The War of Nerves

British Civilians & The Threat of Invasion 1940-41

Home Guardsmen encounter a mock fifth columnist in Tain, Scotland, August 1941. Photograph: Imperial War Museum. Copied from S.P. MacKenzies The Home Guard

James Doing History 600 Prof. Ussishkin May 11, 2012

In 2001, a Northumberland bookstore owner discovered a remarkable vintage poster. The striking image bold white lettering on a bright red background has since become an international sensation. The previously unseen but now wildly famous Keep Calm and Carry On poster was one of a three-part series created in 1939 by the Ministry of Information in an attempt to bolster morale during the early and uncertain days of World War II.1 The Ministry distributed two similar posters,2 but 2,500,000 copies of Keep Calm
The original poster found by Stuart Manley, displayed at Barter Books.

and Carry On were never displayed. It is commonly believed that Keep Calm was reserved for the critical event of a German invasion. The poster and its iconic slogan represent the fact that from roughly May 1940 until December 1941, Britons were held captive by the threat of invasion, which came from all corners and saturated the media in sensational cycles of rumor and speculation. Though the main objective of Hitlers aggressive rhetoric was to influence British military operations in favor of Germany, his war of nerves had a profound effect on British civilians, who, due to the governments lack of public instruction and the difficulty of organizing defense preparations at the local level, had no choice but to come to terms with the idea of invasion on their own. The private thoughts of hundreds of British civilians concerning the hair-raising notion of invasion were recorded in the war diaries and file reports published by Mass Observation, a massive sociological project begun in 1937 by a team of three young men who set out to found the anthropology of ourselves that is, the science of British life.3 Throughout the war, Mass Observation regularly collected the writings of nearly 500 male and female volunteers of all ages and occupations across Britain. In addition, so-called Observers conducted surveys, interviews, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Lewis, R.M. Planning, Design and Reception of British Home Front Propaganda Posters of the Second World War. Southampton: University of Southampton, 2004, Ch. 4 The First Posters. 2 Your courage, your cheerfulness, your resolution will bring us victory and Freedom is in peril, defend it with all your might 3 Hinton, James. Nine Wartime Lives: Mass Observation and the Making of the Modern Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 2.

1!

and opinion polls in the street concerning a broad range of topics, most significantly civilian reactions to propaganda initiatives by the Ministry of Information. They synthesized their findings into daily file reports that have been preserved along with the diaries in a special collection at the University of Sussex. This treasury of wartime commentary provides invaluable insight into civilian attitudes and experiences and will be cited extensively throughout the paper; the diaries and file reports narrate the social and psychological phenomenon of invasion which, for all intents and purposes, was discarded and forgotten along with the now famous Keep Calm and Carry On posters. They present a panoramic view of a time when Britons, as one diarist noted, had never known such a panic.4 Using these and other first-hand accounts as a foundation, I will explore the psychological and emotional consequences of Hitlers war of nerves on the civilian population (with a special focus on the conduct of the popular press) and discuss how the specter of invasion shaped the role of the civilian during wartime, examining the Home Guard and other local organizations in particular. Most importantly, I will show how clumsy efforts by the Ministry of Information to prepare Britons for an invasion scenario (the best they could do was Keep Calm and Carry On) further frayed the publics already shaky faith in an administration that was plagued by an antagonistic relationship with the civilian population.5 In recent decades, revisionist historians such as Angus Calder and Clive Ponting have reexamined the popular legend of Britains Finest Hour, pointing out the publics less than golden morale as well as its cynical view of government incompetence and so-called national unity.6 In February 1942, Mass Observation reported a 59% lack of confidence in some or all members of government;7 I will show how the threat of invasion in particular induced public and private hysteria, tested (and exposed) the fractured nature of national unity, and contributed to a weakening faith in the governments ability to manage the war without a single German setting foot on English soil. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 5

M.O. D 5323: June 1, 1940. McLaine, Ian. Ministry of Morale. London: Allen & Unwin, 1979, 2. 6 Angus Calder argues against the persistent sentimentalisation of 1940 in The Myth of the Blitz (1991). 7 M.O. FR 1111, Opinion on Cabinet Changes (February 24, 1942).

2!

Operation Sea-Lion: Fantasy or Reality? Hitlers exact plans regarding Britain have long been the subject of debate for historians. The extensive preparations for a sea-borne offensive against the British Isles are tempting indications that Hitler may have had it in his mind from day one to invade. Indeed, all signs pointed toward this outcome: As German troops swept through continental Europe in their unstoppable 1940 Blitzkrieg, a similar attack on Britain seemed inevitable. But Hitler hesitated; it was not until July that he issued an official order to prepare for an amphibious assault. Most historians agree that Hitler never actually intended to cross the English Channel; the constant threats of invasion coming out of Berlin functioned solely to weaken morale and coerce the British into accepting a German compromise.8 Nevertheless, on July 16, 1940, perhaps emboldened by the smooth and swift occupation of the Channel Islands earlier that month,9 Hitler drew up General Order No. 16: I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England, and if necessary to carry it out.10 Accompanying the declaration was a list of five preconditions to be met before an invasion could be attempted, the most important of which were total air supremacy over the English Channel and sufficient destruction of the British Royal Navy. These preconditions were to be met by mid-August, giving the German military apparatus less than a month to prepare for a full-scale invasion. Not surprisingly, most of the German high command dismissed the notion with a considerable amount of cynicism, but Hitler pressed forward. On August 1 he issued a directive calling for intensification of aerial attacks on British coastal defenses, and on August 17, Operation SeaLion, a multi-phased, 39-division assault of epic proportions, was officially on the table.11

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 9

See DeWeerd (1948), Kent (1963), Michaelis (1972), Farguharson (1990), Schenk (1990), and others. An examination of the invasion and occupation of the Channel Islands, and the implications thereof, was cut from this paper. Of note are the British governments lackluster response to the attack, civilian actions (fleeing vs. staying put), and the relatively courteous behavior of the Germans toward British civilians To what extent can the Channel Islands be considered a precedent to a general invasion of the British mainland? 10 DeWeerd, H.A. Hitlers Plans for Invading Britain, Military Affairs 12, no. 3 (1948): 144 11 DeWeerd, 144

3!

