Front & Center

Hot Topics
By GEN Frederick J. Kroesen
U.S. Army retired

recent issue of TIME magazine devoted its cover story to the growing problem of soldier suicides. The article dealt principally with anecdotal accounts of two soldiers whose deaths surprisedperhaps shocked their families, friends and colleagues. Also included are pages of statistics identifjnng the variety of victims, categories of probable causes, contributing factors and a summary statement that we have lost more soldiers to suicide than to combat deaths in the past year. There are references to the Army suicide prevention program and observations by psychiatrists and psychologists addressing the whys and hows of the current situation. It is, overall, an enlightening exposure of the problems and an informative presentation of the Army's efforts to combat the trend. Nowhere, however, in this or the many other news reports is attention given to what I believe is the underlying cause: the stress created in the entire force by the mission requirements of the past decade. Since the 9/11 attacks, the Army has been continually committed to an operational tempo that has returned soldiers to corribat or to other "hardship" (unaccompanied) tours of duty at a pace and over a period not contemplated since World War 11. For an Army whose career complement is mostly married, with family concerns and responsibilities, the pace is wearing and debilitating. It is also erosive to combat effectiveness. Courage is an expendable factor; soldiers become less confident of not only their own survivability, but also of their willingness and ability to fulfill responsibilities of their unit and for the "band of brothers." Over time, depression is not uncommon, and depression is almost a constant factor in the lives of the suicidal, but this is only half the problem.
ARMY September 2012

When soldiers retum from a combat tovir they reenter a community that has been under equal stress. Their spouses and children have suffered the anxiety of awaiting the next casualty report from the combat zone. They are committed to the collective support of the next family to receive tragic news and the despondency that affects them all. Wives or husbands who have been single parents for a year or more then have to assimilate a familiar "stranger" who interrupts what had become a settled routine, but one who might be gone again too soon. Corporals, sergeants, Heutenants and captains have to attend career education schools that separate them again for a few weeks or months, and when they retum they may be assigned to a unit now preparing to deploy on another mission, a preparation that might send them to a national training center for another separation period. While this schedule does not always apply, it is a community constant that affects everyone, and there has been little respite for either soldiers or their families for the past 10 years. The cumulative effect is manifest in increases of domestic violence, divorce rates and, yes, suicides. The Arniy has been too small for its mission load for many years, and the portent for the future is more of the same. Only a return to an adequately sized force can promise relief for this situation. A second hot topic is the leaking of classified information to the news media and thus to the world at large. Speculation about the sources of such leaks and about efforts to expose or to cover up the identity of the transgressors is evident in many news reports and opinion columns. A common theme in most is an attack of "the system" of classification.

There are, apparently, almost 5 million people who are granted access or are authorized to classify the written word and its disposition. The charge is made that too many overclassify, creating a mountain of material that does not need to be protected. They do it out of ignorance of the standards, for selfprotection against a faure to know a real need, or to hide inconvenient or embarrassing truths. Whatever the reasons, the system can be fixed through education, training and better control over those exercising the practice. The result will be the eliminationor at least a reductionof leaks because everyone will recognize that what is classified really needs to be protected. No one (none that I have read) identifies what I believe is the basic flaw: Almost no one is ever punished for leaking, even when divulging information that is seriously damaging and that might even justify a charge of treason. Harking back only to the revealing of the Pentagon Papers, whether properly classified or not, they were marked secret and deserved protection until declassified. No one was ever punished even though those responsible were known. Since then there have been too many instances of inquiring and investigating reporters acquiring and publishing information damaging to our national interests. The Rosenbergs were the only known spies executed from the Soviet spy network. We lightly punished Alger Hiss for his involvement in espionage, and one government employee is in ja for spying for our ally, Israel. Most cases, however, have ended with charges dropped or, as recently, by a plea bargain admitting to a misdemeanor. In no case has a news organization been charged for releasing or publishing information that triggers serious consequences.

