God and Evi

God and Evi
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God and Evi
An introduction t o the Iss~es
Michael L. Peterson
ASBURY C O L L E G E
- A Member of t l ~ ePersseus Books Group

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Copyright- 8 1998 by Wcswicw Prcss, A i2ilember of Pcrseus Books: Group
Pubiished in 1998 in the United States ofAnlerica by Wesmietv Press, 5500 Central
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Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ
Press, 12 Hici's Copse ltoad, Gu~~lr?lor
I i brary of C:ongress CZatalog~lg-in- PuI>tiea.tlic>~~

Data
b3ererson, h4iclrael I,. 1950-
to the issues / by Michael L,,
Grrd and cvil : an introd-ctcfict~~
b3ererson.
p, cm,
Ir~ctudesbi bliographicaf references and index.
lSRN 0-8X 33-2848-9 (hc), - XSBN 0-8133-2849-7 (pb)
1. Good and cvit . 2. Reli@c>il-Philosog>11y. I. 'I'irfc.
BJl4QX.P47 1998
2 E 4-d~2 1 98-18429
CTP
'The paper used iit this publica~onmeets the requirements o f the American Na&onal
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For my sons,
Aar~PzaPzd Adam
Contents
11 The Problem of Evil and Its Place

in Philosophy of Religion
Evil in H u l ~ ~ aExistence,
n I
Evil and Rcligio~lsBelicf, 6
The Philosophical Difficulty, 8
The Classification of Evil, 10
Notes, 14
Suggested Readings, 15
2 The Logical Problem of Evil

Staten~entof the Problem, 17
The Structure and Strategy of the kgument, 19
Versions of the Logical Argument, 23
The Burden of Proof, 27
Notes, 5 X
S~lggcstcdReadings, 31
3 T l ~ eFunction of Defense
The Free Will Defense, 53
The Colllpatibilist Position, 35
The Incompatibilist Rejoinder, 37
The f:urrcnt State of the Debate, 41
Notes, 43
4 The Probabilistic Problem af Evil

An Initial Skirmish, 47
A Modified Probabiliy Argument, 49
Three Probabilistic Argumellts fro~nEvil, 52
Reformed Epistemolog!? and Evil, 56
Notes, 61.
5 The Problem af Gramitous Evil 67

Can There Be an Evidential Argument from Evil? 67
Versions of the Evidential Argummt, 69
Analyzing the Evidential Argument from
G r a t u i ~ u Evil,
s 73
The Appearance of Evil, 74
Notes, 79
Suggested Readings, 8 1
6 The Task of Theodicy

The Prospects for Thcodicy, 85
Augustine's Free Will Theodich 89
Lribniz's Best 130ssiblrWorld Theodic~~?
92
Hick's Soul-Making Theodic): 94
Whitehead's Process Theodicj: 99
Theodicy and the Assessment of Theism, 103
Notes, 105
Strggested Readings, 108
7 The Existential Problem of Evil

The Experience of Gratuitous Evil, 111
Evil and Personal Idencirp, 114
The Logic of Rcgrct, 117
Existential Authcnticiq and Evil, 119
Thc Defeat of Horren&,us Evil, 124
Notes, 127
Index
Preface
This jrolumc is an introduction to the problem of evil as it is currently

discussed in professional philosophy. I have designed the book for use
in an academic setting, with hopes that both student and scholar may
find many points interesting and provocative. I also trust that the scri-
ous and thoughtful person outside academia may benefit from my
treatment of this perennially important subject.
No project of this sort is a purely priirate undertaking. Over the
years, I have benefited fro111 hclpful discussions on the problei~lof evil
~ 6 t hAvin Hantinga, Edwarcf Madden, Peter Ham, Wilfiam Idasker,
David Basingrr, Bruce Reichmbach, and Jerry Walls. I have appreci-
ated the mcouragemcnt of the Asbury College administration during
my uriting. I am also thankful to Pew Charitable Trusts for fulldillg
my research during the 1992-1993 acadelnic pear.
I am not completely sure why I continue to be fascinated by the
problem of evil in all of its permutations. In part, I am astonished by
the great profusion of suffering and evil around us and am driven to
ponder it on behalf of those who ask, "Why?" And, in part, I am stag-
gered at the capaciv for evil ~vithinus and am thercbp dra~v1-1 t o the
issues concerlling God and evil. Although I am conscious of the
strange mixture of good and evil in our bvorld, I am more mindful of
how important it is to orient oileself properly toward these realities.
I dedicate this book to my sons, Aaron and Adam, in ~vhomI take
great pleasure and delight. They are certail~lptwo immeasurable
goods in my life that show me just how much value there is in a ~vorld
that contains evil. Their goodness even makes me a better person, My
fatherly hope for them is that thcy will resist evil in all its forms and
that thcy will love and seek the good in all things.
The Prob ern of Evil and
Its Place in Philosophy o f Ke
Something is dreadfully wrong with our ~vorld.An earthquake kills

hulldrcds in Peru. A pancreatic cancer patient suffers prolonged, ex-
cruciadng pain and dies. A pit bull attacks a mo-year-old child, an-
grily ripping his flesh and killing him. Countless lnultitudes suffer the
ravages of war in Somalia. A crazed cult leader pushes eighq-five peo-
ple to their deaths in WBco, Texas. Millions starve and die in North
Korea as famine ravages the land. Horrible things of all kinds happen
in our world-and that has been the story since the dawn of civiliza-
tion. Today's news media thrive on things that are wrong in the
~vorld,on bad things that h a p p n to people every day. Rlevision pa-
rades vivid images of war, ixurdcr, devastation, and suffering before
our eyes. Newspapers report rape, abuse, maylncm, and disaster.
an Existence
In June 199 1, Time magazine asked the question, "Why?"-"Why
does evil happen?"' In the cover essay, journalist Lance Morrojv re-
views the rz~ultitudeof eviils that haunt our cox~scioust~ess-from
Hitler's Auschwitz to Saddanl Husscin" invasion of K~~wait, from
KKK hangings of black men in prc-civil rights Mississippi t o the
AIDS epidemic. Kight there in a pok3ular ixagazinc, Mr~rrowraises
age-old questions in an article starkly titled "Evil." Is evil an entity!
Or is evil the immoral and inhulnane actions of persons? What about
bad and hurtful things that are out of our control, such as disease,
floods, and mental illness? Is nature responsible? Why does evil seem
2 12robigmoj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophy nfRel@Zon
so fascinating and alluring to the hulnan lnilld while good seems so

uninterestiilg and boring! Does evil serve some purpose, or does it
just happen! Why has the human race not seemed able to understand
evil, to conquer it, to shut i t out!
ThoughtFul people raise penetrating questions about evil and seek to
nnderstand what it reveals about the hun2an condition. In a feafi~rearti-
cle in the Tork Times Ma~azinc,Ken Koscnbaul-n seeks to probe
the meaning of evil. The cover of the magazine reads "Evil's Back," and
Rosenbaum's article inside carries the title "Staring into the Heart of
the Heart of Darkness." Koxnbaum's piece sets the stage by recounting
how Susail Smith of Buffalo, South Carolina, murdered her mro young
soxls, He reheal-ses the f'acts that a whole tlation now knows aXI too well:
Susan Smith drowned her two little boys by strapping them into the
child safety seats in her Mazda and sending the car rolling down an em-
bankment into Jobn D. Long Lakc. She then manufactllrcd an "ordeal"
to deflect attention fro111 her crime. Playing on racial prejudice, shc
claimed that an AFrican American car jackcr had kidnapped hcr two chil-
drm, and she pled desperately on television for a search for the car
jacker a i d the children. Yet, kzithin nine days, she confessed to killing
three-)rear-old Michael a i d f o u r t e e n - m o - d Alex.
Itosenbaurn observes that one Local tabtoid called Sxnith" action an
"evil deed." What is imyressive about this pronouncemmt is that the
secular rze\\rs media would make it. In a day when electronic and
bxintcd media typically prefer to assume a "relativity of valuesm----
avoiding difficult issues about ixoralit~thcolog>r,the ixeaning of life,
and our place in the cosmos-it: was blurted out. There it was. Sol-ne-
thing was actually declared "evilv--pure, unadulterated, ullmistak-
able evil-by the press. No141 all the hard questioils are laid on the
tabie and have to be faced: What is evil? Why d o humans have the
seemingly vast capacity to harm others? If there is a good God, why
does he permit innocent people to suffer!2
There is something about the Susan Smith case that evokes our
harshest moral judglnents and gets us asking all of thosc hard ques-
tions. Kosenbam cannily observes that "the great tabloid stories arc
the ones that raise thcologiml questions.'Yct he quiclcly aclcnowl-
edges that we canilot talk about evil-)r about good, for that mat-
ter-~rithout solne definitions. Those definitioils lead us to larger
theories about the origin and existeilce of evil in our midst, and those
theories lead us to even larger conceptions of the meaning of life and
the nature of ~vhateverSupreme Being might exist."
Although our age is acutely conscious of the bnidespread existence
of evil in humall life, past ages have certainly been akvare of its pro-
found significance. AImost no other theme recurs in great literature
more often than that of humanity's capability for evil. I n ancient
Greek tragedy? for example, the tragic hero is a person of noble status
and lofty aspirations who is eventually undone bccausc of a profound
character flaw, k n o w as hztbrts (pride). All of the tragic hero's other
virtucs become disjointed as his flaw subtly ruins his life. Russian au-
thor Ftrodor Dostoejrsky treats scornfully the comforting llotion that
humans are always rational and good. In a famous passage from 7 % ~
Broth~rsKara~~azuv, Dostoevskp protests such wild optimism about
humankind: "I can't endure that a man of lofty rnind and heart be-
gins with the ideal of the Madonna and ends with the ideal of Sodom.
What" still more awful is that a man with the ideal of Sodorn in his
soul does not rcnouncc the ideal of the Madonna, and his heart may
be on firc with that ideal, genuinely on firc, just as in the days of
youth and innocencc,"4 Our hui-nan inaibifiq to 1ivc up to our owvn
high ideals is a perpetual puzzlement.
The paradoxical depravity and perversity of hulnalliry are treated
quite poignantly in Dr. Jebyll n ~ z dMr. Hyde. Robrrt Louis Strvmson's
frightening fable records how the decent Dr. Jekyll came under the
power of a transforming drug: "It severed in me those provinces of
good and ill which divide and compound mall's dual nature. I \ras in
no sense a hypocrite; both sides of me wcrc in dead eamest; I was no
morc ixyself when I laid aside restraint and plunged in shame, than
when I laborcd, in the eye of day, at the f~~rtherance of knowledge or
the relief of sorro~rand sufkring."j
As time %rent on, the thought of evil represented in the person of
Mr. Hyde no longer filled Jekpll with terror: "I sat in the sun on a
bench; the animal within me licking the chops of memory; the spiri-
tual side a little drokmed, promising subsequent penitence, but not
pet moved to begin. I began t o be aware of the telnper of my
thoughts, a grcatcr boldness, a contempt of danger, a solution of the
bonds of obligation.""
The apelike creature had diabolically gained control of Jekyll:
This was the si~ockl~lg tiling; that the slime of the pit seemed to ~tttercries
and voiecs; that the amorphous dust gesricl.rlated and 811ncd; that what
was dead, and had no shape, sho~xldusurp the offices of life And this
again, that tile ii~surgenthorror was knit to him closer than a wife, closer
tl-ran an eye; lay caged in l-ris flesh, where l-re l-reard it rrittxtter and felt it
struggle to be born; and at every hour oft.rreakness, and in the corlfidence
of sltlmber prevailed against him, and deposed him O L Xof ~ life.7
Dr. Jekyll confesses the terrible truth that he is radically both natures:
"It was the curse of mankind that . . . in the agonizcd womb of con-
sciousness these polar wins should be continuously struggling."g
Paul, tlzc early C.:hl-istian evangdist, recognizes the war ~vitbinhim-
self: "I do slot understand my own actions. For I do slot do what I
want, but I do the very thillg I hate. . . . I can will what is right, but I
cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not
want is what X do."Vn a sirnlfar vein, St. Augustine recounts his un-
happy predicament in his Confcssio~zs:"I was bound, not with an-
other's irons, but by my own iron will. My will the enelny held, and
thence had made a chain for me, and bound ixe."l@This personal as-
pect of cvil most closcly coincides with what the Judeo-Christian
Scr-ipturcsdescribe as "sin. "
Once we recogilize the existence of something that can reasonably
be called persollal evil, we must then also recognize that it has collec-
tive as well as illdividual dimensions. Organized crime syndicates, mili-
tant emerging nations, oppressive social structures, and profit-crazed
multinational corporations are, in a real sense, the social extensions of
personal evil. On both individual and corporate levels, one of the sad-
dest features of hulxan evil is its strangc adrnixtllrc with good or appar-
ent good. Marriages are wrccked for lack of mutual understanding, ed-
ucafiond col-nmtlmiticsarc m k n n i n e d by disagreement about how to
pursue colnmosl ideals, political parties are throknn into disarray by ex-
cessive ambition, and nations are ripped apart by struggles for power.
Although we are perplexed by humanin's capaciq for evil, even the
best of us are someti~ueshurt and even crushed by the ilupersonal
forces of the universe. These forces know nothing of human agendas or
purposes and tend to thwart all that we hold dear. Herlnan Melville
deals 144th this thcrnc in Moly Dick. <:aptain Ahab of the Peguod, forq
years a whaler in thc first half of the last century, sets out from Nan-
t~xcketon what appears to be a long ~vhafingcruise, Little does anyone
b o \ v that Ahab's journey is not seamail's busiiless but a quest for the
meanh~gof life. Ahab had lost a leg in an earlier ellcounter with Moby
Dick, a great white bnhale, then the terror of the seas, and is nokn bent
on destroying it. The captain is obsessed with the meanillg of human
existence in the face of overwrhclming natural forces. Ironically, the
whale is white, a color often taken to symbolize what is sacred and
holy; but the whale is fearsome and hostile to hulnall values and, in the
end, triumphant. Ishmael, the ship's only survi\rol; claims that in losing
his life Ahab discovered its meaning." The modem world knows all
too well that this disturbing picture of life-life being ruined and finally
snuffcd out by forces bcyond its control---is a realistic onc.
There is no denying that persons often fall victiln to psychological
and physical forces beyond their control. Rut quite apart from how
these forces affect humall interests, they crrtai~llycause much pain
and death ~rithinllature itself. A%AAlered Lord Tellllpson reminds us,
nature is ""rd in tooth and claw." "rvival of the fittest is btiilt into
the mechanism of anilllate nature. Few anir~aXsare .Free from attack
by stronger animals or from suffering and death due to shifts in their
environment. Although animals d o not possess the higher self-
consciousness of hulllans, they still obviously feel pain and cndurc
suffering. T h o u g h t f ~ ~
people
l tind it very puzzling that the world
shorrld work in such a way as to maim, torture, and destrr~ylarge pm-
portiolls of these subhumall creatures.
At the end of any catalog of ills that plague the world comes death.
All thillgs ekrentually die. But death is a particularly acute probleln for
the human species because we humans sense that our existence has
value and worth, that our agendas have merit, that we deserve to go on
living and building our lives. And yet death stands as the final enem);
the last evil wc illust face; it puts an end not only to our doing and un-
dergoing further evils but also to our pursuing our most cherished
dreams. Thus, death is radically foreiw to all that is within us. Ludwig
Wittge~lsteillobserves: "Death is llot an event in life: we do not live to
experieilce death."" Death is the end of life. H. F. Lovell Cock5 urites
that the termination of one's omrn personal existcllce is the "great hu-
man repression, the univenal 'complex.' Dying is the reality that [per-
sons] dare not face, and to escape which [they] summon all [their] re-
sources."lVhose who have thought long and hard about the human
condition know that death is arguably thc most fearsome of all evils.
After pondering evil in the ~vorld,wc may be tempted to echo thc
sentiment in the chorus of T. S, Eliot's Mg~drpi"in the CTallhedg~al:
Here is no continuing city, here

is no nbidin~sgay.
Iil $he ~~i;tzd,
ill the zcz"me,g1.ztrergain
the plpufit, ccrtai~zthe da~wer.
Olatg latg I&& is $he fime,
mo h4 n ~ rongn d ithe jfega";
Evil $he windJ an& Itz't&;erthe .re&, grid
.qrgy the skj5 ky,greycqreygrcy.1"
Unfortunately, this profo~undand inconsolable pessimism appears to

be natural and warranted when the troubles of hu~llanityarc taken sc-
riously.
All of the bad things that happen-horrors that we humall beings
commit toward one another, awful evellts that occur in nature, and
terrifving kvays in bnhich nature threatens human interestcfall ullder
the rubric of evil. Simply put: There is evil in the world. It is in the
nekvs. It is in our common experience. I'opular periodicals even grap-
ple with it. Quite apart from any precornmitment to a specific theory
of cvil and how evil fits in to a larger interpretation of lifc, thcrc is a
virtual consensus that something is deeply wrong with our ~vt?rld,
that things d o not always seem to go as they should, and that much
too often evellts happen that are utterly dreadful. It is in this broad
sense that we sap, "Evil exists."
Evil and Religious Belief

As people through the centuries have reflected on the meaning of life,
fhcy have had to come to grips with the pcrsisknt and pervasive prcs-
ence of evil. It is not surprising, then, that every major religion ad-
drcsscs cvil ~cithinits ullique kamc ofrcfcrencc.jVor Buddhism, evil is
illherent in huinall existence, lnalung ilonexistence (~zirvnnn) the goal.
For Hinduism, evil belollgs to the world of illusion ( m a p )and cyclical
rebirth (snmsam)kom which we must seek to find release. For Zoroas-
trianism, e\ril is an eternal cosmic principle that opposes the good.
In The Sacgped Calzopy, sociologist Peter Kerger ~vritesthat one func-
tion of eilrry religion is to provide a way of understanding life, of fitting
the events of life into a meaning&[ pattern. He explains that religion
imposes order and l a h l n e s s on cxperienccs that sec113 to be chaotic
and destructi1.e---rnost notably? the phenomena of suffering and death.
Thus, religion imposes a numos, or la~llfulexplanation, on other\\ise
anolnic features of existence. Berger is worth quotillg on this point:
The anomic gl-renorritena mLlst not only be lived tl-rrough, they n ~ u s also
t
be explained-to wit, explai~~ed in tcrms of the nornos established in the
socieq in question. AI expla~lationof these pl-re~~ome~~a in terms of reti-
gious Xegi timatio~ls,of whatever degree of theoretical sophistication, may
be called a theodicqr. It is irnporta~ltto stress I-rere particularly (alttlo~xpb
tl-re sanle point has already bee11 made generally with respect to religious
legitimations) tttat s~tchan. expla~ratior~ need not ex~raila complex theo-
retical sysrexn. The ilititerate peasant who commenB q m n the death of a
child by referring to the will of God is e~lgagi~lg in tbeodicy as much as
the icarxred ttteologian who writes a treatise to demtsr~stratethat the suf-
fering of rhc innocent does not negatc the conceltGorr, of a God both ail-
good and all-po\"iierf~~l, All tl-re same, it is possible to differentiate tl~eodi-
cies in terms of their degree of rationalir~i,tttat is, the degree to ~~hiclt.
ttlcy exlrtdl a theory that col~crentlyand consistently explaixrs the pbe-
llonlella in question in ternls of a1 over-all vie\v of the unitrerse. Such a
theory? of cotrrse, once it is sociall~~.established, may be refracted or1 dif-
ferent lcr,rels of sapt~isricatiunttlroughoc~tthe socieqf. 'Ph~s,the peasa~lt,
when he speaks abo~xt:the will of God, may hill~selfintend, however inar-
ticulatel~p,the majestic theodicy corlstructed by the tttec~tc>gial~.lb
So, what a religious system sa)Ts about evil reveals a great deal about
what it takes ultimate reality and humanity's relation to it to be.
Hence, the credibility of a religio~lis closely linked to its ability to
give its adherents categories for thinking about the presence of evil.
Although evil poses a challenge that every major religion must ad-
dress, the challenge to Christianity is particularly formidable. There
seems to be a scrious tcnsion bcfi4rcen what Christian theolog). affim3s
about thc unrivaled power, nnlimited knodcdgc, and unrelenting Ir>w
of Cod, on the one hand, and what it admia about cvil in God's cce-
ated order, on the other. Many persolls think that the Christial God-
if He really exists a ~ isd the source a ~ guaraltor
d of value-\wuld not
dtow the world to be as it is. This is the crux of the issue for Christian
beliet:, it has traditionally been knowrn as the problem of cvil. Through-
out historj: Christian theologians and philosophers have ~vrestledwith
this problem. Thoughtfill and sensitive laity have also felt the need for
at least a gcncral explanation of how to relate God and evil. The co-
nundrum seems unavoidable. Aficr rc\?iewing all the evils that haunt
our contenlpr>rary consciousness, Lance Morrow raises this prccisc
problem at the end of his Tirne magazine article.17
Son~ethinkers believe that unless Christian believers have an ac-
ceptable solution to the problem of evil, they have 110right to hold
their distinctive theological position or to ask others to adopt it.18
Philosopher T. W. Settle argues that grappling with the problem of
evil is a "prolegomenon to intellectually honest theology."" Thor

Hall proposes that the ability or illability to generate an allswer to the
vexing problem of evil is the lionus test of the "reasonableness of thc-
ology." Hall says that Christian thinkers must "he capable of handling
honestly the actualities of human existence (realities which we all
know) while at the same time providing a fralxework for explicating
responsibly the essential affirmations of the faith (affir~nationswhich
arc given \niithin the historical traditian)."zo
The positioll that is put under direct pressure by the presence of
evil is known as "theism." Theism ~naintainsthat there exists a
Suprelne Being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good.
William Rowe calls this position "restricted theism."2l Theism as such
is not itself living religion but forms what we might call the basic con-
ceptual foundation for several living religions: Christianity, Judaism,
and Islam. Thc total bclicf fraixeworks of these actual religions in-
volve adding certain other signiticant religious beliefs t o restricted
theism. Restricted heism conjoined with other rcligio~~s claims con-
stitutes what Kowe calls "expanded theism."
The presellt study treats Inally of the i~nportalltdiscussions related
to the basic theistic foundation of Chrisrian belief (i.e., restricred the-
ism). After all, insofar as evil presents a challenge to theism, it pre-
sents a challenge to any version of expanded theism. Howriver, this
study also considers some issues related to larger sets of Christian be-
liefs (i.c ., various <:hristian versions of expanded theism). These sets
of Christian beliefs particularly come into play whm considering vari-
ous responses t o the challenge posed by evil. Thcsc largcr sets of
Cl-rristiail beliefs are coilstituted, of course, by restricted theism con-
joined with additional propositioils about God's general purposes in
the world, the role of Jesus C:hrist, life after death, the human condi-
tion, sin, and so forth. The specific propositions with which restricted
theism is augmented-drawn from such sources as church creeds,
biblical interpretation, and common Christian experiencedetermine
the exact version of expanded theism at issue. Although we may refer
to any one of these versions as "Christianit\rmor "Christian bclicf' or
'"hristian thecllog!;" we will mt>rc mgularly use the rnore precise
rubric ""Cl-rristiantheism.''
The Philosophical Difficulty

Let US say that the essential problem here for theism (and thus for any
version of Christian theism) is that of reconciling belief in an all-
po~verful,all-kilo~ving,all-good deity with the belief that there is e\il
in the bnorld. But exactly what kind of a problem is this? Speaking
more precisely, the difficult}! for theism lies in rebutting an argument
that alleges some kind of conflict between beliefs about God and be-
liefs about evil. An argument from e\5l---or, really, any one of several
arguments from evil---has a structure, pre~l~ises, and conclusion. It is
actually the conclusion of any given argkllnent from evil and the rca-
sons for that conclusion that are a "problem" for theism. In the fol-
lokning pages, I will use the term problem ofevil simply as a synonym
for nvgz~me~ztfronz gvil.22 h d there is not just one problem or argu-
lnent from evil; there are actually Inany different arguments. Scholars
have identified se\reral major types of arguments 6orn evil, noting
their key strategies as well as characteristic theistic responses.
These arguments have various roots. For one thing, the problem of
evil expresses a kind of moral protest and so involves categories of
good and evil. For another thing, the problem involves religious bc-
licfs about the existencc and naturc of God, giving it a distinct thco-
logical aspect. Yet the problem of evil is best understood as a philo-
sophical problem. In its traditional role, philosophy clarifies and
ailalyzes our beliefs, exalnilles them for logical consistency and coher-
ence, and evaluates their adequacy for explaining iluportant human
phenomena. These philosophical features make the discipline of phi-
losophy the natural home field for the problem of evil.
There arc, of course, illany areas of philosophical concern, and each
is determined by the exact sct of ideas and issues that arc exalxined:
philosophy of science, philosophy of illind, philosophy of language,
philosophy of art, and so forth. Each of these areas seeks to brillg the
key insights and interests of philosophy to bear upon the relevant
topics. This mealls that typical philosophical yurstiolls about reality
(metaphysics), knojvledge (epistemology), and value (moral theory
and axiology) are appropriate. And questions about the structure and
acceptability of relevant arguments (logic) are always in order. The
s~lbjectat hand, the problem of evil, falls within what is traditionally
k n o w as the philosophy of religion. It is the task of philosophy of rc-
ligion, then, to bring thcsc characteristic questions t o bear on signifi-
cant religious concepts and belieE5, such as those related to God, mir-
acle, prayer, and faith.
Philosophers of religioll have always been deeply interested in the
question of whether there are rational grounds for either belief in
God or disbelief in God. Impressive arguments have been con-
structed to show that God exists-such as the ontological, cosmolog-
it0 12robigmoj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophy nfRel@Zon
ical, and teleological argumellts.23 Likeivise, a number of serious ar-

guments have been adiranced t o show that God does slot exist.
Among those arguments against God's existence, noile has been
more prominent than the problem of evil. In the experience of evil
and reflection upon it, humanity reaches the extreme limit-con-
fronting the decisive question of the ixeaning of life, of the sense and
nonsense of reality. Hans Kiing states that thc problem of evil is "thc
rock of athcismm24 because so Exany pcoplc bclievc it t o be in-
tractable. This accounts for the lively and ongoing discussion of the
probleln in philosophy of religion.
But \vhh one might ask, should this philosophical problem be rele-
vant to faith? Faith is personal commitment, deep abiding trust, firm
conviction. Faith is much more than abstract reasoning. Why should
the intricate arguments and counterarguments of philosophers affect
religious faith at all? A sensible answr, it would secln, runs along the
following lines. Athough, granted, faith is morc than Exere intcllec-
tual assent to a set of beliefs, it is at least intellectual assent. Athough
faith is a personal trust in God, that trust is based on a slumber of im-
portant beliefs about what God is like and how persons Inay have a re-
lationship t o him. These beliefs are subject to philosophical scrutin!:
critique, and defense. Thus, there really is no responsible way to insu-
late religious faith from philosophical reflection. And there is certainly
no jvaj. to insulate i t h m the philosophical problem of evil.
The Cllassif car-ion of Evil

Recognizislg the probleln of evil as a serious challeilge to Christiail the-
ism, it might seem advisable to begin our i~lvestigationwith a precise
definition of evil. Homrever, the attempt to offer a specific defillitiosl at
this point frequently ladens the meaning of evil with preconceived ideas
and thus hinders objcccive discussion. Some thinkers, for example, de-
fine "evil" in theological terms as "sin" and consider the problem only
in this light, reducing all evils to spiritual xbellion again^ God and its
consequences. Other thinkers definc "evil" as "finialdew and thcn treat
ven human pcrversiv----as the inevitable results of creatllrclp
limitation. Defislitions of "evil" could be proposed and debated indefi-
nitely. Therefore, it is advisable for present purposes to leave open the
questioil of definition a ~ proceed
d with a broad, cornmollsense slotion
of evil evoked by the things we typically call "eiril."
lxegardless of how we define it, we are all aware of the existence
and profusion of evil. It is entirely possible to identify a whole spec-
trum of evellts and experiences as "evil." The set of comlnoillp recog-
nized evils includes, at the j7eryleast, such things as extreme pain and
suffering, physical deformities, psychological abnormalities, the pros-
perity of bad people, the demise of good people, disrupted social rela-
tions, unfulfilled potential, a host of character defects, and natural
catastrophes. This list specifics the sorts of things that arc colxmonly
considered evil ~vithoutprejudicing later discussions. In yhilosophial
parlance, this list indicates thc c.~tensionof the term "evil" (i.e., all
thillgs to which the term applies) bnithout speci@ing its exact inten-
sion (i.e., all that the term implies). The eloquent eighteenth-centur~~
skeptic David Hume follo~vedthis approach when 11e listed a sam-
pling of the world's ills: "a hospital full of diseases, a prison crolvded
with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses,
a Reet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under ryrannj:
faixine, [and] pestilence.
Evil indeed has many faces, faces with ~vhichwe arc all too falniliar.
Since the wide range of evils can be vcrp conf~~sing, most philoso-
phers make a helpful distinction beween moral evil and natzlral evil.
111 lnarking out the difference bemeen the t\jrobroad kinds of evil,
Alvin Plantinga writes that "\\re must distinguish beween mofpal evil
and n&t-gg.nle~z'l.The former is evil wl-rich results f?om free hurnan ac-
tivity; natural evil is any other kind of evil. "2"s Plantinga admits, the
distinctioll is not very precise. Yet this salnr point is made by John
Hick: "Moral evil is evil what we hulxan beings originate: crrrd, un-
just, vicious, and perverse thoughts arid deeds. Natural evil is thc evil
that originates independently of human actions: in discasc bacilli,
earthquakes, stonns, droughts, tornadoes, etc."27
Edward Maddell and Peter Hare provide a sinlilar classification:
Phj~ical!e~z'l,we shall say, Cle11~1testhe terrible pain, suffering, a ~ l dun-
timely death caused by evetlts like fire, Rood, la~~dslide, htirricarle,
earttlquake, tidal wave, and fainine and by discases like cancer, leprosy,
and tetanus-as well as the crippli~lgdefects and defor~ltibeslike bIind-
ness, deah~ess,dtimbness, shrivefed limbs, and illsanity by which SO
rnany scl~rtenrbeings are cl~eatedof the full benefits of Iife. . . . Mo~-sal
evil . . . d e ~ ~ o t both
e s rritoral wrong-doing such as lying, cheating, steal-
ing, torturillg, and murderilIg and character defects like greed, deceit,
cruelty, gi,wantar~ness, cowardice, and selCshx7iess.2"
Other authors do not depart far from this same general approach.
Although we could debate the exact boundaries bet\\reen natural
and moral evil, the basic distinction performs a helpful classificatory
it2 12robigmoj'E27i1 and I2hilnsophy nfRel@Zon
fu~lctio~l. It 110t only helps clarifp our thinking about evil but also al-
lows us t o divide the general problem of evil into subsidiary problems
related to moral and to natural evil and thus guides further stages of
inquiry. In his penetrating treatment of the problem of evil, David
Hulne shows he is alvare of this iznportant distinction. Hume ob-
serves that, in naturc, "the stronger prey upon the wcaker" m d ""thc
wcaker, too, in their turn, oftcn prey upon the stronger, and vex and
molest thcm \\;icbout relaxation." Achowlcdging that brr111aniq can
organize into societies and thus avoid some of the harm zlature might
do, he insists that humalls morally mistreat each other: "Oppression,
injustice, contempt, . . . ~riolence,sedition, war, . . . treacherh fraud-
by these they mutually torment each other, and they would soon dis-
solve char society which they had formed were it not for the dread of
still greater ills which must attend their separation."29
Quite apart from technical philosoph!~, the distinction behvecn nat-
nral and moral evil rkzns through most great literature. "The "f"yger'"
by William Blakc is a powerful poetic expression of the problcill of
natural evil. The poem forcefully raises the issue of whether a certain
instance of natural evil (e.g., the threat of being attacked by stronger
mimals) could have been created by the Gr>dof the C:hristian faith.
Ty&er! Twer! burni~gbright

1%theforests of' the n&bt,
W ~ Lim~.e.lo~$al
ZL ha;l.cdor eyle
G"og/d@gme thjl@t.1!pf-ll. ~ y r n ~ ~ e ~ ' r y ?
In tvhat distant d e e p or skies

Burrzed thefir6 ofthifze eyes?
On 117hatwings dafpe he aspigee?
Whnt the hand dar~seize thefir&?
Whar I J ~ C~ ~ P % zwhat ? ~ h a i?~ z

~ c It-hg
In tvhatp6mace was thy brain?
Whnt the anvil? what dreadgrasp
I h v e its dead& termrs clnsp?
~ threa~dolv~ztheir spears,
Whg~zt h stars
And 137~~.tergd e ~ ~ th~iartggrs,
h e l ; t ~~7Ztb
])id he smz'lg his wofpk t o .re&?
])id he $@ad& the Lg$.%zb $.%zakeBee?
q g e ~ !T~ger!Itgrvtia8 b~$&ht:
IB the for^gs~'s
of the %&h$,
W ~ &immor~al
G h a ~ dor eyle
Darg @me thy fearful syrn metry l.3"
We also find the problem of moral evil in great noirels. Dosto-

evsky's classic The Rruthcr.r I<affavanzazovcontains a poignant treatlnent
of the problem. Ivan Karamazov asks his brother Alyosha, who is a
Russian Orthodox monk, the piercing question of why God allows
cruclq to innocent children. Ivan relentlessly enumerates stories of
the torturc and murder of childrcn---a little girl beaten by parents and
then let't overnight in an outhouse to freeze, a young serf boy torn to
death by a landowner's hounds for throui~lga stolle at one of them,
an unborn child cut froln its mother's womb by illvading T ~ ~ r kand s,
on and on. Then, Ivan cries: "Listen! I took the case of children only
to make my case clearer. Of the other tears of humanity with which
the earth is soaked from its crust to its center, I will say nothing. I
have narrowed my subject on purpose. I am a bug, and I recognize in
all hurnilihr that 1 cannot understand why the world is arranged as it
is. . . . But then therc arc the children, and what. a111 I to do about
them? That's a qrxcstion I can't ansjtrer."3J
In the next six chapters, I explore the major atheistic argulnellts
from evil as kvell as ilnportailt theistic responses. I discuss the
strengths and bneaknesses on both sides and point directioils for fur-
ther discussion. In the process, I will not only allalyze mally techlical
issues related to God and evil but also attempt to develop a sense of
the deep significance of this issue in human life. I address three prob-
lems of evil that express various logical and epistemological concerns:
the logical problem, probabilistic problem, and evidential problem.
Thc theistic responses to the logical and probabilistic problems that I
examine can be described as defensive. The typical theistic response
to the ejridential probleln that I inspect comes uilder the rubric of
theodicy. I also explore what can be called the existential problem of
evil, which expresses the intensely personal and moral aspects of the
issue.
Notes
X . Lance Morro\;c; "Evil," Time, June X 0, X 991, pp. 48-53.
2. 'l'he use of the masctxline gcnder pronocln here docs not imply that God
is rritale, Historical Judeo-Chnstiar~views of God have affirmed that sexuatiq is
a creattrrely reality not reflected in God. My use ofmascrrline gcnder proxlotrns
wbex~referring to God tbraughot~tthis book, then, ;followsthe tradition tliat
requires us to use i~~lperfect earthly terms and i~~lages to talk about God, I
i d any new?revised God-language here, which wotrld raise some very
a ~ x ~using
interesting but also very sophisticated contro~rcrsies.X retain traditional usage
simply for the sake of econclmy and getting on with the issl-~es at hand.
3, Roil XXosexlba-itm, "&faring into the Heart of the Heart of l>arkl~ess?"
New T0a.k ?Z'YM.~S'M ~ ~ ~ S( f Zt ~Fn 4, eZ 1995):
~ 36-44, 50-58,61, 72.
4, Fjmodor Dc~stoelirskj?~ ?he B~.ot;t-Jers Kararnazo~~ trans. Collsta~lceGari~ett
(New York: Norton, X 9761, p. 97.
5. Itobert Lauiis Srevcnsan, Y79e Stra~tqeCnse of 131.: JgkyII and HjtcZe
(LR~ndon:Folio Societ!r, 19481, p, 124,
6, Ibid., p. 127.
7. Ibid., p. 146.
S, Ibid., pp, 1 2 4 1 2 5 ,
9. Rt~rn,7:15 , 18 b-li 9 New Xteviscd Standard Versiotl. Paul7$lfamerltatior~
should be read in context: See Ram, 7:15--20,
10. Arlgt~stine,Confessions, 8.5.11).
X X . Herman hlelvtl'le, fJz"ck, eds. H, Hayford and H. Parker (New
York: W, W. Nortor-1, 1'367). For a. cfisctxssio~lof this vision of life, see Henry
A, Myers, Tg*g~~dy: A View ~f-'Lfc(Itl~aca:C:ori~eil University Press, l BSd),
pp. 57-77, and Echard Sewall, The Visiun of T$#g~edy (New Haven: Yale
IZniversiq3 X959), pp. 92-1 05.
12. li~Ct~rig Wittgenstein, ?kactnt$is Lo~z'cn-l-"hz'lmopk~z'c~s, trails. D, F.
Pears and R. F, McGrtix~ness(London: Rcjudecige 8. Kegaxl PauX, X97X),
prol1oskion 6.43lX, p. 147'.
13. H. F, Lovelf C:ocks, By Egi&ljAhlalze ( h n d o n : Tame? CCkarke, 1943), p. 55.
X 4, T. S . Eliot-, ,Wu$edepcZ'Y~ Ca$bedfp~l: "Oc Chf%plet:~ Poems (New Yc~rk:
Harco~rrr,Brace, 19521, p. 180.
15. Such rritatters are disc~~ssed in John Itoliiker, Probie~~s of SzgJir~i~2.~;P%
RlirIi~Zons(~-8hcWofeld(Cambridge: Cambridge U~~iversiry Press, X 970).
16. Peter Berger, lfhe Snc~vdCanopy (New liorlc: Doublcda); X967), pp,
53-54.
X 7 . hiorrow, ""Evil," p 551.
18, In response, same Christians hold that believers may instead argtle
that they do lot need a theobicy. A ~~t~t-rlber of approaches are possible here,
For examplle, a believer may argue that S~IICC the problem of evil does not
co~~clusivcly disprove her position, she need nor answer it. Or a believer may
argue that she has c ~ n v i ~ l c iproc~f
l ~ g of Gc)Cf7sexistence on other grounds
and l-rence that she knows the problem of evil must have some answer. She
may even say that t ~ e rbelief in God is so basic that it supersedes efforts to
prove or disprove it. Tlzls line of tho~xghtis discussed in Chapter 4.
However, it is fair to say that there are differing opinions about whether
any way of avoiding the problem of evil can be cornhrtabfy accepted. After
all, Christian theis111 p ~ ~ r p o rto t s explain relevant feattlrcs of huxnall exis-
tence, brrt evil does slot seem to fit well into the expfanation. Therefore,
there is at feast a prima facie case that the Christian theist must make good
her clairn by addressing the prablcrn of evil.
19, T. W, Settle, ""A Prc~lcgomenonto Intellectudly Honest ~ ~ l ~ e c ~ ~ c ~
Phz'lnsr,phical Fo~*zrlm1 ( 1978): X 36-1 40.
20. Tf'hor Hall, """Theadicyas a Test of the XZeasonablc17tess of rrhealog3'?
i;rzL f e 4 3 (1974): 204.
R~iz8icrf.l.
21. FViltiam Rowe, ""Evil and the 'Theistic Hypothesis: *AL R ~ S P O I It oS ~
kvjrksrra," h8gf*natiuv2atJ ~ ~ u a pJbr ~ a 12bilnsophy
t nfRel@Zon it 6 ( 1984): 95.
22. Da~lielHoward-Snyder distinguishes bet't.\reen the ""poblem of evil"
and the ""argurnexlt: from evil" hi1.1his edited vofrrme T%aE~idertt.z"alrl~ume~t.8
j?om Epil (Ufooxnington: Indiana. Ux-rivcrsiy Xzrcss, X 996), pp. XI-XIX.
23, For a disc~-rssionof most of the major issues related to jiihether there
are rational grounds fbr beiievixlg in God, see Michaet Petersoxl, FViIliam
EIasker, Uruce Reict~cx~bach, and David Basingcr, IZeaso~i!a n d ReIigioz6s Be-
Ziefi Ia~rod%ctiu~t ;t-o ithe Pi?z'lusnpk3y c?f"Relvicrfz,2nd ed, ( N e w York: Oxford
University Press, 1998).
24. Hans KGng, 61*tB P ~ aBCjhri~tz'g~z, ~ trans. Edward Qrrinn (Garden
City>N.Y.: Doublednj?, 1974), p, 432.
25. David Hurne, Dialr~ailicsC u n c e r n i ~ iNg~ural ~ Reli~z'ort,cited in
Michael L. Xzetcrson, ed., 279~12g#oblemof Evil: Selected Readin:&$(Notrc
Darrite, Ind,: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992),p. 42.
26. Afvin Planti~lga,G d , Fffig~dom~ alzd E ~ i (Grand
l k~pids,Mich,: Eerd-
mans, 1977)),p. SO.
27, J o h ~ lHick, E ~ z ' and
l $he Chd @'Love, re\: ed. (Xew k r k : Harper &
Rtxv, 1975), p. 12,
28. Edward Maddell and 13cerer Hare, Evil nlizd ithe C o ~ c e puf'CT"od t (Spring-
Geld, Ilt.: Charles C, Tltomas, 1968), p. 6.
29. Hrrrne quoted in peters or^, ed., " I e Paeoktbm of Evil, p, 4 1.
30. Willam Blakcc, ""'l'lze Tyger," lfhe firtable B l ~ k e ,ed. AIkcd k z i n
(New York: Viki11g Press, 19681, p, 109,
3l . IDostoevsky, B~~oghefps IC&3fiamk7t2~)27, pp, 224-225,
Suggested Readings
16 Yl2e 12robigm oj'Evbl and 12hilnsophy ofRel@Zon
Davis, Stepbeill 'I". "Why Did This Happen to h%eZ-The Patieilt as a

P I I ~ ~ O S O ~ ~Patz"~~~e$o~%)n B Z . E ~ ~ 65
C T , ' ' Scrnip.~na.j) ~ L I( 1972):
: $ ~ 61-67.
FIiek, lot11-t. "The 1%roblemof E-\7il." "1x7. Y%e E~zcyclopediaoj'12hilosop13j~.Edited
by Paul Edivards, New York: Maen~illanand Free Press, 1967, pp.
X 36-1 41.
Hume, L3avid. L>z'ala~$~es (Iloncer~zk~z~Ngt.zza.nl Reli8ion. Parts 10 and l l .
Edited by H. IT,Aiken. New York: Hafner P~xblisbing,1955.
Lcwis, 6, S, "E58Patoktleutz c$'P~ain, New Vc>rk:Macmittan, X 962.
Macktsh, Arct~ibald.1.B. Boston: FIougbton Miffliin, 1986.
h%elville,Hermarr, ~W~by-Dich, Edited by H, Hayford and Hershet Parker,
New York: W, W, Norton, 1967.
13cctersan, Michael L,, eb. If79e 13~coblemof Evil: Selecgcd R e a d i ? ; ~ ~Notrc ,
Dai~le,Ind,: University of Notre Dat-rite Press, 1992.
Pike, Nelson, ed. CTIOd ~ a l ~ EPZI:n! R~ndZplt~s OIEt^h& 29;JeolrgicalP~~oblem of-E~zlt,
E n g j c ~ ~ o oClttffs,
d N .l.: X%rei?tlce-Hall, 1964.
Wiesel, Elie. N@b$.rlI"rarrslatedby Stella Rodi+?a~r. New Uork: Bailtarn Books,
X 960.
. Y79e 2 k i d of God. Trmnslatcd by Marian Wicsel . Ncw York: Schoclccl~
Books, 1979,
The Logical Problem o f Evi
The problem of evil has both theoretical and existential dimensions.

