worry that its superstructures could disintegrate in extreme northern conditions. Source: ITAR-TASS.
The first large naval ship to be built with carbon fiber will start trials in the Barents Sea no later than the end of November. The Admiral Gorshkov frigate is the lead ship of Project 22350. Following the trials, the frigate will join the 14th ASW Brigade of Russias Northern Fleet, a source at Navy Command told Izvestia. The frigate has been built using stealth technology, with superstructures made entirely of composite materials that absorb or semi-conduct radio waves to ensure invisibility on radars. This is the first large ship to be fully designed and built in Russia since 1987 and this includes St. Petersburgs Severnaya Verf shipyard. Project 22350 stealth frigates will replace large ASW ships code-named Udaloy by NATO, an officer at Navy Command said.

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Opinions on the ship have been mixed. Navy officers say carbon fiber is useless, since it is weaker than vessel-grade steel; they worry that its superstructures could disintegrate in extreme northern conditions with strong winds, low temperatures, and frequent storms. In addition, the superstructure is subject to extreme thermal pressure during anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile launches. Severnaya Verf, on the other hand, believes carbon fiber surpasses steel in terms of physical parameters. The shipyards representatives told Izvestia that tests of the superstructure and its components have demonstrated high rigidity and resilience to thermal impact. The Admiral Gorshkov was the first ship to receive not only a stealth superstructure but also the latest combined turbine propulsion system. As a result, the vessel is more efficient and delivers superior acceleration capabilities. The frigate is additionally equipped with a host of modern electronics not found in existing ships; this, however, is a strength and a weakness, since there is a lack of trained personnel. A Navy Command representative and several Northern Fleet officers have stated that it would be impossible to form a crew without extended training on the ground. Vladimir Komoedov , the chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee and former commander of the Black Sea Fleet, maintains that there is nothing to fear from composite materials. Recently, I visited a factory that makes carbon fiber nozzles for space rockets. It is wonderfully resilient to high temperatures and dynamic loads. If carbon fiber provides stealth, then the ship needs it. In any case, the introduction of a new unit to the Navy is good news, Komoedov told Izvestia. Vladimir Scherbakov, the editor-in-chief of Vzlyot magazine, believes that it remains to be seen how carbon fiber will perform real-life conditions particularly in combat situations. Composite materials are used everywhere these days. Individual ship parts have been tested on the ground, and the calculations look excellent on paper. But this already happened with aluminum in the1980s the Falklands war demonstrated that aluminum ships are highly combustible. So many fleets have abandoned aluminum superstructures as a result, Scherbakov said. Military historian Dmitry Boltenkov criticized the carbon fiber frigate from another angle. Should a frigate with a displacement of just 4,500 tons be named after Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who did a lot for the Navy? A 45,000-ton aircraft carrier used to bear his name (it is now Indias Vikramaditya). The name Admiral Gorshkov would be more fitting for a Borei-class submarine, said Boltenkov. The Admiral Gorshkov stealth frigate was laid down in Severnaya Verf in February 2006 and floated out of the launch dock in October 2010. It is equipped with a 130-mm gun mount, 16 anti-ship Onyx missiles, and 16 anti-submarine Kalibr-NKE missiles. There is also a surface-to-air Polimer-Redut defense system and a Ka-27 helicopter for ASW missions.

Russian Navy plans further expansion

January 11, 2013 Viktor Litovkin

The Russian submarine, Yuri Dolgorukiy, was passed into service during its inauguration at the Sevmash shipbuilding company in Severodvinsk, Archangelsk Region on Jan. 10. This indicates that Russia is finally aware of the need for a powerful and effective navy.

Submarine Alexander Nevsky to test-fire Bulava ICBM in September Russia to put first Yasen-class nuclear-powered submarine in service on Dec 25 Large anti-submarine ship Vice Admiral Kulakov joins Russian naval group in Mediterranean Sea

The Russian submarine, Yuri Dolgorukiy, has been passed into service by the Russian Navy. The inauguration took place at the Sevmash shipbuilding company in Severodvinsk, Archangelsk Region on Jan. 10. Source: RIA Novosti / Pavel Kononov
Two landmark events took place during the final days of 2012 and in the begining of 2013 at the Sevmash shipbuilding company in Severodvinsk of Archangelsk Region. To begin with, the navy was presented with the first Project 955, nuclear-powered, Borei-class, ballistic missile submarine, which was put into operational service on Jan. 10. The submarine is equipped with 16 Bulava-30 strategic missiles (NATO reporting name SS-NM-30), which each carry 6-10 nuclear warheads multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The submarine is named after Yuri Dolgorukiy, the founder of Moscow.

