The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasa Author(s): Butrus

Abu-Manneh Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Aug., 1990), pp. 257-274 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/164127 . Accessed: 05/10/2013 18:29
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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 22 (1990), 257-274. Printed in the United States of America

Butrus Abu-Manneh

THE THE

SULTAN VIZIER

AND

THE

BUREAUCRACY: OF PA?A NEDIM

ANTI-TANZIMAT

CONCEPTS

GRAND

MAHMUD

Mahmud Nedim Pasa was appointed grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire for the first time in September 1871 following the death of his predecessor in that office, Mehmed Amin Ali Pasa. His first tenure lasted until the end of July 1872. His rise to power represented the rise of a current in Ottoman politics that had been suppressed in the 1860s, when Ali and Fuad dominated the Porte. About a decade before he became grand vizier, Mahmud Nedim had written a treatise in which he criticized the Tanzimat and advocated an alternative system of government rooted in an idealized concept of early Ottoman history; in it he saw the sultan as an all-powerful ruler who attended in person to the daily affairs of the state. During his tenure as grand vizier, Nedim tried to apply the principles that he had advocated, and in so doing he can be regarded as the precursor of the Hamidian era. Those principles represented a challenge to the ideals of the Tanzimat, however, so it is necessary to explain what those ideals were before dealing further with Nedim and his views. A number of characteristics underlay the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. The first and perhaps the most important was to bring to an end the absolute rule of the sultan and the arbitrary acts of his governors, and to enforce the rule of law, both the shari'a (Muslim law) and the kdniiun (state law), which had suffered neglect in the preceding few generations. "The Tanzimat was a decree that came to erase the old absolute ways," wrote the historian Lufti1 in justification of the dismissal of the aged statesman Hiisrev Pasa as grand vizier in 1840. Indeed, the declaration in the Gulhane Rescript that the decline of the state had resulted from not observing the shari'a and kdnun and that, henceforth, the life, honor, and property of all subjects would be guaranteed were not slogans, but fundamental principles to which the sultan and the Porte adhered throughout most of the Tanzimat period. A second characteristic of the Tanzimat was the gradual shift of the locus of power from the palace to the Porte, i.e., to the bureaucracy, in contrast to the situation under Sultan Mahmud II. This took place even though the sultan continued to exercise the prerogative of dismissing grand viziers and other ministers. This shift meant that the bureaucracy over time included in its ranks not only administrators and reformers but also statesmen and decisionmakers.2
? 1990 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/90 $5.00 + .00

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While the first objective of the Tanzimat, to uproot injustice and oppression, was well received and widely hailed,3 the second was not achieved until after the mid 1850s. In the intervening years Resid Pa?a, the leading figure among the new bureaucrats, waged a long struggle with a group of palace affiliates. Foremost among them were the three damads (sons or brothers-in-law of the sultan)Mehmed Said, Mehmed Ali, and Ahmed Fethi4-and Hasan Riza, a man of palace upbringing.5 Throughout the first half of the Tanzimat period these men posed as the guardians of the sultan's power. The results of this struggle, however, were disastrous for both Re?id and his opponents. Ali Pa?a, Resid's successor as the leading statesman at the Porte,6 skillfully used the circumstances to consolidate the ascendancy of the bureaucracy and the Porte. That ascendancy lasted until his death in 1871. During this period, he and Fuad, assisted at times by Miitercim Mehmed Rii?di,7 initiated and sustained many political and legal reforms. The first of these measures was the Hatt-i Humayuin of 1856, which in itself was a semi-dictat of the European powers.8 The ultimate aim of these reforms was to create a new Ottoman political community based upon equal citizens enjoying equal political and civic rights, or what is known in Ottoman politics as the ideal of Ottomanism.9 Had these measures been given the time and the appropriate social and political milieu after the death of Ali in 1871, they would have perhaps led in the following generations to a shift in the allegiance of the subjects from the person of the sultan to the state (in the European sense), and from community to the (Ottoman) nation. Ottomanism was yet another aspect of the Tanzimat, and one that aroused much resentment among many leading Muslim dignitaries in Istanbul and throughout the empire. It had also caused a split within the bureaucracy.'10 Mahmud Nedim, who, by the end of the 1860s had become a senior bureaucrat and statesman, turned against the achievements of Ali and Fuad and, indeed, against much of what the Tanzimat stood for and worked to undermine those achievements when he became grand vizier. Though Mahmud Nedim" was younger than Ali and Fuad by only about three years,12 they were considerably ahead of him in rank. He had been a relative latecomer to the offices of the Porte and had a different, perhaps even a bad, start. He had come from a well-established upper-class family, his father Giircii Necib13 was a high functionary in the later days of the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-39), and his first clerical appointment was as a secretary (dTvankdtibi) to Damad Mehmed Said during the latter's first appointment to the office of serasker (1837-39)'4 and then to the Ministry of Commerce (183940).15But after the death of Sultan Mahmud II, Mehmed Said seems to have lost his influence and was sent to the provinces.16 Nedim, who found himself unemployed, accompanied his father to Baghdad when the latter was appointed its governor-general in 1841.17After a year there he returned to Istanbul and in his mid-twenties he entered service at the Sublime Porte. Later, upon the recommendation of Ali and Fuad, he joined the circle of Mustafa Re?id.l8 With a different background and coming from a different milieu than Re?id's other disciples,'9 Nedim must have had to work very hard to suppress his true tendencies and accommodate himself to this group. Only in this way could he

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improve his prospects. When Re?id was appointed grand vizier in 1846, Mahmud Nedim joined his staff and became one of his assistant secretaries (mektubcu mu'advini), and a year later, his secretary.20At the same time Ali had become foreign minister. In June 1849, Nedim was promoted to the post of deputy amedi and a few months later amedi.2' He stayed in this post even after the dismissal of Re?id from the grand vizierate in 1852. Under grand vizier Mustafa Naili (May 1853 through May 1854),22Nedim was promoted to the post of beylik(i,23 and shortly afterwards, in March 1854, he became saddret miistedarl.24 But the next grand vizier, Kibrisli Mehmed Emin, had him transferred to the newly created post of hdriciye musteqari,while Re?id Pa?a served as foreign minister.25 His removal from the grand vizier's office after a service of 8 years was, in fact, a demotion for Mahmud Nedim and a serious setback to his career. The fact that he was associated with Re?id all those years, and that Re,id's power was now in decline, might provide an explanation. However, Nedim was misplaced at the foreign ministry, and as he did not know French, the language of diplomacy at the time, his appointment there was bound to be temporary. The fact that he did not learn French, or any other European language, throughout his years of service at the Porte, though many of his colleagues made the effort, was perhaps a barrier between him and European culture. At any rate, after no more than 6 months as undersecretary (muiisteadr), Nedim was, at his own request, appointed governor general of the province of Saida in Syria in February 1855.26 This promoted him to the rank of vizier, which carried with it the title of pasha. In this way he crossed the line from bureaucrat to statesman, though still a junior one. In December 1855, he was transferred to Damascus in the same capacity and stayed there until September 1856,27before he was transferred to Izmir (Smyrna) where he served for about 18 months. In early 1858, just a few weeks after the death of his former benefactor Re?id, he returned to Istanbul. During the 3 years of Nedim's absence from Istanbul, major political developments had taken place. The conflict between Mustafa Re,id and the damads Mehmed Ali and Ahmed Fethi had undermined the prestige and credibility of both sides. Discrediting each other and mishandling the crisis that led to the Crimean War,28 they appeared unfit to lead the Porte any longer. Following that, Ali and Fuad emerged as the most senior statesmen,29in spite of their young age. Together with MuiitercimRii?udi,a distinguished officer and statesman, they formed an alliance.30Their rise indicated that the power struggle between palace affiliates and the bureaucracy had gone in favor of the latter. This was the situation when Nedim returned to Istanbul early in 1858. He had great expectations, to be appointed as the head of the Tanzimat Council or of the Supreme Council of State (meclis-i vald) or as foreign minister,3' but none of them materialized. The best that he could obtain was a membership on the Tanzimat Council. Six months later at the end of August 1858, he was appointed minister of commerce, while Ali was grand vizier.32 His expectations had in fact been unfounded. According to Cevdet, his colleagues had not even seriously considered him and perhaps did not trust him.33 Moreover, he was politically powerless. After the decline of the palace circle and

