Professional Documents
Culture Documents
E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
P R E A M B L E
A R T I C L E I
National Territory
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody
our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
Distinction
It adds the final phrase “under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace.”
“Love” is inserted as a monument to the love that prevented bloodshed in the February Revolution.
The mention of “Truth” is a protest against the deception which characterized the Marcos regime.
“Peace” is mentioned last as the fruit of the convergence of truth, justice, freedom, and love.
“WE”
The use of first person stresses the active and sovereign role of the Filipino people as author of the Constitution. The
language thus differs from that of the 1935 Constitution which used the third person “The Filipino People,” thereby
suggesting that another power was merely announcing that the Filipinos were finally being allowed to promulgate a
constitution.
“EQUALITY”
It emphasizes that a major problem in Philippine society is the prevalence of gross economic and political inequalities.
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ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines
has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and
other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the
internal waters of the Philippines.
“All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.”
This includes any territory which presently belongs or might in the future belong to the Philippines through any of the
internationally accepted modes of acquiring territory. Foremost among these territories are what are referred to by the
1935 Constitution as “all territory over which the present (1935) Government of the Philippine Islands exercises
jurisdiction.” This had reference to the Batanes Islands which, although undisputedly belonging to the Philippines,
apparently lay outside the lines drawn by the Treaty of Paris.
It also includes what was referred to under the 1973 Constitution as territories “belonging to the Philippines by historic
right or legal title,” that is, other territories which, depending on available evidence, might belong to the Philippines (e.g.,
Sabah, the Marianas, Freedom land).
Extent of the Philippine claim to its Aerial Domain, Territorial Sea, the Seabed, the Subsoil, the insular shelves and other
submarine areas.
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The Philippine lays claim to them to the extent recognized by international law. The definition of these areas and right of
the Philippines over these areas are provided for in customary and conventional international law.
For instance, the Philippine claims to parts of the seas, the seabed, the subsoil and the insular shelves are subject to the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea to which the Philippines is a signatory. As to air space, the Philippines claims
sovereignty over the airspace above its land mass and territorial sea up to the height where the outer space begins. It also
adheres to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944.
Special Claim made by the Philippines with respect to the “waters around, between and connecting the islands of the
archipelago”.
The Philippines claims them as part of its “internal waters” irrespective of their breadth and dimension. This is one of the
elements of the archipelagic principle which is now recognized by the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea does not exactly accept the entirety of the Philippine position on the archipelagic
principle. The vast areas of water between islands which the Philippine considers internal waters (and therefore not
subject t the right of innocent passage) the 1982 Convention calls “archipelagic waters” subject to the right of innocent
passage through passages designated by the archipelago concerned.
However, the Philippines has not recognized this distinction because it is contrary to what Article I says about these waters
being internal. For this reason, the Philippines ratified the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea with reservations.
Raegan v. Commissioner, 30 SCRA 968 (1969) | PEOPLE V. GOZO, 53 SCRA 476 (1973)
The US military bases in the Philippines are still part of the Philippine territory. The precise reason why the Philippine government
could cede part of its authority over these bases to the United States was the fact that they were part of the Philippine territory over
which the government exercised sovereign control.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Municipal Ordinance 14, Series of 1964 is applicable to the Appellant.
Whether or not Olongapo City exercises administrative jurisdiction over the area concerned.
HELD
Yes, for both.
RATIO
In the first issue, ordinance is predicated under the General Welfare Clause. In the case of People v. Fajardo was cited by Appellant in her defense.
However, People v. Fajardo is clearly distinguishable from instant case because the conviction of Fajardo violated General Welfare Clause. Said
conviction was oppressive given that Fajardo badly needed a residence. In instant case, however, Appellant did not even bother compliance with the
ordinance.
In the second issue US Jurisdiction over the bases is purely a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. Philippine jurisdiction may have been
diminished by virtue of military bases agreement but it does not disappear. The US Naval Reservation cannot be a foreign terr itory.
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A R T I C L E I I
Declaration of Principles
&
State Policies
FUNCTION OF ARTICLE II
The function of Article II is a statement of the basic ideological principles and policies that underlie the Constitution. As such, the provisions
shed light on the meaning of the other provisions of the Constitution and they are a guide for all departments of the government in the
implementation of the Constitution.
State v. Nation
For the purpose of political sociology a state, which is a legal concept, may be distinguished from nation, which is an ethnic
concept, for the purpose of constitutional law the two terms are not distinct.
The Constitution uses them interchangeably to designate the legal concept of state as defined above.
People
As an element of a state, people simply means a community of persons sufficient in number and capable of maintaining
the continued existence of the community and held together by a common bond of law. It is of no legal consequence if
they possess diverse racial, cultural or economic interests.
Sovereignty
Legal Sovereignty is the supreme power to affect legal interests either by legislative, executive or judicial action.
This is lodged in the people but is normally exercised by state agencies.
In terms of auto-limitation, sovereignty is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal determination and self-restriction.
Political Sovereignty is the sum total of all the influences in a state, legal and non-legal, which determines the course of
law.
Government
As an element of a state, it is defined as that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes
and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon
the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them.”
Ministrant functions are the optional functions of government. The principles for determining whether or not a government shall
exercise certain of these optional functions are:
1. That a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake.
2. That a government should do those things which why its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.
Spouses Fontanilla v. Hon. Maliaman, GR Nos. 55963 and 61045, February 27, 1991
But the undertaking to supply water for a price, as does the government corporation National Irrigation Authority, is
considered a trade and not a governmental activity.
DE JURE | The Gloria Macapagal-
Classification of Governments according to Legitimacy Arroyo Government
ISSUE
Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings under the Japanese regime good and valid and remained so even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US.
Whether or not MacArthur’s declaration nullifies the judicial acts of the Philippines under the Japanese Regime.
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HELD
It is adjudged and decreed that a Writ of Mandamus issue, directed to the respondent, ordering him to take
cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in Civil Case 3012 of said court.
RATIO
In the first issue, though the conquerors are considered supreme and absolute, the laws regarding private issues
and without political complexion were adopted. The Japanese regime declared the use of this laws and rules that
were already established. These laws were not abrogated by the change of sovereignty. At the time of war, the
Japanese could not subject themselves to the tedious overhauling of the government. Therefore, laws that were not
affecting their stay in the Philippines were retained. Furthermore, the Philippines then was a de facto government
under the Japanese regime. Therefore, laws that are considered private and lacking of political complexion are
considered continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended
or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to
remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation.
In the second issue, it was not the intention of General MacArthur to mean that he will be abolishing entirely the
laws in force because that will result in removing even their own laws in the Philippines. After the war the
Philippines, issued EO 37, which made all pending cases under the CA during the Japanese period be settled by the
SC. In this act done by the Philippines, it is already an acknowledgement that the laws under the regime of the
Japanese regime were considered continuing in force even after the liberalization.
Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor, 108 SCRA 757, October 30, 1981
While there was closer relationship between the executive and the legislature, thus manifesting “features of
parliamentarism,” there was separation between them. Separation from the Judiciary also conceptually
remained.
Republican State
State wherein all government authority emanates from the people and is exercised by representatives chosen by the
people.
Democratic State
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In the view of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines is not only a representative or republican state but also shares some
aspects of direct democracy such as “initiative and referendum” in Article VI, Section 32, and Article XVII, Section 2. The
word “democratic” is also a monument to the February Revolution which re-won freedom through direct action of the
people.
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The 1973 and the 1935 versions spoke of “defense” of the State being a prime duty of government. It therefore easily lent
itself to interpretations which justified a national security state offensive to the people.
The present version places the emphasis on service to and protection of the people.
The phrase “under conditions provide by law” in the second sentence also emphasizes the primacy of serving the interest
of the people and protecting their rights even when there is need to defend the State
S T A T E P O L I C I E S
The implication of this policy for the presence of American troops or for any American military base that might be established in the
Philippines is that any new agreement on bases or the presence of troops, if ever there is one, must embody the basic policy of
freedom from nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would be well within the power of government to demand ocular inspection and
removal of nuclear arms.
Underlying Premises
Poverty and gross inequality are major problems besetting the nation and that these problems assault the dignity of the
human person.
Social Justice
Equalization of economic, political, and social opportunities with special emphasis on the duty of the state to tilt the
balance of social forces by favoring the disadvantaged in life.
In the language of the 1935 Constitution, it means justice for the common tao; in the shibboleth of the 1973 Convention,
those who have less in life must have more in law.
The 1987 Constitution reflects majoritarian values and protect the minoritarian rights.
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The special impact of this provision in Philippine Jurisprudence has been chiefly instrumental in the socialization of the
state’s attitude to property rights thus gradually eradicating the vestiges of lasses faire in Philippine society.
The promotion of social justice to be carried out in all phases of national development is specified under Article XIII.
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Five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act authored by Rep. Stephen F. Freind were being challenged as unconstitutional
under Roe v. Wade, which first recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion in the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The "informed consent" rule under the Act required doctors to provide women with information about the health risks and
possible complications of having an abortion before one could be performed.
The "spousal notification" rule required women to give prior notice to their husbands.
The "parental consent" rule required minors to receive consent from a parent or guardian prior to an abortion.
The fourth provision imposed a 24-hour waiting period before obtaining an abortion.
The fifth provision challenged in the case was the imposition of certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion
services.
When the case came before the Court, Pennsylvania defended the Act in part by urging the Court to overturn Roe as having been wrongly
decided.
The case was a seminal one in the history of abortion rights in the United States. It was the first case that provided an opportunity to
overturn Roe since the two liberal Justices, William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, were replaced with the Bush-appointed
Justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas. Both were viewed as ostensible conservatives compared to their predecessors. This left the
Court with eight Republican-appointed justices - five of whom had been appointed by Presidents Reagan or Bush, both of whom were well
known for their opposition to Roe. Finally, the only remaining Democratic appointee - Justice Byron White - had been one of the two
dissenters from the original Roe decision.
At this point, only two of the Justices were obvious supporters of Roe v. Wade: Blackmun, the author of Roe, and Stevens, who had joined
opinions specifically reaffirming Roe in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Given these circumstances, some pro-choice advocates expected Roe to be overruled.
The case was argued by ACLU attorney Kathryn Kolbert for Planned Parenthood, with Linda J. Wharton serving as Co-Lead Counsel.
Pennsylvania attorney general Ernest Preate, Jr. argued the case for the State. In the Supreme Court oral arguments, Solicitor
General Kenneth Starr spoke for the Bush Administration.
Except for three opening sections of the O'Connor-Kennedy-Souter opinion, Casey was a divided judgment, as no other sections of any
opinion were joined by a majority of justices. However, the plurality decision jointly written by Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy is
recognized as the lead opinion with precedential weight because each of its parts were concurred in by at least two other Justices, albeit
different ones for each part.
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe v. Wade (1973), that definition of liberty is still questioned. Joining the
respondents as amicus curiae, the United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last decade, again asks us to
overrule Roe."
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The plurality opinion stated that it was upholding what it called the "essential holding" of Roe. The plurality asserted that the right
to abortion is grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the plurality reiterated what the Court had
said in Eisenstadt v. Baird: "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."
The plurality's opinion also included some controversial language about the doctrine of stare decisis - see the more recent
discussion from Justice Roberts on Stare Decisis in the Citizens United case. The plurality emphasized the need to stand by prior
decisions even if they were unpopular, unless there had been a change in the fundamental reasoning underpinning the previous
decision. It also acknowledged the need for predictability and constancy in judicial decision making. For example,
"Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely
divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the
normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution."
The plurality went on to give society's rejection of the "Separate but Equal" concept as a legitimate reason for the Brown v.
Board of Education court’s rejection of the Plessy v. Ferguson doctrine. Emphasizing the need to not be seen as overruling a
prior decision merely because the individual members of the Court had changed, O’Connor states,
"Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our understanding of it has changed (and because no
other indication of weakened precedent has been shown), the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the prior law with
any justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Court of 1973.”
Since the plurality overruled some portions of Roe v. Wade despite its emphasis on stare decisis, Chief Justice
Rehnquist in dissent argued that this section was entirely obiter dicta. All these opening sections were joined by
Justices Blackmun and Stevens for the majority. The remainder of the decision did not command a majority, but at
least two other Justices concurred in judgment on each of the remaining points.
The plurality then overturned the strict trimester formula used in Roe to weigh the woman's interest in obtaining an
abortion against the State's interest in the life of the fetus. Continuing advancements in medical technology meant
that at the time Casey was decided, a fetus might be considered viable at 22 or 23 weeks rather than at the 28
weeks that was more common at the time of Roe. The plurality recognized viability as the point at which the state
interest in the life of the fetus outweighs the rights of the woman and abortion may be banned entirely "except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother".
The plurality also replaced the heightened scrutiny of abortion regulations under Roe, which was standard for
fundamental rights in the Court's case law, with a lesser "undue burden" standard previously developed by
O'Connor in her dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. A legal restriction posing an undue
burden was defined as one having "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." The plurality also overruled Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986), each of which applied "strict scrutiny" to abortion restrictions.
Applying this new standard to the Pennsylvania Act under challenge, the plurality struck down the spousal
notification requirement, stating that it gave too much power to husbands over their wives and would worsen
situations of spousal abuse. The plurality upheld the State's 24-hour waiting period, informed consent, and parental
consent requirements, holding that none constituted an undue burden.
The Plurality, in section 5 of its decision, made a special note of the precedential value of Roe v. Wade, especially
how women's lives were changed by that decision:
The sum of the precedential enquiry to this point shows Roe's underpinnings unweakened in any way
affecting its central holding. While it has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable. An entire
generation has come of age free to assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to
act in society, and to make reproductive decisions; no erosion of principle going to liberty or personal
autonomy has left Roe's central holding a doctrinal remnant.
Notable by omission in the plurality is any mention of any right to privacy coming from the Constitution; while
O'Connor does use "privacy" a few times in her opinion, the usages are all in the context of a quotation or
paraphrase from Roe or other previous cases.
The concurrence/dissents
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William Rehnquist, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas—the six
Justices who did not join the plurality opinion—wrote or joined opinions in which they partially concurred and
partially dissented from the decision.
Rehnquist and Scalia each joined the plurality in upholding the parental consent, informed consent, and waiting
period laws. However, they dissented from the plurality's decision to uphold Roe v. Wade and strike down the
spousal notification law, contending that Roe was incorrectly decided. Rehnquist and Scalia joined each other's
concurrence/dissents, and White and Thomas, who did not write their own opinions, joined in both.
Blackmun and Stevens wrote opinions in which they approved of the plurality's preservation of Roe and rejection of
the spousal notification law. They did not, however, agree with the plurality's decision to uphold the other three
laws at issue. Blackmun went further, sharply attacking and criticizing the anti-Roe bloc of the Court.
ON ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS
By authority of Section 16 embodying the people’s right to a balanced ecology and under various statutes, several
government agents were required by mandamus to undertake the cleaning of Manila Bay and its surroundings.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals, GR Nos. 120865-71, December 7, 1995
On the basis of Oposa v. Factoran, supra, the Supreme Court upheld the empowerment of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake Area from the deleterious effects of pollutants coming from
garbage dumping and the discharge of wastes in the area as against the local autonomy claim of local governments in the
area.
The clause, “a primary social economic force” means that the human factor has primacy over the non-human factors in
production, which are mainly discussed by Article XIII.
ISSUE
Whether or not BOI and DTI abused their discretion:
In not observing due process in approving the requested revisions without hearing.
In refusing to furnish the petitioner with requested documents.
In approving the change in the site of BPC’s petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas, in violation of PD Nos. 949 and 1803, which
established Lamao, Limay, Bataan as the “petrochemical industrial zone.”
In approving the change in feedstock from naphtha only, to naphtha and/or LPG.
In showing gross partiality for BPC.
HELD
Granted. The Board of Investments (BOI) is ordered to:
To publish the amended application for registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC).
To allow the petitioner to have access to its records on the original and amended applications for registration, excluding confidential
business information as prohibited by law.
To set for hearing the petitioner’s opposition to the amended application.
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A R T I C L E V I
Legislative Department
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Legislative power is a power of the government, which is different from inherent powers of the State. It is the authority to make laws and to
alter or repeal them. It is the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws.
It is vested “in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to
the people by the provision on initiative and referendum” in Section 32 in accordance to Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions).
Initiative: power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an
election called for the purpose.
Three Systems of Initiative
1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution
a. Article XVII, Section 2 | Amendments or Revisions may be directly proposed by an initiative
upon a petition of at least 12% of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. No amendment shall be
authorized oftener than once every five years thereafter.
b. Article XVII, Section 4 | Any amendment shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety
days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation
a. At least 10% of all registered voters.
b. Every legislative district represented by at least 3% of registered voters thereof.
3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
RA 6735, Section 2 | Indirect Initiative: the exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or
local legislative body for action.
RA 6735, Section 2(C) | Referendum: the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election
called for the purpose
Two classes
1. Referendum on Statutes: petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress.
2. Referendum on Local Laws: petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and local legislative.
If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented,
the initiative shall be cancelled.
However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative.
2. Congress | Bicameral
Senate
House of Representatives
It allows for a body a body with a national perspective to check the parochial tendency of representatives elected by district.
It allows for more careful study of legislation.
It makes the legislature less susceptible to control by the Executive.
It serves as training ground for national leaders.
Unicameralism provides for simplicity of organization resulting in economy and efficiency, facility in pinpointing responsibility for
legislation, and avoidance of complication.
The people exercise both: constituent through amendatory process and ordinary through initiative and referendum.
SCOPE | PLENARY
Congress may legislate on any subject matter. This is different from US Congress which consists only of the legislative powers enumerated in
the Federal Constitution.
ON IRREPEALABLE LAWS
The Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. It must remain plenary, which is limited only by the Constitution. When the Legislature attempts
to pass an irrepealable law, to that extent it attempts to limit the power of the future legislatures.
Theoretically by virtue of Separation of Powers, Congress cannot delegate legislative power. It must remain where the people have lodged it.
Delegated power should not be further delegated such that Congress cannot micromanage.
However, there are two (2) exceptions swallow the general rule.
1. Constitutional Delegation
Constitution itself might in specific instances allow delegation of legislative power.
Article VI, Section 23 (2) and 28 (2)
2. Local Government
Immemorial practice legislative power may be delegated to local governments
Article 10 | Local Government expressed this exception in plain language.
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In a resolution adopted by the Defendant, it was stated that there were failed attempts made for the advancement of non-
Christians in Mindoro such that unless other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of the province, no successful result will
be obtained for their education. Hence, it was deemed necessary to oblige them to live in one place, designated in Tigbao, in
the interest of law and order. It also included imprisonment sanctions for violation thereof.
The resolution was approved by the Secretary of Interior. The provincial governor subsequently approved the same in pursuant
of the Administrative Order of 1917, enacted by legislature, which orders the nn-Christians to take up their habitation on the
site provided and their inaction shall be ground for imprisonment.
Petitioner Rubi and those living in his Rancheria have not fixed their dwellings within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable
under Section 2757 of Act 2711. The defendants compelled the Petitioners to take up their habitation in Tigbao. The former
challenged the validity of the said Administrative Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners were unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their freedom.
Whether or not Section 2145 of Administrative Order of 1917 is valid and constitutional.
HELD
The Supreme Court dismissed the Petition.
RATIO
Petitioners were not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty and freedom and that Section 2145 of Administrative
Order of 1917 is valid and constitutional.
In Wayward v. Southard, it was established that “Discretion may be committed by the legislature to an executive department
or official.”
The maxim of constitutional law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected. Judge Ranney
(Ohio case) stated that, “The true distinction therefore is between delegation of power to make the law which necessarily
involved discretion as to what is shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised un der
the pursuance of law. The first cannot be delegated: the latter no objection can be made.”
3. Administrative Agencies
Legislative power as a matter of practice is not delegated to administrative agencies.
Not legislative or law-making power but rule-making or law execution.
May be allowed to “fill up the details” of an already complete statute or to ascertain the facts necessary to bring
a “contingent” law into actual operation.
ON FORCE OF LAW
Rules and regulations promulgated by administrative agencies have the force of law. They have the force of
penal law provided that the following conditions concur:
1. The delegating statute itself must specifically authorize the promulgation of penal regulations. – US v.
Grimmaud, 220 US 506 (1911)
2. The penalty must not be left to the administrative agency but must be provided by the statute itself. –
US v. Barrias, 11 Phil 327 (1908)
3. The regulation must be published in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation. –
People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil 640 (1954)
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Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) – Section 2 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997
Assessment and collection of all internal revenue taxes, fees and charges.
Enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties, and fines connected therewith, including the execution of judgments in all cases
decided in its favor by the Court of Tax Appeals and the ordinary courts.
It shall also give effect to and administer supervisory and police powers conferred to it by the National Internal Revenue
Code and special laws.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) - Section 5 of the Securities Regulation Code
Supervision over all registered business entities in the country, including suspensions and revocations of their
registrations.
Policymaking with regard to the market in securities.
Control over and approval of security registration statements.
Power to investigate violations of securities laws and to impose sanctions for such violations.
Power to issue subpoenas, punish for contempt, and issue cease and desist orders in furtherance of its law enforcement
mission.
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A. Complete in Itself
It must set forth therein the policy to be carried out or implemented by the delegate.
Expressed
Implied
Contained in another statute – “spring cannot be higher than the source”
B. Fix a Standard
The limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Standard may not be formulated in precise declaratory language. It can be drawn from the declared policy of the law
and from the totality of the delegating statute.
Osmena v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703, 711-713 (1993)
The authority of the of the Energy Regulatory Board to fix the domestic prices of petroleum products was found to be
sufficiently specified “by the general policy of the law to protect local consumers by stabilizing and subsidizing
domestic pump rates,” by the authority given to impose additional amounts “to augment the resources of the *Oil
Price Stabilization] Fund.
Chiongbian v. Orbos, G.R. No. 96754, June 22, 1995
The standard may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged law.
Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Contingent Legislation
The effectivity of the law is made dependent on the verification by the executive of the existence of certain conditions. The
verification is delegated to the executive.
ABAKADA GURU PARTY LIST OFFICERS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 168056, October 18, 2005
RA 9337: VAT Reform Act was enacted on May 24, 2005. Section 4 (Sales Of Goods And Properties), Section 5 (Importation of Goods) and
Section 6 (Services And Lease Of Property) of RA 9337, in collective, granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain:
a. Whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of the 2004 GDP exceeds 2.8%.
b. Whether the national government deficit as a percentage of the 2004 GDP exceeds 1.5%
If either condition is met, the Secretary of Finance must inform the President who, in turn, must impose the 12% VAT rate (from 10%) effective
January 1, 2006. Petitioner maintained that Congress abandoned its exclusive authority to fix taxes and that RA 9337 contained a uniform
provision authorizing the President upon recommendation by the DOF Secretary to raise VAT to 12%. Senator Pimentel and Representative
Escudero maintained that RA 9337 constituted undue delegation of legislative powers and a violation of due process since the law was
ambiguous and arbitrary. Pilipinas Shell dealers argued that the VAT reform was arbitrary, oppressive and confiscatory. Respondents countered
that the law was complete, that it left no discretion to the President, and that it merely charged the President with carrying out the rate
increase once any of the two conditions arise.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was undue delegation.
HELD
No.
RATIO DECIDENDI
A. Constitution allows as under exempted delegation the delegation of tariffs, customs duties, and other tolls, levies on goods imported and
exported. VAT is tax levied on sales of goods and services which could not fall under this exemption. Hence, its delegation if unqualified is
unconstitutional.
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B. Legislative power is authority to make a complete law. Thus, to be valid, a law must be complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy
and it must fix a standard, limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable.
C. No undue delegation when congress describes what job must be done who must do it and the scope of the authority given. (Edu v. Ericta)
D. Secretary of Finance was merely tasked to ascertain the existence of facts. All else was laid out.
E. Mainly ministerial for the sec to ascertain the facts and for the President to carry out the implementation f or the VAT. They were agents
of the legislative department.
F. No delegation but mere implementation of the law.
Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene v. Secretary Drilon, G.R. No. 82849, August 2, 1989
The collective bargaining agreement stipulates that in case of any wage adjustment decreed by law higher than the increase
given in the agreement, the company shall pay the difference. RA No. 6640 decreed a wage increase higher than the CBA
increase. DOLE, however, issued a regulation saying that salary increase granted pursuant to a CBA will not be considered in
determining compliance with the new law.
This regulation is not proper. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The
law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress
The petitioner alleges that it is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippine Islands as a
common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water; that on or about the 7th day of June, 1915, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
issued and caused to be served on petitioner an order to show cause why petitioner should not be required to present detailed annual reports
respecting its finances and operations respecting the vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and containing the matters indicated by the
model attached to the petition.
On its return to the order to show cause before the Board of Public Utility Commissioners the petitioner denied the authority of the board to
require the report asked for on the ground that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as authority for such requirement was, if
construed as conferring such power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate legislative power to
the board.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Board’s issuance to the Petitioner of furnishing detailed annual report is a valid delegation of legislative power.
HELD
No. Delegation is invalid. As is apparent at a glance the provision conferring authority on the board is very general. It is also very
comprehensive. It calls for a detailed report of the finances and operations of the petitioning steamship company. That, it w ould seem, covers
substantially everything; for there is very little to a steamship company but its finances and operations. It would have been practically the same
if the statute had given the Board of Public Utility Commissioners power "to require every public utility to furnish annually a detailed report."
Such provision would have been but little broader and little less general than the present provision. It is clear that a statute which authorizes a
Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, th e contents thereof, the
general lines which it shall follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of
the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.
Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what information the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs in order to
impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control, or the facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and equitably with such
public utilities and to require them to deal justly and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners to require what information the board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the provision in question,
delegated to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute, and without
laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied.
In the case at bar the provision complained of does not law "down the general rules of action under which the commission shal l proceed." nor
does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners, which is unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what it
shall act upon.
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EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of POEA is challenged as unallowable delegation. POEA bases its authority to issue the regulation
on Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 97 which authorizes it to “promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration.” It is alleged that there is no sufficient standard. However, the
standard is to be found in the Executive Order creating the Administration mandating it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino
workers to “fair and equitable employment practices.”
Employers Confederation v. National Wages and Productivity Commission, G.R. No.9619, September 24, 1991
The power to fix wages may be delegated to an executive body provided that there are adequate standards.
San Miguel Bay is located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur. Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon,
Navotas, and other places migrated to this region and settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur to fish by trawl nets. A general clamor
among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay arose and prayed that the
President will regulate fishing in the said bay by declaring it close for trawl fishing at a certain period of the year.
The Municipal Mayor's League moved for such resolution and were likewise represented by social and civic organizations such as the NAMFREL
and the COMPADRE, further recommending the cancellation of the licenses of trawl operators. In response to such pleadings, the President
issued on April 5, 1954 Executive Order No. 22, which prohibits the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay. Such was later on amende d by Executive
Order No. 66, allowing the trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. And further amended by Executive Order No. 80, reviving Executive
Order No. 22 to take effect after December 31, 1954.
A group of Otter trawl operators therefore took this matter to the court and filed a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief. The
Secretary answered the complaint by alleging that of the 18 plaintiffs, only 11 were issued licenses to operate fishing boats for the year 1954
and that the EOs in question were issued in accordance with law. The Lower Court decided that EOs 22, 66 and 80 are invalid as they
constituted undue delegation of legislative power by the President. The Court said that the power to close any definite area of the Philippine
waters, falls primarily within the fields of legislation, not execution. It said that until the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot
be banned from SMB by executive proclamation.
Thus, this original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
1. Whether the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a Bureau, acting in their capacities as such Government
officials, could lawfully be required to post a bond in an action against them.
2. Whether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue EOs 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay
OR Whether said EOs were issued in accordance with law.
3. Whether EOs 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the
President.
HELD
1. Moot and academic.
2. YES.
3. YES.
RATIO DECIDENDI
The action, being one against Secretary Araneta and other Government officials as such, is essentially one against the Govern ment,
and to require these officials to file a bond would be indirectly a requirement against the Government, for as regards bonds or
damages that may be proved if any, the real party in interest would be the Republic of the Philippines. However, as the recor ds show
that the petitioners failed to put up the bond required by the lower court, allegedly due to difficulties encountered with the Auditor
General’s Office (giving the impression that they were willing to put up said bond but failed to do so for reasons beyond their
control), and that the orders subjects of the prohibition and certiorari proceedings were enforced, in accordance with section 4 of
1
Rule 39 , which is applicable to the case at bar, the issue as to the regularity or adequacy of requiring herein petitioners to post a
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People v. Maceren, L-32166, 18 October 1977 (76 SCRA 450) – In contrast with Araneta Case
The Secretary of Agriculture passed a regulation penalizing electro fishing, which is not one of the forms of fishing punished in
the Fisheries Act. The regulation was beyond the scope of the Secretary’s authority.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner on Fisheries promulgated a regulation penalizing electro fishing
under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. It was later on amended to cover only fresh water fisheries in the
Philippines. Private appellees (Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino, and Carlito del Rosario) were charged by
a Constabulary investigator for violating the law on electro fishing. The municipal court quashed the complaint upon motion of the accused.
On prosecution’s appeal, the Court of First Instance affirmed the order of dismissal, citing that electro fishing cannot be p enalized since it is not
covered by “obnoxious or poisonous substance” referred to in Sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law. Prosecution contended that the prohibition of
electro fishing is in accordance with the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under Sec. 4 of the Fisheries Law. It further averred
that it was the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the regulations promulgated
hereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose of the development of the fisheries.
ISSUE
Whether the promulgation of the law against electro fishing constituted a violation of the non-delegability of legislative powers.
HELD
YES, it violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte filed a complaint against Celestino M. Zanoria et. al for violating RA 4670, also known as the “Magna Carta of
Public School Teachers”. The private respondents moved to quash the complaint due to lack of Jurisdiction over the correctional nature of the
penalty because Section 32 does not give a definite period for correctional penalty, it only states that “upon conviction… or by imprisonment as
determined by the courts.” The court denied the quash and respondents filed for a motion for reconsideration stating that section 32 of RA
4670 is unconstitutional, due to cruel and unusual punishment and undue delegation of legislative power. This again was denied by the court,
therefore respondents filed for a petition for certiorari against Judge Dacuycuy et. al.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 32 of RA 4670 an undue delegation of legislative power, hence, unconstitutional.
HELD
No
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RATIO DECIDENDI
The prohibition of undue legislation is against the delegation of power to make laws, not to interpret it.
RA 4670 vests in the courts the discretion to choose which of the alternative penalties shall be imposed, not to fix the period of
imprisonment.
An exercise of Judicial discretion is not an attempt to use legislative power, or to prescribe to create a law, but the administration of
justice.
A general exception of forbidding discretion of legislative authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon.
It was held in the SC of the United States that the principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting the courts discr etion as
to the length of sentence or the amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of crime. ( Ohio Ex Rel
Lloyd v. Dollison)
Executive Order 392 considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in ordering the early implementation of full oil
deregulation. Petitioners contend that EO 392 misapplied RA 8180.
The Court held that the Executive Department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA 8180 when t considered the
extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. Such consideration amounts to a rewriting of the standards set forth in RA
8180. On the basis of the text of EO 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive Department to the
depletion of the OPSF fund. In light of this uncertainty, the Court ruled that the early deregulation under EO 392 constitutes
misapplication of RA 8180.
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Angeles, G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996, 263 SCRA 421, 444-445 (citing
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72 [1989])
The rationale of the grant of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers to administrative bodies is the result of the growing
complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the
regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof
with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.
Composed of 24 senators
Elected at large
Election mechanics as may be provided by law
QUALIFICATIONS
These may neither be added to nor subtracted from by Congress.
“Day of the election” means on the day the votes are cast.
Natural-born Citizen
Article IV, Section 1
“The following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of the majori ty.
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
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ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner was a legal resident of Malaybalay, Bukidnon and not Abuyog, Leyte at the time
of his election as municipal mayor of the latter municipality on December 10, 1940.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court holding the election of Petitioner to the office of the municipal
mayor of Abuyog, Leyte null and void ordering the exclusion of him from the office to which he was elected.
HELD
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with costs of this instance against the respondent.
RATIO
The term “residence” as used in the election law is synonymous with “domicile” which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil 645
In order to acquire domicile by choice, there must be an animus non revertendi and an animus manendi to wit:
1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality. The fact of residence must be added the animus manendi.
