Schopenhauer and Heidegger Comparison with Kantbuch Heidegger makes essentially the same argument in Section One, in different

t idiosyncratic terminology, certainly more precisely and with greater enucleation. For Heidegger, Kants Critique is not an epistemology !ecause it looks at "the possi!ility# of knowledge, and therefore seeks "to lay the foundations# $%rundlegen& for epistemology !y seeking to delimit metaphysics, that is, !y descri!ing the limits of the 'metaphysica generalis, opposed to the 'specialis of traditional metaphysics that deals merely with the Seienden $!eings or essents such as %od, the soul, the !ody, language, man, politics, education& and that narrows the focus of ontological reflection !ack onto the 'ontic $the world of empiria&. (ou!tless, Heidegger is !eing kind $see )almer on 'Huss*Heid, and intro to 'K)+&. ,ut he and Schopenhauer agree that Kants greatness lies precisely in this- * that he widened the scope of philosophical reflection $metaphysics& on to "the possi!ility of e.perience#. /he pro!lem is that, in doing so, he posited a dualism of Su!0ect and O!0ect where!y the latter is inscruta!le sa1e as it is "shaped# or configured !y the Su!0ects own "aesthetic constitution#. /he "forms# of e.perience are in1estigated2 !ut the "origin# or "ground# of e.perience the ,eing of !eing * is left to one side. /his is why Schop. insists that "only the other side of human !eing can disclose to us the other side of the inner !eing of things#. 3t is a re*run of 4ugustines "in interiore homine ha!itat 1eritas# !ut not in theological terms, in search of "the /ruth#, or in ontic terms $knowledge&, !ut rather in search of "the !eing of e.perience#, of our awareness of it, of its "hori5on#. /he 6ill is the thing we know !est, according to Schop, not !ecause we know its "contents#, !ut !ecause we know its "!oundaries# !ecause it is the "qualitas occulta# the other side of what we know, the noumenon that Kant had confused partly with a "/hing 7in itself#8 and partly with a Su!0ect $9eason and the 3ntellect 7:erstand8 to the e.tent that it is !ased on "the idea of the o!0ect#, the representation&. 3t is awareness of "the 6ill# that is the "!eing of e.perience#, our e.perience $or with Heidegger, presentment& of the (ing an sich, the possi!ility of the world, the 6orld*9eality or 6eltprin5ip whose impenetra!le limit or "hori5on# is time itself, the e1er*pre*sent (a*sein $awareness of !eing*in*time, of the possi!ility of nothingness, !eing*toward*death, the Position 7Stellen8 of !eing*in*the* world&. ")osition# is defined on p;<. /hat whole section lucidly reproduces the "dialectical# process that leads Kant from "sensi!ility# di1ided into empirical and non* empirical "intuition#, or "conception#, and then to the "understanding# and their "perhaps common though unknown root 76ur5el note the Schop. term8#, and the genesis of "representations# and "appearances# from the O!0ect $to p=>&. 3t is this "common root# that Kant does not pursue, turning instead to pure reason $p=>&. Here the similarities of Heid. and Schop. !egin to surface. ,oth attack at this point of "intuition#, where the su!0ect*o!0ect unity in the :orstellung and ?rscheinung is most "percepti!le#.
/his is the way Schopenhauer reads his Kant. The Critique of Pure Reason, he thinks, treats experience as the result of the conceptualizing of the perceptual material, by which process this material of sensation first becomes organized and real. ow he

finds perception in no need of such conceptual transformation, for it possesses in itself all the concrete reality that is possible in experience. /hinking owes its whole significance to the perceptual source from which it arises through a!straction. @3f we hold firmly to this, the inadmissi!leness of the assumption !ecomes e1ident that the perception of things only o!tains reality and !ecomes e.perience through the thought of these 1ery things i%., 3. pp. <A;*<A=2 HK.. 33, p. ;B* C%., 3, p. <A=2 H.K., 33, p. ;D* ;%., 3, pp. <A=*<A<2 H.K., 33, p. ;D* >BSCHO)?EH4F?9GS C93/3C3S+ OF K4E/. applying its twel1e categories. Rather in perception itself the empirical reality, and consequently e perience, is already gi!en" but the perception itself can only come into e istence by the application to sensation of the #nowledge of the causal ne us, which is the one function of the understanding$ %erception is accordingly in reality intellectual, which is &ust what Kant denies.@H Schopenhauer thinks that Kant makes a triple di1ision- $i& the idea, $C& the o!0ect of the idea, and $;& the thing*in*itself. @/he first !elongs to the sensi!ility, which in its case, as in that of sensation, includes the pure forms of perception, space and time. /he second !elongs to the understanding, which thinks it through its twel1e categories. /he third lies !eyond the possi!ility of all knowledge.@* 'he confusion seems e!ident to Schopenhauer( )'he illicit introduction of that hybrid, the ob&ect of the idea, is the source of Kant*s errors,)+ he says. ,ll we ha!e in concrete #nowledge and e perience is the -orstellung" )if we desire to go beyond this idea, then we arri!e at the question as to the thing.in.itself, the answer to which is the theme of my whole wor# as of all metaphysics in general$)+ /ith this epistemological hybrid, i$ e$, the *ob&ect of the idea,* )the doctrine of the categories as conceptions a priori also falls to the ground$)+ i%., 3, p. <AA2 H.K., 33, p. =I. C%., 3, p. <AJ2 H.K.. 33. p. =>2 Kr. d. r. :., pp. ioBf.2 +., pp. BD f. G%., 3, p. <AJ2 H.K., 33, p. =>. H%., 3, pp. <AJ*<AB2 H.K., 33, p. =C. G%., 3, p. <AJ2 H.K.. 33, pp. =>*=C. !t should be noted that "chopenhauer does not recognize what, after all, is #ant$s real distinction between understanding and reason, the distinction, namely, between understanding as the faculty by which we deal with the conditioned and reason as the faculty which demands the unconditioned. The understanding itself #ant seems to treat in a twofold manner% &i' understanding in the wider sense, as the fundamental principle of ob(ecti)ity in experience, including within itself the immanently organizing function of the producti)e imagination* and &+', understanding in the narrower sense, as the faculty of (udgment or interpretation, operating primarily through the categories.. /his distinction is of great importance for the interpretation of KantGs pure concepts of the understanding2 and it should !e noted that Kant e.plicitly limits the application of the understanding to finite e.perience, to the sphere of the conditioned. On the other hand, Kant holds- @3t is the peculiar

principle of reason $in its logical use& to find for e1ery conditioned knowledge of the understanding the unconditioned, where!y the unity of that knowledge may !e completed. @H /he pure concepts of the understanding, the categories, find their meaning and their sphere of operation in the organic interdependence of GCK., in this connection, 9ichterGs treatment of G:erstandG and G:ernunftG as used !y Kant and Schopenhauer, SchopenhauerGs :erhaltnis 5u Kant in seinen %rund5iigen, pp. >== ff. @HKr. d. r. :., p. ;IJ2 +., p. C=D. CI SCHO)?EH4F?9GS C93/3C3S+ OF K4E/. the different sides of conditioned e.perience. /he concepts of pure reason, on the other hand, or the G/ranscendental 3deas,G as Kant calls them, are e.plicitly concerned with the unconditioned ground of e.perience2 they refer to @something to which all e.perience may !elong, !ut which itself can ne1er !ecome an o!0ect of e.perience.@H 3n this sense the distinction !etween pure understanding and pure reason, in KantGs technical procedure, tends to correspond to the distinction !etween theory of knowledge and theory of reality.H

0eyond Kants 1pistemology( 'he Hori2on of 0eing 3ntuition and 'ime So Heidegger goes !eyond Kant implicitly !y interrogating the adaequatio of su!0ect and o!0ect which still remains at the ontic le1el. Kant theorises the transcendental conditions of this correspondence in the 4esthetik, the positing of a "pure reason# that makes synthetic a priori 0udgements. ,ut there is no adaequatio or "correspondence# !etween different "entities# or "essents# or "!eings# without an inquiry into what it is that corresponds, not the -quidditas. or -what/ness., but rather the 0being of beings1L 6e ha1e two "!eings# opposed the knowing Su!0ect and the to*!e*known O!0ect. 4nd Kant tells us how the one can know the other, that is, !y the adaequatio rei ad intellectus. ,ut !ecause the O!0ect remains "in itself#, and the Su!0ect is only "known# as the "pre*condition of knowledge#, we cannot know what this "adaequatio# really consists of, what it conceals, until we enquire a!out "the ,eing of the essents# $'K)+, pCI2 a!o1e all, p=;&. Met it is o!1ious that this ",eing of the essents# is a "reality# or rather "actuality# or 6irklichkeit that must emanate from "e.perience#, not from "knowledge#. ,ecause otherwise it would remain within the category of 9eason or the Su!0ect, or the 3ntellect, of "3deas or 9epresentations# says Schop., and not to a category "toto genere different#, which can only !e "e.perience#, that is, the 1ery a!ility to interrogate !eing itself (a* sein or 6ill. 3t follows that Kant was wrong in delimiting metaphysics with the "unknowa!le o!0ecti1ity# of the (ing an sich, operating a preposterous separation of su!0ect and o!0ect. 4s Heidegger reminds us $pCI&, it is impossi!le to engage the "3 connect# or adaequatio with either analytic or synthetic 0udgements !ecause it is impossi!le to know the predicateL Eot only, !ut also, as we will see, e1en the 1alidity of analytic and synthetic 0udgements is questiona!le once we peer into the "instrumentality# rather than "true# character of these $cf Kants 'Opus )ostumum and Cacciari, 'K, chC on Eiet5sche and 6ittgenstein&. 4nd gi1en that space is a dimension "e.ternal# to e.perience,