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the death of Regid, there existed no political group to whom he could turn. Because he had not served in any senior position at Istanbul before, he could not have built up a power base for himself, although his position as minister of commerce helped him to keep a foothold in the government. In September 1859, a group of religious zealots conspired to get rid of Sultan Abdulmecid, along with his senior ministers including Ali and Fuad, and bring the sultan's brother Abdulaziz to the throne.34 It is unlikely that Nedim supported that conspiracy while he was minister; there is no evidence that he did. However, toward the end of 1859, he was dismissed from the ministry of commerce (azl edildi) and remained unemployed for about 6 months after that, which was undoubtedly a serious setback.35Finally, in July 1860, upon his own request (kendi talebi), he was sent as governor general (valT)to Tripoli in North Africa.36 Tripoli was one of the less important posts in the provincial administration. The fact that he was left there for 7 years is suggestive. Nedim's elder brother Sagir Ahmed uiikriiwas also dismissed in 1861 from the post of prefect of Istanbul (?ehir eminT) and remained without a job for the next 10 years, as long as Ali was alive.37 That all this had taken place in the wake of the Kuleli affair (fidailer vak'asi) was perhaps a sign that a serious cleavage had occurred within the Ottoman bureaucracy and within the Muslim community as a whole. At any rate, whatever the reasons for Nedim's shabby treatment, his family ties may have had something to do with it. It is known that some of the leaders of the conspiring zealots had belonged to the Naqshbandi-Khalidi suborder,38to which Nedim's father, Giircu Necib, had also belonged.39This suggests that some leaders of the group and Giircii Necib's family shared a common outlook, and that may have been enough in Ali Pasa's eyes to disqualify them for office. As a Naqshbandi-Khalidi, Nedim's father would have brought up his son to believe in the principles of Orthodox Islam and that shari'a rules should be supreme in society and state. This explains why Mahmud Nedim was regarded by some Young Ottomans as a possible replacement for Ali in the later 1860s.40 However, in spite of his upbringing, he seems to have had a change of mind, although his views always remained within the framework of Islam. Nedim's three years of service as a secretary to Damad Mehmed Said may have had their influence upon him, as well. Mehmed Said was a palace man who looked with suspicion on the rising new bureaucrats, regarding them as a threat to the prerogatives of the sultan, if not to the sultanate itself.41 Such suspicions seem to have been an exaggeration even in the eyes of Sultan Abdiilmecid, who in 1848 had Mehmed Said exiled to Sinope in northern Anatolia. After a short service as governor general of Damascus in 1850, Mehmed Said retired from public service at a relatively early age and spent the last 20 years of his life in "solitude and prayers,"42avoiding people and "putting on the garment of dervishes."43 Though Mahmud Nedim never followed suite, he seems to have enjoyed the company of Sufis44 and liked occasionally to escape from the troubled waters of Istanbul politics. Nedim turned out also to be as staunch a supporter of the sultan's power as Mehmed Said.

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In most of the 12 years (1842-54) that Nedim served at the Porte, he seems to have worked closely with Mustafa Re?id, but he does not seem to have been influenced by him in a substantial way, as Ali was. However, the experience he gained during this period was crucial in that it gave him the opportunity to understand the functioning of the Porte and undoubtedly helped him to formulate his views about the Ottoman system. In Tripoli, removed from the politics of Istanbul, Mahmud Nedim used the time to reflect on the affairs of state. The outcome of these reflections was a rejection of the Tanzimat and all that it stood for. The rise of Sultan Abdiilaziz in 1861 led him to write a treatise which he called Ayine-yi [sic] Devlet (The Mirror of State) in which he summed up his views about the causes of Ottoman decline, the Tanzimat, and the means to revive the power of community and state. It is not known whether Sultan Abdiilaziz saw the treatise. However, it is addressed to him,45and if it reached the palace, it is likely that he did know of it, though without the knowledge of Ali or Fuad. In any case, it stayed in manuscript form and remained little known until it was printed in 1909, apparently published by people opposing the post-Hamidian regime.46 To write such a treatise was not unusual. We know of Fuad's "Political Testament" and of a memorandum attributed to Ali published in French under the title of Testament politique, and of another sent from Crete in 1867.47But these memoranda were of a political nature and dealt with current affairs. Nedim's treatise, on the other hand, touched on political theory, analyzing the principles upon which the Ottoman state was founded, the reason for its decline, and the means for its revival as he saw them. Running to 61 printed pages, it was more a political credo than a memorandum, and it is extremely important in helping us understand the man, and perhaps the rationale behind the measures taken by him during his first grand vizierate (September 1871 to end of July 1872). Moreover, it may have been representative of a trend in Ottoman politics that had been stifled by Ali and Fuad and denied representation in government in the 1860s. It may also have been written with the specific purpose of influencing the new sultan. In the foreword Nedim states his purpose "to make known to the Sultan the reality of former principles" (usul-u salife) (p. 7). By doing this, he thought he was serving the public good so that "the land, the [Muslim] millet and the government body (heyet-i devlet) will benefit from the attempt of the Sultan to rectify the order of things" (taslih-i umur) (p. 8). Nedim wanted the new sultan to rectify what went wrong in the state, presumably during the reign of his brother and predecessor Sultan Abdiilmecid. During that period "neither wealth, nor power, nor [even] independence had remained" (p. 65), he wrote, which shows his resentment over the measures taken and the policies followed during the Tanzimat period. What Nedim was suggesting to Sultan Abdiilaziz amounted to an alternative to the Tanzimat reforms. The basic contribution of the Gulhane Rescript had been to bring to an end the absolute rule of the sultans.48After more than two decades of the Tanzimat, Nedim must have come to the conclusion that the Tanzimat were leading, in fact, to an order contrary to that which had existed in the heyday of the empire. In his