2. An intention to remain there. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time.
3. An intention to abandon the old domicile. Acts of person must conform with his purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary, the
residence at the place chosen for the domicile must be actual.
Larena v. Teves, 61 Phil 36 | Mere registration in a municipality in order to be an elector therein does not make one a resident of said municipality:
if, according to constant rulings the word “residence” is synonymous with “home” or “domicile” and denotes permanent dwelling place, to which an
absent person intends to return; if the right to vote in a municipality requires the concurrence of two things: 1) the act of residing coupled with the
intention to do so; and if herein respondent has always lived with his family in the municipality of Dumaguete and never in that of Bacong, he has
never lost his residence in the former. The fact that his registration as elector in the municipality of Bacong was cancelled only on April 5, 1934, upon
his petition, did not qualify him to be a candidate for the office of municipal president of said municipality.
Yra v. Aba’o, 52 Phil 380 | Registration in the list of voters is not one of the conditions prescribed by Section 431 of the Election Law in order to be an
elector, neither does failure to register as such constitute one of the disqualifications prescribed in Section 432 of said law.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Term of Office
Six years
th
Starts June 30 unless otherwise provided by law – July 26, 4 Monday of July
Limitation
Not serve more than two consecutive terms
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which elected (such was the case of Senator Teofisto Guingona when he assumed the position of Vice President.)
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(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of Representatives including those under the part y list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in
this section.
The total composition of the House of Representatives is not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law.
During the Martial Law, legislature was a parliament or the Batasang Pambansa (BP). Members thereof were called “assemblymen.”
Classification of Members
1. District Representatives, each representing one congressional district – elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan area.
2. Party-list Representatives, elected through the “party-list system” of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations, shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives.
3. Sectoral Representatives – existed only until 1998. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
Article XVIII, Section 7 | Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by
the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation.
Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commission, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259 |
These appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS | Article VI, Section 5(3) and Section 5(4) Gerrymandering is a form of boundary delimitation
(redistricting) in which electoral district or
constituency boundaries are deliberately modified
1. Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1 | The question of the validity of an for electoral purposes, thereby producing a
apportionment law is a justiciable question. contorted or unusual shape. The resulting district is
2. Apportionment shall be made in accordance with the number of known as a gerrymander; however, that word can
also refer to the process. It may be used to achieve
respective inhabitants (among provinces, cities and Metro Manila desired electoral results for a particular party, or may
area) on the basis of uniform and progressive ratio. be used to help or hinder a particular group of
Each city with not less than 250,000 inhabitants shall be constituents, such as a political, racial, linguistic,
religious or class group.
entitled to at least one representative.
Each province, irrespective of number of inhabitants, is When used to allege that a given party is gaining
entitled to at least one representative. disproportionate power, the term gerrymandering
This entitles government to undergo census. has negative connotations. However, a gerrymander
may also be used for purposes that some perceive as
3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, positive, notably in US federal voting district
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. This is to prevent boundaries which produce a proportion of
gerrymandering. constituencies with an African-American or other
minority in the majority (these are thus called
4. Congress to make reapportionment of legislative districts within "minority-majority districts").
three years following the return of every census.
The word gerrymander was coined by a newspaper
MARIANO V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 242 SCRA 211 editor in reaction to a redrawing of Massachusetts
electoral boundaries under the then governor
The Court held that the Constitution does not preclude Elbridge Gerry, that included one sprawling
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law other supposedly salamander-shaped constituency. In
than a general apportionment law. 1812, Governor Gerry signed a bill into law that
redistricted his state to benefit his Democratic-
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the Republican party. One of the resulting contorted
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of districts was said to resemble a salamander. The term
Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. The first appeared in the Boston Centinel on March 26,
importance of drawing with precise strokes the 1812.
clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati. The existence of a boundary
dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining
with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, which are hypothetical issues such
as Mayor Binay will run again. Petitioners (residents of Taguig) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new
city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing
its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law.
The policy of the Court favors a liberal construction of the “one title one subject” rule so as not to impede
legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence, it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.
Although Makati has a population of 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has met
the minimum population requirement of 250,000. Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than 250,000 shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative.
Two petitions assailing certain provisions of RA No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbaniz ed
City) as unconstitutional.
GR No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief, and assailing the statute as unconstitutional on the
following grounds:
1. Section 2 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of
the Local Government Code.
2. Section 51 attempts to alter or restart the ‘three-consecutive term’ limit for local elective officials, in violation of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52:
a. Increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter) – violates the constitutional
provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three years following
the return of every census
b. The increase in legislative district was not expressed in the bill title
c. The addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accordance with Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution – the population of Makati is 450,000
GR No. 118627 involves a petition which assails Section 52 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforementioned.
ISSUE
Whether or not the questioned provisions are constitutional.
HELD
Yes. Petitions dismissed.
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legislative districts, and petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress. The Court cannot itself make the reapportionment as
petitioner would want.
THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM | Republic Act 7941 (The Party List System Act)
Party-list System is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than 90 days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the
party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations. Those that have already
registered with the COMELEC need not to register anew, but shall file at the same period a manifestation of its desire to participate once
again.
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon a verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
A list of not less than five names shall be filed not later than 45 days before the elections.
A person may be nominated in one list only.
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No change shall be allowed after the list have been submitted except in cases where the nominee dies or withdraws in writing his
nomination, becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party list system shall not be
considered resigned.
For the youth sector, he must be at least 25 years of age but not more than 30 years of age on the day of the election. If he is 30
years old during his term, he shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
MANNER OF VOTING
Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 177271, May 4, 2007
The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party
list groups, citing Section 7, Article III of the Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern as
complemented by the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government.
NUMBER
20% of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives, including those under the party list.
For purposes of the may 1998 elections, the first five major political parties on the basis of the party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to representation in the
party list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The participants shall be rank from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
2. The participants receiving at least 2% of the total number of votes cast shall be entitled to one seat each; provided that
those garnering more than 2% shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; provided
finally that each shall be entitled to not more than three seats.
The Court said that the Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters:
1. 20% ALLOCATION: the combined number of all party list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of
the House of Representatives, including those elected under party list.
2. 2% THRESHOLD: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
3. THREE-SEAT LIMIT: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
4. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM) AND BUTIL FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL) V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, GR No. 164702, March
15, 2006
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Petitioners party list groups sought the immediate proclamation by the COMELEC of their respective second nominee, claiming that
they were entitled to one (1) additional seat in the House of Representatives based on the number of votes they obtained and on
the formula used by the Supreme Court in Ang Bagong Bayani case. The Court held that the formula used in the landmark case of
Veterans Federation Party, which is:
shall be followed. Ang Bagong Bayani, merely reiterated this formula for computing the additional seats which a party list group
shall be entitled to.
ANG BAGONG BAYANI – OFW LABOR PARTY VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 404 SCRA 719
The Supreme Court held that even if major political parties are allowed by the Constitution to participate in the party list system.
They must show, however, that they represent the interests if the marginalized and underrepresented.
The following guidelines should be followed in order that a political party registered under the party list system may be entitled to a
seat in the House of Representatives:
1. Must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
2. Major political parties must comply with this statutory policy.
3. Ang Bagong Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (as a party) must be subject to the express constitutional prohibition against
religious sects.
4. The party must not be disqualified under RA 7941.
5. The party must not be an adjunct of an entity or project funded by the government.
6. The party and its nominees must comply with the requirements of the law.
7. The nominee must also represent a marginalized or underrepresented sector.
8. The nominee must be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation.
On March 26, 2001, COMELEC issued the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 approving the participation of 154 organizations and parties in the 2001 party
list elections. On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed a petition praying that the names of some herein respondents be deleted from
the Certified List of Political Parties, Sectoral Parties, Organizations, Coalitions participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections.
They also asked as an alternative that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter’s nominees not be
proclaimed. On April 11, Bayan Muna also filed a petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of respondent. Six days later,
they also filed Petition challenging the COMELEC Resolution No. 3785.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
3. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No 3785.
HELD
The case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is hereby directed to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the
party list participants.
1. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party list elections, merely on the g round that they
are political parties. Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the members of the House of Representatives may “be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. Political parties may be registered under the
party list system under Sections 7 and 8 of Article XI(C).
2. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941.
The marginalized and Underrepresented to become lawmakers themselves for proportional representations and lack of well-
defined constituencies, which refers to the absence of traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district
or territorial unit of government.
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RA 7941 does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. It
contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 of the said RA may participate in the elections
OSG asserts that party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented. This claim defies statutory principle
because the system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged ones.
3. What is needed under the present circumstances is a factual determination of whether respondents therein and all the 154 previously
approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
This is a motion for proclamation filed by various party list participants. On June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated a decision requiring COMELEC to
commence hearings following the guidelines stated in the said decision. They are also directed by the Court to start the hear ing of those who look
like they have garnered a certain number of votes to qualify for a seat. Furthermore, they directed to submit to this Court its compliance report
within 30 days from notice. Finally the May 9 Resolution refraining COMELEC from declaring any winner shall remain in force until after the COMELEC
itself will have complied and reported its compliance.
There are four unique parameters of the Philippine Party List System:
1. 20% ALLOCATION: the combined number of all party list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House
of Representatives, including those elected under party list.
2. 2% THRESHOLD: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for the party list system are qualified to
have a seat in the House of Representatives.
3. THREE-SEAT LIMIT: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three
seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
4. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to
their total number of votes.
On July 27, 2001, COMELEC recommended certain parties have passed the 8-point guideline and certain parties were disqualified. On August 14, the
Court issued a resolution partially lifting the May 9 TRO to proclaim BAYAN MUNA as the first winner in the party list election. On August 24, the
Court again issued a resolution partially lifting the May 9 TRO to proclaim AKBAYAN and BUTI as winning party list groups. On January 29, 2002, the
Court agreed to qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had previously been disqualified by the COMELEC in its First Compliance Report. Thus, the Court lifted
the May 9 TRO to proclaim the two as winners. The COMELEC amended its Compliance Reports by adding four more party list parti cipants, namely,
BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA, and BAGONG BAYANI. To the list of qualified candidates for the May 14, 2001 elections. On November 25, OSG contended
that NCIA is not a qualified party under the July 27, 2001 report.
ISSUE
Aside from those already validly proclaimed pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party list candidates that should be
proclaimed as winners?
Does the clause “total votes cast for the party list system” include only those ballots cast for qualified party list candidates?
HELD
Having obtained at least 2% of the total valid votes cast in the last party list elections, the following qualified participants are declared elected with
one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSEI PINAY.
RATIO
COMELEC made a mistake in disqualifying COCOFED and BUHAY. The report on the latter was merely anchored on conjectures or speculations; while
that of the former, the bylaws making the Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of the COCOFED National Board has
already been deleted as early as May 1998. The primary purposes of COCOFED’s Articles of Incorporation authorize the organization to help explore
and obtain possible technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources. This statement does not by
itself constitute such substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded or assisted by the government.
The votes obtained by disqualified candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast for the party list system. In the present cases,
the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total number of votes cast during the 2001 elections.
Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes
they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide. The new figures representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified party list
participants will now be the basis for computing the two-percent threshold for victory and the number of seats the winners are entitled to.
There are only 46 qualified participants. The Commission recommended for qualification only 42 in its three Compliance Reports. The Court found
that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least 2% of the 6,523,185 total valid votes cast.
To determine the number of seats for sectoral representatives, the formula for the quotient is:
where:
S is the number of seats allocated for sectoral representation,
D is the total number of district representatives, and
D / 0.8 is the total number of members of the House.
First Round
To get the first guaranteed seat, a sectoral party or organization should at least get 2% of the total votes cast for partly list elections.
The formula for the quotient is:
where:
g is the percentage of votes garnered by the sectoral organization,
V is the total number of votes cast in the party list representation, and
P is the total number votes of the sectoral organization.
Therefore:
Second Round
If the total number of guaranteed seats awarded is less than the total number of seats reserved for sectoral representatives (S), the
unassigned seats will awarded in the second round of seat allocation. To get the number of additional seats, this formula will be
followed.
where:
R2 is the total number of additional seats awarded to the sectoral organization,
S is the number of seats allocated for party-list representatives,
T1 is the total number awarded seats (R1) in the first round of seat allocation, and
g is the percentage of votes garnered by the sectoral organization.
Note: R2 should appear as whole integer.
Therefore, the seats awarded on the first round will be added on the seats awarded on the second round to get the final allocation
of seats for a sectoral organization.
</
Final/ Wild card Allocation
If the total number of seats awarded after two rounds is still less than the total number of seats reserved for sectoral
representatives (S), the remaining seats will be assigned to sectoral organizations next in rank (one seat each organization)
whose R2 result is 0 until all available seats are completely distributed.
where:
T3 is the total number of sectoral organizations next in rank (in Round 2) to be given with one seat,
S is the number of seats allocated for party-list representatives,
T1 is the total number awarded seats in the first round of seat allocation, and
T2 is the total number awarded seats in the second round of seat allocation.
Note:
Each sectoral organization shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
The succeeding party-list nominee(s) shall be given a seat if any of the initial party-list nominee(s) resign
or was given an expulsion by the general membership of the House through a majority vote.
Applying the 2007 general election, there are 220 district representatives, and 15,950,900 votes cast for party list. That makes 55
seats reserved for sectoral representatives. After the Supreme Court ruling was released, the COMELEC proclaimed 28 additional
members. COMELEC however declared that there are only 219 district representatives (with the Supreme Court decision of the
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election of the congressional seat of Shariff Kabunsuan void and the restoration of the first district of Maguindanao), reducing seats
to 54.
It is however, a point of question on the constitutionality of the new congressional districts 201 to 220 (2nd district of Cagayan de
Oro City as the newest district as of 2007 elections to elect a representative) as the constitution only mandates a maximum of 250
seats (Article VI, Section 5 Paragraph 1) with 50 seats supposed to be reserved for sectoral representatives. As of May 1, 2009, the
House membership increased from 242 to 273. There are also proposals to create more congressional districts. Since the
constitution allows increasing membership through legislation, Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile filed Senate Bill No. 3123
increasing maximum membership from 250 to 350 members.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.
No. 179271
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No.
07-041 (PL) before the National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC). BANAT filed its petition because “the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC
have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.”
There were no interveners in BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007. On 9 July 2007, the C OMELEC, sitting as
the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed 13 parties as winners in the party-list elections. Pursuant to
NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07- 72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the
appropriate parties.
Thereafter, acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 declaring BANAT’s petition as moot and academic. Hence,
this petition by BANAT. Meanwhile, on 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision
to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic
Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
ISSUES
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
HELD
1. No. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the “House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law.” The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-
list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this
point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans.
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative
district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-
list representatives. After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
2. Yes, but only insofar as allocation of additional seats is concerned. The two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list
elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first
50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two
percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the
votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. The two percent
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
3. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:
a. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections;
b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each;
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c. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated;
d. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. In computing the additional seats, the
guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-
percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less
the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
4. No. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a “party” that participates in party-list elections as
either “a political party or a sectoral party,” R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will partici pate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major
political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law. Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-
list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize,
or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisher folk wing to participate in
the party-list election, and this fisher folk wing can field its fisher folk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same
for the urban poor
These are proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective participants to the COMELEC, according to their
ranking in the list.
Any elected party list representative who changes his political party during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; provided that if he changes
his political party within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party list representative under his new
party or organization.
VACANCY
Vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same
party, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party concerned shall submit additional nominees.
TERM OF OFFICE
Party list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years and shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as regular
members of the House of Representatives.
On July 1998, PAGASA filed a petition to the COMELEC alleging that filling up of the 20% membership of party list representatives in the House
is mandatory. Such that instead of 25 declared party list reps declared winners, there should be a total of 52 party list reps that would actually
nd
sit in the house. COMELEC 2 division granted the said appeal thus declaring the 38 respondents as party list reps. The 12 parties earlier
proclaimed filed a motion for reconsideration opposing the proclamation of the respondents.
COMELEC En banc only resolved the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats, hence this appeal to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the 20% allocation for party list representatives mentioned in section 5(2), Art 6 of the constitution mandatory or is it ceiling?
Whether or not the 2% threshold requirement and the 3 seat limit provided in Sec 11 B of RA 7941 Constitutional? If the answer to issue 2 is in
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the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
HELD
(1) It is a ceiling
(2) Yes
(3) Determine additional seats for first party and apply proportionally to the rest.
RATIO
(1) The constitution states that the party list reps shall constitute 20 per centum of the total number of reps including those under the party list.
Sec 5 Art 6 of the constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that congress was vested with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party list system of representation. It explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the
house of reps reserved for party list reps.
(2) The 2 percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the constitution and the law but with th e very essence of
representation under a republican or representative state all government authority emanates from the people but is exercised by reps chosen
by them. Party list system might result to the formation of groups that cant contribute much to legislation. And may pose as a detriment to the
stability of congress. The provision for the 2 percent requirement is therefore precise and conforms to proportional representation.
(3) Initial step is to rank all participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Party receiving the highest number of votes shall
thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Next step, determine the no. of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to
which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Residence – the term is different and distinguishable from constitutional law and civil law such that residence with regards to
suffrage is different from running for office.
In Caasi v. COMELEC, it was held that immigration to the US by virtue of the acquisition of a “green card” constitutes abandonment
of domicile in the Philippines.
Upon election, Aquino wins with 38,547 votes over his opponent, Agusto Syjuco, with 35,910 votes. COMELEC grants the motion for
reconsideration declaring Aquino as ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate and determine the winner from the remaini ng legible
candidates.
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ISSUE
Whether or not Petitioner is legible to run for the said position.
Whether or not declaring the winner from the remaining legible candidates is constitutional.
HELD
No for both issues. The Court held that Petitioner failed to prove that he had established not just a residence but domicile of choice in
Makati. In his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, he indicated that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for 52
years, a registered voter of same district and his birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as birthplace. Thus, his domicile of origin was
Concepcion, Tarlac and his bare assertion of transfer of domicile from Tarlac to Makati is hardly supported by the facts of the case.
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that a candidate must be a resident of the district he is representing for at least one year
before the elections. The Petitioner has always been a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac prior to the elections. Although he leased a
condominium unit within the district he will be representing, mere leasing instead of purchasing the unit is not evident of a strong
intention to establish a domicile.
Declaring the person who garnered the second highest number of votes as the winner is unconstitutional because the choice of the
majority is disqualified and it is against the sovereign will of the people.
Motion for Reconsideration to COMELEC was denied. Petitioner’s reasons for the change are the following:
1. It should be noted that she was born and raised in Leyte.
2. She moved to Manila to pursue her studies as well as work. This was also the time she met Ferdinand Marcos who was then
the representative of Batac, Ilocos Norte. When they got married, she followed her husband throughout his political career.
3. Her husband fixed their residence in Batac but during his presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace.
4. After the death of her husband and her exile, she was not allowed to return to her ancestral home as it was sequestered by the
PCGG, forcing her to live in different residences. Eventually she returned to Leyte and settled there.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Petitioner met the one year residency qualification for election purposes.
2. Whether or not COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction before and after the elections.
HELD
The Court upheld the qualification of Mrs. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (IRM), despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy
that she had resided n the district for only seven months.
In Ong v. Republic, the Court’s definition of domicile is one’s “permanent home.” An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
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To effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate the following such that absence of any, residence of origin is deemed to continue:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile
2. Bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one.
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
The Petitioner argued that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC that has the jurisdictio n over the
election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution.
DOCTRINE
A statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, “so that non-compliance
with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute has intended such result, it would have clearly indicated it.”
Voluntary Renunciation
Dimaporo vs. Mitra
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987
congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Upon being informed of this development by the C ommission on
Elections, respondents Speaker (Mitra) and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code.
Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed to respondent Speaker,
expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress”. Petitioner failed to regain his
seat, hence, this petition.
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution: The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No
Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected
ISSUE
Whether Section 67, Article IX, of B.P. Blg. 881 operative under the present Constitution; thus, shortening the term of those who exercises
“voluntary renunciation” of their office.
HELD
Dismissed for lack of merit. In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress,
petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature, but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances
within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change
the duration of the term of office.
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed
to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
Rodriguez, Dissent
Filing a certificate of candidacy does not constitute voluntary renunciation. The Speaker and the Secretary of the House of
Representatives have no power, in purported implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the na me of a
member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress. In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation,
the Court should also be guided by the principle that all presumptions should be in favor of representation.
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Determined by law
No increase until expiration of full term
Emoluments and allowances
Philconsa v. Mathay
Philconsa (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.) a non-stock, non-profit association duly incorporated and organized under Philippine law, whose
members are taxpayers filed a suit against the Auditor General (Mathay) and Auditor of the Congress (Velasco) for authorizing or passing audit the
payment of increased salaries authorized in RA 4134 (Senate President and House Speaker, from 16,000 to 40,000 and the member of both houses
from 7,200 to 32,000.) Article VI Section 14 of the 1935 Constitution (Article VI, Section 10 of 1987 Constitution): “No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving the
increase.” Case at bar, RA 4134 approved in 1964, Senator’s term ends December 30, 1969 while Congressmen’s term expires December 30, 1 965.
Appropriation allowed by the respondents, granted salary increases to congressmen by December 30, 1965 without due consideration that senate’s
term has yet expire December 30, 1969.
ISSUE
Does Article VI Section 14 of the 1935 Constitution (Article VI, Section 10 of 1987 Constitution) require that not only the term if all the members of
the House but also that if of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
HELD
Writ of prohibition prayed was granted. Effectivity of increase shall be after December 30, 1969. The purpose of the provision is to place a legal bar
to the legislator yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher com pensation is lacking, but
with the length of time that the has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need
for it is clearly felt.
“All the member of the Senate and of the house of representative” particular or collective?
COLLECTIVE. The reason for specifying the component chambers was an emphasis of the transition of a unicameral to a bicameral legislature.
Bengzon concurs: the word term was used in the general sense, to cover for all these different terms.
Zaldivar concurs: Article VI Section 14 of the 1935 Constitution (Article VI, Section 10 of 1987 Constitution) provides for equal compensation of
Senate and Congress at all time, not only in amount, but also at the same time within their respective term of office.
Castro concurs: Section refers to full term of both and not either; conjunction “and”: means expiration of the full term of Senate inseparable from
the expiration of the full term of Congress; a specific rule of interpretation would allow “or” to be interchanged with “and but only if it doesn’t
pervert the plain intention of the writer of the context; section provides for parity of compensation to Senate and Congress.
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Art. 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall use force,
intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) from attending the meetings of the
Assembly (Congress) or of any of its committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from
expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who
shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is in regular or special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to attend sessions in Congress?
HELD
Instant motion is denied. No. Election to high government offices doesn’t free the accused from the common restraints of general law. The
constitution provides that a member of the House of Representative is privileged from arrest only if the offense is punishable by not more than 6
years of imprisonment. The accused has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of this provision. Section 11, Article 6
of the Constitution states that the members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions especially if the reason if a legitimate
one. Confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by more than 6 years of imprisonment has constitutional foundations.
Allowing the accused to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a free man. When the voters of his district
reelected him, they had full awareness of the limitation of his freedom of action. The accused is only one of the members of the House of
Representatives. Congress continues to function despite the absence of one or a few of its members. The issue in this case boils down to the
question of equal protection. Election to the position isn’t reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
The Supreme Court denied the Motion of Representative Jalosjos that he be allowed to fully discharged the duties of a member of
the Congress, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee hearings despite his having been convicted by the trial
court of a non-bailable offense.
Petitioner Antonio Trillanes sought from the Makati RTC leave to attend Senate sessions and to convene his staff resource persons
and guests and to attend to his official functions as Senator. He anchored his motion on his right to be presumed innocent, and
claims that Jalosjos ruling should not be applied to him, because he is a mere detention prisoner and is not charged with a crime
involving moral turpitude. The Makati RTC denied the motion. Elevating the matter, the Supreme Court denied Trillanes’ petition on
the ground that Section 13 of Article III of the Constitution, explicitly provides that crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua are non-
bailable. The Court further said that the presumption of innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
Member of Congress may be held to account for such speech or debate by the House to which he belongs.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner’s suspension was constitutional.
HELD
Court has no Jurisdiction. Dismissed
RATIO
Osmena contends that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity in his privilege speech. Although the purpose of parliamentary
immunity is to guarantee the legislator complete freedom of expression without being made responsible in criminal or civil actions, it does NOT
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words or conducts are disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof.
The question of whether Osmena’s speech constitutes disorderly conduct is for the House to judge. The matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the house knows best. On the question of jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed for being moot or academic. Because no
preliminary injunction was issued, the special committee performed its task, reported to the house and the latter approved the suspension order.
Respondent was a member of the House who wrote an open letter to the President of the Philippines, and caused this to be publ ished in several
newspapers of general circulation. The contents of the letter were mainly to inform the president of the so-called three operational plans under
serious study of some officers of the AFP and aided by some civilians. It also describes these plans as an insidious plan or a massive political build-up
of then Secretary of Defense Vargas. It also details the various means that has already been mopped out to ensure the success of these operational
plans. The letter also suggested that the planners already have in their control several officers of the AFP, included are t he petitioners. It was
mentioned however in the letter that those mentioned above as already in control of the planners may be unwillingly be only tools of the plan which
they may have absolutely no knowledge.
An ordinary civil action for damages was instituted by petitioners against respondent for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter. The trial court
dismissed this complaint.
ISSUES
Whether or not the letter was privileged communication?
Whether or not the letter could be considered libelous?
HELD
No. It is not privileged communication. Although the Constitution provides for any member of Congress not to be questioned for any speech or
debate therein, in the halls of Congress or elsewhere, this publication doesn’t fall into this category. The said expression refers to utterances made
by legislators in the performance of their functions, while Congress is in session. In the case a quo, the letter was made w hile Congress was
presumably not in session. Furthermore, he caused the letter to be published in newspapers of general circulation, thus ipso facto he wasn’t
performing his official duty either as a member of Congress or any officer of any committee.
No. The fact that the letter suggested that the plaintiffs may be unwilling tools of the plan without having knowledge thereof already in a way
exculpate the responsibility of the plaintiffs in the said plans if ever they have any part in the same. This is not derogat ory to the petitioners to
entitle them to damages, especially that the planners of the operational plans were already clearly suggested.
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DUTIES
Incompatible Office | Hold any other office in government during his term without forfeiting seat.
Appointment to any office created or emoluments increased during the term elected.
Personally appear as counsel in any government office.
Direct of indirect interest in any government contract or franchise during term of office.
Intervene before government office for his pecuniary benefit or called upon to act on account of his office.
Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431
Forfeiture of the seat in Congress shall be automatic upon the member’s assumption of such other office deemed incompatible with
his seat in Congress. However, no forfeiture shall take place if the member of Congress holds the other government office in an ex
officio capacity, e.g., membership in the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines of the Chairman, Committee on
Education, in the Senate.
FORBIDDEN OFFICE
The ban against appointment to the office created or the emoluments thereof increased shall, however, last only for the duration of the term
for which the member of Congress was elected.
OTHER INHIBITIONS
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government or any in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
SESSION
Regular Session begins on the 4th Monday of July, which is also the State of the Nation Address of the President.
Special Session called forth by the President.
JOINT SESSIONS
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Voting jointly to revoke or extend proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or placing the Philippines
under martial law under Section 18, Article VII.
1. The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
2. A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may c ompel the attendance
of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
3. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
4. Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national
security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall
also keep a Record of its proceedings.
5. Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than
that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
OFFICERS
Senate to elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective members. Each House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary:
Pro tempore
Majority floor leader as the Chairman of Committee on Rules, who controls the agenda.
STANDING COMMITTEES
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1. Bases Conversion 5. Globalization And WTO 10. Peace, Reconciliation And Unity
2. Bicol Recovery And Economic 6. Land Use 11. Reforestation
Development 7. Metro Manila Development 12. Southern Tagalog Development
3. East Asian Growth Area 8. Millennium Development Goals
4. Food Security 9. North Luzon Growth Quadrangle
A majority of each House, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner and under such penalties as such House may determine.
Petition of quo warranto. Petitioner, Jose Avelino, asks the court to declare him the rightful senate president and oust the respondent, Mariano Jesus
Cuenco. On February 18, 1949, the request of Senator Lorenzo Tanada to speak on the floor on February 21, 1949 was granted to formulate charges
against the then Senate President Avelino. On the day that Tanada was supposed to speak on the floor, Avelino delayed his appearance, did not
immediately open the session, and read slowly the resolution of Senator Sanidad and Tanada.
When the session finally started, Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with but Senator Tirona, Avelino’s follower, opposed the motion
because of the plan of Avelino’s group to delay the session to prevent Tanada from delivering his privilege speech. Suddenly, a disorderly conduct
broke out in the Senate gallery. Senator Pablo David, Avelino’s follower, moved for adjournment of session perhaps consistent with their ploy to
prevent Tanada’s privilege speech.
Sanidad opposed the motion and moved that it be submitted to a vote. Suddenly, Avelino banged the gavel, abandoned the chair, and walked out of
the session hall followed by Senators Francisco, Torres, Magalona, Clarin, David, and Tirona. Cuenco was designated to chair the session. Tanada was
finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Sanidad’s Resolution No. 68 was read and approved. Tanada yielded the chair to Senate President pro-
tempore Arranz. Then, Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67 entitled “Resolution declaring vacant the position of the president of the senate and
designating the honourable Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president of the senate.” Resolution No. 67 was approved.
ISSUE
Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter? If it has, were Resolutions Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
HELD
Petition dismissed. Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. The court does not have any jurisdiction in view of the separation of powers and
the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president. The selection of the presiding officer affects only the senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change, or reinstate them. The petition to put back the petitioner to preside is only
acceptable if the majority of the senators want to, such remedy lies in the Senate session hall and not in the Supreme Court.
Assuming that the court has jurisdiction, the session left by Avelino and presided by Arranz was a continuation of the session. Thus, the departure of
the minority Senators does not prevent the remaining majority Senators from passing a Resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes” (actually specific
taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bi ll was approved on third
reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading
on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of
the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996.
At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proc eeded to deliver his sponsorship speech,
after which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack
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of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared
the presence of a quorum. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he
was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the
following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the new spaper issues of
December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the
motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o’clock, Wednesday, next week.
On that same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996. Petitioners filed a petition for certiora ri and/or challenging the
validity of RA 8240.
ISSUES
Whether or not RA 8240 was passed in violation of rules of the House which will therefore be a violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to look into the internal proceeding of the House.
HELD
It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure
of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Petitioners claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the
Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano’s motion approved. But what happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out
for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently
objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair,
symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Verily, the fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House making the passage of the bill to
a law in accordance with the law. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote,
except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of the bill. Therefore, no violation of the Constitution was shown.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than m embers of that
House as long as no violation of the Constitutional violation is shown.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
House may punish its members for disorderly behavior and with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend (for not more than sixty
days) or expel a member.
should be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts charged. The order of suspension provided in
RA 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks. Neither does the order of suspension encroach upon the
power of Congress. The doctrine of separation of powers, by itself, is not deemed to have effectively excluded the members of
Congress from RA 3019 or its sanctions.
ADJOURNMENT
Neither house during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other
place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. | Jimenez v. Castro
There was enacted a Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Act. The Central Bank of the Philippines issued
Circular No. 95 fixing the a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. Petitioner, Casco Philippine Chemica l Co., Inc,
engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues bought imported urea and formaldehyde which are main raw materials in the
production of its products and has paid the margin fee.
Thereafter, petitioner sought to refund the said margin fee pursuant to Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board which declared that
urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said sale. The Central Bank issued the corresponding vouchers for the refund but failed to give the
money on the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board is not within the purview of the said RA.
XVII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-
users.
Petitioner contends that the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde. It shall be noted that the National
Institute of Science and Technology has expressed that urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is a finished product distinct and
different from urea and formaldehyde
ISSUE
Whether or not Urea and Formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.
HELD
Denied the petition. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by the Congress and
approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was certified by the officers of the Congress and
approved by the Executive, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. The importation of urea and
formaldehyde is not exempt from payment of margin fees being distinct and different from urea formaldehyde as provided in the law.
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Enrolled bill prevails, except as to matters which, under the Constitution, must be entered in the Journal. | Morales v. Subido, 26
SCRA 150
Senator Gerardo M. Roxas suggested an amendment that instead of City Engineer, it be the President Pro-tempore of the Municipal Board who
should succeed the vice-mayor, in case if incapacity. Senator Arturo Tolentino also later made his own suggested amendments, which the Senate
recognized.