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he protection of information concerning military operations, the collection of intelligence, and the development of techniques, technologies and. hardware essential to our maintaining dominant military capabilities is an absolute requirement. Exposure is, first, a threat to the Hves of soldiers engaged in a directed mission, and ultimately a threat to our citizens who may be attacked by an enemy whose capabilities are enhanced by the information di-

vulged. It is also damaging to the credibility of our national security practices among our aUies whose personnel become vulnerable to counteractivity. Cooperation in our common pursuits suffers, sometimes irreparably. Guaranteed punishment for transgressions is a requisite element of our legal system. It is no less a need for the protection of information that can harm or defeat our programs and particularly our military personnel. If our

laws are not adequate in this regard, they need to be strengthened because peace is not at hand, threats abound, and secret preparedness and preparations must not be compromised. D GEN Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret., formerly servedas Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and commander in chief of U.S. Army Europe. He is a senior fellow of AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare.

Mission Command and Army Training Doctrine

By LTG James M. Dubik
U.S. Army retired

/ / n P r a i n as you fight" is one of the J. most essential principles of Army training doctrine, yet for more than 10 years this principle has been applied only partially. Why? Because fighting has been mostly decentralized and training m.ostly centralized. The Army's centralized "road to war" training philosophy erased "white space" from home-station training calendars; deemphasized training meetings, placing more focus on training support meetings; encouraged training to time rather than trairiing to standard; and made training a "top-down" rather than a "bottom-up" activity. Fortunately, the combat training centers (CTCs) retained the commitment to setting conditions for decentralized execution, and the reality of fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere demanded decentralized execution, so a considerable amount of home-station training also focused on it. The reality of combat more than offset the centralized training management habit the Army acquired. If the road-to-war style is allowed to continue, however, it could become an impediment to developing mission command in a peacetime army. Mission command demands trust among the leader teams that make up the chain of command, leaders who properly use initiative within the senior's intent and units that must be able to act, when the situation requires, not only in the absence of orders but also contrary to orders. A centralized approach to training and training man22 ARMY September 2012

agement decreases the probability of developing the habits demanded by mission command. Among the many ways leaders can use Army training doctrine to create and reinforce mission command in leaders and units, the following three areas stand out. Training Meetings Properly run training meetings force training to be a bottom-up activity. They also force officers and NCOs at each level to know and understand their mission-essential training tasks individual, leader and collective; their current status of proficiency relative to these tasks; and, therefore, the gap between where they are and where they must be, which defines a unit's training requirements. When a battalion commander holds his or her training meeting with company commanders, each commander should have already used his or her squad's and platoon's training requirements as well as the company's to develop the training schedules being briefed to the battalion commander. Some of these tasks will be executed within the context of a larger training exercisewhether at home station or deployed. Others wul be executed separately by the unit's leaders. Regardless, the key is that each echelon of command identifies its training requirements relative to the unit's essential tasks and plans to execute these tasks within the context of mandated training exercises.

For example, a battalion might be scheduled to deploy for a three-week training exercise with an ally. The tasks to be trained in preparation for and conduct of this exercise should be driven from the bottom up. The role of senior leaders and headquarters is to plan the home-station preparatory training program and the deployed training exercise with enough flexibility to allow a sufficient match among the senior leader's training goals, the allied training goals and the subordinate unit leaders' training requirements. Such an approach not only respects the role of the junior leader as the chief trainer of his or her unit but also encourages junior leaders to think and act within the intent of their seniors. Preparation for and Assessment of Training Training with l-prepared leaders or under poor conditions means that training wul not be done to standard or that it will not actually be performance-oriented. Well-prepared leaders trairung under well-constructed conditions, on the other hand, improve the quality of training and help establish trust up and down the chain of command; proficiency-based trust is one of the most necessary components of mission command. Preparation for training includes at least three essential elements: preparing leaders, preparing the conditions and preparing the resources. Preparing leaders is a shared "two-level-down"

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