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view the sultan was the mainstay of the state. Sultans of old, he wrote, "were absolute (mustakil), and their government was carried on according to their will."49 They were, moreover, fully involved in the affairs of state and gave them their whole attention. However, though their power was absolute, those sultans did not exceed the bounds of law (p. 8). Consequently, their ministers did not overstep the limits of justice and uprightness (pp. 8-9). Those sultans were not only powerful but also determined and resolute.50 In the early days, when the sultans had personally tended to the affairs of government, and when the laws and regulations were kept within the bounds of the gerF'at, religious and communal zeal (gayret-i diniyye ve milliyye) were real, and "the union of hearts [that bound together] the sultanate and [the Muslim] community, as well as Ottoman power, increased day after day" (pp. 9-10). Moreover, when sultans managed the affairs of state themselves, Muslim power grew, the Janissary corps and the ulema were kept under control, and the interests of the state were kept apart from the private interests of its ministers (p. 10). That was the essence of the Ottoman order in Nedim's view. Under this order the state was powerful and its inhabitants, Muslims and non-Muslims alike (millet ve teba'a), were prosperous. But this system started to decline and the state started to weaken when the sultans became unwary and ceased to attend to state affairs in person as the earlier sultans had done. When this happened, the direction of the affairs of state passed into the hands of officials, and the sultans were not informed about the condition of the land and the people (pp. 10, 36). To preserve their positions and their independence, the officials and high ulema flattered the Janissary corps much more than was justifiable and used them to frighten the sultan. As a result, the Janissaries became unruly, and abuses and corruption began to creep into the governmental system. Consequently, the union that bound together the sultanate and the Muslim millet was breached, and the zeal of the community cooled (p. 11). It could be inferred from the introductory section of Nedim's treatise that the decline of the sultan's power and the rise of the bureaucracy and the ulema lay at the root of the state's and the Muslim millet's weakness. It is perhaps a superficial view about the causes of Ottoman decline, but it was the logical result of the emphasis he placed on the role of the sultan in the traditional Ottoman order and on the direct relation between him and the Muslim community. Whether it was historically true was irrelevant. Nedim's views reflected perhaps more the Tanzimat period than the Ottoman past. It was a call for Sultan Abdiilaziz to take into his own hands the direction of the affairs of state and not to let Ali and Fuad usurp power. Nedim, as we have seen, was affiliated with Mustafa Resid for many years, but in spite of that it is difficult to regard him as Re?id's disciple. Nedim does not appear to have been convinced that the new measures of the Tanzimat were actually beneficial to the state. In his treatise, he had some praise for the acts and measures of Sultan Mahmud II, but only severe criticism for the Tanzimat. There was a "mania" (heves), he wrote, to apply European practices to the Ottoman sultanate (p. 15). Did applying these practices guarantee achieving power and strength? He thought not. They were merely imitating things Euro-

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pean (pp. 12-13) and by so doing were destroying six hundred years of Ottoman practice and "new fundaments had not yet been found" (p. 15). We make new laws, he wrote, by translating paragraphs (fakardt) from European laws and putting them together (p. 13). The ordinances of the seri'at (Muslim law) are no longer observed, and are even regarded as a hindrance to the running of the state (p. 15). The responsibility for all this, writes Nedim, falls on the new bureaucratic class, which has usurped power and now controls the state's destiny. The reforms have allowed this class to increase tremendously in both number and power. The government has numerous ministries. In the past, one secretariat sufficed for the Porte; now each ministry has its own secretariat, not to mention provincial offices (pp. 26-27). The cost of maintaining this inflated bureaucracy is enormous: all of these officials receive high monthly salaries from the treasury (p. 27). No one in Istanbul will teach his son a trade or train him in commerce any longer because every parent wants his son to be a government official (p. 27). As a result, the treasury has suffered greatly. The ulema, whether in active service or not, receive high salaries as well (p. 27). During the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, taking money out of the treasury was not easy (p. 29), and there was no need to ask the merchants of Galata or foreigners for loans (p. 30). This new class of bureaucrats was extravagant and corrupt (p. 28). Offices should be given to capable and experienced men of integrity whose devotion and loyalty (saddkat) to the sultan were beyond doubt (pp. 35-36, 40, 46). Nedim blamed much of the state's decline on incompetence, intrigue, and self-interest. "It is most important," he wrote, that "each state employ honest functionaries. . . and train efficient officials" (p. 40). When a new and inexperienced official is appointed, he should be put under observation and scrutiny (harekatini tefahhus ve tecessus) (p. 40). Nowhere in his treatise does Nedim refer to the Hatt-i Humdytun of 1856, which granted equality to non-Muslims, but he was clearly against it. Justice kept the non-Muslims in the empire satisfied, he wrote; the kind and just treatment (lutuf ve macdelet) the sultans had shown them in early times encouraged them to serve the state well and even sacrifice their lives for it. This treatment led many willingly to become Muslims (p. 43). Following the Muslim concept, it was justice, not equality, that mattered; justice and equity ('addlet ve insdf) were duties upon rulers and governments. "Ghazi Osman Khan, the founder of the exalted state, succeeded in establishing a large state and [in increasing] Muslim power by justice" (p. 43). As justice was at the foundation of the Ottoman state, so it was the abandoning of justice, and the oppression and highhandedness of the government that led to the disorder of later years, to the weakness and decline of the state's power, and to the undermining of its independence (p. 44). But thanks to God, the rise of just, renovating (miijeddid), and resolute padishahs, Islamic power had been saved from great danger (p. 44). A third quality that Nedim would have liked to see in government functionaries was public zeal (gayret), both religious and communal (p. 52). But he warned that zeal could turn into fanaticism, and that, in his view, was misguidance and should be avoided (pp. 52-53). Communal and religious zeal, he

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wrote, along with love of country (vatan) and submission to those entrusted with authority, were sacred duties and an obligation upon all Muslims (p. 53). It is obvious that Nedim was apprehensive about what would become of the state if the Tanzimat reforms were to continue along the same course. The Ottoman state had its duty to Islam and the Muslim community. In his conclusion, he wrote that the Ottoman state had united the Muslim community (cem'iyet-i islamiyye) in the past after it had been scattered and divided, and had preserved and protected it. What was good in the past was still good today. The well-being of the Muslim community depends on the well-being of the state. But the well-being of the state depends on an all-powerful sultan (pp. 60-61). It was the obligation of each Muslim believer to obey the ruler and to show religious and communal zeal, "because the Ottoman sultans who adorn the seat of the Supreme Caliphate (hilafet-i kubra) were the protectors of the faith, the community, and the state. Submission to their orders is the first requirement for the survival of the power of the state and of the [Muslim] community (millet)" (p. 53). Two decades later an Arab sheikh in Istanbul was to make the same argument to support the Caliphate of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), and to justify his absolute rule.51 The following recommendations were the essential principles of Nadim's treatise and were meant to undermine the achievements of the Tanzimat: that the center of power should be restored to the palace and that the sultan should attend in person to the affairs of the state; that the bureaucracy should be fully subject to him; that the sultan and the Muslim community should be united in purpose; that justice, not equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, should be the basis of the state; and that the Muslim community alone should form the body politic. However, as long as Ali was alive, Sultan Abdiilaziz was unable to challenge his control of the government. When Ali died in September 1871, Nedim himself became grand vizier and the sultan finally had the opportunity to put such views into practice. Sagir Ahmed-zade Mehmed Bey, a nephew of Mahmud Nedim, may have been a leader of a conspiracy of Young Ottomans, the aim of which was to remove Ali and other leading ministers from office by violent means and to bring Mahmud Nedim to the grand vizierate.52But Nedim himself was probably not privy to the plot,53 and when it was discovered in spring 1867, he returned without delay from Tripoli to Istanbul and made his peace with Ali.54 For some reason, Ali did not send him back to his post, but found it expedient to keep him in the capital. The timing of Nedim's return could not have been better for him. He was soon appointed a member of the High Council (meclisi vdld). In March 1868, he became minister of the navy (bahriye ndzri), a position he filled for the next three and a half years, a long time by Ottoman standards. It indicates, perhaps, that Ali chose to be tolerant towards at least some of his opponents, or may have wished to placate the Muslims who, according to Cevdet, harbored much resentment against him,55especially after the unpopular concessions he was forced to grant to end the uprising in Crete (1866-68). Immediately after his return from Crete at the end of February 1868, he had appointed not only Mahmud Nedim