The theoretical problerns deal with logical and epistcmic reladonships
bcmeen propositions about God and evil. The existential dimension
of thc problcm pertains t o one's deeply personal response to evil and
overall sellse of the \north of human existence. Leavillg discussioil of
the existential probleln until Chapter 7, I devote the interveiling
chapters t o three important statelnents of the theoretical problem.
During the 1970s and 1 9 8 0 ~ philosophers
~ calnr to make a distinc-
tion between two broad b~ersionsof the theoretical problem. The log-
ical problem revolves around the question of consistency alnong key
theistic propositions. The evidential problcm involves evaluating
propositions about God in terms of the facts of evil. I discuss two
ways of advancing the evidential proble~llin Chapters 4 and 5. Here I
focus on the classic logical probleln of evil.
Statement of the Problem

The logical problem of evil (also called the a priori problem and the
deductive problem) arises on the basis of an alleged inconsistencjr be-
meen certain clai~xsabout God and certain clailns about evil.1 His-
torically, thc discussion of this problem has developed as critics at-
tempt to expose an inconsistenc)~among theistic beliefs and theistic
philosophers attempt to show j4rh.hy there is n o inconsistency.
Oxford philosopher J. L. Mackie sums up the atheistic challmge:
"Here it can be shobnn, not that religious beliefs lack ratioilal support,
but that they are positively irrational, that several parts of the essential
theological doctrine are illconsistent with one allother."2 Si~lcebeillg
logically consistent is necessary for a set of beliefs t o be rational,
Mackie's charge is very serious. Mackie clearly and forcefully states
the logical problem: "In its simplest form the problem is this: God is
omnipotent; God is ~vhollygood; and yet evil exists. There serlns to
be some contradiction bemecn thesc thrcc propositions, so that if
any hvo of them wcrc true the third would be false. But at thc salllc
time all thrcc arc essential parts of ixost theological positions; thc thc-
olo@an, it seems, at once 1 ~ ~ ladhere
s t and calznot cufzsirtently adhere
to all three."3
If Mackie and other critics are right, then the dilemma facing the
theist is whether to retain his theistic position and the propositions
that constitute it (and thus be saddled with a contradiction) or m re-
lincluish one or more of the relevallt yroyositions (and thereby escape
the contradiction). To el-nbracc a contradiction is irrational, but to
surrender any kcy theistic bclicf is to abandon standard thcism.
Two centuries ago, David H t m c (following Epicurus) poscd the
difficulty with stark clarity: "Is [God] \villiilg to prevellt evil, but not
able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not uilling! Then he is
malevolmt. Is he both able and willing? Whellce then is evil?"")r
consider H. J. McCloskry's succinct statement: "The problem of evil
is a very simple one to state. There is evil in the ~vorld;pet the ~vorld
is said to be the creation of a good and omnipotent God. How is this
possible? Surely a good omnipotent God would have made a world
&cc of evil of any kind."Vilnilar expressions of the logical problem
arc abtxndant in the philosophical literature.
If we isolate for closer inspection the propositions that critics com-
monly have in mind, we get the following list of propositions:
( 1 ) God exis&;
(2) God is all-powerful;
(3) God is all-good;
(4) God is all-knoiving;
(5) Evil exists.
The set of beliefs ( 1)-(4) is what Kowe calls "restricted theism," a po-
sitioil that the theist, by jrirtue of being a theist, lnust accept. How-
ever, the ypical theist also accepts (5) as an element in his overall po-
sition. The critic, then, maintains that the set (1)-(5) is logically
ir1consistetlt.
The Structure and Strategy of the ent
Before embarking on a complete discussion of the logical argument
from evil, it is helpful to review the general concept of inconsistency or
contvadictiun.6 Actually, there are seveml types of contradiction to
consider. One type is a certain kind of proposition---a conjunctive
proposition in ~vhichone conjunct is the denial or negation of the
other conjunct. Consider the following proposition:
( 6 ) Socrates is mortal, and i t is false that Socrates is mortal.
The first conjunct (Socrates is mortal) and the second conjunct (it is
false that Socrates is mt~rtal)car111ot both be true. WI-tat we have here
is an explicit contmdiction.
Thc bwoblclll, of course, is that one who asserts a contradiction
cannot be advancing a position that is cornblletcly truce By mctl~ods
found in any elesnentary text on logic, wc can know that a contra-
diction is a proposition that is necessarily false. Interestingly, k~lo\ving
the actual truth or falsity of the conjuncts in a contradictory proposi-
tion is not required in order to know that it suffers from incon-
sistencjc Presumably>few people commit such flagrant errors in think-
ing,
Mackit: speaks of a set of theistic propositions being inconsistent or
containing a contradiction. Rut what does it illcan for a set t o be in-
consistent or contradictory? WC may say that a set of propositions is
explicitly contradictory if one of the mcillbers is the denial or ncga-
tion of allother member. For example, consider the follo~ingset:
(7) Socrates is mortal

( 8 ) it is false that Socrates is mortal.
By conjoining these two propositions, we get: the familiar contradic-

tion (6). A sct from which such a contradiction can bc gcncratcd is
explicitly contradictory in the scnsc in. qtrestion,
In Illany cases, howc\rcr, a sct of propositions is contradictory but
the colltradiction is not obvious, not explicit. In these more difficult
instances, the charge of inconsistency can still be made to stick if ordi-
nary rules of formal logic can be used to deduce a contradictioll.7
Let us develop an example to show how this works. Call the follo\\~-
ing set: A:
(9) If ali snen are mortal, then Socrates is mortal
( 10) All men are mortal
(8) Tt is hlse that Socrates is mortal.
Using the logical rule morlgs punens (if p, then q; p; therefore g), we
can deduce
(7) Socrates is mortal
from (9) and (10). Proposition ( 7 )is logically inconsistent with (8).
Since it is not possible for propositions (7) and (8) both t o be true at
the salnr time; the set from which they are drawn is contradictory. We
shall say that set A is fbrmally contmdictory because we can deduce an
explicit contradiction from its member propositions by the laws of
formal logic.
Admittedly, this cxamplc of an inconsistent set of propositions is a
simplified one; seldom do such easy cascs occur in ordinary lifc. In
fact, the propositions that form an inconsistency in an opponent's po-
sition are sometimes not stated at a l , So, the critic is faced witl-1 the
double task of first producing all of the rrlrvallt unstated propositions
and then drawi~jgout the contradiction from the fully articulated po-
sition. In such cases, the sets of propositions in question are implicit4
contradictory.
For a third cxamplc, let us reflect on the following propositions as
forming an implicitly contradictory set:
( 1 1) Socrates is older than Plato

( 12) 131atois older than Aristotle
( 15) Socrates is not older than Aristotle.
This set-jvhich I will designate s not explicitly contradictory; it

is also not forlnallp contradictory. We cannot use the laws of logic to
deducc thc denial of any of these propositions fro~xthe others. Yet
there is an important sensc in which set B is inconsisrcnt or contradic-
tory. That is, it is not possiltle that its three members arc all true.
i [ y that
Now, it is ~ e c e s s ~ ~ r$rpzte
( 14) If Socrates is older than Plato, and Pfato is older than Aris-
totle, then Socrates is older than Aristotle.
If we add (14) to B, \W get a set that is formally coimadictory Employ-
ing the laws of formal logic, (1I), (12), and (14)yield the denial of (13).
Now we have succeeded in lnaking the i~nplicitcontradiction explicit.
WC were able to deduce the cotltradiction in this set because we
employed an additional proposition that is necessari!y truc. There are
actually different varieties of necessary truth. The truth of solxe
bwopositions----such as (15) below----can be established by the laws of
logic alone.
( 15) If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates
is mortal.
This expresses a truth of logic. Yet the truths of arithmetic and math-
ematics generally are also necessarily true, such as
Furthermore, there are Inany propositiolls that are neither truths of

logic nor truths of lnathematics but are noiletheless llecessarily true,
such as (14). A few more examples of this type of necessary truth
would be
(17) Bachelors arc unmarf-lcd males

( 1X ) Blue is a color
( 19) No numbers are horses.
Let us call the type of necessity with which we are dealing here
bt~oadlylogical necessity. There is a correlative kisld of possibility as
well: A proposition p is possibly true (in the broadly logical sense) just
in case its negation or denial is not necessarily true (in that same
broadly logical sense).
Necessity and possibility in the broadly logical sense lnust be distin-
guished from another scnse of necessity and possibility. That other
sense is cngml!or ~agggffialnecessiq?and possibiliq. Fur instance,
(20) Michael Jordan has lcapt over the Sears Tower.
is a propositiosl that is possibly true in our sense of broadly logical

possibility. Yet in the sense of causal or natural possibility, it is not
possible at all. Human beings-ejren great athletesjust d o not have
the physical endo\\rments required for such a feat. There are a number
of propositions, furthermore, about which it is difficult t o say
whether they are or are not possible in the broadly logical sense, thus
giving rise to philosophical controversy. For example, is it possible for
a person to exist in a disembodied state?
Without attempting to S C M ~thc more subtle philosophical yrob-
lcins lurking in this area, we now arc in a good position t o define
what it mealls for a set of propositio~lsto be ivnplicitly cuntlpadictory:
A set S of propositions is implicitly contradictory if there is a neces-
sary proposition p such that the conjunction of p with S is a formally
contradictory set. Alternatively, we might say: S is implicitly contra-
dictory if there is some necessarily true proposition p such that by us-
ing just the laws of logic, we can deduce an explicit contradiction
froix p together with the mcmbcrs of S.
Now that wc have defined thc concept of implicit contradiction, we
arc in a position to understand how Mackic frames up the logical ar-
gumellt from evil. His atheistic challenge is esselltiallp that theism is a
system of inconsistent beliet5-hat is, that a coiltradiction can be de-
rived from central theistic propositions about God and evil. Hobnever,
the contradiction is not an explicit one. In addition, it does not ap-
pear that a formal contradiction can be deduced from basic theistic
propositions. So, Mackir and other critics who make this argument
arc faccd with the task of supplementing the basic propositions of
theism with one or more necessary truths in order to deduce thc fjtal
contradiction. In fact, Mackie's strategy is t o speci5 additional
propositions that relate to the meanings of key terlns used in the orig-
inal set of theistic propositions:
The contradiction does not arise immediately; to S ~ O L Vit we 12eed some
additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-logical rules ctzrlnecting the
terms ""gad," "evil," and ""oxnnipotel~t.""l'lze additional principles arc
that good is opposed to evil, in ssrch a way that a good thing always
etimir~at-esevil as far as it can, and that there arc no fixnits to \%?hat:an
olnlliyatcnt thing can do, Froxn these it follows that a goad olnlliyatcnt
thing elimi~latesevil completely>and then the propositions that a good
omnipotent- ttting exists, and that evil exists, are ir~compatibte,"
Here we have Mackie's %.ay of generating the contradiction.

In the vigorous debate that surrounded the logical problem, critics
tppically used supplemental propositions from the following list:
(1') God is a real being independent from the world
(2') An omnipotent being can bring about any logically possi-
ble state. of affairs
(3') A wholly good being is opposed to evil and tries to elimi-
nate it as far as it can.
(4') An omniscient being knows everything that it is logically
possible to know
(5') The existence of evil is not logically necessary.
One can readily see how each proposition here defines or extends the
meanings of cemal theistic claims. The atheistic critic maintains that
propositions such as these, together with the original set of theistic
propositions, generate a conaadiction. Other supplemental proposi-
tions become relevmt as we consider the se-verd dilslfinct versions of
the logical problem.
Versions of the Logical ent

The atheistic critic's basic suategy is to demonsuate how the essenrial
theistic claims are implicitly conuadictory. And these critics have not
differed significantly over the set of theistic claims that contains the
conuadiction. As we saw above, the following set is gequently cited:
(1) God exists;

(2) God is omnipotent;
(3) God is omniscient;
(4) God is wholly good.
(5) Evil exists.
For brevity and clarity, let us abbreviate the theistic position expressed
by propositions ( 1)-(4)in one complex proposition:
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists.
Any question about (G) is equivalent, then, to a question about one

or more of the propositions that are incotporated into it. Our subse-
quent analysis will focus on the issue between those atheists who ad-
vance the charge of inconsistency and those theists who refuse to give
up (G) or any of its constituent propositions in order to escape the
charge. Such defenders qualify as true the is^, whereas those who re-
linquish or modiQ (G) are actually quasi-theists' whom we shall dis-
cuss in Chapter 6.
Actualllr, there are three distinct versions of the logical problem of
evil, with each version being determined bp exactly which proposition
about evil i t employs. As we have srm, man!, critics (Hume, Mackie,
McCloskcy, and others) takc the belief in the existence of evil---ex-
pressed in proposition (5) above---to form an inconsistent set when
conjoincd with set (1 )-(4). And clearly, this formulation of the prob-
lem has been the most ~ridelydiscussed. Hobnever, other critics do
not believe that the incoilsistency arises \vhen some proposition about
the sheer existence of evil is added to the set of propositions (1)-(4).
Instead, they hold that the Inore ilnportant logical problem of evil is
formed by adding to (1)-(4) some proposition about the great extent
and prohsion of evil. Plantinga recognizes that this second formula-
tion of the problem is open to the critic who ~vouldsay that "God's
existence is not consistmt with thc vast naguz-zRt and an.ie$y of moral
evil the universe actually contains."'Q A tllird version of the logical
problem, a version that does not focus either on the sheer existence of
evil or on its profusion, has been raised by a few critics. Terence
Penelhum, for example, insists that "it is logically i~lconsiste~lt for a
theist to adrnit the existence of a pointless evil."" The critic raising
this version of the logical argument assumes that the theist believes
both that God exists and that pointless evil exists.
WC may now distinguish threc versions of the logical argument
fro111 cvil, depending on ~vhichproblelnatic belief about evil the critic
attributes to theism. The critic can fommulate an argument t o the ef-
fect that (G) is inconsistent with any one of the three propositioils be-
low:
(EI) Evil exists;

(Ez)Largc amounts, cxtrcmc kinds, and perplexing distfihrx-
tions of evil exist;
(E3) Gratuitrstrs or pointless evil exists.
When conjoined with (G), each of the prcccding propositions detcr-

lnilles a different forsnulatioil or jrersion of the logical problem.
Let us develop a helpful taroilolnp of the logical problem, as pre-
sented in Figure 2.1. All three versions of this argtlsnrnt here are ex-
actly the same in having a purely deductive structure and a strategy of
deriving an implicit contradiction.
FIGIJW 2.1 Versions of the Logical Argtlmel-tt koxn Evil
I I1 111
Since Versioll I is clearly the most influential a ~ most

d btidely discussed
formulation, we shall treat it as the paradiglnatic jrersion of the logical
problem of evil and give it close attention. Besides, most of the analysis
of Version I applies mutatis rnutandis to Versions II and III.
The esserlce of Version X is that the theist believes in the existex~ce
and relevant perfections of God, on the one hand, and that therc is
evil, on the other. Tbc atheistic critic ~~ndcntands this set of beliefs to
be implicitly contradictory. Casting the diffic~~lty in tcrllls of the prc-
cise propositions in\rol\red, we have the follobving logical situation.
The theist is officially committed to
(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists
as well as to
(E, ) Evil exists.
Ho~lrever,it appears to the atheistic critic that propositioll ( G ) ,when

supplemented by the appropriate necessary propositions, entails
(-EL) Evil does not exist.
Now i f (G) does entail (-EL), then the theist is unwittingly commit-
ted to both (El) and (-El). This means that his beliefs arc inconsis-
tent because both (El) and (-El) figurc into his theological position.
In order t o vindicate himself rationally>the theist must clarify and rcc-
ollcilr the propositio~lsthat supposedly generate the contradiction.
It is comlnonlp ageed that the alleged contradiction is not immc-
diately forthcolning from propositions (G) and (E,). So, the critic
must invoke the strategy previously explained for exposing ilnplicit
contradictions-that is, she must add certain propositions to (G) and
26 The Logical Problem of Evil
(El). Let us review a representative selection of auxiliary propositions

often cited by the atheistic critic:
( 1.1) God is a real being transcendent from the world

(2.1) God can bring about any logically possible state of affairs,
including the elimination of evil
(3.1) God kno\vs everything that it is possible to know, includ-
ing how to eliminate evil
(4.1) God always seeks to promote good and eliminate evil
(5.1) The existence of evil is not a logically necessary state of
affairs.
Now, from (G), together with (1.1)-(5.1), it follows that
(-El) Evil does not exist,
a conclusion that clearly contradicts (El). At this point, the atheist

seems t o have made good her charge of inconsistency by deriving
fiom the theist's position two logically incompatible propositions:
(El) and (-El). Obviously, by the law of noncontradiction, these nvo
propositions cannot both be true at the same time and in the same
sense. Hence, anyone holding both propositions is irrational.
The reasoning behind this indictment is not hard to grasp and re-
sembles the third example above, in which unstated belief (14) had t o
be supplied in order t o set up the contradiction. Theists say that God
exists and has a definite character. It is natural to presume that God's
character can be used as a basis for explaining (and perhaps predict-
ing) his actions, even actions related to evil in the world. For present
purposes, this means that the terms in proposition (G) have specifi-
able meanings that can be delineated in additional propositions such
as (1.l)-(4.1). Furthermore, there is no logical necessity that evil ex-
ist, as indicated by (5.1). From (G) together with (1.1 )-(5. l), it is a
fairly elementary exercise in deductive logic t o derive
(-El) Evil does not exist.
Yet evil does exist, and its existence is recognized by the typical theist:
(El) Evil exists.

The classical logical problem as rrpresellted by Version I is thus
forged. This is the kind of case that Macke and many other atheistic
critics articulate.
Other propositions would have to be stated in order to forge Ver-
sions II and III. For instance, a proposition much like the folloiving
~vouldbe needed in Version 11:
(4.2) God" ggodness wodd scck to prcvent or eliminate large

amounts, extrelne kinds, and perplexing distributions of
evil.
Something like
(4.3) God's goodness would not allow gratuitous or pointless

evil to exist.
would be needed to articulate f ~ ~ lVcrsion

ly III. But wc need not pur-
sue discussion of these versions here. The strategy is the same for all
jrersions of the logical problem of evil. The atheistic critic derives a
contradiction from a set of propositions that the theist allegedly ac-
cepts. How shall the theist respond?
The Burden of Proof

In assessing the state of thc debate bemecn the theist and the atheis-
tic critic, it is helpful t o rcvicw how the logical problem of evil devel-
ops. The theist holds a set of beliefs, and the critic claims that they are
inconsistent. This places the initial burden on the critic t o state the
inconsistency, to drakv it out, to make it obirious. The critic's stratem
then, is to attempt to generate a contradiction h m a designated set
of the theist's own beliefs. Otherwise, i t ~vouldnot be possible to
make the accusation that the theist" belie& are incot~sisterltstick,
Once the critic has made the opening fora): thc theist illust respond
by showing what is wrong with thc critic's case.
Consider Version I of the logical problem of evil, which we have
chosen as a no del. Here the critic maintains that the theist holds con-
tradictory beliefs, (G) and (E,). In order t o bring this contradiction
to light, the critic lnust show that (G) ultimately entails (-E,). If the
critic can do this, she will thereby show that the theist's position in-
volves both ( E l ) and (--h), the belief that e ~ iexists
l as well as the be-
lief that evil does not exist. This is a plaill contradiction. For Version
II, the critic's strategy would be similar. She ~vouldneed to deduce
two propositions from theistic commitments: one stating that there
are amountc, kinds, and clistributions of ez5l that God \;vould not al-
low and onc indicating that those amounts, kinds, and distt-ib~ltions
exist. This ~vouldconstitutc a contradiction, For Version 111, thc re-
quired atheistic strategy is now quite familiar. It must be proved that
the theist is commitred to the belief that God bvould not a11014 rratu-
l to the belief that gratuitous evil exists-again, n ~ con-
itous e ~ i and o
tradictory beliefq.
The significance of the charge of logical inconsistency is not diffi-
cult to comprehend. Two propositions that are inconsistent cannot
both be true at the sarne tixl~eand in the sarne sense, such as
(2f ) &nt is a grcat philosopher
and
(22) It is not the case that Kant is a great philosopher.
Any position involving such a contradiction, then, cannot be ~vhollp

true, In the issue over God and evil, the critic decZares that it is not
possible for both (G) and some (E)-like proposition t o bc true and
yet that, on sorne grounds or other, the theist is committed to both.
Although the burden of deducing a contradiction from thcistic be-
liefs rests squarely on the shoulders of the atheistic critic, Alvin Planti-
nga has correctly stated the coilditions that any critic lnust meet: "To
lnake good his claim the atheologian must proiride some proposition
which is either necessarily true, or essential to theism, or a logical
consequences of such propositions."'z Clearly, there is no logical
problem for the theist if he is not committed to each proposition in
the set or if the set does not rrrally entail a contradiczion. If the critic
uses an additional proposition. that is necessarily true, then the theist
must accept it because it ixust be accepted by all rational people. If
the additional propositioll is esse~ltialto any theistic position, then
the theist must accept it by virtue of beillg a theist. And of course, the
theist lnust accept any logical callsequence of his propositions as well.
The critic's aim is to show that it is not possible that both (G) and
(El ) be true. If she can come up with an additional proposition
set of propositioilsthat the theist must accept and derij~ea contra-
diction froin it together with the other relevant theistic propositions,
the theist is in serious trouble. Theistic defenders, such as Plantinga,
maintain that i t is enormously difficult to come up with a proposition
that meets the conditions of being necessarily true, essential to the-
ism, or a logical consequence of such propositions. On these grounds
alone, theists illay argklc that it is far from clcar that it is not possible
for both ( G )and (EI) to be truc.
Exteilding the theistic respoilse further, Plailtinga pioileered a
method for showing that it is possible for both (G) and (E,) to be
true-a method that can presumably be used against the charge of in-
consistency aimed at (G) and any (E)-like proposition. Succeeding at
this task is equivalent to denpil~gthe claim made by Mackie and oth-
ers that i t is not possible for both (G) and (El) to be true. According
to Plantinga, the theist need not show that both propositions are in
fact true in order to rebut the critic's charge. Rebutting the charge of
inconsistency relies on making some fine distinctions in the meanings
of key theistic terlns (e.g., omnipotence) and then on supplying addi-
tioilal propositions that reflect a possible ullderstal~dil~g of a theistic
worldview. These maneuvers directly challenge the critic's auxiliary
definitions and thus block her ability to deduce a contradiction from
theistic beliefs.
In Chapter 3, I elnbark on a hll-scale discussioll of what l'lantinga
and other theists have done to defend against Version I of the logical
problem of cvil. I particularly focus on a conteinporary theistic rc-
span" "own as thc Frce Will Dcfense, which has already become clas-
sic, Ho~ve\ier,1 will first bliefly rehearse some of the basic mows that
theists can make to defend against Versions 11 and 111, although these
versions, ulllike Versioll I, have not attracted widespread interest.
In addressing the challenge posed bp Version II, theists have lnain-
tained that critics have not successfully shown belief in God to imply
that he would limit the evil in the world to manageable amounts,
kinds, and distributions. Theists can construe divine goodness,
power, and knowrlcdgc. as ablc to allow very large ai-nounts, extreme
kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil. God ~xightdo this for a
number of different reasons: for example, to preserj7ea wide range of
free humall choices or to allow the regular operation of impersoilal
natural objects. Theists taking this line in effect argue that they need
not accept some of the additional propositions that critics use to de-
duce a contradiction from key theistic beliefs. So, i t is not clear that
critics can establish that theists hold beliefs that imply both that God
limits the amounts, kinds, and distributions of evil and that those lim-
its have bee11exceeded.
Theists who respond to Version III grapple with the charge that
they are committed to the yroposition that God would not allow gra-
tuitous evil, as ~ve11as the proposition that gratuitous evil exists. The
working assumption of the atheistic critic here is that theism recog-
nizes the existence of very sc\lerc evils as long as they havc some point
or meaning. Ho~vejrer,certain stock responses suffice to refute the
critic's formulation for Versioil 111. Thc theist can take a wry tradi-
tioilal approach and argue that he is not really com~nittedto (E,)-
that is, that he does not belieire that gratuitous or pointless evils exist.
He can argue that his position necessitates that all evils, no matter
how severe, must be meaningful or justified. Many theists understand
their position in prcciseIy this wily The theist who has this orientation
~llightevm venture some explanation or range of explanations dc-
signed to cover paidctxlarly troublesome evils. Some theists, however,
coilstrue their position differently and actually accept (E3).These the-
ists must take a different tack, then, in defellding agaillst Version III
of the logical problem. They can seek to point out that the additional
assumptiolls that the critic emplojrs to derive the contradiction-such
as (4.3)-are neither essential to theism nor necessariljr true. Since
this line of discussion is very rare in the philosophical literature on the
logical problem of evil, I will wait to analyze it fully ulltil Chapter 5,
where it surfaces in relation to the evidential problem.
We can now see that tbc issrzc before us turlls on the abiIiq of crit-
ics, on the one hand, to show that theists lnust accept all of the
propositions they use to drd~lcra contradiction and on the ability of
theists, on the other hand, to show that they need not accept all of
them. The only appropriate grounds for insisting that theists must ac-
cept the propositions are that they are either necessarily true, essential
to theism, o r a consequence of such propositions. Habring framed the
debate in this manner, I must note that an impressive number of crit-
ics have been convinced that serious logical difficulties exist for thc-
ism, and thcy havc labrlrcd vigorously to bring them to light. Like-
wise, there are a ll~zmberof theists who have taken seriously the
lnatter of logical inconsistency and have kvorked diligently to defelld
against such attacks. At present, there is a large consensus that theistic
maneuklers have been very effective and that the burden still rests on
the shoulders of the critic to produce the contradiction. In the next
chapter, I \\.ill turn t o the line of debate in the philosophical literature
that is \%idelpthought to support this sentiment.
Notes
X . 'The following works employ tttese differctlt labels for the problem:
Wlllialn XXmve, PhZ'10~0phyof R e l i ~ i o n :An Ipztf*p.odzaction(Encino and BeI-
mont, Caiif.: nickenson, 1978), pp. 80-86; Micl-rael L. Peterson, ""Christian
Theism a11d rite Problem of I:xri.il,'"fozjs~nnl @'$beE ~ n ~ g e f i c 'gf bl c o l f ~ i c gSl~ c k -
eo! 21 (1978): 3 5 4 6 ; and Nvin Plantia-tga, God and OtIi"ef# rtli~cds:A St$641!of
ithe Ratzonnl J%sr~ific~c.zlon of' Belzef in C7'0d (Ithaca: Gi~rnellU~liversirjrPress,
X 967), p* 128.
2.1. L. Markie, ""Eil ilalld Oxnnipotexlrce," Mind64 (1955): 200.
3, Ibid.
4. David Hurne, Dialoggggs Cr~nce~~i.tz'~g8 Natzgral Rel&Z'on, ed. Henry ID.
Aike1-t (New York: Hafner, l04S>,p. 66.
5, H. J. McGloskey, "The Probient. of Evil," fizitr~~znl of Bible n~zdR e l z ~ b l r ~ ~
30 (1962): 187,
6. I will follow Xzlantinga3 discussion throughout this exposition. See his
<$od, F~*eadn~z$, and Evil (Grand bpids, Mich.: Eerdma~ls,1877), pp. 12-24.
7 . Ir~~ing, M, Copi and Car1 Cohen, I ~ ~ t ' ~ ~ o n ! ~ ~$0l .IJ[@ic)
i c r n IOgh Editiol-2
( El-tgje~~aod GM&, N. J .: 13rrcl-ttice-EIatl,1998), pp. 342-301 .
8.Mackie, LCE\ril and C31ltniipotence~"p. 2209,
9. This terminolou is borrot.crcd fiorn Edward hiladclell and Peter Hare,
Evil and the Concept. of Chd (Springfield, 111.: Charles G, 'rboxnas, 19681,
chap, 6, pp. 104-136.
10, Pla~~tinga, a d , Freedom, alzn! E ~ i l p,, 55, ,4ls0 see remarks in his 2 % ~
Natzlz~eeof Nece~ssir;y(Oxford: Clasendon Press, 19741, pp. 190-191 .
1l . Tere~~ce Penell~sznl,""Divir~eGoodness and the Problcnt. of Evil," ~ I I
Rrndz~tgsin thr: Philosophy oj' Re1biol.t: A n Artalyzic Approlach, ed. Kaructt.
Brody ( E n g j c ~ ~ a oCliffs,
d N.J. : Xzrea-ttlce-Hall,19741, p. 226.
12. Pla~~tinga, God n~zdOther Minds, p. 117.
Suggested Readings
Adarns, Marityn M,, and Rt1bet.t: M. Adams, The P$eoktlg~gof E ~ i l New . Vc3t.k:
Oxf-isrd Univtrrsiq 13rrcs, 1990.
fi-rern, N. B, 7be Problem ofE~z"l, New York: Sel-rockenBooks, 1971.
Feihet-g, John S. 'f bc M ~ PF- ~E X~oj-Evil:
S ?!leulo~icnlS;liic~cm$
a ~ z d$be PaeobEe~la
of Evil. 2nd ed. Grand Ibpids, Mict~.:Zondertran, 1994.
Fletv? h ~ t o n y"Divir~eCjmnipotence and Human Freedom," Hibbert Joszr-
% @ l 5 3(January t 955): X 35-144,
Gale, fichard, f h ithe Ngtz~.rg&and Ekis$~~zce (?f1<;od, Gat-rtbkdge: Cambridge
University Press, X 99 f .
Mackie, 1. I,. ""Eil and Omniporexlrce." Mind 64 (1955): 200.
. ""The Problem of Evil," h Inbe Mia~acbc?f' Thezfm. Oxford: CXaren-
don Press, 1982,
McClosltejr, H. J. CJod and E ~ i l Thc . Hagtlc: Martinus Nijhoff> 1974.
Peterst~n,Michaet . ""Evil and Inconsistency. " Lci~phin(A gst~*alia)18 (July
X 979):20-27.
13ectrsan, Michael L,, eb. 279e I3~@ob7lem of Evil: Selecgcd R e a d i ? ; ~Notrc
~,
Dai~le,Ind,: University of Notre Dat-rte Press, 1992.
Petersoil, Michael, Wiltiarn Hasker, Brrrce Keichenbach, and Davtcl Basinger,
IZeaso~i!and Reltgiozi Beliej An I7il?t~~odi?.l,cirz'01:~ to the 13hZ'Io~-ophj~
ofl<eIz"~ion,
2nd ed. N e w York: Clxford U~liversityPress, 1998, chap, 6, pp, 116-1455.
Plantinga, A h n . Chd grid mhefpMinds: A Stud31o f ~ h eR~k.$io'~nnlJz#s~z$~at:I:on
ofB~lz'cfirtGod. Itfiaca: Corncll Univtrrsiq Prcss, 1967.
. <;od, F~~~ednm, and E ~ i k Grand
. h p i d s , Micb .: Eerdma~ts,1977.
. "Irie Na1:2.trc~ f ' N e ~ e s sOxford:
i~, Glarelilrdorl Press, 1974,
. "Which Worlds Could God Have Created?" Jour~wlof1>kilosophy70
(1973): 539-552,
Keichenbaclt, Kruce. "The Dcducti\re Argtrment from Evil," '$clphi&( 2 ~ s -
tralz'n)20 (April 198l): 2 5 4 2 .
. E ~ it%nd
l n Chad C;od, N e w York: Fordhat-rt University Press, 1982.
The Function o f Defense
Just as we have classified the two major versions of the problem of evil
into the logical and cvidentini formulations, wc Exay also classi@ thc
WO illain responses to the problcill as dgf~.fenseand theodicy. The aim of
defense is to show that antithcistic arguments from evil----either logi-
cal or evidential-are not successful on their own terms. The gelleral
aim of theodicb by contrast, is to give positive, plausible reasons for
the cxiste~lceof evil in a theistic universe. Defensc has come to be tbc
theistic strategy most closely associated with discussions of the logical
formulation of the problem of evil, ~vhereastheodicp has come to be
associated with the evidential formulation. Much controversy has
arisen over the rclativc nced for defensc and thcodicp, and wc shall
latcr scc how thcsc differences play out in the litcraturc on God and
evii.
The Free Will Defense

The present task is to review and e~~aluate a very fascinating and in-
structii~epart of the debate over the logical problem. Taking Version
I of the logical problem of evil as a point of departure, Akin Plan-
tinga developed a response that has now come to be known as the
Frec Will Dcfensc. Plantinga's famous Frcc Will Dcfense was pro-
duced in both 1967 and 1974 rcnditions.Wincc the latcr rendition
exploits the most curreilt and sophisticated ideas in forlnal logic, I
uill use it as the basis for the present discussion.
As we have seen, philosophers such as J. L. Macke have charged
that it is logically inconsistent for a theist to believe that
and that
(E$) Evil exists.
This accusation is tantamount to claiming that it is not possible for

both propositions to be true together----that thc conjunction of (G)
and (E,) is necessarily false. The critics' strateg is to try to produce a
proposition that is at least plausibly thought to be llecessarily true and
whose conjunction wit11 our original two propositions formally yields
a contradiction. Defenders insist that critics have never produced a
plausible candidate for this role.
In fact, many theists through the centuries-perhaps inspired most
notably bp Augustine---have thought that thc theme of free will pro-
vides a basis for rejecting the critics' charge that God and evil arc in-
compatible. Although full discussion of St. Augustine's view of evil
appears in Chapter 6, 1 lnust note here his emphasis on di~rinelycre-
ated ti-ee \till: "If man is a good, and cannot act rightly uilless he wills
to do so, then he must have free will, j4rithout which he can not act
rightly. We must not believe that God gave us free will so that we
might sin, just because sin is committed through free \vil1."2 The
point is that our humanity is of great value and that free will is neces-
sary to our humanity. Hulxan beings have moral sig~~ificance bccausc
\VC have the ability to make choices that arc. morally right or Fvrong.
Yct God cannot give us the power t o make morally right choisxs
uithout givillg us the power to make morally wrong olles as well. So,
in order to have the good of humanity itself as well as the good
choices that humanity might make, God lnust perlnit evil. Many the-
ists through the centuries have found St. Augustine's reasoning on
this lnatter very compelling.
Alvin 131ar>tingais well known for applying this line of reasoning in
a very specific manner to the precise way in which the charge of in-
consistency was formulated. Against the logical problem, he crafls a
defense. Unlike Augustine's discussion, ~vhichaffirms the reality of
creaturelp free will, Plantinga's discussion turns on the pure logical
possibiliv of such. As Plantinga recognizes, the success of the defense
hinges on a certain understandillg of what is meant by a persolz's bei~zg
f k e with respect to alz acgion. For the Free Will Defender, if a person is
free with respect to an action, then he is free either to perform or to
refrain ~ o them action. No causal laws and alltecedent conditions de-
termine that he -will perform or not perform the action. In other
words, at the time in question, it is ~vithinthe person's power to per-
form the action and within his power to refrain from performing the
action. What it means for a person t o g o ,uroncQ ,pith respcct t o a morally
rignz$cant action is for it to be wrong for him to perform it and he
does or Fvrong for him not to and he does not.
According to Plantinga, a preliminary stateincnt of thc Frcc Will De-
feilse bvould go as follo~vs:A bvorld contailling significailtlp free crea-
tures (\\rho can freely choose benveen good a ~ evil) d is more Iraluable,
all other things being equal, than a world containing no free creatures
whatsoever, God, of course, can create free creatures, but then he can-
not caase or dctermilze that they only pelfor~uright actions. Doing this
would preempt their significant freedom. Hence, there is no way for
God to creatc creatures capable of moral good without thereby crcat-
ing crcaturcs capable of moral evil. Conversely, God cannot eliminate
thc possibility of moral evil without eliminating the possibiliw of moral
good. The fact, then, that some creatures have gone kzrong in the exer-
cise of their freedom since the dawn of creation does not count against
God's oln~lipotenceor goodness. Having gained a sellse of this per-
spcccive, we may now state the central claim of the Free Will Defensc:
I t is possible that God could not have created a universe containing
moral good (or a5 much moral good as this one contains) without cre-
al-ing onc containing moral cvil.
The Compatibilist Position