Heidegger comes to focus on "time# which, as Kant himself descri!ed it, is the "representation of our inner state# $p<C&. "Hence, time takes precedence o1er space# for Heidegger $p<C&. $Eot true, as we shall see presently.& )almer notes Husserls reser1ations on this reading of Kant $oppro!rious to the Eeo* Kantians, see 3ntro to 'K)+&For Heidegger, Kant was doing ontology without specifically calling it that*indeed, @fundamental ontology.@ /o reco1er this ontological dimension was his reason for returning to Kant, and this kind of interpretation is proper to the mission of philosophy itself. Husserl, for his part, sprin#les the second page of section 4 with half a do2en marginal comments, putting a question mar# ne t to Heidegger*s reference to )a new concept of sensibility which is ontological rather than sensualistic) 567, e$a$8$ ,longside Heidegger*s assertion that )#nowledge is primarily intuition, i.e$, 9is: a representing that immediately represents the being itself) 5678, Husserl as#s, )3s this Kant;).)the Ding-an-sich;) ,s for <od, says Husserl in the margin, )<od needs no e plicati!e intuition, no step.by.step getting to #now things $ $ $ no fi ation in language, etc$.but such a God is an absurdity)56=, e$a$8$ >or Husserl, the contrast with an infinite creati!e intuition is not only unnecessary but also confusing and phenomenologically impossible$ ,longside Heidegger*s suggestion that the acti!e dimension of finite understanding shows us the nature of absolute #nowledge as originating intuition, Husserl writes( )?onsense$ >initude is not absolute)56@8$ Husserl in this section uses the word )absurd) three times before he concludes, )'his matter is and remains absurd) 5AB8$ >or Husserl, when Heidegger speculates about the mode of <od*s #nowing in contrast with human #nowing, he is emphasi2ing &ust those dimensions of Kant that pre!ented Kant from ma#ing his transcendental philosophy into a rigorous science, which is what Husserl thought philosophy ought to be$

One must agree with Husserl here. Kant quite clearly intended to delineate the "foundations# of "any future metaphysic that will present itself as science#. /o the e.tent that it was "ontological#, Kants K9: was intended as "the contours# of all "possi!le e.perience# and all "possi!le o!0ects of e.perience#, * where "e.perience# is intended as "knowledge#, and certainly not as "the ,eing of !eing#, which Kant quite clearly regarded as "inscruta!le#, from the (ing an sich to the (i1inity. ,ut Heidegger needs "to !ridge the gap# !etween pure intuition and the !eing of its o!*0ect and specifically, like Kant, the nature of the concepts that are the Sinn*ge!ende, the "creati1e# part of (asein or "ontological synthesis# that is "the 1ehicle of finite transcendence# $see )almer !elow&.
, third issue on which Husserl ta#es sharp issue with Heidegger has to do with what Heidegger calls )the ontological synthesis"-including a "knowledge of the Being of beings" prior to all understanding and acting in the world 5A7, e$a$8$ 'he )ontological synthesis) is what bridges the gap between the prior understanding of 0eing and the being of the thing #nown$ 3ndeed, for Heidegger, it is the vehicle of )finite transcendence$) 4longside HeideggerGs sentence, @6e are inquiring into the essential possibility of the ontological synthesis $;B, e.a.&,@ Husserl attempts to reframe the discussion in more phenomenological terms as @the in1ariant structural form of the pre*gi1en world.@ 4gain, the issue is whether Kant is doing ontology or epistemology. Says Husserl- @One need not

!egin with traditional ontology2 one can pose the question as Hume did !efore Kant. One does not need the pro!lem of finitude either@ $;B, e.a.& 6hen $/he Hague- Ei0hoff, >DAC&, p. >IA. Heidegger goes on to assert that the finite human Casein )needs the ontological synthesis in order to exist as Dasein,) Husserl underlines these words and as#s( )But is this the right way to pose the question philosophically? 3sn*t here an entity already presupposed whereby the presupposed 0eing already presupposes sub&ecti!ity; 3s not man himself already pre.gi!en, etc$; $ $ $ 'his is already Heidegger$) ,s Husserl sees it, one does not need to posit infinite #nowledge in order to describe the finite processes of human #nowledge" human e istence does not require some #ind of )ontological synthesis) to enable it to ta#e place" one )does not need) ontology, period$ /hat Heidegger is doing is ontologi2ing Kant the epistemologist$ 4nd when Heidegger starts to descri!e what (asein needs @in order to e.ist as (asein,@ Husserl suspects that a good deal of anthropologi5ing is going on in #P2 and also in "3.

6hereas 4ristotle put the "causa causans# at the !eginning of the causal chain, Kant puts the )ure 9eason as a faculty that can com*prehend the totality of the causal chain, that can see the indi1idual rings as part of the "chain#. ,ut Schop o!0ects that this is inadmissi!le and inconcei1a!le !ecause the causa causans is "a ring# in the chain, !egging the question, what is the causa causae causantisN 4nd then !ecause Kants )ure 9eason, which seeks to e1ade this endless chain of causation, is not a faculty "toto genere different# from the causal chain as it must !e for a successful e1asion, then it remains yet another "ring#. 4nd if it is meant to !e toto genere different, then it cannot !e unless it is a qualitas occulta. ,ut !ecause Kant has already nominated the O!*0ect as the (ing an sich, as the qualitas occulta, then we ha1e two qualitates occultae, one on the su!0ecti1e and one on the o!0ecti1e side, separated !y Eiet5sches "o!scure 1eil# a logical impossi!ility !ecause then there is no adaequatio at all !etween intellectus and res. So Schop turns inward, e.amining pure intuition as the source of the O!0ect and of the causal chain. /his a1oids the regressio ad infinitum of 4ristotles causa causans !y electing a su!0ecti1e qualitas occulta as the intuitus originarius for which all "!eings# are "o!0ectifications# the 6ill. 4gain, we ha1e a transcendental fons et origo, a qualitas occulta that is not a "causa causans# !ut is an "intuiti1e origin# of !eing. /his is where Heidegger is connected with Schopenhauer and !ecomes his direct descendant. Heidegger also cannot concei1e of the "immanence# of !eing human, and therefore needs to place or situate it within the "hori5on of time# indeed, as "time itself#, as facticity, !ut not in space as "em!odiment#L *, he then needs transcendence as a replacement for "su!0ecti1ity# and as the foundation of (asein, the interrogation of ,eing. Fnlike Schop and like Kant, Heidegger does not a!olish "the o!0ect of the idea# so that the separation of (asein from the o!*0ect is retained. /he o!0ect is not an e.*pression or o!0ectification of the 6ill. 9ather, Heidegger maintains the "tension# of Schops original intuition, the "ec*stasis# in1ol1ed in the consciousness of a qualitas occulta, and turns this "consciousness# from a "conscious*ness# $a qudditas& to an "ec*stasis# of (a*sein, awareness of "finitude# and "ec*sistence# such that "the world# or ,eing hinges on "nothing*ness# and (a*sein is "thrown# into the world*of*essents- (asein !ecomes "!eing* in*the*world#. 6hereas Schop turns our intuition of the 6ill into the intuition of a qualitas

occulta, Heidegger turns intuition itself into the intuition of primordial time so that ",eing# is "temporalised# and !ecomes "ec*static#. /he resulting "gap# or "tension# !etween ,eing and /ime is the result of "de*su!0ectifying ,eing# so that "transcendence# allows the "ec*static# perspecti1e or "synopsis# of ,eing without a "Su!0ect# that does the 1iewing. /hat is what distinguishes metaphysica generalis from metaphysica specialis, namely, the "ontological synthesis# required to locate or position not "the ,eing of !eings# as causa causans, as yet another "!eing# that is a ring in the causal chain, !ut rather the "what*ness# of "!eings# or essents understood not as a su!stance or su!stratum !ut as the "dimension# or pure intuition of that chain. +etaphysica generalis !ecomes a "metaphysics of metaphysics#, to quote Kant. On the "o!0ects# or essents side, this "ontological synthesis# retains "the o!*0ect# without turning it into a (ing an sich and, !y reflection, the "temporality# or "facticity# of pure intuition into "a transcendental su!0ect or ego#, which is what Kant ended up doing. Only through "finite transcendence# and "ontological synthesis# can Heidegger a1oid the solipsism of his conception of "pure intuition as time#, as intuitus deri1ati1us that retains the independence of the o!*0ect and does not turn it into an "e*0ect# of an intuitus originarius. 3t can !e said that up to the #antbuch Heidegger maintained this e.istential "tension#, !ut that later he turned it into a mysticism of ,eing.
Husserl poignantly remarks in a marginal note in #P2 that he could not see why su!0ecti1ity, especially a purified transcendental su!0ecti1ity, was an unaccepta!le !asis for phenomenology*and !y e.tension for philosophical in1estigation. /o the 1ery end, Husserl felt that Heidegger had ne1er understood what he meant !y transcendental su!0ecti1ity and the importance of going !ack to the transcendental ego. >or Heidegger, Casein was not &ust another name for human sub&ecti!ity but a way of a!oiding the concept of sub&ecti!ity itself$ 4s the later essays, like the @/he 4ge of the 6orld )icture@$>D;B& and the @Oetter on Humanism@ $>D=A& make quite e.plicit, Heidegger could not ma#e sub&ecti!ity, e!en a )transcendental) sub&ecti!ity, the anchor of his reflection. HusserlGs marginal notes 1i1idly show us his deep disappointment, e1en outrage, at HeideggerGs desertion, !ut they ne1er a!andon the hori5on of su!0ecti1ity, the 1ision of philosophy as rigorous science, and the quest for a relia!le grounding for knowledge. His remarks in the margins of #P2 all testify to this 1ision of philosophy, a 1ision Husserl more and more reali5ed that Heidegger did not share and really had ne1er shared.