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but some other junior statesmen of similar outlook to ministerial posts.56 Nedim took advantage of his post to strengthen his position. Fuad, who seems to have had stronger feelings against Nedim than Ali did, died in early 1869,57 and Nedim succeeded in gaining the sultan's favor and securing the backing of palace
circles.58

By the time Ali died in early September 1871,59Nedim was ready to step into his shoes. There is evidence that Ali was aware that this would happen.60At the time, the British ambassador remarked that Nedim "had been so long on intimate terms with Ali and knew well his opinion upon most public matters."61But it was not the policies of Ali which guided Nedim; it was his own views of the Ottoman past. The appointment of Nedim to the grand vizierate had a direct and immediate effect upon the fortunes of a number of statesmen who shared his political outlook and had for the most part been denied high office since the end of the 1850s; they too were appointed to prominent positions in the government.62 Namik Pa?a (1804-92), a military man, was appointed to the presidency of the Council of State (sura-i devlet).63 In the early 1860s, he had served as governor of Baghdad and, between April 1867 and April 1868, as serasker in Istanbul.64 He was then dismissed and seems to have remained without a post for about 3/2 years before he was given his new post by Nedim.65Much later in his long career, Namik Pasa fell under the influence of a mystic group of the Halveti suborder of Ibrahimiyye, which was of strong orthodox leanings,66 and his beliefs and actions took an ultraconservative turn.67 Another member of the group was Ahmed Muhtar Molla Bey, who became seyh-uiil-Islam.A friend of Nedim and like him of a family of Georgian origin,68 he was also, like Nedim, of Sufi disposition and wrote commentaries on Sufi tracts.69Another minister of conservative outlook, a leftover of Ali's times, was Yusuf Kamil Pasa, a former grand vizier who served as minister of justice.70 On the whole, Kamil tended to side with the palace against Ali and Fuad. He was also known to have been a protector of ?inasi and, after him, of Namik Kemal and Ziya, who later became leading members of the Young Ottoman movement.7' Still others were Ibrahim Edhem and Ahmed Vefik,72both of whom became grand viziers under Sultan Abdulhamid II, and the minister of foreign affairs, Server, whose wife was a niece of Sultan Abduiilaziz.73 Server also served for a while in the same capacity under Abdulhamid II. With the support of this group Nedim felt he was in a position to put into practice the principles advocated in his treatise. True to his word, he allowed the Sultan to assume full and absolute control over the affairs of the state.74 Sultan Abdulaziz may have had tendencies for absolute power, but as long as Ali was in control he could not exercise a free hand.75Mahmud Nedim encouraged him on that course at the expense of his own power as grand vizier. The view attributed to Yusuf Kamil that "the death of Ali [brought] the disintegration of the grand vizierate"76 (saddret-in inhilali), may not have been far from the truth. Among Nedim's first acts after becoming grand vizier was to rid himself of Ali and Fuad's associates and proteges and to shift high officials, especially governors-general of provinces, from one place to another.77 He also dismissed

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many high functionaries, among them All's son, Ali Fuad, who had held a senior position at the foreign ministry.78 Another was Mehmed Ra?id, a young and vigorous provincial governor-general and a protege of Ali, who had been the governor-general of the province of Syria for the last 5/2 years. Nedim ordered him by telegraph to transfer his responsibilities to the commanding general in Damascus within 24 hours and return to Istanbul without delay. As long as Nedim was in office, both Ali Fuad and Ra?id remained unemployed.79 Other senior functionaries of Ali's group were not only dismissed from office, but were not even allowed to remain in Istanbul; they were sent home to the provinces. At the top of that list stood Hiiseyin Avni and 5irvani-zade Mehmed Riidi. The former was a minister of war (serasker) and Ali's right-hand man in military matters, and the latter, a protege of Fuad, was a senior minister in the 1860s.80Another of Ali's ministers who suffered a similar fate at the hands of Nedim was Hiisnii Pa?a, the minister of police (zabtiye miiri) during the last three years of Ali's term.8' They all remained in exile until the fall of Nedim at the end of July 1872. "Such acts," wrote the biographer Inal, "contradicted both the rules of the Tanzimat and of justice."82 When Yusuf Kamil, the president of the Council of State, and Miitercim Mehmed Rii?di, the minister of justice (both leftovers from Ali's last government), protested Nedim's actions, they were both promptly dismissed. A little later, Yusuf Kamil was restored to the government as minister of justice,83 but Miitercim Mehmed Ruiidi remained unemployed and bitterly resentful.84Nedim had perhaps committed a tactical mistake by maltreating such a highly respected old man who was senior to him in both age and service. By all these acts, Nedim thought he could intimidate the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and subjugate it to the absolute will of the sultan. His objective was to shift the locus of power back to the palace where it had been during the reign of Mahmud II. This was the basic idea in his treatise, and this was apparently what he set out to accomplish. But the bureaucracy did not accept this passively, and Nedim perhaps failed to estimate correctly the power it had gathered. Since the late 1850s and especially in the 1860s, the control of the army had passed from the hands of palace affiliates into the hands of officers independent of the palace like Miitercim Mehmed Ru?di and Hiiseyin Avni. Coming from humble origins, these officers and many others like them owed much to the Tanzimat, which opened the way for social mobility, but owed nothing to the palace. Consequently, they supported the Tanzimat and had been close associates of Ali and Fuad. When they had come to occupy the office of serasker (commander-in-chief of the land forces), they automatically became members of the government as ministers of war in accordance with the Ottoman tradition. In other words, during the 1860s, close cooperation was maintained between the army leadership and the bureaucracy.85 Not only was the Tanzimat bureaucracy much more powerful than Nedim had anticipated, but at the same time the prestige of the sultan was much weaker than it had been just a few decades earlier. In addition, Sultan Abdiilaziz himself seems to have lacked the ability and the tact to handle the situation. Finally, the reforms themselves, especially those measures undertaken by Ali and Fuad