For those who doubt the sincerity of Hitlers threat to invade Britain, the focus of German efforts over the next month remains a mystery. A substantial amount of time and resources went into preparations for Sea-Lion: The navy assembled massive transport craft in harbors along the Channel coast, thousands of assault troops received special training for an amphibious operation, and a special set of maps was published for invading troops detailing transportation and communication networks throughout Britain.12 By September 3, everything was in place for the invasion of the century. The only element missing from the equation was the requisite air superiority that would guarantee success for a landing operation. Winston Churchill famously stated in a radio broadcast on August 20, 1940, Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.13 It would seem, if Hitlers plan to invade is to be taken seriously, that Churchill was entirely correct. Between July and September the Luftwaffe lost nearly 2000 planes in the Battle of Britain, failing to weaken the R.A.F. and making the proposed invasion far too dangerous to attempt without proper air cover. On September 19, all German invasion craft were dispersed to safer waters,14 and, on October 12, Hitler officially postponed Sea-Lion indefinitely. A more subtle, yet decisive, directive was issued on December 3, 1940, instructing munitions minister Georg Thomas to reorient armaments productions for land campaigns, since there would no longer be any mention of an invasion of Britain but only a siege.15 With this directive Hitler put the final nail in the coffin of Operation Sea-Lion. Britons had thus escaped the ultimate nightmare of invasion, and, according to General Bernard Montgomery, they should have thanked their lucky stars. Despite Hitlers misgivings, there would have been no chance of resisting a full-fledged German invasion, due to the desperate state of the British army during the summer of 1940, which lacked equipment and organization after the chaos at Dunkirk (this information was apparently lost on German !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 13

See Schenk, Peter. Invasion of England 1940. London: Conway Maritime Press, Ltd., 1990. Churchill, Winston. A Man of Destiny: Winston S. Churchill. 1st ed. Waukesha, Wis.: Country Beautiful Foundation, 1965. 14 German plans for invading Britain in 1940, The Times: November 19, 1946. 15 DeWeerd, 147.

4!

intelligence, who over-counted British forces at an astoundingly high number).16 However, though Hitler had permanently shelved his plans to invade Britain, he pursued an equally effective style of warfare that kept the world guessing and his enemy at bay. The War of Nerves: 1940-41 In the October 12 directive, Hitler ordered the carefully planned preparations for invasion to be maintained until further notice, albeit to be used purely as a military and political threat. In fact, Hitler did everything in his power to give an impression that an attack on the British Isles is planned for this year, going so far as to sustain the illusion within German ranks. Until June 22, 1941, the entire planning of Operation Barbarossa was referred to as Operation Sea-Lion in a deliberate attempt to deceive German soldiers.17 Nazi newspapers did their part to keep up this farce among German civilians, who were reminded daily of the imminence of Britains invasion: In August 1940, the Vlkischer Beobachter predicted that Britain would collapse beneath our flag while Der Montag reported nervousness increasing every hour in the anticipation of attack.18 So effective was this campaign of deception that on September 5, 1940, a Luftwaffe pilot, upon bailing out of his plane and landing in the coastal village of Whitby, politely asked to be directed to the nearest invading German troops. The villagers escorted him to the police, where he seemed genuinely startled to learn that the invasion had not yet begun!19 Although the Germans constant harping on the nearness of invasion would have spoiled any element of surprise in the event of an actual attack, the barrage of threats served an invaluable purpose in that it forced the British to reckon with the eventuality of invasion.20 One had only to look across the Strait of Dover to see long-range gun emplacements and convoys of assault barges looming in the mist.21 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 17

DeWeerd, 146. Farguharson, John. After Sealion: A German Channel Tunnel?, Journal of Contemporary History 25, no. 4 (1990): 423. 18 Calm Before Invasion?, The Times: August 6, 1940. 19 Phipps, Katherine. The Diary of Katherine M. Phipps, 1939-45: September 5, 1940. Accessed through British and Irish Womens Letters and Diaries, Alexander Street Press (2004). 20 Farguharson, 424. 21 Watching and Waiting, The Times: August 27, 1941.

5!

Just how effective was Hitlers war of nerves on the British? The statistical data compiled by Mass Observation provides insight into the salience of invasion fear among civilians, whose expectation of an attack waxed and waned throughout the first two years of the war and was characterized by fleeting and sensational scares. The spring and summer of 1940 experienced an initial and intense invasion fever: In May and June, 22% of those polled accepted the likelihood of invasion, accompanied by a massive media discussion of the possibility and a flurry of diary entries riddled with the fear of, for example, waking up to the sound of jackboots in the street. In July, only 17% expected invasion, but as a topic of conversation it made up 58% of all war talk, reflected in numerous Mass Observation diaries. The number of people who believed in invasion dropped to 10% in August and almost zero in September, and it would seem that the war of nerves had cooled off. However, starting in January 1941, these figures sky-rocketed to a point when at the end of February no fewer than 53% of those polled believed Hitler would attempt an invasion. By June the number had dropped to 38% and steadily declined until Mass Observation stopped taking invasion expectation polls in September.22 However, as late as August 1943, families on the coast were making detailed plans in the event of an attack, and as late as January 1944 coastal communities staged full-fledged mock invasions in preparation.23 It was not until D-Day in June 1944 that the idea became absolutely unthinkable. The fear of invasion melted away as the once heavily-fortified beaches finally opened to eager vacationers.24 The most important factor shaping civilians attitudes toward invasion was the ebb and flow of international events. Until May 1940, people had accustomed themselves to the so-called phony war, and the only over-heards about invasion were in joking or drunk conversations.25 The invasion and occupation of Belgium and Holland caused the first wave of serious fear among Britons, who suddenly found the enemy on their doorstep. One woman in Norfolk wished she did !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 23

For polling data: M.O. FR 349, 438, 568, 576, and 745. M.O. D 5201: August 23, 1943 and M.O. D 5399: January 11, 1944. 24 See The seaside takes off its war-paint, Hultons National Weekly Picture Post 24, no. 8 (August 1944): 16-18. 25 M.O. FR 19, US 15: Weekly Intelligence (May 10, 1940).