,ack to 'K)+, in par.>< Heidegger reminds us that the o!*0ect of pure intuition and the synthesis a priori ena!led !y the transcendental schema $through the su!sumption that results in the understanding& this o!*0ect is not an 'e*0ect, or the "creati1e# product of the $di1ine& intuitus originarius as against the deri1ati1us $human and finite&- Kant calls it an "P#, the (ing an sich $pp>C<*J&. 3t is rather the o!*0ect of finitude, of finite knowledge, to which ontology must su!mit and "a!andon its 'pride andQ 'presumption# $p>CB&. Heidegger is here!y "re*defining# Kants (ing an sich from an "unknowa!le o!*0ect#, which would confine Kant to epistemology, to "that whose ,eing requires an ontological synthesis, a metaphysics of metaphysics or metaphysica generalis#. 4nd this is the topic of Section ;. )almer again,

'he second issue has to do with Heidegger*s discussion of the "finitude of hu an knowledge" as discussed in D4$ Here Heidegger, originally a theology student, follows Kant in comparing the supposed mode of di!ine #nowing as originary and creati!e, an intuition that is intuitus originarius, with human #nowledge as the reception into #nowledge of something whose nature one did not oneself create$ 'his Kant calls intuitus derivativus$ 0ut Heidegger notes here also a moment of )finite transcendence,) in that human #nowing gains access to something other than itself, something of which it had no prior #nowledge and did not create$ 'his process, the )!eritati!e synthesis,) in!ol!es the synthesis of intuition and thought by which a thing )becomes manifest) as what it is$ Heidegger finds in Kant*s close analysis of this synthesis a more nuanced description of what he had in !" connected with )the ontological comprehension of 0eing,) the hermeneutical as# and his definition of phenomenology as )letting something appear from itself$) Small wonder, then, that 6illiam 9ichardson, in his lengthy study, 4eidegger% Through Phenomenology to Thought, de1otes a <<*page chapter to #P2, calling it @the most authoritati1e interpretation of 5eing and Time,@ and referring to the last section of #P2 @the See his @Kant und die 3dee der /rans5endentale )hilosophie $>DC=&,@ in 6rste Philosophie ! &78+9/78+:', Husserliana 1ol. J- C;I*CBJ, especially CBI*CBJ. !est propaedeutic@ to that work.>=

%i1en this manifest "caesura# !etween intuitus and o!*0ect $or "possi!le e.perience of the o!0ect# and "o!*0ect# itself& at pAD Heidegger re1iews the "relationship# or articulations $Fuge 3 would say, "stitching the caesuraL#& of the 1arious Kantian distinctions !etween intuition and its synthesis with thought performed !y the "imagination# and finally reflected upon !y the understanding. 3t is an important paragraph !ecause Heidegger here notes how Kant e.amined the first in the 4esthetik and the third in the Oogik, largely confining himself to Formal Oogic and, !y so doing, neglecting to reflect on the ontological status of the imagination. 3t is this synthetic unity of intuition and reflecti1e thought that Heidegger focuses on something that analytically puts him ahead of Schopenhauer. 3t is the ina!ility of the latter "to sew# $fugen& these elements of pure knowledge together that leads to the "materialistic e.cesses# listed !y /sanoff $pJ>&. Heidegger 1irtually repeats Schops o!0ection that as Kant clim!s up the ladder of conceptuali5ation, away from perception, "the ser1ant !ecomes the master# $pJD& in that the understanding now seems "to posit# the o!0ect increasingly, to re*duce it to an empty "schematism# of categories until the latter almost dis*appears in the pond of perception. /his is where Heidegger re*introduces the primacy of "time# as the hori5on of intuition $pp>IBff&. Eotice that in the "now*ness# or "pre*sence# of !eing, the unity of "!eing# in terms of "su!*stance# 7Heidegger prefers 'ousia as )almer notes8,what "stands under# or "sup*ports# !eing& and "!eing*ness#, the time dimension of "su!*stance#, are inconcei1a!le separately and form conceptually a unity. Heideggers a!struse 1er!iage makes it hard to dis/cern $winnow& his meaning, !ut that is what he is doing $p>>;&. /here is an "intra*mundanity# of !eing 0ust as there is an "intra*temporality# of the ego or the self. For Heidegger, !eing and ego are the "interrogation# of these what is dis*closed when their not*!eing or nothing*ness is countenanced resulting in (a*sein and self* consciousness respecti1ely. ,ut the pure intuition of "intra*temporality# is "primordial

time#. "3ntra*temporal time# or "the pure now*sequence# is what Heidegger indicates as "time#, which is simultaneously "spatial#. Eow, if we return to Schops notion of "the 6ill#, it is e1ident that if the 6ill itself is "time*less# and only its "consciousness# $conscious*ness still !elongs to the 6ill, which is the qualitas occulta, from which e1erything "springs out# or is e.trinsic*ated or mani* fested or o!0ecti*fied& is "temporal#, this is only !ecause the 6ill is "the e1er*present#, the "always*now#. Oike Heidegger, Schopenhauer refrains from turning the 6ill into "the pure now*sequence#, into "intra*temporality#. ,ut he fails to e.press or articulate $fugen& the 6ill as something that can !e intuited !y "consciousness as (a*sein#, as ?k*stasis or ?c* sistence that is not "su!0ecti1e# or a "Oe!enskraft# or "6eltprin5ip#. Heidegger maintains the "tension# of ec*stasis, of the ontological synthesis through the "positioning# of ,eing in the hori5on of time. Schopenhauer ends up with the 6ill filling up $o!0ectifying& all e.istence or !eing- Heidegger sees ,eing only through the .*ray of nothing*ness. /hat is "transcendental imagination#. Here is )almer on Husserls notes on Heidegger, showing some of the same perple.ities on these points4 fourth ma0or issue !etween Husserl and Heidegger in the margins of #P2 is the nature of the transcendental self. 4ow is such a self to be concei)ed; ,ccording to Heidegger in Being and $i e, both Cescartes and Kant wrongly thought of the famous )3 am) in terms of a static metaphysics of presence, while Heidegger wanted to see Casein as a factical, temporally e isting entity$ ,s Heidegger saw it, Husserl in his BEF@ lectures on internal time consciousness had already ta#en a step beyond Kant in ma#ing time a definiti!e factor in consciousness$ ,nd now here in the Kantboo#, Heidegger goes further to credit Kant with showing that the shaping power of the imagination is temporal" indeed, says Heidegger, imagination )must first of all shape time itself$ %nly when we reali&e this do we have a full concept of ti e) 5B=@8$ >or Heidegger, time and human finitude, are #eys to a more adequate fundamental ontology, and it is important to ma#e them also the essential core of the self$ >or Husserl, the transcendental ego functions as the philosophically necessary anchor of his phenomenology$ 3n order to be transcendental, Husserl*s transcendental ego would need in a certain sense to transcend at least ontic time$ 3nterestingly, at this point Husserl instead of differing with Heidegger on the temporality of the ego seems to !e trying hard to understand what Heidegger is saying. Husserl in the margin refers to @the immanent life of the ego@ and asks- @3s the ego the immanent time in which o!0ecti1e time temporali5es itselfN@ $>B=&, as if he were trying here principally to grasp HeideggerGs concept. Oater, for instance, he writes in the margin, as if paraphrasing- @/he immanent life of the ego as, rather, originally temporali5ing@ $>BJ&. !t would seem here he is merely restating what he understands to be 4eidegger$s point, for he concedes, <an immanent temporal horizon =of the ego> is necessary< &7?@'. Ahat 4usserl may be saying is% Time is of course an essential component of the transcendental ego* what baffles me is all this talk about what time is <primordially<B Ahat is the <primordial essence< of time; Ahy is it so important here; HeideggerGs answer to this question comes in the ne.t section, where he states, )%rimordial time akes possible the transcendental power of the imagination 5BGG8$ 0ut here Husserl underlines )ma#es possible) and as#s( )/hat does this *ma#es possible* mean;) >or Husserl, Heidegger is not describing the e perience of time phenomenologically, or e!en accounting

for it philosophically" rather, he is doing metaphysics and bringing Kant along with him$ Hes of course there is an immanent temporal hori2on for transcendental sub&ecti!ity, says Husserl, but how does that ma#e the transcendental ego into )time itself); ?ot only is Heidegger*s language strange here, he also seems to be ma#ing philosophical assumptions or claims about the metaphysical nature of Casein, which raises the issue of the nature of man, and more pointedly for Husserl of philosophical anthropology as a basis for philosophy. +ay!e Heidegger here is really doing philosophical anthropology, Husserl thinks2 in any case, he is not doing phenomenology, again not doing what philosophy today ought to !e doing.

Cing an sich and 'ranscendence 9eturning to our starting point with Schop, what makes the 6ill or pure intuition a qualitas occulta is precisely the ina!ility of consciousness "to know# and "to !e# 6ill at once, !ecause the concept of a reality is not the reality itself- this im*possi!ility makes the "quality# of the 6ill or pure intuition "occult#, in*scruta!le. /hat is why consciousness can ec*sist only as self*consciousness. 4nd it ec*sists not merely in time, as Heidegger seeks to esta!lish !y appealing to Kants "in*there# and "out*there#. ,ut the 1ery fact that there can !e no physical or psychological "!oundary# !etween "in# and "out# $and !ecause they are !oth "there#, they are "!eing#&, it is e1ident that consciousness or "!eing*in*itself# that is simultaneously "!eing*for*itself# must also ec*sist in spaceL /his means that all (asein is at once !oth in time and in space and that therefore the Cartesian transcendental distinction !etween mind and !ody $res cogitans and res e.tensa& is fictitious $un*real& and fallacious $false&. $Kant e.presses this "at once# with "at the same time#, in connection with "the possi!ility of e.perience# !eing also "the possi!ility of the o!0ects of e.perience# see 'K)+, p>C;.& "/he mind#, consciousness, necessarily ec*sists in !oth space and time if it ec*sists at allL /he Kantian and Heideggerian pri1ileging of time is unwarranted. $Kant speaks of "e.*position# and ?kstasis, p>C;. /he pro!lem is that Kant is always thinking of the su!0ect as separate from the o!0ect, and therefore transcending and dominating it.& 3ndeed, it is this "conscious*ness# that is !oth "self*consciousness# and "consciousness of !eing*in*time*and*space#, that is, consciousness of immanence, that allows human !eings to ha1e "con*science#, scientific consciousness of their "!eing*in*the*world# where "world# stands for !oth space and time, for !oth mind and matter, for history and nature $see !elow for discussion of these concepts in Heidegger&, so that "trans*scendence# is utterly meaningless. Once again, Spino5as "(eus si1e Eatura# may !e con1erted into "+ens si1e Corpus#. /here is a "corpo*reality# of mind $0ust as %regory ,ateson spoke metaphorically of "ecology of mind#&. /he answer lies already in Kants characteri5ation of the /ranscendental '4esthetic, which requires !oth time and space in 'aesthesis which means also that "transcendental aesthetic# is an o.ymoron, 0ust as immanent aesthetic is a pleonasm. /hat this pro!lematic is foremost in Heidegger is e1inced !y the paragraph on p>C= where once more it is the "possi!ility of e.perience and of its o!0ects# in reference to "that which makes it possi!le# that preoccupies him. ,ut this "that which makes