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beginning with the Hatt-i Humdyuin of 1856, had also weakened the sultan's power. Those measures that had attempted to tackle the problem of communal plurality in the state at the time of changing political circumstances and that had come to be known by the name of Ottomanism (osmanhhk) were objectionable, in Nedim's view, because they put the sultan in a false position as having to approve acts that contradicted the shari'a, which it was his duty to defend and preserve. In this way, a gulf had been cut between the sultan and the Muslim community. Ottomanism, moreover, had made the sultan the head of a state of legally equal citizens. But in the eyes of Nedim this function overshadowed the sultan's traditional and primary function as the head of the Muslim community. Consequently, it was a source of weakness, as well, because it weakened the bond, or in Nedim's words "the union of hearts," between him and that community. Nedim saw the need to tighten this bond, regarding it as a source of strength for both the sultan and the community. To achieve this, he called for a renewal of Muslim religious and communal zeal (gayret).86 But it was not clear in his treatise how he was going to achieve it. When he became grand vizier (about 10 years after he had written his treatise), the idea of an Ottoman caliphate presented itself to him. To have this title reemphasized after it had been neglected throughout the Tanzimat years would undoubtedly serve the sultan in more than one way. In his treatise, Nedim referred to the caliphate only in passing. In the section about "zeal," he spoke of the duty of obedience to the sultan "because Ottoman Padigahs adorn the seat of the Supreme Caliphate" (hilafet-i kibrd).87 But he did not elaborate. In the meantime, however, several developments had taken place that would support such a claim. First of all, there was a rise in the religious sentiment among Ottoman Muslims which "seems to have been a reaction against the . .. policies of Ali and the pressure of Europeans."88The rise of this sentiment was a sign for Nedim that Muslim public opinion would respond favorably to a move towards Islamic values of state. On the other hand, the Muslim world had begun to look to Istanbul. As Muslim rulers in Asia and Africa fell under the sway of European colonial powers, they turned towards the Ottoman Empire, the most powerful Muslim state, for help. Only after 1871, did their envoys meet with a positive, though limited, response.89This was the beginning of a pan-Islamic movement at whose center the Ottoman sultan found himself. It provided the sultan with a distinguished place among Muslim rulers and a justification to claim the supreme caliphate. "This doctrine," states Bernard Lewis, "was advanced for the first time" under Sultan Abdtilaziz.90As Ali would presumably have objected to such a doctrine, it was most probably advanced during the first grand vizierate of Nedim. Whatever help the Ottomans were able to provide for those rulers, there is no doubt that the promotion of this doctrine helped to enhance the position of the sultan internally as well as externally. The idea of an Ottoman caliphate had undoubtedly appealed to many Muslims throughout the empire. But this was not in itself sufficient to arouse the religious

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and communal zeal that Nedim sought. Thus, he looked for other means, though his 11 months as grand vizier were not enough to find them. Muslims were endowed by nature (bilmecbuliyyet) with the quality of religious and communal zeal, he wrote in his treatise. This quality, along with the obedience to those entrusted with authority (uli'l-amr), were in his view a religious duty (farzia).9' But, he warned, arousing religious zeal should be achieved without allowing fanaticism. "To turn religious zeal into fanaticism ... [was an act] of some coarse and ignorant people who wear the garb of ulema,"92 he wrote. Nedim might have been sincere in wanting to avoid fanaticism. In a multireligious society, it would have imperiled relations between the various communities, and accusing "some ulema" of fanaticism was perhaps an indication of his distrust of the ulema. Maybe it was not an accident that some ulema took an active part in the movement that led to Nedim's dismissal, in May 1876, from his second tenure as grand vizier.93If Nedim had a plan in mind when he wrote the treatise, we may infer from this comment that the ulema had no place in it. He would use instead the Sufi sheikhs, especially those sheikhs of the popular or semipopular orders. Nedim seems to have liked the company of Sufi sheikhs. His first master and perhaps real mentor, Damad Mehmed Said spent, as we have seen, the last two decades of his life in their company. When he was in Tripoli, Nedim enjoyed friendly relations with Muhammad Zafir, the sheikh of the Shadhili-Madani suborder.94When he was governor-general of Adana (October 1873-April 1875), it was reported that he also associated with them.95 These close relations convinced him of the influence they could exert over ordinary Muslims. But in his brief tenure as grand vizier, Nedim could not possibly have done more than initiate steps towards a policy of using the Sufi sheikhs to arouse religious and communal zeal and to strengthen the bond between the sultan and the Muslim community. It was left to Sultan Abdulhamid 11 (1876-1909) to implement the policies laid down by Nedim.96 One act, however, does shed light on the means that Nedim thought of for arousing communal zeal. On Wednesday, 23 Safer 1289 (2 May 1872) the newspaper BasTret,which seems to have been close to the Sublime Porte and was widely read in Istanbul,97reported that a certain "Dervish Bey Efendi, a descendent of the .. . Abbasid dynasty [sic] who is living in the Sanjak of Hakkari [in southeast Anatolia] and who until now. . . possessed a pair of sandals of the Prophet," was on his way from Diyarbakir to Istanbul. He was bringing the sandals with him in order to hand them over to the Imperial Treasury.98For the next 11 days, BasTret and other newspapers published on their front pages Dervish Efendi's itinerary. He crossed Anatolia from Diyarbakir in the south to the port of Samsun on the Black Sea in the north. Several miracles were said to have occurred along the way. When, for instance, the carriage carrying the sandals crossed a bridge over "the river of Amasya," the current, normally strong, stopped, and the water stood still.99 And when the sandals reached Samsun, they were received "with full honors and respect according to timehonored Muslim practice."100

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A special boat, the 5i'ar-i Nusret, was sent to Samsun to transport Dervish Efendi and "the exalted trust" to Istanbul. It arrived on 4 Rabi I. On Monday 5 Rabi I [13 May], the offices of the Porte declared a holiday,'10 and Mahmud Nedim, the grand vizier, Namik Pa?a, the president of the Council of State, ministers, ulema, (Sufi) sheikhs, high-ranking officers, and many other dignitaries went down to the landing at Sirkeci. The grand vizier solemnly carried the box that contained the sandals and put it on a special carriage driven by four horses. About 50 men carrying torches attended the carriage and about 50 special guards escorted it, all praying and calling: "Ellah-ii Ekber. ..." Before the carriage rode the grand vizier and a number of preachers (vdaizler) and behind it rode Dervish Efendi mounted on a horse, and behind him the ministers, ulema, and sheikhs, all mounted. The procession went up the hill along the Divan Road (Divan Yolu) to the Topkapi Palace. Police and troops lined the road. When the procession reached the palace grounds, the grand vizier solemnly carried the box to the hall where the sacred relics of the Prophet were kept. Then ministers, ulema, sheikhs, and the other dignitaries entered the hall for the blessing. The sultan was to visit the place after Friday's prayers, after which it was to be opened to the public for three days.'02 It was certainly a demonstration of piety, though with many political overtones. Many questions arise from this event. First of all, why were these sandals discovered during the grand vizierate of Nedim? Had they been discovered a little earlier, would they have received such attention?'03Whatever the answers, the event was not at all compatible with the tenets of orthodox Islam. It obviously belonged to popular Islam, and was certainly a long way from Nedim's own early training. To theorize about the political order was one thing, and to put those theories into practice was another. Nedim had been very unhappy about the Tanzimat reforms. They meant for him the contraction of the sultan's power and the rise of the bureaucracy, in other words, the shifting of the locus of power from the palace to the Porte, and the granting of equal rights to the non-Muslims, in violation of the shari'a. The result had been the establishment of a state on the basis of equal citizens rather than confessional communities, innovations which Nedim regarded as a source of weakness to state and community. The success of his alternative depended on a capable and determined sultan and a submissive bureaucracy. But Sultan Abdulaziz was not equal to the role that Nedim had asked him to assume, and the bureaucracy did not acquiesce to any loss of its power. What followed was a struggle between two concepts of political order and perhaps between two political forces as well. Ali had been able to avoid such a struggle in the 1860s and achieve stability as well as apply extensive reforms. But Ali had no successor. The struggle between the bureaucrats and the conservatives caused instability at the highest level, which in the end brought down the sultan himself.
HAIFA UNIVERSITY HAIFA, ISRAEL