6!

not live on the coast, as it seems only a stones throw from Holland.26 One Londoner envisioned, The circle is almost complete.27 The spectacular Fall of France on June 17 and the occupation of the Channel Islands two weeks later convinced many that invasion of Britain was just around the corner, but as the summer wore on and no attack came, the ambiguous threat faded into the background as the stark reality of air raids consumed peoples lives. However, the successful invasion of Crete by German paratroopers in May 1941 had a profound impact on the British; many saw it as the rehearsal for England.28 The invasion of the Soviet Union in June had the opposite effect; though the British were acutely aware of the importance of the Soviet campaign, and some hinged their fear of invasion on it (If he gets Russia, itll be poor dos for us!29), the overwhelming feeling throughout the country was one of relief. Operation Barbarossa was the greatest stroke of luck weve had,30 as Hitler turned his sights away from Britain and pursued war in the East. After this point, the likelihood of an invasion of Britain became more and more remote, until at last the entry of the United States into the war in December turned the tide of the conflict and seemed to herald salvation. If for some reason a British civilian were indifferent to international events, plenty of other voices warned of the nearness of invasion. A schoolteacher in Sussex recorded in February 1941, From all sides papers, B.B.C., talk the likelihood of invasion is suggested,31 and a store clerk in Yorkshire observed, The subject certainly gets no rest in this country.32 Winston Churchills forewarnings of invasion were taken very seriously by those who heard them; one couple in the coastal town of Worthing made the decision to evacuate their children based on a single speech of Churchills in September 1940.33 Churchill single-handedly threw the whole country into one of the wars most potent invasion scares in the summer of 1941 when in a radio broadcast he alluded !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 27

M.O. D 5324: May 10, 1940. M.O. D 5163: June 3, 1940. 28 M.O. D 5425: May 20, 1941. 29 M.O. D 5039.5: July 19, 1941. 30 M.O. D 5039.1: September 9, 1941. 31 M.O. D 5376: February 4, 1941. 32 M.O. D 5039.1: September 30, 1940. 33 Strange, Joan. War Diaries of Joan C. Strange: 1939-45: September 10, 1940. Accessed through British and Irish Womens Letters and Diaries, Alexander Street Press (2004).

7!

to an attack on September 1. Churchill was not the only man on the radio with the power to cause a stir; Civil Defence chief Hugh Elles made several incendiary broadcasts, and special programs like What to do if the invader comes in July 1940 did nothing to alleviate public anxiety.34 News bulletins could be taken out of context or only half-listened to, resulting in misinformed invasion scares with justifications like, They as good as said on the wireless he was coming.35 A group of schoolteachers in Kent mistook an overzealous air raid report for the long-awaited invasion in August 1942; one wrote, My heart missed a good few beats between the 7 and 8 oclock broadcast.36 False alarms like this one characterized the essence of Hitlers scheme. The role of the press in fueling these invasion scares cannot be overstated. Though most newspapers retained the obligatory patriotic tone (lest they be labeled defeatist), writers almost universally gravitated towards sensational topics like invasion and enemy sabotage. The public demand for these titillating themes is reflected in the sheer number of stories published concerning parachutists, attempted landings, and possible German attacks. However, the press seems to have gone above and beyond the call of duty; not only did they meet the public appetite for lurid stories, they exceeded it, and, as a result, played a major role in initiating and perpetuating bouts of invasion paranoia. As early as October 1939, an article called Get Ready appeared in several London papers and caused a minor panic despite condemnation of its hysterical, flamboyant tone.37 Starting in May 1940, a
Factors Governing Invasion, Illustrated London News: June 29, 1940

relentless stream of invasion stories filled the popular press and often leaked onto the pages of more respectable papers like The Times and The Economist. On May 13, 1940, no fewer than eight popular newspapers ran front-page articles warning of invasion by parachutists, invasion by sea, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 35

M.O. D 5163: July 4, 1940. M.O. D 5419: May 31, 1940. 36 M.O. D 5412: August 1942. 37 M.O. D 5425: October 30, 1939.

8!

and sabotage by fifth-columnists. During the summer of 1940, at the height of the initial invasion craze, the Illustrated London News published full-length feature articles concerning invasion virtually weekly, accompanied by vivid two-page pictorial spreads. These illustrations took the form of artists renditions of enemy landings, maps showing possible invasion routes, and photographs of German parachutists and soldiers. It was, as one diarist noted, Enough to scare anybody.38 Take, for example, an article that appeared in the Illustrated on June 29 called Factors Governing Invasion (above), complete with a map highlighting all likely landing spots and a diagram showing the amassed number of German ships and troop divisions that would comprise an invading force.39 Though the paper patriotically professed its belief in Britains ultimate victory, this and other visually shocking news items could have a damaging effect on morale. A Norfolk woman noted how adversely invasion stories in The Daily Mail affected her employer, who came to work throughout June 1940 wringing his hands in despair after reading merely the headlines.40 The newspapers latched onto and proliferated rumors of failed invasion operations and eagerly made dark predictions about the time, location, and manner of future attempts. Speculations about Germanys technological innovations were rampant. The Nazis were supposed to be in possession of tanks that could float on water or be dropped from a plane and assembled in five minutes, and in November 1941 the media was gripped by an invasion glider craze. The bulk of all invasion gossip can be attributed to the sensationalized treatment of otherwise mundane news in the popular press; one Londoner mused, How Jerrys work can be exaggerated.41 To read the popular press and listen to gossip, it would seem that Britain was invaded anew every day by a massive force of Germans, all of whom were massacred or driven into the sea. Wales was said to have been attacked by 300,000 Germans on September 14, and later that day the sea was full of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38

Strange, Joan: January 26, 1941. Factors Governing Invasion, Illustrated London News: June 29, 1940.! 40 M.O. D 5324: June 18, 1940. 41 M.O. D 5098: May 12, 1941.
38

9!

dead Huns.42 Similar tales abounded throughout Britain, passed from mouth to mouth after appearing first in the press. Not surprisingly, these flashy and alarmist invasion stories practically disappeared from the newspapers after the autumn of 1941, when the nation as a whole collectively lost interest in the topic; Mass Observation noted in June 1941, The press invasion scares have exhausted themselves by over-repetition.43 In addition to a decreased expectation of invasion, readers had become tired of and cynical about the perpetual harping on the theme of future horrors44 and were annoyed by the repeated warnings to prepare for an invasion that ultimately ended in anti-climax. A London housewife decided as early as June 1940 to give up the Picture Post, because it has been nothing but pictures of corpses and the most detailed instructions for how to defend a village.45 Despite widespread criticism of the media and the exhaustion of invasion scares, until September 1941 at least one third of the British public continued to profess a belief in the probability of a German invasion.46 However, the only means of truly gauging a persons expectation of such a cataclysmic event is to consider behavior that would betray a serious fear of it. Several examples are to be found in the diaries of people living on the coast, who considered the invasion threat a matter of life and death. An elderly woman in Norfolk gave her entire life savings to grandchildren in May 1940 because you never know when you might get killed nowadays; her granddaughter considered writing a will at the age of 21.47 A woman in the same town spent a considerable amount of time sewing 5 notes into her corset, lest the Nazis get their hands on them! A tragic example of someone taking the invasion all too seriously is Mrs. Fleischmann, a Jewish refugee in Worthing who burned precious books and family documents in June 1940,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 43

M.O. D 5282: September 14, 1940. M.O. FR 745, Third Invasion Leaflet (June 16, 1941). 44 M.O. D 5427: February 1, 1941. 45 M.O. D 5427: June 26, 1940. 46 M.O. FR 1111, Opinion on Cabinet Changes (February 24, 1942). 47 M.O. D 5324: May 16, 1940.