On May 20, 1964, same date of Sen. Tolentino's suggestion, the Secretary of Senate sent a letter to the Hous e of Representatives that House Bill No.
9266 had been passed by the Senate “with amendments” (the one recommended by Sen. Roxas, and not the Tolentino amendments, were
approved) The bill was then attested by the Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the two Secretaries of the House.
On June 16, 1964, the Secretary of the House gave 4 printed copies of the bill the President and the latter signed said bill, thereupon became RA No.
4065. However, Senator Tolentino later on released a press statement saying that the bill passed was the wrong version and didn't contain the
amendments approved by the Senate. The Senate President and the Secretary of the Senate then addressed a letter to the President explaining the
error committed as to the attested copy of the bill and their intent to withdraw their signatures affixed in the said bill, making the bill invalid and w/o
effect.
On July 31, 1964, the President sent a message to the House of Congress informing his withdrawal of his signature on the bill. As a consequence,
Mayor Antonio Villegas of Manila issued a circular within his municipality retracting the said bill's effectivity and a notic e to disregard the provisions
of RA 4065, and recalling the five city police force assigned to the vice-mayor in pursuance of said law. Vice-mayor Herminio A. Astorga then filed this
petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel the respondent mayor to
comply with RA 4065.
ISSUE
Whether the “enrolled bill doctrine” or the “journal entry rule” should be adhered to in this jurisdiction?
HELD
Petition is dismissed. In the absence or ineptness of the enrolled bill, the journals may be looked upon to verify the enact ment of a bill or law. Justice
Cesar Bengzon and Justice Sabino Padilla concurred in the opinion that, “enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive
upon us.” The Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears as the only statutory bases of the enrolled bill, which reads:
“The proceedings of the Philippine Commissions....when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive-proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
The function of the attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both houses.
The law making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill of
cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words, it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of th e presiding officers that is
essential. The indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officers, other proof that it has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.
The Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was
not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The withdrawal of signatures by the President of the Senate, Secretary of the Senate, and the
President, himself, shows the lack of intent to pass such erroneous bill and implies the absence of an enrolled bill.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD | Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings | Article VI, Section 16(4)
Matters which, under the Constitution, are to be entered in the Journal:
Yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill
Veto message of the President
Yeas and nays on the re-passing of a bill vetoed by the President
Yeas and nays on any question at the request of 1/5 of members present.
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Composition
Three (3) Supreme Court justices designated by the Chief Justice
Six (6) members of the House concerned chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The Senior Justice shall be its Chairman.
Pimentel v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal | GR No. 141489, November 29, 2002
The Supreme Court said that even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed
to designated common nominees to the HRET and Commission on Appointments, their primary recourse clearly rests with
the House of Representatives and not with the Court. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the
Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and Commission on Appointments can the
party-list representatives seek recourse from this Court through judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary before the petitioners may bring the case to Court.
Power | Electoral Tribunals of the Houses of Congress shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members.
Pena v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal | GR No. 123037, March 21, 1997
Angara v. Electoral Commission | 63 Phil 139
Morrero v. Bocar | 66 Phil 429
The Electoral Tribunal is independent of the Houses of Congress and its decisions may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court.
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Composition
The Senate President, as ex officio Chairman who shall not vote except in case of a tie.
Twelve (12) Senators, elected on the basis of proportional representation from political parties
Twelve (12) Members of the House of Representatives, elected on the basis of proportional representation from political
parties registered under the party-list system represented therein.
Powers | The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty (30) session days of Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of its members. The Commission shall meet only while Congress is in
session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members
Sarmiento v. Mison, supra | Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments, supra
Bautista v. Salonga, supra
The Commission is independent of the two Houses of Congress: its employees are not, technically, employees of Congress.
It has the power to promulgate its own rules of proceedings.
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Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions & Currencies,
G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007
Petitioner was being investigated but Senate cannot do so because the Bank argued that there is already a pending criminal case.
The Supreme Court ruled that the criminal case and the inquiry in aid of legislation are completely different. Mere filing of a criminal
or an administrative complaint before a court pr a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of a legislative
inquiry.
2. Procedural
a. ONLY ONE SUBJECT | to be expressed in the title thereof –
Article VI, Section 26 ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Commission | 151 SCRA 208
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall
Philconsa v. Gimenez | 15 SCRA 479 embrace only one subject which shall be
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections | 21 SCRA 496 expressed in the title thereof.
2. No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on
Chiongbian v. Orbos, supra separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
It was held that the title is not required to be an index of final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except
the contents of the bill. It is sufficient compliance if the title
when the President certifies to the necessity of
expresses the general subject, and all the provisions of the its immediate enactment to meet a public
statute are germane to that subject. calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
Mariano v. Commission on Elections, supra immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
It was declared that the creation of an additional legislative entered in the Journal.
district need not be expressly stated in the title of the bill.
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b. THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS | printed copies of bill in its final form distributed to Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency; upon last reading, no amendment allowed and vote thereon taken immediately and yeas and nays
entered in the Journal (Article VI, Section 26)
As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute, not just a bill,
must be substantially the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only “to concur with
amendments” but also to “propose amendments.” It would violate the coequality of legislative power of the
Senate. The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bi from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
This was reiterated in the Supreme Court Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration, October 30, 1995.
2. Procedure | No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. |
Article VI, Section 26(2)
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In its Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration in the same case, June 26, 1998, the Supreme Court ruled that it is well
settled that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for non-compliance with the internal rules of the House.
It is within the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not
found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. And if the Committee can propose an amendment consisting one or two
provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as “an amendment in the
nature of a substitute,” so long as the amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the Committee.
3. Approval of Bills | The bill becomes a law in any of the following cases: ARTICLE VI, SECTION 27
a. When the President approves the same and signs it. 1. Every bill passed by the
b. When Congress overrides the Presidential veto. Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented
If the President disapproves the bill, he shall return the same, with his to the President. If he
objections thereto contained in his Veto Message, to the House of origin approves the same he shall
which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal. The Veto is sign it; otherwise, he shall veto
it and return the same with his
overridden upon a vote of 2/3 of all members of the House of origin and objections to the House where
the other House. Yeas and nays entered in the Journal of each House. it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to
NO POCKET VETO reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of
PARTIAL VETO all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it
As a rule, a partial veto is invalid. It is allowed only for particular items in shall be sent, together with the
an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill | Article VI, Section 27(2) objections, to the other House
by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved
Bengzon v. Drilon | 208 SCRA 133 by two-thirds of all the
The Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the veto made by Members of that House, it shall
President Aquino of appropriations intended for the adjustment of become a law. In all such
cases, the votes of each House
pensions of retired justices – pursuant to AM 91-8-225-CA under RA 910, shall be determined by yeas or
as amended by RA 1797, as this is not an item veto. The President cannot nays, and the names of the
set aside a judgment of the Supreme Court, neither can the veto power Members voting for or against
shall be entered in its Journal.
be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. The veto also impairs the The President shall
fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, and deprives retired justices of the right communicate his veto of any
to a pension vested under RA 1797. bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days
after the date of receipt
LEGISLATIVE VETO thereof, otherwise, it shall
A congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can block or become a law as if he had
signed it.
modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form of 2. The President shall have the
legislative control in the implementation of particular execution action. power to veto any particular
The form may either be negative, subjecting the executive action to item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or
disapproval by Congress, or affirmative, requiring approval of the tariff bill, but the veto shall not
executive action by Congress. A congressional veto is subject to serious affect the item or items to
questions involving the principle of separation of powers. which he does not object.
approval for executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Thus, since SP No. 2 is an
inappropriate provision, the President properly vetoed the same.
c. When the President fails to act upon the bill for thirty (3) days from receipt thereof, the bill shall become a law
as if he had signed it.
4. Effectivity of Laws
Article 2, Civil Code
Tanada v. Tuvera, supra
Executive Order No. 200, June 18, 1987
C. Classification
1. GENERAL APPROPRIATION LAW
Passed annually, intended to provide for the financial operation of the entire government during one fiscal period.
legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal
banking charges when the shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact
amounts as shown by the books in the Treasury.
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 25
E. Constitutional limitations on special appropriation measures 1. The Congress may not increase
1. Must specify the public purpose for which the sum is intended. the appropriations
2. Article VI, Section 25(4) recommended by the President
for the operation of the
Must be supported by funds actually available as certified to by the National Government as specified in the
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal included therein. budget. The form, content, and
manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by
F. Constitutional rule on general appropriations law law.
1. Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for 2. No provision or enactment
the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. shall be embraced in the
general appropriations bill
2. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by unless it relates specifically to
law. some particular appropriation
3. No provision or enactment shall be embraced unless it relates specifically to some therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited its operation to the
in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. This is intended to prevent appropriation to which it
relates.
riders or irrelevant provisions included in the bill to ensure its approval. Garcia v.
3. The procedure in approving
Mata | 65 SCRA 520 appropriations for the
4. Procedure for approving appropriations for Congress shall strictly follow the Congress shall strictly follow
the procedure for approving
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies. This
appropriations for other
is intended to prevent sub rosa appropriation by Congress. departments and agencies.
5. Prohibition against transfer of appropriations | Article VI, Section 5(5) | Demetria 4. A special appropriations bill
shall specify the purpose for
v. Alba |148 SCRA 208 on the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of PD 1177
which it is intended, and shall
be supported by funds actually
Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra available as certified by the
National Treasurer, or to be
On the constitutionality of a Special Provision in the 1994 GAA which allows a raised by a corresponding
member of Congress to realign his allocation for operation expenses to any other revenue proposal therein.
expense category, the Supreme Court said that the members of Congress only 5. No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of
determine the necessity of the realignment of savings in the allotments for their appropriations; however, the
operational expenses, because they are in the best position to do so, being President, the President of the
knowledgeable of the savings available in some items of the operational expenses, Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the
and which items need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President or the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve Court, and the heads of
the realignment/ hence, the special provision adverted to is not unconstitutional. Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to
augment any item in the
Court also upheld the Presidential veto of a provision – in the appropriation for the general appropriations law for
AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, 1994 GAA – which authorized the Chief of Staff to their respective offices from
savings in other items of their
use savings to augment the pension fund, on the ground that under Article VI, respective appropriations.
Section 25(5), such right must an can be exercised only by the President of the 6. Discretionary funds
Philippines. appropriated for particular
officials shall be disbursed only
for public purposes to be
6. Prohibition against appropriations for sectarian benefit | Article VI, Section 29(2) supported by appropriate
Aglipay v. Ruiz, supra | Garces v. Estenzo, supra vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be
prescribed by law.
Manosca v. Court of Appeals, supra 7. If, by the end of any fiscal year,
The expropriation of the birthplace of Felix Manalo, founder of Iglesia ni Cristo, the Congress shall have failed
to pass the general
was deemed not violative of the provision. The Supreme Court said that the appropriations bill for the
attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little ensuing fiscal year, the general
consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the appropriations law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be
casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The deemed re-enacted and shall
practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of INC than by remain in force and effect until
most others could well be true, but such peculiar advantage still remains to be the general appropriations bill
is passed by the Congress.
merely incidental and secondary in nature.
G. Impoundment
Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra
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Constitutional Law 1 | 1.E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
The refusal by the President for whatever reason to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or
obligate budget authority of any tape. This power of the President is derived from Section 38, Administrative Code of 1987 on
suspension.
Appropriation Reserves
Section 37, Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the Budget Secretary to establish reserves against appropriations to
provide for contingencies and emergencies which may arise during the year. This is merely expenditure deferral, not
suspension, since the agencies concerned can still draw on the reserves if the fiscal outlook improves.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing
laws, as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or abolish.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress in the absence of any constitutional
basis. Furthermore, Section 4(b), EO 1, being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1, which states
that “public office is a public trust,” as it goes against the grain of public accountability and places PCGG members and staff beyond
the reach of the courts, Congress and other administrative bodies.
This power encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws, as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes.
Limitation
In aid of legislation
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Constitutional Law 1 | 1.E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically
bar the conduct of legislative inquiry. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress
through the convenient ploy of instituting a complaint. The exercise of legislative authority of which the power of
legislative inquiry is essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
Thus, the requirement for Cabinet Members to secure Presidential consent under Section 1, EO 464, which is limited only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. It cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made either by the President or Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, the department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty.
In keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers, the provision states that Congress may only request the appearance of
department heads, with the consent of the President. However, when the appearance is in aid of legislation, the appearance is
mandatory.
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Constitutional Law 1 | 1.E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid
claim of executive privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may
be exempted from this power – the President – on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment.
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Constitutional Law 1 | 1.E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
A R T I C L E V I I
Executive Department
1. The President
A. Qualification | Section 2
B. Election | Section 4
C. Term of Office | Section 5, Article XVIII
D. Oath of Office | Section 5
E. Privileges | Section 6
a. Official Residence
b. Salary
c. Immunity from Suit
d. Executive Privilege
F. Prohibitions and Inhibitions | Section 6 & 13
G. Rules on Succession
H. Removal of the President | Section 2 & 3, Article XI
2. The Vice President
3. Powers of the President
A. Executive Power | Section 1
B. Appointment | Section 16
C. Control | Section 17
D. Military Powers | Section 18
E. Pardoning Power | Section 19
F. Barrowing Power | Section 20
G. Diplomatic Power | Section 21
H. Budgetary Power | Section 22
I. Informing Power | Section 23
J. Other Powers
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Constitutional Law 1 | 1.E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
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Constitutional Law 1 | 1.E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
THE PRESIDENT
ON QUALIFICATIONS
The Executive Power is unique as it is vested on only one individual, who is the President serving Why is the requirement for a
both as Head of State and Chief Executive as contrasted with Legislative Power that is vested on a college degree not stipulated?
Congress of multiple individuals and Judicial Power that is vested on one Supreme Court and What does “able to read and
write” mean?
other lower courts. It is rational for a democratic
state, where majority rules, to
Head of State would mean the ceremonial head of the government who must take part with real consider the population of the
people who can avail a college
or apparent enthusiasm in a range of activities that would keep him running and posing from degree so as for proper
sunrise to bedtime if he were not protected by a cold-blooded staff – The American Presidency, representation. History tells us
Clinton Rossiter. that elected Presidents were not
really marginalized; in fact they
belong to the elite, rich class.
Chief Executive means that he is executive and no one else is. In Villena v. Secretary of Interior,
67 Phil 451, 464 (1939), it was said that the President is the executive of the government of the
The need for “natural-born
Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political position and citizenship” and “residency”
hold office in an advisory capacity, and in the language of Thomas Jefferson, “should be of the requirement.
President’s bosom confidence” and in the words of Atty. Cushing, “are subject to the direction of It is presumed that it reflects one’s
allegiance to the country. In
the President.” reality it is not true. It may be
argued that aliens who are
The enumeration of specific powers does not exhaust the totality thereof. Tradition recognizes naturalized to become Filipinos
are proven to be more loyal to the
that the powers of the President are more than the sum of them, which brings about the country as it is their choice to
existence of “residual powers.” become one. The residency is
required as it is premised on the
person representing the entire
Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990) state as a person who is physically
The President may not convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole knowledgeable and aware of
will. Conveyance must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress. issues and concerns in his own
territory. Moreover, in the US
Constitution, residency
Qualifications | Section 2 requirement is 14 years.
Natural- born citizen
Registered vote In this era of technological
Able to read and write advancement, are these
Forty years of age on the day of the election qualifications still applicable
and valid?
Resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election It may be argued that changing
times may necessitate amendment
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 161434, March 3, 2004 of the Constitution. For instance, if
the sole reason of the residency
In the case of Fernando Poe Jr. being an illegitimate child of an American mother and a Filipino requirement is for the awareness
father, it was held that he is still a natural-born citizen provided that paternity is clearly proved, an of problems of society which the
President belongs, then with the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
advancement in technology, even
an alien may be fully aware of
ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE | Senate v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 other countries’ problems and
issues even if he does not belong to
Executive Order 464 imposed a gag on executive officials summoned to a Senate legislative
that society.
investigation. In simplest terms, it is the power of the President to withhold certain types of
information from the courts, the Congress, and ultimately the public.
The types of information include those which are of nature that disclosure would subvert military or diplomatic objectives, or
information about the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law, or information about internal deliberations
comprising the process by which government decisions are reached.
Section 2(a) of EO 464, upheld as valid by the Supreme Court, enumerated the following as privileged. These are taken from earlier
decisions:
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Constitutional Law 1 | 1.E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
1. Conversational and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive
order.
2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged.
3. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements.
4. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings.
5. Matters affecting national security and public order.
Ermita said, “Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is
crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from
disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, the necessity must be of such high
degree as to outweigh the public interest, in enforcing the obligation in a particular case. Put differently, the Court said that a claim
of privilege may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is claimed. For in
determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls
within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.”
From this the Court concluded that it is not for one claiming executive privilege to “unilaterally determine that respondents’ duly-
issued privilege Subpoena should be totally disregarded.”
One must also see executive privilege vis-à-vis the power of Congress to use compulsory process. “While the executive branch is a
co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power – the President.
Another point which the Court emphasized in the case was that a claim of privilege must be stated with sufficient particularity to
enable Congress or the court to determine its legitimacy. “Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive
privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances
in which it is made, it should be respected.” The lack of specificity renders and assessment of the potential harm resulting from
disclosure impossible. However, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as
to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.
Senate v. Ermita was followed by Neri v. Senate. In a Senate hearing involving a contract with a Chinese firm, Neri in his capacity as
Chairman of NEDA was asked three questions:
a) Whether the President followed up the NBN project;
b) Whether the President directed him to prioritize the ZTE;
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe.
Neri claimed executive privilege. This type was “presidential communication privilege.” Presidential communication is presumptively
privileged; but the presumption is subject to rebuttal. Thus, whoever challenges it, must show good and valid reasons related to the
public welfare.
The Court ruled that the Senate failed to convert the presumption. Communications between the President and “operationally
proximate” advisers are presumed to be privileged and one challenging it must show cause why it should not be considered so. But
these must be limited to communications with the President. Moreover, the decision itself, once reached, can become a matter of
public concern. Certainly, for instance, if a decision reached is criminal, it cannot be privileged.
The Court could have asked for an in camera session for Neri to explain his claim within the hearing of the Court alone. Such a
procedure, followed by American practice, could have enabled the Court to sift what was privileged and what was not and then to
allow the revelation of what was not privileged. But the Court did not use the procedure, and relied instead on presumption. Thus,
the Chief Justice commented that executive privilege was established by guesswork.
The decision, if applied to criminal cases, has the dangerous effect of blocking discovery of wrongdoing by the mere claim of
presumptive privilege.
A lesser anomaly in the decision is its rejection of the manner in which the Senate approved its show cause order to Secretary Neri.
The Senate approved the order through the collection of a sufficient number of signatures and not in a meeting. The Court found
this t be an invalid procedure. But is it for the Court to tell the Senate what its voting procedure should be? As our own Court said in
1960:
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Courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the court have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Provided, of course, private rights are not violated. The Court too does modify or even dispense with its own rules. What is good for
the goose should be good for the gander.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them
shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualificat ions of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Election | Section 4
IRRELEVANT PROVISION | Article VII,
Mechanism: By direct vote of the people. Section 4(4)
Regular: Second Monday of May.
“The person having the highest
number of votes shall be proclaimed
Congress as National Canvassing Board
elected, but in case two or more shall
In theory, all of the votes from the election returns when added must be equal to the votes have an equal and highest number of
canvassed by Congress coming from the city/provincial Certificate of Canvass (COC). The votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all
function of Congress is not merely ministerial. It has authority to examine the certificates the Members of both Houses of the
of canvass for authenticity and due execution. For this purpose, Congress must pass a law Congress, voting separately.”
governing their canvassing functions. This was only copied from the US
Constitution. We do not use electoral
voting, which this scenario may anticipate.
Returns of every election for President and Vice President, duly certified by the board of Philippine election voting is of millions and
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to Congress, directed to the it is highly impossible for a situation
wherein a tie would happen.
Senate President who, upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, shall, not later than 30
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate ON CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS
and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by What is the mindset of the framers on
this?
law, canvass the votes. Congress shall promulgate its rules for canvassing of the Mindset of Constitutional Commission is
certificates. In case two or more candidates shall have an equal and highest number of that Certificate of Canvass (COC) is just a
votes, one of them shall be chosen by a majority vote of all the members of Congress. piece of paper. Before, it takes several days
before. In these times, it should be in tune
with the technological advancements such
After voters had finished voting, the counting machines will then count the votes received that it may be transmitted electronically
or physically, that is the actual paper.
by each candidate in each position. For positions elected on a national basis (president,
COMELEC can make a parallel count but it
vice president, senators and party-list representatives), the counting machine will then is not really their duty.
print an election return for that precinct, and will transmit the results to the municipal/city
board of canvassers, Congress, Commission on Elections, the citizen's arm authorized by
the commission, political parties, and others.
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Constitutional Law 1 | 1.E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
The city or municipality will then tally the votes for all positions and will issue two documents at its conclusion: a statement of votes
where the votes obtained by candidates in each precinct in a city/municipality is stated; and a certificate of canvass (COC), a
document in electronic and printed form containing the total votes in figures obtained by each candidate in the city or municipality.
The city or municipal COC will either be sent electronically to Congress (if the city is an Independent city with its own legislative
district) or to the provincial board of canvassers in which the process is repeated; this time the provincial COC will be sent to
Congress.
Makalintal v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003 on the Section 18.5 of RA 9189 | Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003
Insofar as the RA grants sweeping authority to the COMELEC to proclaim all winning candidates, is unconstitutional as it is
repugnant to Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution vesting in Congress the authority to proclaim the winning candidates
for the positions of President and Vice President.
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioner’s right to file the instant petition, stating in
essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people,
considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said law.
ARGUMENTS
Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
1. That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the
residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
2. That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party
list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of
the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress;
and
3. That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same
section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the
COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
HELD
1. NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2. YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the votes of the President and Vice-President, and not to the votes of
the Senators and party-list representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3. YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the second sentence in its second paragraph allowing Congress to
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate, is violative of Art. IX-A,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 163556, June 8, 2004
In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution
of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee, composed of members of the House of Representatives
and the Senate. The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived
petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under
attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of both
Houses of Congress, voting separately.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the votes cast for President and Vice President, GR No.
163783, June 22, 2004
Adjournment terminates legislation but not the non-legislative functions. Even after Congress has adjourned its regular
session, it may continue to perform this constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and vice-presidential election
results without need of any call for a special session by the President. The joint public session of both Houses of Congress
convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the
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Constitutional Law 1 | 1.E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
newly-elected President and Vice President has not, and cannot adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus
officio.
It shall be composed of nine members, three of whom shall be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and two other justices to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be chosen as follows: three to be nominated by the majority party from
among its Members in the Batasang Pambansa, and three to be nominated by the minority party from among its Members. The
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be its Chairman.
Any vacancy in the Tribunal shall be filed by nomination by the Chief Justice, the majority party or the minority party in the Batasang
Pambansa, as the case may be.
Fernando Poe Jr. v. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005
Susan Roces, widow of Petitioner cannot intervene and/or substitute for him, assuming arguendo that the protest could
survive his death. The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election protest is under Rule 14 of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal Rules, which provides that only the registered candidate for President or Vice President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice
President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
(30) days after the proclamation of the winner. Pursuant to this rule, only two persons may contest the election.
The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February
7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, extended at noon of
June 30, 1992 under Section 5 of Article XVIII.
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Under Article XVIII, Section 17 | Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an
annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred
forty thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four
thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty
thousand pesos each.
After Tenure
Estrada v. Desierto, GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of
acts done by him while he was President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties.
Gloria v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119903, August 15, 2000
Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President, he cannot invoke the President’s immunity
from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but
merely those of a department Secretary.
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Executive Privilege
The right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from Congress, the
courts and the public.
Most members of the Supreme Court upheld the refusal f the petitioner to answer the three questions asked
during the Senate inquiry because the information sought by the three questions is properly covered by the
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege was validly claimed by the President, through the
Executive Secretary.
Communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President. This was received by a
close advisor of the President, Secretary Neri being a member of the Cabinet and by virtue of the “proximity
test”, he is covered by executive privilege. There was also no adequate showing by the respondents of the
compelling need for the information as to justify the limitation of the privilege, nor was there a showing of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Prohibitions and Inhibitions | Sections 6 and 13, Article VII -- Paragraphs A to D ARTICLE VII, SECTION 13
apply to Vice President; B to D also apply to members of the Cabinet, their The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
deputies or assistants. During tenure: Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their
1. Shall not receive any other emoluments from the government or any tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly
other source. or indirectly, practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 152154, July 15, 2003 interested in any contract with, or in any
The Court noted that the total accumulated salaries of the franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Marcos couple amounted to P 2,319,583.33 which when Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
converted to dollars at the exchange rate then prevailing owned or controlled corporations or their
would have an equivalent value of $ 304,372.43. This sum subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
should be held as the only known lawful income of the interest in the conduct of their office.
respondent Marcos since they did not file any Statement of The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or
Assets and Liabilities, as required by law, from which their affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
net worth could be determined. President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or
2. Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, shall not hold any as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or
other office or employment. heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations
Vice President may be appointed to the Cabinet without and their subsidiaries.
need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Secretary of Justice is an ex officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council.
3. Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business or be financially interested in any
contract with or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or –controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
5. May not appoint spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as members of
Constitutional Commissions or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Under Secretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or –controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Rules on Succession
President has vast powers and vacancy matters a lot. Everyone has to know who the boss is.
There is no law on Presidential Succession unlike in the United States.
The law is silent on the possibility that the President-apparent dies before the proclamation. There is problem on
succession: who takes over – the second front runner or the Vice President?
Acting President does not relinquish his original position: he serves double function.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall
have been chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become
permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have
died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen
and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected
until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of
the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
The Court declared that the elements of a valid resignation are present which are:
1. Intent to resign.
2. Act of relinquishment.
Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the
Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President
until a President or Vice President shall be elected and qualified. Congress, by law, shall provide for the manner
in which one is to act as President in the event of inability of the officials mentioned above.
3. Temporary Disability
When the President transmits to the Senate President and the ARTICLE VII, SECTION 14
Appointments extended by an Acting
Speaker of the House his written declaration that he is unable to President shall remain effective, unless
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he revoked by the elected President, within
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary: such ninety days from his assumption or
reassumption of office.
power and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as
Acting President.
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When a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet ARTICLE VII, SECTION 11
Whenever the President transmits to the President of
transmit to the Senate President and Speaker of the the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
House their written declaration that the President is Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties
and duties of the office as Acting President. shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President.
Senate President and Speaker his written Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
declaration that no inability exists, he shall transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
reassume the powers and duties of his office. Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge
Meanwhile, should a majority of the Members the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
of the Cabinet transmit within five (5) days to shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
the Senate President and Speaker their written
declaration that the President is unable to Thereafter, when the President transmits to the
discharge the powers and duties of his office, President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that
Congress shall decide the issue. no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and
For this purpose, the Congress shall convene, if duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all
not in session, within 48 hours. the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days
to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
And if within ten (10) days from receipt of the the House of Representatives, their written
last written declaration or, if not in session, declaration that the President is unable to discharge
within 12 days after it is required to assemble, the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
Congress determines by a 2/3 vote of both convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight
Houses, voting separately, that the President is hours, in accordance with its rules and without need
unable to discharge powers and duties of his of call.
office, the Vice President shall act as President; If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
otherwise, the President shall continue written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve
exercising the powers and duties of his office. days after it is required to assemble, determines by a
two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and
4. Constitutional duty of Congress in case of vacancy in the offices of duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President and Vice President President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office.
At 10:00 in the morning of the third day after the vacancy
occurs, Congress shall convene without the need of a call, ARTICLE VII, SECTION 12
and within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election In case of serious illness of the President, the public
shall be informed of the state of his health. The
to elect a President and a Vice President to be held not members of the Cabinet in charge of national security
earlier than 45 nor later than 60 days from the time of and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the
such call. The bill shall be deemed certified and shall Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied
access to the President during such illness.
become law upon its approval on third reading by
Congress. The convening of Congress cannot be ARTICLE VII, SECTION 10
suspended nor the special election postponed. No special The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the
third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
months before the date of the next presidential election. accordance with its rules without need of a call and
within seven days, enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be
Removal of the President | By Impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than
Article XI sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling
such special election shall be deemed certified under
paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution
Article XI, Section 2 and shall become law upon its approval on third
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office special election shall be charged against any current
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, appropriations and shall be exempt from the
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of
this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not cannot be suspended nor the special election
by impeachment. postponed. No special election shall be called if the
vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the
Article XI, Section 3 date of the next presidential election.
1. The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
ARTICLE VII, SECTION 15
cases of impeachment.
Two months immediately before the next presidential
2. A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order temporary appointments to executive positions when
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by service or endanger public safety.
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
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within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
3. A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
4. In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
5. No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on
oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall presi de, but shall not
vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and puni shment,
according to law.
8. The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
Function | His only constitutional function is to be on hand to act as President when needed or to
ARTICLE VII, SECTION 9
succeed to the presidency in case of a permanent vacancy in the office. The President may also appoint Whenever there is a
him as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment does not need the consent of the Commission on vacancy in the Office of
Appointments. the Vice-President
during the term for
which he was elected,
Qualifications | Election | Term of Office | Removal the President shall
The same as the President | Section 3, Article VII nominate a Vice-
President from among
No Vice President shall serve for more than 2 successive terms. the Members of the
May be appointed as Member of the Cabinet, which requires no confirmation by the Senate and the House of
Commission on Appointments. Representatives who
shall assume office upon
confirmation by a
Vacancy in the Office of the Vice President majority vote of all the
Section 9, Article VII | The President shall nominate a Vice President among the members of Members of both Houses
of the Congress, voting
the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office by confirmation by a separately.
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of Congress voting separately.
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT | THE EXECUTIVE POWER as first power of the President
1. The Executive Power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17
The President shall
2. National Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 143481, February 15, 2002 have control of all
the executive
The Supreme Court said that as the administrative head of the government, the President is vested with departments,
the power to execute, administer and carry out laws into practical operation. Executive Power, then, is bureaus, and offices.
the power of carrying out the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully
executed.
3. Authority to reorganize the Office of the President
1. Domingo v. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003
The Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292) expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of
the President. This is to recognize the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office “to achieve simplicity,
economy, and efficiency.” This office is the nerve of the Executive Branch, which must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped in the manner deemed fit to carry out directives and policies.
This should be distinguished from the Power to Reorganize the Office of the President Proper, such that under Section
31(1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize this by abolishing, consolidating or merging units or by transferring functions
from one unit to another. In contrast under Section 31 (2) and (3), the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the
Office of the President Proper is limited merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies and vice versa.
4. Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil 451 | Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil 62 | Myers v. United States, 271 US 52
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The Supreme Court declared that the President is the Executive of the Government and no other, and that al executive authority is
thus vested in him. In the third case, it was announced that the specific grant of executive powers is not inclusive but is merely a
limitation upon the general grant of executive power.
5. Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines Inc. (MEWAP) v. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007
It was held that the President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution
and statutes. This authority is an adjunct of the President’s power of control under Article VII, Section 1 and 17 and it is also an
exercise of his “residual powers”. However, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch
or agency of the executive department.
6. It is not for the President to determine the validity of a law since this is a question addressed to the judiciary. Thus, until and unless a
law is declared unconstitutional, the President has a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts on its validity. A contrary opinion
would allow him to negate the will of the legislature and to encroach upon the prerogatives of the Judiciary.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
This section provides for the second power of the President, which is the power of appointment.
1. APPOINTMENT
It is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. It is distinguished from designation in that the latter simply means the imposition of additional duties, usually by
law, on a person already in the public service. It is also different from the commission in that he latter is the written
evidence of the appointment.
The power to appoint includes the power to decide who among various choices is the best qualified, provided that the
person chosen has the qualifications provided by law.
Appointments that need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments are only those enumerated in Section 16,
Article VII. This is different from the law under the 1935 Constitution where the general rule was that all appointments
made by the President needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointments unless exempted by Congress from the
need for confirmation. Moreover, “ad interim appointments” under paragraph 2 are immediately effective.