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Author's note: It is a pleasure to express my gratitude to Professor Roderic H. Davison of George Washington University for reading this paper and commenting on it. His remarks were most useful. I am grateful as well to the governing body of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin for their fellowship, which allowed me the free time to write this article. 'Ahmed Liitfi, TarTh-i LutfT, 8 vols. (Istanbul, A.H. 1290-1328), vol. 6:107: "Tanzimat usuilu atika-yi istibdddiyeyi imhd ifiin bir kdniun idi." See also Abdulrahman Seref, Tdr7h Musdhabeleri (Istanbul, A.H. 1339), p. 63; cf. Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton, N.J., 1963), p. 43. 2According to Cevdet, Ali said in private that "the Lord has entrusted the well-being of the state to five or six people. These should govern the fate of the state" (quoted in Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought [Princeton, N.J., 1962], p. 111. See also Mardin's quotation from F. Millingen, La Turquie sous le regne d'Abdul Aziz (Paris, 1868), p. 112. See also Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 vols. (New York, 1977), 2:153. 3See, for instance, what Ahmed Arif Hikmet Bey (seyh-ul-Islam, 1846-1854) had written in his DTvan (Istanbul, A.H. 1283), p. 263, concerning the Giilhane Rescript and Sultan Abdiilmecid; see also Lutfi, Tarih, 6:55, 165. 40n Mehmed Said, see Tdrih-i Atd (Istanbul, A.H. 1292), 2:198-202; on Mehmed Ali, see Ahmed Rifat, HadTkat-ulvuzerd zeyli (Istanbul, A.H. 1283), pp. 48-52; Mahmud K. Inal, Son sadrlazamlar (Istanbul, 1940), 1:59-73; on Fethi, see Tdrih-i 'Atd, 2:215-18. On their conflict with Resid, see Inal, Son sadrizamlar, 1:63-64; 'Ali Fu'ad, Rical-i miihimme-i siydsiye (Istanbul, 1928), pp. 11-14; Fatma 'Aliyye, Ahmed Cevdet Pdsd ve zemdni (Istanbul, A.H. 1332), pp. 34-35, 42-43, 86, 92; Mehmed Memduh, Esvdt-i sudur (Izmir, A.H. 1328), p. 13. 50n Hasan Riza, see Sicill-i Osmani, 4 vols. (hereafter SO) (Istanbul, A.H. 1308-11), 2:399-400. 60n Ali, see a short biography by his son cAli Fu'ad, Rical-i muhimme-i siydsiye, pp. 56-101. See also Inal, Son sadriazamlar, vol. 1:4-58; Ahmed Rifat, HadTkat-ulvuzerd zeyli, pp. 43-48; Davison, Reform, index. H. Bowen, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2d ed. (El2), 1:396-98. Ahmet H. Ongunsu, Islam Ansiklopedisi, 1:335-40. Until now there has been no monograph on him in any language. 7cAli Fu'ad, Rical-i muhimme-i siydsiye, pp. 94-96; Ahmed Cevdet, Tezakir, 4 vols. (Ankara, 1953-67), 1:16; Davison, Reform, p. 53. 8English translation in Jacob C. Hurewitz, ed., The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics (New Haven, Conn., 1975), pp. 315-18; see also Davison, Reform, pp. 53-54, for the part of some European ambassadors in its drafting. See also Enver Z. Karal, Osmanli tarihi, VI: Islahdt Fermani Devri, 1856-1861 (Ankara, 1954), pp. 1-12; Ahmet Refik, "Turikiye'de isldhdtfermdni," in Turk Tarih Encumeni Mecmuasi, no. 4 (81), 1922, pp. 193-215. 9As far as I know, there is no research work in any language on "Ottomanism"; see, however, references in Davison, Reform, pp. 8; 56 f.; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1961), pp. 333-34; Mardin, Genesis, p. 14. '?For the reaction to the Hatt-i Humdyun, see Cevdet, Tezakir, 1:68-69; Davison, Reform, pp. 57-60; and Mardin, Genesis, p. 355. "On Mahmud Nedim, see M. K. Inal, Son sadriazamlar (Istanbul, 1940), 1:259-314; Mehmed Z. Pakalin, Mahmud Nedim Pasa (Istanbul, 1940); R. Davison in El2, 6:68-69 and SO, 4:336-37. Strangely enough there is no biography of Mahmud Nedim in Islam Ansiklopedisi. 2Nedim was born in 1818; Ali and Fuad were born in 1815. '3As his name shows, Necib Pasa was of Georgian origin. He was perhaps born in Istanbul, but his father seems to have come there from Georgia. See [Andreas D. Mordtmann], Stambul und das moderne Turkenthum (Leipzig, 1877-78), 1:91. On Necib, see SO, 4:545-46. Mahmud Nedim Pasa (Istanbul, 1940), p. 1. 4Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:259; Pakahlin, '5See Nedim's autobiographical poem Hasbihdl, in Ayine ve hasbihdl (Istanbul, 1327/1909), p. 69. '6Tdrih-i Atd, 2:200-201. 17Hasbihdl,p. 69. 'Ibid., pp. 75-76.

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'9Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:259. 20James Redhouse, TurkVeden inglizceye lugat kitdbi (Constantinople, 1921), p. 1954; "Chief secretary of a ministry." See also Mehmed Z. Pakalin, Osmanlhtarih deyimleri ve terimleri sozlii.ii, 3 vols. (Istanbul, 1946-54), 3:80. 21Amedi was the receiver-general of provincial correspondence addressed to the grand vizier; see Pakalin, Deyimleri ve terimleri, 1:55-56. 22He is also known as Giritli Mustafa because he served as governor of Crete for many years. See Inal, Son sadriazamlar 1:75, n. 1; SO 4:480-81. was the head of an office at the Porte which issued diplomas and ratified foreign treaties. 23BeylikCi For beylikci, see Pakalin, Deyimleri ve terimleri, 1:221. 24He was a councillor and assistant to the grand vizier. For this post see SO, addenda to 4:806-7. 25Minir Aktepe, ed., Vak'a-niivis Ahmed Lufti Efendi tarihi, cilt IX (Istanbul, 1984), p. 100. It was a new post, and the duties assigned to it were not clear. Carter V. Findley, in his book Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922 (Princeton, N.J., 1980), renders it "under secretary"(see p. 170). 26Liitf, Tdarh,9:114; see also Cevdet, Tezakir, 1:32; Inal, Son sadrlazamlar, 1:260. 27Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:262, stated that Nedim served in Damascus between December 1855 and August-September 1857 (Muharram, A.H. 1274), i.e., for about 20 months. Siireyya however, in SO 4:336, stated that he served there between December 1855 and September 1856. The truth is with Siireyya as there is a report from the British consul general in Beirut stating that Nedim had left Beirut to go to Smyrna on 19 October 1856. (See F.O. 78/1219, Moore-Clarendon, despatch 54 (Political), dated Beirut, 6 November 1856; see also Lutfi, Tdrih, 9:125, 129. 2Mehmed Mamduh, Esvat-i Sudufir (Izmir, 1328 A.H.), p. 13. See also Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:63. 29Ali Fuad, Rical-i muihimme-i siyasiye, p. 19; Ahmed Rifat, pp. 46-47, pp. 68-69. See also for further bibliography R. Davison, "Fu-ad Pasa," in El2, 2:934-36; on Ali see also n. 6; see also Findley, Bureaucratic Reform, p. 154. 300On"the alliance" with MuiitercimRuidi see LuiitfT, Tdrih, 9:175; Ali Fuad, Rical-i muhimme-i siyasiye, pp. 94-96; Fatma 'Aliyye, Ahmed Cevdet, p. 88, who called them perhaps after her father selase" (i.e., the three divine persons of the Christian Trinity). It should be added that a "akdnTm-i little later the relationship between Ali and Riisdi cooled, and it was never warm again, see 5eref, TadrhMusdhabeleri (Istanbul, A.H. 1339), p. 203. "On the expectations of Nedim, see Cevdet, Tezakir, 2:92. "32See Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:263 and Davison, El2, 6:68. "33Cevdet, Tezaikir,2:92; Cevdet, Ma'ruizat,ed. Yusuf Halacoglu (Istanbul, 1980), p. 67; Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:267-68. 34On the "Fidailer Vak'asi," known also as "Kuleli Vak'asi," see Cevdet, Tezakir, 2:82-83, 85-86; Lufti, TarTh,9:152; Davison, Reform, pp. 100-103; n. 69, p. 102; Davison, "European Archives as a Source for Later Ottoman History," in Report on Current Research on the Middle East, 1958, pp. 33-45, especially pp. 38-41; Ulug Igdemir, Kuleli Vak'asihakkinda bir Arastirma (Ankara, 1937). "35See Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:263; Davison, El2, 6:68. 36On his service in Tripoli, see Ahmad al-Na'ib, al-Manhal al-Adhb f TarTkhTarablus al-Gharb, 2 vols. (Istanbul, 1317 A.H.), 1:383-86; T. A. al-ZawT, Wulat Tarablus min Bidayat al-Fath al-Arabr ila Nihdyat al-Ahd al- Turki (Beirut, 1390/1970), pp. 128-29. 37"On Ahmed Lutfi Efendi Tarihi, Sagir Ahmed Sukru, see SO 1:303; M. Aktepe, ed., Vaka-nuiivis cilt X (Istanbul, 1988), p. 29. He was the father of Mehmed Bey, one of the Young Ottoman leaders; see Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, N.J., 1962), pp. 10, 12, nn. 1, 3. 38The leader Sheikh Ahmad al-Sulaimani belonged, it seems, to the Naqshbandi-Khalidi suborder. See Serif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey (Albany, N.Y., 1989), p. 59. One of his chief supporters, Hizargradli Hasan Feyzullah Efendi, was also a Naqshbandi sheikh (see U. Igdemir, Kuleli Vakasi, pp. 62-63; SO, 4:40). On the release of Sheikh Feyzullah from exile incurred as a punishment, see Lutfit, Tdrah,9:26-27. 39See my article, "The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19th Century," WI., 22 (1982-84), 1-36, especially p. 24.