10!

anticipating the Nazis inevitable arrival.48 She and others who took such drastic measures represent the casualties of Hitlers manipulative war of nerves. Ministry of Information: The Boy Who Cried Invasion The British government played a surprisingly active role in the propagation of these invasion scares during the first two years of the war. Rather than reassuring Britons of the high improbability of invasion (which, they believed, would lead to complacency and apathy), the Ministry of Information pursued a policy of directly instigating invasion rumors in an effort to produce an atmosphere of healthy anticipation.49 The reason for this was two-fold: First, a heightened sense of danger among civilians served to combat apathy; if people were made to expect a horde of invading Germans raining down from the sky at any moment, perhaps they would be more motivated to do their bit for the war effort. Second, in the event of an actual attack, Britons would not be caught unprepared, having evaporate[d] fear by intellectualizing it.50 British authorities imagined scenes of chaos and hysteria if the reality of invasion fell upon an unsuspecting populace, as in France.51 Mass Observation reported that studies of communities hit by the Blitz showed the effect of unexpected violent attack is far greater than where people have been conditioned to accept and expect the possibility or probability of violent attack.52 Thus, an occasional dose of bad news as Tom Clarke, Deputy Director of the News Division, described it would ensure psychological healthiness among civilians, preventing panic and disorganization should the invasion materialize.53 For these reasons, the Ministry of Information was advised to get the public keyed up to a proper state of preparedness.54 Their strategy involved the periodical publication of invasion warnings in the newspapers, by leaflets distributed across the country, and by transmission over !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 49

Strange, Joan: August 28, 1941. M.O. FR 544, Attitudes to Invasion (January 14, 1941). 50 McLaine, 28. 51 The logistical nightmare and humanitarian plight of the millions of refugees who fled Northern France in June 1940 made an indelible impression on the British. 52 M.O. FR 544. 53 McLaine, 62. 54 Nicholl, A.N. (War Cabinet). Memo to Norman Brook: March 5, 1941. The National Archives, INF 1/887.

11!

the radio. A brief experiment with loudspeakers carried by van ended in disaster: In July 1940 the Ministry drove a small van through the coastal town of Lowestoft in Suffolk announcing instructions in the event of invasion. Local authorities were immediately besieged by frantic inquiries and several families packed up and fled town, mistaking the awareness campaign for the real thing.55 The British governments effort to convince its own people that invasion was a credible threat oddly complimented both Hitlers deceptive ploy and the salacious whirlwind of newspaper invasion scares, and partly explains why the percentages of people expecting invasion were so high throughout the winter and spring of 1941. Already by autumn 1940, Mass Observation noted the development of a November toughness as people grew accustomed to, and even callous about, the idea of invasion.56 However, civilians did not accept the governments demand to stay vigilant without making demands of their own: If invasion was really on the way, Britons wanted clear instructions for what to do when it came. As early as 1939 the Ministry of Information acknowledged the public need to rely on something bigger than yourself; Ministry chief Duff Cooper advised his colleagues quite plainly, people want to be ordered about.57 To this effect, the Ministry advanced its own agenda of spreading somewhat phony vigilance while meeting the public craving for instruction by drawing up a standard set of rules for invasion to be printed and reprinted throughout the war, echoing the typical wartime slogan Carry On: Stay in your home. Do not block the roads. Take orders from local authorities. Outside of these basic principles, each new version of the instructions included various bits of advice (Do not listen to gossip, Do not hoard food, Put your car out of commission, etc.). Three official invasion leaflets were published and distributed to every household in Britain: If The Invader Comes (June 1940), Stay Where You Are (July 1940), and Beating the Invader (June 1941). These leaflets were not well received, and actually back-fired by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 56

M.O. FR 331, A Misunderstanding (August 6, 1940). M.O. FR 438, World News (October 3, 1940). 57 McLaine, 71.

12!

creating resentment against the government. The leaflets were deliberately written in simple language to communicate the Ministrys message clearly, but civilians by and large found them childish and patronizing, as one explained, Those things get my wick. They treat you as though youre kids.58 Being told to stay calm, stay put and ignore rumors was akin to a pat on the head by ones parents. Some readers even detected a note of upper-class condescension while talking down to the stupid mass.59 However, what frustrated civilians most was not the tone of the leaflets, but the emptiness and irrelevance of the instructions. They were described by interviewees as totally ridiculous, a joke, and a waste of paper. The leaflets focused on one thing and one thing only: Not interfering with military operations. Stay Put was
Third invasion leaflet, June 1941

the catch phrase; the second leaflet stated very plainly, If you do not

stay put you will stand a very good chance of being killed. But civilians craved knowledge of official preparations for invasion, or, worse, a prolonged occupation: What if the military couldnt stop the Germans? What if the government fell? Where would they send their children? What would happen to their money? Their homes? Their jobs? British men and women of all ages and stations took the menace of German conquest quite seriously and had no qualms about asking the seemingly impossible question: What if Britain lost? The disparity between the Ministry of Informations rhetoric of vigilance and the governments apparent lack of actual plans for invasion became increasingly clear as the war dragged on. Not surprisingly, doubts about whether or not the government actually believed in invasion at all created growing cynicism; for many people, the Ministrys work was irritating rather than reassuring,60 and they began to see through the transparent tactic of promoting healthy expectation. A Wembley man noted, Although the authorities continue to warn us !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 59

M.O. FR 216, Report on June 4th Invasion Leaflet (June 20, 1940). M.O. FR 216. 60 McLaine, 1.