Critics, of course, are not ullfalniliar with the recurrillg theme of free
uill in ~nuchtheistic thought. h t o n y Flew and J. L. Mackie raised a
very important objection to the Free Will Dcfense that had to be met
before the defrnse could be totally effective. The objection rests on
the claim that it is logically possible that there could be a world con-
taining significantly frcc beings who always do what is right. Sincc
there is no contradiction or inconsistency in this claim, it lneans that
there arc possible worlds containing moral good but no moral evil.
Since God is omnipotent-and thus can briilg about any logically
possible state of affairsGod lnust be able to create a bvorld contain-
ing moral good but no lnoral evil. 111 other kvords, God lnight have
made people so that they always freely do the right thing. As Flew ex-
presses it, "If there is no contradiction here then Omnipotence might
have made a bnorld inhabited by bnhollp ~rirtuouspcople."3 If this is
sr], then, as Flew says, ""the Free Will Defense is brokell-backed," and
"\re are back again with the original intractable al~tinomy.""
Flew is not alone in voicing this line of reasoning. Mackie puts it
forthrightly:
If God has made men such that in their kee choices they sometii-rites
prefer wlitat. is good and sometimes \%?hatis evil, why could he 110t have
rnade rnen such that they always freely choose the goad? If tliere is n o
logical i~npossibilityitit a mail's seely choosing the good on one, or on
scverat occasions, there catlIlot be a logical impossibility in his freely
choosing the good on every occasion. God was not, then, hced with a
choice between nitakiilg innocent autoi-ritata and making beings who, in
actirlg freejy, \%rouIci sometimes go wro~lg:there \%?asopen t o ltirn the
obviously bctrcr possibiliy of making bei~lgswho would act k e l y b t ~ t
always g o right. Clearly, his failure t o avail l~imsetfof this possibility is
inconsistent- with his beillg both omnipotent and ~7hoXlygood."
The positio~lchalnpioncd here is known as compntibilism. It is the

view that keedonl and determinisnl-even divine detern~inism-are
compatible.
Put another Ivaj; the compatibilists' point is that the propositioll
( 2 3 ) God brings it about that human beings always choose what

is right
is logicaly consistent with the proposition
(24) humall beillgs have free choice.
This position directly opposes the Free Will Defense, which, as Ivr
have already seen, relies on an i~zcvnzpatibilistpositioll: the view that
( 2 3 )and (24) are logically inconsistent.
As wc would expect, the controversy behvccn Frce Will Defenders
and critics historically rcvolved aro~undthe issuc of how key concepts
such as omnipotence and free will should be understood. Although
the Free Will Defellder may agree with critics that a world in which
all persoils freely choose to do what is right is indeed a possible bnorld,
he seeks to qualifp our understandings of free will and omnipotence
in a Ivap that avoids the dilelnma presented bp the critic. Obviousll:
the critic here believes that an omnipotmt deity can create just any
logically possible ~rorldhe selects. A ~rhollygood deity kvould select
the bvorld that is best on the whole, a j4rc1rld that we bvould surely
deem to be one in which everyone freely does what is right. At this
point, we have come to the hotly contested claim that God could
have created any possible world he pleased.6 The defender counters
that God, though omnipotent, could not bme created just any possi-
ble world. At this point, WC must pause to consider how Frcc Will
Defenders have co~llcto frame the issue of free will and omnipotcncc
in terms of contemporarjl ideas about possible \vorlds.
The Incompatibilist Rejoinder

Since Plantinga is credited with first putting the Free Will Defense in
t c m s of thc logic of possible worlds, WC will consider his vindication
of incompatibilism.7 We may say that a possible world is a way things
could have been, a total possible state of affairs. Among states of af-
fairs, some are actual, and some are not. For example, the iCentz$clzy
Wildcats' bctei~wthe c c ~ a i n z z i nbasketball
~" teal@in NC:AA history is a
state of affairs, as is Abtpaham Li~zculn'sbctei~zgthe firrt presidcfzt of the
U ~ h Stntcs.
d However, the former is actual, whereas the latter is not.
Although the latter is not actual, it is still a possible state of affairs.
Possible states of affairs must be distinguished kom impossible ones,
and impossible ones ixust be further distinguished. Both Reth's hnv-
ing climbed Mt. E~crcstin five minutesfigt and John ir hnving squa~qd
thg circle arc impossible states of affdirs. The foriller is causally or nat-
urally impossible; the latter is impossible in the broadly logical sense.
A possible world, then, is a possible state of affairs in the sense that it
is possible in the broadly logical sense. Although a possible world is a
state of affairs, not every state of aftBirs is a possible world. To have the
status of a possible world, a state of affairs must be cvmplctc or maximdl.
Socgpatcs' having been executed by dnilzkilzg hemlock is a possible state of
affairs, but it is not complete or inclusive enough to be a possible world.
Cornplctcness must now bc defined. A statc of affairs S includes state of
affairs S' if is not possible that S obtain and S' fail to obtain. Like\yiselsc,
the colljunctive state of affairs S bat not S' is not possible. A state of af-
fairs Sprecl~desa ~ o t h estate
r of affairs S' if it is not possible that both ob-
tain. 111other words, S precl~4desS' if the colljul~ctivestate of affairs S
and S' is impossible. Now, a complete or maximal state of affairs-that
is, a possible ~vorld-is one that either includes or precludes every other
state of affairs. It should be obvious that exactly one possible world is
actual alld that at ~nostone possible world is actual.
Corresponding to each possible world W" there is a set of proposi-
tions that we may call the ltvob on W. A propositioll is in the boob on W
just in case that state of affairs to which it corresponds is included in
W. Wc ~xightexprcss this idea alternatively as follo~rs:A proposition
P is trup in a ~vorldW if and only if P a?o%ldh n v ~been trup if W had
been actzlal---if and only if it is not possible that W is actual and P is
false. The book on W, then, is the set of propositions true in W: Books,
like bnorlds, are ~naximalor complete. A book on a world is a maximal
consistent set of propositions. The additioll of just one propositio~lt o
it al\\raps yields an explicitly inconsistellt set. There is exactly one book
for each possible world.
Possible worlds possess some interesting features. For example, a
bwoposition p is possible if it is true in at lcast one world and impossi-
ble if truc in none. A proposition p is necessary if it is truc in all possi-
blc worlds. Another feature of possible tvorlds is that persons as wcll
as other thillgs exist in them. Clearls each of us exists in the actual
~rorld,but we also exist in a great man)! ~rorldsdistillct froln the ac-
tual twrld. These other twrlds are simply possible but unactual.8 To
say that something exists in a possible world means that it ~vouldhave
existed had that world been actuail,
As we begin to turn our thoughts back toward God's relation to pos-
sible ~vodds,tvc must notc that it \i\?orsldnot be technically propcr to
say that God clpenter any possible tvorlds or states of afiairs. What God
crcatcs are the heavens, the earth, and so forth. In performing such ac-
tions as creati~igthe heavens a ~ the d earth and all that they contain,
God brings about a multitude of states of affairs. For example, God
created Socrates, but he did not create the state of affairs colxisting in
Socrates' existence. Strictly speaking, we must say that God nctgnlizps a
state of affairs, such a5 the state of affairs consisting in Socrates' exis-
tence. Accuracy, then, demands that we speak of God as actgallzi~ga
possible tvorld, which is of coursc a total state of affairs."
After this brief explanation of key ideas rclatcd to the logic of possi-
bfc worlds, wc can now rcturn to our original q~lcscion:C;otrld Cud
have actualized just any possible ~rorldhe chose? The se~renteenth-
century Gerlnan philosopher Gottfried Leibniz believed that it is
uithin the scope of olnnipotence to bring about any possible t.orld.lO
Flew and Mackie, moreover, have already argued that there are possi-
ble worlds containing moral good but no moral evil. We know that
the books 011 such ~rorldsform eiltirely coilsistent sets of proposi-
tions. Furthermore, as Flew and Mackie insist, if divine omnipotence
can bring about any logically possible state of affairs, even a complete
possible world, then God must be able to bring about a world con-
taining lnoral good but n o moral evil. Thus, God can make people so
that they always freely do what is morally right.
The Free Will Dcfender rcsponds that it is not objrious that God,
though omnipotent, can bring about j ~ ~ any s t possible world he
pleases. Eve13 grailting that God is a ilecessary being (i.e., one that ex-
ists in every possible bnorld), not every possible world is such that
God can actualize it." In worlds in which the omnipotent God
chooses to create free persons, we must remember that the free ac-
tions of those persons cannot be determined by causal laws and an-
tecedent conditions. More broadly, if a person is free with respect to
an accion A, then God does not Itvi?g& it n l ~ u gor
t cgggse it ; ~ be
u the
that shc does A or refrains fro111 doing A. For if God byin&$ it ahoztt or
cags-rs it $0 be casrr in any manner ~vl~atsoever that thc pcrson eithcr
does A or does not d o A, then that persol1 is not really free.
Plantinga dubs Flew and Mackic's contelltion "Lribniz's Lapse." It
is the contention that
(25) God, if omnipotent, could have actualized just any possible

world he pleased.
The Free Will Defender claims to the contrary that the following is
possible :
(26) God is omnipotent, and it was not uithin his power to bring
about a world containing moral good but no inoral evil.
Plantinga takes for granted that God cannot actualize a state of affairs
including the existence of creatures who fi.eely take some action or
other; this wotald be ~ ~ ' r oactualization,
~cg He then considers lveak ac-
tualization, which is all the critic really needs for his casc. What is at
issue, then, is whether there is solncfhing God cotald have done, some
series of actions he could have takm, such that if he had, a given pos-
sible world W jvould have been actual. Lct is say that W contains
inoral good but no inoral evil.
To develop his case, Plantinga provides an argument based on the
peculiar behavior of counterfactual condidonals. Rehearsing Plan-
tinga's o~z.11
example, we may imagille Curley Smith, sometime ma)Tor
of Boston, who was offered a $35,000 bribe to allow a disputed free-
way to be constructed. Suppose he accepted. Now, ponder:
(27) If Curley had been offered $20,000, he would have ac-

ccptcd the bribe
and
(27.1) If Curley had been offered $20,000, he bvould have re-

jected the bribe.
Next, think of the possibk worlds that include the antecedent state of
affairs consisting in Cgulqy's bein8 offelfled $2620,000.Then think of two
possible ~vorlds,W and W", which arc exac~balike up to thc point in
time when Curley responds to the bribe offer. Lct us say that in U:
Crrrley acccps the bribc, and in kP, Curley does not. Le.t us call tfic
states of affairs shared by W and W* an initial world segment a1d even
suppose that God could actualize this initial world segment. If Curley
accepts the bribe, then God could ilot have actualized W*; if Curley re-
jects the bribe, then God could not have actualized W" So, there is a
possible world W* in which Curley does not go Ivrong with respect to
the bribe offer, but whether W* is actual was partly up to Curlep and
not completely up to God. Therefore, we have an instance of a possible
world- W*,in h i s casc-that God cotrld not have brought about.
Plantinga diagnoses Curley as suffering from what he calls trannvorld
depfpa~lity,a terrible malady. M e r defini~lgthe concept of an ilzdividg4al
nat8sre or esselzce as the set of all properties a person or thing possesses
in every possible world where he or it exists, Plantinga clainls that it is
possible that Curley's essence sufkrs from transworld depravity. He
states: "If an essence E suffers From trans~rorlddepravity, then it was
not within God's pokver to actualize a possible world W such that E
n t ~in W and al~j~gys
contains tile propertics i s f & ~ i ~ c afree does g?Itla$ is
r&bt in W."12 He then ventllres the further observation: It is possible
that every crcaturely ess~ncc-e\~ery esscncc, including the propert). of
being created by God ufkrs from trmsprorld depravity. From this, it
follo~rsthat it is possible that God could not have created a bvorld con-
taining moral good but 110 moral evil.
Now the Free Will Defender has made his case against the critics.
He has argued that, although there are possible worlds containillg
moral good but n o lnoral evil, it is not within God's power to bring
them about. Although W* is possible, it is nut possible for God to
bring it about. This establishes that the Free Will Defender's claim
that
(26) God is onnnipr~tent,and it was not ~vithinhis power to bfing

abo-bat a world containing moral good but no moral evil
is possible. Hence, Leibniz's L a p s e t h e claim that God, if omnipo-

tent, can create any possible kvorld-is false. The critic's case fails.
Theism has been defended.
Fundamental to the Free Will Defender" scase, of course, is a cer-
tain understanding of the metaphysics of eeedom and its relation to
divine omnipotmce.l3 Theists who have an incomyatibilist ul~der-
standing of this matter can then defend theisin bp arguing that bring-
ing about a ~vorlcfeontaini~lgmoral good but no moral evil is a coop-
eratijre venture. It rcquircs thc uncocrccd concurrence of significantly
free creatures; it is not up to God alone. The power of an olnilipote~lt
God is limited by the frredoln he confers upon his creatures, given
that he chooses to create free creatures at all.
The Cwrent State of the Debate

It is now widely acknokvlcdgcd that the Frcc Will Defcnse adequately
rebuts the logical problem of evil. As it has turned out, athcistic crit-
ics made their best case that the theistic belief3
and
(E$) Evil exists
arc inconsistent. Theistic defenders----i\lvin Plantinga, Keith Yandell,

Stephen T. Davis, and othersarticulated and amplified the Free Will
Dek~lseto shmv that these belief5 are ilot inconsistent. 'Thus, Version
I of the logical problem has been laid t o rest.
Version II in our taxonomy of the problem is based on the charge
that the proposition
is inconsistent with the proposition
(Ez) Large amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distribu-

tions of evil exist.
According to Plantinga, the salne type of dcfcnsive xnaneuver used

against Version I applies t o Version 11. Focusing simply on the
alnount of moral evil, Plantinga recommends that the theistic de-
fender argue that somethillg like the follo\\ring claim is possible:
(28) God is omnipotent, and it was not within his power to

bring about a world containing as much moral good and
less xnoral evil than this one,
Again, thc theistic defender here would need to e~nploythe same basic
assertiolls previously made in arguing against Versioll I-that God,
though omnipotent, calnot actualize a state of affairs consisting in an
agellt freely doing what is right, that all crraturely essellces might suffer
eom transworld depravity, and so forth. h successhl defensc against
Version II shows, in effect, that God's existence is compatible with the
existence of as much evil as the real world does, in fact, contain.14
In any event, the theistic defcndcr's strategy against all versions of
the logical problcrx is t o show that the two kcy theistic bclicfs in
question arc not inconsistent, that thcy arc logicall]? compatible. This
is not to say that he must show that they are both true. This \%~ould be
too strong a requirement for the defender and illappropriate to the
nature of the issue. A kind of minimalist response is all that the purely
logical problem of evil really requires: Accusations that theism is in-
consistent can be met with vindicatiolls showing that i t is not.
As theists have solidified their defensive position, they have exposed
one of two hllacics bp critics who adb~anccany version of the logical
problem of evil. It appears that critics either beg the guestition by selcct-
in6 propositions to whiril the theist is not comrnittcd or Iif~ozzl: of
cofztext propositio~lsto which the theists are colnmitted and impute
new meanings to them that are not fully coililected with the theists'
own theological background beliefs. So, the critic might find a set of
propositions that invo1j.e a logical contradiction, but doing so is irrel-
eFrant unless the propositions genuinely represent theistic belief.
In the final analysis, the logical problem of evil does not seem to be
a promising avellue of attack against Christiall theism. Ironically, the
atheistic challenger begins by accusing the theist of committing a log-
ical mistake and ends up embroiled in logical fallacies herself. Al-
though Version I is by far the most popular formulation of the prob-
lem, it appears no ixorc effective than the other two fonnulations. All
of the fonnulations of thc argurxent arc now thought to exhibit ccr-
tain sy~~dromatic errors.
Adlnittillg that the Free Will Defellse is successful but relnaining
convinced that a viable argulnent from evil can still be mounted,
srlmc critics have shieed the attentioil to what we may call the ejiiden-
tial yrobleln of evil. They agree that defense against the logical prob-
lem establishes that no claim about evil, conjoined with other key
theistic beliefs, sets up an automatic contradiction. These critics
lnalntain that, although evil does not: reveal theism to be inconsistentt
the facts of evil constitute evidence against thcism. Using the lan-
guage of possible ~vorldsthinking, they admit that thc Frcc Will Dc-
fense shows that there is at least one possible bnorld in kvhich the
propositions "God exists" and "evil exists" are both true, but they
n~aintainthat this does not shcw that it is reasonable to think that
God exists despite the evil in our world, the actual world.
Interestingl)r, theists seeking further understanding of the intellec-
tual commitments of their faith have also considered whether the log-
ical problem expresses the only rational concern rciatcd to God and
evil. Thus, they also express strong interest in solxe kind of evidential
problem of evil. The next chapters are de\?otedto analyzing the exact
structure as well as the proper strategy for such a response.
l . A v i r ~Pta~~dnga,
God n~zdOther Minds: A 'Cj~aitdy@'$ha Rac.innn;lJ25s88ficn -
$ion of Rdz'g'ilaz G d (Tthaca: Cornell i1712iversircy Press, 1967), pp, X 31-1 55;
Xzlantinga, Y7fe N ~ g u r eof Necg~xiql( O x f o r d : G l a r e ~ ~ d o13rrcss,
~l 1974),
pp. 164-195.
2. Augustine, 0r.t Free Choicg of'ghe Will, trans, *411na Rex~jaminand L, H.
EIackstaff (New h r k : Babbs-Merrili, li964), bk. 2, chap. l , p. 36.
3, Antony Flew, "Divir~eOmnipotence a ~ H ~ udn ~ a nF;reeCf~)m,"in Ncw E;-
says in Philosopd3z"cd 2'hcolo8yl, ecis. ,411t01ly Flew and Alasdair MacTrztyre
(New York: Macn-tillan, 1955), p, 149.
4, Ibid.
5 . J, L, Mackie, ""Ei(.iland Omnipotence," Mind64 (1955): 209.
6, See Robert M, Adat-rits, LCMustGod Create the Itcst?" in 726 PfpobIe~f$ of'
E P ~ /Se/gc$~-ed
; Re@d;En&sfed. Michael Peters011 (Notrc I>ame, h-id.: Ut1iversir-y
of Notre Dame 13ress, 1992),pp. 275-288; in tlie same volume, also see Philip
I,. Quinn, "God, Mord Perfection, and Possible Worlds," pp. 289-3132,
7 , 'The classical locatiotl of ,ALfvix~Plantinga" ideas on the logic of possiMe
worlds and inodal logic is his Nat5et.r: oj"N~cessz'q~~, cited in Notc l .
S, Ptantinga, C;od, Fffleedam, and E ~ i (Grand l Kqpids, Mich.: Eerdmarrs,
X977), p* 39.
9. 'I3here are a multitude of things that exist but that Gad did nor create.
In addition to the fact that God has not created states of affairs, he has not
created himself or nurn bers, propoktt ems, properties, and so forth. These
havc no begini2ings. God" activity results in sorne states of affairs being or
becoming act~xaf,See Plantinga, 7 b e Natuf*gof'Nc~essz'q~~ p. 169,
10. Gottfiied Wilhelm von LJeibiliz, "Xeudiicy: ESSGE~S 0% the Cgorrdng~sof
God, the Fr#r:edomoj'Man, a n d $he &k&in of Evil, ed. Austt n Farrer, trails. E,
h%,Huggard ( k ~ n d o nRouttcdge
: 8r Kegan Pa~xt,1952), p. 127-129.
X X . From this point: forbvard, \vc assume that God is a necessary and not a
cantingat being, that God exists in all passible worlds. l'lze question before
us, tl-ren, is whetl~erGod can actualize just any possible world that i~~cludes
his existence. iYe foflow~Planbnga" discussion of \~~hictit wc~rldsGod cotrid
havc created, kom his N&CZ.L~*C @OJgccssz"[y,pp. 169-174.
12. Pla~itti~lga,Chd, Freedurn, a ~ z dE ~ i kp., 53,
X 3, A complete statement of the Free FViH Dcfense ~~o-itlci need to take
into accoullt a11 of the eleinel~tsthat 131tandnga b~tildsinto it, such as a con-
cept of essences, a hller treatnlelitt of cor~~iterfactr~aIs of freedollit, aiitd so
forth. See his Natzgrc of'Ngc~rssz'ty,ppp,X 72ff.
14. Many thinkers, both theists and tl~eircridcs, havc Xong accelttcd the
pril~cipletl-rat there are no ~zop2Io~Tiicnl limits to what an o~~iti~ip~)telitt being can
do. In other wc~rds,God has the ability to bring about any z'~zt:~*i~zsicrsk.I[~pc~~s
bl~rstate of affairs (i.e., a state of affairs the description of which is not logi-
catty inco~itsistent).God could bring about, for example, white polar bears
and tI-iangfes because they are intrix~sicallypossible, but he could not bring
about rnarried bachelors and square cirdes bccause ttiey are intrinsically im-
possible.
Howcver, Planti~lgarevises the cotlcept of omnipotcxlce to aIlo\v for the
hct ttiat there are states ofafcatrs that are passible z'7.z tbe~$gclve~- (Le., intrinsi-
catiy) b ~ r that
t are not possible for Chd to bring about. Tllis poiritt depel-rds
on a proper ~11lderstandi1.1g of the logic of free witl. If a persoil is free with re-
spect to an action, then whether she perforrns or rekair-ts &am performing
that action is up to her, ~ z o God.
t A l t h o ~ ~ ga fworld
~ in which all persons a1-
\%raysfreety d o what is right is cereainly possible, it is not a state of affairs that
was within God's pawer to create; all of the kee crcattires in that world
would have to l-relp bring it about by their olirn choices. The Free Wi11 De-
fe~lderit~siststhat God cann<)t detc-ermi~zethe actiosls of fkee persons. See
Plantinga, The Natzgre of Nec~ssigf,pp, 190-X 9 1.
For a. i~elpfrrldiscussion of this matter, see Williarn kvainwrtght, "fircedam
and Cjmnipotence," Nosis 2 (1968):239-301,
Suggested Readings
Adams, 1Zc)bert M. "Middle ktowlcdge and the XZrobleinof Evil." Aifef*ic~n
Philosophical Qtggrgeriy 14 ( 1677)):109-1 17.
. ""Pat-rtinga 011 the Problem of :Evil."ln Alpin PlgFzri~wa,cdited by
James Tamberiiit and Ikter van Inwagen. Dordrcch t: IZeidel, 1985,
pp, 225-255.
Basinger, David. ""Christian Theism and the Free Will Defense," "phi@
(A$~stralin;) 19 (July 1980):20-33.
. "Determii~isnland Evil: So111e C:larifications."" Agstr;t~-lasian Pzitr~~zal
of PbiIt~sc~phy 60 ( IX 982): X 63-1 64.
. ""Il)i\iine Omniscricnce and the Best of ,411 130assibleWorlds." figrl.znl
of Valge I~zgwigty16 (1982): 143-148.
. "Hr~manFreedom and Divine Orutnipotence: Some New Thorrghts
on an Old XZrablem." R~eIz&z"o%s St$$diwl 5 (1979): 491-510.
. ""IWhat Se~lseM L I SG~ c )DC) ~ His Best? A Response to Hasker.?'
I%zg:e~.~i.tn$iortal
Jozg~~ialf"ar Philosophy ofRlirl@Zon X 8 ( X 985): X 6 X -1 64.
. "Must God Create the Best Possible World? A XZespoitse." htef*nn-
tiofzt%lPhiIosophiical Qtggr$gr[y20 ( 1680):339-342.
Co-itgltlan, Michaei L, ""'Fhe Free FVill Defensc and Natttral Evif," I%zg:ep.~ivtn-
tionat Jourrrat J b 12bilnsophyofReli~ion:20 ( 1986):93-1 08.
Gale, %chard, "fireedom and the Free Wilt Defense." 'Social 7beot#y and
Pfpgc$icli:(Fall X 990): 397423.
. OF$$he Na$zz~ee.end E x I ~ e ~ cofeC;od. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
rrcrsity Press, 1991.
Hasker, WiXliam, "hifust God Do His Rest.>" hz$gf*:mal.z'unnI Juzgr~ialfbrPhilos-
opj~yofRelz&t"opi!16 (t984):213-224.
Hoi tenga, Dewcy. ""Logic and the Pro ble1-11 of Evil." A kfze~#ican Pi?z'lusopk3ical
QgarzerI,~ 4 (1967): X 14-1 26,
b n e , G. Staniley. """l'hcFrce-kviitl Defcnse l3efcnded." " c Mc~aSchol@~$icism
50 (1976):435446,
Mavrodes, George. "The Problem of Evil ." "1 Bgli!jeSi~itG d : A &$$z&djf in the
E p i a ~ ~ ~ oofRglg&io~i!.
Io~y New York: Ibndoxn EIouse, 1970, chap. 4,
C)akes, Robert A, ""Actualities, Possibilities, and Free-will "fheodicy." '?he
Ne~vSeholns~icZsm46 ( X 972): X 9 1-20 1.
13ike, Nelson. ""Iflantinga on Free Will and Evil." R~eli~ioz~s S$z$diw l 5
(1979):449473,
PLarrtinga, B v i n . "Existence, Necessit~and God," The N;em ,5'cholastz'cisliaz 50
(1976): 61-72.
. ""Tl~eFrce bVill Defense." h In2hilnsopI3j~in: r(t~$er.ic&,edited by Max
Black, London: George AIlen and Unwin, 1965.
. Chd nrtd Qti$g~* Minds: A Stgdjf ofthe Rgtional Jzgstg$cation ~fRalz"@'
~ P ZGod. Ithaca: Cornell Ux-riversiv Press, 1967.
. <$od, Ff~cgdnm,and E~pil.Grand h p i d s , Micb.: Eerdma~ls,1977.
. "Irie M&I:~.~PC
of'N~~essz"~, Oxford: Glarelldorl Press, 1974,
. "Which Worlds Could God Have Created?" Jour~wlof1>hz"losophy70
(1973): 539-552,
Quinn, Phitip L, "God, Moral Perfectiotl, and Possible Worlds." h Chd:
Gm~~tcn'~pot.arj~ Disczzaion, edited by Frederick Sontag and M. Darrol
Bryant, New York: Kc~seof Sharon Press, 1982, pp. 197-21 3,
Kc?\vc, Wilfiam L, "Rlantinga on PossiMe iVorfds and Evi1," fi~uuz?.~i.tnl oj'philos-
ophy 70 (1973): 554-555.
Sennett, Janles F. ""The Free Will ITefc-nse a ~ l dDeter~ltillisnl.'' Fgkgh and Phi-
losophy 8 (1981 ): 340-353.
Smart, Ninian. ""C)mniyatence, Evil and Superinel-E." Philosophy 36 (1961):
188-195.
Stcw~ar t , Melville, 2 ge G~~eatct.er-C;ood
~ I ~ ~ TAJnSEss@*y
P : on the R~.k.ziofzalz-'qof'
F~z'lrh.Ncw York: St. Martin", 1993.
Wainwkght, William. "C:ii.iristian Theism and the Free Will Defense." hgtc~#-
national Jogsen~aIjb.~* P/$ilosophyof'flelgion 6 ( X 975): 243-2 50.
Walls, Jerry. '"I'hc Free Wilt Dcfcl-Ese, Calvinism, bVcsiey7 and tbc Goodness
of God," CC;'hr.af$ian c5'chalgr"s~evz'ew1 3 (January 1983): 19-33,
The Probabilistic
Problem of Evi
From the atheistic critics' point of view, the beautp of the logical ar-
gurxent from evil is that, if it could be made t o work, it would be a
tour de force for atheis~x.Critics could then ignore any allegedly fa-
vorable evidence for God's existence and declare theism patently irra-
tional. Hobnever, with what appears to be the decisive defeat of the
logical argulnent from evil by the Free Will Defense,] some critics
have developed a different kind of argumeilt from evil. This other
type of argument seeks to establish that the existence of God is still
somehow rationally unacceptable given the facts of evil. Philosophers
~vieldingthis kind of argument say that evil so~uehowcounts against
the existcncc of God, although it is not inconsistent with the exis-
tcncc of God. Since the mid- 1970s, the number of these argkllnents
in the philosophical literature has grown significantly. Such argu-
lnents have been ~rariouslylabeled evidential, inductiire, or a posteri-
ori? but one of the more prominellt formulations is now called the
probabilistic argumeilt from evil. It is to this argumeilt that I 12014~
turn, leab~ingconsideration of a more broadly conceived evidential ar-
gument until the next chapter.
h Initial SKrmish
Proponents of the probabilistic argument maintain that evil ixakcs
the existellce of God imp~pobableor unlikeb. Let us consider an early
exchange ben4reen noiltheistic and theistic philosophers along these
lines. Consider how J. W. Cornman and Keith Lehrer preseilt the
problem in the guise of a provocative thought experiment:
If you were all-good, all-k~lowing,and all-powerfut and you were going
t o create a universe in ~ ~ h i ctherett were scxltient beixlgs-beings that
are happy and sad; enjoy pleasure, feel pain; express love, anger, pity,
l-ratred-what kind of world would you create? . . . Try t o i~ltaginewltnt
such a \voriA WCIUIBbe like. FVould it bc like the one wl~ichactually does
exist, this world wc live in? bVould you crcatc a world such as this or-zc if
you had tl-re power and know-how t o create any logically possible
\%rorld?If yorrr anst;Grcris ""no," as it scerns t o be, then yorr sftorrlct begin
t o undersra~~d why the evil of suffering and pain i1-t this world is such a
problcnl for allyone who tl-rinks God created this world. . . . Girrcn this
\%rorld,then, it seems, we should cotlcltrde that it is z'mpgeoktaktk: that it
was created or sustained by anytfiing wc would call God. Thus, 81~~11
this particular world, it s e e ~ ~that e it is impmb-
t s we should c o n c l ~ ~ dthat
a6k that: God-who, if he exists, crcated the \%rorfd-exists, Conse-
quexlrtl!?, the belief that God does not exist, rather tfian the belief that he
exists, W O L I / ~seen1 to be jz&s"r~z$edby $he eviide~zeewe find in tl-ris world."
Herc wc find the language of probability. <:omman and Lchrcr arc

sapi~lgthat evil in the ~rorldmakes the existence of God impfpobatable.
But let us try to extract the esselltial argtllnent from their comments.
Before proceeding, we shall discount at the outset the rhetorical sug-
gestion that the reader's answer "seems" to be a negative one. This
phraseology imposes a bias on the reader and too hastily dismisses a
number of very important perspectives about why the world contains
evil. I shall cover solxe of thcsc perspectives later but hcrc must clari@
the structure of the argument at hand.
One premise in Cornman and Lehrcr" argument seems to be
(29) If God is omnipotent and omniscient, then he could have

created any logically possiblc world.
Another prelnise seems to be
(30) If God is all-good, he would choose to crcatc the best

\vorid he corxld.
From (29) and (30), they conclude
(31) If God is omniscient, omnipotmt, and all-good, he would

have created the best of all possible worlds.
Then they add
( 3 2 ) It is unlikely or improbable that the actual world is the best

of all possible worlds.
And from (31) and ( 3 2 ) ,it follows that
(33) It: is unlikeb or imprObablc that thcrc is an omnipotent,

omniscient, and all-good God.
If this is a reasonably accurate sketch of the basic moves of the argll-

mmt,"ow might theists respond?
Alvin Plantinga thinks that the argument contains at least two ma-
jor errors. For one, Cornman and Lehrer incorporate into their argu-
Illent Lcibniz's Lapse----the claim that God, if omnipotent, can create
any logically possible world. WC have already seen the error of Lcib-
niz's Lapse in our discussion of the Frcc Will Dcfensc for the logical
proble~n.Thus, Plantinga mailltaills that the argument as stated is not
S O U I ~because
~ it i~lcorporatesthis falsehood. We now h o w that it is
simply not true that God, if he exists, could have actualized any possi-
ble world. Another error in the argulllent is that it seems to presup-
pose that there is "a best of all possible worlds," a concept that is in-
coherent. Consider what we all know: that for any prilne number you
designate, thcrc is always one that is greater. In like manner, Plan-
tinga reasons that, for any world you mention (kvith howc\rcr many
dancing girls and dclirio~~sly happy sentient creatures), thcrc is always
one that is better (with even more dancing girls and deliriously happy
sentiellt creatures). So, Plantinga pronounces the arguineilt of Corn-
mall and Lehrrr incapable of sho~lingthat the existence of evil in the
world rnakes it uniilicly that God exists.
A Modified Probability ent

We might, however, try t o modify and strengthen Comman and
Lrhrer's argumellt in order to make the best of their case against the-
ism. One %.ay to revise it is to elimiilate the claim that God can create
just any logically possible Ivorld. The substitute claim can be made
that, alnong the logically possible worlds that were within God's
power to create, he could have created one containing a more fairor-
able balance of good and evil. hlother alteratioil would be t o cast
this claim in terms of natugpal evil rather than moral evil, since many
thinkers now grant that God could not do anything about the
amount of moral evil brought about by free human beings. Neverthe-
less, they still insist that God can control the amount of natural evil.
With these two adjustments, does thc argument farc any better?
Plantiilga thinks that the modified argument still fails. He rcbuts
this strollger renditioil of the argtllnent by extending the Free Will
Defense-the claim that it is possible that God caililot actualize any
possible world that includes free agency. His point is that the evil in
the world does not render the existence of God improbable. He asks
us to consider the following proposition:
(34) ALl thc evil in this world is broadly illoral evil; and of all the
worlds God co-rrld have created, none contains a bctter bal-
ancc of broadly moral good with rcspcct to broadly moral
evil.
In keeping with the earlier strategy of defense, Plantillga asks us to

consider that (34) is logically possible.
The reference to "broadly moral evil" recluircs comment. Plantinga
claims i t is possible that what we normally call natural evil is really
broadly ixoral evil causcd bp nonhuman free agcnts.Traditional rcli-
gion, for cxample, attributes much evil to Satan or to Satan and his
cohorts. These dc~nonicspirits arc fallen angels ivho seek t o spoil
God's creation. In this light, 131antinga states that, of all the jwrlds
God could have created, it is possible that none contains a better bal-
ance of broadly ~noralgood and broadly ~noralevil than this one.
Although we Inay have no evidence to confirln (34), Plantinga
points out that we do not appear to have any e~~idence that ~voulddis-
confirnl it either, But how shall we think about this wl~olebusiness of
confirmation anyway? Let us say that a proposition p confirms a
proposition q if q is ixorc probablc than nor on p alone: if, that is, q
would be more probable that not-q with respect to what we know, if
p were the only thing we knew that was relevant to q. hid let us say
that p discvnfirws q if p co~lfirmsthe denial of q.
Although there is really no \vay to measure the quantiv of evil in the
~vorld,PIantinga takes Cornman and Lehrer's argument to be about
the anzu5fintand variety of evil. He then advances this proposition:
( 3 5 ) There are 1013 turps of evil.
Plantinga here coins the term "turp" as a basic unit of evil in order to
facilitate discussion. Here the expression "1 013CUWS" nallles the past,
present, and future evil in the actual ~vorld.
Claiming that ( 3 5 ) does not disconfirm (349, Plantinga goes on to
sap that neither does it disconfirm the following:
( 3 6 ) God is omniscient, omnipotmt, and morally perfect; God

has created the world; all the evil in the ~rorldis broadly
Inoral evil; and there is no possible ~rorldGod could have
created that contains a better balance of broadly moral
good and broadly moral evil.
No\\; if a proposition p confirms a proposition q, then it confirms

every proposition q entails; and if p disconfirms g, p disconfirllls every
bwoposition that entails g. It seems clcar that ( 3 5 ) does not disconfir121
(36); but (36) entails
( 3 7 ) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and Inorally perfect.
So, the existence of the great amount and variety of evil does not ren-
der improbable the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and
wholly good God. Of coursc, therc may bc other things we know such
that the existence of God is improbable with respect t o them.
Nonetheless, the amount and variety of evil in this wodd does not
disconfirm God" existence.
Here we can sec how the Free Will Drfense works agaillst the prob-
abilistic problem of evil. Against the logical problem, of course,
Plantinga established that
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists
and
(E, ) Evil exists
are not loaically incompatible. He accomplished this by shokning that

the consistent conjunction of a certain proposition about free will and
a proposition asserting God's existence entails that there is evil. Now,
against the probabilistic problem, Plantinga employs a similar defen-
sive strategy to show that
(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, \\.holly good God exists
and
( 3 5 ) There are 10'Qturps of evil
are not probabilistically incompatible.6 He does this by showing that

proposition (G) and a certain propositioil about all evil being broadly
moral evil entail that God could not control the evil in the world.
Some critics as well as some theists have misunderstod Pfantinga's
suggestion that possibly there are nonhuinan free agents-wri~at tradi-
tional religion calls "delxons" or "fallen angelsm---\\.ha arc responsible
for \\.hat wc call natural evil. This ~vould,in effect, make all cvil broadly
inoral c\-it. Several tbinkcrs rightly pointed out that neither classical
theisln nor the livillg religions that embrace it (Christianit): Judaism, or
Islam) hold that demonic activiy is the best explanation of evil. Yet
there is a misul~dersta~ding here that provides an opportuniq to clarifp
the nature of 131antinga's defensive strategy against the charge that God
could reduce the amount of evil. Plantinga does not postglg~gthat there
are tlonfiumm free creatures w i ~ ocreatc: evil in our wortd; hc is not of-
fering this notion as a hypothesis in order to gxplain an\%hing. Plan-
tinga's defensive stratcm does not rcquirc that the claim that all natural
evil could bc viclvcd as broadly moral evil bc h % eor even probabl?, trgge.
And he certclinly does not have t o be committed to its truth or even its
probable truth. In light of a sophisticated theistic world~rie\v,it could
even be factually @lsg that demolls create what we call natural evil; or,
in light of many other things we know, it could be h&h& inzp~.obable.
Rut Plantinga's strategy requires only that i t be posgible and consistent
with (G) in order to accomplish its defensive purpose.?
Three Prababilisr-ic ents from Evil

Discussion of the prospects for a viable probabilistic argumellt from
evil did not end with Plantinga's critique of Corlllnail and Lehrer.
Several atheistic critics have developed their oMrn statements of the ar-
gument. The general strategy they follolv is to argue that a proposi-
tion such as
(E) A great amoullt and variet): of evil exists
is evidence against the proposition
(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, ~vhollygood God exists.
Philosophers have still thought it worthwhile to contil~rscto probc

the issue of exactly how it is that (E) renders (G) improbable. In fact,
the probabilistic argumellt f r o ~ nevil could be framed and subse-
que~ltlyanalyzed in terms of any of the three (E)-propositions dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. But we will pursue the argument that iilcorpo-
rates (E;) as stated here.
After all, what is the relationship that the critic says holds between
(E) and (G) when he says the fonner is evidmce against the latter or
that (-G), which is the denial of (G), is probable with respect to (E)?
In probabilitj~studies generally>the probabilit). of any proposition B
on the basis of the e\ridencc A is depicted as P(B/A). Thc question,
then, is h0141 to ullderstand precisely h0141 all of this works in the mat-
ter of God and evil-that is, how to interpret the critic's claim that
P((G)/(E)) is lob\ less than .5. To comprehend this, of course, we
must have some idea of what the relationship is between any proposi-
tions K and A when A is evidcnce for R or when K is prohgble %pithre-
spect to A. Yet this ~vholearea of scholarship is notoriously unsettled,
with no clcar consensus on how to define thc evidential relationship
between propositions or on how t o think about the probability of
one proposition given another proposition. Plantinga suggcsts that a
good starting place would be to view the relatio~lshipbet\i.een propo-
sitions B and A as coilforlning to the calculus of probabilities. He
then collsiders the three main interpretatio~lsof probabiliyprrson-
alist, logical, and frequency-to determine if there is any basis for a
good probabilistic argument from evil.Vdet us briefly revieiv his re-
marks about the first two interpretation~and then focus on how he
treats t l ~ ethird.
According to a personalist interplflctntion,the probabilit)? of (G) on
(E) reflects a person's crcdcnccf2tnction, which is the dcgrcc of bclicf
that she assigns to a given proposition, P(A), or that she assigns to the
proposition niven another proposition, P . Plalltinga pro-
nounces a personalist argument for the low probability of theism
based on evil to be nothing more than mere biographical infom~a-
tion. Predictably? an atheist will assign a low subjecti~reprobability,
perhaps close to zero, t o the hypothesis that God exists
own terms or in view of the e~ridenceas he sees it. So, it is not surpris-
ing that the atheistic critic maintains that 13s((G)/(E)) = c .5. A the-
ist, on the other hand, will assign a high subjective probability to
((;)-%ither on its own terms or in view of the evidmce as she sees it.
But then it appears that a personalistic probability argument from evil
tells only about the belief dispositions of the atheistic critic and noth-
ing abo~atwhether God exists or ~vhethcrit is rational per sc to be-
lieve that God exists given the e~ridenceof evil?
Plantinga lnailltains that an evidelltial argtllnent based on the in&-
cal theory of probability fares no better than the perso~lalisticargtl-
ment. Here probability is a "quasi-logical relation of which entail-
lnent is a special casr."jo Trying to protect probability judgments
from the taint of subjectivity, those promoting this theory think of
probability as a kind of "partial entailment" of onc proposition by an-
o t h c r J In other words, one proposition (A) has an a priori probabil-
ity in view of another proposition (B). The ideally rational pcrson,
thm, should believe (A) to the exact degree it is entailed by (B). For
example, the probability of the proposition
(38) Friedrich cannot swirn
(39) Nine out often Prtrssians cannot skvim and Friedrich is a

Prussian/Geman
appears to be .9-i.e., P((38)/(39)) = .9. So, the rational persol2 who

k1lo~z.snothillg else relevant will believe (38) t o the degree .9. How-
ever, if we consider
(40) Friedrich is a lifeguard,
then the probability of (38) changcs drail~atically!