The power to appoint may be vested by law in officers other than the President “in courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.” However, when the law is silent as to who should appoint corresponding officers in
created office, the President shall appoint.
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prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the
limited exercise of power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office.”
NOTE: The appointing authority of the President should not be confused with the authority of the legislature to impose
additional duties on existing offices. Thus, under the 1935 Constitution, while it was clearly the prerogative of the
President to appoint the members of the Supreme Court, Roxas v. Lopez, 17 SCRA 756 (1966) upheld the authority of
Congress to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal consisting of the Chief Justice and the Justices of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court upheld that the act did not create a new office nor specify who should hold the office but merely
imposed additional duties and powers upon the Supreme Court and consequently upon whoever may be the incumbent
Chief Justice and Associate Justices.
Appointment calls for discretion on the part of the appointing authority. The power to appoint prosecutors is given to the
President. The Secretary of Justice is under the control of the President. Hence, the law must be read simply as allowing
the Secretary to advice the President. The doctrine in San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 is not applicable because the stress
there was on the constitutional mandate on local autonomy.
2. CLASSIFICATION OF APPOINTMENTS
1. Permanent or Temporary
Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing the qualifications and the requisite eligibly
and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and without the
necessity of just cause or a valid investigation, made on the understanding that the appointing power has not yet
decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a permanent
choice is made.
2. Regular or Ad Interim
Regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session takes effect only after
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved, continues until the end of the term of
the appointee.
Ad Interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in session, takes effect immediately,
but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or upon the next adjournment is
deemed “by-passed” through inaction. It is intended to prevent interruptions in vital government services that
would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in government offices.
This appointment refers to positions which need confirmation by the Committee on Appointments while an
appointment in an acting capacity is also given to those which do not need confirmation. The former may be
given only when Congress is not in session whereas the latter may be given even when Congress is in session.
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Ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution:
1. Disapproval of the appointment by the Commission on Appointments
2. Adjournment by Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on it.
There is no dispute that when the Commission on Appointments disapproves an ad interim appointment, the
appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment, inasmuch as the disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. Such disapproval
is final and binding on both the appointee and the appointing power. But when an ad interim appointment is by-
passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize, there is no final
decision by the Commission to give or withhold its consent to the appointment. Absent such decision, the
President is free to renew the ad interim appointment.
First Sentence:
Heads of executive departments
Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain
Those other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution
Second Sentence
All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law
Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
Article 215 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, insofar as it requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointment of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman and commissioners, is
unconstitutional, because it violates Section 16, Article VII.
The Supreme Court said that Congress cannot, by law, require the confirmation of appointments of government officials
other than those enumerated in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII with reference to the appointment of the head
of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The promotion of senior officers of the PNP is not subject to the confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments as required by the PNP law. PNP officers are not members of the Armed Forces but are
civilians.
Appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee, if issued a permanent appointment, should possess the
minimum qualification requirements, including the Civil Service eligibility prescribed by law for the position. This discretion
also includes the determination of the nature of character of the appointment, i.e., whether the appointment is temporary
or permanent.
Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327
Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 106
Pobre v. Mendieta, 224 SCRA 738
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court said that the essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature.
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1. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position
of great trust and confidence. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices, but if
abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent
from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess
of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
2. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of a department secretary, the President must appoint in
an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be
permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be
the permanent appointee. Moreover, the law expressly allows the President to make such acting
appointment. Section 7, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that “The President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the
functions of an office in the executive branch.”
3. As to standing, the Supreme Court held that the Commission on Appointments is independent of the
Senate; senators who are not members of it may not act in their behalf.
In case of a vacancy in an office, occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of Department Secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint the alter ego of her choice as Acting Secretary before the permanent appointee of her
choice could assume office.
The Presidential Power of Appointment may also be limited by Congress through its power to prescribe qualifications for
public office; and the judiciary may annul an appointment made by the President if the appointee is not qualified or has
not been validly confirmed.
Under Section 13 of Article VII, the President may not appoint his spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within
fourth civil degree as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, as Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or –controlled corporations.
Section 14 of Article VII states that appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by
the elected President within ninety days from his assumption of office.
In Article VII, Section 15, it provides that two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The Supreme Court ruled that this provision applies only to presidential appointments. There is no law that
prohibits local executive officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure.
This may be implied from the power of appointment. However, the President cannot remove officials appointed by him
where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for separation of such officers from public service. For instance,
Chairmen and Commissioners of Constitutional Commissions who can be removed only by impeachment, or judges who
are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. In the cases where the power of removal is lodged in the
President, the same may be exercised only for cause as may be provided by law, and in accordance with the prescribed
administrative procedure.
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Alajar v. Alba, 100 Phil 683 | Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231
Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office depends upon the pleasure of the President may be
replaced at any time, but legally speaking, their separation is effected not by removal but by expiration of their term.
This section provides for the third power of the President, which is the power of control.
1. CONTROL
It is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter (Mondano v. Silvosa, supra).
It is distinguished from supervision in that the latter means overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may take such
action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.
Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines (MEWAP) v. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007
The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and
statutes. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17, of the Constitution. While
the power to abolish an office is generally lodged in the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the
executive branch, which may incidentally include such abolition, is permissible under present laws.
The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title
I, Book II, Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of the Philippines), which grants the President broad organization
powers to implement reorganization measures. Further, Presidential Decree No. 1772, which amended PD 1416, grants
the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services, and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the
executive department if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. RA 6656 enumerates the
circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees as a result of
reorganization:
a. Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned.
b. Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created.
c. Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit.
d. Where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices.
e. Where the removal violates the order of separation.
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unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” (Villena v.
Secretary of Interior, supra)
NOTE: Constitution now made a distinction between government-owned corporations with original charter from those
with derivative charter.
DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees, GR No. 149724, August 19, 2003
This doctrine recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executives and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Applying this doctrine, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly delegated to his
Cabinet Members exercising control over a particular executive department. Accordingly, in this case, the DENR Secretary
can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal,
South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, is presumed to be
the act of the President because the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
Blaquera v. Alcala, GR Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, 112056 and 119597, September 11, 1998, pp. 59-60
Section 31 of EO No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) provided an incentive award system for government employees.
On February 21, 1992, President Aquino issued AO No. 268 enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without
prior approval of the President. On January 19, 1992, President Ramos issued AO No. 29, which limited the amount of
incentive benefits for 1992m enjoined head of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without prior
approval from him, and directed the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount.
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits
for 1992. They assail the constitutionality of AO Nos. 29 and 268 on the ground that:
1. They violate the provisions of EO No. 292 and, since the latter is a law, it prevails over executive
issuances.
2. They encroach upon the constitutional authority of the Civil Service Commission to adopt measures to
strengthen the merit and reward system and to promulgate rules, regulations and standards governing
the incentive awards system of the Civil Service.
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The Supreme Court held that both AO nos. 29 and 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the
executive departments. “The President issued subject Administrative Orders to regulate the grant of productivity incentive
benefits and to prevent discontentment, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing
limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The President was only exercising his
power of control of modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the President, thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government
resources.
The President did not encroach upon the authority of the CSC to grant benefits to government personnel. AO Nos. 29 and
268 did not revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive benefits, but merely regulated the grant and amount
thereof. Fixing the amount of the incentives is not the duty of the CSC. Such function belongs to the President or his duly
empowered alter ego.
City of Iligan v. Director of Lands, 158 SCRA 158 | Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328
President may exercise powers conferred by law upon Cabinet members or other subordinate executive officers.
Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302 | Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92
Appeal to the president from decisions of subordinate executive officers, including Cabinet members, completes
exhaustion of administrative remedies, except in the instances when the doctrine of qualified political agency applies; in
which case the decision of the Cabinet Secretary carries the presumptive approval of the President and there is no need to
appeal the decision to the President in order to complete exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The power of control, therefore, is not the source of the Executive disciplinary power over the person of his subordinates.
Rather, his disciplinary power flows from his power to appoint: the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.
This inherent disciplinary power has been made subject to limitation by the legislature through the latter’s power to
provide for a civil service system one of whose main features is security of tenure: No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law. Article IX-B, Section 2(3). Hence, it can be
said that while the Executive has control over the “judgment” or “discretion” of his subordinates, it is the legislature which
has control over their “person”.
5. Hutchinson Ports Phils. Ltd. V. SBMA, GR No. 131367, August 31, 2000 | Respondent is under control of the Office of the President.
All projects undertaken by SBMA involving P2M or above require the approval of the President under LOI 620.
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Review as an act of supervision and control by the Justice Secretary, finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. This power may still be availed of despite the filing of criminal information in Court, and in his
discretion, the Secretary may affirm, modify or reverse the resolution of his subordinates.
The Crespo ruling did not foreclose the Justice Secretary’s power of review. Thus, where the Secretary of Justice exercises
his power of review only after information is filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and other proceedings
until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment, however, does not mean that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice, because jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court is not lost despite the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss the case.
Solar Team Entertainment v. Judge How, GR No. 140863, August 22, 2000
Noblejas v. Salas, 67 SCRA 47
Villegas v. Enrile, 50 SCRA 11
David v. Villegas, 81 SCRA 842
7. THE PRESIDENT EXERCISES ONLY THE POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
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The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts o r legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
This section provides for the fourth power of the President, which is the military power.
What was said by the American Supreme Court in Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat 19 US (1827) which Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971) said
was not applicable to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, must be considered applicable to the broad power to make
use of the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion. The authority to decide whether the
exigency has arisen belongs exclusively to the President, and his decision is conclusive upon all other persons.
The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to a
wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority – the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. By
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tradition and jurisprudence, these powers are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach
to executive privilege or executive control.
The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the AFP is most crucial to the democratic way of
life, to civil supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government. The
Court quoted Kapunan v. De Villa: “The Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline.
It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be
circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the
effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline
within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with,
irrespective of a soldier’s personal view on the matter.”
On September 22, 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled on September 28, 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the
conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an
audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. Gen. Francisco Gudani and Col. Alexander Balutan, who were designated as commander and member,
respectively, of the “Joint Task Force Ranao” by the AFP Southern Command in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, tasked
with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections, received invitations to attend the said Senate hearing.
In the evening of September 27, a message was transmitted from the office of AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Generoso Senga, stating that: “per
instruction of her excellency PGMA, no AFP personnel shall appear before any congressional or Senate hearing without her appr oval.
Inform BGen Francisco F Gudani AFP and LTC Alexander Balutan PA (GSC) accordingly.” On the day of the hearing, President Arroyo issued
Executive Order 464 (E.O. 464) which enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing
in any legislative inquiry without her approval. Despite E.O. 464 and despite the order from Gen. Senga, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
appeared and testified during the Senate hearing.
The Office of the Provost Marshall General (OPMG) recommended that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan be charged with violation of Article
of War 65, for willfully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to Article of War 97, for conduct prejudicial to the good order and military
discipline. The day after Gen Gudani and Col. Balutan were required to appear before the OPMG, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired
from service. Thereafter, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and injunction, claiming that E.O. 464 is
unconstitutional and seeking that the charges against them be quashed. Furthermore, it is stressed that Gen. Gudani was no longer
subject to military jurisdiction on account of his compulsory retirement.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the violation of directive of the President could lead to any investigation for court-martial of Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan.
2. Whether or not the court martial has jurisdiction over Gen. Gudani in view of his compulsory retirement
HELD
NO. The petition is DISMISSED. AFP personnel of whatever rank are liable under military law for violating a direct order of an officer
superior in rank.
A most dangerous general proposition is foisted on the Court – that soldiers who defy orders of their superior officers are exempt from
the strictures of military law and discipline if such defiance is predicated on an act otherwise valid under civilian law. Obedience and
deference to the military chain of command and the President as commander-in-chief are the cornerstones of a professional military in
the firm cusp of civilian control. These values of obedience and deference expected of military officers are content-neutral, beyond the
sway of the officer’s own sense of what is prudent and ash, or more elementally, of right or wrong. A self-righteous military invites itself
as the scoundrel’s activist solution to the “ills” of participatory democracy.
The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress pertains to the
commander-in-chief powers of the President. The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the
President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the
organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature.
The commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the
members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military
officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers
of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or exec utive
control. Any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under the law to compel such attendance. Any military officer whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, the attendanc e or non-attendance in
legislative inquiries.
The court martial has jurisdiction over Gen. Gudani since proceedings were initiated against him before his compulsory retire ment.
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The Court has already declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the
jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once
jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to
Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily
retired.
To call out (such) armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion whenever it becomes
necessary.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra
Supreme Court said that the petitioners failed to prove that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power,
by issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. Court noted the Solicitor General
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum showing a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of
PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the record. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is
convinced that the President was justified issuing PP 1017, calling for military aid. Indeed, judging from the
seriousness of the incidents, President was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or
suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Under the calling-out of power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid her in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion; this involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond this is
considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of her power. She
cannot invoke a greater power when she wishes to act under a lesser one.
General Order No. 5 issued to implement PP 1017 is valid. It is an order issued by the President, acting as
commander-in-chief, addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it
provides a valid standard – that the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” But the words “acts of terrorism” found
in the GO, had not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress, and thus, should be deemed deleted
to the GO.
However, PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the President the authority to promulgate ”decrees”,
because legislative power is peculiarly within the province of Congress. Likewise, the inclusion in PP 1017 of
Section 17, Article II of the Constitution is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers. Section 17,
Article XII, must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause, and thus, requires a delegation
from Congress.
It is pertinent to the state that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state of
rebellion (Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While the authority to declare a
state of rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive (the statutory authority being Section 4, Chapter
2 of Book II, Administrative Code of 1997) and the declaration was deemed harmless and without legal
significance, in declaring a state of emergency in PP 1017, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII, but also on Section 17, Article XII calling for the exercise of awesome powers which cannot be
deemed as harmless or without legal significance.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000
Petitioners argue that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” by President Arroyo is violative of the doctrine of
separation of powers, being an encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional
prerogative to “determine or interpret” what took place in EDSA III on May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a
state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.
It was held that the factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is something that is for the President to
decide. He has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly
confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on the spot decisions may
be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. Although the Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
of this power, on the basis of its power to determine grave abuse of discretion, this is no longer feasible when
the proclamation has already been lifted. (Lacson v. Secretary Perez, supra | Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,
supra)
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Supreme Court said that when the President calls out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, rebellion or
invasion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. The Court cannot overrule
the President’s discretion or substitute its own. The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary”, the
President may call out the armed forces. In the exercise of the power, on-the-spot decisions may be necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to
call out the armed forces must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
As held in Lacson v. Perez, supra, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrest of persons suspected of
rebellion as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Be that as it may, the Court said that, in
calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an “utter superfluity”. At most, it only gives
notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
“The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is
deemed not written.”
The power to organize courts martial for the discipline of the members of the armed forces, create military commissions
for the punishment of war criminals.
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil 875 | Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 42 OG 4282
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It is defined as a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf. Hence, an essential requisite for the availability of the
writ is actual deprivation of personal liberty.
Duration: Not to exceed sixty days following which it shall be lifted, unless extended by Congress.
Congress may revoke or extend on the request of the President the effectivity of proclamation by a majority vote of all its
members, voting jointly.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
The suspension of the privilege of the writ does not impair the right to bail under Section 13, Article III.
The suspension only applies to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
During the suspension, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise, he
shall be released.
If respondents have the burden of proving, the evidence needs further study. The Court is not a trier of facts. If
respondents have not satisfied that burden, the case must be referred to the Commission on Human Rights for relief.
3. MARTIAL LAW
It is essentially police power. This is borne out by the constitutional text which sets down “public safety” as the object of the exercise
of martial law. Public safety is the concern of police power, which is normally a function of the legislature executed by the civilian
executive arm. Martial law, however, is exercised by the executive with the aid of the military and in place of “certain governmental
agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with existing conditions in a locality which remains subject to the sovereignty.
Justice Stone
The exercise of the power which resides in the executive branch of the Gumaua v. Espino, 96 SCRA 403, 403-407
government to preserve order and insure the public safety in times of February 29, 1980
emergency, when other branches of the government are unable to function,
Due to this amorphous shape of martial law
or their functioning would itself threaten the public safety. It is the law of
power, the Marcos Supreme Court arrived at
necessity to be prescribed and administered by the executive power. Its the following conclusions:
object, the preservation of the public safety and good order, defines the
scope, which will vary with the circumstances and necessities of the case. The 1. That the proclamation of martial law
automatically suspends the privilege of the
exercise of the power may not extend beyond what is required by the writ of habeas corpus.
exigency which calls it forth.
2. That the President of the Philippines, “as
Commander-in-Chief and as enforcer or
Scope of Martial Law Powers as a Fixed Concept administrator of martial law can promulgate
Martial law is a flexible concept, which is something that can be insinuated proclamations, orders and decrees during the
from the text of the Constitution. It depends on two (2) factual bases: period of martial law essential to the security
1. The existence of actual invasion or rebellion. and preservation of the Republic, to the
defense of the political and social liberties of
2. The requirements of public safety. the people, and to the institution of reforms to
Necessity creates the conditions for marital law and at the same time limits prevent the resurgence of rebellion or
the scope of martial law. Certainly, the necessities created by a state of insurrection or secession or the threat thereof
as well as to meet the impact of a world
invasion would be different from those created by rebellion. Necessarily, recession, inflation or economic crises which
therefore, the degree and kind of vigorous executive action needed to meet presently threatens all nations including highly
the varying kinds and degrees of emergency could not be identical under all developed countries.
conditions.
3. That the President of the President, as
legislator during the period of martial law, can
Limitations on the power to suspend the privilege and the power to impose legally create military commissions or courts
martial law under the 1987 Constitution. martial to try not only members of the armed
forces but also civilian offenders for specified
1. The constitutional limitations for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
offenses.
are likewise imposed on the proclamation of martial law. This has a maximum
of 60 days.
2. The President shall submit report to Congress within 48 hours. Congress, The 1987 Constitution rejects the above
voting jointly, by a vote of at least majority, may revoke or extend the Marcos Court pronouncements and now
says categorically: “A state of martial law
proclamation.
does not suspend the operation of the
3. Any citizen may question the factual basis of the proclamation by filing a case Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
with the Supreme Court which must decide within 30 days. This posits that the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
the imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege is not a authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
political question. military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the
State of Martial Law does not:
writ.”
Suspend the operation of the Constitution
Suspend the functioning of the Courts or legislative assembly
Authorize military courts to enforce jurisdiction over civilians
Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
Suspension of Writ
Applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
Any person arrested or detained during the suspension shall be judicially charged within 3 days otherwise he shall be
released.
Aberca, et. al. alleged that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases
defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number
of purely personal items belonging to Aberca, et. al.; that Aberca, et. al. were arrested without proper warrants issued by the
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courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that Aberca, et. al. were
interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats,
tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish
them; that all violations of Aberca, et. al.’s constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract
information and incriminatory statements from Aberca, et. al. and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being
previously known to and sanctioned by Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo B. Lantoria,
Col. Galileo Kintanar, Lt. Col. Panfilo M. Lacson, Maj. Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1lt. Pedro Tango, 1lt. Romeo
Ricardo, 1lt. Raul Bacalso, Msgt. Bienvenido Balaba. Aberca, et. al. sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to
P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the
amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney’s fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.
Ver, et. al. moved to dismiss.
On 8 November 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, through Judge Willelmo C. Fortun presiding,
issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental
motion for reconsideration was filed by Aberca, et. al. on 18 November 1983, and 24 November 1983, respectively. On 15
December 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the
resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, “to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun)
cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs
assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion.” This order prompted Aberca, et.
al. to file an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group [FLAG] of Mabini
Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad on 12 April 1984. In an order dated 11 May
1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising presiding, without acting on the motion to set aside order of 8 November 1983,
issued an order declaring the order of 8 November 1983 final against Aberca, et al. for failure to move for reconsideration nor
to interpose an appeal therefrom.
Assailing the said order of 11 May 1984, Aberca, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration on 28 May 1984. In its resolution of 21
September 1984, the court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of 11 May 1984 declaring that with respect to
certain plaintiffs, the resolution of 8 November 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of 8 November
1983 granting Ver, et. al.’s motion to dismiss. On 15 March 1985, Aberca, et. al. filed the petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ver, et. al., may be held civilly liable for undertaking invalid search and seizures, or violation of Constitutional
rights or liberties of another in general.
HELD
No. It may be that Ver, et. al., as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as
they claim, “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in accordance with Proclamation
2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on 27 January 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch
pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license
or a roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of
the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to
which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times. Article 32 of the Civil Code which
renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and
liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt Ver, et. al. from responsibility.
Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of
the Penal Code or other penal statute. This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned
task or carrying out their mission with vigor. However, in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards
must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. Article 32 clearly speaks of an officer or employee
or person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is
not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. By this provision, the principle of
accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a larger dimension.
No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought
that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and
liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that
the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it
would certainly be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage
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suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tort feasors.
Further, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy Aberca, et. al.’s right and cause of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render
valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Furthermore, their right and cause of
action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the
following to its text: “However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of
any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including
the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.”
Thus, even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends Aberca, et. al.’s right of action
for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries
suffered because of Ver, et. al.’s confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to
counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
This section provides for the fifth power of the President, which is the pardoning power.
Limitations on Exercise
Cannot be granted in cases of impeachment | Section 19, Article VII
Cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without favorable recommendation of the Commission on
Elections | Section 5, Article IX-C
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PEOPLE V. SALLE JR., GR No. 103567, December 4, 1995 | 250 SCRA 581 People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56, 110 (1937)
Pardon can be granted only after conviction by final judgment. This power A reprieve “postpones the execution of an
offense to a day certain.” And a commutation “is
cannot pre-empt the Courts since pardon can be extended only to one a remission of a part of the punishment; a
whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the person withdraws substitution of a less penalty for the one
his appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final. This corrects People originally imposed.” Remission of fines and
forfeitures is a self-explanatory term. However,
v. Crisola, March 2, 1984 | 126 SCRA 1, which said that clemency terminates
it should be noted that remission of fines and
the appeal. forfeitures merely prevents the collection of
fines or the confiscation of forfeited property; it
People v. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44 cannot have the effect of returning property
which has been vested in third parties or money
The Court declared that the 1987 Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, in the public treasury.
whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal
from the judgment of conviction by the trial court. Any application for a United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 (US 1833)
A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the
pardon should not be acted upon, or the process toward its grant should not
power entrusted with the execution of the laws,
begin, unless the appeal is withdrawn. which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts
MONSANTO V. FACTORAN, 170 SCRA 190 for a crime he has committed. It is the private,
though official, act of the executive magistrate,
This ruling, which was laid down under the 1973 Constitution is now delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is
changed by virtue of the explicit requirement under the 1987 Constitution. intended and not communicated officially to the
Court. It is a deed, to the validity of which
delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete
Petitioner was a teacher with the rank of Principal I. Convicted of a criminal
without acceptance. It may then be rejected by
offense; he was sentenced to one year imprisonment and disqualification to the person to whom it is tendered; and if it be
hold public office. Subsequently he was given absolute pardon and restored rejected, we have discovered no power in a
to “full civil and political rights” he applied for reinstatement and was given court to force it on him.
the position merely of classroom teacher. Cabantog v. Wolfe, 6 Phil 273, 278 (1906)
It is submitted that a distinction must be made
It is true that one who is given absolute pardon has no demandable right to between absolute and conditional pardon.
Absolute pardon is complete even without
reinstatement. However, since the petitioner in this instance was actually
acceptance; whereas a conditional pardon has
reinstated and there are no circumstances that would warrant the no force until accepted by the condemned. The
diminution of his rank, justice and equity dictates that he be given his former reason is obvious. The condition may be less
rank. acceptable to him than the original punishment,
and may in fact be more onerous..
Sabello v. DECS, 180 SCRA 623 PARDON is an act grace which exempts
A pardoned elementary school principal, on consideration of justice and the individual on whom it is bestowed
from the punishment that the law inflicts
equity, was deemed eligible for reinstatement to the same position of
for the crime he has committed.
principle and not to the lower position of classroom teacher. COMMUTATION is the reduction or
mitigation of the penalty.
People v. Catido, GR No. 116512, March 7, 1997 REPRIEVE is the postponement of a
sentence or stay of execution.
It was held that while the pardon was void for having been extended during PAROLE is the release from prison, but
the pendency of the appeal, or before conviction by final judgment, and without full restoration of liberty, as
therefore a violation of Section 19, Article VII, the grant of amnesty, applied parolee is still in the custody of the law
although not in confinement.
for by the accused-appellants under Proclamation No. 347, was valid. AMNESTY is the act of grace, concurred in
by the legislature, usually extended to
Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt as it would violate the groups of persons who committed political
separation of powers, or civil contempt as the State is without interest in the offenses, which puts into oblivion the
offense itself.
same.
Classification of Pardon
1. Plenary or Partial
2. Absolute or Conditional
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Amnesty
This can only be done with the concurrence of the majority of the members of the Congress.
Pardon is granted t ne after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty
of political offense, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that
is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work restoration of the rights to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. And it in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. (Article 36, Revised Penal
Code)
While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed the offense.
NOTE: The distinctions made here should be understood in the light of the later cases of Monsanto and Garcia, which hold
that pardon can have the effect of restoring rights such as the right to hold public office or the right of suffrage.
Vera v. People of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 152 | People v. Pasilan, 14 SCRA 694 (1965)
It was held that to avail of the benefits of an amnesty proclamation, one must admit his guilt of offense covered by the
proclamation.
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. 69344, April 26, 1991, quoting Commission of Internal Revenue v.
Botelho Corporation, 20 SCRA 487
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The legal nature of a tax amnesty is that it is a general pardon or intentional overlooking of its authority to impose
penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of revenue or tax law, [and as such] partakes of an absolute
forgiveness or waiver by the Government of its rights to collect what otherwise would be due it.
This section provides for the sixth power of the President, which is the borrowing power.
Monetary Board
It has expertise and consistency to perform the mandate and since such expertise or consistency may be absent among the
Members of Congress. In order to allow Congress to act on whatever legislation may be needed to protect public interest
The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It
makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more
onerous than others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the powers
of the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed in a sense that will allow the
full exercise of the power provided therein. It would be the worst kind of judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue and
change the meaning of the organic act.
This section provides for the seventh power of the President, which is the diplomatic power.
This also includes power to contract or guarantee foreign loans | Section 22, Article VII
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In general, it can be said that agreements that are permanent and original should be embodied in a treaty and
need Senate concurrence. Agreements, however, which are temporary or are merely implementations of
treaties or statutes do not need concurrence.
USAFFE Veterans Association, Inc. v. Treasurer of the Philippines, 105 Phil 1030
While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate under the Constitution, less formal types of international agreements may be
entered into by the Chief Executive and become binding without the concurrence of the legislative body.
World Health Organization v. Hon. Benjamin Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 | Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. John Gotamco and Sons,
148 SCRA 36, 39-40 (1987)
The Host Agreement comes within the latter category; it is a valid and binding international agreement even without the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate. The privileges and immunities granted to the WHO under the Host Agreement have been
recognized by this Court as legally binding on Philippine authorities.
The Republic of the Philippines cannot require the United States to submit the agreement to the US Senate for concurrence, for that
would be giving a strict construction to the phrase, “recognize as a treaty”. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the
VFA as merely an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is just as binding as a treaty.
During the evaluation stage in the office of the Department of Justice the subject of the extradition request does not have the right
to notice and hearing. PD No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when as extradite shall be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that
accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty. As an extradition
proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary
investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.
In an extradition proceeding, the subject of extradition does not have a right of access to evidence in the hands of the executive
department. It is during the judicial phase that he has the right.
There is no provision in the Constitution or act of the legislature defining the power, as it is evident that it is the intention of the law
to grant to the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien’s residence in the country is so undesirable as to effect
or injure the security, welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which the deportation is predicated also
devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory.
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This section provides for the eighth power of the President, which is the budgetary power.
Basis for the general appropriations bill passed by Congress.
The budget receipts and expenditures prepared by the President.
Source of Financing
Financing can come from sources other than revenue measures.
This section provides for the ninth power of the President, which is the informing power.
OTHER POWERS
1. To submit a budget
Section 22, Article VII | Section 25, Article 6
2. Residual Powers
Marcos v. Manglapus, supra
3. Call Congress to a special session
Section 15, Article VI
4. State of the Nation Address (SONA)
To address to appear before Congress | Section 23, Article VII
5. Power to approve or veto bills
Section 27, Article VI
6. To consent to deputation of government personnel by the Commission on Elections
Section 2(4), Article IX-C
7. To discipline such deputies
Section 2(8), Article IX-C
8. By delegation from Congress, emergency powers and tariff powers
Section 23(2) and 28(2), Article VI
9. Emergency Powers
Article VI, Section 23 | Article XII, Section 17
10. General supervision over local government and autonomous regional governments
Article X
Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, GR No. 125350, December 2, 2002
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A R T I C L E V I I I
Judicial Department
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Jurisdiction
It is defined as the power to hear and decide a case.
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO INSURE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 6
The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body; it may not be abolished by the legislature. courts and the personnel thereof.
2. The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment.
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 12
3. The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate The Members of the Supreme Court and
jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice and of other courts established by law shall
concurrence. not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or
4. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and administrative function.
personnel.
5. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges or justices of inferior ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 3
The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
courts.
6. The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not
7. The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing quasi- be reduced by the legislature below the
amount appropriated for the previous
judicial or administrative functions. year and, after approval, shall be
8. Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy. automatically and regularly released.
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two positions in the Philippine Judicial Academy, the DBM overstepped its authority and encroached upon the fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme Court and its power of supervision over court personnel, as enshrined in the Constitution.
9. The Supreme Court, alone, may initiate and promulgate the Rules of Court.
10. The Supreme Court, alone, may order temporary detail of judges.
11. The Supreme Court can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary.
material points, was held to have raised an issue which had become moot and academic.
Atlas Fertilizer v. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform | GR No. 93100, June 19, 1997
Because Congress had already passed amendatory laws excluding fishponds and prawn farms from the coverage
of CARL, the issue on the constitutionality of the assailed provisions had become moot and academic, and
therefore, not ripe for judicial review.
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004 (and other companion cases)
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case.
Relative to the validity of the declaration by President Arroyo of a “state of rebellion” after the Oakwood incident was
similarly decided on the fourth ground below. Courts will decide cases otherwise moot and academic if:
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution.
b. There is an exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved.
c. The constitutional issues raised require formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and
the public.
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evasive review.
Alunan III v. Mirasol | GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997 | 276 SCRA 501, 511
The court decided because it raised a question, otherwise moot, but “capable of repetition yet evading review”.
In a US case, it was held that the application of this principle presupposes that: 1) the life of the controversy is
too short to be fully litigated prior to its termination; and 2) that there is a reasonable expectation that the
plaintiff will again be subjected to the same problem.
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In numerous decisions particularly in recent ones, the Supreme Court has adopted a liberal attitude and recognized the
legal standing of petitioners who have invoked a public right allegedly breached by a governmental act.
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The Supreme Court summarized its earlier rulings and declared that petitioners may be accorded standing to sue
provided that the following requirements are met:
1. The case involves constitutional issues.
2. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional (the prevailing doctrine is that taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the
national government or by government-owned or –controlled corporations allegedly in contravention
of law – Abaya v. Ebdane | 515 SCRA 720)
3. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question.
4. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early.
5. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives
as legislators.
Anak Mindanao Party List Group (AMIN) v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 166052, August 29, 2007
It was held that AMIN, as member of Congress, had legal standing to institute the suit questioning the validity of
Executive Order No. 364 placing the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) under the supervision
and control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Commission on Human Rights Employees Association (CHREA) v. Commission on Human Rights (CHR) | GR No. 155336,
November 25, 2004
The petitioner, as association consisting of rank-and-file employees in the Commission on Human Rights, protests that the
upgrading and collapsing of position benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission, resulting in
the demoralization of rank-and-file employees. This, according to the Supreme Court, meets the injury test.
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) | GR No. 155001, May 5, 2003
The petitioners, NAIA concessionaires and service contractors, were declared proper parties because they stood
to lose their source of livelihood by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO contracts. The financial
prejudice brought about by the said PIATCO contracts on them are legitimate interests sufficient to confer on
them the requisite standing to file instant petitions.