e.perience and its o!0ects possi!le# is erroneously seen as a transcendent faculty $p>C=, "intrinsic unitary structure of transcendence#& not an immanent one, as we ha1e shown it must !e. $,elow we will follow Heidegger in the analysis of "the o!*0ect#.& 3n the footnote, Heidegger then shows that he must ha1e !een grappling with Schops critique of Kant, !ecause he refers to "the principle of sufficient reason# as no o!stacle to the ec*sistence of the faculty that makes possi!le the "synthesis# of 0udgements, the acquisition of "totally different knowledge# $p>CI&. ,ut it is in e.posing the "instrumentality# of knowledge the inapplica!ility of synthetic 0udgements to science that Schop attacks Kants schematism $and derision a!out "all good things come in threes#&. Kants lament a!out "schematism is one of the most difficult points# is in the posthumous writings $cited on p>>B&. 6hat Heidegger considers to !e the most punctilious part of the K9: $"weighed word for word#, p>>J&, Schop pilloried mercilessly for its "schematism#. Kants search for "a medium# !etween the understanding and aesthesis that would account for its a!ility "to su!sume# o!0ects with concepts $see 'K)+, p>>A& ends with the magical unco1ering of "the transcendental schema# - * a gross piece of legerdemain. Kant calls it "a mediati1e representation 7what elseN8 at once intellectual and sensi!le#. 3t is neither, in fact, we would argueL ,etween generalis and specialis, this is metaphysica speciosaL /hus !egins the /ranscendental Oogic. 3n this !eing "a force#, the 6ill is at once the time hori5on and "in*concei1a!le impulse#, it is a "will*to*li1e# the precursor of the Eiet5schean "will to power# once Schops "su!0ecti1ity# arising from the :erstand*:ernunft is remo1ed. /he question arises of how the 6ill then comes to !e "self*consciousness#. (ifferently and con1ersely put, the question is how this "unity# of su!stance and time in "!e*ing# this pre*sentment of !eing can !e separated or asported or "split# from self*consciousnessL Fnless we do away with all notions of "consciousness#, of "self# itselfL Here /sanoffs 0udgement may !e applied to Schop as well as to Heidegger !ut he o!scures the fact that Schops critique is now directed more at Hegel $for whom Kant opened the door& than at the Konigs!erger.
)henomenalistic idealism and 1oluntaristic materialism, aesthetic quietism and ethical nihilism, are ad1ocated one after another2 and, while the criticism of KantGs principles often lays !are the concealed inconsistencies of the Critical system, the solutions offered are as often inadequate. 3s not the real e.planation of the situation to !e found in the fact that Schopenhauer is not the true successor of Kant at allN 3nstead of !eing a neo*rationalist, as Kant, on the whole, remained, he is fundamentally an irrationalist, so far as his attitude towards ultimate reality is concerned. 'e is keen in perceiving and criticising (ant)s confusion of various aspects and ele ents of experience* but# instead of tracing their i anent organic unity# which (ant i perfectly reali&es and for ulates# he goes so far# in al ost every case# as to assert their actual separation$ /his was seen to !e true of his treatment of perception and conception, understanding and reason. 3nstead of recogni5ing their unity in the concrete process of knowledge, Schopenhauer dogmatically separates them in a scholastic manner, thus su!stituting a lucidly wrong theory for KantGs confusedly right one. $).J<&

4 similar critique can !e applied to Heidegger in the sense that (a*sein, the "unity of intuition in time# which would require the positing of an "intuiti1e agency in time#, a "!eing# capa!le of consciousness and self*consciousness, then !ecomes merely another "essent# whose "o!*0ecti1ity# $%egen*standlichkeit& is purely "the opposition of o!0ecti1ity# $p>>;& made possi!le !y time, where "7time is8 the aspect 7)osition, 4n!lick, 4nschauung8 of the permanent# $p>>C&. Met, howe1er refined and sophistical the attempt $see especially p>>;&, what remains is the "in*separa!ility# and "in*concei1a!ility# of "time without concept and therefore su!*stance or su!*stratum#. /his is the Kantian "su!sumption# that Heidegger discusses $from p>>;&. Our argument is 1irtually identical to Spino5as "(eus si1e Eatura# in the sense that time is co*e.tensi1e with su!stance, e1en where su!stance can !e "reduced conceptually# to pure concept without "space#. ?1en in Kants formulation, "the in*here#, time, and the "out*there#, space, require a "spatialisation# of the concepts which only ser1es to demonstrate the futility of the attempt to separate themL Heidegger himself refers to "pure intuition $time&# $pDC&. ,ut intuition cannot !e separated, not only from "time#, !ut also from "concept# which is the 'eidos of thought, nor indeed from the moment of perception $the su!sumption of the o!0ect !y concepts& and therefore from "space#L $4gain, Kants reflection entails this conclusion- intuition without thought is empty, thought without concept is !lind# !ut !oth "emptiness# and "!lindness# 7sight8 refer to "space#L& /his idealism forms the !asis of Hegels de1elopment of Kants 'Kritik in the )haenomenologie the inescapa!le fact that "hic et nunc# are "concepts# $,egriffe&. ,ut then they remain "concepts#, e1en when he tackles the 'inter*su!0ecti1ity of concepts- * namely, the process !y which it is possi!le to allow !oth the 'pre*sence of intuition and the awareness of 'the other, and then the possi!ility of '!eings human that are part of the "out*there#, of spatial separation $physis&. 4lthough not resorting to Kantian "schematisms# of pure reason or pro*0ections $Schop, Fichte& into practical reason, Hegel also remains "locked# in the transcendental sphere. /his is how 9ichardson $'Heidegger& summarises Heideggers "position# read well o1er a year after we took these notes $L&a passage we

",efore we mo1e on, we should note that !etween the two types of intuition, time en0oys a distinct priority o1er space2 for in all presentations the act of presenting is always a modifi*7>>B8cation of the interior sense which takes its place in the succession of moments we call "time#. ,ecause of this greater uni1ersality, time must !e more fundamental to ontological knowledge than space. /hat is why the author in his analysis of pure intuition feels 0ustified in restricting himself almost entirely to the intuition, time# $6R 9ichardson, Heidegger- From )h. /o /hought, pp>>J*B&

(iscussing Heideggers return to Kants schematism in the conte.t of Hegels critique of Spino5as notion of time in the ?thics, Eegri concludes $'Spino5as 4nti*+odernity, pB<&Heidegger is the e.treme limit of this process, a process in which he is well integrated if it is true that one of the goals of ,eing and /ime is to rethink the Kantian theory of transcendental schematism,G.< !ut also a process which, at the 1ery moment when it sets off again along the usual tracks, is completely contorted. Q

$pBA& Here, in this falling, in !eing this GcareG, temporality constitutes itself as )ossi!ility and self*pro0ection into time*to*come. Here, without e1er e.posing itself to the snares of teleology and the dialectic, temporality re1eals possi!ility as the most originary ontological determination of (asein. /hus it is only in presence that fate opens up onto possi!ility and time to come once again. ,ut how is it possi!le to authenticate (aseinN 3n this tragically tangled skein death is the ownmost and most authentic possi!ility of (asein. ,ut the latter is also an impossi!ility of presence- the Gpossi!ility of an impossi!ilityG therefore !ecomes the ownmost and most authentic possi!ility of (asein. /his is the way the Hegelian theme of modernity comes to conclusionin nothingness, in death, the immediate unity of e.istence and essence is gi1en. /he nostalgic Hegelian claim of ,estimmung has !ecome a desperate ?ntschlossenheit in Heidegger a deli!eration and a resolution of the disclosedness of (asein to its own truth, which is nothingness. /he music to which the dance of determination and the transcendental was set has come to an end.

Eegri here takes up Oowiths accurate characteri5ation of "the certainty of death and of nothingness# as "the a!solute fi.ed point of SuS $p;J, see his first essay, from p>J&, !ut not that of the 'Kehre, the one championed !y Cacciari, to which we will turn later. 4t the !eginning of Section ;, in parCA, when introducing "anthropology# and metaphysics as part of "human nature#, Heidegger presents the imagination as "the essential unity of pure intuition $time& and pure thought $apperception&# $p>;=& and then quotes Kant saying $4nthropologie&, "/he imagination is a faculty of intuition e1en without the presence of an o!0ect# $p>;<&. 3t is precisely this "immateriality# of Heideggers $and Kants& conception of pure intuition as time, its in*su!stantial quality that makes "a Eothing# the true possi!ility of transcendence, and therefore !ecomes the truth of Casein, its authenticity.
"0y a ?othing we mean not an essent but ne!ertheless somethingI according to its essence it is pure hori2on$ Kant calls this J the transcendental ob&ectI percei!ed by transcendence as its hori2on ,# $'K)+, p>CJ&.

"/o !egin with, then, the imagination en0oys a peculiar independence with respect to the essent,# $p>;<&.