Likewise, the critic ofkring an argument from evil roorcd in the
logical theory of probability lnight claim that the probabilit). of
is low given, saj;

(E, ) _t;,\-ilexists.
But the theist might retort that the probability of (G) changes signif-
icantljr when we consider
(R) God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil to ex-
ist.
It is extremely difficult to see, therefore, how a given propositioll can

just have a certain probabiliq on the basis of ailother proposition-a
lnatter long debated alnoilg scholars of inductiire logic.12 Since there
is no reason to think that contingent propositions have a priori prob-
abilities, Plantinga concludes that there is no reason to think that a
proposition such as (E1) disconfirms (G).
Although the pcrsonalist and logical theories of probabilit). do not
seem to lend themscl\rcs to ixaking a decent atheistic argulxcnt kolx
evil, a number of thinkers have considered whethcrfreguencjf thcory (or
statistical probability) offers a more interestillg and more prolnising
way of framiilg the argument. According t o the frequency theory,
probabiliw is a vgtio: It is a measure of the relative freq~~ellcy with
which the members of a specified class of objects or eirenrs exhibit a
certain propcrty.13 An insurance actklary, fir example, might compute
the number of thiry-year-old males in a sample of 10,000 who survive
to their fortieth birthdays and get a result of 9,450. The probabilit).
value, then, is .945. This value, in turn, bccomcs a predictive factor for
the undcrwl-itcr in setting insurance m ~ s Thcre
. arc literally thnusmds
of situations in science, mathematics, and practical life in ~rhichthis
kind of statistical reasoning is entirely appropriate and helpful.
Weslep Salnlon suggests that the frequellcjr theory can also be used
to collclude that evil makes God's existence improbable-that is,
13(CG)J(E)) = .= .5.'"ut how are we to undentand this yrobabilistic
claim in frequency terms? Salmon must surely mean something like
the following: Among possible worlds that contain as much evil as
this one does (lvhich is lO'qturps), there arc relatively few-less than
half-that arc divillely crcated.l5 Thus, poposition
(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists
has a low probability value, i.e., below .5.But how would one arrive
at such a judgment? Should we start bp imagining hypothetical uni-
verses (or what we have called "possible jwrlds") and simply estimat-
ing how mallp co1ltai1li13g as much evil as this one were created by a
being who has the relevant theistic attributes? Salmon ~vouldinsist
that the number here would be relatively low.
Plantinga poina out a number of serious difficulties in the frequen-
tist ixcthods Salmon uses for arriving at the conclusion that
P((G)/(E)) = .5. For one thing, how can the frequentist critic
count the possible ~vorlds,which arc theoretically infinite in nulxber,
so that he map perform his calculations! For another thing, what
about the differences in how the theist and atheist ~nakea number of
initial assesslnellts before arrij~ingat a final value for P((G)/(E))! Af-
ter all, the nontheist would typically assess the probability that there
would be less evil in our ~vorldif God did exist to be high, ~vhereas
the theist would most certainly disagree.
Herc Plantinga rccognizcs the fact that such initial assesslllcnts arc
nltimately rciativc to thc do;dnJ hseIiefsg$ that each party brings to thc
bwobabilitp judgment at hand and that the belicf sets of the theist and
the critic differ in some irreconcilable w a y s . l V e would expect the
theist and the atheistic critic to disagree, for instance, on the success
of various independent argulnents for God's existence, such as the
ontological and cosmological arguments. But surely, their assess-
ments of such matters will form part of their respective total belief
sets, or, as Plantinga calls them, their respective "noetic frameworks."
These as well as othcr problems undercut any effort to mount a viable
frcqucncy argument from evil.18
Reformed Epistemology and Evil

111 the contemporarjl debates over God and evil, a certaill pattern of
response has emerged in regard to both the logical and the proba-
bilisric arguments: challenge from the critic followed by defensive
maneuvers by the theist. In discussions of the logical argument, the
critic charges that bclief in God and belief in evil arc inconristent. The
theist shields his bclicf sjrstcm frolx the charge by demonstrating that
theism is not inconsistpnt. In discussions of the probabilistic argu-
ment, the critic claims that God's existellce is impfpobablein light of
the evil in the world. The theist answers by s h o ~ i n gthat God's exis-
tence is not improbable given evil. These defellsive responses are trch-
nically correct and instructive in many ways. We should note that
such responses are not geared to show that theism is plausible, proba-
ble, or true. They are also not ailned at shouillg either that theism
makes good sense on its o\lrn terms or that it makes better sellse than
competing \vorldvie\vs. The general defensij~estrategy is simply that
of protecting theistic beliefs while deflecting all challenges-a strategy
that has becolne well recognized and widely employed.
Intercstingl!: theists who have constructed dcfcnses against various
challcngcs detcctcd a recurring flaw in critics' attacks. In defending
against the logical probleill of evil, theists took exception to auxiliary
assumptiolls einployed by their atheistic critics who sought to deduce
a coiltradiction within theism. As we have seen, these critics con-
structed their arguments using propositions defining such theistic
concepts as omnipotence and perfect goodness-definitions that
tilted the controversjl in their favor from the outset. This, of course,
was an early indication of how different thinkers inevitably appeal to
their own background infornation in evaluating philosophical posi-
tions. Then, in defending against the probabilistic problern of evil,
theistic defenders pointed out that the atheistic critic could not avoid
assessing a number of probabilities based on things he already ac-
cepts, byhereas the theist \vould clearly differ 011 such things. So, pre-
dictably, (G) -will be improbable with respect t o things that the atheist
accepts but probable with respect to things that the theist accepts.
Continuing reflection on the construction of both logical and
probabilistic arguments has brought to light an important fact-that
must be probabilisticallp assessed on the basis of all the propositions

one knows or beliel2-es,T"13is is what W mean when we talk of the re-
quirement of "total evidence." Discussioils of this lnatter have be-
come couched in tenns of one's "epistemic framework" or "noetic
structure." Rut then, i t is difficult to see how so many of the argu-
ments from evil-both logical and probabilistic-are really objections
against thcism when they arc based on thc atheistic critic's total set of
beliefs. How might we tllink of the objection from evil now?
Clcarlj~,the discussion shifts away fro111 its original focus on
~rhether(E,) or (E) or any other (E)-like proposition per se proba-
bilistically discollfirms the proposition that God exists. Instead, the
coiltroversy revolves around a byhole coiltext of other beliefs kvithin
which such a probabilistic judg~nentcould ever be made. We map call
this context of total evidence one's evidence ret. So, if there is going to
be any kind of effective probabilistic argllinent f r o ~ nevil, it will have
to run along these lines: For any theist T, there is a set of propositions
Ts that constitute his totnl evidence .re6 for any proposition A that the
theist accepts, he is rational in accepting A only if A is not improbable
with respect to Ts. The critic's case, then, is that the existence of God
is improbable with respect to 'f's,
Many philosophers---including David Hume, W. K. Clifford,
Bertrand R~lsscll,h m n y Flew, Michatll Scrivcn, and others-make
this kind of case.19 Flew maintains that it is rational t o presume that
atheisln is true (i.e., that theism is false) ullless convincing argulnents
for theism are advanced.20 This places the burden of proof on the
theist, since there are propositions that all rational persons believe or
ought to believe that- either offer no support for (G) or make i t im-
probable. According to most critics, then, the theist is irrational (and
pehaps unethical) in believing in God because them is little or no etr-
idcncc for the bclief (e.g., the hilure of traditional theistic proofs)
and bccause there is impressive etridencc (e.g., evil) against the belief.
At this juncture, a ilumber of importailt questioils surface, questions
about what beliefs are properly included in a \yell-formed noetic
structure: byhat it meails to be rationally entitled to hold a belief, and
what our epistemic obligations are.
In addressing such questions, Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolter-
storff, William Alston, and George Mavrodes have developed a posi-
tion known as Reformed episte111olo~21Reformed epistemology is
relevant, first, to the critic's procedure of formulating rcasons for not
believing (G) and, second, to the critic's protest that defense against
these reasons is an unsatis@ing minimalist approach. Plantinga and
other Reformed epistemologists explain that the critic operates on the
evidentialist assu~nptionthat a person is rationally kvarranted in hold-
ing a belief only if he holds other beliefs that give it good evidential
support. Conversely, one is not rationally warranted in holding a br-
lief if there is good evidence against it. Of course, "evidmce" here
must be expanded to include one's total evidence. set, This is a very
natural way of thinking about i.ntionaiit?i.
Of coursc, the critic here takes the probabilistic argulllcnt from evil
to supply good evidence against (G). When the theist provides a de-
fense sho~ringthat evil does not count n~ginstit, the critic points out
that the theist is not entitled to hold (G) ullless he can supply good
e~~idence for it. It is this ~vholeevidentialist Ivay of looking at the mat-
ter that Reformed epistemology calls into question. Refor~nedepiste-
mologists point out that those evidentialists who raise serious chal-
lenges to theism also accept strongfoz~ndatio~zali~~~. Strong founda-
tionalislu is a jvajl of looking at human knojvlrdge as built or erected
upon "foundations." The general foundationalist position, then, is
that our beliefs may be dik~idedinto tjvo kinds: those that are sup-
ported by or rcccivc e\ridcntial support from other beliefs and thosc
that arc accepted without bcing supported by still other belicfs. This
second kind of bclief forxns thc "basis" on which t>rrrentire structure
of belief and kno~rledgeultimately rests. Foundatio~lalbeliefs are
"basic" and not "&eritred" &om other beliefs.22
The "strong" foundationalist wants to place very strict rrquirr-
ments on what sorts of beliefs car1 be in the foundations. Wanting to
allow only belie& about jvhich i t is ilupossible or nearly impossible to
go wrong? the foundationalist asserts that the only beliefs that can be
t incorr&ible.
properly basic are thosc that are either r e v - c ~ i d g n or
Selfevident belicfs arc seen to be true by anyone who understands
them (e.g., the simple trklths of arithmetic, such as 2 + 2 = 4). Incor-
rigible beliefs are those that deal with one's immediate experience and
thus are thought to be immune from serious doubt (e.g., reports of
consciousness, such as "I am feeling pain" and "I seem to be seeillg
something green"). h strong foundationalist, then, maintains that
(SF) A person is rational in accepting a givcn belief only if that

bclief is self-evident or incorrigible or is derived form sclf-
evident or incorrigible belie& using acceptable lnrthods of
logical inference.
The "ekridentialist challenge" t o religious belief, then, is for religious

belief to satis@ these requirements of ejridence.
Many nontheists (e.g., W. K. C;lifford, Antony Flew, and others)
embrace evidentialism and strong foundationalism, but a number of
jvellknown theists do as well (e.g., l)escartes, Lockr, and 1,eibniz).
Historicallj~,the twin assumptions of e\ridentialism and strong foun-
dationalisrn have created a certain way of thinking about how rcli-
gious bclief ixust be justified. The theistic e\ridcntialist is obliged to
give positive evide~lcefor belief in the existe~lceof God, kvhereas the
evide~ltialistcritic either must provide evidence for rejectillg belief in
God or must point out that the theist's evidellce is insufficient.
Plantinga has identified tjvo serious difficulties with strong hunda-
tionalism. For one thing, strong foundationalisrn is self-rrferrntially
incoherent. It simply does not meet its o~z.11standards of evidence, for
it is not self-evident, incorrigible, or logically derij~ablefrom beliefs
that are. For another thing, strong fou~~dationalism is overlp restric-
tive in regard to what kinds of beliefs can count as properly basic.
Strong foundationalisrn rnistakenlp rules out various kinds of beliefs
that arc properly basic but that arc neither sclf-evident nor incorrigi-
ble. In fact, a careful analysis of our native noetic powers (such as per-
ception and memory) shows that they produce iflgrnedinte or d i ~ p g c t
beliefs in us. Such beliefs as "I see a tree in the quad now" and "I had
breakfast three hours ago" are "properly basic" for me although they
are not held on the basis of other belief5 in my ejridential set. When
one is in normal circumstances and one's cognitive powers are func-
tioning properly, one is entitled to accept the beliefs formed by these
native cogniti~epowers, such as perception and memory.
Now we arc ready t o understand the Reformed cpistelnologists'
contention that belief in God call be a properly basic belief. Plantinga
sklggests that all rational persons have cognitive faculties that, under
appapriate conditions, can forln such a belief in them. Thus, I might
accept the belief that
(41) There is such a person as God
without appeal to my other beliefs. That is, it can be part of the foun-
dations of my noetic structure without being derived by argkllnents
koix bundational belie&,
Thc rclcvancc of Reformed epistemology to the discussion of God
and evil is that it changes how we think about the rationality of the
parties involved. Alld it is a llatural colnpollent in defensive maneu-
vers by theists. For one thing, Reformed epistemolog!? explains how
the theist may be rational ~vithoutmounting, say, a pprbbailistic argu-
lnent for divine existence that is aimed at overturning the yrobabilis-
tic argument from evil. The theist may siinply hold belief in God as
basic (\\?ithour:argmentj. Then, when a critic adtrances soi-ne version
of the problem of evil and thc theist feels its probative force, the the-
ist must deal with the oL7jcction. The objection is a potential defeatgr
of the basic belief in God; it threatens the theist's s~loeticstructure.
But the only action rationally required of the theist, according to Re-
forlned epistemology, is to depat the defeater, so to speak. This may
be done by defgnse, showing that the critic's case against theism does
not succeed, whatever that case map be (e.g., logical or probabilistic
probleln of evil). Of course, it is eiltirely possible for the antitheistic
critic to respond bp trying t o defeat the defeater defeater and so on.
Thus, although one may be rational in believing in God without dis-
cursive reasoning and argument, this would be a situation in which
reasoning and argkxment is needed. However, the point of theistic ar-
gurxentation in this casc has changed frolx thc positive enterprise of
showing that bclicf in God is rational because it is derived from basic
beliefs to the project of showing that antithcistic attacks do not rcveal
it to be rationally substandard.
I . h-rtong ~lontheisticgl-rilosophers who recognize that the logical prob-

lem is not: cffecti~reare: Edward Maddex? and Peter Hare, Evil nrtd COP$-
17epctof ir;Ud (Sprii~gfield,Ill .: Cirarles C. Tlroxnas, 19681, and Williarn XXowc,
Pj~z'losaphyof-'Reli~ion (Enci~itoand Itetl-ritont,Calif.: Dickenson, 1978).
2. For the i11ductive argument, see Rruce Reichenbach, "The Ilrductive
Argumellt from Et't1," Amwz'c~n12bilosophz'cal Qfbartc~~I,y 1 7 (1980):
221-227; for the a posteriori argument, see Atvin Pla~ittinga,God and Other
LWinds:A Agzbdy c~-$he of' B e l z " ~ -E& ( kehaca: Cornef l
fCnti:z'ortnlJ~~stz~ckal-z'un
Universiq, I967), p. 128.
3, Tames W, Cornt-ritan and ICeith Lebrer, Philosophiical Prohle~~s n~zdAy@%-
mgg8.s:An lr:zt$*oduction(New York: Macmillan, X 970), pp, 340-341 (italics
rnine) .
4, Here we follow PLantinga" strayof oudining the argunitent, See PLantinga,
G d , Fr6gdomI n~.tdE d (Grand bpids, Mich.: Eerdrna~~s, 1977), pp. 59-64.
5, XZlantingafirst introduced the notion of all evil beix~gbroadly rnoral evil
in dealing with the argut-ritent that the existellce of God is i~~consistent with
the existe~lceof i2atrrraX evil. This notion is then a~rallablcto be imported into
his discr~ssionof tlic probabllisric problem.
6, Plantinga, Ct'od, Frgada~~~ and L?:t?il,
p. 64.
7 . Of co~rrsc,classicai tt~eismas \%.ellas the major moxlrstlteistic religions that
espoclse it acknobviedge that God's kuitful and creative power can create many
orders of ration&? kee beings other than hul-ritan beings. Wllnt is repugllailt
both to commox? sexlse and to a sophisticated ttledogical uxlderstanding is the
llotlon that reference t a nontluman creatures who are rational and kce plays a
rritajor part i r ~tl-re explanation of the evil we experience, Clne can add to tl-ris
the assessmellt titat it is extremely unlikely that \%.hat~~ecall natrrral evil in our
wodd is really broadly moral evil. First, natural law themes can be drawn kern
biblicd sources as well as rritajor theologies of the Ckristia~itfaith. Such themes
ellvisage the natural world as cor~stitcrtedby imgersoxlal objects operating and
interactirlg according to their own inherent natures, Seco~~d, deniat of or at
least de-emphais 0x1 the role ofdemorls or devils in our w r i d can be adduced
kom such sotrrces by fair and ir-ttelligel-ttintcryretattan.
S, Avin Planringa, """l"1e Probabilistic Argtrt-rte~~t fr.ol-rtEvil," Pi3ilusopk3ical
Sgudz'lrs35 ( X 979): 1-53, For tttose \%rishingto fblfow the subsequent discus-
siol-ts of PIax~tinga"work in this area, see Kcith CIirzan, "Plantinga on Athe-
istic Induc~on,"&phi& 27 (1988): 10, a ~ l dPlaliti~lga,LCEpi~temic Probabil-
ity and Evil," Arlrshi~z'od i fzko~ofi~k56 (I988), reprinted in IDaniel
FIobvard-Snyder, ed,, 2he Evbdgngial A~gz~~~.aze~ztJkon2 Evil (Bloorningtan: In-
diana Ulliversity Press, 1996), pp, 69-96.
9. Planti~lga,""-X)robabilisticArgrrmexlt," pppp, X 5-1 8.
IO. Ibid., p. 15.
11, Ibid.>p. 18.
12, Planting3 thczrotrghly discusses this and other diffictrlties in ibid.,
pp. 21-30,
13, Cjf course, the classical or LaPlacean theory of probability also as-
sumes it is a ratio brit one cseablished a priori based 0x1 equiprobable out-
ccsxnes.
14, Wesley Sailnon, "Religion and Science: .A New I,r>ok at Hume" Dia-
I ~ ~ ~ e sPl~z'lir~~ophic~li
," Scz#dies 33 (I9";j"): 143-1 76, ,4ctually, Safmorl pro-
poses that wc evaluate the dcsigi-t argumcx~tclairn that it is highly probable
that this world was created by a benelirolcnt, intelligelit Supreme Being, In
evaluati~lgthe argument from the perspective of eequel~cytheor~i,he con-
cludes that it i s ii-nyrobable that this world was deslgr-ted by an all-knowing,
all-pokverfkrl, and all-good being, particularly give11 the evil that it co~ltains.
15. Planrnnga, "Probabitistic Argument," p, 33. In the same articte (pp.
32-30), Plal-ttiilga also col-tsldersthe possibility that the kcquency clairn here
i~~volves the frequency with jiil-tich one class of propositions are true relative
to ar~otherclass ofpr~positiorls.
16. Pial-ttir-tgaalso calls tt~csebelief sets "~loertcsrrucrurcs" aal-td makes ixn-
portallt observations on frolii they ft~nctionin h~xma~i knoliitcdge, See l-ris
""Pobabitistic *4rgument," pp. 44,628, and 51.
I 7. See Michael 13ctcrson,Wit liam Haskcr, Bruce 12cicbel-tbach, and David
Bas, nger , R~nsonand Relg&iozss Bciie$ AB Iatrod2.tctz'on $0 the Phikosophy oj'
Itgl&a;)n, 2nd ed. (NewYork: C)xhrd University Press, I998), pp. 87-91
and 81-100.
1S, For more criticism of the frequentist argu~~itent ahanced by Sdr-rton,see
Nancy Cartiv15ght, ""Commex~tson WesIey Salmon's '"Sclex~ceand Keligiol~:A
New Look at Hurnc" 12i~lo~aze;r;"Y~l~ilosuplha"cal Stztdz'es 33 ( 1978): 1.77-5.85.
Mthough freqrxentist metllods may not be feasible for arritfing at cr~rcial
initial asessments or estimates that can, in turn, be L I S C ~in cafculati~~g the
probabiliy of (C), Bruce 1teichei-tbacb7a theist, still thinks it worth\%rhilc:to
consider Sati-rton"~proposal that Itayes's Theorem be used for calculation
purposes, Where P(B/A) mealls the probability of E; on A, Reichenbacl-rfor-
mulates Kayes? Theorem in this fashion:
The parts of the theorern have the foliowing meanings:
P(K/CA) = the prior p~obgbilz'ythat the origi~ialhypothesis is true,

givcn the backgrorxnd evidence
P(B/A) = the prior prvbnbility that the original hypothesis is false,
gi~renthe background cvide~lce
13((C/A&B) = the probabiliv that the effcct will be observed, give11
tl-rat the hypothesis is true
P(c/A&B) = the probability that the effcct will be obscrvcd, given
that the hypothesis is htse
P(B/"A&C:) = the probability tl-rat the hypo the"^ is true, given the back-
ground evidence and the fact titat the effect is obser\red,
Now the way is prepared fir construixig a probabilistic argrrmexlt from evil
along Uaycsial-t lines.
Reichenbach sets up the frame~iorkfor the Bayesian-ppe argu~tenth111 evil:
Then, casting the cridc? argtlmcl-tt in terlns of tfic alnoul-rr ofnat~rralevil in

our world, Iteichenbach interprets the parts of tl-re theoren~as follo\vs:
13((G)/(N)) = the prababititry that a. persorlal, Zo~ring,omnipotent,

omniscient, perfectly good God exists, gillell the
f~trnittirearid strticrtire of the w r l d (iliclrxdix~gsen-
tier~tcreatures, insexltient creatures, physical objects,
a i d taws of nature but exclgdi~~q any morally suffi-
cient reasorl, defense or tt-xeodiqfix evil, any con-
strued evidence ;for God" eexistcnce, or evil)
P((G)/(?.J)) = the probability that a God as described above does
not exist, given the furiiittire and structrrre of the
world
P((E)/(N)&(G)) = the probability of there being the an~ountof eli.21
that exists in orir world, givejl that the world de-
scribed above obtair-ts arid the God described
above exists
P((E)/(N)&(G)) = the probability of there being the amouilt of evil
that exists in our wc~rld,given tltauhe \%rorfdde-
scribed atrove obtains and the God described
above does nclt exist
P((G)/(N)&(E)) = the probabifiy tha"i:od as described above exists,
give11 that the world described above obtains and
there exists the amount of natural evil that our
Of course, the critic advanci~lgthis kind of Itayesian argunlent claims, in the

end, that P((G)/(N)&(E)r = .S.
Relchenbact~rightly observes that P((G)/(N)&(E)) cannot be computed
by the atl-reistic critic wt thout dcternli~li~lgthe prior probabilities,
P((G)/(N)) and P((G)/(N)).
For ~ L I L Z C ~context, see Uruce XXcicbe~~bacEx,Evil n~gdn CJood CJod (New
York: Fordhanl rjni\iersitjr Press, 19821, pp, 26-27.
19. W. K. Clifford, ""'Fhe Ethics of Belie<" in his f J ~ c t z ~ ralzd
c s E S S ~(Lon-
~&
don: Mactniltan, 1979), pp. 3456 Brand Blanct~ard,IZg~so~i! and Bglief'(br-1-
don: Mien 8r Urzwin, 1974), pp. 40116 Bertra~ldRussell, "Why I Am Not a
Gl~ristian,"in his Why 1 A m Not a. Christz'alz (New York: Sirnon & Schrtster,
X957), pp. 3ff; Micbael Scrivcn, 13i.ai~%aznf*y I2bklo~-op/3j~(New York: McGraw-
Hill, 19662, pp. 87fe Antony Fie\!; 7be P~eszkmp~inp2 c?f'Athez'sliaz(London:
Pernbcrto1.1, 197.6),pp, 22ff.
W. K Clifford insists that ""l is wrong always, evcrj5vherc, and ;for anjiox~e
to believe anythi~lgupon insufficie~ltevide~lce,"See his ""Ethics," p 186.
20, Flew, Prgszgmp~iofz,pp, 1 4-1 5
21. See, far example, their respecti~reessays in Alvtn 131antinga and
l i ~ ~ : and Blief' if$it$od
Nicholas FVcd terstor ff3eds,, Faith n~zdR a t i n ~ ~ t %Rmson
(Notre IDarne, Ind.: Uxli\rersiq of Notre I>ame Press, 1983). See also A1Gn
Xzlantinga, """I'heXXeformcd Objecrior-1to Natural ' ~ f ~ e a l aChriaZn~~ ~ " Schol-
a n R ~ ~ i a1l lv (1882): 187-198.
22. Sec the fuller discussiorl of evtclel~tialismand fou~~datioxlalism in Peter-
sar-1et al., R e a s o ~pp.
, 146-165.
Suggested Readings
Adams, Robert M, "Hlantinga on the Problcnl of Evil." h Inlvzlaz P l a ~ z t z ' ~ % ~ a ~
edited by Jarnes Tornberlin and Peter 17anXn~ragen.Dordrecht: Reidcl,
1985, pp. 225-255.
Basinger, David. "Evil as E\rider~ceAgainst the Existerlce of God: A Re-
sponse," Philosopy Rcsn-a.ch Archivcs 4 ( f 978): article no. X 275.
Carti#irigl--tt,Na~lcy.""Comments on Wesley Salmon's '"Sience and Reli-
gion .'" Pjjz'los~pk3ic~l Stzbdies 33 (Fall 1978): 177-1 83.
C;brza~),Keith. ccPlantii~ga on Atheistic Induction. " Lcj~phia(A gstralin) 27
(July 1988): 10-14.
Draper, Xzaul. ""E.\iI and the XZroper Basicalier of UeXief in God." Fail-h a n d
Izhitosoph~y8 ( 1991): it 35-1 47.
. ""Pain and Pleasure: An E.\ride~-ttialProbXsrn ;for l'heists." Nags 23
(1989): 331-350.
. ""Prababilistic Arguxnents kern E.\iI." Raelgaiogs S$z%rrl!ies28 ( 1993):
303-3 X 7 .
Ho~%rard-Snjlder, Daniel. 2 ge Evidg..zlt.ti:z'alA ~ g ~ g ~ ~ c n t f k Eo r~pi zl .Bloomingtor1:
lrldialta Univcrsity Press, X 996,
Ihufman, Gordon D, ""E\ridexlrnalism: A 'Theologian" Xtcspoilsc," Fgigh alzd
Phikosc~phy6 (1989): 3 5 - 4 6 .
Martin, Micftael. rl~hl;risg%: A PhiZ~sophZ~alJ~~sl:i$c~ti:~'~~~, Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1990.
. ""God, Satm alld Natural Evil," "Tiaiphia (Agstrnlia) 22 (flctober
1983):4 3 4 5 ,
. ""I Evil Evidence Agait~stthe Existence of Gc>d?"~Wklzd87 (1978):
429432,
. Theistic I ~ l d ~ ~ c tArgul-tle~~t
ive from Evil?" I~~ite:ernt%tio~~t%Z Jozzr~zaI
jbr 12bilnsophy nfReli~iun:22 (1987):81-87.
Qakes, lXabert A, ""Cod, Suffering, and Cox~clusivcE.\ride~-tce."&pi$ia (Az$s-
tralia) it4 (July 1975): 16-20.
13cterson, Michael. "ltceent Work on the 13rablcm of Evil." Aifmefeic~n12biln-
sopI3icnI QztartcrCv 20 (1983): 521-339.
13ectrsan, Michael L., ed. 279e I3~@ob7lem of Evil: Selecgcd R e a d i ~ m s ,Notrc
Dame, Ind.: Univcrsity of Notre Dame Press, 1992,
Petersoil, Michael, Wilfiarn Hasker, Brrrce Xteichen bach, and Davtcl Basinger,
Rcgsc~rtalzd R el@iuus Retiq: A $2 I ~ t ~ ~ o d ~I;O~ &l;rz i oPhilosopb
n of Rci<qion,
2nd ed, New York: Qxfc>rd Plniversi~Press, 1998, chap, 6.
Plantinga, Alvin. ""X=,pisternicProbability and Evil ," A~rchiviod i fi"lofoji"a
(Italy) 56 ( X 988): 557-588
. <$od, F ~ ~ ~ e d nand
m , E~z'l,Grand h p i d s , Micb.: Eerdma~ls,1977.
. 7be N a t ~ ~ oftf'Nccessi9.
*g Clxford: C:larendon Press, 1974.
. T h e Probabilistic Arg~lntentfi-om Evil." Philnsopk~icaI Stz4dies 35
(1979): 1-53,
Reiche~~baeh, l n Ct'ood Ct'od. New York: Fordbnt-tit University
Itruce, E ~ i n~zd
Press, 1982.
-P . ""The l~lductiveArgumetlt from Evil." Az~erickavt Phz'lusf?phicgl
Q~fartea*(y 17 ( l980): 22 1-227.
Satl-riton,Wesicy. "Religion and Science: A N e w Look at Hunite's Dialn~ugs.?'
Philosophical Stztdigs 33 3 19978): X 43-1 76.
Wainwright, Williarn, "The XZrescl~ce of Evil and ttlc Falsificarisn of Theistic
A;sertic~ns." R~eli~iagfsStz4dies 4 (196";2:21 3-216,
The Prob
Gratuitous Evil
In thc prc\rious chapter, we saw that assessment of probabilitics for

theisln depended not sinlply on bcliefs about evil but also on a larger
collection of background beliefs and, ultimately, on one's total evi-
dence set. Since the atheist's ttotal set of beliefi will surely differ from
the theist's in important \naps, their assign~ne~lts of probabilities t o
(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, ~vhollygood God exists
will differ greatly. For the theist, the probability of ( G ) is high,

~vhercasfor the atheist, it is low. But thcn it is difficult to sec how evil
constitutes a probabilistic probleln for thc theist. Additionally, Re-
forlned epistemology's critique of evidentialism, coupled with its per-
spective on j4rhethrr evidence is even necessary for one to be ratio-
nally entitled to beliekre (G), b r a s a recoilsideration of the role of
atheistic as well as theistic arguments over God's existence.' Yet Inany
philosoyhersatheists and theists alike-still think that evil yrovides
a basis for some kind of nondeductive or broadly indtxctive argument
against thcism. The trick is to arrive at a formulation of an e\ridential
argument fro111 evil that significantly advances the discussion.
Can. There Be an Evidential ent from Evil?