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Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Romulo | GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005
The petitioners, composed of ten labor unions, seeking the declaration of unconstitutionality of EO 185, dated March 10,
2003, which transfer administrative supervision over the NLRC from the NLRC Chairman to the Secretary of Labor, could
not show that their members sustained or were in danger of sustaining injury from EO 185. This was because the authority
conferred upon the Secretary of Labor did not extend to the power to review, revise, reverse or modify the decisions of
the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
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Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections | 289 SCRA 337
It was held that the petitioner, an association of lawyers of radio and television broadcast companies, was not a
proper party, because the members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered any injury as a result
of Section 92, BP 881. They do not have any interest as registered voters, because the case does not involve the
right of suffrage. Neither do they have an interest as taxpayers because the case does not include the exercise by
Congress of its taxing or spending powers. However, a co-petitioner, a broadcast company, was deemed to have
locus standi because it would suffer losses from the implementation of Section 92, BP 881, since it would be
required to give free airtime to the COMELEC.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) v. Zamora | GR No. 141284, August 15, 2000
The petition seeking to nullify the order of President Estrada for the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join
the PBP in visibility patrols around the Metro Manila area, was dismissed on the ground that the IBP had no legal
standing to question the presidential act.
Information Technology Foundation v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 159139, January 13, 2004
It was held that the subject matter of the case is “a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest”. In
other words, it is of “paramount public interest” and of “transcendental importance”. The nation’s political and
economic future virtually hangs in the balance, pending the outcome of the 2004 elections; accordingly, the
award for the automation of the electoral process was a matter of public concern, imbued with the public
interest. This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court
whenever a case involves “an issue of overarching significance to our society.”
Information Technology Foundation v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 159139, January 13, 2004
This case reiterated the principle that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of “illegal disbursement
of public funds”, or if public money is being “deflected to any improper purpose”, or when petitioners seek to
retain respondent from “wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.” In
this case, the individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers, asset a material interest in seeing to it that public funds
are properly and lawfully used, claiming that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity,
and the award of the contract contrary to law and regulations.
FACIAL CHALLENGE
The established rule is that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional.
The exception is the so-called “facial challenge”. But the only time a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it
operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the
validity of a statute even though, as applied to him, it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if applied to others not before
the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.
Justice Mendoza’s concurring opinion in Cruz v. DENR | GR No. 135385, December 6, 2000
Invalidation of the statute “on its face” rather than “as applied”, is permitted in the interest of preventing a
“chilling effect” on freedom of expression.
challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the
assailed law may be valid. Here, the petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS
Related to “overbreadth”, this doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence, must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is subject to the same principles governing the overbreadth
doctrine.
David v. Macapagal- Arroyo, supra cited in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 167011, April 30,
2008
For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing “on their faces” statutes in free speech cases. And like
overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications.
The test to determine whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice. The Court has stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.
Thus, Section 45(J) of RA 8189 which provides that violation of any of the provisions of the law is an election
offense is specific enough since as held in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, “a statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them, much less do we have to define every word we use.
As to the issue of vagueness, the petitioners did not attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in its application.
They failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP
1017.
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THE DECISION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION MUST BE DETERMINATIVE OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 7
THE CASE ITSELF 1. No person shall be appointed
Member of the Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate court unless he
Because of the doctrine of separation of powers which demands that proper respect be
is a natural-born citizen of the
accorded the other departments, courts are loathe to decide constitutional questions Philippines. A Member of the
as long as there is some other basis that can be sued for a decision. The constitutional Supreme Court must be at least forty
years of age, and must have been for
issue must be the lis mota of the case.
fifteen years or more, a judge of a
Zandueta v. de la Costa, supra lower court or engaged in the
De la Llana v. Alba, supra practice of law in the Philippines.
It was held that during this period, the President is not required to make appointments to the courts, nor allowed to do so.
While the filling up of vacancies in the Judiciary is in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling
reason to justify the issuance of the appointment during the period of the ban.
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Regular members shall be appointed by the President for a term of four (4) years, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. They shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court.
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Only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is death must the trial court forward the records of the case to the
Supreme Court for automatic review of the conviction.
Temporary Assignment of Judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require; but the assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
In Re: Request for Creation of a Special Division | AM No. 02-1-09-SC, January 21, 2002
It was held that it is within the competence of the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its power to promulgate rules
governing the enforcement and protection of constitutional rights and rules governing pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, to create a Special Division in the Sandiganbayan which will hear and decide the plunder case
against former President Joseph Estrada.
Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Requesting Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues | BM No. 1370, May 9,
2005
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, of
which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long one’s
membership in the IBP remains regardless of lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged
in.
THE WRIT OF AMPARO | Azcuna, The Writ of Amparo: A Remedy to Enforce Fundamental Rights, 37 Ateneo L.J. 15
(1993)
The nature and time-tested role of Amparo has shown that it is an effective and inexpensive instrument for the
protection of constitutional rights. Amparo, literally “to protect”, originated in Mexico and spread throughout the
Western Hemisphere where it gradually evolved into various forms, depending on the particular needs of each
country.
Rule on the Writ of Amparo | Resolution AM No. 07-9-12-SC (October 24, 2007)
Section 1 thereof provides: “The petition for a Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee or of a private individual or entity.
Section 14 of the Rule allows the grant by the Court of interim reliefs, which may either be a temporary
protection order, inspection order, production order or a witness protection order.
Rule of the Writ of Habeas Data | Resolution AM No. 08-1-16-SC (February 2, 2008)
Section 1 thereof provides: “The Writ of Habeas Data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, honor and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said
decision. In other words, the memorandum decision should actually embody the findings of facts and conclusions of
law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensible part of the decision.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis
therefor.
The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a
majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon.
It was held that the first clause in the said section is a declaration of the grant of the disciplinary power to, and the
determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It did not intend that all administrative
disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court. The second clause, intentionally separated from
the first by a comma, declares that the Court en banc may “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority”. Thus, only
cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc.
Office of the Judicial Administrator v. Pascual | AM No. MT-93-783, July 29, 1996
The Supreme Court, reiterating Raquiza v. Castaneda, declared that the grounds for the removal of a judicial officer
should be established beyond reasonable doubt, particularly where the charges on which the removal is sought are
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetence.
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In Re: Derogatory News Item Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 10
Demetrio Demetria with Interference on Behalf of A Suspected Drug Queen | The salary of the Chief Justice
and of the Associate Justices of
AM No. 00-7-09-CA, March 27, 2001 the Supreme Court, and of
The Supreme Court said that although every office in government service is a judges of lower courts shall be
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and fixed by law. During the
continuance in office, their
uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of salary shall not be decreased.
propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the
Judiciary so indispensible in an orderly society cannot be preserved. There is ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 15
1. All cases or matters filed
simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards after the effectivity of this
of judicial conduct and integrity. Constitution must be
decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from
In Re: Release by Judge Manuel T. Muro, RTC Branch 54 Manila, of an date of submission for the
Accused in a Non-Bailable Offense | AM No. 00-7-323-RTJ, October 17, 2001 Supreme Court, and, unless
Where the judge, despite opposition from the prosecution, simply issued an reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for
order submitting for resolution the motion and the opposition without the all lower collegiate courts,
same being heard, and later, granting the motion for extension of medical and three months for all
confinement for two months, the Supreme Court found the judge guilty of other lower courts.
2. A case or matter shall be
gross misconduct for being utterly inefficient and for manifest partiality. And deemed submitted for
it is said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic decision or resolution
and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or
judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he memorandum required by
holds, or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately the Rules of Court or by the
done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. court itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the
corresponding period, a
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2 | No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it certification to this effect
undermines the security of tenure of its members. signed by the Chief Justice
or the presiding judge
shall forthwith be issued
De la Llana v. Alba | 112 SCRA 294 and a copy thereof
It was held that BP 129 was a valid reorganization law, and that, therefore, the attached to the record of
the case or matter, and
abolition of then existing judicial offices did not violate security of tenure. served upon the parties.
NOTE: In view of the clear declaration of Article VIII, Section 2, the ruling in The certification shall
De la Llana, as well as that in Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice | L-7918, state why a decision or
resolution has not been
January 18, 1955, may be said to have been modified accordingly. rendered or issued within
said period.
4. Despite the expiration of
SALARIES the applicable mandatory
period, the court, without
Nitafan v. Tan | 152 SCRA 284 prejudice to such
responsibility as may have
Salaries are fixed by law and may not be decreased during their continuance in office. In this case, it been incurred in
was held that imposition of income tax on salaries of judges does not violate the constitutional consequence thereof, shall
prohibition against decrease in salaries. decide or resolve the case
or matter submitted
thereto for determination,
without further delay.
PERIODS FOR DECISION
1. All cases filed after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided or resolved, from date of
submission, within: 24 months – Supreme Court; 12 months – lower collegiate courts; and 3 months – all other lower courts; unless,
in the two latter cases, the period is reduced by the Supreme Court. A certification to be signed by the Chief Justice or Presiding
Justice shall be issued stating the reason for delay.
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disapproval of the practice of rendering “sin perjuicio” judgments. What should be promulgated must be the complete
decision.
Report on the Judicial Audit in RTC Branch 27 of Lapulapu City | AM Case No. 97-9-282-RTC, April 22, 1998
Article VIII, Section 15, is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice, and judges are repeatedly reminded that
failure to decide cases within the prescribed period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency which is a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge.
2. Despite expiration of the mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in
consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted to it without further delay.
The court does not lose jurisdiction over the case, despite the lapse of the mandatory period, but the erring judge or justice
may be subjected to administrative sanctions for the delay.
Pros. Robert Visbal v. Judge Ramos | AM No. MTJ-00-1306, March 20, 2001
Atty. Montes v. Judge Bugtas | AM No. RTJ-01-1627, April 27, 2001
Maquiran v. Judge Lopez | AM No. RTJ-00-1606
Canada v. Judge Montecillo | AM No. RTJ-01-1664
In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC Branch 69, Silay City, Judge Arinday, respondent | AM No. 99-5-162-
RTC, May 11, 2001
Report on the Judicial Audit in the MTC’s of Calasiao, Binmaley, Sta. Barbara and Mapandan and in the MCTC of Tayug-San
Nicolas, all in Pangasinan | AM No. MTJ-01-1375, November 13, 2001
Arap v. Judge Mustafa | AM No. SCC-01-7, March 12, 2002
In Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan | AM No. 00-8-05-SC, November 08, 2001
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena was fined P20,000 and was relieved of his powers, functions and duties as
Presiding Justice, so that he may devote himself exclusively to decision-writing. His motion for reconsideration was denied on
January 31, 2002.
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A R T I C L E I X
Constitutional Commissions
I. Common Provisions
A. Scope
B. General Characteristics
C. General Powers
D. General Prohibitions
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Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 159940, February 16, 2005 ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 5
The Commission shall enjoy
They are constitutionally created; may not be abolished by statute. fiscal autonomy. Their approved
annual appropriations shall be
Each is expressly described as “independent”. automatically and regularly
Each is conferred certain powers and functions which cannot be reduced by statute. released.
The Chairmen and members cannot be removed except by impeachment.
ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 6
The Chairmen and members are given a fairly long term of office of seven years. Each Commission en banc may
The Chairmen and members may not be reappointed or appointed in an acting promulgate its own rules
capacity. concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any
of its offices. Such rules,
Brillantes v. Yorac | 192 SCRA 258 however, shall not diminish,
It was held that the designation of Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the increase, or modify substantive
rights.
Commission on Elections was a violation of this provision.
ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 8
Matibag v. Benipayo | GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002 Each Commission shall perform
such other functions as may be
The Supreme Court said that when an ad interim appointment (of the Chairman of the provided by law.
Commission on Elections) is not confirmed (as it was by-passed, or that there was not
ample time for the Commission on Appointments to pass upon the same), another ad
interim appointment may be extended to the appointee without violating the
Constitution.
The salaries of the chairman and members are relatively high and may not be decreased during continuance in office.
The Commission enjoy fiscal autonomy.
The Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections perform key functions in the
government. In order to protect their integrity, they have been made constitutional bodies. Because they perform vital
functions of government, it is essential that their independence be protected against outside influences and political
pressures. Hence, they enjoy fiscal autonomy; the salary of Commissioners may not be diminished during their
continuance in office; the Commissioners have a fixed term; and they are removable only by impeachment.
Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and Management | GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005
The petitioner, via the present petition for mandamus seeks to compel the Department of Budget and Management to
release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. CSC claims that the reason for the withholding was the “no report, no
release” policy. Budget Department, however, claims that the failure to release the fund in full is because of shortage of
funds.
Respecting respondent’s justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner as due to a shortfall in revenues, the
same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming
that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance with the mandate above-quoted Article IX-A,
Section 5. If respondent’s theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release
approved appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month that there is a shortfall of revenues,
thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering insignificant altogether, such mandate.
The Supreme Court said that the “no report, no release” policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with
fiscal autonomy, without violating Article IX-A, Section 5. The “automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to
petitioner, a constitutional commission vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be construed to mean that no condition
to fund releases to it may be imposed. However, petitioner’s claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress below
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the amount appropriated for the previous year, as in the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected. Article VIII, Section 3,
prohibiting the reduction in the appropriation for the Judiciary below the amount appropriated for the previous year, does
not appear in Article IX-A, Section 5. The plain implication of this omission is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing
the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.
Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Human Rights | GR No. 155336, November 25,
2004
The Supreme Court said that the Commission on Human Rights, unlike the three Constitutional Commissions, does not
enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Each Commission may promulgate its own procedural rules, provided they do not diminish, increase of modify substantive
rights – though subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court.
The Constitutional Commissions are independent bodies. Hence, the power of the Supreme Court over rules issued by
quasi-judicial bodies found in Article VIII, Section 5(5) does not apply to them. The Court, however, in appropriate
cases, may exercise “judicial review” over them.
Decisions
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution.
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The provision of the Constitution is clear that what is required is the majority vote of all the members, not only of those
who participated in the deliberations and voted thereon in order that a valid decision may be made by the Constitutional
Commissions. Under rules of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which the constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. This ruling abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua v.
Commission on Elections | 156 SCRA 582
Because two Commissioners who had participated in the deliberations had retired prior to the promulgation of the
decision, the Supreme Court said that the votes of the said Commissioners should merely be considered withdrawn, as if
they had not signed the resolution at all, and only the votes of the remaining Commissioners considered for the purpose of
deciding the controversy. Unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result insofar as votes for or
against a party is concerned, there is no reason to declare the decision a nullity. In this case, the withdrawal of the votes of
Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent commissioners, still constituting a
quorum at the time of the promulgation of the resolution, would still be 3 to 1 and thus, be a vote of the majority, in favor
of the respondent.
Any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.
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The Court reiterated that certiorari under Rule 65, Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy to invalidate disputed
Commission on Elections resolutions such as final orders, rulings and decisions of the Commission on Elections rendered in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
The Supreme Court held that the proper mode of appeal from the decision of the Civil Service Commission is a petition for
review under Rule 43 filed with the Court of Appeals.
Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 152574, November 17, 2004
Because the petitioner imputed to the Court of Appeals “grave abuse of discretion” for ruling that he had no legal standing
to contest the disapproval of his appointment, the Supreme Court said that “grave abuse of discretion is a ground for a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court resolved to give due course to
the petition and to treat it appropriately as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
grounds alleged shall be deemed “reversible errors”, not “grave abuse of discretion”.
Enforcement of Decision
Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals | 212 SCRA 235
It was held that final decisions of the Civil Service Commission are enforceable by a writ of execution that the Civil Service
Commission may itself issue.
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Olanda v. Bugayong | GR No. 140917, October 10, 2003 citing Mantala v. Salvador 206 SCRA 264
It is the intent of the Civil Service Law, in requiring the establishment of a grievance procedure, that decisions of lower
level officials in cases involving personnel action be appealed to the agency head, then to the Civil Service Commission.
The Regional Trial Court does not have jurisdiction over such personnel actions.
Philippine National Oil Company Energy Development Corporation v. Leogardo | GR No. 58494, July 5, 1985
The test is the manner of its creation. Corporations created by special charter are subject to the Civil Service, whereas
corporations incorporated under the Corporation Law are not.
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. National Labor Relations Commission & Odin Security Agency | GR No.
94825, September 4, 1992
Entities under the civil service system are not completely beyond the reach of the Department of Labor or labor laws.
When a government entity that is under the Civil Service enters into a contract such as with a security agency or a
janitorial agency, it becomes an indirect employer of the security guards or the janitors. In such a situation, under the
Labor Code, the liabilities for wages are joint and solidary with the contractor. The law on wages in the Labor Code
specifically provides that “employer” includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to employees.
Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission | GR Nos. 95237-8, September 13, 1991
Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton | 172 SCRA 253 (1989)
Local Water Districts incorporated are under PD 198 government owned corporations with original, which means
corporations created by special law and not under the Corporation Code of the Philippines and therefore under the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service.
During the 1971 Constitutional Convention debates, when this provision was first introduced, government-owned
corporations came under attack as milking cows of a privileged few enjoying salaries far higher than their counterparts in
the various branches of government. It was pointed out that the capital of these corporations belongs to the government
and that government money is pumped into them whenever on the brink of disaster and they should therefor come under
the strict surveillance of the civil service system.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 93396, September 30, 1991
PAGCOR is under the Civil Service since it was created by PD 1869, July 11, 1983.
Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing Corporation (1990)
National Service Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission | 168 SCRA 122
It was held that the NHC is not embraced in the civil service, and that employer-employee relationship therein is governed
not by the Civil Service Law but by the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Juco v. National Labor Relations Commission | GR No. 98107, August 18, 1997
It was held that employment relations in the National Housing Corporation (NHC) are within the jurisdiction of the NLRC,
but the CSC, even if the controversy arose prior to 1987, because, as held in NASECO v. NLRC, supra, it is the Constitution
in place at the time of the decision which governs. In this case, the Supreme Court declared that the phrase “with original
charter” refers to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the
Corporation Code.
Prior to June 1, 1995, decisions could be reviewed only by the Supreme Court by certiorari under Rule 65. Now, however,
it is provided (June 1, 1995) in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, pursuant to RA No. 7902, that judgments or final
orders of quasi-judicial agencies may be appealed to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
change is pursuant to Section 7 which says, “unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law.” Mathay, Jr. v.
Commission on Civil Service, supra
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The kind of decisions of Constitutional Commissions may be elevated to the Supreme Court through Rule 65 are only grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, “the case or matter referred to by the
Constitution may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Section 7, Article IX-C are those that relate to the
exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.” In the case of COMELEC, these must be cases involving “elective,
regional, provincial, and city officials.”
Camporedondo v. National Labor Relations Commission & Philippine National Red Cross | GR No. 129049, August 6,
1999
The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government-owned and –controlled corporation with an original charter
under RA No. 95, as amended. Paid staff of the PNRC are government employees who are members of the GSIS and
covered by the Civil Service Law.
Classes of Service
Characterized by entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based
on highly technical qualifications; opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and security of tenure.
Incumbents of positions which are declared to be Career Executive Service positions for the first time pursuant to this Resolution who
hold permanent appointments thereto shall remain under permanent status in their respective positions. However, upon promotion
or transfer to other CES positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary status in said other CES positions until they qualify.
Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 152574, November 17, 2004
The petitioner, who was already holding the position of Department Manager of the Legal Services Department of EPZA
(with appropriate ELM eligibility required at that time) had the right to remain in his position even after the same had
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been declared a CES position in 1994. However, when he retired as such Department CLASSIFICATION OF
Manager in 1996, his government service ended, and his right to remain in the CES position, POSITIONS IN THE CIVIL
notwithstanding his lack of CES eligibility, also ceased. Upon his reemployment in January SERVICE UNDER CIVIL
SERVICE CODE – PD 807
1999 at Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority as Department Manager III, it was necessary for
him to comply with the CES eligibility prescribed at the time for that position. Not being a CAREER SERVICE
CES eligible, he could not validly challenge the disapproval of his appointment by the Civil 1. Entrance based on
merit and fitness to
Service Commission. be determined as
far as practicable
De Leon v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 127182, January 22, 2001 by competitive
examinations, or
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Executive Service does not automatically based on highly
confer security of tenure on the applicant. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his technical
appointment which, in turn, depends on his eligibility of lack of it. A person who does not qualifications.
2. Security of tenure.
have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place 3. Opportunity for
or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it only in an acting capacity in the advancement to
absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as higher career
positions.
permanent even if it may be so designated. Such being the case, he could be transferred or
reassigned without violating the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. NON-CAREER SERVICE
1. Entrance on bases
other than those of
Security of Tenure in the Career Executive Service the usual tests of
The two requisites that must concur in order that an employee in the career executive service may merit and fitness
attain security of tenure are: utilized for the
career service.
1. Career executive service eligibility 2. Tenure which is
2. Appointment to the appropriate career executive service rank. limited to a period
specified by law, or
which is co-
It must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service except first terminous with
and second level employees in the civil service pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the that of the
position to which they may be appointed. appointing
authority or subject
to his pleasure, or
The importance of security of tenure in the system is for the efficiency of a civil service system, which which is limited to
depends largely on the morale of the officers and employees in the service. Morale, in turn, can be the duration of a
particular project
fatally undermined when the security of officers in the possession of their office is unprotected against for which purpose
the arbitrary action of superior officers. Hence, the basic in any civil service is a guarantee of security employment was
of tenure, a guarantee against arbitrary impairment, whether total or partial, of the right to continue made.
in the position held.
This classification and
General v. Roco | GR Nos. 143366 & 143524, January 29, 2001 the classification in
Section 2(2) are not
A career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to mutually exclusive.
another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. Rather, they overlap and
In fact, a career executive service officer suffers no diminution in salary even if assigned to a complement each other.
The classification in the
CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank and not Code is for purposes of
on the basis of the position or office which he occupies. determining tenure. The
classification in Section
2(2) is for purposes of
determining the manner
Cuevas v. Bacal | GR No. 139382, December 6, 2000 of testing merit and
fitness.
Respondent Josefina Bacal, who held CES Rank Level III, Salary Grade 28, could not claim that
she had a valid and vested right to the position of Chief Public Attorney (CES Rank Level IV,
Salary Grade 30). Inasmuch as respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the
position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be considered
permanent, and she can claim no security of tenure in respect to that position.
Non-Career Service
Characterized by entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests utilized for the career service; tenure limited to a period
specified by law, or which is co-terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. The officers and employees embraced in the non-
career service are:
1. Elective officials, and their personal and confidential staff.
2. Department heads and officials of Cabinet rank who hold office at the pleasure of the President, and their personal and
confidential staff.
3. Chairmen and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office, and their personal and confidential staff.
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4. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a
specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a
specific period not exceeding one year, under their own responsibility, with the minimum direction and supervision.
5. Emergency and seasonal personnel.
Appointment to a competitive position must be made according to merit and fitness as determined, as far as practicable, by
competitive examination. Merit and fitness in appointments to non-competitive positions are not determined by competitive
examinations. But merit and fitness are required.
Santiago, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 81467, October 27, 1989 CLASSES OF NON-COMPETITIVE
POSITIONS
The appointing authority is not bound by the restrictions of a statutory next-in-rank
rule. One who is next in rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to The non-competitive positions
the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be are those which by their nature
appointed. The rule neither guarantees a vested right to the holder nor imposes a are policy-determining,
primarily confidential, or highly
ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher technical.
position. The power to appoint is a matter of discretion
Early jurisprudence on this
subject established that it is the
PAGCOR v. Rilloraza | GR No. 141141, June 25, 2001 nature and not just the label of
Three important points were underscored: the position which makes it con-
competitive. Thus “much more
1. The classification of a particular position as policy-determining, primarily than ordinary confidence is
confidential or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or reposed in the occupant of a
legislative declaration that is no conclusive upon the courts the true test position that is primarily
confidential. The latter phrase
being the nature of the position. denotes not only confidence in
2. The exemption provided in this section pertains only to exemption from the aptitude of the appointee for
competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which
civil service. insures freedom of intercourse
3. Section 16, PD 1869, insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as without embarrassment or
primarily confidential, is not absolutely binding on the courts. freedom from misgivings or
betrayals of personal trust on
confidential matters of state.”
Darangina v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 167472, January 31, 2007 DE LOS SANTOS V.MALLARE | 87
A permanent appointment can issue only to a person who possesses all the PHIL 289, 298 (1950)
requirements for the position to which he is appointed. An exception to this rule is
A policy-determining position is
where, in the absence of appropriate eligibles, he or she may be appointed to the one charged with the duty to
position merely in a temporary capacity for a period of twelve (12) months, unless “formulate a method of action
for the government or any of its
sooner terminated by the appointing authority. Such a temporary appointment is made
subdivisions.” A position is
not for the benefit of the appointee; rather it seeks to prevent a hiatus in the discharge highly technical if the occupant
of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the is required “to possess a
technical skill or training in the
selection of a permanent appointee. supreme or superior degree.
Thus, the temporary appointee accepts the position with the condition that he shall
surrender the office when called upon to do so by the appointing authority. Such
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termination of a temporary appointment may be with or without cause as the appointee serves merely at the pleasure of
the appointing power. Accordingly, the Court held that where a non-eligible holds a temporary appointment, his
replacement by another non-eligible is not prohibited.
Exempt from the competitive examination requirement – to determine merit and fitness – are positions
which are:
1. Policy determining: where the officer lays down principal or fundamental guidelines or rules; or formulate
a method of action for government or any of its subdivision, such as department head.
Civil Service Commission and PAGCOR v. Salas | GR No. 123708, June 19, 1997
The Supreme Court clarified this, as follows: Prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1959, there were
two recognized instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential, namely:
1. When the President, upon recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, has declared the
position to be primarily confidential.
2. In the absence of such a declaration, when from the nature of the functions of the office, there
exists close intimacy between the appointee and the appointing authority which insures freedom
of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals on confidential
matters of State.
When RA 2260 was enacted on June 19, 1959, Section 5 thereof provided that “the non-competitive or
unclassified service shall be composed of positions declared by law to be in the non-competitive or
unclassified service or those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in
nature.” Thus, at least since the enactment of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the nature of the position
which determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution textually support the Pinero v. Hechanova | 18 SCRA 417 (1966)
doctrine that it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether a position is primarily
confidential, policy-determining or highly technical. The 1987 Constitution deleted the phrase “in nature”.
This doctrine is still controlling.
The primary purpose of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in providing for the declaration of a position as
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical is “to exempt these categories from
competitive examination as a means for determining merit and fitness. This is not mean to exclude them
from security of tenure.
The PROXIMITY RULE states that, “every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary
confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes
not only confidence in aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy
which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.
The meaning of “for cause provided by law” is a guarantee both procedural and substantive due process.
Hence, not only must removal or suspension be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, but
also they can only be made on the basis of a valid cause provided by law. The phrase “for cause” has
acquired a well-defined meaning in Philippine jurisprudence. It means for reasons which the law and sound
public policy recognize as sufficient for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the
appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be
removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without cause. Moreover, the
cause must relate to and effect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.
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In other words, the fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority
the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career
service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for
cause and in accordance with procedural due process.
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior
consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or is a scheme to
lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office
of those who are in the Civil Service.
The provision can be saved from invalidation only if it is read to require that:
1. The employee is informed of the charges against him by furnishing him with a copy of the
charges against him.
2. The employee must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter.
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The proximity rule enunciated in De los Santos v. Mallare, supra, is still authoritative, such that the
occupant of a particular position could be considered a confidential employee if the predominant reason
why he was chosen by the appointing authority was the latter’s belief that he can share a close intimate
relationship with the occupant which ensures freedom of discussion without fear of embarrassment or
misgivings of possible betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of State. Where the position
occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer
predominant, and therefore, cannot be classified as primarily confidential.
Highly technical: which requires possession of technical skill or training in a supreme or superior degree.
In every case, the ultimate test is the nature of the responsibilities of the position, not the administrative or
legislative description that is given to the position; that is, the nature of the office must be such as to
require close intimacy between the appointee and appointing authority which insures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving of betrayal of personal trust on confidential
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matters of state. Executive pronouncements as to the nature of the office can be no more than initial
determination of the nature of the office.
In this case, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that Civil Service Commission cannot convert a temporary
appointment into a permanent one, as it would constitute an arrogation of a power properly belonging to the
appointing authority. The Civil Service Commission may, however, approve as merely temporary an appointment
intended to be permanent where the appointee does not possess the requisite eligibility and the exigency of the
service demands that the position be filled up, even in a temporary capacity.
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Section 6 of RA 6656 on government reorganization merely provides that the selection of placement
should be done through the creation of a Placement Committee the members of which are the
representatives of the head of the agency as well as representatives of the employees. The
committee’s work is recommendatory and does not fix a stringent formula regarding the mode of
choosing among the candidates.
University of the Philippines and Alfredo Torres v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 132860, April 3, 2001
The Supreme Court said that the Civil Service Commission is not a co-manager or surrogate administrator of
government offices and agencies, its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments
to determine their compliance with requirements of the Civil Service Law. On its own, the Commission does not
have the power to terminate employment or to drop members from the rolls.
Oriental Mindoro National College v. Macaraig | GR No. 152017, January 15, 2004
Inasmuch as alleged appointment of the respondent was submitted to the Civil Service Commission only after
two years and twelve days after its issuance, there was no valid appointment.
A substantive requirement under Section 11 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations is that
an appointment should be submitted to the Civil Service Commission within thirty (30) days from
issuance; otherwise, it shall be ineffective.
Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 152574, November 17, 2004
Despite the CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998, which provides that only the appointing authority has the
right to challenge the CSC’s disapproval of an appointment, the Supreme Court said that both the appointing
authority and the appointee are the real parties in interest, and both have legal standing, in a suit assailing a CSC
order disapproving an appointment. The CSC’s disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the appointing
authority’s discretion: thus, the appointing authority has the right to contest the disapproval, as he stands to be
adversely affected when the CSC disapproves an appointment. Although the appointee has no vested right to the
position, it was his eligibility that was being questioned. He should ,therefore, be granted the opportunity to
prove his eligibility. He has a personal stake in the outcome of the case, which justifies his challenge to the CSC
act which denied his permanent appointment.
Moreover, unlike in the case of appointive officers in the following paragraph, Congress may not create an exception to
this rule.
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Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Security of Tenure
The grounds and the procedure for investigation of charges and the discipline of career service officers and employees are provided
in the Civil Service Law. Non-compliance therewith constitutes a denial of the right to security of tenure.
No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 2(3)
Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals | 183 SCRA 555
Where the appointment of a principal does not refer to any particular school, reassignment does not offend the
constitutional guarantee.
Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 112513, August 21, 1997
When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and
purposes he is considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding the silence of the decision, he is entitled to
payment of back salaries.
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Where the petitioners were no longer pleadings for exoneration from the administrative charges filed against them, but
were merely asking for the payment of back wages computed from the time they could not teach pursuant to Secretary
Carino’s dismissal order minus the six months suspension until their actual reinstatement, the Supreme Court said that the
petitioners have no right to back wages because they were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended. In a host of
cases, the Supreme Court had categorically declared that the payment of back wages during the period of suspension of a
civil servant who is subsequently reinstated is proper only if he is found innocent of the charges and the suspension is
unjustified.
Under the Rules of Court, a career service officer or employee who has been unlawfully ousted from his office has one year within
which to file an action in court to recover his office, otherwise the right to recover the same prescribes.
Section 40 of the Civil Service Law provides for summary dismissal – when the charge is serious and evidence of guilt is strong;
when respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged, and there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the
present charge; and when respondent is notoriously undesirable – and is reproduced verbatim in the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which took effect in 1989.
Section 37(a), PD 807, as amended, provides for appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission only over the Merit System
Protection Board’s decisions in administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of the penalty of suspension, fine,
demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
abandoned in this case. The Supreme Court considered the factual situation in the case at bench: The CSC found Dacoycoy
guilty of nepotism and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service. Dacoycoy, at the party adversely affected by the
CSC decision, could go to the Court of Appeals for the review of the CSC decision, impleading the CSC as public respondent,
being the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil
service. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the CSC, and held Dacoycoy not guilty of nepotism.
At that point, the CSC had become “the party adversely affected” by such a CA ruling which seriously prejudices the civil
service system. Accordingly, as an aggrieved party, the CSC may appeal the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court.
Philippine National Bank v. Garcia | GR No. 141246, September 9, 2002
Where the employer PNB was allowed to elevate on appeal the decision of the CSC exonerating the employee.