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40SeeR. Davison, Reform, pp. 210-11; Cevdet, Ma'ruzdt, pp. 196 ff. 41See Mehmed Said's attitude towards Resid in 1848 when the latter was grand vizier, in Fatma 'Aliyye, Ahmed Cevdet, pp. 42-43; Ali Fuad, Riciil-i muhimme-i siyasiye, p. 11. 42TarihicAta, 2:201. 43sO, 3:47-48; see also Ali Fuad, Rical-i muhimme-i siyasiye, p. 163. 44Z. M. Mujahid, al-Aclam al-Sharqiyya, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1949-63), 3:125-26; al-Jawdaib, 4 October 1876. 45See pp. 7-8 of Nedim's treatise, Ayine ve Hasbihdl (Istanbul, A.H. 1327). Pakalin thinks that it was published by one of Nedim's "relatives";see his Mahmud Nedim Papa (Istanbul, 1940), p. 8. is a long autobiographical poem written in 1861-62 (perhaps at the same time of the 46IHasbihdl treatise). It was published as an addendum in pp. 68-78. The treatise was also followed by a long poem (pp. 62-68) in praise of the Ottoman sultans, each of whom were named. Nedim seems to have written another treatise (risale) called Hikaye-i Melik-i Muzaffer (The Story of the Victorious King), perhaps in verse, but it cannot be found. Perhaps it was never published. See pp. 3-5 of Nedim, Ayine ve Hasbihdl, where the editor had given a short biography of Nedim. He was apparently the author of another risale called Reddiye, in which he answered Ahmed Midhat in his book Uss-i Inkildb, 2 vols. (Istanbul, A.H. 1294-95), but it was never published; see Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:272 ff. 4See R. H. Davison, "The Question of Ali Pasa's Political Testament," in International Journal of Middle East Studies, II (1980), 209-25; R. H. Davison, "The Question of Fu'ad Pasa's Political Testament," in Belleten 23,89 (1959), 119-36; Engin D. Akarli, Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanli sadriazamlarindan Ali ve Fuad Pasalarin siyasi vasiyetnameleri (Istanbul, 1978). 48Seen. 1 above; Mardin, Genesis, pp. 155 ff. 49Nedim, Ayine, pp. 9, 36. Mustakil means "absolute," according to Redhouse p. 1846. See also "Istiklal," in El2, 3:260. Redhouse, however, gave the same meaning for muiistebid(1831). But ,. Sami in Kamus-u Tuirkidifferentiated between them. For mustakil he wrote "Kendi ba#ina" which can mean "absolute," and for istibdad he added: "Hip bir nizam ve kanun tabi olmak . . . ," i.e., [he] who does not follow any order or law. See pp. 1340, 96, respectively, see also p. 103. "Nedim, Ayine, p. 9. He summarizes that in five words: "vukiufve ikddm ve himmet." 5'See my article, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda al-Sayyadi," in Middle Eastern Studies, 15 (1979), 131-53. "2Cevdet, Ma'ruzdt, p. 197; Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:265; Abdulrahman Seref, TdrrhMusdhabeleri (Istanbul, A.H. 1339), p. 173; Davison, El2, 6:68; Mardin, Genesis, p. 43. "5This is the accepted view (see Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:265 ff. for Nedim's application to return to Istanbul and the approval of the Porte). But Cevdet thought the contrary was true. He wrote in Ma'ruizdt(p. 197) that Nedim planned "to arrive in Istanbul on precisely the day the conspirators attacked the Porte." It is likely that Cevdet was biased because he disliked Nedim. 54On his return, see BasbakanhlkArsivi, Meclis-i Mahsus, no. 1420 (dated 15 Safer 1284), where it is stated that Nedim returned "me-zun-en ve muivakkaten"(by permission and [only] temporarily); see also Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:266. However, Ali may have suspected that Nedim was implicated in the affair (see a quotation attributed to Said Pasa in Inal, Son sadriazamlar), but it requires a further investigation. "55SeeInal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:38, quoting Cevdet; Davison, Reform, pp. 209-10; cf. Mardin, Genesis, pp. 113-14. 56Comparethe list of ministers in Sdlndme-i Devlet-i Aliye for 1284 (1867-68), p. 35, and 1285 (1868-69), p. 35; see also SO, 2:90; 3:230; 4:52 for the biographies of A. Cevdet, M. Safvet, and M. Qabuli, respectively; and 2:11 for Server who was appointed prefect of Istanbul (?ehir Emini) at the same time. "See Davison, El2, 2:935; on Fuad see also Ali Fuad, Rical-i muhimme-i siyasiye, pp. 141-74. "Mahmud Celaluddin, Mir'dt-i HakTkat (Istanbul, A.H. 1326-27), vol. 1:35; Ali Fuad, Rical-i muhimme-i siydsiye, p. 99. 59Cevdetsays in Ma'ruzdt, p. 207, that the sultan waited two or three days before deciding finally on Nedim. 60Accordingto Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:270. 6'Elliot-Granville, F.O. 78/2177, despatch 329 dated Constantinople, 11 September 1871.