In seeki~lgto determi~le%.hether there is some kind of evidential argu-
ment that ai~oidsthe defeca of the logical and probabilistic argumenu:
from evil and still gives solne rational basis for not believing in God, we
n~ustfirst renlember -what defenders have and batre not sho~v11.131alti-
nga has shown that theism is nut improbabir: given evil; he has not
proved that evil cannot be cvidelzcc apinst theistic belief. For example,
the testilnony of the defendant's husband that she was at home at the
time of the murder is e\ridcnce against the hypothesis that she is guilty.
But the testimony ixay not show that the hjrpothesis is improbable if
there is enough other e\ridencc of her guilt. Likewise, evils may gcn-
uillely be ekidence against theism a ~ stilld not show that the probabilit)~
of theisln is low, if theisln is sufficie~ltlyprobable on other grounds.
Furthermore, Reformed epistemologists poiilt out that the theist
may be entirely rational in taking belief in God as basic, that he need
not justif\. i t by arguments constructed from other beliefs. However,
Reformed epistemology does not entail that evil cannot count as evi-
dencc against belief in God. It does undermine unfair efforts to eval-
uate bclicf in God probabilistically according to the atheist's own evi-
dential sct. More generally, Reformed epistemology calls into
question the idea that one is rationally elltitled to believe in God only
if one has adequate evidence for this belief. None of this, hobnever,
shows that evil cannot count against belief in God-evm when that
belief is construed as basic. The probabilistic problem of evil reRects
one (albeit flawed) strategy for showing how evil can be conceived as
e~~idence. It is, then, a potential defeater for theistic belief that itself
can be defeated by appropriate defensive illaneuvers. Rut this leaves
open the possibilitp that a illorc formidable defeater can bc fashioned
in terms of another type of evidential argument.
Plantinga has clearly shown that the atheistic critic is misguided if
he thinks he can produce an argument of coercive force that will
compel all reasonable people to agree that theism is improbable with
respect to evil and thus that one ~vouldnot be rational in embracing
it. However, it does not hllow kom this either that aheists have no
argument at their disposal regarding the evidential ilnpact of evil on
theistic belief or that theists should show no concern for any such ar-
gurxent. Thc atheistic critic, for instance, ixap not intend to "coercc"
but rathcr to "persuade" the minds of theists and agnostics. The the-
ist and atheist can reason together about the bearing of evil 011 the ex-
isteilce of G o d a s well as the bearillg of a great Inany other things,
for that matter-~rithout accusing each other of beillg irrational or
being in violation of some inteIlectual duties.
Much reasoning in philosophy generally has this persuasive, II~IICO-
ercive character. Eve11 if it canilot be shobnn that one position on
some controversial issue is more probable than another, it is still legit-
imate for the position's proponent to make a case for why it is prrfer-
able to the other. And it is liltewise legitimate for his interlocutor to
~llakea case for his own position, point out wcakncsscs on the other
side, ansjtrcr objections, and so firth. This all takes on the character
of clnssicnl philosophicaj diajectic----giving reasons for and against a
controversial position. Since such reasolling does sometimes lead t o
changes of opinion, we map ellgage in it with a sincere hope of per-
suading others or of comillg to a more adequately justified position
ourselves. In the process, we may rely on assessments of plausibility or
credibility that are not obvious and not universally accepted. Neither
Plantinga's defense against the probabilistic problem nor his presen-
tation of Reformed episteil~olomhas shown that it is useless to offer
an evidential probleln of evil in this vein. The key is to arrive at some
understanding of thc kind of nondemonstrative argument that sup-
plies rational grounds for the rejection of theism.
Versions of the Evidential ent

This kind of nondemonstrative or broadly inductive argument csscn-
tially asks the theist to make scnsc of evil in light of his belief in God.
Thc critic cites soille alleged fact about evil as the ewidence that sup-
ports the conclusioll that it is more rational, given the evidmce, t o
believe that God does not exist. Three forn~ulatiansof this kind of ar-
gumellt Inay be detected in the grokning literature on the ejridential
argument. As with the logical and probabilistic arguments, we Inay
classify these formulations according to which of the followring
propositions about evil they use:
(E$) Evil exists

(Ez) Large amounts, cxtrcme kinds, and perplexing distfihrx-
tioils of evil exist
(E3) Gratuitous evil exists.
Thus, we get the taxonomy of arguments shown in Figure 5.1:

FIGIJW 5-1 Versions of the Evidential Argtlmel-tt koxn Evil
(E,) (E21 (E3)

is evidence is evidence is evidence
agair~st against against
(6) (6) (G)
For each jrersion of the argument, thm, a specific (E)-proposition is

said to count as ejridence agaillst (G).
The first formulation of the evidential argument-Version IV-is
not now widely discussed. George Schlesinger, a theist, recognized
this version in very early discussions of the evidmtial argument:
"While the question of the amount of evil the world contains most vi-
tally affccts our lives, in the context of our problcm this is an entirely
irrcle\rant questione9'2According to this version of the argument, any
instancc of cvil at all tends to disconfirm God's eexistencc. Howrever,
the critic's hope of lnaking Version IV successful depends on his
shokning that there is no lnorallp sufficient reason for an omnipotent,
omniscient, kvholly good God to allow any evil whatsoejrer. This is a
claim that seems well beyond the critic's reach, since a number of
thoughtful nontheists admit that some evil szrFTesgood ends that
could not otherwise be achieved. Therefore, the theist can respond
that God, if he exists, could have a illorally sufficient rcason for allow-
ing som~evil. Thc thcist might even suggest solxe general kinds of
evils that arc connected to soillc goods (e.g., hardship is connected to
character development, danger to heroism, and so forth).
Many critics, ho~vever,see Versioil V as a more promising argu-
ment. In 7 %Faith
~ ofa Hefpetic, Walter Kaufnlann states:
The problenl arises when rritoncltl-reismis e~lrichedwit1-r-or impo~ferished
by-two assumptions: that God is omnipotexlt: and titat God is just, 1x1
het, popular tfieism goes beyond rnerely asserting that God is just and
clAms that God is ""good," that he is moraiIly perfect, that he l-raressuffer-
ing, that he loves mall, and titat he is infitlitely mercifirl, far trax~scending
all human mercy, love, and perfection. Ql~cethese assuxnytior-zs are
granted, tile prchblenl arises: w1-;ty9then, is there all the suffering we kilo~v?
And as long as these assurngtioxls arc grar~ted,titis questioxl callnot be an-
swcrcd, For if these assumptions were true, it would follow that tticrc
couid not be at1 this suffering. Con\rersely: since it is a fact that tl-rere is aU
this suffering, it is plain that at least one of these asstxnlptions nlust be
false, Popular theism is refilted by the existence of so gg~chs~tffering.The
tt~eisrnpreactled kom rbac~sandsof p~llpltsand credited by iniltions of
believers is disprocrcd by Auschwitz and a billion lesser evils.3
Many theists also acknowledge that this argument is quite formida-
ble. Harvard theologian Gordon Kaufman discusses its force:
A tl~ajc~r stut-ritbling block for contemporary faith it1 God remait~s:If
there is a God, and if he is lo\ri~~g, why is there such horrendorts evil in
t t ~ cworld? Do not the facts of terror, pain, and ulljustifiable suffentlg
demonstrate either that Gob is not good-and therefc~ret ~ o jiiorthy t of
our adoration and worship-or that there is l10 God at all? . . . ExpXo-
ration of thc ~?nri..te$i-zs,
sgbtteties, and e~zormitiesof cviI in huxnan life has
becr>rriteperhaps the principal theme of Iiterature, art, and dranla since
FVorid War 11.4
Thus 1ECarrfinan adn~itsthat
(E2) Large amounts, extrelne kinds, and perplexing distribu-

tions of evil exist
can be construed to count against
( G ) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists.
Again, it is not the sheer existence of evil per se that counts against
the existence of God but the fact that thcrc arc so many evils that arc
very severe and presellt in patterns de@ing comprehension.5
Formulating a reply to this ~rersionof the problem is dimcult but
not impossible for theists. Sorne theists have poilited out that this ar-
gumellt rests on an assulnption that the theistic deity would allowv
only certain amounts, kinds, and distributions of evil. Yet i t is hard to
kxlo\%rhow to establish how rz~uchevil is too mgcb for God to allow.
How, in principle, could we establish this? The logic of theism itsclf
does not scc131 to gcncratc any clear limit on the amount, type, and
bxoportions of evil in thc world. It also does not appear that thc
teachings of Christian theology, which expand upon restricted the-
ism, contain some limit. We could obviously apply one theistic re-
sponse to Versioll V here, sayillg that God could allow quite a lot of
evil, even very extreme evil, as long as it serves good purposes that
God could not otherwise achieve. A secolld question that theists of-
ten raise regards how any finite person could ascertain that the pres-
ent amount of evil in the world far exceeds the divinely set limit.
These and other perplexing questions make it difficult to imagine
how the atheist could ever establish such claims.6
What arc we to sal: then, about formulation V? In spite of its diffi-
cultics, wc should not dislniss V too quickl~r.After all, it is an attetnpt
to articulate one of the deepest and most profound objections to rcli-
gious disbelief. Expressions of this argument that describe concrete
instances of suffering, for example, strike a responsive chord in man)!
thoughtful people, believers and unbelievers alike. The critic can cer-
tainly argue strongly that theism fails to explain the large amounts,
extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil in the ~vorldand
that this is a prima facie good reason to reject theism. Further, critics
can argue that ~vhatcvcrdivine purposes thc horrible evils of our
world allegedly serve must be shown to be illorally worthwhile if God
is to be exonerated for permitting them.
The debate over Version V is vigorous and important. Theists typi-
cally argue that even quite considerable evil can be allokved bp a
morally perfect deity as long as it is necessary to either bringillg about
a greater good or preventing a greater evil. They employ either de-
fenses or theodicies that involve suggestions for what morally suffi-
cient reasons God has or rnight have along these lines? Atheistic crit-
ics find fault in attempts to arguc that all evils have a point. But this
rcally brings us to the consideration of the next version of the eriden-
tial problcim.
Version VI has become a major focus of both atl-reists and theists
alike. We map refer to this ~rersionhere as the evidefztial alzament
f i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r e~?il.
a t ~Many
i t u critics
~ s who advance Version V1 of the evi-
dential argument are willing to admit that the theistic deity might al-
low vast amounts, extreme kinds, and perplexing distributions of evil
to exist. But they insist that God is justified in allowing the magni-
tude and profusion of evil only if it serves some purpose. Cornman
and Lehrcr speak of "unnecessary evil," Madden and Harc speak of
"gratuitous evil," and Danicl Howard-Snyder speaks of "poititless
evil."8 So, it is gratuitous or pointless evil, if it exists, that proirides
crucial e~ridenceagaillst the existence of a supremely pobverful, wise,
and good God. WC must now take a look at how the philosophical
cornmunitp has handled this argument from evil.
ProbZ~mof Gratuitous E ~ i l
Andping the Evidential

fioxn. G r a t ~ t a u sEvil
William Rowe has provided the most widely discussed version of the
evidential argument from gratuitous evil. In 1979, Rowe wrote:
(R1) There exist instances of intense suffering which an om-

nipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without
thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil
equally bad or worse.
( M ) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the oc-
currence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could
not do so without thereby losing some greater good or
permitdng some evil equally bad or worse.
(R3) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly
good being.9
Rowe actually offers a concrete version of this argument by citing a

specific instance of intense suffering that could have been prevented
without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil
equally bad or worse. Largely to avoid the Free Will Defense, he de-
scribes an instance of natural evil: A helpless fawn is uapped in a for-
est fire and suffers horribly for days before dying. Now, assuming that
premise ( U )is held in common by most theists and atheists, the bulk
of the controversy revolves around the first premise.
In providing rational support for premise (Rl), Rowe states that
the fawn's suffering is "apparently pointless" for "there does not ap-
pear to be any ourneighing good such that the prevention of the
fawn's suffering would require either the loss of that good or the oc-
currence of an evil equally bad or worse." In later revisions of the ar-
gument, Rowe also borrows a case of suffen'ng from Bruce Russell as
an instance of moral evil: A five-year-old girl is raped, severely beaten,
and strangled to death by her mother's drunken boyfriend. Rowe's
WO examples are now referred to as "the cases of Bambi and Sue"
and employed as two reasons to believe that gratuitous evil exists.
Rowe argues, moreover, that even if we could discover that God
could not have eliminated these specific cases of seemingly pointless
evil without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some
evil equally bad or worse, it would still be unreasonable to believe
that all the illstances of seelnillgly pointless human and allinlal suffer-
ing that occur have such a point.'Q Thus, Rowe beliekres he has pro-
vided inductive support for premise (R1 ).
Iiowr's argument has brirtually been the paradigrn for the evidential
argument from evil since the late 1970s. For present purposes, let us
trin~it dow1-1as bllows:
(Kf ' ) Gratuitous evil exists

(R2')If God exists, then gratuitous evil does not exist
( M ' ) Therehre, God does not exist.
The argument structure here is obviously deductive. The support for

premise (1x1' ) is inductive, making this version of the argulnent from
evil "e\~idrntial~"l~
We must understand ~ra~git.of&s evil (in b w c % svords) as an evil
that an omnipotent, omniscient bcing could have prevented without
thercby tosing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad
or worse. A gratuitous evil, in this smse, is a state of affairs that is not
necessary (either logically or causally) to the attainment of a greater
good or to the prevention of an evil equally bad or kvorse. According
to this line of thinking, the only muraJly ~ztfficielzt1.ea~ulz God can
have for permitting any evil is that i t must be necessary either to the
attainment of a greater good or to the prevention of an evil equally
bad or s\rorsc,
The Appearance
Mally theists have joined the fray to rebut or lnitigate the force of
Rowr's first premise and thus stop the argulnent from ~vorking.Some
of them argue that the instances of apparently pointless evil that
Rowe cites are not generated by following proper inductive tech-
niques, that is, that they arc not part of a rcprescntativc sample.
These theists argue that wc arc rationally justified in belic\ring that
therc arc no goods that justi@ an evil only if we think the goods wc
kno~vof are part of a represeiltative sample. <)bviously, in making
many ordillarp illductive judgments, the rallge of relejrant items in
the sample falls kvithin our range of knokvledge (e.g., lookixlg all
around the world and seeing many storlts with red legs and then con-
cluding that it is reasonable to believe that all storks have red legs).
But Stephrn Wykstra argues that the atheistic critic has no reasoll to
believe that finite human beings can have a representatiire sample of
goods for the sake of which an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good
being would allow evil.
To begi12 to understand the exact point of this objection to Kowe, we
131ust understand Wybtra's analysis of appears-locutions. He assumes
Rowc uses the term "appears'? hil-t what Kodcrick C:hisholm calls the
"epistcrnic'? sense of the tcnn. That is, it pertains to what \VC arc in-
clined to belieire when we contemplate a situation. Then, Wykstra
makes a careful distinction in the different jwys that the word "not"
fullctions in such locutions. He argues that Ko\ve's statelnent that
"there does not appear to be any ounveighing good" should not be in-
telpreted as the initial premise in an argument h m ignorance, ~vhichis
a blatant fallacy. Rowre's statement, a5 Wykstra correctly poi~ltsout, is
bener i n w r p ~ t e das meaning that "it aayycars that tl~crcis no ourneigh-
ing good ."l2
Rowe's inference, then, may be understood as moving from a
proposition such as
(42) It appears that some evils are co~lllectedto no ounvrighing

goods
to the proposition
(43) It is masonable to believe that some c\-ils arc not connected

to o t r ~ c i g h i n ggoods.
This reasoning has this gelleral form: (A) It appears that p; therefore,
(B) it is reasollablc to believe that p.
Such an inference seems warranted by the Principle of Crcdkxliry ex-
pounded by Kichard Swinburne: lf something appears to be the case
(in the epistemic sense of "appears"), then this prima facie justifies
one in bclicving it is the case.lVhis pr;\nciylc is rooted in a wide-
spread philosophical opinion that \VC have generally rcliablc bclief-
forming powers (e.g., perception, memory) that incline us toward
certain belie& in certaill situations.l%ccordi~lg to Wykstra, hobvever,
the Principle of Credulity does not quite provide the criterion we
need. He argues that the epistelnic relatioil that the principle posits
bet\\reen (A) and (B) tnust meet the Condition of Reasonable Epi-
stemic Access (COIWEA):
CCILWEA: On the basis of cognized situation s, l-rut-ritanH is entirled to
claim "It appears that g" only if it i s reasonable for H to believc that,
give11 her c~gtlftivcfactzIties and the use she has rnade of them, if p wcrc
12ot the ease, s would likely be different than it is in sot-rite way dis-
cernible by her,'"
In ~-nakingan appears-claim, one assrrmes there is an evidential con-

nection bcween what she is inclined to belie\re (i.e., that p) and the
cog~lizedsituation that illclines her to believe it. However, if it is not
reasonable for her t o believe that this e~ridentialconnection obtains,
then she is not entitled to sap, "It appears that p,"
Wykstra argues that applying COWEA is fatal to liowe's case, for
by COlWEA, one is entitled to claim "this suffering does nor appear
(i.e., appears not) to serve any Divinely purposed ounvrighing good"
only if it is reasonable t o believc that if such a Divinely purposed
good exists, it would be within our ken. But it is not reasonable to
believe this, according to Wykstra, sincc an infinitely wise deity ~vould
crrtaillly know of ounveighing goods that escape our finite undrr-
standing. We hulnalls could not expect to know all the goods in
jrirtue of bnhich God permits suffering. They are beyond our ken.
Thus, Kowr's clailx~that there appear to be no ounvrighing goods for
much suffering does not meet the Condition of lieasonable Epis-
ternic Access. If such goods did exist, Wykstra claims that we have no
reason to think WC would have cognitive access to thel-n.
Wj~kstra.contends that Rowc would have to show that if thcism is
true, then there is reason to think that \VC \\rouid have access to the all
the goods that ellter into God's reasons for permitting suffering. Wyk-
stra beliejrrs that the prospects for doing this are very bleak. Since he
lnaintains that belief in God's illfillite kno~rledgethat exceeds our own
is logically implied bp theism, the theist should gxpect that we would fail
to see outweighing goods for many e\rils.lb According to Wykstra, the
theist has reason indeed to believe that in many cases of sufkring,
C O m E A is not rmt. But then he ~vondcrsho\v Rowe's claim that
thcrc appear to be no justifiiing goods connccted to many evils is sup-
posed to be rational support for the key prcmisc that
(K1 ) There exist illstances of intense suffering that an omnipo-

tellt, omniscient being could have prevented ~vithout
equally bad or worse,
If this premise does not have adequate rational support, that is, if one
is not bnithin her epistemic rights to believe it, then it is difficult to see
how it can serve as evidence n&ginst theism.
In replying to Wkstra, Rowe reinforces his position that the fact that
various evils "appear" not to have out\veighing goods is acceptable ra-
tional justification f i r his prclnise (RI). He clarifies that his original in-
tcntion was to discrrss sta%d~~!gfid &eis%az, ~vhichis the view that the= is
an omnipotent, omniscient?~vhollygood bcing who crcrtted the world.
Within standard theism, Kowe distinguishes rertricted theism and 6%-
panded theism. Restricted theism is strictly the view that the being de-
scribed bp standard theism exists. Expanded theism, hobnever, is the
view that this being exists, conjoined with certain other significant reli-
gious claims (about sin, redemption, afterlife, and so forth). The
essence of Rowe's response to Wkstra, then, is that Wyhtra mistak-
enly defends his o w prcferrcd version of expanded thcisln, whereas
Rowc"s original attacli was mounted against rcsat-icted thcism. Wjrk-
stra's defensc, then, inisses the point. It might work for his particular
versioil of expailded theism, but it does not help restricted theism at all.
Rowe describes Wykstra's gelleral strategy as an attelnpt to block
his abiliy to affirm a proyositioil such as
(44) It appears that the fawn's suffering is pointless-that is, i t

appears that the fawn's suffering does not serve an out-
weighing good otherwise unobtainable by an omnipo-
tent, omniscient beixilg.
Ro~ve,of course, cites as justificatioil for (44)the fact that k2.e are unable
to think of any good that exists or might come into existeilce that both
ounveighs the fmrll's suffering a ~ could
d not be obtained by God with-
out permitting that suffering. If this is acceptable support for (44), then
the eilidential argument fioln gratuitous evil works.
Ho~vever,Wykstra counters that Rowe is not entitled to affirm (44)
ulllcss the following proposition is true:
(45) WC have no reason to think that wcrc God to exist things

would strike us in pretty much the same %.ay concernillg
the fawn's suffering.
Wykstra's objection focuses, then, on shojving (45) to be false by

supplying a reason to think that were the fawn's suffering actually to
serve an ourneighing good, otherwise unobtainable bp God, things
would still strike us in pretty much the same way-that is, we jwuld
be unable to think of any outweighing good for it.
Rowe characterizes Wykstra7sreasoning in this \\lap. Wykstra starts
with the claim
(46) God" smind grasps goods bcyond our ken,
(47) It is likely that the goods for the sake of which God per-
mits suffering are, to a large extent, beyond our ken,
and condudes with
(48) It is likely that illany of the s~lfkringsin our world do not

appear to have a point----WCcannot see what goods justi@
God in permitting them.
For Wykstra, then, proposition (48) is a "logical erteilsioil of the-

ism," "implicit" in theism, and not simply an "additional yostu-
tate.'"y Armed with a version of theisrn that includes (48), Wjrkstra
claims that the appearance that many instances of suffering do not
have a point is exactly what WC would expect if God exists. In other
~vords,(45) is not true,
Rowc agrccs that standard theism implics (46) and that it also im-
plies a proposition something like
(49) God allo~rsthe sufferillgs that occur in this world in order

to achie~~e
goods he could otherwise not achieve.
Rut l b w e vigorously disagrees that restricted standard theism ilxplies

that these goods, once: they occur, rei~~ain beyond our ken," That is
an implication of some versions of expanded thcislll, such as Wyk-
stra"? but not of rcstrieted tbeism itself.
R o w maintains, then, that Wykstra" move kern (46) to (47) is the
heart of the difficulty. This move presupposes that the goods in ques-
tion have not occurred or, if they hiwe occurred, remain unknown to
us (in themselves or in their connections to actual sufkrings). Rut re-
stricted standard theism, says Rokve, supplies no reason to think that
either of these alternatives is true. Perhaps, prior to their being real-
ized, God's inind grasps goods that we cannot imagine. This much
seems deducible flt.om standard theisr~~. But this is no reason to thinlr
either that the greater goods in virtue of which God permits most suf-
fering~come into existence in the distant future o r that once they do
come into existence, we rclllain ignorant of them and their relation to
the sufkrings. 1"
Athough restricted standard theism implies that God can appre-
heild noilactual goods prior t o their occurring that lie beyond our
ken, this is iilsufficie~ltto justifi Wj~kstra'sclaim that, if God were t o
exist, the sufferillgs in our ~rorld~rouldappear to us as they do. Kowe
concludes, therefore, that Wykstra has not supplied a convincing rea-
so11 to reject his evidential claim:
(R1) Thcrc exist instances of intcnsc suffering that an o~llnipo-

tent, omniscient being co~aldhave pre\rcnted ~virhout
thereby losing some grearcr good or pcrlnitting some evil
equally bad or bvorse.
Thus, for Rowe, a crucial pre~nisein the evidential argumellt can be

shown reasonable to believe, and the argument from gratuitous evil
stands.
Notes
X . Sec AIVIIIPlalltil~ga,"The Kefc>rmedObjection to Natrrral T h e ~ I o m ~ "
Ci!$ristian Scjgokgr S- Revieav l I (1982): it 87-198. See also Nicholas WoLter-
storff; "The Migration of the Tl~eisticArguments: From Natural Theology
to Ellidtentialist Apologetics," bin Rationnlit-y; Relz'~z'clz$sBeliq; sad bAo18~al
Ciovkz~~itment~ eds. Roberr Audi and Williarn J. bVainwrigl~t:(Xthaca: Cornell
University Press, 1986),pp. 38-81.
2. Gcorge Schlcsinger, Reltqz'clrt alzd Sez'e~t.tg3c6g190d ( F-Xi~~gIlam, Mass.:
IXcidcl, l977), p. 13,
3, Waiter &ufn-lan~~,?he Failch @"a Hgretic (Garden City, N.Y.: ITo~xble-
day, X 961), p, 139 (italics rnirle),
4. Gorcfan D, bufman, God: 2he IZroblem (Cambndgc, Mass.: EIarvard
University, 1972), pp. 171-1 72 (italics rritine),
5 . Pauf X3raper has offered the rnczst sopl-liseicatcd recent relldirion of ar-
gumcx~rV in ""Pin and Ncasure: An E~ridentiaiIZrobleinfor 'l'lzeisa," "1 Y79e
E ~ ~ i d e ~ z tA<qu$ge~zt
ial fgom Evil, ed, Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington:
Indiana Universi~Press, X 996), pp. 12-29. In the early X 980s, I i~ltroduced
the tailguage of "*ai~~ount," akind,'7 and ""distribution" iinto the discrission of
the evidential argrrmexlt in my E ~ i nrtd l tha Christi~anG d ( G r a ~ ~bdp i d s ,
Mich,: Baker Book House, 1982), p. 67. Peter van fslwagcl~has more re-
celntly used these collcepts as the basis for an artictc on the problem of evil.
See his "The Magnitrtde, Drtration, and I>iseribr~tionof Evil: A Tl~eodicy,"
I2hil~sophicai1>er~pectives 5 ( 1991): X 35-1 65. Brtlce XXusscfull acknowledges
this kind of problem in "Defensetess," bin 7be E~~identz.zlal Ar~g~s$ent fkom
E ~ i l ,ed. IDaniel Howard-Sr1-t7del.de ( Ifloomi ngton : Indiana University Prcss,
lY96), pp. 194, l99ff.
6, Peter van Inwagell discrisses the difficufties surroundi~lgthe argut-ritent
over the arnorrnt and kinds of evil in his ""The Probiern ofEvi1, the Probtern
of Air, and the Problem of Silence," Philosophical 13g~slfiect-zz7es 5 (199 1):
135-165, especially pp, 140-1 52.
7 . St~chan. appraisai of the situation seems more intellectrrafly hoxlest and
rnore philosoptlically proxnising than del-tj'inp that there reafly is as mueh evil
or tl-tnt rrituftitrzdes of people are really as ul-thappy as is iinibdiy supposed, It
is better fir the theist simply to admit that there are a great maxly severe evils
in the world and the11 t a argtle that the existel-tce of God is llelthcr precluded
nor n~adeunlikely thereby. The argllnlent can be constructed either fro111 the
logic of essc~~tiaf ttteistic coxlcepts ur from the additiotla! cotlcepts ir~cluded
in sarne e x p a ~ ~ d;form~ d of tftelsm that is represented in a Xivii-tg faith tradi-
tion, ssrch as C;l~ristianity,
Althczugh strclt theistic maxleu\rers seem reasonable, pertlaps there is at
least one sense in which the evidel-ztial argtlmel-tt kom the amounts, kinds,
and disrril;liutior~of evil is ii~lmediateiydestrt~ctiveto religious belief. The ar-
grrmexlt clearly discredits belief in a delry who places a felicitorrs limitation
01-1the evils that lrulnall beings can experience and about wham sixnplisttc
answers for evil may be given. Th~xs,the god of popu1~"fotk religion
peddled in the name of historical, ortltodox Christianiq-really is dead, The
burden, then, falls upon the shoulders of thoughtfufulChristian theists to ar-
ticulate a concept of God that is 111ore sopllisticated a i d profo~xndthan pop-
ufar theism envisioxls.
8. 7 . W Cornrnan and Keirfi Lefirer, 1>hilosophical1>roblgmsa d A ~ ~ E . c -
aazents: An I~trodaectio~$ (New York: h%acmiIlan,1970), p. 347; Edkirard
Maddell and Peter Hare, Evil grid the Concep~of C;c.d (Springijeld, Ill.:
Charles C;. Thomas, 19681, p. 3; Dalliel Howard-Si~yder,""l'be Argtlmel-tt
fi-om Inserurablc Evil," in his Evidential A ~ q u ~ s $ e n t fEvili o ~(Bloomington:
~
Indiana Universiry Press, X 996), pp, 29 1-292,
9. WiIliam Itowe, ""Tfie Problem of Evil and Soine Vaneties of Atheism,"
Amtsrica~zPhilosophical Qzir%rter1",~ 16 ( 1879): 336. I have changed nsxnlbers
and added parentheses to Ro\%rc?argrrment in keeping with the convcntioll
;for lluxnbering used thro~tphoutthis book,
10. Ibid., p. 337.
1l , In terms we used earlier,
(E3) Grat~zitclusevil exists
counts as negative er~idenceagai~lst
( G ) AI omnipotent, omnisciet~t,jiiholly good God exists,
But what is the sig~~ificant ~legatiifeer~identiairelationship to (G) in jiihich
(E3) sta~lds?Rrrrce Russell explains that ttterc are really m70ways ofcor~ceiv-
ing of this evidential relationship, one z'~tdi?.l.ct.zveand the other nbdacctive. AI-
though we callnot psrrstxe this distincdon here, the reader is encouraged to
read R~tsself'S 'Wefenseless,"" pp, X 93-2 X 8,
121. Stephen Wyksrra, ""'l'he I3trmean Obstacle to Evldel-zdal hguments
fi-om S~~ffering: O n AvoiQi~lgtl-re Evils of "ppearance,"' I~$er~~zac.innn;lJo~~~
nlili.l$%trPj~iltrscphjf~'Rel@z"on X 6 ( 1.984):80-8 l .
12%. lZichard Srvinburne, 2be E~igg~-zce of Chd (Oxford: Clarel-Edan lzress,
1970), pp. 245,254.
14, For example, Swirtbr~rnecircs an example o f a betiefformed 0x1 the ba-
sis of scl~soryexperience: ""If say 'ttil~cship appears to be mokring" am say-
ing that I am i~~clined to beliecre that the ship is movii~g,and that it is my
present sensory experience which leads me to have this ir1ciina6ol1 to belief."
See his Existence of'God, p. 246. For a fuller discussion of these cognitive
golirers and their function, see Afiin Pia~ltinga,Wa~.r#gnt and Pf*operFgnc-
tiun (New York: Oxhrd U111versit.y Press, 1993).
it 5. Wykstra, "Humcan Obstacle," p. 85.
16, Ibid., p. 89.
X 7 . Ibid., pp* 89,9l.
18. WiXliarn Rowc, ""E7il and the '~bcisricEIyyothcsis: A lXcsponsc t o
Wykstra," hic~:ep-pzatin~~t%I PhiIusopby of"Relg3ion16 ( 1984):99.
J1;1~a#nt%lf-;3~
X 9. Xi,owe observes that ~ 7 ecould, of cottrse, imagine a ~rersiotlof ex-
panded theism that conjoins a praposidan such as
The goods for the sake of which God rnLlst perinit suffering wilt. be real-
ized only at the e ~ l dof the wortd
with standard theisnl. This version of expanded theism is not rendered un-
likely by ttte items that render restl-icted theism ~tnXikeXy-See ibid.
Suggested Radings
Aston, William, "The Inductive Argut~le~lt from Evil and the Human Cog-
nitive Condition." Phz'kos~~phz'cnl Pe~~spccgi~cs 5 ( 1991): 2947.
Bear)?, MichaeI D. ""'l'lze Problein of Evil: l'lze Ux-rans\vered Questions Argu-
" kSuzdt.htvenPifilo~~phy
rrite~lt, R e v i e l ~4 ( 1988): 57-44,
82 'Ihe l3faoble~$
of C;r&ggit~gs
Evil
Chrzan, Keith, "Necessary Grat~ritousEvil: An Cjxymoron Revisited," Fgitlj

alzd P/$z'losophyX 1 ( 1994): 134-1 37.
. "W~CXI 1s a Graruirac~sEvil Xtcally Grattlitaus?" fizt.gr.l.znt-z'o~nI]otc~~-
nt%lf-irrPhz"losopk3~1 24 ( 1988): 87-9 l.
n_f"Religi;on
Dore, Cternexlt. "Does Strffcring Serve Valuable Ends!" 111 Thehm, Dor-
drcchr: D. IZcidel, 1984.
Feinberg, Joh11S, ?he LW~PZJI Faca of Evil: Theolo~z'cal ,I?tfte:msand the P~~olibm
of7Evil,2nd ed. Grand bpids, Mich,: %iondervan,1994.
Gcach, Petcr. Piw~kdanceand Evil. Gambndgc: Cambndgc Ux-rivcrsiy Press,
1977.
Hasker, iVilliam, ""Chrzan on Necessary Grattritous Evil," Faith and Phiinso-
pby l 2 (1995):4 2 3 4 2 5 .
. "The Necessity of Grattiitous Evil." Fgigh and Phiilosopk3~1 9 (1992):
2344'
. ""Pravidcncc and Evil: Three l'heorics." Raeti8iaws S~udkes28
(1992): 91-105,
Hick, John. Evil and tik G d of'IJc~~e. 2nd ed. New York: Harper 13r: I<ou;
1978.
Howard-S~lyder,Daniel. ?he E~~ide~ztial A Y B Z . ~ F # $ PEvil,F ~ ~B~l ~
o oOmPiB~ ~ g t o ~ ~ :
lrldialla University Press, 1996,
. ""Sceing Throtxgta 6 0 l W E A ." htgr'l.zntio~nI Jout.l.zwlfit. 12bilosophy
ofRelz&ion 32 ( 1992): 2 5-49,
Mi~dden,Edward, and Peter Hare. " h i 1 and I~~cor~clcrsivet~ess.'~ Sl,phia
(A8~stalin;) 1l (January-Jul~e 1972): 8-12.
CjT~onnor,David, "Hasker on Necessary Gratuito~xsEvil." Fgith n ~ z dPi2z'los-
opby X 2 ( l995): 380-392,
Xzcterson, Michael. Evil a ~ z d$he Cb~z'fiianGod. Grand Xbpids, Micb.: Baker
Book House, 1982.
. ""God and Eviit in Process Theolon." hi Pf~ocessTheoI08~f, edited by
IXoiIald Nasfi. Grand Xtapids, Micf.1.: Baker Book EIouse, 1987, pp,
117139,
. ""God and Evil: Problems of Collsistcclcy and Grattrizrq:" fi~uz%~~z.tnl of'
Vall-zeI ~ g a i q t13 (1979): 305-31 3.
. "l<ecent Work on the Problem of Evil." A~zzericanPhilosophical
Qga~*t.crI,~20 (1983): 321-339.
Xzetcrson, Michael, ed . 'Ihe IZroble~*of' Evil: Selected I Z g ~ d i ~Notre ~ s . Dame,
Ind.: U-ni~ferstrjr of Notre Dame Press, 1992.
Petersoil, Michael, Wilfiarn Hasker, Brrrce Keichenbach, and Davtcl Basinger,
Rggso~i!and dTelz9z"ogsBeliej An I~t$~~di?.l.cirZ'o~z to tb~d: l'hilo~~~phptof l<eIz"~z'~'~n,
2nd ed. New Uorlc: Oxford fj~iivcrsityPress, 1998, chap, 6, pp, 116-1455.
Rt~wc,William I,. ""The Empirical Argument I.i.om Evil." "I R R L ~ . ~ : ~Re- oFZ~~~
li8z'ogs1Yelig; wnd MOP"&/ C ~ P B P E ~ ~ P edited
~ Z ~ F Zby~ ,1x0berr Audi and William
Wain~liiright.Ithaca: C:ornefl fj~iiversityPress, 1986, pp. 227-247,
. ""Evil a ~ l dTheadicy." Pi2z'los~phicalTopics 16 (Fall 1988): 119-1 32.
. "Evil and the Theistic Hypothesis: A Respotlse to S, J. Wykstra." h-
teaerrationat Jotca~aatJbr I2hilnsophjt ofReli8ion: it 6 ( 1984): 95-1 00.
. "The Prc->ble~-rit of Evil ." h1 Pi$z/osaphy of Reltqion: AFZI ~ z t ~ 0 d ~ . ~ c t i r n ,
Etldno and Belmont, Calif.: IDickensor-r, 1978, pp, 79-95,
. ""TIC ProbXem of Evil and Soxne Varieties of Atheism," Aifmeaeic~n
PhiIttsophical Qts@rtgr[y16 ( 19792: 335-34 1.
. "R~~rni natiolls about khil, " PhiIosc~phicdPerspecti~~es 5 ( X 99X ) : 69-8 8,
12ussel1, Bruce. "Thc 13eersistel-ttXzroblenl of Evil," a ~ z dIZhilosophy 6
(1989): 121-139.
Kusscll, Bruce, and Stephell Wykstra, "The "~xlducti\reWrgrrmex-rtfrom Evil:
A Dialogue." P!~ilosophicak Ybpiw 16 (Fall 1988): 133-1 60.
Sennett, Jan~esE", ""The Inscrutable Evil Defense," Fgith n~zdPhilosophy 10
(X 993): 220-229.
Stc~par t, Mclville. 7ke CJ~~eatea*-Good Dgkasme: An: Essgy on: the Rn;t-z'o~nlip of
Faith. New k r k : St. Martin'ss, 1993,
Trau, Jane hilary, "hltacies in the ,ALrg~rne~lt from Grattritous S~rfferil-rg."
~ - ~(1986):58'5-588,
2be M ~ u 7S c h o i g ~ % i c i60
Iran Inwagen, Peter, ""Tlte Magnitude, Duratioil, a ~ l dDistribution of Evil: A
Tkcodicy." Philosophicnl Topics X 6 (Fall X 988): 16 1-X 87.
. ""'l'llc 131taceof Gballce in a bVorid Sustained by God," h Inlivi~zea n d
Hgagn~zAcrt:Z082, edited by Thornas V. Morris. Itltnca: Ci~rilellUniversity
Press, X988, pp, 21 1-235.
. "The 13rrablem of EliI, the Problem of Air, and the 13rrablcm of Si-
lence," Phi/osopk~icaIPc?~spectz'~e~ 5 ( 1991): l 35-1 65.
The evidential argulllent from gratuitous evil is now widely consid-
ered the most forlnidable objection to theistic belief. Glearlj: de@nse
against this as well as other objections fro111 evil is an important type
of theistic response. Yet Exany classical and contemporary theists have
responded in an altogether different mode. Thcse theists engage in
what has traditionally been called theodicy. The term derives froin the
Greek theus (god) and dike (justice) and is, as John Milton saps, an at-
tempt t o "justify the ways of God t o man." Rather than propose
merelj!pusslblc reasons God inight have for permitting evil, a theodicy
seeks to articulate plausible or crcdiblc explanations that rest on theis-
tic truths and insights. Just as contemporary analytic philosophers of
religion have sharply distinguished the logical and evidential prob-
lems of evil, they also have carefully defi~lcdthc strategic tilnctions of
defense and theodicy. Although debate about the viabiliq?of theodicy
continues, snany illtrresti~lgand influelltial theodicies have been ad-
in the discussion of God 2nd evil. I review here discussions of
12-al2cet;f.
the feasibility of theodicy. Then, 1 will take a close look at four fa-
mous theodicies, &om Augustine, Gottfried Leibniz, John Hick, and
AXei-etl North Whitehead.
The Prospects for Theodiq

Most theistic responses to the argument from gratuitous evil rcvolve
around its factual premise, which is the claim that there is (or proba-
bly is) gratuitous evil. William Rowe writes: "If we are to fault this ar-
gument, . . . we must find some fault with its [factual] premise."'
Madden and Hare state that "the really interesting problem of evil is
whether the apparellt gratuity can be explained a\lray . . . or whether
the gratuity [of evil] is real and hence detrimental t o religious be-
lief."2 Keith Yandell, a theist, insists that "the crucial question is
whether it is certain, or at least more yrobable than not, that there is
unjustified evil, ~vhethernatural or moral."3 Almost all defenses as
\veil. as thc~dicicsbased on standard theis111 react t o the factual
premise of the argument.
Theistic defenses against the factual claim that therc is gratuitous
e\ril-sucI~ as Wykstra's, Aston's, and van In\vagen7s4-tppicaIly cite
the severe cognitive limitations of human beings in relation to divine
wisdom. According to these theists, such limitations bar the critic
from claiming that i t is reasonable to believe that therc are no offset-
ting goods conllected to many evils in the world. The goods that jus-
tie God in allowing evil are, they contend, beyond our ken, known to
the divine mind but not to our minds. Because of thcsc salxc cognitive
limitations, many theists who offer a defense declarc thcodicy to be
impossible or klnneccssary or inappropriate. Some sec fheodicy as im-
possible because it requires knokning the rewons for evil that only the
divine kvisdom can kno\n. Even if it kvere not strictly impossible to
blow God's reasons for evil, others kvould argue that theodicy bnould
still be unnecessary because i t exceeds what pure defense coupled with
Reforlned episteluology requires of the theist in the debate with the
critic. Some even say that theodicy is inapyropriate because it displays
the presumption and arrogance of mere hulxans trying to probe into
divine ixysterics. Let us look at cach of thcse objections in turn.
A grcat many C:hristian theists, past and prcscnt, have not consid-
ered theodicy impossible. Most of them have not thought that for-
mulating a theodicy requires kilowing God's reasolls for evil as
though finite humail beillgs could completely fathom the infiilite di-
vine ~visdom.liather, they conceive of the project of theodicy as
drawing out the implications of one's theological position for evil. Af-
ter all, religious believers commonly accept that the doctrines and
teachings of their faith have implications for all sorts of illlportant
il~attcrs----moraland spiritual virtues, the meaning of rcdeil~ption,the
purpose of htlman life, and so forth. So, it would bc odd indeed to
think that religious beliefs have no implicatioils kvhatsoever for under-
standing something so important as evil in the bnorld. In a sense,
then, Christiall theisln already contains implicit theodical insights that
may be made explicit and systematic. In fact, some Christian tradi-
tions forthrightly claim that it is God's good pleasure to give us at
least dim and partial glimpses of his general purposes, including his
purposes for evil. (Here we simply have t o recognize difkre~lces
among Christian traditions or what we are calling versions of ex-
panded theism, and some are more positive toward theodicy.) What-
ever degree of understanding of evil that believers achieve, then, pro-
vides a lneasklrc of theodicy. Thus, theodicy is not impossible.
Not all theists agrcc with what we ~xightcall the Reformed objcc-
tion to theodic): which designates defcnse as the theist's only rcspon-
sibility in the debate with the critic and offers a theory of how belief
in God can be episte~nicallybasic. Yet developillg a theodicy seems
completely justified to theists who coilstrue the dialectical context of
rational debate in a certain fashion. The theist might see himself not
as asserting the isolated claim that "God exists" but rather as assert-
ing a whole set of logically interrelated clairns regarding the divine
nature and purposes. He ~xighteven understand the single claim
""God cxists" to toe investcd with this largcr interpretive scheme and
thercforc entailing all sorts of other claims about God's ways with thc
bvc~rld.He could maintain that the j4rhsle system of tselieE5 that consti-
tute his understanding of theism offers an iilterpretatioil of human
life and the kvorld at large. The dialectic develops, then, when the
critic alleges that this theological interpretation has difficulty account-
ing for evil. The theist responds by trying to elucidate and explain
how his theological beliefs make sense of evil. Here the critic is not
being eccentric or unfair to request that the thcist make sensc of his
own belief in God, particularly by tracing out its ramifications for the
issue of evil. So, when the contest of dialoguc is conceived differcntlj~,
theodicy is not unilecessav.
Even if we grmt that the ixliever may be entitled to accept belief in
I ~ Sto, think that lik's eex-
Gad as basic Litider certai~lC O I ~ ~ ~it~isOnaive
perirnces \\.illnever invite deeper reflection upon that belief, reflection
that includes questioning as well a5 reaffirgning one's faith. When en-
gaging in this kind of honest reflection, thoughtful believers explore the
implications of their uniqur particular <:hristian and theistic pcrspectivc
for a large number of illlportant issues----moral crises, the worth of ccr-
tain humanitarian projects, the hope of life after death, and the prcscncc
of evil. Thus, it is quite legitimate for theists to try to formulate some
reasonable understaildi~lgof evil for themselves, and ~rhate~rer under-
stailding they obtain moves them in the direction of theodicy. This ac-
tivity need not be characterized as exhibiting the haught)' presumption
that a finite hurnan being can know the dibrine mind. Instead, i t may be
seen as the process of "faith seeking u~~dersta~ding" Cfides qthaefpelzs i ~ z -
tellect&snz).Hence, theodicp is not inappropriate.
If theodicy is not impossible or unnecessary or inappropriate, then
the way is open to discuss a variety of issues at the 1e-d of metatheon'-
icy. For example, how lnuch conceptual work can or ought theodicy
accomplish? That is, can theodicy specify God's reason for allowing
partic~alarevilsmr sho~aIdit aim at explainir~gwhy God allows the
broad kinds of evils that exist? Must a thcodicy ~ sont just one theme
(e.g., punishlnent or character building)! Or can it kveave together
several themes and illsights into an oirerall picture of the sort of 14rorld
God created and sustains? And what role does our particular ~noral
theory play in the creation of theodicp! What difference does it make,
saj: ~vhetherwe adopt a co~lsequentialistor a deontological moral
theory! Where are appropriate building blocks for theodicy to be
found---in restricted theislx or in solxe version of expanded theism?
Ho\v these and many Exore related questions are settled determines
the direetion theodicy will cake.
Without attempting t o discuss these questioils in detail, let us say
that all of the theodicies considered here try to give some highly gen-
eral explailatioils for the evils we find in our world. Furthermore,
since restricted theism prok~idrsvery little material for theodicl~,each
of the following theodicies relies on some for~nof expanded theism
adopted by the theodicist. In developing their theodicies, Christian
theists extract themes frolx the Bible and historical church teachings
as wcll as insights prc\ralcnt in the communiq of belic\rers, thus tap-
ping into a rich vein of ideas. Of course, various <:hristian traditions
\n.ill yield difkrellt forms of expanded theism. The theodicist then re-
flects upon the various ideas ajrailable bnithin his tradition and coil-
strues them in a \nap that accounts for evil in the ~rorld.
The motivation for theodicy, of course, is that we do not readily see
the purpose of much evil. Without at least a general account of evil
from a theistic perspective, then, evil appears pointless. Hence, we
have the force of Rowc's first premise:
(RI) Thcrc exist instances of intcnsc suffering that an o~llni-

potent, omniscient being could have prevellted ~rithout
equally bad or bnorse.
Most theodicies therefore follojv the strategy of specifying either

greater goods that are gained or worse evils that are averted by God's
permitting evil? We map call this gelleral approach "Greater-Good
Theodic~7."Greater-Good Throdicy is, so to speak, the "parmt," and
man!. particular theodicies are its "offspring."b The b~ariousoffspring
theodicies may specift different offsetting goods for the evils of the
world, but they all agree in assuming that the justification of God
consists in specieing some grcatcr good.7 The difference bcmecn a
Greater-Good Dcfcnsc and a Create~GoodThesdic~;of course, is
that thc former claims it is possible that some proposed grcatcr good
justifies evil kvhereas the latter claims that the proposed good ifzfact
justifies evil.
Augustine's Free Will Theodicy