It is a well-settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the
first office and his title thereto is thereby terminated without any other act of proceeding.
It is exceedingly apparent to the Court that RA 8551 effected a reorganization of the PNP, not of the NAPOLCOM. They are
two separate and distinct bodies, with one having supervision and control over the other. In fact, it is the NAPOLCOM that
is given the duty of submitting a proposed reorganization plan of the PNP to Congress. The basic structure of the
NAPOLCOM has been preserved by the amendatory law. There has been no revision in its lines of control, authority and
responsibility, neither has there been a reduction in its membership, nor a consolidation or abolition of the offices
constituting the same. Adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member of the Commission does not result in a
reorganization. No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it
declares the terms of office of the incumbent as expired must be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.
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Good faith is presumed. In the absence of proof of bad faith and considering that the new hospital is not exactly
the same as the first and considering likewise the desire to preserve the donated property, there is no unlawful
abolition of office.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Executive Secretary | GR Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001
The President has the authority to reorganize the executive department. And this can include deactivation of
offices. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s power
of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the
broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
No officer or employee of the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 2(4)
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Partisan political activity, which is the phrase used in previous Constitutions, includes “every form of solicitation
of the elector’s vote in favor of” a specific candidate. People v. De Venecia | 14 SCRA 864, 867 (1965)
It includes contribution of money for election purposes and distribution of handbills.
However, this provision does not “prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of candidates for public office whom he supports.” Section
29, RA 2260
The prohibition does not apply to department secretaries.
A proposal in the 1935 Constitutional Convention to include department secretaries was disapproved. Santos v.
Yatco | 106 Phil (1959)
Right to Self-Organization
The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 2(5), ARTICLE III, SECTION 8
Three provisions which serve as bases for the right of Civil Service to unionize
Article III, Section 8: guarantees the right of all, “including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions.”
Article XII, Section 3: guarantees “the right of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.”
Article IX-B, Section 2(5)
Resort to the intent of the framers points to the understanding that the
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 5
right to organize does not include the right to strike. The Constitution, The Congress shall provide for the
however, does not say that government employees may not be given standardization of compensation of
the statutory right to strike. On this point, the SSS Case is vague. government officials and
employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled
Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) v. Secretary of corporations with original
Education | GR No. 95445, August 6, 1991 charters, taking into account the
nature of the responsibilities
The dissenting opinions, however, would anchor their defense of the pertaining to, and the
public school teachers on their right to petition the government for qualifications required for, their
positions.
redress of grievances.
This provision is in relation to RA 6758 –
Bangasilan v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 124678, July 23, 1997 An Act Prescribing a Revised
Jacinto v. Court of Appeals | GR No.. 124540, November 17, 1997 Compensation and Classification
System in the Government.
The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. The right of
sovereign to prohibit strikes, either by statute or judicial decision, simply
incorporate or reassert the common law rules.
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Standardization of Compensation
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities
pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their positions.
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 5
Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas | GR No. 148208, December 15, 2005
It was challenged as a violation of the equal protection clause is the provision in RA 7693 – The Central Bank Act, which creates two
classes of employees in the BSP:
1. The BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL), which is the exempt
class.
2. The rank-and-file (Salary Grade 19 and below, which is the non-exempt class.
The Supreme Court said that while the “policy determination” argument may support the inequality of treatment between the BSP
rank-and-file employees and those of other Government Financing Institutions (GFIs) – who in their respective charters, are exempt
from the provisions of SSL. These rank-and-file employees of BSP and GFIs are similarly situated. Thus, the classification made in the
Central Bank Act is not based on any substantial distinction vis-à-vis the particular circumstances of each GFI.
Double Compensation
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 8
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, No elective or appointive
public officer or
any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions or employee shall receive
gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. additional, double, or
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 8 indirect compensation,
unless specifically
authorized by law, nor
PURPOSE | Peralta v. Mathay | 38 SCRA 256, 258 (1967) accept without the
This is to manifest a commitment to the fundamental principle that a public office is a public consent of the Congress,
any present, emolument,
trust. It is expected of a government official or employee that he keeps uppermost in mind
office, or title of any kind
the demands of public welfare. He is there to render public service. He is of course entitled from any foreign
to be rewarded for the performance of the function entrusted to him, but that should not government.
be the overriding consideration.
Pensions or gratuities
shall not be considered
DEFINITION | Peralta v. Mathay | 38 SCRA 256, 258 (1967) as additional, double, or
indirect compensation.
While the terms “additional” and “double” compensation are used interchangeably, it is,
perhaps, best to draw a distinction between the two. ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 4
All public officers and
Additional Compensation exists when for one and the same office for which a employees shall take an
oath or affirmation to
compensation has been fixed there is added to such fixed compensation an extra uphold and defend this
reward in the form, for instance, of a bonus. This is not allowed in the absence of a Constitution.
law specifically authorizing such extra reward. Thus, where an officer’s pay
provided by law was a fixed per diem, the Supreme Court disallowed additional
compensation in the form of cost of living allowances as well as incentive and Christmas bonuses. The Court,
however, was careful to point out that when a per diem or an allowance is given as reimbursement for expenses
incident to the discharge of an officer’s duties, it is not an additional compensation prohibited by the
Constitution.
Double Compensation more properly refers to two sets of compensation for two different offices held
concurrently by one officer. In the instances when holding a second office is allowed, when an officer accepts a
second office, he can draw the salary attached to such second only when he is specifically authorized by law to
receive double compensation.
DEFINITION: “specifically authorized by law” | Sadueste v. Municipality of Surigao | 72 Phil 485 (1941)
The authority required by the Constitution to receive double or additional compensation is a specific authority given to a
particular employee or officer of the Government because of peculiar or exceptional reasons warranting the payment of
extra or additional compensation.
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The above interpretation of the constitutional provision seems to be too strict. It seems in effect to require a special law
for every instance of additional or double compensation. An obiter dictum in this later case approves of a more liberal and
perhaps administratively more rational approach.
The Court said, “According to law, under certain circumstances, the President may authorize double compensation in some
cases, such as government officials acting as members with compensation in government examining boards like the bar
examinations, or department secretaries acting as members of Board of Directors of government corporations, and in such
cases the prohibition against double compensation is not observed. If the President approves the double compensation,
well and good. The appointee whose appointment may then be regarded as valid from the beginning could receive extra
compensation. If it is disapproved, then the appointment will have to be withdrawn or cancelled, unless of course, the
appointee was willing to serve without compensation, in which case there could be no valid objection.
Upon optional retirement from the judiciary on April 1, 1992, Santos was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under RA 910, as
amended. For five years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension. Thereafter he was appointed Director III of the defunct
MMA as Director III thereof.
He can continue to receive his pension while receiving salary as Director. Section 8, par. 2 means that a retiree receiving pension or
gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which another
compensation is attached.
Upon separation from the MMA, his separation pay under RA 7294 cannot include his years of service in the judiciary. That would be
double compensation for the same service in the judiciary for which he has already been paid. Section 11, RA 7924 does not
specifically authorize payment of additional compensation for years of government service outside of the MMA.
Oath of Allegiance
All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this Constitution.
ARTICLE IX-B, SECTION 4
This is in relation to ARTICLE XI, SECTION 18, which provides that public officers and employees owe the State ad this
Constitution allegiance at all times.
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2. Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy rests with the COMELEC in division, not the COMELEC en banc.
Garvida v. Sales | GR No. 122872, September 10, 1997, reiterated in Bautista v. COMELEC | GR Nos. 154796-97, October 23,
2003
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3. Even cases appealed from the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court have to be heard and decided in Division before
they may be heard en banc upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the Division decision. And, although not raised as
an issue, the Supreme Court may motu proprio consider and resolve this question of jurisdiction. Abad v. COMELEC | GR No.
128877, December 10, 1999
4. A petition for certiorari filed with the Commission from a decision of the RTC or MTC is likewise to be resolved in Division
before the same may be heard en banc.
Exceptions
1. A petition for the correction of manifest of errors alleges an erroneous copying of figures from the election return to the
Statement of Votes by precinct. Such as error in the tabulation of results, which merely requires a clerical correction without
opening the ballot boxes or examining the ballots, demands only the exercise of the administrative power of the COMELEC.
Hence, the COMELEC en banc may properly assume jurisdiction.
The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates, as reflected in the election
returns. What is involved is simple arithmetic. In making the correction in the computation, the BOC acts in an administrative
capacity under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Pursuant to its constitutional function, to decide questions
affecting elections, the COMELEC en banc has the authority to resolve any question pertaining to proceedings of the BOC. This
ruling was reiterated in Matsura v. COMELEC | 285 SCRA 493
2. The power of the COMELEC to prosecute cases of violation of election laws involves the exercise of administrative powers
which may be exercised directly by the COMELEC en banc.
election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since
a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to
disenfranchisement of voters.
The rule that all election cases, including pre-proclamation cases, should first be heard and decided by the COMELEC in
division applies only when the COMELEC exercises its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, not when it exercises purely
administrative functions.
Municipal Board of Canvassers v. COMELEC | GR No. 150946, October 23, 2003
Jaramilla v. COMELEC, supra
Canicosa v. COMELEC | GR No. 120318, December 5, 1997
2. Only decisions of the COMELEC made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power may be brought to Supreme
Court on certiorari.
The COMELEC en banc shall promulgate rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, but
they must not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. ARTICLE IX-A, SECTION 6
1. This power is subject to Section 5(5), Article VIII, which provides that rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
2. Procedural Rules in election cases are designed to achieve not only a correct but also an expeditious determination of the
popular will of the electorate. The nature of an election case differs from an ordinary civil action. Because of this difference, the
Rules on Civil Procedure on demurer to evidence cannot apply to election cases, even by analogy or in a suppletory character,
especially because the application of the Rules would not be practicable and convenient.
3. The COMELEC has the authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by its rules, or the requirement of certificate of
non-forum shopping, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of cases. The COMELEC is likewise not constrained to
dismiss a case before it by reason of non-payment of filing fees. Jaramilla v. COMELEC, supra; Barot v. COMELEC | GR No.
149147, June 18, 2003
4. It was held in Penaflorida v. COMELEC | 206 SCRA 754 that the fingerprinting of the Chairman and members of the Board of
Election Inspectors is an internal matter, and may be done even without prior notice to the parties.
By exception, however, it has been given judicial power as judge with exclusive original jurisdiction over “all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.”
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Carlos v. Judge Angeles | GR No. 142907, November 29, 2000 ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 2
The COMELEC has jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, mandamus, quo The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
warranto or habeas corpus, but only to aid of its appellate jurisdiction over following powers and functions:
1. Enforce and administer all laws and
election protest cases involving elective municipal officials decided by regulations relative to the conduct of an
courts of general jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX-C, Section 2. This election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
point was settled in Relampagos v. Cumba. This means that its jurisdiction and recall.
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section all contests relating to the elections, returns,
5(1). and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving
SUMMARY OF JURISPRUDENCE ON POWERS OF THE COMMISSION ON elective municipal officials decided by trial
ELECTIONS courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.
1. Nacionalista v. COMELEC | 85 Phil 149 (1949) Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Utulan v. COMELEC | 15 SCRA 465, 469 (1965) Commission on election contests involving
Functions of the Commission under the Constitution are elective municipal and barangay offices
shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
essentially executive (enforcement) and administrative 3. Decide, except those involving the right to
(administration) in nature. vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of
2. Abes v. COMELEC | L-28348, December 15, 1967 election officials and inspectors, and
This case could say that there “has been neither deviation nor registration of voters.
4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the
retreat” from this doctrine. President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government,
Subsequent decisions, however, showed that the characterization including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of
of the COMELEC’s power by the Nacionalista Case as being ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
“preventive only and not curative also” was, perhaps, less than credible elections.
accurate. The Supreme Court, in acknowledging the broad sweep 5. Register, after sufficient publication,
political parties, organizations, or coalitions
of the COMELEC’s constitutional power to insure free, orderly, which, in addition to other requirements,
and honest elections, recognized in the Commission a power must present their platform or program of
which already partook of the “curative” power to nullify government; and accredit citizens' arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious
improperly made canvass. denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve
3. Lagumbay v. COMELEC | 16 SCRA 175 (1966) their goals through violence or unlawful
means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to
The divided Court upheld the Commission’s authority to exclude this Constitution, or which are supported by
what the Court characterized as statistically improbable returns. any foreign government shall likewise be
refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign
4. Antonio, Jr. v. COMELEC | 32 SCRA 319 (1970) governments and their agencies to political
The Court upheld the power of the COMELEC to exclude returns parties, organizations, coalitions, or
which were the product of coercion even if they be clean on their candidates related to elections, constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when
face. accepted, shall be an additional ground for
the cancellation of their registration with
5. Usman v. COMELEC | 42 SCRA 667 (1971) the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.
Upheld the authority of the COMELEC to entertain the testimony 6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
of handwriting experts as proof of the falsity of the returns. initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
At the core of most of these cases, and other similar cases, was election laws, including acts or omissions
the problem of determining where the jurisdiction of the constituting election frauds, offenses, and
Commission ended and where the authority of the Electoral malpractices.
7. Recommend to the Congress effective
Tribunals and the courts began. Under the 1973 Constitution, measures to minimize election spending,
this aspect of the problem largely disappeared because aside including limitation of places where
from its administrative power of deciding all cases relative to the propaganda materials shall be posted, and
conduct of election, the Commission then was given the judicial to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
power of being the sole judge of all contests relating to the candidacies.
elections, returns, and qualifications of all members of the 8. Recommend to the President the removal of
Batasang Pambansa and the elective provincial and city any officer or employee it has deputized, or
the imposition of any other disciplinary
officials. action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to, its directive, order, or
The problem of conflict of jurisdiction could then arise only in decision.
the election of municipal and other minor elective officials. This 9. Submit to the President and the Congress, a
comprehensive report on the conduct of
problem will continue under the new Constitution because the each election, plebiscite, initiative,
COMELEC continues to have original jurisdiction over election referendum, or recall.
contests involving regional, provincial and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over municipal and barangay officials.
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Moreover, with the return of jurisdiction over election contests involving members of Congress to the Electoral
Tribunals, the problems under the 1935 Constitution will also return.
1. ENFORCE AND ADMINISTER ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATIVE TO THE CONDUCT OF AN ELECTION, PLEBISCITE, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM OR
RECALL.
Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation
through an election called for the purpose. There are three (3) system of initiative, namely: Initiative on the Constitution;
Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and Initiative on local legislation
which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance. SECTION 2(a), RA 6735.
Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for the purpose. It
may be of two classes:
a. Referendum on statutes, which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by
Congress.
b. Referendum on local law, which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted
by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
Recall is the termination of official relationship of a local elective official for loss of confidence prior to the expiration of his
term through the will of the electorate.
Plebiscite is the submission of constitutional amendments or important legislative measures to the people for ratification.
Broad Powers
The COMELEC may promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of election laws. Such power is deemed
implicit in the power to implement regulations.
The COMELEC correctly stated that “the ascertainment of the identity of a political party and its legitimate
officers” is a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is not other than the
fundamental law itself, which vests upon the OCMLEC the power and function to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with ample
“wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting means to and methods that will ensure the
accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.”
To resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC needs only to return the root of the conflict between the party
officials. It needs only resolve such questions as may be necessary in the exercise of its enforcement powers.
and the resolution of such controversies as the one now before it where one party appears to be divided into
two wings under separate leaders each claiming to be the president of the entire party. The COMELEC erred in
resolving the controversy by granting official candidate status to LDP candidates under either the “Angara Wing”
or the “Aquino Wing”, because clearly, it is the Party Chairman, who is the Chief Executive Officer of the Party,
who has the authority to represent the party and in all external affairs and concerns, and to sign documents for
and in its behalf.
Alunan III v. Mirasol | GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997 | 276 SCRA 501, 511
The power of direct control and supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) over
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections does not contravene the constitutional grant of powers to the COMELEC.
Inasmuch as the election, and contests involving election, of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC. Thus, it was within the authority of the DILG Secretary to exempt a local government unit from
holding SK elections.
Section 4, COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 placed the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections under the direct
control and supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government. This does not contravene the
Constitutional mandate that the COMELEC shall have the power to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. Elections for SK
officers are not subject to supervision of the COMELEC in the same way that, as the Court recently held in
Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors | 243 SCRA 422 (1995), contests involving elections of SK officials do
not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction over plebiscites. The case at bar involves the determination of whether the
electorate of Taguig voted in favor of, or against the conversion of the municipality of Taguig into a highly
urbanized city in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose. This is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and not
of regular courts.
The case at bar assailing the regularity of the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case
calling for the exercise of judicial power. It does not involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its
enforcement. There is no plaintiff or defendant in the case at bar for it merely involves the ascertainment of the
vote of the electorate of Taguig whether they approve or disapprove the conversion of their municipality to a
highly urbanized city.
Article VIII, Section 5(5) provides in part that “rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC | GR No. 119654. May 22, 1995 | 244 SCRA 272
The Supreme Court invalidated the COMELEC Resolution requiring newspapers to give, for free, one-half page
newspaper space for use by the COMELEC. This was held to be an invalid exercise of the police power, there
being no imperious public necessity for the taking of the newspaper space.
Print media may not be compelled to allocate free space to the COMELEC. Such would amount to a prohibited
taking of property without just compensation.
Sanidad v. COMELEC | GR No. 90878, January 29, 1990 | 181 SCRA 529
The Supreme Court held that this power may be exercised only over the media, not over practitioners of the
media. Thus, the Supreme Court invalidated a COMELEC resolution prohibiting radio and TV commentators and
newspaper columnists from commenting on the issues involved in the forthcoming plebiscite for the ratification
of the organic law establishing the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
On the occasion of the ratification campaign for the Autonomy Act for the Cordillera, the COMELEC, issued a
resolution prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from using their columns or radio or television
time to campaign for or against the plebiscite during the period of the campaign. Reliance was made on the
Election Code and on Article IX-C, Section 4 authorizing the COMELEC to “supervise or regulate the enjoyment
or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media communication or information.” Sanidad, a
columnist, challenged the validity of the resolution as a violation of freedom of expression.
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The resolution is unconstitutional. The authority given by the Constitution is over holders of franchises. The
purpose is to assure candidates equal opportunity and equal access to media. Sanidad is not a candidate and in
fact in a plebiscite there are no candidates. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and the people’s right
to be informed must be preserved. Moreover, the people’s choice of forum for discussion should not be
restricted.
No pardon, amnesty, parole, etc., for violation of election laws shall be granted by the President without its
favorable recommendation. Article IX-C, Section 5
The Commission does not have the power to transfer municipalities from one congressional district to another for the
purpose of preserving proportionality. This is not one of the broad powers granted by Section 2(2). Neither is it what is
referred to by the Ordinance Appended to the Constitution, Sections 2 & 3, authorizing the Commission to make “minor
adjustments.” The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the subject clearly excluded the power to transfer
whole municipalities.
this case, for failure of the petition to show the existence of the first condition, the COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the petition even without a hearing.
The COMELEC is not authorized to make an unofficial quick count of presidential election results.
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Flores v. Commission on Elections| GR No. 89604, April 20, 1990 | 184 SCRA 484; reiterated in Guieb v. Fontanilla | 247
SCRA 48, and in Calacag v. COMELEC | 274 SCRA 405
RA 6679, insofar as it grants appellate jurisdiction to the RTC over decisions of Municipal Trial Courts and/or Metropolitan
Trial Courts in electoral cases involving elective barangay officials is unconstitutional.
Section 9, RA 6679 which makes decisions of a municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay appealable to the regional
trial court was declared unconstitutional. The COMELEC has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
barangay elective officials decided by trial court of limited jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC, however, is over
questions of fact; questions of law go to the Supreme Court.
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It was held that the COMELEC has the authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by its rules, or the
requirement of non-forum shopping, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of cases. The COMELEC is likewise not
constrained to dismiss a case before it by reason of non-payment of filing fees.
Balajonda v. COMELEC | GR No. 166032, February 28, 2005 cited Batul v. Bayron | GR No. 157959, February 26, 2004
Judgment which may be executed pending appeal need not only be those rendered by the trial court, but by the COMELEC
as well.
The “final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law
are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance by said body in the exercise of
the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.”
The regional trial court, on the other hand, is given exclusive authority to try and decide criminal cases involving elections.
When the COMELEC as prosecutor files a case before a trial court, the trial court acquires jurisdiction and all subsequent
dispositions of the case must be subject to approval by the court. Hence, the court may order reinvestigation and require
submission of records of the preliminary examination to satisfy itself that there is probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
3. DECIDE, SAVE THOSE INVOLVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE, ALL QUESTIONS AFFECTING ELECTIONS, INCLUDING DETERMINATION OF THE NUMBER AND
LOCATION OF POLLING PLACES, APPOINTMENT OF ELECTION OFFICIALS AND INSPECTORS AND REGISTRATION OF VOTERS.
As an incident to its duties concerning registration of voters, it may decide a question involving the right to vote, but its
decision shall be subject to judicial review. In this regard, read also appropriate chapter in Election Laws relative to
inclusion and exclusion proceedings.
When exercising its purely administrative powers under this paragraph, the COMELEC may not punish contempt.
There are certain powers which even under the new Constitution still clearly do not belong to the Commission. Thus, it is
not empowered to decide questions “involving the right to vote.”
The power to determine whether or not a person can exercise or is precluded from exercising the right of suffrage is a
judicial question, Pungutan v. Abubakar | 43 SCRA 1, 12 (1972), and the power to resolve such question has been
excluded from the Commission’s power to be judge of election contests. Finally, while the Commission may punish for
contempt, such power may not be exercised in connection with its purely executive or ministerial functions but only in
furtherance of its quasi-judicial and now also judicial functions.
The rationale of the rule is explained in Benito v. COMELEC | 235 SCRA 436, as follows: “For to allow the defeated and
repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate
without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people’s right to
elect officials of their choice.
4. DEPUTIZE, WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE PRESIDENT, LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR THE EXCLUSIVE PURPOSE OF
ENSURING FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS.
The power of the Commission over deputized officers under Section 2(6) covers not just criminal cases but also
administrative cases. Thus, where the Commission has deputized a City Prosecutor as election canvasser, such Prosecutor
cannot claim immunity from the power of the Commission on the argument that he comes under the executive
department. The Commission has the power over all persons required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections. However, under Section 2(8), the Commission may merely issue a recommendation for disciplinary action to the
President.
The Court said that the authority of the COMELEC is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters. The
administrative case against the petitioner, taken cognizance of by the COMELEC, is in relation to the performance of his
duties as election canvasser and not as City Prosecutor. In order to ensure that such duly deputized officials and
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employees of the government carry out their assigned tasks, the law also provides that upon COMELEC’s
recommendation, the corresponding proper authority shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from
office the officer or employee who may, after due proves, be found guilty of violation of election laws. It is the COMELEC,
being in the best position to assess how its deputized officials and employees perform, that should conduct the
administrative inquiry. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound
exercise of its recommendatory power.
5. REGISTER, AFTER SUFFICIENT PUBLICATION, POLITICAL PARTIES, ORGANIZATIONS OR COALITIONS WHICH MUST PRESENT THEIR PLATFORM OR
PROGRAM OF GOVERNMENT; ACCREDIT CITIZENS’ ARMS.
Generally, all political parties and organizations which present their platform or program of government and which satisfy
requirements prescribed by law may register. However, religious denominations and sects and organizations which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means or refuse to uphold and adhere to the Constitution, or which are
supported by foreign governments, may not be registered.
Lay organizations with religious affiliations or political parties which derive their principles from religious beliefs may be
registered. The ban is only on religious denominations and sects, such as the Catholic Church, or the Anglican Church, or
the Iglesia ni Kristo, or the Muslim denomination. This prohibition is made in the spirit of separation of Church and State
and is intended to prevent churches as churches from wielding political power.
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RA 8173 – An Act Granting All Citizens’ Arms Equal Opportunity to be Accredited by the Commission on
Elections
In the same case, the Supreme Court also upheld the action of the COMELEC in denying the registration of AKLAT, for
failure to comply with the eight guidelines laid down by the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC |
GR No. 147589, June 26, 2001, which are:
1. The political party, sectoral organization or coalition must represent a marginalized or underrepresented sector or
group identified in Section 5, RA 7941.
2. Major political parties must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives.
3. The religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.
4. A party or organization must not be disqualified under Section 6, RA 7941.
5. The party must not be an adjunct or, or a project organized, or an entity funded or assisted by the Government.
6. The party must not only comply with the requirements of the law, its nominees must likewise do so.
7. The party’s nominees must also represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
8. While lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must also be able to contribute to the formulation
and enactment of appropriate legislation which will benefit the nation as a whole.
6. FILE, UPON A VERIFIED COMPLAINT, OR ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, PETITIONS IN COURT FOR THE INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF VOTERS; INVESTIGATE
AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE PROSECUTE CASES OF VIOLATIONS OF ELECTION LAWS.
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 128054, October 16, 1997 | 280 SCRA 892, 917
The import of the constitutional (Article IX-C, Section 2(7)) and statutory (Section 265, BP 881 – Omnibus Election Code)
mandate for the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election laws is that it “translates, in effect, to
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing
an information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of
arrest should be issued.
Petitioner contends that, since the 1987 Constitution empowered the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute cases
involving election offenses, it is the obligation of the COMELEC to search for the evidence needed to judicially indict the
respondents identified in petitioner’s letter-complaint as the government officials who disbursed public finds allegedly for
electioneering purposes during the May 1992 elections.
Erroneous contention. “The task of COMELEC as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense complaint,
is not physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense.
A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the
burden, as it is his responsibility to follow through his accusation and prove his complaint.”
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People v. Judge Inting | GR No. 88919, July 25, 1990 | 187 SCRA 788
The trial court was in error when it dismissed an information filed by the Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City because
the latter failed to comply with the order of the court to secure the concurrence or approval of the Provincial Fiscal
(Prosecutor) in the filing of the information. Indeed, such concurrence is not necessary not required.
Preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses does not have to be
coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court may not take cognizance of the investigation
and determine whether or not probable cause exists. It is because prosecution of election offenses is exclusively under the
COMELEC. If the Provincial Prosecutor performs any role at all, it is by delegation by the COMELEC. The court therefore
may rely on the investigation conducted by the Provincial Election Supervisor for purposes of determining the existence of
probable cause to issue a warrant.
Information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal for an election offense as an aftermath of the elections of May 1987. The
judge dismissed the information on the ground that prosecuting election offenses is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections. While indeed the COMELEC is vested with exclusive power to prosecute election offenses, the
Constitution in Article IX-C, Section 2(4) likewise authorizes the COMELEC to deputize, with the consent of the President,
other law enforcement agencies. This the COMELEC has done and the consent of the President was given in EO 134 dated
February 27, 1987. The acts of the delegated officers are in legal contemplation acts of the COMELEC.
7. RECOMMEND TO CONGRESS EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO MINIMIZE ELECTION SPENDING, INCLUDING LIMITATION OF PLACES WHERE PROPAGANDA
MATERIALS SHALL BE POSTED, AND TO PREVENT AND PENALIZE ALL FORMS OF ELECTION FRAUDS, OFFENSES, MALPRACTICE, AND NUISANCE
CANDIDATES.
8. SUBMIT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF EACH ELECTION, PLEBISCITE, INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM
OR RECALL.
3. After the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 5
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof such election results in a failure to No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by
causes. the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
Mitmug v. COMELEC, supra
ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 6
Loong v. COMELEC | 257 SCRA 1 A free and open party system shall be
Hassan v. COMELEC | 264 SCRA 125 allowed to evolve according to the free
Batabor v. COMELEC | GR No. 160428, July 21, 2004 choice of the people, subject to the
provisions of this Article.
However, before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking a declaration of
failure of election, two conditions must concur, namely:
1. No voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law, or Importance of registration of a political party:
even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect. 1. Registration confers juridical personality on the
party.
2. The votes cast would affect the results of the election 2. It informs the public of the party’s existence.
3. It identifies the party and its officers for
Borja v. COMELEC | 260 SCRA 604 purposes of regulation by the COMELEC.
A petition to declare a failure of election is neither an election protest nor a pre-
proclamation controversy. To register for purposes of the electoral process,
an organization may not be a political party.
Loong v. COMELEC, supra Section 2(5)
The Supreme Court denied the petition to declare failure of election, because when
the COMELEC resorted to manual count after the automated machines failed to read The concept of accreditation no longer appears in
the ballots correctly, it did not do so arbitrarily. The Court found that there was, after the new Constitution. For purposes of the
all, compliance with due process clause because the petitioner and the intervenor electoral process, all parties, organizations and
coalitions are considered equal.
were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count, and the result of the said
count was reliable.
ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 7
No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid,
For the validity of an election, it is essential that the voters have notice in except for those registered under the party-
some form, either actual or constructive, of the time, place, and purpose list system as provided in this Constitution.
thereof. The time must be authoritatively designated in advance.
In effect, Section 7 prohibits block-voting “except
Hassan v. COMELEC | 264 SCRA 125 for those registered under the party-list system.”
The requirement of notice becomes stricter in cases of special elections where it was
called by some authority after the happening of a condition precedent, or at least,
there must be substantial compliance therewith, so that it may fairly and reasonably ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 8
Political parties, or organizations or
be said that the purpose of the statute had been carried into effect. The sufficiency of coalitions registered under the party-list
notice is based on whether the voters generally have knowledge of the time, place and system, shall not be represented in the
purpose of the elections so as to give them full opportunity to attend the polls and voters' registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or
express their will. other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in
Lucero v. COMELEC, supra accordance with law.
It was held that in fixing the date of the special elections, the COMELEC should see to ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 9
it that: Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in
1. It should not be later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause of the special cases, the election period shall
commence ninety days before the day of
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. election and shall end thirty days thereafter.
2. It should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in failure to elect. ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 10
Bona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination.
Loong v. COMELEC | 257 SCRA 1
No law provides for a reglementary period within which to file a petition for the This provision does not give candidates immunity
annulment of an election if there has been no proclamation yet. from suit.
prescribed by the law. The COMELEC may fix other dates for the conduct of the special ARTICLE IX-C, SECTION 11
elections when the same cannot be reasonably held within the period prescribed by law. Funds certified by the
Commission as necessary to
defray the expenses for holding
Since there was failure of elections, petitioners can legally remain in office as barangay regular and special elections,
chairmen of the respective barangays in a holdover capacity. They shall continue to discharge plebiscites, initiatives, referenda,
and recalls, shall be provided in
their powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to the office. While it is the regular or special
true that Section 43C of the Local Government Code limits the term of elective barangay appropriations and, once
officials to three years, Section 5, RA 9164 explicitly provides that incumbent barangay official approved, shall be released
automatically upon certification
may continue in office in a holdover capacity under their successors and elected and shall have by the Chairman of the
qualified. Commission.
While the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is without
jurisdiction to go beyond them and investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in an action for annulment of election results or for a declaration of failure of
elections.
Party System
A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people. Article IX-C, Section 6
No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list
system. Article IX-C, Section 7
This is related to Article VI, Section 5(2), providing for 20% of the seats in the House of Representatives being allocated to party-list
representatives and RA 7941 – An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System
These advantages disappeared with the adoption in 1973, Section 9(2), “No party or candidate shall have membership in
the registration board, board of election inspectors, board of canvassers, other similar bodies.
Moreover, such accredited parties “may by law be granted other rights or privileges and the consequent advantages of
accredited parties disappeared.
Moreover, Section 8 now says, “Political parties or organizations or coalition registered under the party list system, shall
not be represented in the voters’ registration boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.”
Thus, there is again a leveling of all political parties.
In fact, the purpose of Section 8 and Section 7 is to allow the growth of a multi-party system.
Note, however, that the multi-party systems was responsible for the proliferation of candidates during the 1992 national
elections.
Election Period
Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of the
election and shall end thirty days thereafter. Article IX-C, Section 9
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Even in cases where pre-audit is allowed and pre-audit has already been performed, the Commission is not estopped from
making a post-audit.
Examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property owned or held in trust or pertaining to, the Government.
On post-audit basis: Constitutional Commissions and bodies or offices granted fiscal autonomy under the Constitution;
autonomous state colleges and universities; other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
and non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government.
Temporary or special pre-audit: where the internal control system of the audited agency is inadequate.