/he ensuing e.position on p>;Jff shows neatly how !oth thinkers fail to see that the a!ility of the mind "to imagine# a!*sent o!0ects does not in the least mean that its "act of imagining# is not an acti1ity with an ob(ect, that includes an o!0ect that indeed the 1ery fact that it is an "acti1ity# implies the "materiality# of the mind, its "!eing*in the world#. /he fact that the imagination can dispense with this or that o!0ect does not remotely mean that it is a Oockean tabula rasa, or that indeed it is a ta!ula rasa with "pre*formed# intuition and thought articulated !y imagination, !ecause then we would concei1e of human "faculties# $Heidegger discusses the word from p>;D& as capa!le of !eing "mental# or "psychological#, that is "independent# of "o!*0ects#. For this to !e "possi!le#, for these faculties to allow "the possi!ility of e.perience and of the o!0ect of e.perience#, these faculties must "transcendQ the finitude of human knowledge# and therefore encompass "the impossi!le# $see p>=J2 see also Eegri quote a!o1e, pBA&. /hat is why Heidegger wishes to a1oid "anthropology#, to e.pose its "limitations# and "lack of transcendence#, the !etter to e.alt the merits of "ontology# $p>;D Heidegger calls any attempt to collapse the latter into the former "useless# and "a mistake#&. Heidegger appreciates the point made a!o1e, that intuition cannot !e "form without content# $p>=D&. He quotes Kant to insist that the forms of intuition $space and time& are an

"ens imaginarium# that, although without "o!*0ect#, "are still somethingQ !ut are not themsel1es o!0ects which can !e intuited# $p><I&)ure intuitions as @forms of intuiting@ are, to !e sure, @intuitions without things,@ HH !ut ne1ertheless they do ha1e a content. Space is nothing @real,@ that is, it is not an essent accessi!le to perception !ut @the representation of a mere possi!ility of coe.istence.@ $p><>&

4nd he hastens to add/he ens imaginarium pertains to the possi!le forms of @Eothing,@ to what is not an essent in the sense of something actually present. )ure space and pure time are @something,@ !ut they are not o!0ects. $p><I&

,ut Heidegger is still "reducing# the faculty of intuition and the imagination to a mere "essence# and "ens# that remains purely and firmly "ontological# and dis/embodiedL He fails to appreciate that these "faculties# do not e.ist in 1acuo, !ut are necessarily and simultaneously "!odily functions#L /he 1ery fact that Kant and Heidegger in his wake insist on this Cartesian hence transcendental dichotomy !etween "the o!*0ect of intuition or thought or imagination# and "pure intuition or thought or imagination#, as "mere faculties# dis*em!odied, ethereal and "trans*scendental# this fact re1eals that at !ottom Heidegger remains an idealist philosopher $despite his disa1owal, fn>A, p>==& in the tradition of Kant and Schopenhauer. $,ut in the latter the "schematism# is replaced !y a "Oife force# that is "immaterial# in preser1ing its qualitas occulta, and a force that Schop ultimately "renounces# !y "going !eyond# it intellectually a "renunciation# that !ecomes an "acceptance# of the world as its quietistic "mirror# in Eir1ana. 3t is this '3m*potence that Eiet5sche e.ecrates and hopes "to o1ercome# with the 6ill to )ower.& (istant is the 'potentia that Eegri disco1ers in Spino5a2 the "producti1e# indefinite duration of appetitus $the link of this Oei!nit5ian and Spino5an concept to "das 6ille# is traced !y 9ichardson in his 'Heid. from )henom. to /hought, chapter on Eiet5sche.& Oost as they are in their +anichean and Cartesian opposition of mind and matter, Kant and Heidegger cannot o1ercome the necessity of transcendence. Eegri, for his part, whilst chastising Heidegger, does not address this "primordiality# of time, e1en when contrasting it to Hegels ,estimmung and Heideggers Eicht*heit'empus potentiae$ insistence on presence fills out what Heidegger lea!es us as mere possibility$ 'he hegemony of presence with respect to the becoming that distinguishes Spino2ian from Hegelian metaphysics reasserts itself as the hegemony of the plenitude of the present face d with empty Heideggerian presence$ /ithout e!er ha!ing entered into the modern, Spino2a e its from it here, by o!erturning the conception of time which others wanted to fulfill in becoming or nothingness .into a positi!ely open and constituti!e time$ Fnder the 1ery same ontological conditions, lo1e takes the place of GcareG. Spino5a systematically o1erturns Heidegger- to 4ngst $an.iety& he opposes 4mor, to Fmsicht $circumspection& he opposes +ens, to ?ntschlossenheit $resolution& he opposes Cupiditas, to 4nwesenheit $!eing*present& he opposes the Conatus, to ,esorgen $concern& he opposes 4ppetitus, to +oglichkeit $possi!ility& he opposes )otentia. 3n this confrontation, an anti*purposi1e presence and possi!ility unite that which different meanings of ontology di1ide. 4t the same time, the indifferent meanings of being are precisely di)ided /4eidegger aims at nothingness, and "pinoza at plenitude. The 4eideggerian ambiguity that )acillates in the direction of the )oid is resol)ed in the "pinozian tension that concei)es the present as plenitude. $'Ss4*+, pBA&

Small wonder that, as we shall see shortly, Husserl was dri1en to despair !y Heideggers negation of su!0ecti1ity and the transcendental ego and descent into a paradigm that, he thought, could only ha1e legitimacy as philosophical anthropology, not e1en as "ontology !ecause, as Heidegger himself found out, the inquiry into ,eing could ne1er !e completed. Here is )almer/he quest Heidegger so ardently pursued for the meaning of ,eing, a quest that dominated his philosophical life, leading him later into the philosophy of Eiet5sche, into reflection on the @origin@ of the work of art, into e.plicating the poetry of HTlderlin and down @forest paths@ without end, 4usserl would say/had he li)ed to see it/was a dead end, only a way of getting bogged down in sub(ecti)e reflection instead of making a solid and positi1e contri!ution to philosophy.

4s Heidegger neatly concludes,

Hence, if it is true that the innermost essence of transcendence is grounded in pure imagination, then the transcendental character of transcendental intuition is made clear for the first time !y means of this interpretation of pure intuition. )laced as it is at the !eginning of the Critique of )ure 9eason, the transcendental aesthetic is !asically unintelligi!le. 3t has only an introductory character and can !e truly understood only in the perspecti1e of the transcendental schematism. $p><C&

,ut here the deri1ation of the Schematism from the unity or "synopsis# of imagination as "the common root# of intuition and thought places Heidegger at odds with "the +ar!urg school# of Eeo*Kantains who treat "the categories# of the Schematism as deri1ed from the /ranscendental Oogic as "Formal Oogic# $p><C&. /he e.change !elow neatly summarises the situation. Heidegger firstH?3(?%%?9/he work that really has to !e done is not helped !y smoothing them o1er. For the sake of clarity 3 would like to place our entire discussion once more under the sign of KantGs Critique of )ure 9eason, and once more to fm upon the question, what man is, as the central question. /his question need not !e put anthropocentrically, !ut it must !e shown, Urough the fact that man is the !eing who transcends, i.e., is open to @that*which*is@ in its totality and to himself, that !y means of this eccentric character man is also at the same time put into the totality of @that*which* is@ as such. /he question and the idea of a philosophical anthropology has this meaning2 not that of in1estigating man empirical3y as a gi1en o!0ect. Rather it has to be moti!ated out of the central problematic of philosophy itself which must lead man bac# beyond himself into the whole of )that.which.is,) in order to ma#e manifest to him, for all his freedom, the nothingness of his Casein$ 'his nothingness is not an inducement to pessimism and de&ection, but to the understanding of this, namely, that there is genuine acti!ity only where there is oppo. sition and that philosophy has the tas# of throwing man bac# into the hardness of his fate from out of the softness of one who merely li!es off the wor# of the spirit$

Here is the return of Hegels "negation#, now transformed into a :ernichtung of the o!* 0ect in order to preser1e the "primordiality# of transcendence. "/hrowing man !ack into the hardness of his fate from out of the softnessQ 7of8 the work of the spirit# here is the e.istential contingency of human !eing e.tended to the world of signification, of conceptuali5ation not in itself !ut as the comm*union of !eing human. /he retreat of metaphysics into 3ch*heit, into pure su!0ecti1ity $Cacciari, pA=&- "/he awareness of the thing is a!o1e all self*consciousness# $Heid. cited in Cacciari, ')Ee9, pJ<&- * with the consequence that the only conceptuali5ation possi!le is the reified one of /echnik, of mathesis, of 9ationalisierung $Cacciari, pJDff, with reference to +ar. on technology on pB>&. 4s with 6ittgenstein, the only "meaning# possi!le is the tautological one of "language games# $pJ=&. /he rest is Ftopia.
7). C<.> C4SS39?9- 3 !elie1e it has already !ecome dearer in what the opposition consists. 3t is, howe1er not fruitful to stress this opposition repeatedly. 6e are at a point where little is to !e gained through purely logical arguments. 3t seems, then, we are condemned here to some sort of relati1ity. Howe1er, we may not persist in this relati1ity which would place empirical man in the center, 6hat Heidegger said at the end was most important. His position cannot !e anthropocentric either. 4nd then, 3 ask, where now lies the common center in our oppositionN 6e do not need to look for this. >or we ha!e this center, and we ha!e it indeed because there is one co on ob&ecti!e human world in which, although the differences of indi!iduals are in no way cancelled, a bridge is built from indi!idual to indi!idual$ 'hat 3 find again and again in the primal phenomenon of language$ 1!eryone spea#s his own language, and yet we understand one another through the medium of language$ 'here is something such as the language, something such as a unity o!er and abo!e the endlessly different ways of speaking. 'herein lies the decisi!e point for me$ 4nd therefore 3 start from the o!0ecti1ity of the sym!olic Form !ecause here @the inconcei1a!le +@+ +49/3E H?3(?%%?9 is achie1ed,@ /hat is what 3 should like to call the world of o!0ecti1e spirit. /here is no other way from one e.istence 7(asein8 to another e.istence 7(asein8 than through this world of Form. 3f it did not e.ist, then 3 would not know how such a thing as a common understanding could !e. Cognition, too, is therefore simply only a !asic instance of this position, !ecause an o!0ecti1e assertion is formulated which no longer takes into consideration the su!0ecti1ity of the particular indi1idual.