13!

against invasion, we all think the warnings are given to keep us on our toes.61 A skeptical Scotsman wrote of Churchills September 1 scare, He just said that because he knew that people were getting slack during this lull.62 Mass Observation reported on June 16, 1941, that the majority of people surveyed were irritated at having to discuss the subject at all, and conceded that intellectual preparation of the civilian population for invasion is still far from complete;63 one week later Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, and the threat of a German attack on Britain was all but swept away before Britons really had the chance to prepare themselves for it. Preparing for Invasion at the National Level Despite increasing suspicion of the governments belief in invasion, no one could ignore the changes that had taken place in Britain to meet the threat of a German attack. Almost overnight the entire eastern coast of England was transformed into a battlefront popularly dubbed the Churchill Line. Barbwire, mines, trenches, and tank traps littered the beaches where vacationers had just recently gone for strolls, while further inland, barricades and checkpoints popped up along country roads. Starting in May 1940, soldiers routinely stopped cars and bicyclists to ask for identification, and for over two years signposts revealing the names
The tank traps that were never used, Hultons National Weekly Picture Post: August 19, 1944

of towns across England were blacked out in order to prevent parachutists, fifth columnists, and invading troops from easily finding their way around the country (this tactic only proved frustrating for Britons themselves).64 The internment of aliens within Britain presents perhaps the most compelling evidence of the government having taken Hitlers threat at least somewhat seriously. The numbers of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 62

M.O. D 5150: March 31, 1941. M.O. D 5390: July 29, 1941. 63 M.O. FR 745, Third Invasion Leaflet (June 16, 1941). 64 See M.O. D 5163: Jan. 1943; D 5098: May 22, 1941; D 5163: June 6, 1940 and August 5, 1942 for specific examples.

14!

incarcerated aliens correlated closely to the initial ebb and flow of invasion fear among the public.65 During the summer of 1940, as Britons lived in daily expectation of invasion, as many as 40,000 German and Austrian aliens, most of them Jewish refugees, were crowded into internment camps hastily set up in crumbling mansions, gymnasiums, and half-complete housing developments.66 The governments actions against aliens found resonance among British civilians, many of whom supported roping in those Germans, potential fifth columnists, as a means of preventing or at least hindering an invasion attempt. A Suffolk man was overheard to remark, Im glad theyve rounded up those aliens. They never ought to have let so many of them loose.67 A Jewish woman in Whitby worried that her friends Austrian maid could be manipulated by the Nazis into denouncing her.68 As the publics fear of invasion began to cool off in August (and substandard conditions in the camps became a matter of national embarrassment), the government relaxed its internment policy and steadily released enemy aliens until by April 1941 the number of internees had decreased to 9,000.69 It is important to note that internment did not balloon up in the spring of 1941 along with public invasion hysteria, but rather continued to decline after the tense summer of 1940. This can be taken as a further indication of how skeptical the British government had really become about the invasion threat, while actively promoting healthy fear among the public (and, to judge from the February 1941 statistics, quite successfully).70 There still existed within the British government, however, no centralized authority set up specifically to prepare the country for a possible German attack. Consequently, the defense of local communities was left to the people, who took the threat of invasion into their own hands with varying degrees of success through the grassroots organization of a variety of institutions and activities, most importantly the Local Defence Volunteers, or Home Guard. The reason for this decentralized arrangement was two-fold: First, the armed forces needed every soldier it could !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 66

Position of Aliens in Great Britain in Wartime, Social Service Review 16, no. 2 (June 1942): 327-332. Rose, Sonja. Which Peoples War? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 94. 67 M.O. FR 170, Suffolk Village Reports (June 6, 1940). 68 Phipps, Katherine: June 13, 1940. 69 Position of Aliens in Great Britain in Wartime, 330. 70 M.O. FR 576, Invasion Feelings (February 17, 1941), 53% of those interviewed expected invasion.

15!

muster up, and the maintenance of local garrisons became a very last priority when battling the Germans in North Africa and the Mediterranean. If able-bodied soldiers could be replaced by a homegrown army of non-combatants, the Army would be able to focus its efforts abroad, and soldiers had expressed an interest in the formation of local armies to ensure the safety of their families while they were overseas. More importantly, British leaders realized that giving noncombatant civilians the responsibility of defending their own communities would fulfill the deep desire felt by many to contribute to the war effort in a substantial way. This would, in turn, boost morale and fight public apathy.71 Dads Army & The Invasion Committees In a radio broadcast on May 14, 1940, War Secretary Anthony Eden called on male volunteers aged 17 to 65 to register at their local police station to form bands of Local Defence Volunteers (L.D.V.).72 The result of his broadcast was electrifying: Within six days, over 250,000 men had signed up. After just two months there were 1,300,000 eager volunteers, and by November 1940, the L.D.V., or Home Guard, as it became known, numbered 1,700,000. At the end of the war, 20% of British men not otherwise involved in defense had served in its ranks.73 This was truly an improvised army: A typical Guardsman remained unarmed for the duration of the war, and an armband worn over civilian clothes constituted his official uniform. His work might involve assisting Air Raid Precautions (A.R.P.) activities, watching for parachutists, manning military checkpoints, and providing physical labor for anti-invasion measures such as trench-digging and booby-trap setting. When not performing these services, a Guardsman would attend military exercises and invasion training. Local garrisons often paraded in formation. About once a year they helped stage a mock invasion that involved the entire community and tested their preparedness for the actual event. Most importantly, involvement in the Home Guard provided !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71

Yelton, David. British Public Opinion, the Home Guard, and the Defense of Great Britain, 1940-1944, The Journal of Military History 58, no. 3 (1994): 469. 72 Yelton, 465-66. 73 MacKenzie, S.P. The Home Guard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 175.

16!

male civilians, especially older ones, with a sense of contributing to the war effort; while their sons were off fighting the Nazis face-to-face, they could do their bit at home to keep the country safe.74 However, despite its fairly romanticized popular legacy, Dads Army was not all roses. Rather than provide inspiration through the noble example of leadership and sacrifice, the activities of the Home Guard more often than not created conflict and consternation within the community. Even a small sampling of Mass Observation diaries reveals quite a pessimistic civilian attitude toward the Home Guard, which was described as a bunch of old Rajahs, third-rate security guards, and tragically ill-equipped to meet the Nazis. Members of the Guard were notorious for bad attendance at meetings, which resulted in poor training and muddled operations. A dismayed London diarist noted, One can only stare and gape at the incompetence.75 The fact that only 3% of Londoners interviewed in June 1941 would turn to a Guardsman for advice during an invasion is telling evidence of the publics lack of confidence in the Home Guard.76 The older, more inept Guardsmen were often a source of embarrassment, while the younger, more eager ones could be a source of anxiety: Overzealous volunteers set up unauthorized checkpoints, harassed civilians unduly, virtually broke into homes to enforce blackout regulations, and, in a few extreme cases, shot unarmed travelers who appeared suspicious.77 The antagonistic relationship between the Home Guard and the A.R.P. became the stuff of legend, as the two volunteer organizations competed to direct anti-invasion activities within each town and, consequently, bungled each others operations. Upon witnessing an invasion exercise carried out by the Home Guard in July 1941, a Birmingham housewife wrote three words: Lord help us.78 Fortunately, the Home Guard was not the only organization civilians could turn to in a time of crisis. While their husbands were off parading with the other Rajahs, many women devoted their free time to anti-invasion activities arranged through various committees set up locally by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 75

MacKenzie, S.P. The Home Guard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, 25. M.O. D 5402: June 19, 1941. 76 M.O. FR 745, Third Invasion Leaflet (June 16, 1941). 77 Yelton, 468. 78 M.O. D 5420: July 6, 1941.