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62Alist in the Salndme of 1289, p. 35. 63He was appointed in 21 October 1871, after the dismissal from that post of Yusuf Kamil a leftover from the time of Ali, see SO, 4:71, 539; Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:224. 64This must have been an exceptional appointment, due perhaps to the fact that many highranking officers were in Crete. 65On Namik Pasa, see I. A. Govsa, Turk Mehuirlari Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1946), p. 274; Sehabeddin Akalin, "Mehmet Namik Pasa," in Tarih Dergisi (Eyliil, 1952), 4:127-46. 66See Mardin, Genesis, pp. 58-59, n. 106. On this suborder, see Yasar N. Oztiirk, Kutsal Gnillii Veli KusadalhIbrahim Halveti (Istanbul, 1982). 67According to I. Parmaksizoglu, when he was a member of the senate in 1877, Namik Pasa suggested that all ministers should be Muslims, but Miitercim Mehmed Ruldi Pasa opposed him and accused him of "alrilik" (exceeding the limits); see Turk Ansiklopedisi, 25:114. 68AbdulkadirAltunsu, Osmanli Seyhiiulislamlari (Ankara, 1972), pp. 202-3. He was a grandson of Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasa (on him see SO, 4:667-68). 69Altunsu, Seyhiiulislamlarn, p. 203; Mehmed T. Brussall, Osmanll Miiellifleri, 2:40; Seref, Tarih Musdhabeleri, p. 307. 70In fact he was left over from the period when Ali was president of the Council of State, but Nedim brought about his dismissal in favor of Namik Pasa after about a month. On Y. Kamil see SO, 4:71-72; Inal, Son Sadriazamlar, 1:196 ff. On this episode, see ibid., 1:107, 224 f. 7See Inal, Son sadrlazamlar, 1:236 f.; Ali Fuad, Rical-i muhimme-i siyasiye, pp. 162-63; Mardin, Genesis, p. 13 n. 5, p. 191, 233; Davison, Reform, p. 183. 72See E. Z. Karal, Osmanlh Tarihi, cilt VIII, Birinci Mesrutiyet ve Istibdad Devirleri, 1876-1907 (Ankara, 1962), p. 280. 73She was the daughter of Damad Halil Rifat by his wife Seniha Sultan. See SO, 3:11-12, and 2:307; Sultan Abdiulazizwas her maternal uncle. 74Celaluddin, Mir'at-i Hakikat, 1:35; cf. also Davison, Reform, p. 279; Findley, Bureaucratic Reform, p. 222; Pakalin, Mahmud Nedim, p. 9. 75It is reported that Sultan Abduiilazizhad said when Ali died that he was at last a free man; see Davison, Reform, p. 279, n. 37; cf. Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:27. 76The statement is quoted in Mahmud K. Inal, "Sultan Abduiilaziz-e dair," in TTEM, n.s., 9 (May, 1925), p. 177; see also Findley, Bureaucratic Reform, p. 221. 17 See Davison, Reform, pp. 281 f.; cf. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform, p. 153. 78On Ali Fuad, see SO 3:578. He was 26 years old at the time, see Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:304 and n. 2. 790On Mehmed Rasid see SO, 2:356-57. On the way of his dismissal, see al-Jawadib dated 11 October and 12 December 1871; for more information about him, see two long obituaries of him in al-Jinan 7 (1876), 473-75; and al-Jawadib, 6 September 1876. 'There is quite a bit of material about those two personalities. First of all, Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:483-599 (for Avni), and 1:436-82 (for ,irvanizade Mehmed Riisdi). On Avni, see also M. Z. Pakalin, Huseyin Avni Pasa (Istanbul, 1941); see E. Kuran, El2, 3:621; concerning possible palace involvement in Avni's exile see Inal, in TTEM, 9 (86), p. 178; Davison, Reform, pp. 264-65. 8'On him, see SO 2:177; Davison, Reform, p. 282; Mordtmann, Stambul, 1:105. 82TTEM,9 (86), p. 180. "8See n. 70; SO, 2:386-87 and 4:71-72. 4Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:107 f. "See my article, "The Roots of the Ascendancy of Ali and Fu'ad at the Sublime Porte: 18551871," forthcoming in the proceedings of the Congress on the Tanzimat held in Ankara, 31 October to 3 November 1989. "Nedim, Ayine, pp. 52-53.
8Ibid. 8See Davison, Reform, p. 271. 89Ibid., pp. 272-77.

9Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1961), p. 121. See also a call for panIslam in Basiret, no. 604, dated 14 Safer 1289 (23 April 1872) and no. 606 and in several other following issues; and Es'ad Efendi, Ittihad-i Islam (Istanbul, 1873), pp. 7-10, 21.

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274

Butrus Abu-Manneh

9'Nedim, Ayine, pp. 52-53.

92Ibid.

93See Davison, Reform, pp. 326-27; I. Hakki Uzuncarseli, Midhat Pasa ve Ylldlz Mahkemesi (Ankara, 1967), p. 14; see also [Midhat Pasa], Midhat Paa, IHayat-i Siydsiyesi Hidemati, Menfa Hayatisi, ed. Ali Hayder Midhat (Istanbul, A.H. 1325), pp. 161-62. 940n Sheikh Zafir, see Muhammad Z. Mujahid, al-A'lam al-sharqiyya, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1949-63), 3:125-26; see also [I. al-Muwaylihi], Ma Hundlika (Cairo, 1895), pp. 200 ff.; see also Tahir A. alZawT,Acldm LTbiya(Tripoli, 1390/1971), pp. 363-64. Sheikh Zafir was the same sheikh who later became close to Sultan Abdulhamid II; see my article, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda al-Sayyadi," in Middle Eastern Studies, 15 (1979), 131-53; especially p. 139. 95Al-Jawa'ib, 4 October 1876; this was a weekly paper that appeared in Istanbul edited by Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq. 96Seepp. 138-42 of my article cited in n. 94. 970n BasTret,see Selim Niizhet, Turk Gazeteciligi 1831-1931 (Istanbul, 1931), pp. 53-54; see also Davison, Reform, p. 276 quoting Mordtmann, Stambul, 1:242. no. 610, dated 23 Safer 1289 (2 May 1872); see also Hakaik-ul Vekdyi', no. 562, dated 98BasTret, 6 Rebi I 1289 (14 May 1872). no. 621, dated 6 Rebi I 1289 (14 May 1872). 99BasTret, 'lIbid., no. 615, dated 29 Safer 1289 (8 May 1872). 'O'Ibid.,no. 621, dated 6 Rebi I 1289 (14 May 1872). '02Thisdescription is based on BasTret,no. 621, on Hakdik-ul Vekadyi,no. 562, both dated 6 Rebi I 1289, and on al-Jawadib of 15 May 1872. '03Itis not clear whether the sandals are among the holy relics in the Topkapi Saray Museum in Istanbul. In a list of relics published by Kemal Qlg entitled Topkapi Miisezi Mukaddes Emanetler Resimli Rehberi (Istanbul, 1966?) no reference to "sandals" is given (I thank my colleague Dr. U. Kupferschmidt for drawing my attention to this publication). But in a booklet published by Tahsin Oz, Hirka-i Saadet Dairesi ve Emanat-i Mukaddese (Istanbul, 1953), an entry on p. 32 entitled "Na'ilin'i Saadet" lists one wooden sandal, 0.23 [cm!] long, upon which the Throne Verse (Quran, 2:256) is engraved. Whether this one sandal is what was discovered, or whether there are another pair of sandals is not clear. BasTretmentioned "a pair." For a photograph of a sandal of the Prophet, see A. Schimmel, And Muhammad Is His Messenger (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), p. 41.

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