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Then, on the same day, a second ballistic missile submarine, Vladimir Monomakh, was set afloat. A third, slightly longer Borei-class submarine, Svyatitel Nikolai, will be set forth soon. There is an important reason why the new submarine will have a longer hull: Svyatitel Nikolai and other ballistic missile submarines to follow will carry 20 Bulava-30 MIRV missiles, instead of 16. The new project is codenamed 955A, as an upgrade from the original 955. The rest of the submarine will remain the same. Russia hopes to have at least four ballistic missile submarines operational in the next three or four years. These submarines will carry 68 missiles in total. The Vladimir Monomakh has already begun mooring and sea trials, and another 955 Borei-class ballistic missile submarine, Alexander Nevsky, is also expected to be commissioned. By 2020, Russia plans to have eight ballistic missile submarines carrying a total of 148 Bulava missiles. They will be added to the Project 667BDR Kalmar (Delta III) and Project 667BDRM Delfin (Delta IV) submarines. According to Cmdr. Viktor Chirkov of the Russian navy, the eight Borei-class submarines, the 885 Yasen-class nuclear-powered submarines (the first of which is called the Severodvinsk and is expected to be put into service in 2013), modernized Project 949 Granit submarines (which included the sunk Kursk submarine) and heavy nuclear-powered missile ships from the Project 1144 Orlan (including the flagship of the northern fleet, Pyotr Veliky) will form the base of Russian strategic deterrent forces. The commander-in-chief said in a recent interview that aircraft carriers should make up the core of the deterrent forces. A new generation aircraft carrier must form the basis of these forces, together with the foreign-built amphibious assault ship and helicopter carrier (the French Mistral), Chirkov said. He explained that, unlike the heavy aircraft carriers of previous generations (such as the Admiral Kuznetsov), this must be an all-new versatile combat ship with an increased deadweight. It will be armed with manned weapons and drones that will operate in the air, on the sea surface, underwater and possibly in space. The effectiveness of these ships will depend on the availability of aerial picket and guidance aircraft in their air groups, along with the armed reconnaissance drones. The navy commander stressed that plans to create aircraft carriers involve not only the design and construction of the ships. We are planning to create a full-scale sea aircraft-carrying complex, which will include ships, stationing sites with the requisite infrastructure (including social facilities, aircraft, and training center

for ship and aircraft crews), as well as other components. We must provide the basis for the creation of the sea aircraft-carrying complex by 2020, said Chirkov. The core of the surface naval forces of Russia, at both far and short ranges, will be formed by Project 22350 and Project 20380 frigates and corvettes and their modifications. Some of these are being developed at St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad shipbuilding companies. They will be replaced by modular design ships equipped with a broad range of robotic tools, said Chirkov. In his words, a new class destroyer with an increased combat and defensive potential including anti-ballistic missile potential will become the main ship in the ocean zone in the medium term. Chirkov also revealed that the first ship of this kind will be the advanced harbor defense corvette. The ship is already under development. It will perform a wide range of functions normally required in coastal regions and currently fulfilled by ships and other forces and facilities. It will have antisubmarine, anti-mine, anti-ship and air defense capacity and be capable of laying mines and providing fire support for assault forces and land troops in coastal areas, the commander said. Chirkov explained that the corvette is a phase in the process of the navy transferring to modular ships of increased deadweight. The approach toward module construction and robotic automation of combat systems that were originally developed for the harbor defense corvette will later be applied to other ships, creating the future image of the Russian fleet. The admiral commented on the outlook for the Russian navy. According to our forecasts, after 2020, the navy will change to an extensive construction of autonomous unmanned submarines and sea robotized systems, as well as special sea-bottom equipment deployed mostly from undersea carriers of various types and purposes. During the second development phase (from 2021 to 2030), the navy hopes to complete the creation of and put into active service weapons based on new physical principles, as well as to create a new generation of advanced weapons for the general purpose naval forces. Also, there are plans to commission ship-based early-warning aircraft, unmanned ship-based aircraft, and an advanced complex of ship-based aviation. This period will see a transition to optionally-manned aviation (including on the basis of modern manned aviation complexes), whereas the aircraft of the old fleet will be replaced by advanced multipurpose aviation materiel and weapons, including unmanned aircraft, Chirkov said. It is hard to make plans for the period after 2020. Will the Russian shipbuilding industry manage to perform these tasks? It is important that Russia is finally aware of the need for a powerful and effective navy, so there is hope that Cmdr. Chirkovs plans concerning the future of the Russian navy will pan out.