17!

concerned citizens. With names like Invasion Committee, Invasion Organization, Invasion Plans Committee, and Committee for Invasion, the founding and management of these groups highlighted the decentralized, ad hoc nature of the national response to the invasion threat. Their activities included, but were not limited to, running anti-invasion watch posts, assembling and inspecting emergency food supplies, and canvassing neighborhoods to recruit volunteers for special invasion services should the time come like assisting with evacuation and billeting, carrying messages via bicycle, and providing first aid. In coastal areas, these invasion committees offered refreshments to soldiers guarding the beaches and ran bonfires for late-night trenchdigging operations.79 Like the men of the Home Guard, members of these committees felt they were contributing to the war effort by doing their small part to prepare for invasion. They were, of course, not without critics. A Trowbridge man described his local Invasion Committee as a bunch of doddering old fools and as helpless as a flock of sheep.80 The biggest concern civilians had about all local provisions for invasion military, logistical, or otherwise was the very thing that defined them: The lack of uniformity between towns, and even within organizations, caused frustration for those involved in the planning of antiinvasion activities. The A.R.P. Post Warden in Belmont lamented that, though his borough was thoroughly outfitted to meet an invasion, arrangements throughout the rest of London were not even a muddle, as the absence of government direction and aid left each district to its own devices.81 Upon arriving at her new school in Sussex, one teacher was horrified to find zero preparations in place for invasion, especially since her old school had made detailed plans to be used as a rest center and makeshift hospital.82 The complete lack of an official hierarchy for these kind of operations forced people into leadership positions they would never have dreamed of taking: Our Belmont Post Warden suddenly found himself with the task of acting entirely as I think best to look after the civilian population. No instructions have come my way, yet residents !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 80

Phipps, Katherine: September 27, 1940. M.O. D 5118: April 18, 1942. 81 M.O. D 5004: September 4, 1941. 82 M.O. D 5376: February 4, 1941.

18!

will look to me for every assistance and advice.83 A schoolteacher in Kent complained of being forced to do the whole blinking show by herself.84 Those who had grown cynical or complacent about the invasion threat got in the way of preparations by refusing to cooperate: A mock invasion in Wales was foiled by an obstinate woman who declined to lend her private property to the exercise, despite warnings that her land left a gaping hole in Home Guard defenses. She said sarcastically, Ill risk that!85 Frequent false alarms exposed embarrassing disorganization and negligence; how can a town defend itself when half the Home Guard fails to report for duty? Widespread anxiety about the incompetence of local defense mechanisms and the obvious futility of ad hoc invasion committees only compounded the publics fear of invasion and further alienated civilians from the government, which continued to propagate its alarmist message of vigilance while failing to provide relevant instructions for how to cope with such an event. This confused and disoriented state of affairs led many civilians to one conclusion: They would have to prepare for a German invasion mentally, logistically, and emotionally on their own. The Invasion at Home: To Flee or Not to Flee? The first thought on everyones mind was evacuation: Despite the governments admonitions to Stay Put no matter what, many people, especially those living in coastal regions along the English Channel, seriously considered fleeing inland or even emigrating to the Dominion. Parents agonized about the decision to preemptively send their children away to Canada or even New Zealand, and about 15,000 children eventually made their way overseas.86 Other families planned to evacuate at zero hour; it was common to see invasion cases packed and ready to go in the hallway or in the trunk of the car. One Norfolk family had our handbags

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 84

M.O. D 5004: September 4, 1941. M.O. D 5412: August 1942. 85 M.O. D 5282: September 20, 1940. 86 Jackson, Carlton. Who Will Take Our Children? London: Methuen London Ltd., 1985, 88.

19!

ready with bankbooks in since the day war was declared.87 The consequences of fleeing were all too clear for this family: Leaving would mean the loss of the family business, and we should have to ask someone to shoot the dog. But the impulse to flee was powerful and overwhelming; when the news of Belgiums capitulation came on the radio, Mrs. B. in Cornwall imagined herself piling the car up with bedding, throwing her children on top, and escaping to the interior.88 Those who decided to do the patriotic thing and Stay Put sometimes resorted to subversive measures to make sure they would survive an invasion. Hoarding food was a common practice; the newspapers suggested storing two weeks worth of supplies in the home, but some people took it to the extreme and squirreled away whatever they could find for months. A Norfolk man was discovered to be in possession of over 200 gallons of petrol tucked away in his basement.89 In addition to making domestic preparations, Britons premeditated their personal roles in the invasion, letting their imaginations, like Mrs. B., run wild. The new teacher in Sussex decided that if invasion were to take place during the day, she would take all the children who lived outside town and drive them to her home for safe-keeping.90 One woman in Yorkshire resolved to join the Home Guard, even if she had to dress up like a man to do it,91 and a group of men in Hertfordshire organized a rather serious plan to attack the Germans with garden spades and forks.92 Employees at a petrol station in Norfolk worked out a scheme to sabotage the invading troops by filling their tanks with water instead of gas. Their less patriotic employer suggested painting a swastika under the doorknocker.93 It is impossible to know whether these aspiring partisans would have followed through in their plans to act during an invasion, but the fact that they thought them out, discussed them with friends, and wrote them down is telling of the pervasive hysteria that racked the country.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 88

M.O. D 5324: June 18, 1940. M.O. D 5396: June 6, 1940. 89 M.O. D 5324: June 1, 1940. 90 M.O. D 5376: February 4, 1941. 91 M.O. D 5333: June 17, 1940. 92 M.O. D 5240: July 15, 1940. 93 M.O. D 5323: May 14, 1940.

20!