In settling accounts, such function is limited to a determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given
purpose; whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered into in conformity with said appropriation law;
whether the goods or services covered by said contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions
thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by the officials of the
corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor
General to approve and pass in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment.
NOTE, however, that under the 1987 Constitution, with its expanded powers, the COA may validly veto appropriations
which violate rules on unnecessary, irregular, extravagant or unconscionable expenses.
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The circular was merely a safeguard to prevent irregular unnecessary, excessive and extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures.
Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 85285, July 28, 1989
Where regulations require public bidding for the sale of government property, the Commission on Audit have the
authority to interpret the meaning of “public bidding” and what constitutes its “failure” for as long that there is no clear
evidence of abuse of discretion, the decision of COA will not be disturbed. “No less than the Constitution has ordained that
the COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or use of
government funds and properties.
The COA has audit jurisdiction over government-owned and controlled corporations ARTICLE IX-D, SECTION 3
with original charters, as well as government-owned and controlled corporations No law shall be passed
without original charters. The nature or purpose of the corporation is not material in exempting any entity of the
Government or its subsidiaries
determining COA’s audit jurisdiction. Neither is the manner of creation of a in any guise whatever, or any
corporation, whether under a general or special law. investment of public funds,
from the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit.
Feliciano v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 147402, January 14, 2004
Local Water Districts (LWD) are not private corporations because they are not created ARTICLE IX-D, SECTION 4
under the Corporation Code; they exist by virtue of PD 198, the special enabling The Commission shall submit
charter which expressly confers on LWDs corporate powers. COA, therefore, exercises to the President and the
Congress, within the time fixed
audit jurisdiction over LWDs. by law, an annual report
covering the financial
Keep the general accounts of Government, and preserve vouchers and supporting condition and operation of the
Government, its subdivisions,
papers for such period as provided by law. agencies, and
instrumentalities, including
government-owned or
Authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish techniques and controlled corporations, and
methods required therefor. non-governmental entities
subject to its audit, and
recommend measures
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 88435, January necessary to improve their
15, 2002 effectiveness and efficiency. It
The Supreme Court said that the power of the Commission to define the scope of its shall submit such other reports
as may be required by law.
audit and to promulgate auditing rules and regulations and the power to disallow
unnecessary expenditures, is exclusive, but its power to examine and audit is not
exclusive.
Public corporations under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit may employ private auditors. The clear
unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COA’s power to examine and audit is non-
exclusive. On the other hand, the COA’s authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and
regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.
However, as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA’s findings and conclusions
necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned.
Promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of
irregular, unnecessary, expensive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds or property.
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A R T I C L E X
Local Government
I. Common Provisions
A. Scope
B. Implementing Legislation
C. Supervisory Authority
D. Powers
E. Rights
F. LGU Officials
G. Cities
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GENERAL PROVISIONS G E N E R A L
P R O V I S I O N S
ARTICLE X, SECTION 2
Reasons of Constitutional Commission retained the word barangay in spite of its links with the The territorial and political
previous regime: subdivisions shall enjoy local
It has a historical significance in Asia. autonomy.
Existing laws use the term.
There are continuing references to it in public discussions. As Section 3 states, the Local
Government Code must be characterized by decentralization.
Cordillera Board Coalition v. Commission on Audit | GR No. 79956, January 29, 1990
EO 220 dated July 15, 1987 creates the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) creating a temporary administrative agency pending
the creation of the CAR. EO 220 does not thereby create a territorial and political subdivision. What is created is not a public
corporation but an executive agency under the control of the national government. It is more similar to the regional development
councils which the President may create under Article X, Section 14.
LOCAL AUTONOMY
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Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals | GR Nos. 120865-71, December 7, 1995
The Supreme Court denied to the municipalities around Laguna Lake the power to authorize the construction or
dismantling of fish pens, fish enclosures, fish corals and the like in Laguna Lake. The municipalities claimed the authority
under general provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code, specifically Section 149. The LLDA, however, claimed power
under RA 4850 as amended by PD 813. Applying principles of statutory construction, the Court ruled that the specific
power of the LLDA must prevail over the general power of local governments. Moreover, the Court pointed out that the
power given by the Local Government Code to local governments was a revenue generating power and not a regulatory
power. Hence, the Court, while denying regulatory authority to the municipalities, recognized their authority to impose
fees for purposes of generating revenue.
Batangas CATV v. Court of Appeals & Batangas City | GR No. 138810, September 29, 2004
Local governments do not have power to grant franchise to operate CATV system.
San Juan v. Civil Service Commission | GR No. 92299, April 19, 1991
The law says that the budget officer shall be appointed by the Department head upon the recommendation of the head of
local government subject to civil service rules and regulations. If none of those recommended by the local government
head meets the requirements of law, the Department head may not appoint anyone he chooses. He must return the
recommendations of the local government head explaining why the recommendees are not qualified and ask for new
recommendations. In other words, the recommendation of the local government head is a condition sine qua non of the
Department’s appointing authority. This is the only way local autonomy can be given the recognition the Constitution
wants it to have. When in doubt, favor autonomy.
The current law on “recall” is now found also in the LGC of 1991. The constitutionality of one method of recall adopted by
the Code was tested in this case. Section 70, LGC authorized provinces, cities, legislative districts and municipalities to
have a “preparatory recall assembly” authorized to initiate the recall of an elective official. The contention of Governor
Enrique Garcia was that “the right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the electorate to reconfirm or
withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be recalled at a special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes
the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings or not.”
The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit
the adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by Article X, Section 3 is for Congress to
“enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
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through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. By this constitutional
mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
For Makati to impose a business tax, it must be shown that the Condominium is engaged in business. The City Treasurer has not
posited the claim that the Corporation is engaged in business activities beyond the statutory purposes of a condominium
corporation. The assessment appears to be based solely on the Corporation’s collection of assessments from unit owners, such
assessments being utilized to defray the necessary expenses for the Condominium Project and the common areas. There is no
contemplation of business, no orientation towards profit in this case. Hence, the assailed tax assessment has no basis under the LGC
or the Makati Revenue Code, and the insistence of the city in its collection of the void tax constitutes an attempt at deprivation of
property without due process of law.
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim | GR No. 119775, October 24, 2003
The power to tax of local governments may not be negated by executive order through a grant of exemption absent a
statute granting such exemption.
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Section 1 can be read as merely advisory and therefore cannot be proscribed as an attempt to exercise control over local
governments. Section 4, however, is “in contravention of Section 286, LGC, providing for the automatic release of each of these
units its share in the national internal revenue.
Under the assailed provisos in the GAA of 1999, 2000 and 2001, a portion of the IRA in the amount of five (5) billion pesos was
earmarked for the LGSEF, and these provisos imposed the condition that “such amount shall be released to the local government
units subject to the implementing rules and regulations, including such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and
distribution of said fund among local government units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee
on Devolution.”
Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the Oversight Committee’s prior approval. To the Court’s mind,
the entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA
or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and
regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the OC from time to time, as sanctioned by the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation
of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the “just share” of the LGUs “shall be automatically released to them.”
release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 would have been worded to say “shall be automatically
released to them as provided by law.”
First, historical examination of this provision reveals that two ideas emerge from the Constitutional Commission proceedings:
1. The notion of service of term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of prolonged
stay in office.
2. The idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whim they wish to govern
them be preserved.
Moreover, the Commission discussed term limits “on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election.
To recapitulate, the term limit of elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve
in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three (3) consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
The three-term limit of local elective officials apply only when these two conditions concur:
1. The local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times.
2. He has fully served three consecutive terms.
Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice elected
after that, he can run for one more term in the next election because he has served only two full terms successively. Suspension
does not interrupt his term nor in fact his tenure because the office still belongs to him during suspension.
David v. Commission on Elections | GR No. 127116, April 8, 1997 | 271 SCRA 90, 104
RA 7160 – Local Government Code of 1991 approved on October 10, 1991, took effect on January 1, 1992, Section 43-C limits the
term of office of Barangay officials to three (3) years. Petitioners argue that Article X, Section 8 “by excepting Barangay officials
whose terms shall be determined by law from the general provision fixing the term of elective local officials at three years,”
impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a three-year term for such officers. Thus, Section 43-C, RA 7160 is unconstitutional.
Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for Barangay officials. It merely left
the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the
lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service.
The phrase, “as may be provided by law” is not prospective. Hence, it can refer to law already existing at the time the Constitution
was enacted or to future laws.
Since the Constitution does not prescribe the qualifications, these are prescribed by law. And in making the appointments, the
President must observe the qualification requirements.
This case was decided on the basis of the 1973 Constitution which prescribed that the plebiscite should be “in the unit or units
affected,” the Court had said that where a portion of an existing province was being lopped off to form a new province, both the
mother province and the proposed new province should participate and not just the proposed new province. Certainly, the mother
province is affected because its boundary is substantially altered.
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is no evidence to support the claim of its continued existence as a corporation. To uphold the claim would mean upholding defiance
of the decision which nullified its existence as a municipality.
This decision was based on the provisions of the 1973 Constitution. A similar provision is found in the 1987 Constitution. However, it
is submitted that the freedom which Congress has in departing from the LGC is wider now than under the 1973 Constitution because
the LGC is now just like any other statute.
Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village | GR No. 135962, March 27, 2000
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units – 12 cities and 5 municipalities. With the
passage of RA 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared a “special development and administrative region” and the
administration of “metro-wide” basic services affecting the region placed under “a development authority” referred to as the
MMDA.
“Metro-wide services” are those “services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge
expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising
Metro Manila. There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following:
1. Development planning
2. Transport and traffic management
3. Solid waste disposal and management
4. Flood control and sewerage management
5. Urban renewal, zoning and land use planning and shelter services
6. Health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control
7. Public safety
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
1. Formulation
2. Coordination
3. Regulation
4. Implementation
5. Preparation
6. Management
7. Monitoring
8. Setting of policies
9. Installation of a system of administration
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has
not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in the RA
7924 that empowers the MMDA or its council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare” of the inhabitants of the Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a “development authority.” It is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s
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organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in
the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature. It is not a municipal corporation endowed with police
power. Its creation was never submitted to a plebiscite.
MMDA cannot order the Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to open Jupiter Street to the public considering that Jupiter Street is
owned by BAVA. MMDA is not a local government unit with police power. It is different from the Metro Manila Commission (MMC)
which was the central government of a local government unit. Neither is it a metropolitan political subdivision under Section 11
because its creation was never submitted to a plebiscite. MMDA therefore does not possess police power.
Metro Manila Development Authority v. Garin | GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005
Where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been
delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded –an in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise if its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs. Without such law,
the MMDA has no power.
3. Component cities – cities which still are under a province in some way
May rise to the level of highly urbanized cities.
Since cities in 1 & 2 do not vote in provincial elections, they are independent of the province; but since cities in 3 are under
a province, they cannot be denied a vote in the election of provincial officials.
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An autonomous region is organized “within he framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty,” and not an
independent nation within a nation.
ORGANIC ACT
The charter of the autonomous regions will be the Organic Act that will be passed by Congress in the manner and according to the
substantive specifications contained in Section 18.
The creation of the autonomous regions become effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in
a plebiscite held for the purpose.
Only the provinces, cities and geographic areas which vote favorably become part of the autonomous region. This means that it is
possible for a cluster of municipalities or barangays within one province to belong to an autonomous region while the others might
not.
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It is submitted that constituent units that vote negatively in the first plebiscite may through
ARTICLE X, SECTION 18
a subsequent plebiscite join the autonomous region at some future time. The language of The Congress shall enact an organic
the last paragraph of Section 18 does not put a time limit and the evident intent of the act for each autonomous region with
Constitution is to honor the free choice of constituent units. the assistance and participation of
the regional consultative
commission composed of
Pandi v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 116850, April 11, 2002 representatives appointed by the
An ordinary statute, whether general or special, cannot amend an organic act that provides President from a list of nominees
from multi-sectoral bodies. The
for an autonomous region which under the Constitution may only be created, and therefore organic act shall define the basic
changed, through a plebiscite called for the purpose. structure of government for the
region consisting of the executive
department and legislative
Ordillo v. Commission on Elections | HR No. 93054, December 4, 1990 assembly, both of which shall be
The Province of Ifugao, which was the only province which voted for a Cordillera elective and representative of the
constituent political units. The
Autonomous Region (CAR), cannot constitute the CAR. The Constitution says that an
organic acts shall likewise provide
autonomous region shall consist of provinces, cities and municipalities, and, therefore, not for special courts with personal,
just of one province. Moreover, RA 6766, the Organic Act which was the subject of the family, and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of this
referendum, itself contains provisions which can be implemented only if the new political
Constitution and national laws.
entity would consist of more than one province.
The creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when
Spouses Badua v. Cordillera Bodong Administration | GR No. 92649, February 14, 1991
approved by majority of the votes
A tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration cannot render a valid executory cast by the constituent units in a
decision in a land dispute. In the January 23, 1990 plebiscite, the creation of CAR was plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities,
rejected by all the provinces and city of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province. Hence, and geographic areas voting
the CAR did not come to be. Therefore, no autonomous region was created. As a logical favorably in such plebiscite shall be
consequence of that, the Cordillera Bodong Administration created under EO 220, Section included in the autonomous region.
13, as well as the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of
the Cordillera region (RA 6776, Article VII, Section 1) do not exist.
Such tribal court are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which
have been established by law (Article VIII, Section 1). They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels
created by PD 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together the
parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise.
The approval of the OA does not automatically create autonomous region. As the Constitution says, the creation of the autonomous
region takes effect only after it is ratified in a plebiscite.
For the effective creation of the autonomous region, it is not required that the total votes cast in all the units where the plebiscite is
called must yield a majority of affirmative votes. It is enough for the creation of the autonomous region that some “provinces, cities,
and geographic areas” vote favorably. In other words, as an examination of the constitutional text shows, for effective ratification it
is not necessary to achieve a “double majority.” Political subdivisions which did not vote favorably remain the administrative Region
to which they initially belong.
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When the conflict is between national statutes and local laws, however, there is no easy answer to the question as to which should
prevail. The matter could not only very well necessitate the serious weighing of the values involved but even the adjustment of
national laws in order to accommodate the constitutional desire for local autonomy in its various aspects. This could be especially
crucial in the application of personal and property laws for those belonging to autonomous regions but acting outside the
autonomous territory, and vice versa. Thus, conflict of law principles could develop within our one national municipal law.
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A R T I C L E X I
I. Rationale
II. Removal
III. Impeachment
IV. Impeachment Process
V. Impeachment Safeguards
VI. Sandiganbayan
VII. Office of the Ombudsman
VIII. Prohibition on Impeachable Officers
IX. Statement of Assets and Liabilities
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Penalty
ARTICLE XI, SECTION 2
Because the only purpose of impeachment is to remove, the penalty that may be The President, the Vice-President, the
imposed upon conviction on impeachment “shall not extend further than removal Members of the Supreme Court, the
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic.” This is broader Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
than the old 1935 and 1973 formula of disqualification “to hold any office of honor, removed from office on impeachment for,
trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines.” This penalty, moreover, is and conviction of, culpable violation of the
beyond the reach of the President’s power of executive clemency, but does not place Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
the officer beyond liability to criminal prosecution. When criminally prosecuted, public trust. All other public officers and
therefore, for the offense which warranted his conviction on impeachment, the officer employees may be removed from office as
cannot plead the defense of double jeopardy. provided by law, but not by impeachment.
In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez | AM No. 88-4-5433, April 15, 1988
The Supreme Court said that the Special Prosecutor (Tanodbayan) cannot conduct investigation into alleged misconduct of a
Supreme Court justice, with the end in view of filing a criminal information against him with the Sandiganbayan, as this would
violate the security of tenure of Supreme Court justices.
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Effect of Conviction
Removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines. But the party convicted
shall be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
Composition
Under PD 1606, it is composed of a Presiding Justice and Eight Associate Justices, with the rank of Justice of the Court of Appeals. It
sits in three (3) divisions of three members each. RA 8249
Rationale
The 1971 Constitutional Convention was fully aware of the continuing need to combat the evils of graft and corruption; hence, this
provision. In fact, as early as 1955 an anti-graft law, RA 1379, was already thought necessary. This was followed in 1960 by the Anti-
Graft Act, RA 3019, whose validity was upheld in Morfe v. Mutuc | 22 SCRA 424 (1968) and Nunez v. Sandiganbayan | 111 SCRA
433 (1982).
Jurisdiction
Did not the accused
The following requisites must concur in order that a case may fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the become a public
Sandiganbayan. officer and therefore
The offense committed is a violation of RA 3019, RA 1379, Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II became subject to
the Sandiganbayan’s
of the Revised Penal Code, Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986, or other jurisdiction when the
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes. BIR designated him
The offender committing the offenses violating RA 3019, RA 1379, the RPC provisions, and other as custodian?
No. Although Section
offenses, is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a, 206 of the National
Section 4, RA 8249. Internal Revenue
The offense committed is in relation to the office. Lacson v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 128096, Code “authorizes the
BIR to effect a
January 20, 1999
constructive distraint
by requiring ‘any
Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan | 128 SCRA 324 (1984) person’ to preserve a
distrained property,”
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan is not limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt there is no provision
practices of public officers. Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution gave to the legislature broad in the said statute
discretion to grant jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan not only over graft and corrupt practices but also “constituting such
person a public
over “such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government officer by reason of
owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.” Pursuant to such requirement.
this, broad powers were given to the Sandiganbayan through PD 1486. The BIR’s power
authorizing a private
individual to act as
Balmadrid v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan | GR No. 58327, March 22, 1991 depository cannot be
The Superintendent and Cashier of the Government-owned Catanduanes Agricultural and Industrial stretched to include
the power to appoint
College (CAIC) were indebted to Jesus and Mila Balmadrid, suppliers of school construction materials. him as a public
The Superintendent and Cashier fraudulently issued 4 CAIC checks to the Balmadrids. The officer.
Superintendent, Cashier, and the Balmadrids were tried and found guilty by the Sandiganbayan of
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violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Balmadrids allege that as private citizens, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them.
The contention is not correct. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees (Section 4, PD 1606). Private persons
may be charged together with public officers to avoid repeated and unnecessary presentation of witnesses and exhibits against
conspirators in different venues, especially if the issues involved are the same. It follows therefore that if a private person may
be tried jointly with public officers, he may also be convicted jointly with them, as in the case of the present petitioners.
Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 116033, February 26, 1997 | 268 SCRA 747, 758
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual who is charged with malversation of public funds as a principal after
the said individual had been designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a custodian of distrained property. Section 4, PD
1606, in enunciating the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, “unequivocally specifies the only instances when the Sandiganbayan
will have jurisdiction over private individual, i.e., when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction. The
Information does not charge petitioner of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an
offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
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Decisions or Review
The unanimous vote of all the three members shall be required for the pronouncement of judgment by a division. Decisions of the
Sandiganbayan shall be reviewable by the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari.
The power of the Military Deputy to investigate members of the civilian police has also been affirmed because the power of the
Ombudsman is broad and because the Deputy Ombudsman acts under the direction of the Ombudsman.
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The Ombudsman has authority. Section 12 says that he may “investigate any ARTICLE XI, SECTION 9
act or omission of any public official when such act or omission appears to The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least six nominees
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.” This is set out in greater detail in prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a
Section 16, RA 6770, the Ombudsman Act. Murder is illegal. And since it was list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter.
allegedly committed by a public official it comes within the jurisdiction of the Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All
vacancies shall be filled within three months after they
Ombudsman. occur.
The power of the Ombudsman to investigate is very broad especially as it ARTICLE XI, SECTION 10
The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank
has been expanded by the Ombudsman Act of 1989. He can investigate “any of Chairman and Members, respectively, of the
illegal act or omission of any public official” even if the offense committed by Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the
the official is not related to the performance of his functions. same salary which shall not be decreased during their
term of office.
and employees of Petrophil Corporation, even if Petrophil does not have an original May a claim of confidentiality bar the
charter. Ombudsman’s power to investigate?
Even the claim of confidentiality will not prevent
the Ombudsman from demanding the production of
Leyson v. Ombudsman | GR No. 134990, April 29, 2000 documents needed for the investigation.
It was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over “government-owned or –
controlled corporations” should be understood in relation to paragraph 13, Section Almonte v. Vasquez | GR No. 95367, May 22, 1995
The Court said that where the claim of
2, Administrative Code of 1987, which defines government-owned or –controlled confidentiality does not rest on the need to
corporations. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely: protect military, diplomatic or other national
security secrets but on general public interest in
preserving confidentiality, the courts have
1. An agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. declined to find in the Constitution an absolute
2. Vested with functions relating to public needs, whether governmental privilege even for the President. Moreover, even
or proprietary. in cases where matters are really confidential,
inspection can be done in camera.
3. Owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities,
either wholly or, where applicable as in the case of stock Buenaseda v. Flavier | 226 SCRA 645 (1993)
corporations, to the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. The power to investigate also includes the power
to impose preventive suspension. This is different
from the suspension referred to in Section 13(3).
In this case, since there is no showing that Gran Export and/or United Coconut are This latter is suspension as a penalty; preventive
vested with functions related to public needs, whether governmental or proprietary, suspension is not a penalty.
unlike Petrophil, then the said corporations do not fall within the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman.
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Supreme Court said that whether the evidence of guilt is strong to warrant preventive suspension is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman. There is no need for a preliminary hearing such as that required in a petition for bail.
If the Ombudsman refers a case to the National Bureau of Investigation for investigation and the NBI recommends prosecution.
Accused cannot complain that the Ombudsman abdicated its duty to investigate. Section 13(2) allows him to direct cases for
investigation to other officers. Besides, what was referred to the NBI was fact finding; preliminary investigation would still be
conducted by the Ombudsman.
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For purposes of determining the scope of the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, a public officer is one to whom some of the sovereign
functions of the government has been delegated. The National Centennial Commission performs executive power which “is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
Honasan II v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice | GR No. 159747, April 13, 2004
The fact that the petitioner holds a Salary Grade 31 position – so that the case against him falls exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan – does not mean that only the Ombudsman has the authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of the charge of coup d’état against him. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate is not an exclusive
authority, but rather a shared or concurrent authority with the Department of Justice Panel of Investigators, “in respect of
the offense charged.”
The powers of the Ombudsman are delegable. The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any
Ombudsman case may exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or
City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
There is, however, one important exception to this rule: when grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman in
either prosecuting or dismissing a case before it is evident. In this event, the act of the Ombudsman can justifiably be
assailed.
But while the Office of the Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether an information should be withdrawn and
a criminal case should be dismissed, and to move for the withdrawal of such information or dismissal of a criminal case,
the final disposition of the said motion and of the case is addressed to the sound discretion of the Sandiganbayan, subject
only to the caveat that the action of the Sandiganbayan must not impair the substantial rights of the accused and the right
of the People to due process of law.
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Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 160675, June 16, 2006
It is now clear that pursuant to Section 25, RA 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to impose penalties in administrative cases.
And in connection with this administrative disciplinary authority, the Ombudsman and his deputies are expressly given the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges, in accordance with Section 24, RA 6770.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 168079, July 17, 2007
The Court reiterated Estarija v. Ranada, supra, where it upheld the constitutionality of Sections 15, 21 and 25, RA 6770, and ruled
that the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official, other than a
Member of Congress or of the Judiciary.
ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees
or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.
Republic Act 1379 – An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by
any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor.
Presidential Ad-hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto | GR No. 130140, October 25, 1999
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This provision applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to ARTICLE XI, SECTION 6
criminal cases. Thus, prosecution of offenses arising from, relating, or incident to, or The officials and employees of the Office of
involving ill-gotten wealth in the said provision may be barred by prescription. the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies,
shall be appointed by the Ombudsman,
according to the Civil Service Law.
RESTRICTION ON LOANS
ARTICLE XI, SECTION 7
The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be
No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and
purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or exercise its powers as now or hereafter may
controlled bank or financial institution to the President, Vice President, the Members be provided by law, except those conferred
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional on the Office of the Ombudsman created
Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have under this Constitution.
controlling interest, during their tenure. ARTICLE XI, SECTION 14
The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORT appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter ARTICLE XI, SECTION 15
as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, The right of the State to recover properties
and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the unlawfully acquired by public officials or
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be ARTICLE XI, SECTION 16
dealt with by law. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial
accommodation for any business purpose
may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any
Caasi v. Court of Appeals & Miguel | GR No. 88831, November 8, 1990 government-owned or controlled bank or
Miguel is a holder of a “green card” entitling him to be a resident of the United States financial institution to the President, the
permanently. In his application for the card he put down his intention to reside in the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
United States “permanently.” He actually immigrated to the United States in 1984 Constitutional Commissions, the
and thereby assumed allegiance to the United States. He however returned to the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in
Philippines in 1987 to run for mayor of a municipality. Article XI, Section 18 is not which they have controlling interest, during
their tenure.
applicable because it has reference to “incumbents.” What is applicable is Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code which bars “a permanent resident of or an immigrant ARTICLE XI, SECTION 17
to a foreign country” unless he waives his status as a permanent resident of the A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter
foreign country. The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy is not the required as may be required by law, submit a
waiver. It must be by a special act done before filing a certificate of candidacy. declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme
Court, the Constitutional Commissions and
other constitutional offices, and officers of
the armed forces with general or flag rank,
the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law.
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A R T I C L E X I I
1. Goals
2. Natural Resources
3. Private Lands
4. Preference for Filipino Labor, etc.
5. Practice of Profession
6. Cooperatives
7. Monopolies
8. Central Monetary Authority
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NATURAL RESOURCES
The consequence of Regalian Doctrine of Section 2 is that any person claiming ownership of a portion of the public domain must be
able to show title from the state according to any of the recognized modes of acquisition of title.
San Miguel Corporation v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 57667, May 28, 1990
Prescription can transform public land into private land, if it is alienable land. “Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. Such open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of the disputed properties for more than 30 years must, however, be conclusively
established. This quantum of proof is necessary to avoid the erroneous validation of actually fictitious claims of possession over the
property in dispute.
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The nature of reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands is that they are lands of the Aliens cannot lease land of the public
public domain and, unless classified as alienable, may not be disposed of. domain, because that would involve
enjoyment of the natural resources of the
public domain.
Requisites for reclaimed land to be registered as private property:
1. Since reclaimed land is part of the inalienable public domain, there must be proof
that the land had been classified as alienable.
2. The person seeking registration must show proof of having acquired the property
such as by prescription.
Inalienable land, however, cannot be acquired by prescription. Republic v. Enciso | GR No. 160145, November 11, 2005
The Supreme Court declared: “We adhere to the Regalian Doctrine wherein all agricultural, ARTICLE XII, SECTION 3
timber and mineral lands are subject to the dominion of the State.” Thus, before any land may Lands of the public domain are
be classified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for classified into agricultural, forest
or timber, mineral lands and
agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government. The mere national parks. Agricultural lands
fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer ownership over the of the public domain may be
property covered by such title where the property is part of the public forest. further classified by law according
to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the
Republic v. Sayo | 191 SCRA 71 public domain shall be limited to
Seville v. National Development Company | GR No. 129401, February 2, 2001 agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may
It was held that in the absence of proof that property is privately owned, the presumption is not hold such alienable lands of
that it belongs to the State. Thus, where there is no showing that the land had been classified the public domain except by lease,
as alienable before the title was issued, any possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more
cannot ripen into ownership. And all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within than twenty-five years, and not to
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines
may lease not more than five
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court | 219 SCRA 339 hundred hectares, or acquire not
United Paracale v. de la Rosa | 221 SCRA 108 more than twelve hectares
thereof, by purchase, homestead,
The Court said that consonant with the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
or grant.
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. It is also on the basis
of this doctrine that the State has the power to control mining claims, as provided in PD 1214. Taking into account the
requirements of conservation,
ecology, and development, and
Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon | 244 SCRA 537 subject to the requirements of
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be privately owned agrarian reform, the Congress
shall determine, by law, the size of
are presumed to belong to the State. In our jurisdiction, the task of administering and lands of the public domain which
disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the Director of Lands and, ultimately, the may be acquired, developed, held,
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. The classification of public lands is, thus, an or leased and the conditions
therefor.
exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department through the Office of the President. Courts
have no authority to do so. In the absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified
public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Section 2 speaks of “co-production,
joint venture, or production sharing
agreements” as modes of exploration,
Ituralde v. Falcasantos | GR No. 128017, January 20, 1999 development, and utilization of
Forest land is not capable of private appropriation and occupation in the absence of a positive inalienable lands. This effectively
act of the Government declassifying it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or excludes the lease system, with
other purposes. Accordingly, where there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the land in respect to mineral and forest lands.
Agricultural lands may be the subject
question by free patent or other ways of acquisition of public land, petitioner cannot lawfully of lease.
claim ownership of the land. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.
The following are qualified to take part
in the exploration, development, and
2. Imperium and Dominium utilization of the natural resources:
In public law, there exists the well-known distinction between government authority
possessed by the State which is appropriately embraced in sovereignty, and its capacity to Filipino citizens, and corporations or
associations at least 60% of whose
own or acquire property.
capital is owned by Filipino citizens.
The former comes under the heading of imperium, and the latter of dominium. Note, however, that as to marine
The use of the term dominium is appropriate with reference to lands held by the State in its wealth, only Filipino citizens are
proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands qualified. This is also true of natural
resources in rivers, bays, lakes, and
and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. lagoons, but with allowance for
cooperatives.
3. Citizenship Requirements
Article XII, Section 2
How much of the lands of the public
Co-production, joint venture or production sharing agreements for exploration, development domain is open to acquisition,
and utilization, development and utilization of natural resources: Filipino citizens, or exploration, development and
corporations or associations at least 60% of whose capital is Filipino owned. Agreements utilization?
shall not exceed a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
The last paragraph of Section 3 as
well as Section 4 authorize Congress
Article XII, Section 2 to fix the available area taking into
Use and enjoyment of the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea consideration “the requirements of
and exclusive economic zone – PD 1599 (June 11, 1978); UN Convention on the Law of the conservation, ecology and
development and subject to the
Sea – ratified by Philippines in August, 1983: Exclusively for Filipino citizens. principles of agrarian reform.”
Section 4 also adds a note of urgency
Tano v. Socrates | GR No. 110249, August 21, 1997 to the need to fix “the specific limits of
forest lands and national parks.”
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to
the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore
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– Article XII, Section 7. A “marginal” fisherman is defined by the Supreme Court as an individual
ARTICLE XII, SECTION 4
engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward from his harvest of fish, as measured by The Congress shall, as soon
existing price levels, is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish; while as possible, determine, by
a “subsistence” fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. law, the specific limits of
forest lands and national
parks, marking clearly their
Section 131 of the Local Government Code defines a “marginal farmer or fisherman” as one boundaries on the ground.
engaged in subsistence farming or fishing, which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of Thereafter, such forest lands
and national parks shall be
agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family. The preferential conserved and may not be
right granted to them is not absolute. increased nor diminished,
except by law. The Congress
shall provide for such period
Alienable lands of public domain, which shall be limited to agricultural lands. as it may determine,
Only Filipino citizens may acquire not more than 12 hectares by purchase, homestead or grant; or measures to prohibit logging
lease not more than 500 hectares. Private corporations may lease not more than 1,000 hectares in endangered forests and
watershed areas.
for 25 years, renewable for 25 years.
ARTICLE XII, SECTION 5
Article XII, Section 10 The State, subject to the
provisions of this
Certain areas of investment – as Congress shall provide when the national interest so dictates: Constitution and national
Reserved for Filipino citizens or corporations 60% of whose capital is Filipino owned, although development policies and
Congress may prescribe a higher percentage of Filipino ownership. programs, shall protect the
rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System | GR No. 122156, February 3, 1997 | ancestral lands to ensure
267 SCRA 408, 434 (citing State ex rel. Miller v. O’Malley | 342 Mo 641 their economic, social, and
cultural well-being.
In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. The Supreme Court said that the term “patrimony” The Congress may provide
pertains to heritage – and for over eight decades, the Manila Hotel has been mute witness to the for the applicability of
customary laws governing
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipino. It existence is impressed with public property rights or relations
interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and in determining the
nationhood. Verily, the Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony, and ownership and extent of
ancestral domain.
51% of its equity comes with the purview of the constitutional shelter, for it comprises the majority
and controlling stock. Consequently, the Filipino First Policy provision is applicable. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court said that this provision is a positive command which is complete in itself and What is the difference between
needs no further guidelines or implementing rules or laws for its operation. It is per se enforceable. “ancestral domain” and
“ancestral lands”?