6e would part ways with Cassirer here, where "the Forms# !egin a neo*Kantian delusion. ,ut the question of meaning does not stop with linguistic analysis. +athematics and logic may well !e "language games#2 !ut language itself is not $cf )iana 'Oectrs. on 6itt&. ,etween 9atio and 9ationalisierung lies pra.is and not 'scientia. /he pro!lem for Cacciari $'Confronto con H& is that he asks us to throw out, not 6ittgensteins ladder after clim!ing the wall or the raft after crossing the ri1er, !ut the !a!y with the !athwater $see his discussion on ppBI*>&.

Hermeneutics /he same argument we find with regard to the interpretation of history and of te.ts $hermeneutics& in Oowith $second essay, pp<=*<, !ut passim in 'Saggi su H& where 'authenticity turns into ar!itrariness, in SuS !ecause of the ?nt*schlossenheit required !y !eing*toward*death, which determines the 'finitude of (asein, and in the 'Kehre period !ecause of the mystical 'dis*closing and 'unconcealing of ,eing $Oowith,from p<B&. /his 'turn is re1iewed !y Oowith with clearly negati1e 'tone a!out the "in1ersion# from the centrality of (asein to that of ,eing $from p>J&, from an e.istential to a more mystical and religious "aspect#. /here were early 1estiges of this in the 'Kant!uch in the references to "the essent gi1ing itself to (asein# where ,eing is the Eothing of essents. Oater, Oowith questions the "immateriality# of this concept of "nature# and of the "Oichtung# that is to illuminate it $pJJ&. 3t culminates with the famous SuS formulation "only until there is (asein, ,eing is gi1en#, in1erted in 'Historismus with the reading that "is gi1en# refers to ,eing "gi)ing itself to 7es gi!t8 (asein# $pCD and p=B&, ,eing "dis*closing# or "un* concealing# itself, as /ruth, so that the o!1ious meaning of the sentence is neatly in1erted and from Fakti5itat $discussed on ppC=ff& we mo1e to a*letheia $ppCDff&. Oike 4ugustine, Heidegger nowhere finds ',eing, !ut the access to it that was a1aila!le to the saint was precluded to the philosopher $Oowith, p=J&. Oowith seeks to comprehend this "duality#, clearly contradictory, in Heideggers attempt to keep these two ")ositions# or "aspects# as "correspondences# that illustrate the "positioning# or "!eing*out*of*oneself# $p=;& whilst a1oiding recourse to Hegelian "dialectical# concepts. $Oowith, p=A, also contrasts derisi1ely Heideggers "word games# with 6ittgensteins Sprachspiele intended to show "the limits of language# and to warn that "philosophical pro!lems arise there where language 'makes merry# 7)3, >D8.& Similarly with Husserl, as )almer notes4 fifth issue that arises with regard to HeideggerGs interpretation in #P2 is that of interpreti)e )iolence. Heidegger asserts- @?1ery interpretation, if it wants to wring from what the words say what they want to say, must use )iolence. Such 1iolence, howe1er cannot simply !e a ro1ing ar!itrariness. The power of an idea that sheds ad)ance light must dri1e and lead the e.plication@ $>D;* >D=, e.a.&. 4usserl underlines the words <e)ery interpretation must use )iolence< and puts three exclamation points and three question marks/his maximum. Husserl is astonished, we can assume, at HeideggerGs pro1ocati1e statement, and e1en Heidegger hastens to qualify it in the ne.t sentence. 3n the margin Husserl writes, @3 differentiate !etween what they wanted to say and what they ultimately aimed at and wanted to say as they were said@ $>D;&. 3nterestingly, Husserl himself had elsewhere earlier argued that Kant was constrained !y the thought*forms of his time, so he could not carry through the founding of a truly rigorous transcendental philosophy. >< /his claim would seem to parallel HeideggerGs deconstruction in suggesting this was what Kant really wanted to say. 0ut the larger issue at sta#e here is Heidegger*s whole pro&ect of Destruktion# of unco!ering what has been repressed and forgotten in /estern philosophy since %lato. 3n other words, we again ha1e to do with a quite different 1ision of philosophy and its mission. For Heidegger, philosophi5ing See his comments on Kant in 6rste Philosophie !, cited a!o1e. meant seeking out of the @primordial roots@ of 6estern thought, @restoring@ to

thought what had !een @forgotten@ or only preser1ed in a Oatini5ed distortion, as in the case of 4ristotleGs ousia !ecoming substantia. 4s Heidegger later put it, philosophy is really @a thoughtful con1ersation !etween thinkers,@ o!1iously an endea1or more hermeneutical and dialogical than rigorously scientific and 1erifia!le. )hilosophy for Husserl, on the other hand, was supposed to in1ol1e rigorous logical and scientific reflection, purifying oneGs thinking of unreflected presuppositions and esta!lishing a philosophical foundation for further work, in order to achie1e @results@ that would !e uni1ersally accepta!le scientifically. Such a 1ision of philosophy makes quite clear HusserlGs continuity with the ?nlightenment faith in reason as a!le to o1ercome religious dogma and other !aseless inherited assumptions.

Heidegger was aware of the implications and sought to defend his method3t is true that in order to wrest from the actual words that which these words @intend to say,@ e1ery interpretation must necessarily resort to 1iolence. /his 1iolence, howe1er, should not !e confused with an action that is wholly ar!itrary. /he interpretation must !e animated and guided !y the power of an illuminati1e idea. Only through the power of this idea can an interpretation risk that which is always audacious, namely, entrusting itself to the secret elan of a work, in order !y this elan to get through to the unsaid and to attempt to find an e.pression for it. /he directi1e idea itself is confirmed !y its own power of illumination.

Oowith notes further, pC<, how Heideggers claim of re1i1ing for the first time since the %reeks the question of ,eing from 6estern metaphysics, clashes with the entire !i!lical narrati1e of the 'creatio e. nihilo, which poses already the possi!ility of nothingness, and therefore e1en in the intuitus originarius of di1ine creation, the whole question of ,eing other than the essent. $Heideggers (estruktion of history and therefore the history of metaphysics which he identifies like Hegel, for whom the history of philosophy and the philosophy of history were identical is discussed in Oowiths second essay. See esp. pp<I*= and pJ> and pBJ for references to +ar. and (ilthey.& 'ranscendence and 3mmanence 6hen Heidegger turns to the transcendental imagination, his efforts are directed clearly and 1aliantly at a!rogating the $Eeo*Kantian a!o1e all& distinction !etween intuition and understanding into "lower# and "higher# functions responding to aesthetic and formal logic, respecti1ely, and leading to the apotheosis of "pure reason#.
'he sensibility of the transcendental imagination cannot be ta#en as a reason for classifying it as one of the lower faculties of the soul, especially since, as transcendental, it must be the condition of the possibility of all the faculties$ 'hus, the most serious, because the most )natural,) ob&ection to the thesis that pure thought originates in the transcendental imagination is without foundation$ Reason can now no longer be ta#en as a )higher) faculty. $p><=&

,ut note once more how !y "sensi!ility# Heidegger intends the "primordial !eing# of pure intuition as the hori5on of time, as time itself and therefore as transcendental and insu!stantial, immaterial, dis*em!odied. /his seems to run counter to Kants Critique, which now threatens to !e reduced to philosophical anthropology precisely !y the Schopenhauerian "instrumentalisation# of :ernunft. /his is entirely e1ident in paragraph ;I on )ractical 9eason, where Heidegger reduces Kants source of moral and ethical 0udgement to a "feeling#. /he sophistical contortions are almost amusing as Heidegger seeks to a1oid the o!1ious implications of 'instrumentality on "practical reason# and on "the moral law#3n su!mitting to the 7moral8 law, 3 su!mit myself to myself qua pure reason. 3n su!mitting to myself, 3 raise myself to myself as a free !eing capa!le of self*determination. /his raising the self !y su!mitting to the self re1eals the ego in its @dignity.@ Eegati1ely e.pressed- in ha1ing respect for the law which 3 gi1e to myself as a free !eing, 3 am una!le to despise myself. Consequently, respect is that mode of !eing*as*self of the ego which pre1ents the latter from @re0ecting the hero in his soul.@ 9espect is the mode of !eing responsi!le for the ,eing of the self2 it is the authentic !eing*as*self. 'he pro&ection of the self, in submission, on the total, fundamental possibility of authentic e istence, this possibility being gi!en by the law, is the essence of the self, i$e$, practical reason.

3t is little wonder that Schop had such an easy time of it in the '%rundpro!lemeL Heidegger percei1es the pro!lems and seeks to address them, gi1ing an intimation of the hermeneutic "1iolence# that Husserl so despised.
/his fundamental constitution of the essence of man, @rooted@ $>AA& in the transcendental imagination, is the @unknown@ of which Kant must ha1e had an intimation when he spoke of @the root unknown to us@2 for the unknown is not that of which we know a!solutely nothing !ut that of which the knowledge makes us uneasy. Howe1er, Kant did not carry out the primordial interpretation of the transcendental imagination2 indeed, he did not e1en make the attempt, despite the clear indications he ga1e us concerning such an analytic. Kant recoiled from this unknown root. Kant !egins !y striking out in the second edition the two principal passages in the preceding edition which specifically present the imagination as a third fundamental faculty !eside sensi!ility and the understanding. /he first passage HH is replaced !y a critical discussion of the analyses !y Oocke and Hume of the understanding, 0ust as if KantValthough mistakenlyV looked upon his conception in the first edition as being still too close to the empirical. $p>AJ&

9eferring to the second edition of 'K9:, he writes/he transcendental imagination no longer functions as an autonomous fundamental faculty, mediating !etween sensi!ility

and understanding in their possi!le unity. /his intermediate faculty disappears and only two fundamental sources of the mind are retained. /he function of the transcendental imagination is transferred to the understanding. +nd when# in the second edition# (ant provides a proper na e# apparently descriptive# for the i agination# na ely# synthesis speciosa,++ he shows by this expression that the transcendental i agination has lost its for er autono y$ 3t recei!es this name only because in it the understanding is referred to sensibility and without this reference would be synthesis intellectualis$ ,ut why did Kant recoil from the transcendental imaginationN $p>JI&