For tomorrow we die!: The Psychology of Invasion Although the much-anticipated German invasion never materialized, it had a marked presence in peoples lives and affected their behavior and personalities in subtle yet profound ways. A park keeper in London carefully observed throughout the summer of 1940 how people changed under the threat of invasion: Men and women both developed anxious and jumpy tendencies, constantly asking each other about invasion news, while mothers became more urgent and overbearing, admonishing their children to come home earlier and more frequently.94 A Birmingham woman wrote in May 1940, We are so used to England being safe, we are not like the French whose country has been invaded time and time again... The shock of a foreign people invading England will be great.95 Many other diarists echoed this sentiment, finding it difficult to visualize our land as a battlefield.96 Invasion itself was a terrible word, it conjured up images of death and intense suffering, and many people, especially women, felt unusually depressed after talking, hearing, or reading about it. A Liverpool woman claimed that talk about the invasion makes me feel ill,97 and she and other women recorded vivid nightmares in which the invading Germans separated them from their husbands and children. For others, the lack of a clear future was the most frightening consequence of invasion: Air raids, yes, theres the dawn to hope for, but invasion, no, the thought is unbearable.98 This uncertainty was for some unbearable, but others found it strangely liberating. Take, for example, the family in Norfolk who, on the night of the most anticipated invasion scare yet (June 19, 1940), cracked open a bottle of brandy and ate their fancy chocolates, treating themselves to what could be their final moments together.99 Others used the imminent invasion as an excuse to neglect their yard work (Why slave over your garden when you may

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 95

M.O. D 5163: June 27 - August 10, 1940. M.O. D 5419: May 27, 1940. 96 Strange, Joan: July 8, 1940. 97 M.O. D 5341: December 31, 1940. 98 M.O. D 5402: June 19, 1941. 99 M.O. D 5324: June 19, 1940.

21!

have to leave it to the Germans anytime?100), while a nurse in Bristol consoled herself after a patients death by admitting he was spared suffering should invasion come.101 At a London dinner party on June 27, 1940, after a particularly harrowing false alarm, the hostess made a toast: Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die!102 This last comment was most likely made in jest, which evokes the most important coping mechanism the British people possessed: Humor. As early as May 1940, Mass Observation reported that the most frequent reaction to the idea of invasion was a smile or a wisecrack, and this facetious and releasing treatment appears as a common motif throughout the diaries.103 In response to a newspaper article warning of invasion coming tomorrow, one man wrote, Well, Id better make im [Hitler] a cup of tea!,104 and when asked what she would do if the invading Germans demanded petrol, the young petrol station employee said, Id tell them wed make it right about the coupons afterwards.105 These sarcastic comments served to relax the tension of anticipation and take the jokers mind off a more sinister possibility. Some jokes, however, betrayed a deeper, more serious fear of invasion, for example Me and Mrs. Wilkins are going to put our heads in the oven if they get here, arent we?106 This and other jokes about suicide in particular reveal an inability or unwillingness to imagine a future under German rule. One woman noted, Theres quite a lot of laughter about, though some folks are taking the possibility of German victory in more matter of fact than I think is good.107 Sometimes, though, musings about the possibility of a German victory were not made in jest but were all too serious. The war will be lost by us in a month. That is my secret thought, wrote one man in August 1940, Not for the world would I tell it to anybody but Mass

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 101

M.O. D 5323: May 3, 1940. M.O. D 5238: June 22, 1941. 102 M.O. D 5427: June 27, 1940. 103 M.O. FR 106, Further Memo on Parachute Fear (May 14, 1940). 104 M.O. D 5039.9: July 9, 1940. 105 M.O. D 5324: November 6, 1939. 106 M.O. D 5314: February 3, 1941. 107 M.O. D 5396: June 16, 1940.

22!

Observation.108 The Jewish woman in Whitby found Quaker school where her children could hide from the Nazis, and had a long and sober conversation with her neighbor about the possibility of the Germans finding and arresting them.109 One girl in Norfolk consoled her friend by reminding her, quite seriously, that the Germans were fond of sports, so they would still be able to play tennis after an invasion.110 Fears of the Nazi racial agenda were a frequent topic of conversation among women in particular: In a Glasgow shipping office, a group of female employees took to studying the colour of their hair after discussing Hitlers Aryan rhetoric,111 and a young woman in Norfolk recounted, Mrs. F. says she knows for sure that Hitler will make all English women have German babies. Keeps saying she is glad she is too old but pities me.112 Perhaps the most interesting psychological effect of the invasion threat on British civilians, men as well as women, was the way it made them feel like children. The governments simplistic and condescending invasion leaflets seemed to read as if they are written for a child,113 and the civilians constant reliance on government instruction and information further enhanced this impression. One Londoner who attended a gas-mask training wrote, It was just like being at school again and reduced me to a state of dither.114 For a Birmingham woman, living under the cloud of invasion was similar to her childhood fear of the dentist: I have been all morning carrying on but knowing that something nasty is going to happen.115 To a Glasgow office worker, the image of local men dressed up in uniforms while staging mock invasions was like watching children playing cowboys and red Indians.116 These mock invasion were games in the purest sense, as neighbors fought neighbors dressed up as Nazis, spies, and fifth columnists (see title photograph). Stories of successful sabotage became the talk of the town, such as the one about a man who arrived at a convent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 109

M.O. D 5212: August 2, 1940. Phipps, Katherine: February 13, 1941. 110 M.O. D 5324: May 21, 1940. 111 M.O. D 5390: January 14, 1941. 112 M.O. D 5324: June 16, 1940. 113 M.O. FR 349, Stay Where You Are (August 12, 1940). 114 M.O. D 5401: July 14, 1940. 115 M.O. D 5419: May 31, 1940. 116 M.O. D 5390: October 5, 1941.