The first fully formed theodicy in the Western world was offered by
St. Augustine, an early C:hristian philosopher and theologian. 111 part,
A-rxgustine was rebutting Manichacan Dualism, ~vj~ich, holds that
equal cosmic powers, one Good and the other Evil, arc at war in thc
unikrerse. For Manichaeism, the Good pokner, ~rhichpeople ~rorshiy,
is therefore not absolute. For Augustine, ho~rever,the Christian
worldview elltails that God is absolutely sovereign over all things and
that no evil comes from hirn. So, Augustine undertook the task of
shojving how the disturbing and undeniable presence of evil in no
way detracts from God's total sovereignty.
Augustine ofkrs a comprchensivc vision of reality that brings to-
gether several strands of thought. One of Augustine's central idcas is
that God is suprcme in rcaliq and goodness. He also bclic\res that the
universe-that is, the whole of God's creation-is good. Only God
has the pokner to bestow beillg upon finite creatures, and God only
creates good things. All of the creatures in God's creation, then, are
good in their essence. Augustine elnbraces a recurring theme in West-
ern philosophy: the linkage of being and goodness. Here we must un-
derstand "being" not as bare "existence" (~vhichdoes not admit of
degccs) but as having more or less ""intensiq" (in the sense, say, that
a poetic genius lives more i t ~ ~ n s c lthan
j ? a simpleton). Intcnsiq ad-
131its of degrees. I11 Augustine's terminology, everything has some dc-
gree of "measure, form, and order,"8 ~rhichis its proportion of being.
Just as God's being is illfinite and absolute, so his goodlless is infillire
and unsurpassable. God's creation is rich and variegated, filled with
all levels of being, and the goodness of all things is correlated to the
degree of measure, form, and order he has given them. On the scale
of created things, an artichoke is more valuable than a rock, a gorilla
is more valuable than an artichoke, and a human being is more valu-
able than a gorilla-all because of their relative degrees of being.'
Evil, then, from Augustine's perspective, is not a thing, not a being.
Although evil in human experience can be very powerful and pro-
found, evil does not, at least metaphysically speaking, represent the
positive existencc of anything. Evil silnplp does not exist in its own
right; it is not one of the constituents of the universe. Rathcr, it is thc
lack of realit)?and thus the lack of goodness. Put another way, evil en-
ters creation when created beings cease to function as they \yere cre-
ated to function by nature. Evil is thus metaphysical deprivation, pri-
vation, or degradation. Augustine's term for evil is prlvatio boni
(privation of good).
For Augustine, evil enters creation through the misuse of finite &ee
will. He attributes all evils, both natural and moral, to the wrong
choices of frcc rational beings. This evil choice is "sin" in theological
language. Augustine's intcrprctation of Christian teachings leads him
to assert that, first, a company of angels (none~nbodiedrational frcc
beings) rebelled agaillst God and that this rebellioll was then repli-
cated in humallkind (embodied ratioilal free beings). In order to ex-
plain how free rational creatures-~rhich represent a very valuable
kind of being-<an fall away from God, Augustine appeals to the clas-
sic C;hristian doctrine of "creation out of nothing" (creatio w izihilu).
Since creatures are brought into being "out of nothing," they are
""mutable" or changeable. <)lily God, the Crcator, is "inirnmutable" or
unchangeable. So, although the finitc rational crcaturc is origillallp
good, it has thc capability for sin.
This line of thought clearly gives rise to the unavoidable dilemlna
of accouilting for how an unqualifiedly good creature can commit sin.
On the one hand, if the creature is perfect according to its place in
the scale of being, then it is difficult to envision how it would commit
sin. On the other hand, if the creature is initially flawed and thus
colnmits sin, it is difficult to see how to exonerate God of blame. This
dilcil~maarises with rcgard to human cl-catures; it arises with respect
to angdic creatures as well. Fricdrich Schlciermacher pressed the
point: "The ixorc perfect these good angels arc supposed to have
been, the less possible it is to find any lnotive but those presupposing
a fall already, e.g., arrogance and env).."]o Unable to find a satisfac-
tory logical solutio~lto this difficulty, Augustine ejrentuallp retreats
into the "mystery of finite fi-eedom." Somehow, the free, originally
good creature originated an evil act. That is a great "mystery."
Of course, the classic Cbristiall belief in God's <omniscienceentails
that God knew behre the act of creation that the creature bvould sin.
So, God bears the ultilnate responsibility for the creation of beings
that he knew ~vould,if created, freely fall into sin. Augustine ad-
dresses divine responsibility in creation by developing a conception of
sovcreigm yrcdestination. In Adam, the whole human race sinned,
since the race was "scminally present" in his loins.'] Thus, all of hu-
mankind is gaily of sin and sul7jcct to condemnation. Yet in God's
sovereign grace, which is t o us a mystery, some are predestined to sal-
\ration while the rest of humanity is allobved to receive its just punish-
ment: "God leads some in mere)' and repentance, and others in just
judgment does not lead."" The sovereign election of some to salva-
tion is due to God's mere)?, not to their own merits. Thus, Augustine
subsumes the mystery of &et. will under the mystery of predestina-
tion. Of course, many important questions deserve morc thorough
discussion than I can provide hcre---for example, whether thc con-
cept of free will nccded to fit with concepts of divine forcknowlcdgc
and predestination is adequate t o the reality of sig~lifica~lt hu~nan
freedom, byhether a moral critique of God's apparent arbitrarilless in
predestination is devastating, and so on. At this point, ho~\rever,I
must be content with laying out a few more important themes in Au-
gustinian theodicp and then evaluating it in light of the concerns of
this book.
The larger perspective of Augustillian theodicy is not complete
without including what Arthur Lovejoy calls "the principle of plenti-
tude."'Vhis thcme, which held sway in Western intellectual history
from Plato to Leibniz, enirisions the whole u~liverseas a complex and
variegated order of different kinds of created beings, from least to
greatest, each kind exhibitill8 its own unique qualities as well as limi-
tations. In the hands of Augustine, this metaphysical interpretation
assumes that God knows that it is good to fill every level of creation,
up and down the scale, with finite beings, making creation rich and
full. The principle of plentitude helps to account for what \vc call
"evil" due to crcaturcly finitude.
Perhaps the final ltey that lnakcs Augustinian theodicy fall into
place is what John Hick calls the "aesthetic theme."" This is the as-
sumption that the whole of creation, even including those aspects we
call evil, is good when seen froln God's perspective. Related, of
course, to the idea of the unilrerse as a graded diversit!: the aesthetic
theme is used by Augustine to stress the "beauty" and "fitness" of the
universe seen as a kvhole. So, the uniqueness of each grade or kind of
finite creature is somehokn complementarjl in an overall scheme that is
harmonious, beautiful, and balanced in the sight of God. The deter-
minate characteristics of each kind of creature, then, betoken its place
in the great chain of being (e.g., the skbriftness of the cheetah, the
beauty of a giant sequoia), as do its limitations (e.g., the pig is not as
beautihl as the peacock, the dog does not live as long as the ele-
phant).
It may seem that the aesthetic emphasis here explaills natural evil
better than it does lnoral evil. Yet Augustine obviously extellds it to
cover lnoral evil bp reference to justly deserved, properly propor-
tioned punishment that settles accounts for Ivrongs that were done.
Augustine sees even the fall of the human race and the darnnation of
sinners as subsumed under the "perfection" and "beautp" of the uni-
verse.lWe states: "For as the beauty of a picture is increased by well-
managed shadows, so, to the eyc that: has skill to discern it, che uni-
verse is beautified even by sinners, though, considered by themselves,
their deformity is a sad blemish."lb The result of pressing the aes-
thetic theme to the fullest is that everythi~lgin God's creation con-
tributes to the beauq and appropriateness of the %.hole-even ilatural
and moral evil.17 "If it were not good that evil things exist, they
would certainly not be allowed to exist by the Olnnipotent Good."lR
Clearly, the upshot of Augustinian throdicy is the dellial of the fac-
tual prcmise of the argument frolx gratuitous evil. Everything in the
ulliverse sertres the highcr harmony of God's sovereign design. There
is no state of affairs ltrithout which the rxnivcrsc ~voutdhave been bet-
ter: "God judged it better to good out of evil than not to per-
mit any evil to exist."lWAll evil serves a greater good.
Leibniz's Best Possible World Theodicy

Gotrfried Wilhelm von l,eibniz (1646-1716) is the only thinker in-
cluded in the present study who has ~vrittena book explicitly entitled
fieodicy.2"eibnizian thcodicy seeks to demonstrate that God can-
not be blamed for the existence of evil in the ~vodd,since this wodd is
the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz's argllmcnt utilizes the con-
cept of a "possible world" that was introduced in Chapter 3. Techni-
cally speaking, a p~ssibleworld is a total possible state of affairs, a com-
plete universe with past, present, and future. Possibility here, as
defined in Chapter 2, is broadly logical possibility. For lmibniz, God's
omnipotence ellsures that God has the pokner to actualize any possi-
ble world he chooses from among an infillite llumber of eternally
fixed possibilities. God's perfect goodness, which always and unerr-
ingly acts for the best, ensures that he will choose to create the most
valuable possible world. And God's omniscience ensures that he un-
derstands all possible worlds that he could create, accurately calcu-
lates their wtr>rth,and identifies the very best one. So, the theistic
concept of God entails the conclusion that ~vhateverworld exists is
indeed the best of all possible ones.
Of course, no creaturely reality can be totally perfect, and at lcast in
that sense, reality \nil1 contain some evil (i.e., "metaphysical evi17').21
According to Leibniz, God's goodness and power guarantee that he
will select that possible ~vorldfrom among all other alternatives that
contains the optilnum balance of good and evil. Some interpreters of
Leibniz mistakenly think he maintains that God brotrght about that
world containing the least amount of evil colllmensurate with thcrc
being a world at all. Howc\rer, a more correct interpretation of Lcib-
niz is that he enirisions God actualizing that possible ~rorldthat con-
tains the amount of evil ilecessary to make the byodd the best one on
the kvholc. And frankly, this map not meail actualizing the \norid that
has the least amount of evil. It may mean bringing about a world that
has a great many evils in i t but evils of such kinds and arranged in
such Ivaps that they contribute to the world being the very best one
possible, As Lcibniz says, the actual 'ivorld contains those possible
states of affairs "which, bcing united, produce most reality, ixost per-
fection, most significancc."z2 Sometimes he e~nploysan aesthetic mo-
tif, relniiliscent of Augustine, illdicating that mere quantitative maxi-
malization is dull and uninteresting, that God seelts to produce
richiless and quality in the world.
In the process of comparing and evaluating all possible worlds, God
foresees the natural and moral evil they contain. He chooses to actu-
alize that world whose various cox~stituents-eve its evil ~0x1-
stitucnts-make it the best on the ~vhole:"Not only does [God] de-
rive from [c\rils] greater goods, but he finds them connected with the
greatest goods of all those that arc possible: so that it would bc a fault
not t o permit them."2"impl!~ put, all the evils of the world con-
tribute to its character as the best of all possible ~rorlds:"If the slnall-
est evil that comes t o pass in the world were missing in it, it bnould no
longer be this ~vorld;~vhich,with nothing omitted and all allowallce
made, was found the best by the Creator who chose it?"'"
There are many poi~ltsof serious philosophical interest in Leibniz's
theodicy-for example, its conceptio~lof the relation benveen dil~ine
omnipotence and human fiee will'2bhe standard of b~alueaccording
to which this possible world is the "best," and the prospect that it im-
pugns God's power that he cannot make a better world than this one.
Yet the point of central interest for us is this theodicy's bearing on the
factual premise of the argument from gratuito~lsevil. Lcibnizian
thcodicp is tantalxount to a denial of the factual prcmisc. The evil
that exists is illdispensable to the jralue of the ulliverse coilsidered as a
whole. Leibniz's argumellt is not an elnpirical one that starts with the
evils that actually exist in the world and argues that they coiltribute to
the best b~alueof the whole. Instead, the argulnent starts with several
crucial assumptions about God's attributes and purposes, ~vhichare
taken as axiomatic and which yield a demonstratian that this world
must bc the best one possible. It is a cwrld that contains no gratu-
itous evil.
Hick's Soul-Making Theodicy

Although St. h ~ s e l m St.
, Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, and other tradi-
tional thinkers may be seen as following in the broad Augustinian tra-
dition in theodicj: there is allother major approach to theodicy that
also has roots in Christian antiquity. This type of theodicy can be
traced to Bishop Irenaeus (c. 130-c. 202). The most articulate con-
temporary proponent of lrenaean theodicy is John Hick, and it is his
prcscntation that wc will exallline. The main difference bemecn the
n\.o traditions map be plainly put: Augustiniail theodicy looks back to
the fall of a good creation through the inisuse of humall freedom;
Irellaeail theodicy looks to the future in terms of God's plail for the
development of humanity. However, the ostensible airn of lrenaean
theodicy is the same as that of Augustinian theodicy: to relieve God
of responsibility for evil.
According to Hick, Adam, the first human, and the rest of the orig-
inal creation werc innocent and immature, possessing thc privilege of
becoming good by loving God and fellow creatures. But it would bc
an error t o hold, as Augustinian theodicp does, that original inno-
cellce can be equated with original perfection. Indeed, it is not at all
clear that God can illstantaneouslp create morally mature persons,
since lnoral maturity allnost certainly requires struggling, grappling
with telnytation over time, and probably participating in evil. But
even if God could create by fiat a morally mature humall person, Hick
saps, "one \\rho has attained to goodness by lneeting and ejrentuallp
mastering temptations, and thus bp rightly making responsible
choices in concrete situatiolls, is good in a richer and more valuable
sense than would be one created ab ilzitiu in a state either of inno-
cence or of virtuc."2"ence, cvil as wc know it is explained not as a
decline from a state of pristine purity and goodness but rather as an
inevitable stage in the gradual growth and struggle of the human
race. Hick also states: "I suggest . . . that it is an ethically reasonable
judgement, even though in the nature of the case not one that is ca-
pable of demoilstrative proof, that human goodness slo~vlybuilt up
through personal histories of moral effort has a value in the eyes of
the Creator which justifies even the long travail of the soul-making
process."27 Thus, humanity was not created perfect but is in the
process of being perfected.
Hick tabcls his Irenaean-type apprclactl s o g l - ~ g a k i ~gheodicy
z~ be-
cause it paints a picture of God's grand scheillc of hclping relatively
immature humail beings become morally and spiritually mature. The
~rorldwe inhabit is an eni~ironmentdesigned to promote God's plan
of soul-making. h enirironmmt collducive to personal gro\l.th lnust
be one in which there are real challenges, real opportunities for the
display of moral virtue, and real possibilities for expressing faith in
God. A major component of this environment is a community of
moral agents who interact in a variet). of special ways----deciding on
the kinds of relationships thcy will haw, what projects they will pur-
sue, and how thcy will live togcthcr, h o t h c r component is a physical
order of impersonal objects that operate indepelldellt of our wills:
atolns and molecules, fields of energ): oceail currents, biological cells,
and illnumerable other physical things. <)bviously, in this lund of en-
vironment, there are opportunities to develop moral character as well
as distinctively spiritual qualities. Equally obviousll: in such condi-
tions there is the genuine risk of evil f failure and ruin, suffering
and injustice.
1rztercstIni;ly Hick even deems it important that chc ~vorldappear as
if thcrc is no God, and cvil certainly plays an important role in fomming
this appearance. For Hick, the potentially atheistic appearailce of the
world creates "epistemic distance" benveen creature and Creator.28 He
thillks that, if the preseilce of God \=re impressed too forcefully upon
human consciousness, people ~vouldreadily ackno\rledge that God es-
ists and authentic faith would not be possible. So, God has to conceal
his presence from us, having an importailt dual effect. On the one
hand, epistemic distailce has the effect of making it virtually inekritable
that huinan beings will organize their lives apart from God and in self-
centered competition with their fellow human beings. Thus, our state
of fallenness represents the Ivay we humans were made, not a descent
from a prior statc of holiness. On thc othcr hand, epistcmic distance
has thc result of making room f i r sincere, uncoixpcllcd acceptance of
God's gracious invitation to a life of faith and trust.2"
Within the general frame~rorkof an lrenaeail vision of soul-
making, Hick faces the realities of evil and sufkriilg in hulnall life. In
regard to moral evil, Hick saps that the possibility of \vr01lg choice
and action is necessary to the kind of world that is conducive to pcr-
sonal growth. He is ~villingto agree with Mackie, Flew, and others
that i t is lvgicallypoJsible that God could have created free finite be-
ings who always do what is morally right. But then he e~l~phasizes
that the spiritual dimension requires the frcedoix either to rcject God
or to come to him: "According to Christianiq?the divine purpose for
m m is not only that they shall freely act rightly towards one allother
but that they shall also freely elltrr into a filial persollal relatio~lship
uith God Himself. There is, in other jwrds, a religious as !.ell as an
ethical dimension to this purpose."" i t is relationship with God,
then, that makes it logically inzpo~siblefor God to have so constituted
humans that they freely respond to him, manifesting love and trust
and faith. So, Hick's argument is that God created the world with the
possibility of moral evil (or sin, from a theological perspectijre) as the
kind of cn\rironil~cntin ~vl~ich hun2ans corxld exercise arxthentic faith
in him as well as 112aitifest love and virtue toward their fello~vs.
In regard to pain and suffering, Hick argtles that it is rational to
recognize the value of a ~rorldof physical objects operatillg by stable
natural laws. In such a ~vorld,both pleasure and pain are possible for
the sentient creatures inhabiting it. Rut he turns this feature of the
world into fodder for his soul-building thesis, explaining that a pain-
frcc, soh, unchallenging world would be inhabited by a soft, unchal-
lenged race of frcc beings. Hick then distinguishes "sufkring" (as a
qualitatively ulliquc psychic state) from "pain" (as a physical state).
Though pain may sometimes be the source of suffering, it is not al-
ways or even usually so. Suffering is a distillct and very profoulld hu-
man phmomenon.
Hick defines suffering as "that state of mind in which we wish vio-
lently or obsessively that our situation were otherwise." This state of
mind can be as co~nplexand high-lekrel as the husnan mind i t s e l f re-
lated t o regret and remorse, to anxiety and despair, to guilt and
shame, or to the loss of a loved one. Even what makes, saj: a terminal
illness produce suffering is not only the physical pain involved but the
anticipation of loss. Now, suffering or anguish is usually self-regarding
in focus but is solxetimcs other-regarding. Hick attributes suffering to
sin and its consequences for our improper attitt~destoward our own
finitude, ~veakness,and mortalit).. Sin keeps us from bcing filllp con-
scious of God and humbly and joyfully accepting his ulliversal pur-
poses for good. Again, just as physical pain is an ingredient of a kwrld
in bnhich the soul-building purposes of God can be carried out, so suf-
fering is also a feature of such a world. It prompts human beings to
search for the deeper meanings of their existence, helping prepare
them for mutual service to each other arnid suffering and for turning
to God.
Much of Hick's argurxent rc\rolves aro~undthc instrumental (teleo-
logical) value of the evils of this world: Both natural and moral evils
cosltribute to the soul-making process. Hick assulnes that he has won
the point that a hedonistic paradiseor at least a bnorld kzithout sig-
nificant challenge and opportunity-does not contribute t o solid
moral character or authentic religious faith. It seems that a consider-
able amormt of many kinds of evils would be necessary to any world
that could be an environment for soul- making. Whate~~er amounts
and kinds arc necessary, then, arc not gratuitous but j~lstificdin the
sense we have bcen discussing. At this point, it appears that Hick is
rcady to deny the factual premise of the argument from gratuitous
evil, since he has obviously idelltified much evil that serves a good
pul-yose.
But then Hick asks the hauntill8 question regarding why God al-
lows "dysteleological evil," that is, those evils that are excessij~eand
go beyond anything rationally required of a soul-making process:
Need the ~vorfdcontain the more extreme and crrxshing evils ~~hicft. it in
fact contains? h e nor life3 challenges often so severe as to be self-
defeating whe11considered as soul-making i~lftuences?Man rnlxst (let us
of his
suppose) cultivate tile soil so as to \%.inhis bread by tile s\%?eat-
brow; but need there be the gigantic famines, ;for exaxnyls in China,
fi-0111which millions have so rritiserablj~perished?5"
Hick states that it would have been better if such events had never
happened," an adjnission that seems to embrace the fact of gratu-
itous evil. Then he moves 011 to ask how, from the staildpoint of
Christian theodicy, we can address the utterly destructi1.e evils in our
world. Why does this world seem less like an environment for soul-
building and more like a cold and indifferent, if not outright hostile
and malevolent, place?33
Hick ultimately says that the exccss and random character of much
evil is mysterious to us. We sec no constructive purposc for it. Rut
then he begins to bring even dysteleological or excessic.e evil ~vithin
the ambit of soul-making theodicy, saying that even the lnpstery of
dysteleological evil has soul-making value. He argues that the human
misery in this jwrld calls forth deep perso~lalsylnpathy and energetic
efforts to help.31 He contends that unless the suffering is really unde-
served and actually bad for the sufkrer, we would not have such de-
sirable and valuable passionate reactions. He also argues that, in a
world where sufferillg and prosperity were exactly proportioned to
desert, we W O U ~lose ~ the moral environment in which persons do
what is right simply for the sake of what is right. Instead, persons
would act prude~ltiallyso as to bring about the most fakrorablr conse-
quences for themselves. So, bp the end of his treatment of dysteleo-
logical evil, it is not clear that the evil relnains dysteleolo@cal. In the
end, there is no gratuitous evil for Hick because all evil serves a pur-
pose. He says that God permits evil to "bring out of it an even greater
good than ~vouldhave been possible if evil had never existed."3"
A study of Hick's Ircnaean version of thcodicp would nor be corn-
pletc without analpzing his view of life akcr death as the continuation
of God's plan of soul-lxaking. Hick argues that God's plan is the uni-
versal salvation of all persons, a process that extends beyond earthly
existence and into the afrerlife. For those people who, for whate~rer
reasons, depart mortal life bnithout hajring achieved the proper degree
of moral and spiritual maturity (or soul-hood, one might say), God
pursues his same objective for them in the life to come. After all,
some of these persons would have been among those ~ v h osuffered
terribIy and whosc lives were snufkd out ~vithorzta fair chance to ma-
ture along moral and spiritual lines. So, God continkles his efforts in
the aftcrlifc, providing occasions for exercising love and trust, ulltil all
persons are brought into the heavenly kingdom. He notes that the
universal sal~rationof humaniy is not a logical necessiy ~rithinire-
naean theology but is a "practical certailly."36 This affirmatioil of di-
vine persistence completes the progressive, developmental, and escha-
tological orientation of lrmaean theodicy.
In the final analysis, then, Hick is not able to admit the existence of
gratuitous evil. On this point, ironically3Irenaean theodicjr falls back
into agreement with Augustinian theodicy. Hick says that "the King-
dom of God will be an infinite, because eternal, good, outbveighing
all temporal and therefore finite evils."37 Interestingl~: whereas Au-
gustinian theodicy argues for the possibilit). of evil in a theistic uni-
verse, Hick uses Ircnaean theodicy t o argue for its actuality being
necessary to the kind of theistic univene he describes. So, Irenaean
theodicy places the responsibilitp for evil on God in at least as strong
a sense as Augustiniall theodicy does. Yet in relatioll to the fulfilllnent
of God's purpose, "nothing will finally have been sheerly and irre-
deemably evil. For everything will receive a new meaning in the light
of the end to which it 1eadse7'3a
Hick's contributioll to the ongoing discussioll of God and evil is an
important one. He must be colxmcnded for not denying the reality
of the evil in the world by saying that it only seems evil fro111 our finite
perspective. Although he tries to facc even the most horrible and ex-
cessikre evils, his theodicy cannot ultimately recognize really gratu-
itous evils. Even though, for Hick, it %.as ~rithinGod's power to make
a world significantly like this one but uithout dysteleological evils,
such a ~vorldwould not have been as conducive to soul-making as is
this world. Thus, colltrarg to other relnarks he makes along the
way?" h the end Hick comes very close to arguing that our world,
even with its most extreme evils, is the best possible one for achieving
God's purposc of soul-making. For those whose intuitions run
counter to this conclusion, perhaps WC lxust say that it col-nes down
to difkrillg conceptions of goodness and what goodlless ~ r o u l dd o
regardill8 things that are kzithin its power.
itehead's Process Theodicy

Each of the theodicies I have surveyed so far has ended up rejecting
the factual premise of the argument frolx gratuitous evil. Yet some
thinkers d o not bclic\re that denying gratuitous evil is a satisfactory
xsponse to the problem, although they see such a denial as a logical
coilsequence of classical theistic commitments. They seek t o develop
a viable theodicy based on an alternative conception of deity. One im-
portant alterllative to classical theism is found in the process philoso-
phy of Alfred North Whitehead. Process philosophy assumes a difkr-
ent metaphysical picture of reality than does much traditional
philosophical thought upon bnhich classical theism rests. Process
tl-tinkers-such as Charles fiartshorne, John Cobb, and Dinrid Ray
Griffin-have employed process concepts to articulate what is corn-
monly k n o ~ mas pgpoccsstheism and its implicatiolls for throdicy. They
claim that process theism retains the strengths of classical theism
while avoiding its ~veakncsscsand that thcrc are clcar benefits t o
theodicy
Process thought is based on a view of reality as becoming rather
than hci~zg,which is a direct re~rersalof the traditiollal approach. It is
not surprising, then, that the central theme in process theodicy is the
concept of change, development, evolutioll-both in the creaturely
world and in God. Creatures are conscious, ever-changing centers of
activity and experience rather than relatively enduring substal1ces.4Q
God, for process thought, has two natures: l'rimordial Nature and
Conscqtxent Nature. God's Prirnt~rdialNature contains all etcrnal
possibilities for how the crcaturcly world can adk~ance;God's Consc-
quent Nature contains the experiences and rcsponses of crcaturcs as
they choose to actualize some of these possibilities in their lives. A%
God's Consequent Nature changes in respol-tse to eIrents in the crea-
turely ~rorld,God also map be said t o change or to be in p r o c e s s
not something that classical theists would say of God. Although
process thinkers deny that they hold a pantheistic ~vorldvieiv~ the inti-
mate and reciprocal ontological relationship betjjreen God and the
~vorfdis ob~rious.Process thinkers have labeled their position ""pancn-
theisin," ~vhichaffirms that the cxpericnccs of the world arc included
in God.41
One key point in process theodicy is the rejection of the classical
concept of divine omnipotence, kvhich process thinkers find inade-
quate and ladell with fallacies. Process theists deny that God has a
monopoly on power or is "infinite in power," as traditional theology
affirms. Since finite creatures are also centers of power (or "freedom"
or "self-determination"), they can bring about new states of affairs
that God cannot control. Althotrgh traditional thcisms qpically entri-
sion God choosing t o bestow some degrcc of significant freedom on
crcaturcs, the process version of freedom is rooted in the vcrp struc-
ture of reality, with each creature having the illherent power of self-
determination. This power enables creatures to choose good or evil
possibilities for their lives. God's pokner, then, can meet real resistance
from creatures. Thus, we may say that God has all of the power that it
is possible for a being to have but not all of the power that there is.
This Inarks a clear parting of the ways with the classical col-rcept of
omnipotence, ~rhichprocess theists criticize as lnonopolistic and to-
talitarian .42
According to yrocess thinkers, God's chief goal for the universe is
the realization and rnaxi~nizationof value in the experience of crea-
turely rcalities. Important valucs here include novelv, c r c a t i v i ~ad-
~
venture, intensiq, c c o i ~ p l e xand
i ~ ~so
~ forth. Rut God's powcr must be
viewed as pcrszggsive rather than coercive. God tries to "persuade" or
"lure" creatures toward the good and atyap from evil, but he cannot
force them to choose the good. Process thil-rker David Rap Griffin
states that God cannot elin~il-rateevil because ""God cai-rnot unilater-
ally effect any state of affairs."4"1nstead, God offers persons possi bili-
ties for the realization of good in their experience. When negative
("evil") experiences occur, threatening to thwart the divine aim, God
simply offers new ideal possibilities that arc adjusted to what has al-
ready happened. Again, creatures freely respond, and again, God of-
fers new possibilities. So goes the evolution of the world as God con-
tinually creates increased order and significai-rce out of aboriginal
chaos and triviality.
Since finite creatures are always perishing, process theodicy affirms
that God is co~ltinuallystoring up their experiences in his Conse-
quent Nature. All positive and negative experiences are ultimately
corzser~ledand harmonized in God's own conscious life, Thus, all
things can be said to work out all right insofar as God "include[s] in
hirnsclf a synthesis of the total miverse.""" "1 his f~mctionas ""the
Kingdom of Heaven," God brings about a kind of synthesis of all
earthly experiences but does not unilaterally rectiq all evils. Typically,
process thinkers have not conceived of "personal immortality" or
"life after death" as cel-rtral to the defense of God's goodness agail-rst
the problem of evil, as traditional Christian thinkers sornetiznes do .45
There i s also no final, definitive, eschatological culmination of all
things. Thus, for process thinkers, the continual, ongoing sjlnthesis of
all experiences in God's own conscious life is the basic hope for the
triu~xphof good and the redemption of the world.
Process theisn2 has forced classical theists to rethink and rcfine their
fundalnel-rtal col-rcepts.4b But classical theists as -well as some i-ro~~the-
ists have also raised a i-rumber of serious objections to process
thought. For example, the process attack on the classical concept of
divine power has been said to rest on pure caricature that sets up an
oversimplified "either/orW distinction between coercive and persua-
sive power. It is probably wiser to adnlit that there map be a range of
modes of divine power, such as "productive power" or "sustaining
power" or "enabling power," many of which are compatible with
moral persuasion." Another topic about which there is vigorous dis-
cussion is divine goodness. Some classical theistic thinkers declare
that the proccss concept of God's goodness is fundamentally aesthetic
rather than moral. If the aims of the proccss deity arc to makc crca-
turcly experience richer and inore complex, even at the cost of pain
and discord, then there is the risk of violating many ordinary ~noral
principles. Most classical theists uilderstand that their 014~11position
denies that God could be morally perfect if he caused or allo~vedsuf-
fering in order to attain merely aesthetic aims. l'rocess theists have
replied that their conception of aesthetic value is a larger, more inclu-
sive category than moral \Talue. Hanging on the outcome of this dis-
pute, of course, is the question of whether God is worthy of \jrorship.
Putting thesc and other questions aside for the moment, lct us fo-
cus on how proccss thought rclatcs to the e\ridential argument from
gratuitous evil. It ~ r o u l dbe difficult to think of another tradition in
theodicy that tries to come to grips more squarely with what appear
to be gratuitous evils in the world. In its analysis of the concept of
power, process metaphysics makes roorn for really gratuitous evils.
These are evils that God does not ordain, canrzot control, and cannot
necessarily make right. Now, in order to admit the existence of such
evils, at the very least, proccss theists have radically overhauled the
traditional theistic concept of divinc power. Thcy maintain that the
classical concept of omnipotence lcads logically to the denial of gratu-
itous evil and that their alter~lativecoilcept of divine power allows us
to ack~>o\vledge its existence.
In our brief survey of theodicies, it may seem that process thought
has pushed us to a dilemma: Either we can retain classical categories
and deny the existence of gratuitous evil or we can adopt process cat-
egories and accept gratuitous evil. In a sense, process theodicy de-
fends theism against the argument from gratuitous evil by inodi$ing
theisln---by opting for "cluasi-theisln," as it has bccn called. Thus, in
terms of the historical discussion, the critic asks llow classical theisrn
deals with what appears to be gratuitous evil in the world. The
process theist responds bp coilceding that classical theism cannot han-
dle gratuitous evil and thus must be modified along process lines. Of
course, for those theists who agree that there is something to the
claim about gratuitous evil but who Ivant to retain classical theistic
commitments, the only visible option is to try to break the dilemlna
to which we have come. It map be that an i~lterpretatioilof divine
goodness and other diviile attributes can be developed that allows for
the possibility of genuinely gratuitous evil. But that is a project that
lies beyond the scope of the present volume.48
Theodicy and the Assessment of Theism