Heideggers e.planation makes for !reath*taking readingHow can sensi!ility as a lower faculty !e said to determine the essence of reasonN (oes not e1erything fall into confusion if the lower is put in place of the higherN 6hat is to happen to the honora!le tradition according to which, in the long history of metaphysics, ratio and the logos ha1e laid claim to the central roleN Can the primacy of logic disappearN Can the architectonic of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, i.e., its di1ision into transcendental aesthetic and logic, !e preser1ed if the theme of the latter is !asically the transcendental imaginationN (oes not the Critique of )ure 9eason depri1e itself of its own theme if pure reason is transformed into transcendental imaginationN (oes not this laying of the foundation lead to an a!yssN 0y his radical interrogation, Kant brought the )possibility) of metaphysics before this abyss$ He saw the un#nown" he had to draw bac#$ ?ot only did the imagination fill him with alarm, but in the meantime 9between the first and second editions: he had also come more and more under the influence of pure reason as such. $p>J;&

Spoken like a 1erita!le Schopenhauer Kants conception of pure reason !ecomes toto genere different from intuition and the principle of sufficient reason.
3t should !e noted, in truth, that the laying of the foundation is no more @psychological@ in the first edition than it is @logical@ in the second. Kn the contrary, both are transcendental, i$e$, necessarily )ob&ecti!e) as well as )sub&ecti!e$) 4ll that takes place so far as the su!0ecti1e transcendental deduction is concerned is that in order to preser1e the supremacy of reason the second edition has decided for the pure understanding as opposed to the pure imagination. 3n the second edition, the su!0ecti1e @psychological@ deduction does not disappear. On the contrary, !ecause it is oriented on the pure understanding as the faculty of synthesis, the su!0ecti1e side !ecomes e1en more prominent. /o attempt to trace the understanding !ack to a more primordial @faculty of knowledge@ is, henceforth, superfluous. $>J<&

/hen Heidegger rightly underlines the importance of this "1iolent interpretation#, confirming the "anthropocentricKlogical# concerns held !y Husserl/his ontological pro!lem of the person as finite pure reason cannot !e formulated with reference to anything peculiar to the constitution and mode of e.istence of a particular type of finite, rational !eing. Such, howe1er, is the imagination which is not only regarded as a specifically human faculty !ut also as a sensi!le one. 5eing thus self/reinforcing, the problematic of a pure reason must ine)itably thrust the imagination into the background, thus concealing its transcendental nature co pletely$ 3t is incontestable that the distinction between a finite rational being in general and man as a particular exa ple of such a being comes to the fore in the transcendental deduction as the latter appears in the second edition$ 3ndeed, e!en Kant*s first )correction,) appearing on the first page of the second edition, ma#es this clear$ 'o the characteri2ation of finite #nowledge, more precisely, to that of finite intuition, he adds( )to man at least$) ++ 'his is intended to show that although all A;. , ;;, EKS, p. A<.>J= finite intuition is recepti!e, this recepti!ity does not necessarily, as is the case with man, require the mediation of sense organs$

3n other words, gi1en "the transcendental nature of the imagination#, then "the distinction !etween a finite rational !eing in general and man as a particular e.ample of such !eing# made !y Kant means that "the recepti1ity of finite intuition in a finite rational !eing in general does not necessarily, as it would in the case of man taken in his 'particularity as an e.ample of such !eing $that is, taken 'anthropologically&, require the mediation of sense organs#. 3n other other words, then, sense organs are not necessary for the conceptuali2ation of the transcendental imagination. Once again, and unequi1ocally, Heidegger is a!le to do what we cannot, namely to concei1e "human nature# or "reality# or "!eing# in ontological guise only, transcendentally, "without the mediation of sense organs# and in the dis*em!odied "primordial hori5on of time#L $Cf Oowith, from pBC.& Soon after, we will see, Heidegger distinguishes !etween "finite self# and "self*consciousness# and !etween "intra*temporal ego# and the ego as "3 think#, as pure sensi!ility. /he former are "intra*temporal# notions and not "primordial possi!ilities# staked against their finitude or nothing*ness, and therefore not transcendental. Met, as we stressed earlier, it is impossi!le for us to concei1e of our "faculties#, of the mind, as ha1ing any reality outside of !oth time as well as space, and therefore independently of sense organsL Eor is it possi!le for us to a!stract from this space and this time to "ec*static# notions that "spatialise# space and $in Heidegger& "temporalise# time. 4s Hegel put it, there is no dichotomy !etween consciousness and self/consciousness- the one is implicitly the other. ,ut Hegel insisted on the "concreteness# of his categories against Kants a!stractness only to remo1e them to the empyrean of the dialectic of Spirit. /he 1ery fact that Heidegger speaks of "the ediation of sense organs# gi1es away the incipient idealism of his notions. 3n this lies the fundamental difference !etween our immanentism and idealist thought from Kant to Heidegger.

(On all this, cf Nietzsche, TotI, Reason in Philosophy, par1 re body Par!" #o$ic as sy%bolic con&ention In the sa%e part, see refs to lan$'a$e and (ill )lso, *o( the tr'e (orld and +oni$sber$ers thin$s, -chop in par. and The /o'r 0rrors, esp par1 (hich o(es %'ch to -chop, on (ho% see also -2ir%ishes of an 'nti%ely %an 3f #o(ith on *eide$$ers interpretation of Nietzsche on &al'e, pp111ff, and political econo%y, p11!, ref to -chop on p114 and p111 on 5ollend'n$ 6

,ut are not these considerations enough to condemn the present interpretation and, a!o1e all, the primordial e.plication of the transcendental imagination which it proposesN 0ut why, from the beginning, has the finitude of pure #nowledge been placed at the center 9of our interpretation:; Because etaphysics# with the laying of the foundation of which we are concerned# belongs to "hu an nature." ,onsequently# the specific finitude of hu an nature is decisive for the laying of this foundation$ /his question, apparently superficial, as to whether, in the interpretation of the Critique of )ure 9eason, the second edition deser1es to !e ranked o1er the first or con1ersely is only the pale reflection of a question which is decisi1e insofar as the Kantian laying of the foundation is concernedQ $>JA& Human finitude necessarily in1ol1es sensi!ility in the sense of recepti1e intuition. 4s pure intuition $pure sensi!ility& it is $>JJ& a necessary element of the structure of transcendence characteristic of finitude. Human pure reason is necessarily pure sensi!le reason. $his pure reason ust be sensible in itself and not beco e so erely because it is connected with a body$ Rather, the con!erse is true" an as a finite rational being can in a transcendental# i.e.# etaphysical# sense "have" his body only because transcendence as such is sensible a priori$ ?ow, if transcendental imagination is to be the pri ordial ground of hu an sub-ectivity ta#en in its unity and totality,, then it must also ma#e possible a faculty on the order of pure sensible reason$ But pure sensibility# according to the universal signification in which it ust be taken for the laying of the foundation of etaphysics# is ti e$ How can time as pure sensi!ility form a primordial unity with the @3 think@N 3s the pure ego which, according to the interpretation generally accepted, Kant concei1ed to !e e.tratemporal and opposed to time, to !e considered as @temporal@N 4nd all this on the !asis of the transcendental imaginationN How, in general, is the latter related to timeN $>JB&

6e really ought to thank Heidegger here for resiling from his characteristic speciosity $"a!strusion# to Oowith, pA, later 1erging on "sophistic art# that grows more mystical in the "Kehre#, pB& and stating matters as clearly as he can. For him, it is not that "pure reason must !e sensi!leQ !ecause it is connected with a !ody#. 9ather, "the !ody# itself, as an essent, as an o!*0ect of pure intuition, "is there# or sense "has# it "only because transcendence as such is sensible a priori# 6hate1er Heidegger may mean !y this "a priori# he pro!a!ly refers to pure intuition or sensi!ility as "making possi!le !oth e.perience and its o!*0ects#, which is what transcendence means *, it seems o!1ious that the "a priori# character of this "sensi!le transcendence# $an o.ymoron if e1er one e.isted& requires that pure sensi!ility * "according to the uni1ersal signification in which it must !e taken for the laying of the foundation of metaphysics# is time itselfL

Oet us take a pause and return to Eegri4ccording to the dynamic of his own system, which takes shape essentially in the /hird and Fourth )arts of the ?thics, Spino5a constructs the collecti1e dimension of producti1e force, and therefore the collecti1e figure of lo1e for di1inity. Rust as the modern is indi1idualistic, and there!y constrained to search for the apparatus 7dispositi1o8 of mediation and recomposition in the transcendental, so Spino5a radically negates any dimension e.ternal to the constituti1e process of the human community, to its a!solute immanence. /his !ecomes completely e.plicit in the )olitical /reatise, and already partially in the /heological*)olitical /reatise, although pro!a!ly only the /) allows us to clarify the line of thought go1erning )roposition CI of the Fifth )art of the ?thics, or !etter, allows us clearly to read the whole apparatus of the constituti1e motions of intellectual Oo1e as a collecti1e essence. 3 mean that intellectual Oo1e is the formal condition of sociali5ation, and that the communitarian process is the ontological condition of intellectual Oo1e. Consequently, the light of intellectual Oo1e clarifies the parado. of the multitude and its making of itself a community, since intellectual Oo1e alone descri!es the real mechanisms that lead potentia from the multitudo to itself as the unity of an a!solute political order- the democratic potestas. C> On the other hand, the modern does not know how to 0us* /he modern always gi1es democracy as a limit and therefore transfigures it into the perspecti1e of the transcendental. $pBB, 'Ss4*+&