23!

carrying a bouquet of flowers; once allowed to enter he withdrew a gun from the bouquet and held everyone inside hostage until the mock invasion was over.117 The invasion games even involved toys: after throwing a muslin bag filled with chalk onto the back of a truck, which promptly drove off, a Home Guardsman ran after it shouting, Hey, I want my bomb back! As long as they finished in time for dinner, these practice invasions provided great fun for the participants; during Birminghams July 1941 mock invasion (which lasted two whole days) apparently everyone thoroughly enjoyed themselves.118 Fortunately for them, these games were the closest that anyone in Britain came to experiencing the reality of a German invasion. Historical Legacy of the Invasion Threat Chalk bombs, phony spies, lethal bouquets. For Britons, the idea of invasion lay in the realm of morbid fantasy, informed only by what they knew had occurred on the Continent. At night, they were terrorized by deadly air raids, and by day, there lingered a quiet anxiety, a sense that the enemy was, in fact, very close. On July 1, 1940, a line of twenty Nazi officers stood shoulder-to-shoulder on the beach at Cap Gris-Nez, France, staring across the English Channel toward the hazy white Cliffs of Dover. A photographer captured the moment just as Hermann Goering turned to his left, binoculars in hand.119 This photograph (right),
Germans surveying the English coast, July 1940

housed in the Imperial War Museum, symbolizes a line that was never crossed; the occupation of the Channel Islands a few days later was the closest Hitler would come to conquering Britain. In retrospect, it is easy to forget that the seemingly unassailable island fortress teetered on the brink of all-out invasion for almost two years, and that Britons were forced to consider the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 118

M.O. D 5004: September 30, 1941. M.O. D 5420: July 14, 1941. 119 Germanys Planned Invasion of Britain, 1940. Imperial War Museum: HU 1185

24!

real possibility of a German attack and life under Nazi rule publicly and privately. If Goering had been able to peer a little further through the mist and fog, he would have seen a nation torn by wild speculation about the dark possibilities of invasion. While skeptics grew cynical and dismissed the threat as a government propaganda tool, those who took the notion all too seriously let their minds run wild imagining what the attack would be like, egged on by the newspaper articles, radio warnings, instruction leaflets, and idle gossip to which they were subjected almost daily. As local communities scrambled to organize clumsy defenses and individuals were left to prepare for invasion by themselves, the already shaky connection between the civilian and the government sorely tested by the Blitz (bombed out people confronted with inadequate post-raid services, let down by the authorities120), by evacuation (in some areas a state of affairs approaching chaos121), and by the war in general (Theres no sense of urgency122) became a chasm. The Ministry of Informations effort to promote psychologically healthy anticipation of invasion backfired by instead creating resentment against the seemingly transparent attempt to convince civilians of an impending, yet increasingly dubious, German attack. Just as the first air raids in September 1940 exposed the governments insufficient provisions for bombing victims, shocking people in an introspective, unaggressive and disappointed way,123 the unfulfilled threat of invasion further strained the relationship between civilian and government, which was never more than tenuous at best. Moreover, because the invasion ultimately failed to materialize and peoples lives were consumed by the extant terror of air raids and a real war raging throughout the world, the idea of Operation Sea-Lion is often dismissed as an exaggerated wartime fantasy. However, the iconic Keep Calm and Carry On poster and testimonies collected by Mass Observation serve as lasting reminders of the panic and its social and political consequences that gripped British civilians from 1940 to 1941. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120 121

Calder, Angus. The Myth of the Blitz. London: Jonathan Cape, 1991, 119. Johnson, B.S. The Evacuees. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1968, 14. 122 M.O. D 5423: October 9, 1941. 123 M.O. FR 406, Air Raids and Invasion (September 17, 1940).!

25!

Works Cited 1) Primary sources cited in the paper: Mass Observation Archive (University of Sussex) Diaries 5004, 5039.1, 5039.5, 5093.9, 5098, 5118, 5150, 5163, 5201, 5212, 5238, 5240, 5282, 5285, 5323, 5324, 5314, 5324, 5333, 5341, 5376, 5390, 5396, 5399, 5401, 5402, 5412, 5419, 5420, 5423, 5425, and 5427. File Reports 19 106 170 216 331 349 406 438 544 576 745 1111 US 15: Weekly Intelligence (May 10, 1940) Further Memo on the Parachute Fear (May 14, 1940) Suffolk Village Reports (June 6, 1940) Report on June 4th Invasion Leaflet (June 20, 1940) A Misunderstanding (August 6, 1940) Stay Where You Are (August 12, 1940) Air Raids and Invasion (September 17, 1940) World News (October 3, 1940) Attitudes to Invasion (January 14, 1941) Invasion Feelings (February 17, 1941) Third Invasion Leaflet (June 16, 1941) Opinion on Cabinet Changes (February 24, 1942)

Newspaper & Magazine Articles Calm Before Invasion?, The Times: August 6, 1940. Factors Governing Invasion, Illustrated London News: June 29, 1940. The seaside takes off its war-paint, Hultons National Weekly Picture Post 24, no. 8 (August 1994): 16-18. Watching and Waiting, The Times: August 27, 1941. Personal Diaries Phipps, Katherine. The Diary of Katherine M. Phipps, 1929-45. Accessed through British and Irish Womens Letters and Diaries, Alexander Street Press: 2004. Strange, Joan. War Diaries of Joan C. Strange: 1939-45. Accessed through British and Irish Womens Letters and Diaries, Alexander Street Press: 2004. Other Sources Churchill, Winston. A Man of Destiny: Winston S. Churchill. 1st ed. Waukesha, Wis: Country Beautiful Foundation, 1965 (Collection of Churchills speeches and writings). Germanys Planned Invasion of Britain, 1940. Imperial War Museum, HU 1185. (Photograph) Nicholl, A.N. (War Cabinet). Memo to Norman Brook, March 5, 1941. The National Archives, INF 1/887. Position of Aliens in Great Britain in Wartime, Social Service Review 16, no. 2 (June 1942). Tain Home Guard, Ross, preparing to meet the Fifth Column, August 1941. Imperial War Museum (Photograph). Copied from S.P. MacKenzies The Home Guard.

2) Secondary sources cited in the paper: Books Calder, Angus. The Myth of the Blitz. London: Jonathan Cape, 1991. Hinton, James. Nine Wartime Lives: Mass Observation and the Making of the Modern Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Jackson, Carlton. Who Will Take Our Children? London: Methuen London Ltd., 1985. Johnson, B.S. The Evacuees. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1968. MacKenzie, S.P. The Home Guard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. McLaine, Ian. Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in WWII. London: Allen & Unwin, 1979. Rose, Sonja. Which Peoples War? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Schenk, Peter. Invasion of England 1940. London: Conway Maritime Press, Ltd., 1990. Newspaper Articles German plans for invading Britain in 1940, The Times: November 19, 1946. Scholarly Articles DeWeerd, H.A. Hitlers Plans for Invading Britain, Military Affairs 12, no. 3 (1948). Farguharson, John. After Sealion: A German Channel Tunnel?, Journal of Contemporary History 25, no. 4 (1990). Lewis, R.M. Planning, Design and Reception of British Home Front Propaganda Posters of the Second World War. Southampton: University of Southampton, 2004. Yelton, David. British Public Opinion, the Home Guard, and the Defense of Great Britain, 1940-1944, The Journal of Military History 58, no. 3 (1994).