It means precisely that Filipinos should be preferred, and when the Constitution declares that a
right exists in certain specified circumstances, an action may be maintained to enforce such right. Ancestral domain is an all-
embracing concept which refers
to lands, inland waters, coastal
In the dispute whether the shares of GSIS in Manila Hotel should be awarded to a Malaysian bidder areas, and natural resources
corporation or to a Filipino corporation, the Malaysian bidder corporation or to a Filipino therein and includes ancestral
corporation, the Malaysian bidder contended that, since the first and third paragraphs of Section lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and
10, Article XII are not self-executory, the second paragraph, by implication, is also not self- other lands individually-owned
executory. whether alienable or not,
hunting grounds, burial
grounds, worship areas, bodies
A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. The of water and other natural
second paragraph is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs resources. They include lands
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. indigenous cultural
communities but to which they
In light of this case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the GATT treaty which places had traditionally had access for
their subsistence and
aliens on the same footing as Filipinos by distinguishing the two (2) cases by saying that the traditional activities.
provision was mandatory and enforceable “only in regard to the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and Ancestral lands is a narrower
concept. It refers to those held
commerce.“ The suggestion is that there are some aspects of trade and commerce which do not under the same conditions but
form part of the national economy. For what reason we are not told. Then the Court continued: ancestral domain but limited to
“The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Section 10, Article XII is self-executing or not.” lands that are not merely
occupied and possessed but are
That, after all, had been settled in Manila Prince. But the Court continued: “Rather, the issue is also utilized by cultural
whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to communities under the claim of
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.” In other individual or traditional group
ownership. These include but
words, the Senate may play around with a mandatory provision through a balancing of values. are not limited to residential
Tanada v. Angara | GR No. 118295, May 2, 1997. My suspicion s that this is the Court’s polite way lots, rice terraces or paddies,
of distancing itself from the divided decision in Manila Prince. private forests, farms and tree
lots.
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The constitutionality of RA 7042, the Foreign Investment Law, on the ground that Compare the rule under the 1987
provisions in it which liberalize the rules for the entry of foreign investors is detrimental Constitution with those of the 1935 and 1973
to the interest of Filipinos. The Solicitor General, however, and intervenor Senator Constitutions.
Vicente Paterno argue otherwise. The debate here is on the wisdom and on the efficacy
The 1987 Constitution rule is more strict
of the law. The case as presented as yet poses no constitutional issue. than the 1935 and 1973 rules. What the new
rule says is that whenever natural resources
Article XII, Section 11 are involved, particularly in the case of
inalienable natural resources, the State must
Franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public always have some control of the exploration,
utility: Only citizens of the Philippines, or corporations at least 60% of whose capital is development and utilization even if the
Filipino-owned. individual or corporation engaged in the
operation is Filipino. Thus, for instance, in
the words of Commissioner Davide, “no
First sentence prescribes that public utility franchises be granted only to timber or forest concessions, permits or
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations at least 60% of the capital of which authorization can be exclusively granted to
any citizen of the Philippines nor to any
is owned by citizens. corporations qualified to acquire lands of the
Second sentence enjoins the State to encourage equity participation by the public domain.” But this rule is not
general public. retroactive.
Last sentence, first introduced in 1973, which authorizes foreign investors to The non-retroactivity of this rule is respected
participate in the governing boards of public utilities proportionately to their in the Executive Order No. 211 issued by
share in capital, is a reversal of the Filipinization trend which had found support President Aquino in the exercise of legislative
powers and in Executve Order No. 279
in King v. Hernaez | 4 SCRA 792 (1962) and Luzon Stevedoring Co v. Anti- which authorized the Secretary of Natural
Dummy Board | 46 SCRA 474 (1972). The 1987 Constitution, however, has Resources to conclude joint venture, co-
added that “executive and managing officers must be citizens of the production, or production sharing
agreements for the exploration, development
Philippines.” and utilization of mineral resources
applicable to contracts entered into after the
Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Public Utility Board | 44 Phil 551 (1923) effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
A public utility is a utility corporation which renders service to the general
public for compensation. Its essential feature is that its service is not confined Miners Association of the Philippines v.
to privileged individuals but is open to an indefinite public. The public or Factoran, Jr. | 240 SCRA 100
private character of a utility does not depend on the number of persons who
In upholding the administrative regulations
avail of its services but on whether or not it is open to serve all members of the issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources,
public who may require it. this case recognized that the new
Constitution assumes a more dynamic role in
relation to natural resources. “ No longer is
Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization and Philippine National Oil Company the utilization of inalienable lands of public
| GR No. 112399, July 14, 1995 domain through “license, concession or
A public utility under the Constitution and the Public Service Law is one lease.” “The options open to the State are
organized “for hire or compensation” to serve the public. Under this definition, through direct undertaking or by entering into
co-production, joint venture, or production
PETRON, the refining company of the government, was not considered a public sharing agreements.”
utility coming under Section 11 because it does not engage in oil refining for
hire or compensation.
Distinguish Filipinization of an aspect of the
economy from nationalization.
JG Summit Holdings v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 124293, November 20, 2000
A shipyard comes under the definition of a public utility found is Section 13(b), There is Filipinization when ownership is
CA 146. But PD 666 said that a shipyard was not a public utility; but this was limited to Filipino citizens or Filipino
corporations; there is nationalization when
repealed by BP 391, which was repealed by Omnibus Investment Code but in ownership is reserved to the State.
so doing it did not revive PD 666.
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1. Filipino citizens;
When technical and financial assistance agreement is entered into under 2. Filipino corporations and associations as
Section 2, can it include some management role for the foreign corporation? defined in Section 2; and, by exception,
3. Aliens, but only by hereditary succession, and
4. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
To the extent that management is incidental to financial and technical has lost Philippine citizenship (but only under
assistance agreements, management may be included. the terms of Section 8.)
Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is therefore unavoidable, and a careful scrutiny thereof
conclusively shows that the ConCom members discussed agreements involving either technical or financial assistance in
the same sense as service contracts and used the terms interchangeably. The drafters in fact knew that the agreements with
foreign corporations were going to entail not mere technical or financial assistance but, rather, foreign investment in and
management of an enterprise for large-scale exploration development and utilization of minerals.
192
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The framers spoke about service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution. It is obvious from their
discussions that they did not intend to band or eradicate service contracts. Instead, they were intent on crafting provisions to
put in place safeguards that would eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime.
In brief, they were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors – but with safety measure to
prevent abuses – as an exception to the general norm established in the first paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII, which
reserves or limits to Filipino citizens the exploration, development and utilization of mineral or petroleum resources. This was
prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt need for foreign expertise in the EDU of mineral
resources.
From the foregoing, it is clear that agreements involving either technical or financial assistance referred to in
paragraph 4 are in fact service contracts, but such new service contracts are between foreign corporations acting as
contractors on the one hand, and on the other hand government as principal or “owner” (of the works), whereby the foreign
contractor provides the capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the creation and operation
of the large-scale mining/extractive enterprise, and government through its agencies (DENR, MGB) actively exercises full
control and supervision over the entire enterprise.
The Philippine Port Authority awarded the contract to operate the container service to International Container Terminal Services, a
private entity. It is contended that since this involves the operation of a public utility a special franchise from Congress is needed.
Under applicable laws, a special franchise is not needed. PD 857 specifically authorizes the Philippine Port Authority to provide
services within the Port Districts “whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise.” PPA contracted ICTS to operate the Manila
International Container Terminal. This is enough to satisfy the law. Even if MICT is a public utility, or a public service on the theory
that it is a “wharf” or “dock” as contemplated under the Public Service Act, its operation does not necessarily call for a franchise
from Congress. That the Constitution provides that the issuance of a franchise, certificate or other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress does not necessarily imply that only
Congress has the authority to grant such authorization. Our statute books are replete with laws granting specified agencies power to
issue such authorization.
Philippine Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics Board | GR No. 119528, March 26, 1997
Where it was held that Section 10, RA 776, reveals the clear intent of Congress to delegate the authority to regulate the
issuance of a license to operate domestic air transport services.
Associated Communications & Wireless Services – United Broadcasting Networks v. National Telecommunications
Commission | GR No. 144109, February 17, 2003
The Supreme Court acknowledged that there is a trend towards delegating the legislative power to authorize the
operation of certain public utilities to administrative agencies and dispensing with the requirement of a congressional
franchise. However, in this case, it was held that in view of the clear requirement for a legislative franchise under PD 576-
A, the authorization of a certificate of public convenience by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for the
petitioner to operate television Channel 25 does not dispense with the need for a franchise.
Likewise, the power to issue franchises for radio and television systems is legislative in nature but is delegable. We believe
that EO 546 is one law which authorizes an administrative agency, the NTC, to issue authorizations for the operation of
radio and television broadcasting systems without need of a prior franchise issued by Congress.
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The prohibition in the Constitution is against foreigners and foreign corporations being given a franchise to operate a public utility.
But they may own the facilities. The Court held that a foreign corporation could construct and own the facilities for a light rail transit
system but it may not be given the franchise to operate the system.
JG Summit Holdings v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 124293, September 24, 2003, January 31, 2005
Foreign corporation may buy shares in excess of 40% of the shares of the corporation. There is no law against that. But the
effect would be that the corporation would lose its capacity to hold.
A public utility is a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the public with some commodity or service of public
consequence, such as electricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone or telegraph service. To constitute a public utility,
the facility must be necessary for the maintenance of life and occupation of the residents. As the name indicates, “public
utility” implies public use and service to the public. A shipyard is not a public utility. Its nature dictates that it serves but a
limited clientele whom it may choose to serve at its discretion. It has no legal obligation to render the services sought by
each and every client.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections | 289 SCRA 337
All broadcasting, whether radio or television stations, is licensed by the Government. Radio and television companies do not own
the airwaves and frequencies; they are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. A franchise is a privilege subject to
amendment, and the provision of BP 881 granting free airtime to the COMELEC is an amendment of the franchise of radio and
television stations.
Foreshore land is that part of the land which is between the high and low water, and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. It is
part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise.
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals | 129 SCRA 689 (June 22, 1984)
The Court said, “The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and
not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition. This should be so under time honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the
Regalian Doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in the land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
It should be noted, however, that he power of the executive is delegated power by virtue of CA No. 141.
The classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the President upon recommendation of the pertinent
department head. Therefore, they are the ones who may change the classification of public lands, e.g., from inalienable to
alienable.
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If a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership ARTICLE XII, SECTION 10
of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the The Congress shall, upon
recommendation of the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong. This is an application of the economic and planning
Regalian Doctrine. Thus, once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to agency, when the national
which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable interest dictates, reserve
to citizens of the
it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is Philippines or to
thus converted to mineral land. For the loss sustained, the owner is entitled to corporations or
compensation under the Mining Law or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. associations at least sixty
per centum of whose
capital is owned by such
Director of Forestry v. Villareal | GR No. 32266, February 27, 1989 citizens, or such higher
Are mangrove swamps or Manglares agricultural or forest lands? The classification by the percentage as Congress
may prescribe, certain
Administrative Code of Manglares as forest lands has not been changed. areas of investments. The
Congress shall enact
Rules on the disposition and exploitation of agricultural lands of the public domain measures that will
encourage the formation
Private corporations or associations may not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. and operation of
Qualified individuals may acquire a maximum of 12 hectares (down from 24 of the 1973 enterprises whose capital
Constitution) of alienable lands of the public domain. is wholly owned by
Filipinos.
Private corporations may hold alienable lands of the public domain by lease up to a
maximum of 1,000 hectares and for a period of twenty-five (25) years renewable for In the grant of rights,
another twenty-five (25) years. privileges, and
concessions covering the
Qualified individuals may lease land of the public domain up to a maximum of 500 national economy and
hectares. patrimony, the State shall
give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
(CENRO) in the DENR stating that the land subject of an application is found to be within the What is the difference between the
alienable and disposable site in a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to show provision of Section 15, Article XIV
(1973 as amended) and Section 8 of
the real character of the land subject of the application. the 1987 Constitution relative to
natural born citizens who lost their
citizenship?
Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome | 114 SCRA 799 The 1981 amendment to the 1973
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain Constitution limited the right of such
except by lease. The Court held that as between the State and Meralco, the land is still public persons to the acquisition of private
lands “for use by him as residence”. No
land. It would cease to be public and only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any such limitation appears in the 1987
Filipino citizen qualified to acquire the same. Meralco, being a juridical person, is disqualified. Constitution. However, Congress may
add such limitation as we as
limitation on size. Moreover, the size
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. | 146 limitation imposed by statute under
SCRA 509 the 1973 Constitution still holds.
The ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome was abandoned where the Supreme Court
declared that the 1973 Constitution cannot impair vested rights. Where the land was acquired
What is the current law on the
in 1962 when corporations were allowed to acquire lands not exceeding 1,024 hectares, the subject?
same may be registered in 1982, despite the constitutional prohibition against corporations
acquiring ands of the public domain. This is the controlling doctrine today. Section 5, RA 8179, amending
Section 10, Foreign Investment Act,
says:
Where public land was acquired within the maximum limit of the Constitution in effect at the
time of acquisition, such land may be registered even if the area is beyond the new land limit “Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen
Pursuant to the Provisions of Article
in a later Constitution. the validity of acquisition is determined as of the time land was XII, Section 8 of the Constitution. –
acquired. Any [former] natural born citizen who
has the legal capacity to enter into a
contract under Philippine laws may be
When does public land become private land: upon issuance of the certificate of a transferee of a private land up to a
registration or upon completion of all steps necessary to entitle one to maximum area of five thousand
registration? (5,000) square meters in the case of
urban land or three (3) hectares in the
Alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors case of rural land to be used by him
in interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period for business or other purposes. In the
of thirty years is converted to private property by the mere lapse of completion of case of married couples, one of them
may avail of the privilege herein
said period, ipso jure. granted: Provided, that if both shall
avail of the same, the total area
Lausan Ayog v. Judge Cusi | GR No. 46729, November 19, 1982 acquired shall not exceed the
maximum herein fixed.
One purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by
private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage “owner- In case the transferee already owns
cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm” and to prevent a recurrence of huge urban or rural land for business or
other purposes, he shall still be
landholdings. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had spawned social entitled to be a transferee of
unrest. additional urban or rural land for
business or other purposes which
when added to those already owned
The prohibition which prevents private corporations from acquiring and of the public domain by him shall not exceed the maximum
is not retroactive. The constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the areas herein authorized.
corporation which “had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the
A transferee under this Act may
1973 Constitution took effect. acquire not more than two (2) lots
which should be situated in different
NOTE: Under the 1935 Constitution, the limit on the area of public land which may be municipalities or cities anywhere in
acquired by private individuals was 144 hectares. The 1973 Constitution, however, set the the Philippines: Provided, That the
total land area thereof shall not
limit at 24 hectares. The 1987 Constitution has further reduced this to 12 hectares.
exceed five thousand (5,000) square
meters in the case of rural land for use
Republic v. Intermediate Court of Appeals | GR No. 75042, November 29, 1988 by him for business or other purposes.
Qualified corporations may acquire land, but only private land. The prohibition on acquisition A transferee who has already acquired
urban land shall be disqualified from
of public lands apply to corporations sole, to the same extent that the prohibition is acquiring rural land area and vice
applicable to private corporations. Even is a corporation sole is different from other versa.
corporations in other respects, in the matter of acquisition of public land they are treated like
other corporations.
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and AMARI | GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002
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In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, ARTICLE XII, SECTION 6
there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is The use of property
necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No. 141, which states, “but the land so granted, donated or bears a social function,
and all economic agents
transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be shall contribute to the
alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when common good.
authorized by Congress.” Individuals and private
groups, including
corporations,
When such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and cooperatives, and similar
submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA collective organizations,
shall have the right to
to sells its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban own, establish, and
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. Hence, such legislative operate economic
authority could only benefit private individuals. enterprises, subject to
the duty of the State to
promote distributive
However, in a May 6, 2003 Resolution the Court clarified that “reclaimed lands of the public domain if justice and to intervene
sold or transferred to a public of municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become when the common good
so demands.
patrimonial property and may be sold to private parties, whether Filipinos citizens or qualified
corporations.
La Union Electric
Laurel v. Garcia | GR Nos. 92013 & 92047, July 25, 1990 Cooperative v. Judge
Yaranon | GR No. 87001,
The nature of the Roppongi property in Japan is that the subject property in this case is one of the four December 4, 1989
(4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service In the facts of this case the
Court saw no proof of direct
is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the injury to petitioner. Hence it
corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese did not want to rule directly
government. on the constitutionality of
the law authorizing NEA to
override a board. However,
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property the Court observed that
has become patrimonial. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of Article XII, Section 6 of the
man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and Constitution says that
cooperatives are subject to
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The the duty of the State to
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common intervene when the
and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation. common good demands.
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The opinion assailing the constitutionality of the law held the following:
1. The law amounts to an abdication of the authority over a significant are of the country’s patrimony.
2. It relinquishes full control of natural resources in favor of indigenous people.
3. The law contravenes the provision which says that all natural resources belong to the state.
PRIVATE LANDS
The alien petitioner claims that the sales of real property in question were entered into by him as the real vendee. He claims that
therefore he is entitled to compensation for the properties. The said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null
and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and
ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction
which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain action for his losses.
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from S. thereafter, D sold the disputed lot to C, a Filipino citizen. Petitioners, owners of the adjoining lot, questioned the
constitutionality and validity of the 2 conveyances –between H and D, and between D and C.
H’s deed of quitclaim in favor of her son violated Article XII, Section 7 which limits the transfer or conveyance of private lands to
those who are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. As to the effect of a subsequent sale by D to a Filipino,
“jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a
citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
The rationale of the principle that the invalid transfer of land to an alien is cured when the alien subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen is that the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future generations of Filipinos. That aim
is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.
Ramirez, a Filipino national, willed usufructuary rights over real property to an Austrian national. This was challenged on the basis of
Section 14 (now 7), but the lower court upheld the validity of the usufruct on the ground that the exception in favor of
“testamentary succession” applies to both to succession by operation of law and to testamentary succession. The will is valid but not
for the reason given by the lower court. Its validity rests on the fact that “a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land
in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to the land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
NOTE: But the Court also said, “We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands
does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the provision will be for naught and meaningless. The same decision
allowed the legitime in favor of the alien widow.
Assuming that it was (the husband’s) intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase, and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution.
The sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the
same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition.
If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over
land as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him
to have.
Even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on
high constitutional grounds, against recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof.
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The legitime of compulsory heirs, however, is determined only after collation. Article 1061
ARTICLE XII, SECTION 12
states that, “Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring The State shall promote the
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the preferential use of Filipino labor,
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title domestic materials and locally
produced goods, and adopt measures
in order that it may computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the that help make them competitive.
account of the partition.”
ARTICLE XII, SECTION 13
The State shall pursue a trade policy
Unfortunately, however, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition that serves the general welfare and
for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The utilizes all forms and arrangements of
petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity.
proceeding where all the indispensible parties are present for the rightful determination of
their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos. ARTICLE XII, SECTION 14
The sustained development of a
reservoir of national talents
Article XII, Section 8 consisting of Filipino scientists,
A natural born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a entrepreneurs, professionals,
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. managers, high-level technical
manpower and skilled workers and
craftsmen in all fields shall be
Republic v. Court of Appeals | 235 SCRA 567 promoted by the State. The State shall
This section is similar to Article XIV, Section 15 – 1973 Constitution, pursuant to which BP encourage appropriate technology
and regulate its transfer for the
185 was passed. BP 185 provided that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who lost his national benefit. The practice of all
Filipino citizenship maybe the transferee of private land up to a maximum of 1,000 square professions in the Philippines shall be
meters, if urban, or one hectare, if rural, to be used by him as his residence. Thus, even if limited to Filipino citizens, save in
cases prescribed by law.
private respondents were already Canadians when they applied for registration of the
properties in question, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof, ARTICLE XII, SECTION 15
considering that it is undisputed that they were formerly natural-born Filipino citizens. The Congress shall create an agency to
promote the viability and growth of
cooperatives as instruments for social
BP 185 has now been amended by RA 8179 which has increased the maximum area of justice and economic development.
private land which the former natural born Filipino citizen may acquire to 5,000 square
ARTICLE XII, SECTION 16
meters for urban land and 3 hectares for rural land. Furthermore, such land may now be The Congress shall not, except by
used for business and for other purposes. general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation
of private corporations. Government-
Americans hold valid title to private lands as against private persons owned or controlled corporations
may be created or established by
Republic v. Quasha | 46 SCRA 160 (1972) special charters in the interest of the
common good and subject to the test
The Parity Amendment of 1946 did not authorize Americans to acquire private lands. of economic viability.
Thus, a previous owner may no longer recover the land from an American buyer who
National Development Co. and New Agrix
succeeded in obtaining title over the land. Only the State has the superior right to the land,
v. Philippine Veterans Bank | GR Nos.
through the institution of escheat proceedings – as a consequence of the violation of the 84132-33, December 10, 1990
Constitution – or through an action for reversion – as expressly authorized under the Public
Land Act with respect to lands which formerly formed part of the public domain. PD 1717 was passed to rehabilitate the
Agrix Group of Companies which was a
corporation neither owned nor controlled
To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an by the government. As part of the
alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. rehabilitation process, the Agrix Group was
dissolved by the decree and the decree
created New Agrix Inc. likewise neither
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds | 79 Phil 461, 481 (1947) owned nor controlled by the government.
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Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She | No. L-17587, September 12, 1967 ARTICLE XII, SECTION 18
JG Summit v. Court of Appeals | GR No. 124293, January 31, 2005 The State may, in the interest of
Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for national welfare or defense, establish
and operate vital industries and, upon
residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be
payment of just compensation, transfer
granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the to public ownership utilities and other
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and private enterprises to be operated by
the Government.
misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by Section 11 deals with Filipinization, meaning
virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this Filipino ownership, whereas Section 18
deals with Nationalization or state
to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership.
ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy
the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to
dispose of it (jus disponendi) – rights the sum total of which make up ownership. It is While Section 18 deals with state ownership
of public utilities and industries, Section 17
just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow the use, the next day deals merely with the temporary state
disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are takeover of “the operation of any privately-
consolidated in the alien.” This is circumvention of the constitution. owned public utility or business affected
with public interest.” Hence, no
compensation is involved in Section 17.
In the case of JG Summit v. Court of Appeals, it was held that aliens are not disqualified
from owning every kind of real property. The prohibition of the Constitution applies
only to ownership of land. It does not extend to all immovable or real property as Republic v. PLDT | 26 SCRA 620, 628 (1969)
defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code, that is, those which are considered Under Section 18 the state may compel a
public utility to render service in the public
immovable for being attached to land, including buildings and construction of all kind interest, provided just compensation is paid
attached to the soil. therefor.
Lee Bun Ting v. Aligaen | L-30523, May 4, 1977 (not in SCRA) PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. | GR No. 94374, August 27,
On June 27, 1956, the rule was established that a Filipino seller could not, 1992
because of pari delicto, recover the land from an alien buyer. Twelve years Eastern was not allowed to interconnect
later, the rule was reversed in Lui She. Cases prior to Lui She can be relitigated with PLDT, but this was on the ground that
Eastern had no franchise to operate a
not when res judicata applies. telephone system.
3. Remedies to recover private land from disqualified alien. On reconsideration, however, in PLDT v.
NTC | 241 SCRA 486 (1995), Eastern case
was reversed.
Escheat proceedings
Gregorio Reyes Uy Un, an alien, acquired private lands in 1934. Upon his death in 1946, his properties were taken over by Chua Kim,
an adopted son, whose title to the land was confirmed in a compromise agreement approved by judgment in 1970 which recognized
him as heir of Gregorio Reyes Uy Un. In 1977, Chua Kim took his oath as a naturalized Filipino citizen. Chua Kim is entitled to acquire
the property under this Constitution, for two reasons:
1. His predecessor, Gregorio Reyes, acquired the property in 1934 when there was as yet no prohibition against aliens
acquiring private land.
2. Even if Chua Kim acquired the land when he was not qualified to do so, now that he is a Filipino citizen public policy will
not be served by dispossessing him
The State can be put in estoppel by the mistake or errors of its officials or agents. Estoppel against the State is not favored; it may be
invoked only in rare and unusual circumstances as it would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect
the public. However, the State may not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens.
An action for recovery filed by the former Filipino owner, the pari delicto doctrine having been abandoned, unless the land is sold to
an American citizen prior to July 3, 1974 and the American citizen obtained title thereto.
PRACTICE OF PROFESSION
202
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The Supreme Court, while upholding the principle that the license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the
government, declared that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the
State or its agent in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner.
wise is not for the Court to decide. On the other hand, petitioner has not shown that deregulation will
result in monopoly. ARTICLE XII, SECTION 19
The State shall regulate or
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, supra prohibit monopolies
when the public interest
RA 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key provisions intended to promote free so requires. No
competition were shown to achieve the opposite result. More specifically, this Court ruled combinations in restraint
that its provisions on tariff differential, stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit of trade or unfair
competition shall be
fair competition, encourage monopolistic power, and interfere with the free interaction of allowed.
the market forces.
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A R T I C L E X V I
General Provisions
I. Flag
II. Name
III. Armed Forces of the Philippines
IV. National Police Force
V. Mass Media and Advertising Industry
205
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206
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managing officers of such entities must be citizens of the Philippines. Article XVI, Section 11(2)
207
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A R T I C L E X V I I I
Transitory Provisions
I. Elections
II. Existing Laws and Treaties
III. Reserved Executive Powers
IV. Career Civil Service
V. Sequestration
I. Elections
Date
National
Local
II. Laws
Statutes, Presidential Decrees, Executive Orders, Proclamations, etc.
Operative until amended, repealed or revoked | Section 3
Treaties and International Agreements
Not reviewed or extended without concurrence of 2/3 of Senate | Section 4
Foreign military bases, troops or facilities need a treaty | Section 25
Bayan v. Executive Secretary
208
Constitutional Law 1 | 1.E M A R I A F R A N C E S C A M O N T E S
III. Courts
Status Quo
Continue to exercise jurisdiction
Rules of Court remain operative
Incumbent members remain until 70, incapacitated or removed for cause
Back Log
Systematic plan to expedite
Legal effect of lapse of period for cases filed before ratification of the 1987 Constitution | Article VIII, Section 15(3), (4) apply in
certification and penalties
V. Civil Service
Reorganization
Allowed provided it is done in good faith | Dario v. Mison
Appropriate separation pay and retirement benefits
Considered for employment
VI. Salaries
Top officials | Section 17
Other officials | Section 18
VII. Lands
Illegally acquired | Section 21
Violation of Constitution, public land laws or through corrupt practices
Adequate remedies for reversion
No transfer until after 1 year from ratification
Idle or abandoned agricultural lands | Section 22
Expropriate for distribution under agrarian reform program
X. Effectivity
February 2, 1987
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All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 5
The six-year term of the incumbent
other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain President and Vice-President elected in
operative until amended, repealed or revoked. Article XVIII, Section 3 the February 7, 1986 election is, for
People v. Gacott | 242 SCRA 514 purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
It was held that President Marcos’ Letter of Implementation No. 2 dated
March 18, 1972, which abolished the Anti-Dummy Board, not having been The first regular elections for the
revised, revoked or repealed, continues to have the force and effect of law. President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second
Thus, the accused may not validly claim that the power to prosecute
Monday of May, 1992.
violations of the Anti-Dummy Law is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy
Board and the City Prosecutor is without authority to file and prosecute the ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 6
same. The incumbent President shall continue to
exercise legislative powers until the first
Congress is convened.
All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been ratified shall
not be renewed or extended without the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all members of ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 7
Until a law is passed, the President may fill
the Senate. Article XVIII, Section 4 by appointment from a list of nominees by
After the expiration in 1992 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the respective sectors, the seats reserved
the United States, foreign military bases shall not be allowed in the for sectoral representation in paragraph
(2), Section 5 of Article V1 of this
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when Constitution.
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in
a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 8
the other contracting State. Article XVIII, Section 25 Until otherwise provided by the Congress,
the President may constitute the
Metropolitan Manila Authority to be
Bayan v. Executive Secretary | GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000 composed of the heads of all local
government units comprising the
Metropolitan Manila area.
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211
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This provision shall also apply to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 17
with the existing policy, had been accepted. Ortiz v. Commission on Elections | Until the Congress provides
162 SCRA 812 otherwise, the President shall
receive an annual salary of three
hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-
Dario v. Mison | 176 SCRA 84 (1989) President, the President of the
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for “automatic” vacancies. They Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and the Chief
are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free Justice of the Supreme Court, two
from the fetters of due process and security of tenure. The Court distinguished removals hundred forty thousand pesos each;
from separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue of this Constitution) as a result the Senators, the Members of the
House of Representatives, the
of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In Associate Justices of the Supreme
the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals Court, and the Chairmen of the
undertaken to comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not Constitutional Commissions, two
hundred four thousand pesos each;
hard put to prove anything, plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it, and the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, one
Article XVIII, Section 16 is critical for two reasons: hundred eighty thousand pesos
each.
1. It is the only provision – insofar as it mentions removals not for cause – that
would arguably support the challenged dismissals by mere notice. ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 18
2. It is the single existing law on reorganization after the ratification At the earliest possible time, the
Government shall increase the
of 1987 Constitution, except RA 6656, which came much later on June 10, 1988. salary scales of the other officials
and employees of the National
Government.
SEQUESTRATION
ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 19
Authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders relative to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth All properties, records, equipment,
buildings, facilities, and other assets
shall remain operative for not more than 18 months after the ratification of this Constitution. of any office or body abolished or
However, Congress may extend such period. reorganized under Proclamation No.
3 dated March 25, 1986 or this
Sequestration or freeze orders shall be issued upon showing of a prima facie case.
Constitution shall be transferred to
The corresponding judicial action shall be filed within 6 months from ratification of the office or body to which its
this Constitution, or, if issued after ratification, within 6 months from such issue. powers, functions, and
responsibilities substantially
The order is deemed automatically lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is pertain.
commenced as provided therein.
ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 20
The first Congress shall give priority
Republic v. Sandiganbayan | 240 SCRA 376
to the determination of the period
The Court said that there is no particular description or specification of the kind or for the full implementation of free
character of “judicial action or proceeding,” much less an explicit requirement for public secondary education.
the impleading of the corporations sequestrated or of the ostensible owners of the ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 21
property suspected to be ill-gotten. The only qualifying requirement in the The Congress shall provide
Constitution is that the action or proceeding be filed “for” orders of sequestration, efficacious procedures and adequate
remedies for the reversion to the
freezing or provisional take-over. What is apparently contemplated is that the
State of all lands of the public
action or proceeding must concern or involve the matter or sequestration, freezing domain and real rights connected
or provisional take-over of specific property – and should have, as objective, the therewith which were acquired in
violation of the Constitution or the
demonstration by competent evidence that the property is indeed “ill-gotten public land laws, or through corrupt
wealth” over which the government has a legitimate claim for recovery and other practices. No transfer or disposition
relief. of such lands or real rights shall be
allowed until after the lapse of one
year from the ratification of this
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan | GR No. 125788, June 5, 1998 Constitution.
It was held that the mere issuance of the writ of sequestration, without the
ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 22
corresponding service thereof, within the 18-month period, does not comply with
At the earliest possible time, the
the constitutional requirement. Government shall expropriate idle
or abandoned agricultural lands as
may be defined by law, for
distribution to the beneficiaries of
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan | GR Nos. 119609-10, September 21, 2001 the agrarian reform program.
For failure of the PCGG to commence the proper judicial action or to implead the
ARTICLE XVIII, SECTION 23
respondents therein within the period prescribed by the Constitution, the Advertising entities affected by
sequestration orders issued against the respondents were deemed automatically paragraph (2), Section 11 of Article
lifted. But the lifting of the sequestration orders does not ipso facto mean that XV1 of this Constitution shall have
five years from its ratification to
sequestered property are not ill-gotten. The effect of the lifting will merely be the comply on a graduated and
termination of the role of the government as conservator of the property. proportionate basis with the
minimum Filipino ownership
requirement therein.
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213
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The other violations of the Anti-Graft Law not otherwise fulfilling these elements are not within the authority of PCGG t investigate,
but within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating agencies.
214