The complete list of comprehensive theodicies as well as the various
themes that they incorporate is too long to treat in this chapter.
Ho~rever,this samplillg of approaches begills to acquai~ltus with the
wide scope of moves available to theists and a number of counter-
moves open to critics.
We can detect one common thread running through virtually all
theistic solutions, ~vhctherglobal theodicics or more specific the~nes:
God j~vhoir omnipotgnt, onz~ircient~ and ?~?holly&oord) jvould design the
l.~pZilters~"
SUC~ e~dlis Becessary $0 ~ o r m t r ? ~ o o oTllcists
d. have typi-
cally taken a ~ r e a t e r ~ q o oapproach
d as iiltegral to their search for a
morally sufficieilt reasoll fix why God allows evil. For maily who
think about the problem, it seelns to be a deeply held intuition that
for an evil to be justified-and for God to be justified in permitting
it-the evil must be necessary to a greater good. If i t Ivere not strictly
"necessary," then a God \\rho is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-
good could achieve the specified good through other mcans. With
this stratebT in the background, theistic thinkers havc proposcd a va-
riety of types of goods and a range of suggestions for how they arc
connected with evils. The various responses to evil in the immediately
preceding pages only hint at the ~videspectruln of possibilities.
Actually, the greater-good schelna is also the common root of man)!
defenses to the problem of evil. Using a great-er-good approach de-
fensively?man!. theists have long endorsed a greater-good strategy to
undermine all versions of the logical problem of evil, for example. In
constructing a defense around the t h m c of free will, theists havc
stated that the greater good of free will is a possiblfi rcason for why a
deity who is s~~prcmclp powerful and perfectly good allows evil. How-
ever, the greater-good strateg). stands behind Inany attempts to de-
\relop a positive theodicy as well. The free will theme is one that the-
ists have used in the context of theodicy, not as a merely possible
reason for God's permission of evil but as a purportedly true and
plausible reason. Whether i t is free will or some other proposed
greater good, let us focus here on the gelleral stratew of specifpi~lga
greater good as the basis for theodicy.
Many theists and their critics believe that a moralljr sufficient reason
for why God a1low.s evil must relate evil to a good that outweighs it.
These theists usually take for granted that no explanation of evil can
be acccptrtblc unless it credibty argues that the evil in qtrcstion is nec-
essarily connected t o a greater good. A large numbcr of thcodicics,
then, simply ofkr difkrcnt ways of construing what that good is. In
effect, they conclude that no existing evils are pointless or gratuitous
and thus that they d o not coullt as evidence against the existence of
God. Here ~ r g t a i t o g sevil is understood as an evil that is not lleces-
sary to the existence of a greater good. The most potent atheistic re-
buttals to theistic specifications of greater goods revolve around the
claim that at least sorzle evils or sorzle broad kinds of evil do not seem
necessary to any greater good. It makes more sense to believe either
that they scrve no good purpose ~vhatrsocveror that the purpose they
s~lpposedlyserve is not worth thc pricc.
In the history of the debate over theodic)~?several important points
have been made by both sides. 111 f ~ ~ t ~debates,
lre perhaps critics could
probe more deeply into the yurstioil of ~rhethera greater-good justi-
ficatory scheme is viable. After all, attempting to justify evil by refer-
ence to some good essentially makes the moral weight of the evil de-
pend on an extrinsic factor. It may we11 be, however, that a more
bwomising line for thc critic is to say that soillc actual evils arc intrinsi-
cally so negative and dcstruaive that no external good could out-
weigh them. This certainly is the tone of Ivan Karamazov's rcmarks
to his brother Myosha with which I opened this book. And the writ-
ings of Madden and Hare lnake a forceful case along these lines.
Theists, by contrast, could more fully explore a distinction betjjreen
two sorts of greater-good theodicy: One type claims that the nrtztnlit;y
of evil is necessary to a greater good, and another type claims that the
possibility of evil is necessary to a greater good. Clearljf, Inany of the
unacceptable greater-good thcodicics arc of the first type. Follo\\.ing
this first type of approach, thcodicists embracing classical theism have
to justify each actual cvil or kind of evil by lillking it to some actual
good or class of goods-ail effort that is extremely difficult and prob-
ably doomed. Solne classical theists ajroid mailp seIrere difficulties bp
dellyillg that God is morally obligated to make each specific installce
of cvil turn out for the best, arguing instead that- God is morally obli-
gated to create or pursue a certain kind of jvorld in which we have the
potesltial for certain goods. A good kind of ~rorldkvould be struc-
tured according to certaill overall policies. Such policies bnould in-
clude the granting of significant freedom to human beings, the estab-
Iishment of a stable tlatural order, and so forth. These structural
features of God's created order would then make many particular
evils possible, evils that may or may not always bc connected to par-
ticular goods within the world system, either now or in the future.
kcording to this approach, the greater good would bc the overall
structure of the kvorld order and the values that are generally able to
emerge from it. Thus, as long as the theist describes a very jraluable
kind of world (structured so that free creatures can make significailt
choices, have the opportunity to develop lnoral character, and so on),
the existence of such a world might well be seen as worth it?
Ultimately, the dispute over evil is one of several considerations rel-
evant to the rational acceptance or rejection of theistic belief. A rca-
soned judglnent about the acceptability of theisln, thcrcforc, must be
~lladein light of all of the rclcvant argulllcnts for and against the exis-
tellcc of God. What is more, a final judgment bnould have to consider
ho14r well the overall theistic positiosl fares in comparison to other
worldviews, both religious and secular.
Notes
oj'Relz&z'o~:An I~@ad.t~ct.z'on:o
it. Wilitiam Itowe, 13hz'lo~-ophy ( Encino and Bel-
mont, Chlif.: nickenson, 1978), p. 88.
2. Edward Maddell and Peter Hare, E ~ i arid l Conccp~ofC&n! (Sprixlg-
field, Ill,: Charles G, 'lVhomas,19681, p. 3.
3, Keith Yandel, Basic Isstbcs 6 ~ z$he f'hilosophy of Relzhion (Boston: Mlyn
and Bacon, 1971), pp. 62-63.
4, In the previous cilaptcr, we considered Stcphen Wj~kstra"ddefense, which
turns on the cognitive limitations of humall beings. S i ~ ~ ~ defe~lses
ilar are used
by iVittiarn Alstor~,""The Indtrctivc Arg~rrnelltkorn Evil and the Humail Cog-
ni tive Condidon," in 2 he &pidentigl Alyg~gentfro~gEvil, d. D a ~ ~ iEIoward-
el
Snqrdder (Bloomington: It~diallaUrliversixy Press, 19961, pp. 97-1 25, a i d by
Peter van Inwagexl, """fieProblem of k:viI, the Problem of Air, arid the Prob-
lem of Silence," in Howard-Snyder, pp. Isit-l 74, 131anrtngaalso alludes to the
cogi~itivelis~litatimthenle: ""ferhaps God has a good reason, but that reason
is too complicated for us to undersrand"~esecAtvirr Piax~tinga,God2Ffpegdom,
and Evil (Grand bpids, Mich. : Ecrdmans, 19772, p. 10.
E;, In otl-rer jiiords, these theodicies offer a moratly ssrfficient reasoil for
God permitting evil
6, This imagery is bornowed from Melville Stewart, The <$re~t~rfi-C~ood De-
fgnse (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p. fX.
7. And whether for purposes of defense or thcodicj?, both agrcc that a
Greater-Good "fhe~lteis ~teeded,Sir~cethe theme is assut-rted to be ileeessary
t o theism, authors developing both defel~sesancl theodicies c m p l q it.
8. Augustine, Y'he Natgre uf'the Good, cd. and trans. J.H.S. Burlcigh, in
Ag&~stine:Earlier W ~ i t i (LC)II~CJI~:
~g~ SrC.M, Press, 1953), p. vt.
9. Interestingly, Neoplatonism heavily influenced Augustine's view7 of evil.
For a discussion of Plotinian Ncoylatonism, see W. R. Ingc, ?'hel3hilo~-opi$j~ of
Pknginzes, 3rd ed, j h ~ r t d o i Longntans,
~: Green, 1929). Plotinus's view of evil
as lack occurs in Augustine, as explained in this chapter.
t 0. Friedricb Schlcicrmacher, " f k e Chrz'stknn Fgz'lih (Edinb~~rgh: 1'. cyi 'I3,
CLark, 19282, p, 161.
1 1. Augusti~~e, Cily oS"ll;od,trarrs, Marcus Dods, George Wilson, and I. 1.
Smith (New York: lbx~damHouse, t950), pp. 13, 14.
12. A~~gustine, C:olzt-ra Jglia~ztpaP~la&inawm,bk. 5, chap, M,
13. To see hc>wthis principle is wok7enthroitgh much of Western intellec-
tual history, sec A r t h ~ ~Lov~u);r ll&e Cbnir.a qf N e i ~ g(Camt>ridgc,
~
Mass,: Harvard Unikrersity Press, 1936)-
14. John Hick, Evil arid the God of-Love, 2nd ecd. (San Frarrcisco: Harper
Sr IXORT,19781, pp. 82ff.
15. Augustine, On Free Wiill,trans. J.H.S. Burleigh, in A ~ ~ z ~Ea~*Lier ~ z ~ e :
W~*i$ip.t&$, 3. 9. 26,
16. Augtlstinc, Cz'g~ofC;od, I. 1. 23.
17. Augustine, f='~tci~i~*idio~, trans. J, E;. Shay in Baszc W~*i;t.i~asof'Sc. A~8z"ts-
Z r i n ~(2 vols.), ed., FVhitney J. Oates (New b r k : Random House, 19481, .27
1.8. Ibid., 24.96.
19, Ibid., 8. 27.
20. Gottfii-iediVilhelm van I,eib~riz, "X;heudicjf:ESSGE~S 0% the Cgotrdng~sof
(;uA tht~eFz~gedu~6 ~J'LMcz-n,m d $he O$~inuf'Evil, trans. E. M . H uggard fi-om
C:. J. Cerhardfs edition of the CoIlectcd Philosopbicnl Wnt#ks( 1875-1 890)
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.).
2 1. Gotrfrictd Wif helm vor-1 Lei bniz, Ygeodic~trans. E, M . Huggard ( b r - 1 -
don: Rc~uticdge& ICegan Paul, 1952), paras, 30-33.
22. Ibid., para. 2.01.
23. Ibid., para. 127.
24. Ibid., para. 9.
25. The reader ~iiillll remember Plantingaysremarks 011 Leibniz's Lapsc that
was discussed ii-1 Chaptcr 3.
26, Hick, E~lil,p. 255,
22. Ibid., p*256,
28. Ibid., p. 281.
29, Ibid., p. 287.
30. Ibid., p. 272.
31. Ibid., pp* 329-330,
32, Hiclr speaks of "evil. wfilch is utterly grattlitous" (ibid., p. 324); of
""evil in so far as it is p~lrelyand unambiguously eli.21" (ibid., p. 325); and
"horrors ~vhichwill disfigure the universe to the end of time" (ibid., p*361 ).
33. Hick (ibid., p. 330) even quotes ShAcspeare ( I < i g Lcgr):
~ ''h Rics to
wailtoll boys, are Itre to the gods, They kill us for their sport.?'
34, Ibid., p+ 334.
35. Ibid., p, 176.
36. Ibid., p. 344.
37, Ibid., p+ 350.
38. Ibid., p. 363.
39, Many of Hick" statements about the Ilature of evil indicate that sin
and sufferit~gare to be regarded as ""gexluinefy spit! and utterly inimical to
God's wifI and p~~rpose" "(ibid., pp. 15-16); he also says: ""For it is an in-
ecritable deliverance of our moral conscio~xsness,of jtrhich nothilsg must be
allowed to rob LIS, that evil in all its forms is to be abhorred and resisted and
feared" "bid,, p. 363).
40. Aift.ed North Whitehead, Pr~ee,cfa n d i"Et7nlz'tyf(New York: Macmill~n,
1929), p* 343,
41. Michael Petcrson, "God and Evil in l)rocess 'rfrzeodiqr,,"YinlZrocess7%gol-
0g3f3ed. Rondd Nash ( G r a ~ dbpids, h%ich,:Baker Book House, 19871, p. 123,
42, See, for example, Charles Hart-shorne, "Omxlipotence,"' in Afz Eacy-
clopedia oJJIZet!z"gZo~ eb. V. Fenn (New Yorkz: 13hhllosophical Librar): 1945),
pp, 545f. See also C:harles Hartshorne, (Jl.rzn$atencc a~zdOther ~ ' ~ " J ~ O ~ D & Z C
LW2'~akcs (Alba~~y: State Uni\rersiry ofNew7 York Press, 1984), pp. 1If:
43. l3avid Iby Griffin, God, 130wer, and Epil (Philadelphia: Westminster,
1976), p. 280,
44. ,4lltred North Wttircltcad, R~k&ioni f z the IM;nkz'~z&(New York: Macmil-
Zan, 19261, p. 98; also sce his I3'i.aceaand Reality, pp. 524-525.
45, Sonte prcxcess philosophers 1-rac.e atte~~tpted to prcnride a prcxcss ae-
count of persotlal irnmczrtality, that is, life after death. See the discussiotl of
' o ~- s
thls in DaGd Ihy Griffirl, Ep61 Revisited: Rgspourscs and R e c o ~ s i d c ~ ~ n t z(AI
: State Universiq of N e w York Press, 1991), pp. 34-40,
(iba~ly
46. See the f~zll-scalediscussiot~of process thcodicy in Petersorl, "God and
Evil in 13rocess'I'k~eodicjr,"pp. it 2 1-1 39.
47, Naney Frarrkenberr~""Some Problet-rts in Process "fheodi~y~" Ri"~elz-
~ i o a ~ S t ~X7d i(1981):
~s 181-184,
48. I supgcsted that Christiall theists could take thls kind of approach in
11ty wcr~rkEvZI a d $he C;h~ez'st.z'gnCt'od (Grand Rapids, h%ich.:Baker Book
House, 1982), particularly cltag, 5 , pp. 101-1 33. X: also recommended it in
the book I wrote with WiiZla~nHasker, Ur~rccI<eict~enbach,and David
Basinger, Reason and Relli_qiufbsBelz'eJ1:AFZI~trod~.tctz'on $0 the PhiIos~phyof-'
Rer!z~icrfz,2nd ed. (New k r k : Oxford Universirjr Press, 1998),pp, 123-1 27.
iViIXiarn Haskcr makes a case fbr the possibifiy of gratrrito~rsevil from the
persyectivc of Christial~rheis1-n in his """l'hcNecessiy of Gratuitous Evil,"
Fgilch n~zdPhiIttsophy 6 ( 1992):23-44,
49. See Hasker, "Xecessity"flr~ruce Reichenbach, Evil ;land ;l G o d Cgod
(Ncw York: Forciiliam Ux-tiversiqr Press, 1982); David Basir~gcr,lfhe Cas6jbr
Frpca Will Thczffaz(Dolvners Grove, Ill.: Interh7arstrjr Press, 1996), chap. 4,
pp. 83-1 04; and Petersoxl, Evil alzd $he Chrz"st:igna d ,
Suggested Radings
Adarns, Marityn M, "Theodicjr FVithout RIame," PPhil~s~)phic&l Topics X6 (Fall
1988):215-245,
Adanls, Marityll M,, advisory ed, Theological C:tr>ntributions to Theodicy,
special iss~reof Faz'gh nrtd Philosophy f 3 ( X 996).
Basingcr, David. ""Uivil~eOxnnipotcnce: Ptantiinga vs, Griffirl." Procgss Stud-
has 11 (1981): 11-24,
Daris, Stephell T., ed. Evzcognl-erz"~-g E ~ i l L: i ~ Options
c ip.~"Irgeodz'cy.Atf anta,
Ga.: b o x Press, it98 X .
Fdcs, Evarr. "Antedilurrian "fheodicy: Str~nlpon the Fall." Faith n~zdPhiloso-
phy 6 ( l989): 320-329.
m
-
- . ""Shauld Gad Nor Have Created Adam? Fait/? a d 13/2ilosophy 6
(1992):192-218,
Ferrb, Nets, E ~ i l;lnd the CJ3rG~ianFai~h.New York: Harper, 1947.
12cllrintcd by Books for Libraries Press, Ncw York, 1972.
Griffin, David Rny E ~ i Revisited:
l Responses n~zdReeunsiderations. Af bany :
Seate University of New Vc>rkPress, X 99 I .
. CGod, Po1i57eq annd Evil: 14 12rocgss ?%ea&cjf. Philadelphia: bVcsrminstcr
Press, 1976.
Hare, Peter, "Review of David Xby Griffin, a d , P P P E ;l~zd ~ E~il." P$eocess
S~z.~dz'gs'S' ( 1977):44-5 1.
Hartshorile, C:harles. "A S,e\-\lr Look at the Problct-rit of Evil," "I ci,'~rr*g~zt
Philosophical Issgfes: Essgjrs Hoptor of'C@.t.gJohn Ducasse, edited by F. C.
l3ommcyer. Sprtrlgficld, f 11.: Charles C . 'l'homas, 1966, pp. 20 1-212.
Hasker, Wiuiam. ""Sffering, Soul-hlaking, and Sal~fation,"h z t e r ~ z a t i o ~ a l
Phikos~~phical Q@arge;.l;~28 ( X 988): 3-1 9.
Hick, ]ofin, Eviln;yrd the God @love. 2nd cd. New York: EIarper 8r lXowJ 1978.
. ""God, E\i1 and Mystery*"Rel&io~s,5'tzdies 3 ( 1668):5 39-546.
. "The Problem of Evil in the First and I,ast 2"hings." fig$r.utnl c~'"Ir3e-
olr~z'calS t u d z ' ~19 ( f. 968): 591-602.
Ibne, G. Stanley, "The Concept of ITiville Goodness a~itdthe Problem of
Evil ." Rek&z"uus '$tz&digsf l ( (1975): 49-72 .
. "Evil and Privation." hter~zalti;onnlJournt%l jbr Pi3ilosophy c?f" Reli-
~ i o r lt X (1980): 43-58.
. ""TIC Failcrre of Soul-Making 'rfieodicy.'Y~rzt.errraziournl Jotb~erratjbr
PhiIttsophy of'R~I&io~z 6 6 1975): l -22.
. ""So-ttl-Maliing 'Theadicy and Escttatology," %Suphi& (Az&s$rglza)X 4
(July 1975): 24-31.
I,e.c\liis, C . S , The P~pobLc;lazc?f'Pgin. New York: h%aclltillan,1962.
Maddexl, Ed\\~arcS,and Petcr Hare, E ~ i arid l $he Concgpt: ofC;ud, Springfield,
111.: Charles 6, l'lzoxnas, 1968.
h%aritair~, Jacques, Ct'od a ~ $he d Perfimissicjn oJ-'E~?il.Milwaukee: Brrrce Pub-
lishixlg, X 966,
13cterson, ~Vichael.""God and Evil in 13rocess Thcologr." h~n12rocess Y79ealo&jt7
edited by Rondd Nash. Grand Rapids, h%icl--t,: Baker Book Hosxse, 1987,
pp. X X 7-1 39.
. "lXcce~-EtbVork 017. the Probleln of Evil." A ~ ~ e j e i c a12bilosaphz'cal
n
Qzfartt:r1",y20 (1683): 321-339.
Petersoil, hiiichael, ed. Y'hg P~oblemof &P$/:Salcczgd R c g d i ~ g s .Notre Dame,
Ind. : Ux~ivcrsiyof Norrc Dame f3ress, 1992,
Peterson, Michaei, Williant Hasker, Bruee Reichenbacb, and David Basinger.
Rcgsort alzd Relgious Reli$ An In ~~poduction t o the Philosophjf of Rcli&z"on,
2nd ed, New York: Oxford Universi~Prcss, 1998, chap. 6, pp. 1X6-145.
Reiche~~bach, Bruce, E ~ i n~zd
l n Ct'ood God. New York: Fordbnt-rt University
Press, 1982.
. ""Natural Evils and Natural Law: A 'rheodicy ;for Natural Evils." h-
;t-ernt%$infzt%l Philosophical Qsfartt:r1",~l 6 ( 1676): l 76-1 66.
Swinburnc, &chard. "Does ?'X~cismNeed a 'Theodicy?'T~nnadz"g;~z Joztmal
of12bilosophy t 8 (1988): 287-31 X.
. "Kno\vledge from Experience, and the Problem of Evil." In 7be R n -
tzl"oaali2-yoj' Rt:r!&kozits Belig; Essajfs i.1.2 Hornor of Basil Migchell, edited by
bVilliam Abrafialn and Stcve1-1Holtzcr. Oxford: Czlarendon Press, 1987,
pp, 141-167.
-P . ""Natriral Evil." A~merz'cgnPljilosophickal Qggnrterly X5 (1978):
295-301.
. "The Problei~t-ritofEvil." In The &ZZstgnce crlf'C;od. Oxford: Clare~~don
Press, 1979, pp. 200-224.
. "A l'lzeodicy of I-Ieavcmi and Heill." h~n Y72e E~is$g;elzceand Nat:z$re of
C$od, edited by &fi-ed Freddoso. Natre Dame, Ind.: Notre Da~~t-rite U-~liver-
sity Press, 1983, pp. 37-54.
bVhitncy, Barry L. Evil and the Izrocess Chd. Ncw York: MelXc1-113rcss, 1985.
The Existentia Problem o f Evil
As noted earlier, the problem of evil may be divided into theoretical

and existential dinnensions. We are far~jiliarwith the various versions
of the theoretical problem: the logical, probabilistic, and evidential
formulations. Yet writers 011 the theoretical problem frequently d u d e
to another kind of problem lying beyond the scope of the logical,
probabilistic, and epistemic concerns that give shape t o the ~rarious
theoretical expressions. This other dimension of the probleln of evil is
more dimcult to characterize. At the very least, i t is rooted in the ac-
tual experience of evil and how that experience supports disbelief in
God. It has been called a practical problem, a psychological problem,
and a moral problc111.1 Mvin Plantinga has catled it the "religious
bxoblcm of evil,"2 and Marilyn A d a ~ l ~has s called it the "pastoral
problcm of evil."WWhat is clear is that, For some people, the existcn-
tial feel for evil somehow leads to the rejectioll of religious belief.4 Al-
though there is no definitive study ofthe existential problem of evil, I
shall explore major aspects of it here and tie together sejreral impor-
tant ideas about it ~ o r n
the current Literature.
The Experience of Gratuitous Evil

What one ~llightcall the "phenomenology of e\ri19'----thatis, the study
of the awareness of evil in human consciousness and how we assign
mealli~lgto it-is a rich field of investigation. Jeffrey Burton R~lssell
insists that evil is "perceived immediately, directly and existe~~tiallp.""
Many other authors also believe that there is something forceful and
primal about the way evil is experienced." John Bowker ~vritesthat
"the sheer bloody agonies of existence" are something of which "all
m m are atvare and have direct experiencr.''7 Actually, it is not the ex-
perience of evil per se that has such intensiry but the experience of evil
as meaningless, pointless, gratuitous. It is this aspect of experience
that is expressed in the bitter lament of the ordinary person as well as
in the sophisticated reasoning of thc antitheistic philosopher.Wrcat
literature also provides extremely effective rcprcsentations of this ex-
bxricnce: Consider the writings of Dostoevsky,%Albert Camus,'o and
Migtlel dr Unamuno. H
There is something about the experience of evil as gratuitous that
can and often does render faith in God untenable. Man)! persoils say
that they find themselves gripped at the core of their being by the
horror of evil and that this awareness is profoundly transforming.
Those who have this kind of perception of evil often report that they
cannot experience the universe as theistic-tha they could never
~llanifestattitudes of praise, adoration, gratitude, and worship toward
God. AFtcr reflecting on thc horrible and absurd evils in the world
that the divine being is supposed to allow, John Stuart Mill says,
"When I am told that . . . 1 must . . . call this being bp the nalnes
which express and affirln the highest hulnall moralit5 I say in plain
terlns that I will not. Whatever power such a being map have over me,
there is one thing which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to
worship him."l2
h long as theism is understood to entail that there are no gratu-
imus evils and as long as human beings expcrience much evil as gratu-
itous, then therc will be a continuing tension b c w c n theistic belief
and common experience. Somc defensive lnalleuvrrs by theists such
as Plantinga seek to show that the facts of evil do not rellder theism
improbable. Other theists, such as Stephen Wykstra, argue defensivel!~
that we are in no position cognitivelp to affirm the existence (or likely
existence) of gratuitous evil. In a sense, Plantinga sums up the net re-
sult of all such defensive strategies when he writes:
The theist nlay find a ?*eLz~z'u~s probble~~it
in evil; in the presence of his
own suffering or that of sorneolle near to him hc may find it difficuft to
maintair-t what he takes to be the proper attitude towards God. Faced
with great persollnf s~~fferingor misfc~rtune,he may be tempted to rebel
agair~stGod, to shake his fist: in God's face, ,or cvcn to give up belief in
God altogether. But this is a probXsm of a different dime~-tsion.Such a
grobfem calls IIQX for philosophical enligl~tennlent,but for pastoral
care.13
So, presumably? at the strictly philosophical level-the level of logi-
cally reconciling jrarious claims, coilfirming and disconfir~niilg
them-the critic's argumena can be staved off, and the intellectual
doubts of believers can be assuaged. If there is any remaining objec-
tion to religious faith, then it must be emotional or attitudinal or
practical in nature.
Plantinga correctly intimates that therc is more to the problcill of
evil than abstract exercises in juggling propositions. But how we con-
ceive of this other dimellsioll in relation to the theoretical dimension
is of major importance. To suggest that further philosophical enlight-
enment is slot relejrant to the attitudinal or experiential dimension bi-
firrcatcs reason and experience. When defense against the problem of
evil is coupled with Reformed epistemologh which affirms the theist's
intellectual right to believe in God basically, man!. theists believe that
virtually everything rclatcd to the issue of God and evil that is philo-
soyhically important has been addrcsscd.
Frorn another ycrspcctivc, Mal.llyl-x Adams indicates that the pas-
toral or religious problem of evil "has a philosophical dilnension in
that it lnight be partially alleviated by some sort of explanations of
how God is being good to created persons, even byhen he permits
and/or causes evils such as theseeWl4 For Adams, to deny the bifurca-
tion between theoretical considerations and the actual experience of
evil is to move in a more appropriate direction. After all, there are
many convincing philosophical and psychological studies, quite unrc-
latcd to the issuc of God and evil, that argue for the intimate link bc-
mecn "logic and e~notion"or "bclicf and cxpericnce." These studies
show that what a person believes coilditions the railge and qualiy of
his experience. 15
It is not surprising that, in discussing the problcln of evil, critic Sid-
ney Hook observed that "no monotheistic religioll ~vhichconceives
of God as both omnipotent and benevolent, no metaphysic which as-
serts that the world is rational, necessary, and good has any rooln for
genuine traged~r."lbh e r e we may assume that Hook's term ""gc.nuinc
tragedy" rcfers to gratuitous evil. The point, then, is that what onc
believes about theism and its implications affects his experience of thc
world. Mit: can see why theistic believers who ullderstalld the exis-
tence of God to exclude gratuitous evil would ellcounter significant
dissollance in the face of intense experiences of evil as being gratu-
itous. John Hick captures something of this dissonance when he ar-
gues that a theology cannot be repugnant t o the moral sense on
which it is based.17 In this same vein, we can comprehelld why non-
theists who ponder the credibility of theistic belief3 have great diffi-
culty seeing how they fit with the experience of real life.
Adams is correct in suggesting that the religious probleln can be
somewhat alleviated by relevant explanations. In other words, a per-
son's beliefs about God and their logical implications map necd to bc
clarified, amplified, or modified. Or she map necd to bc encouragcd,
in an emotionally supportive context, to sec that thc beliefs shc holds
about God really call for attitudinal change or for a different personal
response. Recognizing the seriousness of the religious problem, the-
oloaian Thomas Oden has articulated a "theodicji for pastoral prac-
tice." The pastoral approach Oden outlines clearly discouna false and
hannful answers for evil, offers some general explanations for why evil
exists, suggests how some good may still be brought out of unneces-
sary evil, and presents some general themes about God" love and
care for persons in spite of the contingcncics of hurxan existencc.l8
One does not have to follow this sort of pastoral process very long
to see that it cannot go far simply on the conceptual resources of re-
stricted theisn~.Standard theistic belief3 about the divine attributes of
omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness inlply only the
broadest outlines of ho\\r to thinlr about the relation of God and evil.
Although sheer defense may be efkctivel~rbased on restricted theism,
any sufficient explanation of evil, which obviously takes us into the
area of theodic): rcquircs additional rcsourccs, drawn from various
doctrines and teachings of a faith tradition.
Evil and Personal Identity

We are now in a position t o see how the experiellce of gratuitous evil
supports the factual premise of the argument. For the person offering
the argument from gratuitous evil, the factual clairn-such as Ro\ve7s
(RI)-has strong experiential ~veight.Though the argument itself-
its constituent propositions and their logieal and epistemic rcladons-
f o m s the thcorctical dilllension of the problem, it is intimately rc-
latcd to what \ve arc calling the existential dilllension. Afier all, thc
argtllnent must be advanced by somcolle who thinks it is sound, that
is, a person who believes the premises to be true and that they lead to
the stated conclusion. We geilerally assume that the critic who be-
lieves there is gratuitous evil is expressing lnoral protest, indignatioll,
and outrage. We typically see him as wishing violently that things
were not the way they are and insisting that God, if he exists, is
blameworthy for allo~lingthem t o be the way they are. That is a large
part of the existential dimension of the problem.
Rut once a person experiences the ~vorldas containing gratuitous
evils and is morally repulsed bp their horrors, an interesting and sub-
de considcratian arises. It is a deeply existential consideration pcrtain-
ing to the person's value prcfercnces toward himself and toward the
world in general. According to a certain way of thiilking about such
things, a persoil can be girtentially azlthelztic or existentially honest in
raising a theoretical statement of the problem of evil only if he gen-
uinely regrets his own existence. This consideratio12provides the basis
for an intriguing theistic response to the problem of gratuitous evil, a
response that does not advance an explanatory theory of why God
justifiably allojvs the evils of the world. Although i t would be interest-
ing to explorc other nuances of the attitude of rcgrct in rclation to
other statements of the problelll of evil, I will focus here on thc most
formidable of all statements: the argurxent from gratuitous evil.
The particular theistic strategy here rests on certaill value prefer-
ellcrs or attitudes. The first step in developillg this respollse is to call
upon each indi~ridualwho thillks about it--in this case, the atheist ad-
vancing the problem of gratuitous evil-to declare his attitude toward
his own existence. Williarn Hasker straightforwardly poses a question
to each person who rnight advance the problem of evil as a reason for
rajecting theism: A m PoIgd 1: exist?He explains the exact mean-
ing of the question as follows:
The question is imt whether my life is all that it ougl-rt t o be o r all that it
cor~ccivablycoufd be. It is not whetfier tile pleasure-pain batajlce in my
life ta date has bccx-1, on the whole, ;fa~.orableor unhvorabls. Ir is not
wl-rether my life is, in general, a benefit t o tl~osewho are affected by it,
It is not- even the questiorl whether my fife, all tilings considered, ctzri-
tains more good than evil. Ai of these q~~estions arc deeply interesting,
and the allsMiers to them, if knoliin, n~igl-rtaffect my arlsMier t o the qlxes-
tion which I am asking. But the questiorl is simplj~,am I glad that I am
alivc? Or is my existence, on thc whole, sainerbing which X regret? Is
~ g I affirmit,or do I wish, like Job, that I had
my life s o n ~ e t h i ~which
rlcvcr been?
Ob~riously,this casts the lnatter in a persoll-relative way. Each person

must answer for himself ~vhetherhe is glad for his own existence or
would rather i t be replaced by nonexistence. And the question can
obviously be extended to ask byhether one is glad for the existence of
loved ones: AIMI ~ l a doftheir wistelzce?
The second step in laying out the theistic existential response is to
clarifv what is necessary for human beings to exist as the unique indi-
viduals that they are. Hasker yroposes a thesis that is not uncontro-
versial but is widely accepted by thinkers who hold a varicq of philo-
soyhical perspectives. The thcsis is
(50) A lleccssary colldition of my coming-into-existence is the

coming-into-existencr of my body.zo
In one way or another, then, my unique personal identity depends

somehow on having this particular body. Materialists, identit)' theo-
rist, epiphenomenalists, brhaviorists, and even Thomists accept this
thesis. Cartesian dt~alistsand the likc, who do not hold that the body
is a necessary condition of personal existence, will not fccl thc force of
the following reasoning.
The third step in progressively unfolding this existential response is
to show that, logically' ~rhate~reris lleccssary for my body3 existence is
necessary for my existence. That is, if my body is necessarjl for me to
have indikridual personal existence, then ~vhateveris necessary for my
body's existence is also necessary for my personal existence. This prin-
ciple, of course, holds for any person. When one honestly and thor-
oughly exalllines all of the necessary conditions for one's bodily exis-
tcncc, the results arc impressive. In order for my body to co111c into
existence, my parents w u l d have had to have had a child, Had my
noth her married sonleone else, nolle of their children could have been
mc?,sincc notle of their bodies could have been $hisbody. Moreover,
not just any child of my parents ~ r o u l dhave been me, with my identi-
cal genetic heritage donated by a specific pair of male and female re-
productive cells at a specific time.
All of this means that the corning into existence of any particular
individual is, antccedently, an extremely improbable event. In fact,
antecedently, it is quite improbable that any given individual would
come into cxistcnce in view of his or her dependence on a illultitude
of other highly improbable events, such as the fortuitous circuln-
stances surrounding how one's parents met and got married, which
could include events as routine as a school prom or as dralnatic as a
world war. And behind one's parents stand a whole series of their
progenitors, persons ~vhoseco~xing-into-beingmust have depended
on pet other contingent events. All of this leads Hasker to conclude
that
(51) Had major or sig~lificantevents in the world's past history

been different than they were, then in all probabiliry neither
I nor the persons ~vhoxnI love would even have existed.
This securcs the connection bernc.cn one" attitude toward one's ex-
isteilce and the j4rc1rld" trotal history.
The meeting and mating of our ancestors was influenced by the
events of their rir~es-many of j4rhich were undoubtedk calamitous,
such as wars, epidemics, crimes, accidents, and so forth. And we al-
ready know that no person has any reason whatever to suppose that
he would have existed had the course of the world's history been sub-
stantially diffcrcnt. WC arc now in a position to grasp thc link be-
wecn one's individual existence and thc existence of all the evils of
the world leading up to his coming-into-isei13g.ASRobcrl: Mams ob-
serves, "The farther back we go into history, the larger the propor-
tion of evils to which we owe our being; for the causal nexus relc~rant
to our individual genesis widms as we go back in time. We almost
certainly ~vouldneFrer have existed had there not been just about the
same evils as actually occurred in a large part of human history."21 Let
us now explore the bearing of this link on the original question, A m I
I ~~isli?
&Ifid t h a ~
The Logic of Regret

At this point, we need to specify some principles governing the logi-
cal relationships beween certain attitudes. The relevant attitudes are
expressed by the phrases "bring glad that" and "being sorry that."
Such a ~ i t u d e cannot
s be true or false, as beliefs are. Hasker contends
that they share with beliefs, moral judgment, and imperati\res the
property of bcing ~pationnlbconsistent or inconsistent. Thc scnse of
'"lad" and ""srry'\tl..th ~vl~ich we are concerned is not essentially a
mattcr of fcelin~gladness or sorrow, although it might involve thcsc
feelings. These attitudes are largely defi~ledby p ~ p e f e ~ ~ g ~ Thus,
z c e . my
beillg glad that P entails m y p ~ g f ~ r rthat
i ~ zP~ be the case rather than
not-F. Conversely if I am s o n y or reBret that P, this means that I
~uuuldprefer that not-Pbe the case rather than I? (Here P stands for
the sentmce that expresses the proposition that P, and P is the name
of the state of affairs such that P.) By virtue of these preferences, the
attitudes in questioil are ratiollallp consistent or inconsistent.
At this point, we can begin to discern important logical priilciples
that apply to the attitudes in question. Surely, we can say that
(52) If I am glad that P, I rationally cannot be sorry that P.
Of course, a person may fcel both gladncss and sorrow about soille-
thing. This is what we mean j4rhen we sap that an eIrent in life is "bit-
tersweet" (e.g., a parent j4rhose child is grttillg married may be de-
scribed as "being sad" that a family lnember is leaving home but
"being glad" that she is finding committed companionship). Rut "be-
ing glad" in the relevant sense here involves an attitude of preference
to which principle (52) applies.
Let us now specifp some key definitions that will enable us to scc
the significance of some other important principles. Haskcr first sug-
gests this:
t z " X>'=
'A i s ~ z " ~ . ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ $ a ~that ~ I 'A
a I & cif a t 1zs glad rbat 13, and there i s
some state-of-affairs Qsuch that .A k~le>wsthat if Qdid 1l0t obtain nei-
ther wc~ufdP, and A regrets that Q.'
One mah for example, be circumstantially glad that the University of
Kentucky defeated the University of Utah to win the 1998 NCAA
basketball challlpionship but not prefer Kentucky's victory gnder all
possible ~igficztnzstnnces(i.e., on the whole). For example, one may have
placed a largc bet on Utah or bclic\rc that the N C M ? existencc is a
bad thing because its championships, telc~risioncontracts, and the like
foster corruption and an ulldue emphasis on athletics in our societ)'.
So, @iven the civc~mstalzces,one may be glad for Kentucky's ~rictory.
Rut this does not mean that one is glad on the ~vhole.We are now
ready for the second definition we need:
"A i s 8 I a B on the r??hokr:that I"'= df "A is glad that P, atld fbr any state-of-
affairs Qsuctl rbar A k~lowsrbar if &did not obtain neltlicr would P, A
is glad t l ~ a Q."
t
Modi@ing our example, we map say that one may be glad on the
whole whm, recognizillg that the NCAA involves some ulldrsirable
consequences, he still definitely prefers Kentucky's cha~npionshipvic-
tory. Finally, we may say that a person ve&lpe~son the ivholc that P
~vheneverhe is clearly nut glad on the ~vholethat P or is only circum-
stantially glad that P.
In light of these definitions, we can now see the significance of the
follo\ning principle:
(53) If I am glad on the whole that 1:and I know that Pentails

Q then I rationally must be glad on the whole that Q.
(54) If I am glad on the j4rhole that P, and I know that if Qdid

not obtain neither bnould P, then I rationally must be glad
that Q.
These principles seem quite clearly correct. But when principle (54) is
combined with ( 5l ) from the previous section regarding self-identity,
\VC get an astotmding conclusion:
(55) If I am glad on the whole about my own existcncc and that

of those whom I love, the13 I must be glad that the history
of the world, in its major aspects, has beell as it has.
Of course, this conclusion does not follow dedtlctively from (54) and
( 5 1) as they have been stated. Principle (54) speaks of my klzo~vllzn
that if Qdid not obtain neither would I< whereas (51) saps only that
in all pffiobgbili~there is such a connection. This should makc little
difference in our attitude toward (55).32 Perhaps, then, the rcason
why (55) has been largely ignorcd is the fact that (50) and (51) arc
not obvious. The ideas expressed in (54) and (55) have been dis-
cussed in philosophical literature. Benedict de Spinoza, for example,
saps that our ordinar!. judglnellts of good and evil are irratioilal pre-
cisely because in lnaking them, we overlook the necessary connec-
tions bet~reenevents.2"
Existential Authenticity and Evil

If what we have said so far is souild and if the truth of (55) has been
established, what bearing does all this have for the problein of evil?
Put more precisely, what effect can it have on one who advances or
considers advancing the argument from gratuitous evil? For a person
who is glad on the ~vholethat he exists or even that someone he loves
exists, then it follo\\rs-due to (55) above-that he must be glad also
about the world's existence and about the gelleral course its history
has taken. But then it is very difficult for him to be exigenti~lhna-
thentic or wistentiall~honest in advancing the argument from gratu-
itous evil. Let us see why this is so.
The argument from gratuitous evil involves affirming a factual
premise about: thcrc being evil in the world that sertrcs no good pur-
pose. To have the experiential grounds for affirming this crucial
premise is to have certain moral convictions, to consult one's cxpcri-
ence of the goods and evils of life, and to be lnorallp repulsed by !vl=~t
one finds. To assert the factual premise is, in effect, to issue a com-
plaint that there is something drastically wrong with the world as a
whole. And we nowr are keenly aware of the intricate causal intcrcon-
ncctions between all the events in the world (including evil events)
and our own existence. Thus, the critic who is glad on the ~vholefor
his own existence or that of those ~vl1on2he loves cannot bc existcn-
tially authentic in advancing the factual prelllise. Robcrt Adams
writes: "Thc fact that \vc owe our existence to evils gives rise t o a
probleln of evil, not only for theists but for allyone who loves an ac-
tual human individual-himself or anyone else. How is our Love for
actual hulnan selves to be recoilciled with moral repudiation of the
e\rils that crowd the pages of history? Are we to wish that neither we
nor the evils had existed?"z4
Based on this line of reasoning, the followring existential stance sim-
ply becomes ludicrr~rzs:
(56) The world as we know it is morally so objectionable that a

God who tolcratrd it could in no meaningful sense be
called good-nevertheless, I arnflladfior ~ z own y Existence
alzd tbggpefore I am almglgd that the wofpld exists and ghat
the main events andfeatugpes [ f i t s history have been a$ they
have,
We may say that s ~ ~ ac posture

h is ~.Z~~L'~.PZGZ"I%IIJI or exis-
.fe~-stt~~~z:fyz"n&
tia[{ysey-dgfg&L'i?$&.
BPZ
It shorrld now bc intuitively evident that
(57) If I am glad on the whole about my owrn existence and that

of persons close to me, then I cannot reproach God for the
general character or the major events of the world's past
history.
Since reproach is attitudinal, preferential, and existential in nature,
the critic is hereby blocked from reproachillg God by citing the gen-
eral character and major events of the past, many of which Ivere tragic
for the persons involved. It will also not do for the critic to base his
argument from gratuitous evil just on events in his own lifetime,
events, therefore, on which his own existence does not depend in the
way in which it depends on those tragic events of the past. Af'tcr all,
the tragedies of our lifetime arc simply the same kinds of events as
those that have occurred countless times in the past. For a critic to
lnount his moral complaint solely 011the basis of evil evellts that oc-
cur only in his lifetime is for him to express a position too egocelltric
to deserve serious attention.
Thus, the critic who is positively glad about (i.e., does not positively
regret) his own existence cannot advance the general problem of gratu-
itous evil in an existentially authentic way. One interesting aspect of this
approach to the exi~entialproblem is that, without trj<r.lgto sketch an
overall view of why God allows evil, it strikcs on a very deep lcvel at
one's sellsr of existence. Furthermore, it logically conllects one's exis-
tence with the o~rrrallstate of the world. This respollsr capitalizes on an
ofi-en lleglected fact: that we do not come to our j~tdgmrlltsabout the
goodness or badness of existence from the standpoint of "a cos~nicideal
observer." This is a standpoint we can never attain. Instead, each of us
comes to these judgments kom a personal standpoint as an existing hu-
man being---one who prospers and struggles, rcjoiccs and sorrowst
laughs and weeps, and is glad for the opportunit). to live out his life
upon the earth. It is t.hc critic who adopfs $bz^sstandpoint who cannrlt
raise the probleln of gratuitous evil in a1 existeiltially authentic \\lay.
There are, of course, other types of critics who are glad that they
exist and pet are not deterred by the preceding line of reasoning. One
type would be the antitheistic critic who is indeed glad on the Irhole
that she exists or that her loved ones exist and who conceives and prr-
sents the problem of evil merely as a matter of i~lternalinconsistency
for theistic belief (as explored in Chapter 2). Another type of critic
may take thc problem of evil to bc a probabilistic difficulq for theistic
belief in light of evil in the ~vorld(as explored in <:haptcr 4). In eithcr
case, the critics in question need not support any substantive
premises, commit t o any moral principles, or form any value judg-
lnents about the actual state of the world. So, the theistic response
here does not directljr address them. Of course, we have already seen
that the logical and probabilistic argulnents from evil are vulnerable
to rebuttal in other %laps.As sho~z.11 in Chapter 5, the argulnellt from
gratuitous evil is the ~ n o s tdifficult for the theist to rebut anymrap.
Chapter 6 reviewed several theodicies that could be interpreted as at-
tempts to answer the argument from gratuity by offering theoretical
explanations. But now we see a different way for the theist to respond
to the antitheistic critic who ahanecs the argument.
This still leavcs us with the one very formidable typc of critic-the
persc1r.r who is willing to say that he positikrely j#cBre&his own existencc
on the whole. This is the persoll-presulnably a very rare individual in-
deed-who is able hollestly to say that he would truly uish and would
prefer that some other world, in j4rhich no one now living has a share,
or perhaps no world at all should exist in place of this present evil ~vorld
of which he is unhappily a part. Out of the depths of his own pointless
suffering, the ancient patriarch Job cursed the day of his birth:
"Let the day perish in wl-ricb I was born, alld the night that said, 'A
mall-child is cotlceived."
"Let that &ay be darkt~ess!May Gad abovc not seek it, or light sfiine
on it.
"Let gloom and deep darkness claim it. Let clorrds settle upoxl it; let-
the blackl~cssof the day tern@ it.
"That light-let thick darkness seize it! tct it not rejoice among the
days ofthe year; let it not come into tile number of the moxlths.
"Yes, 1st that night be barrel-t; let no jo~rfix)cry be heard in it.
"Let those curse it who curse the Sea, those who are skilled to rouse
up I~viathan.
"Let the stars of its dawn be dark; let it hope ;for light, b ~ have
~ t none;
may it not see the eyelids of the morning-
""because it did not shut the doors of my mczther? s%romb,and hide
trouble fi-on1my eyes.
"Why did I not die at birth, come forth from the wo111b and expire,"
"liVhy were there knees to receive me, or breasts far me to suck?
""Now I wo~tIdbc Xying dawn and quiet; I wo~tldbe asleep; then I
w ~ t ~ be
l dat rest
"with ki~lgsand counsclors of the earth \%rhorebuild ruins f i r them-
selves,
""or with princes whc) have gold, who fit1 their houses with silver.
"Or why was I not: br~riediikc a stillborn child, like an ir1h:;lxlt:that
never sees the Iight?"25
This is the deep existential regret char is recluired for one meaning-
firlly to raise the argument from gratuitous evil. To be able to assert
the factual prelnise that there is gratuitous evil, the critic must posi-
tively regret on the %.hole that he, his famill: his friends, all his loved
otles, and all the rest of us have ever lived.
Perhaps lvan Karamazov is the paradigmatic figure here. Ivan re-
sists his brother" declaration that all events I11 the world contribute to
a dkinck designed ""frtigher harmony" that will bc rcvealed at the end
of time:
You see, Alyosl-ra, perhaps it really may happen that if X jive to that mo-
ment, or rise agaix~to see it, I, too, perhaps may cry aloud with the rest,
looliing at the mother en~bracirlgthe child's torturer, "Thou art just, 0
Lord!" "but I don" r7ant to cry aloud then. W~ilcsthere is still time, X
hasten to protect rnyself and so I renounce the higher harmor-zy alto-
getl~er.It's slot worth the tears of that one tortured child who beat itself
on the breast ~virtti t s little fist and prajxed in its stinkixlg outhouse, 1vit1-r
its unexpiated tears t o ""dear, kind God"! It's s a t worth it, because
those tears are unatoned for.26
Summarizing his existential posture, Ivan declares, "In the final re-
sult, I don't accept this world of God's, and, although I kno~vit ex-
ists, I don't accept it at all."27
Here we have a person who is willing to say that the existellce and
history of the world has not been worth it. For Ivan, man!. of the
world's evils are gratuitous because whatever purpose they serve is
not worth thc price, A rebellious existcntiali hero, Ivan clearly seems
ready to embracc the implication that he must be willing for his own
existence to be replaced by nonexistence.. W ~ a Ivan t does, then, is to
answer the penetrating question with which we have been working-
Am Iglnd that I mist?-and to ansNrer it negatiirely. This ansNrer al-
lows him to be existentially honest or authentic in rejectillg the evils
of the world.28 It is these kinds of persons-the Ivan Karamazovs of
this world-jvho are unaffected by the theistic response to the prob-
lem of evil that has been sketched here. Ivan is the person who can
honestly say that he regrets his own existence and the cxistcncc of all
whom he loves, since too great a price in terms of illiser): and suffer-
ing has been paid for thcir existencc.z"
In fact, for such a person, framillg his objectioll in terlns of the gen-
eral problem of gratuitous evil is somekvhat unnecessary because he
can consider the evils occurrillg in his o\vn life as the only factual in-
stance of gratuity he needs to cite. On that basis alone, he might ob-
ject that the God of theism does not exist. Or he might cite as a case
in point any single life that does not seem to be good on the whole,
not a great good to the person living it. A12 implicit assumption here
would be that a morally good deity would not allow even one individ-
ual to have a life that is not a great good to hirn on the whole, re-
gardless of what broad reasons there are for thinking that our ~vorldis
good on balance. This line of thought, of course, pursues the attack
in an Ivan-like direction. h d it ccrtaillly makes the attel-npt to apply
general explanations for evils to individual cascs impertinent, at least,
and damaging, at most.30
The Defeat of Horrendous Evil

It is not clear whether restricted theism offers enough rich ideas to
fashion an effective response to the person who says that he regrets
his own existence or that of the whole world. Thc critic's charge here
is essentially that it would have been better if God---if he exists at
ail---had not created this world, For one thil~g,the theist might
query, "Better tvhom!" since if God had not created this \norid and
the critic had not come into existence, it could hardly be better for
the critic. For ailother thing, the theist who accepts the fact of gratu-
itous evil in a thristic unikrrrse may stress the ok~erallvalue of the
moral enterprise--even if there are no guarantees that all evils will al-
ways be compensated with greater goods. Rut all such tactics map still
be met with the Ivan-like rcsponsc, "h, but \\;hat about all the hor-
rendous suffcrillg! It is just not worth it. Nothing can make it worth
it." b a n even admits that all people map indccd be resurrected at the
end of time and that victims map forgive their torturers. But that will
all be too ulljust, he insists, since some of the sufferings are too awful
to be compensated.31 For Ivan, there are too Inany people whose lives
are not a great good to them and may, on balance, not have positive
value. Thus, no just and loving deity could have created a world that
contains them. Put another way, the magnitude of the horrific evils
that sornc tragic human lives irlcludc cannot: be ctrcn approximately
estimated without recognizing that they are incommensurate with
any collection of goods.
Although we are enteri~lga territory of fundamental disagreelnellt
benvern the theist and critic, a territory that is largely uncharted,
Marilyn Adams has offered a response that is disti~lctivelyChristian as
well as theistic. She observes that most responses to the problem of
evil are generic (specifl~inga general reason for evil) and global (fo-
cusillg on some feature of the bnorld that makes evil possible). Yet she
points out the insufficiencj~of geileric and global solutions for the
problem raised bp horrmdous evils. "Horrelldous evils" are evils the
doing or suffering of which gives one pri~nafacie reason to doubt
whether one's life could (givm the inclusion of such evils in it) be a
great good to one on the wholc. Adams argues that the attribute of
divine goodness must bc analpzed to show not only that God cvould
create a world that is good on the whole but also that he ~votxldnot
allow any individual lives to be lived that are ellgt~lfedand ole~- -c o n ~ e
F
by evil. The difficulty that the Christian theist faces here is not only
that do we not know God's nctzlnl reason for permittillg horrelldous
evils but also that we cannot even conceive of any plausible reasons.32
Employing what she calls the "resources of religious value theory,"
Adams develops an argument that horrendous evils can be defeated in
the context of the lives of individuals who expericncc them. Let us
simply say that evil is "defeated" \vhen it is part of a life that is good
on the wholc, when it is related appropriatdy to relevant and great
goods. Adams agrees with rebels like Ivan Karamazov and John Stu-
art Mill in insisti~lgthat there is no set of temporal and firlite goods
that can guarantee that a person kvhose life includes horrendous evils
will be a great good to him or her on the whole.
According to Adams, i t is the intimate relationship with God that
has value incommensurable with anything else:
Fro111 a Clhri-istianpoint of view; God is a bei~lga greater than jiihich can-

not- be coilceived, a good i~~commex~sttrat-e with both created goods and
tcxnyoral evils. Liketvisc, the good of beatific, face-to-face intimacy with
God is simply incommensurate ji4tl-r any n~erefyn<)n-transcendent
goods or ills a perso-il might experience. Thus, the good of beatific face-
to-face intimacy with God would e~z825CI('. . . even the horrendous evils
l-run~a~~sexpekence in this present fife here beto\\; and overcame ally
prima-facie reasoils the iji~divid~lal had to do-itbt ~ ~ h e t h chis/her
r life
woc~lbor co~tldbe worth li17ing.33
Thc ccntraf logic at work here is that the cwrst evils dernand to be dt-
feated bp the best goods.34 Christian theists such as Marilpn Adams
argue, then, that horrendous evils can be overcolne only by the infi-
nite goodness of God.
Adams claims that it is not ilecessary to firxi reasorls (eiien merely
logically possible reasons) ivhy God lnight permit horrendous evils.
Thus, theoretical theodicy is not essential. It is enough for the Chris-
tian theist to show bus, God can be good ellough to created persons
despite their participation in such horrors. For Christiall theists to
show this, according to Adalns, they must work out the implications
of divine goodlless conceived not just as aiming at the excellent pro-
duction of global goods but also as not allowing any individtlal life to
s~lstainevils that would ultimately engulf it. Her conclusion, then, is
that, for a person who experiences horrendous evil, God can ensure
that his life is a great good to him only by integrating participation in
those evils into a perso~lalrelationship with God himself. This is, in
effect, to offer a practical or existential theodicy.
How shall we think about what it means for God to integrate hor-
rendous evil into a relationship with himselfi Adams argues that
God's loving identification with the sufferer, vividly displayed in his
own self-sacrifice in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, is a helpful
Christian rl~odelin this contcxt."Vhe asserts that Christian theism
tcachcs that God through Christ participated in horrendous evil, ex-
periencing hulxan horrors. Thus, the sufferer can idcntie (either
sympathetically or mystically) with Christ and thereby have access to
the illner life of God. According to Adams, this experience of God
preelnpts the need to kno\\r why horrendous evils erist.36 At the end
of his long ordeal with anguish and loss, the biblical character Job was
not privileged to know the reasons why he suffered so terribly. But he
was given an intimate brision of God that seemed to satisfv hiin and let
him sec that his life was indecd a great good. Job answcrcd the h r d :
"I know that you can d o all things, and that no purposc of yours can
be thwarted. I have uttcrcd what I did not udcrstand, things too
wonderful for me, which I did not know. I had heard of you by the
hearillg of the ear, but 11ow my eye sees pou."37
In the final analysis, the issue comes down to whether Adams's case
is acceptable to the one to whom it is addressed. Adams can maintain
that her own distinctively Christian approach is internally consistent,
although the Christian theist and the critic will predictably differ on
the truth and plausibility of its claims. Thc antitheistic critic, bp con-
trast, could agrcc that God, if he exists, is a good incom~xensurable
with all other goods. But he might object chat some means by which
people can be collilected to God (e.g., horrendous suffering) are so
iiltrinsically awful that they still violate other moral principles we
hold. The critic inight also complain that Adalns has shifted ground
in answering the theoretical problem by giving a practical solution.
The critic might even press the point that i t is extremely difficult to
understand what it is for one person to experience another's pain or
for suffering to be an avellue of interpersoilal identificatioil and thus
that the acceptability of Adarns's answer hangs, in part, on fuller
analysis of such concepts. Adams and other Christian theists may
eventually offer complete accounts of these concepts so that this
strand of cxistcntial theodicy may adi~ancc.It is hard to sap exactly
wherc thc kxturc discussion of thc cxistcntial problem of evil will icad,
but it is surc to be both fascinating and important.
Notes
it. Kennetb Surin dlsrtngtlishes theoretical &am practical problems of cvil
y the Pr~bLep#%
in his ? h c o l ~ ~and oc?f'E~~ik
(Clxford: Black~vetl,1986), p, l 12,
Robert ,4dams calls it a psycltdogical problem in his "Irge Virgge of'Fgic'gJ3 alzd
Other Essays in lZhz"los~phical 2 heolo~y(New Yorlcr: Oxford Ux-rivcrsit>rPress,
l987), p. 75. Williaix Hasker alludes to the problenl beiilg a form of moral
protest in ""011 Regretting the Evils of this World," "~ultghernJuz#~~i.tnl ofphi-
losophy 19 (19811: 425.
2. M v i n Plantinga, ($04 fi-eedom, and E ~ i (Gmndl hpids, Micb.: Eerd-
mans, 1977), p. 63,
3. Marily1.r Adams, "lXedcmprive Suffering: A Christian Solution to the
Problem of Evil," in The Pffioble~n ofE11i1: iS"eIee$cdR s g d i ~ z ed,
~ s ~Michael I,. Pe-
terser1 (Notre Dame, Xnd, : Universi~of Notre IDarnc Press, 19921, p. 171 .
4, Ed-vzrard Madden and Peter Hare, Evil and t.hConcept of' God (Syring-
Geld, Ilt.: Charles C. Ihomas, 1968),p. 25.
5. Jeffrey Burt-on Itussell, "The Experiex~ceof Evil," Lz's2:g1~ifv 9 ( X 974): 72,
6. X%ut lGco~xer, is;ymbolisfnof'Epz'l, rrans. Exnersor-1Buchallan (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1967));see, for instance, pp. 3-5.
7 . John Bol%rli;er,Pffi~higitpzs
c ~ ~ S ~ in. ~ Z ' Pof ~the~ W ( I P I( ~
J ~R~l&z'ons Lotldox~:
Carnbrldge Universiq 13rrcss, 1970), p. 2.
8. A contenlporary classic, written for the layperson, that expresses grief
and bitterness in a strrrggle to mair~tair~ refigio-its faith i s C. S. I R ~ v ~ s ' s ,A
G r i q Observed (?clew York: Macinillan, 19611. Ar~athcrbook in the same
spirit is Nicholas Wc~lterstorff,Lt%f$$e~$t fbf* a Son (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmax~s,1987).
9. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Y79e NrotI~ef~s IC~ra~@.znzov, trans. Constance Garnert
(Xew York: Norton, 1976),pnrticrrlarty pp. 217-227.
X Q. ,4lmczse all of AI bert Camus" writings can be seen as dealing with the
problem of gratuitous evil and the senseless destruction of things of value.
But see particufarly his "The Mytl-r of Slsyphus,'Yin ?he Myth of-'i";<~pphgsm2d .
Og/ge~* trans, Justirl O'Br-ien (New York: AI&ed A, bopl.; 1955), pp,
Essaj~s~
1-1 38, Alst~see C:at-ritus, 7be Pla~ug,trails, Stuart Gifbert (New York: Alfred
A. h o p 6 1948).
it it. Miguel &c Unamuno, Y2e ??&&;C Sense of' Lge, trans. 1. Grawford
Flitch (New York: Dover, 1954;).
12, From John Stuart Mill, ""The Philosophy of the Col~ditiot~ed as Ap-
plied by Mr. Manscl to the 1,imits of ktigious TI-iought," i - t A B k i z ~ ~ g i n n -
$ion@",SirWilliam H&rnil$~n'~. PhiIos~ph, repri~~ted in Nelson Pike, ed,, <$od
a d Evil: Re&diaz&.f 0% Th@oZo~z"~nl I,gpoblem~f'lz.:~il(Engle~roodCliffs,
N.J.:13rcnttce-EIatl,1964), p. 43.
13, Plnntinga, CI-Tod,F ~ ~ ~ en~zd ~ ~ ~pp.
d o E~ik, , 63-44,
X 4, M, Adaxns, "Redemptive Srtfferi~-tg,"p. 171. .
it 5. Edward Waiter, """L"hcLogic of Emotions," "agthcr~ Jourrrat of'l3hz'l'os-
ophy 10 (1972): 71-78,
16, Sidtley Hook, "Pragmatism and the 'l'ragic Sense of Life," Paeoc~.edi;~&s
and Adds~esswof' the A ~aze.l.zcan15,hilosophicalAssocia$ion ( October 19601,
reprinted in Robert Gorrigan, ed,, 7'3"~1.~~47: n~zdFor~rn(San Francisco:
VZ'JJ~OP;~
Clrandter, 1965), p*68.
it?. 1olil-t Hick, E ~ i and
l the God oflove, 2nd ed, (San Francisco: Harper
& Ro~li;1978), p. 82,
18. 'Thornas OAen, ""A Theodicy for Pastoral Practice," in his Pgsto~e~aZ
2 heol08y (Sax1 Francisco: Harper & i$ro\\rl, 1983), pp. 223-248.
19. Hasker, "Regretting," pp, 4 2 5 4 2 6 .
20, Ibid., p. 427. Here X have renrtmbered Hasker? prix~ciptesfor the sake
of continui~rin the context of this book. ALI rc~naintngprinciplss cited here
rritay be k ~ u n din the context of Hasker" articles and will. lot carry hrtber
referel-tces.
21. llobert M, Adams, ""Eistcnce, Self-Interest, and the XZrablem of
Evil," kin his VZ'rt~e of"Fai$b,p, 66,
22. Hasker, "Regretting," p. 4431. Hasker writes: "Note first of all that,
ghcn the truth of (A), it is cert-&;B,and not just probable, that scrbsequel-tt to
any major c&anlit.fr,such as a war, maily of the persolls whc) come into exis-
tence are differexlt ir~di\iidttalsfrom those \%rhowczufd have existed had the
calamiq not occurrcd, Many persons who wo~tldotherlvisc have become
parents die without l-rairing children, Those who would have been their
mates have cltildren wit11 other partners, and so on. FVithi1.1a few genera-
tions, it is likely that hardly anyone Iivil~gin the affected area is idel-ttical with
any indijlidual who would have existed, had the calamity not occurred, What
is mczre difficrtft is to show that this is true in the case of a given individual.
But even in the indlvld~ralcase, the probabilities mount up very rapidly. Sup-
pose, for exat-ritpic, tl-rat had the First World War not occt-rrred tl-tere is one
cf~ax~ce in ten that my parents ~ ~ o - i thave
l d met each other. (X am sure that
this is too high. But at this point I can afford to be conservative.) Stlppose,
ft~rther~ltore, that on just ~ L V Oprevio~~soccasic~i~sthe meetitrg and mating of
some of my earlier ancestors has been influenced in similar walrs by ealami-
totts evellts of their own times. Then neglecti~igall other factors (all of
which, if considered, would further strel-tgthen my argtlmel-tt),the likelihood
of my existing, if just these three major calamities had not occsrrred, is 110
better than oxie in a thousaxid! The truth is, that I have no reasoil h hat ever
to suppose that I would have existed, had the coktrsc ofthe world" history
been ssrbstarrtially different,. But what I have 110reason to suppose true mlxst
for practical purposes be disregarded. So (55) must be acceptedm7'
23. Benedict: cie Spinoza, EtIfiq ed. Hcnry Frowde, trans. W. EIale White.
Revised by Amelia Hutchinson Stirtiilg ( k ~ n d o nClxfc~rd : University Press,
X 910), pp* 80-8 l .
24. R, Adams, ""Existence," p. 75.
25. Job 33-7 New Revised Standard Version,
2.6. Ivaxi K~ramazo\rin IDostoevsky, 2 ge B~*o$hew ICgf*&mazu~, p. 22 5,
27. Ibid., p. 216.
28. We nclte here b~xtcannclt pursue tl-re jirell-knokvn ease of Leo -rolstoy
\?rho came to the conclusiol~that lik had ~ i r meax-xirzg s and was ~ i owrtel-1
t living
and thus cajne to the brink of suicide. If the critic raising the problem of gratu-
itous evil is jirilling to say that he regrets his ow11 existence, tltat his own exis-
tence is not a positive good to him ox3 the ~ ~ h o tthen e , the theist might ask why
he does not colnrnit suicide. What we might call tlie suicide argumel-tt seerns
especidly strong for the one jirho is iviltitlg t c ~say he regets Iris existence. See
Leo 'Tolstoy, Mjj CJII~gkssiu~gs, trans. Leo FViener ( I ~ n d o nJ,: M. Dent, X 905).
29, Although wc canllot explore the inatrer here, the reality of suffering
and the search for the proper response to the aivareness of s~rfferinglies at
the heart of Ruddl-xism,Xirvana (no~~existence) is recommex~ded.See John
Bowkcr, l Z ~ o b b ~of'$ sStgjFcri~~ in: Rclg&iol.zsof $he Wo~eld(Cambridge: Garn-
bridge University Press, 19";""0), pp. 237-258.
30. The tendency of certain theodicaf ans\%rcrsto do damage to persoxis is
discussed in .rerrencc W. Tilfey, Y79e Evils of Ifheodicjt (kVashir-xgton, D.C.:
Georgetolirn University Press, l99 L1 ).
3X . I-\laxikramazo~rin Dostoe\~sb,Kbe Rr~~thers ICar~~azov, pp. 22+226,
32. M. Adams, "Horrel-tdous Evils and the Goodness of God," Praceed-
b ~ i l of'tha
p A ri$otgZI;apz ,"incz'e[?t3 supplcmentar y vol. 63 ( 1989): 297-3 10, The
presel2r quote is from the reprix-xted piece in Rt~bertMerrihew Adarns arid
Marilyn McCord Adams, eds., 77% l Z ~ o b l eofE~il ~$ (New York: Oxford Uni-
rrersity Press, 1990), p. 2 1E;,
33, M. *ALdams, "Horrelld~~ts Evils," p, 2.18. The reader should coxis~rlt
the coinpletc article for techxiical distinctians between bgknnciqg ofx de,l(bgt-
b ~ i l 8and
~ F P ~ B Z I . &evil,
~J~
34. Tofstoy (mentioxied in Note 28) came to accept this kind of logic: that
only the inf illre call give meaning ta the f i-xite. 'l'hus, he averted suicide and
claii-xited to find i-xitearringin his life,
35. M, Adams, "Redemptive Stiffering," pp, 169-187.
36. M, Adarns, "Horrendo~rsEvils," p. 222.
57. Job 42-2, Sb, 5 Ncw IXevised Standard Version.
Suggested Readings
Adarrits, Marilyn h%."Horrendo~isEvils a i d the Goodness of God," The
A f8i@otelz'~lz 63 ( X 989): 297-3 l 0,
Society: S g p p l 8 r n e ~ t . tVoluf%.sz~
. ""Problcxns of Evil: More Advice to Christim XzhiXosotttbers," Faith
and Phiilosapby S (1988):f 21-143,
. "Redemptive Suffering: A Christian Solutiotl to the Problem of
Evil ." In l<atit:ol.zali~~~,Rer!z"giazl?sBelig; n ~ MOT&/ d C~mn'~itmen& edited by
Robert Audi and William J, Wainwright. Itbnca: C:ori~elt University Press,
1986, pp. 248-267.
Adams, Itobert M. ""Existcncc, Self-Interest, and the ProbXcm of Evil." l o g s
13 (1979): 53-65.
Dupri, L,ouis, ""E\rit--A Xi,cligious Mystery." Faith alzd Philosophy 7 (1990):
261-280.
Hasker, Willram, "On Regretting the Evils of This Wczrld." Soutbe~fi~z Jozitr~~zal
ofPhilusc1ph3t X 5) ( X 98 X ): 42 5 - 4 37.
Hauer was, Stanlcy. gi.ame"~& the Sibg$ces: God, lWgdicivre, n ~ the d l Z r o b b ~ o*f'
S$tfliP.Z~z~. Grnild bpids, Mich,: Eerdmarrs, L 990.
. S ~ j J h r i Presence:
~z~ r"Jigeolo&z'cnlReflections 0l.t Medz'cifzc, the LWg~ggl[$j
Hapzlilricapped, nvrd the CIs~.~rcIil. Notre Dame, Ind,: University of Notre
Dat-rite Press, 1985,
KohAXr, Erazim, "The Persoxl in a Persoxlal iVorfd: Axl lrlquiry into the Meta-
physical Slgi~ificanceof the Tragic Setlsc of Life," hdepe~dentloacrrrnlof
Philosophy 1 ( 1877): E;1-64.
I ~ w i s6,
, S. PaFoktliemofPgz'n, New Vc>rk:Macmittan, X 962.
Xzcterson, Michael. "Recent Work 01-1the Problem of Evil." A merkcan 12biln-
sopjjical Qgdnr$~-e~.& 20 (1983): 321-339,
Petersoil, hifichael, ed. ""JiiePi..oblcrfm of &P$/: Salccted Rcgdi~gs.Notre Dame,
Ind. : Ux~ivcrsi~ of Narrc Dame Press, 1992,
Index
Abducti\re argument from evil, Berger, 13etcr,6

81(n11) Bible (as source of ideas for Icheodicy),
Adam (biblical character), 9 1,94 88
Adarns, Marilyn, 111, 1 13-3 14, Blake, FVifliam, 12
124-227 Bowkcr, John, Z 1X
Adams, IXobcrt, 1 17, 2 20 BTOE~CP.~.
Kat#gmaso~, 3, 13
Aestlrctic thcmc, 9 1-92,93 Buddhism, 6, 129(rr29)
aesthetic ain-rs (God's), 102
See alm Bil~cipleaf plel~titude (l:an~us,Albert, 112, 127-128(r110)
Akerlifc, 98, Z 01, 107(n45>,124 (l:h%iractcr-t)uild;ingtheme, 88
AIDS, 1 C:l~isholm,Roderick, 75
Ml-good, God as, 7,9, 18,23, C:lifEord, bT. IC., 58-59
36--3q 448+9,55,70--"7, Czobb, John, 100
102-103 C:ocks, EI. F. Lovell, 5
Mston, Wiltiarn, 58, 86 C:ognitive limitations, 75-78, 86,
hiunal pain, 5, '74. See a l s ~Evil, 105(114), X12
natuml Cognitive (epistcmic) powers, GO, 75
h ~ s e l mSr.,
, 94 Compat">itism, 35-36. See also
h~tecedentNat~tref Go~l'ss),100-1 0 3 hibxziiz's Lapse
Appears-iiocurions, 75, Sec also Evil, Coxzditioxz of llcasonabte Epistcmic
gratuitous Access ((I:OXWEA), 75-76
Aquinds, St. "l"homas, 94 Coxzseqilent Nature (God"),
Augizstil~c,St., 4, 34, 85, 89-93 100-101
Aushwitz, 1 (l:onsistenc.gp of rfreisnl. See Frcc Wilt
Axiologj??9 Deknsc
(l:ontrol, (divine ), See Con~patilisn~;
Basinger, 13avic1, 107(n48), Z Q8jn49) 111compattbiIisn1; Sovereignty
Bayes thcorcm, 62-64(r1 18) Czornman, f ohn, 47-50,72
Beliefs C:osmof~gicalargtiment, 9-1 0, 56
basic, 59-61 C:rrarion, 50,89--91. See alm God, as
irzcorrigible, 59-60, See a l s ~ creator
Foirndatiol~aiis~~, strong C:rrdence function, 75
self-evident, 5 9 4 0 , Sce also
Fsundationaiism, strong Davis, Stephen 'I.,41
rhetsbc, 8-9, 18,41,57,6"7 Death, 5-6
Defeater (of belief-),60-6 l , 68 Free Will Defense, 29, 33-43,
Defense, as a theistic strategy?33, 69, 44(n13), 73
85,239 applied to natirral evil, 50-52
1leIated to Ixehrnted epistemolom,
60-6 1 God
Sec also Free Will L3efense as conceivc~lby classical theism, 7-8
L>escartes, Ixene, 512 as creator, 18,88,91,93,95, 125
L3esign argumellt, G2.Cn 141, Sec aim as identteing with the sufferer,
'Itleolctgical argument 125-127
Dostoevskh FyocSor, 3, 13, 112 as necessary being, 44(1111)
See also Process theisrrr
Eliot, 'I". S., 6 ~ ~2 03-1 04,
Greater-Gooct s t r a t c g ~89,
Eyicur~is,2 8 206(n7)
Eyistemic distance, 95-96 Griffin?David 100-1 0 X
Eyistemic ~amcwork(beliefs), 57
Ej>istemolag>r,9 Hait, Thor, 8
Escharalogicat motif, 98, 101 Hare, Peter, 1 1,72, 85-86, 104
Evidentialism, 58-60, 64(n22), 67 Harrshome, C:ilarles, 100
Evi 1 Hasker, kVilLiarn, 1 1 1, 107-1 08(n48),
dassification af, 10-1 3 108(n49), 115-119
definition of, 2, 10-1 1 Hick, John, 11,85,91,94-99,
ci>rstcleoiogical,98-99 113-1 14
as an eternal cosrmtic e~lttqr,G, 39 Higher harmorly solution, 123. S66
gratuitous (poinrless, rmteanitrgless), also Aesthetic theme
30,72-79,92,94,97-99> Hinduisrmt, 6
102-103,111-115, 119-126 Hook, Sidney, 1 13
in the media, 1-2,6, 7 Howarcli-Snydcr, Danicl, 9,72
metai3hysicaf, 93, $86 also Privatit~n H,fi~*i;~
(y-rcte)
(of good) Hume, David, 12 , 12, 2 8 , 2 4 , 5 8
moral, 11-12?, ,24,35, 3 8 4 2 , 5 0
natural, 4-5, 22-1 3, SO Xncompatibilisn~,37-41, Secr also
Existcntiai artitudes toward evil, hibniz" 1,aysc
X 25-124 I~tconsistellcyin theism, 17-23, 33
Iltcorrigibhie beliefs. See
Faith, relatioll of to rational. pmcess, i~lcorrigible
10 Iltductive argument from ~ i l47-52.
,
Fallen angels, 50, 52, 61-62(n7), 90 Sce also Prnbabiliy (as a inerhod
Fler?i, h t o r ~ y35-36,
~ 38-39, 58-59, of irlduction)
96 Irenaeus, 94
Foundationalisnt, strong, 59-60, Islam, 8, 52
64(n22)
Free will, 34-35,89-90,94-96,103 Jes~ts,8, 126
as self-~Ietcrmil~atic>n,100 Job (biblical chamcrer), 115, 122,
Sec also Compatibiiism; 126
Xncompatibilisrn J~idaisn~,8, 52
Index
Ihramazo\i, Ivan, 13,104,123-125 Pantheism, 100

Ihufn~an,Cordon, 71 Pastoral theodicy, 1 14, 126
Ihufmann, kValter, 70, 7 1 Pastoral prnblern of evil, 1 12
7 1 Paul (the al~ostfe),4
ICGng, Hans, 10 Peneff-rum,"Yerence,24
Peterson, Mtchael, 17,
Lehre2; ICeirf-r, 47-50, 72 107-108(n48), 108(n49)
Leibniz, Gottfxned FVifhelm von, 38, Philosophical dialectic, 69, 87
59,85,91-94 Pfax~dnga,Avin, 1 1,28-29,33-35,
I,eibrziz% I,apse, 3 8 4 l , 49,94 37, 39-42,44(nr.r9,X X),
I,ewis, C. S., 127(n8) 4445(nX4), 49-56,58-50,
I,ocke, John, 551 62(11rt14,15,XS),68,75,
I,ovejoy, Arthur, 9 X ZQ5(n4), I. X 1-1 X2
Plato, 91
hrackie, J. I,. , 17- X 9,22,24,27,29, Possiblc worf ds
33,35,36,38,39,96 hest of all possible warlds, 48-49,
Madden, Edurard, 11,72,85-86, 104 92-94
Madonna, the, 3 logic of, 37-38
Manichaealism (Cosmic Dualism), 89 God's relation to, 38-41, 56
Mavrodes, George, 58 Pourer, God's
M a p (illusion), 6 coercive, 101-1 02
McC:loske.4; H. J,, 18,24- persuasive, 10 1-1 02
Meaning of life (itr relation to evil), 2, Sec alm Ontnipotence
+G, 10, 123, X25Cn28) Predestination, 9 1
Metaphysics, 9 Presrtmption of att~eism,58
Metarheodic!i, 88. Sec aim 'rheodicy Princi12le of plerltitude, 9 1 . Stz alm
Mill, Toll11 Stuarr, 112, 125 Aesthetic .tizcrnc
&jilton, Jahn, 85 Principle af CrcduXiry, 75
MO[??Dick, 4-5 Privation (of gooct), 90. Slscr also
hrorrobv, Lance, 1,7 iuetaphysical evil
Probability (as a mctlrad af induction)
Natural law tlrerne, 29, 6142(117), 1OS f'reycrency theory at; 55-56,
Neoplato~~ism, 2 OS(n9) 62(1114), 62-64(n 18)
Nirpapza, 6, 129(n29) logical theory af, 54-55
Noeric ponrcrs (episemic), 6 0 4 1 personalist theory ol; 53-54
Process theism, 99-103
Oden, Thornas, 114 P~~nisfiment theme, 88,Y 1-92
Omnipotence (having ail pokrzrcr), 7-9
in relation m humall freeciom, Qr~asi-theism,2, Sec also Process
4445(n14), Scc also theism
Compa"bi1isnt; Xncompadbilism
process critique of, 100-1 0 1 1btionalizrq;of religious belief (faith),
Omniscience f having ail-knowledge), 9-1 0, Sce also Evidentialism;
7-9,76 Foundatioxlalismt, strong;
Ontological argument, 9 , 5 6 Rchrmed epistemoiogy
1Xel"ormecf ei~istcmoIoa~, 56-60, 'I"eleo1ogical. argument, 10, G2fn 14)
68-69,8687, X 13 'I"c11nysol1, At ftred Lord, S
fXegrct, See Existential attituctes 'I"heisn3 jstartctarcl), 18
tomrard evil Ghristial~,7-8, 43, 86, 124
fXeicl-rc~~bach,Eeichc~~bacl-r, expa~~ded, 8 , 7 l , 77-79,80(117),
62-64(n I 8), 108t11.19) 8X(11X9), 87-88, 114, 224
fXoscn ba~rxl~,fb11, 2 monotheism, 52,70, 113
Ro~re,William, 8, 17, 18,4"7 73-79, restricted, 8, 18,71,77--"7,88,
85 114,124
Russeil, Bertrand, 58 Theodicy, 13,33,39, 105(n5)
Russeil, Bri~ce,73, 81(nl 1) as related to csedibiliw of religious
Russeil, f efeey Burton, l 11 belief, 6-8, 14-1 5(n18)
viabilif)iof, 85-88
Salmon, FVesle)i, 55-56 S66 alm Metattleo~licy
Sgrnsnm f cycle of birth-deattl- 'I"olstoy, Leo, f 29f 11281, (n34)
rebirtf-r), 6 'I"otaJt etridence, 56-58, 62(nf 6),
Sapan, S66 Fallen angels. 6 7 4 8 . %c alm E\ridentialisn~
Schleiermacher, Friecirich, 90 'I"ransworld depravity, 4 0 4 2
Schlesinger, George, 70
Scriven, Mici-raeX, 58
Self-cl~identbeliefs, Secr Bclich, sefC
evident Value theory, rrcftgious, 125
Self-rcfcrcl~tidi~~cohcrcl~cc, 59-60 van tn\vagen, Peter, 79-80(n5), 86
Settfc, 'I". W., 7
SIII, 4, 34, 77,90-91,97. See also Whitehead, Alfred North, 85,99-101
Evil, moral Witrgenstein, Lud~srig,5
Smith, Srisan, 2 Wolcersmrff, Nicholas, 58
Soveseignv (God"), 8 9 , 9 1. Sge also W>rkstra,Stephen, 8,75-79, 112,
Omnipotence 12Pn8)
Spinoza, Beneclict de, 119
Stevenson, Robert Louis, 3
S~ticide,f 21-3Cn28)and (n34)
Swlnf7~1"11e, &chard, 75, X f(xtl4)

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God and Evi

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- A Member of t l ~ ePersseus Books Group

Copyright- 8 1998 by Wcswicw Prcss, A i2ilember of Pcrseus Books: Group

I i brary of C:ongress CZatalog~lg-in- PuI>tiea.tlic>~~

11 The Problem of Evil and Its Place

2 The Logical Problem of Evil

4 The Probabilistic Problem af Evil

5 The Problem af Gramitous Evil 67

6 The Task of Theodicy

7 The Existential Problem of Evil

This jrolumc is an introduction to the problem of evil as it is currently

Something is dreadfully wrong with our ~vorld.An earthquake kills

so fascinating and alluring to the hulnan lnilld while good seems so

Here is no continuing city, here

Unfortunately, this profo~undand inconsolable pessimism appears to

Evil and Religious Belief

evil is a "prolegomenon to intellectually honest theology."" Thor

The Philosophical Difficulty

ical, and teleological argumellts.23 Likeivise, a number of serious ar-

The Cllassif car-ion of Evil

Ty&er! Twer! burni~gbright

In tvhat distant d e e p or skies

Whar I J ~ C~ ~ P % zwhat ? ~ h a i?~ z

We also find the problem of moral evil in great noirels. Dosto-

Davis, Stepbeill 'I". "Why Did This Happen to h%eZ-The Patieilt as a

The problem of evil has both theoretical and existential dimensions.

Statement of the Problem

( 6 ) Socrates is mortal, and i t is false that Socrates is mortal.

(7) Socrates is mortal

By conjoining these two propositions, we get: the familiar contradic-

(7) Socrates is mortal

( 1 1) Socrates is older than Plato

This set-jvhich I will designate s not explicitly contradictory; it

Furthermore, there are Inany propositiolls that are neither truths of

(17) Bachelors arc unmarf-lcd males

(20) Michael Jordan has lcapt over the Sears Tower.

is a propositiosl that is possibly true in our sense of broadly logical

Here we have Mackie's %.ay of generating the contradiction.

Versions of the Logical ent

(1) God exists;

(G) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists.

Any question about (G) is equivalent, then, to a question about one

(EI) Evil exists;

When conjoined with (G), each of the prcccding propositions detcr-

Since Versioll I is clearly the most influential a ~ most

(G) h omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists

(E, ) Evil exists.

Ho~lrever,it appears to the atheistic critic that propositioll ( G ) ,when

(-EL) Evil does not exist.

(El). Let us review a representative selection of auxiliary propositions

( 1.1) God is a real being transcendent from the world

Now, from (G), together with (1.1)-(5.1), it follows that

(-El) Evil does not exist,

a conclusion that clearly contradicts (El). At this point, the atheist

(-El) Evil does not exist.

(El) Evil exists.

(4.2) God" ggodness wodd scck to prcvent or eliminate large

(4.3) God's goodness would not allow gratuitous or pointless

would be needed to articulate f ~ ~ lVcrsion

The Burden of Proof

(2f ) &nt is a grcat philosopher

(22) It is not the case that Kant is a great philosopher.

Any position involving such a contradiction, then, cannot be ~vhollp