1#stasis 'he 3ntuition of 'ime )aragraph ;C is remarka!le, !ecause here we find Heideggers most direct "peering# into the central "dualism# in his philosophy ,eing and /ime.
4s the pure succession of the now*series, time is @in constant flu..@ HH )ure intuition intuits this succession uno!0ecti1ely. 'o intuit means ( to recei!e that which offers itself$ %ure intuition A<. See a!o1e, W CB, p. >=B. AA. , CD>, EKS, p. C<<. >JB gi!es to itself, in the recepti!e act, that which is capable of being recei!ed$ 4lthough in this passage, Kant does not speak of the transcendental imagination, it is clear that the @formation of images@ !y the imagination is in itself relati1e to time. )ure imagination, thus termed !ecause it forms its images 7%e!ilde8 spontaneously, must, since it is itself relati1e to time, constitute 7form8 time originally. 'ime as pure intuition is neither only what is intuited in the pure act of intuition nor this act itself depri!ed of its )ob&ect$) 'ime as pure intuition is in one the formati!e act of intuiting and what is intuited therein$ Such is the complete concept of time$ %ure intuition can form the pure succession of the now sequence only if, in itself, it is imagination as that which forms, reproduces, and anticipates$ Hence it follows that time, abo!e AJ. )olit5, :orlesungen ii!er die +etaphysik, op. cit., p. BB, cf. p. B;. >BI all in the Kantian sense, should not be thought of as an indifferent field of action which the imagination enters, as it were, in order to further its own acti!ity$ ,lthough, on the ordinary plane of e perience where )we ta#e account of time,)

we must consider it to be a pure succession of nows, this succession by no means constitutes primordial time$ Kn the contrary, the transcendental imagination as that which lets time as the now.sequence spring forth isLas the origin of the latter L+primordial time$

Here we ha1e the clearest e.ample of how Heidegger "correlates# the !inary approaches to "!eing# that Oowith says are inconsistent $see end of first essay, from p=;&. For the question is- what can possi!ly !e meant !y the proposition that "the transcendental imaginationQ is primordial timeQ as that which lets time as the now*sequence spring forth#N 3f pure intuition "gi1es itself that which offers itself#, we simply ha1e no concei1a!le idea whether it is pure intuition that "gi1es itself# "that*which*offers* itself# or whether pure intuition "is gi1en# that which offers itself that which, in offering itself, is gi1en to intuition. 3n any proposition, one must !e the su!0ect and another must !e the o!0ect. ,ut if the o!0ect is defined as "that which is not an o!0ect#, !ecause "it offers itself#, then we ha1e "the mother of all confusions# literally, a "fusion# of !rain cellsL /he mystery of "es gi!t# returns. 3f there is $es gi!tL& an e*1ent $?r*eignis& such that "time springs forth as the now*sequence#, then this e*1ent must ha1e an origin and therefore a cause either the imagination "lets# or "time*as*the*now*sequence# "springs forth#. 3n either case we cannot conceptualise the imagination or time independently of a spatial dimension of its perception. /he imagination simply cannot be time, !ecause time is inconcei1a!le without "spatial !eing#. 3n other words, "!eing# is !oth temporal and spatial, not 0ust the formerL Heidegger is "fudging#. 4s with (asein and ,eing, he first makes (asein !e the 'Oichtung of ,eing, and then makes "the Oichtung*of*,eing# !e that which "gi1es itself# $es gi!t& to ena!le (asein to !eL From "it is gi1en# $passi1e, !y a su!0ect&, "es gi!t# !ecomes "gi1es itself# $acti1ely !estows or confers its quality upon its o!0ect&. He does the same with "the o!0ect of imagination# fudging !etween the su!0ecti1e and the o!0ecti1e geniti1e- "the ob(ect of imagination# or "the o!0ect of imagination#. 3n the former it is the imagination that has an o!*0ect, and in the latter it is the imagination that is the o!*0ect. 3f the two are said to correspond, as Schop did with his "3deas# $:orstellungen& as a "unity of su!0ect and o!0ect#, then there must !e a qualitas occulta somewhere that com*prehends them as its "o!0ectification# the 6ill. Heidegger continues?ow we are in a position to clarify the meaning of the statement( 'ime necessarily affects the concept of the representations of ob&ects$ 'o affect a priori the act of ob.&ectification as such, i$e$, the pure act of orientation toward $ $ $ means( to bring up against it something on the order of an opposition, )3t)Lthe pure act of ob.&ectificationLbeing pure apperception, the ego itself$ 'ime is implicated in the internal possibility of this act of ob.&ectification$ ,s pure self.affection, it originally forms finite selfhood in such a way that the self can become self.consciousness$ $>D<&

Once we identify pure intuition with time, it follows that the 1ery "intention# or what Heidegger calls "orientation# of intuition $time& must yield some as yet unspecified notion

of "op*position# which, Heidegger calls "the ego itself# or "self*consciousness#, though clearly he cannot mean !y this something "per*manent# or "intra*temporal# such as "the finite self#, a su!stance or entity that "lasts# $recall %er. 'Oast, or 'weight, the iron used !y shoemakers&.
/he predicates @a!iding@ and @unchanging@ are not ontic assertions concerning the immuta!ility of the ego !ut are transcendental determinations. /hey signify that the ego is a!le to form an hori5on of identity only insofar as qua ego it pro*poses to itself in ad1ance something on the order of permanence and immuta!ility. 3t is only within this hori5on that an o!0ect is capa!le of !eing e.perienced as remaining the same through change.$>DB& 3t would be contrary to sense to try to effect an essential determination of primordial time itself with the aid of what is deri!ed from it$ 'he ego cannot be concei!ed as temporal, i$e$, intra.temporal, precisely because the 6FF self originally and in its innermost essence is time itself$ %ure sensibility 5time8 and pure reason are not only homogeneous, they belong together in the unity of the same essence which ma#es possible the finitude of human sub&ecti!ity in its totality$

3t follows that the ego is identical not with the "self# !ut with "the self originally and in its innermost essence#, the self as pure sensi!ility or pure intuition, which is identical with primordial time.
/ime and the @3 think@ are no longer opposed to one another as unlike and incompati!le2 they are the same. /hanks to the radicalism with which, in the laying of the foundation of metaphysics, Kant for the first time su!0ected time and the @3 think,@ each taken separately, to a transcendental interpretation, he succeeded in !ringing them together in their pri ordial identity Vwithout, to !e sure, ha1ing seen this identity e.pressly as such. $>DJ& 'he pro!ision of a pure aspect of the present in general is the !ery essence of time as pure intuition$ 'he description of the ego as )abiding and unchanging) means that the ego in forming time originally, i$e$, as primordial time, constitutes the essence of the act of ob.&ectification and the hori2on thereof$ Eothing has !een decided, therefore, concerning the atemporality and eternity of the ego. 3ndeed, the transcendental pro!lematic in general does not e1en raise this question. 3t is only as a finite self, i$e$, as long as it is temporal, that the ego is )abiding and unchanging) in the transcendental sense$ 3f the same predicates are attributed to time, they do not signify only that time is not )in time$) Rather, they also signify that if time as pure self.affection lets the pure succession of the now.sequence arise, that which thus arises, although it is considered in the ordinary e perience of time as subsisting in its own right, is by no means sufficient to determine the true

essence of time$ Consequently, if we are to come to a decision concerning the )temporality) or )atemporality) of time, the primordial essence of time as pure self.affection must be ta#en as our guide. $>DD& 3n the second edition, a %eneral Eote on the System of the )rinciples,HH on ontological knowledge as a whole, was added. 3t !egins with the sentence- @/hat the possi!ility of a thing cannot !e determined from the category alone, and that in order to e.hi!it the o!0ecti1e reality of the pure concept of understanding we must always ha1e an intuition, is a 1ery noteworthy fact.@ Here in a few words is e.pressed the essential necessity of a sensi!ili5ation of the notions, i.e., their presentation in the form of a @pure image.@ 0ut it is not stated that this pure image must be pure intuition qua time$ /he ne.t paragraph !egins with an e.plicit reference to the sentence quoted a!o1e- )0ut it is an e!en more noteworthy fact that in order to understand the possibility of things in conformity with the categories, and so to demonstrate the ob&ecti!e reality of the latter, we need not merely intuitions but intuitions that are in all cases outer intuitions$) ++ Here appears the transcendental function of space, which unmista#ably opens up a D<. , CBBff., EKS, p. C<Cflf. DA. , CD>, EKS, p. ><=. CI= new perspecti!e for Kant$ Space enters into pure schematism$ 3t is true that in the second edition the chapter on schematism has not been modified to ta#e this into account$ 0ut is it not necessary to conclude, ne!ertheless, that the primacy of time has disappeared; 'his conclusion would not only be premature, but to attempt to infer from this passage that it is not time alone which forms transcendence would also be a complete misunderstanding of the whole interpretation as carried out thus far$

,ut if Kant had already distinguished "outer intuitions# from "inner intuition# it was !ecause he percei1ed a pro!lem with the Cartesian conception of "3 think#, of the ego, of the Su!0ect2 it was !ecause he percei1ed the untena!ility of this dichotomy !etween res cogitans and res e.tensa $cf Oowith re Heideggers concept of nature from pJI&. Oet us see through what contortions, what "!eating a!out the !ush# $a play on 'Hol5wegeL& Heidegger gets past this one,ut, one might o!0ect, if transcendence is not !ased on time alone, is it not only natural for Kant, in limiting the primacy of time, to thrust aside the pure imaginationN 3n reasoning thus, howe!er, one forgets that pure space as pure intuition is no less rooted in the transcendental imagination than is )time,) insofar as the latter is understood as that which is formed in pure intuition, namely, the pure succession of the now.sequence$ .n fact# in a certain sense# space is always and necessarily identical with ti e thus understood. Howe!er, it is not in this form but as pure self.affection that

time is the primordial ground of transcendence. +s such, it is also the condition of the possibility of all formati!e acts of representation, for e ample, the ma#ing manifest of space. 3t does not follow, then, that to admit the transcendental function of space is to re&ect the primacy of time$ Rather, this admission obligates one to show how space, li#e time, also belongs to the self as finite and that the latter, precisely because it is based on primordial time, is essentially )spatial$) /he acknowledgment in the second edition that space in a certain sense also !elongs to the transcendental schematism only makes it clear that this schematism cannot !e grasped in its innermost essence as long as time is concei1ed as the pure succession of the now*sequence. /ime must !e understood as pure self*affection2 otherwise its function in the formation of schemata remains completely o!scure.

3n other words, understood as "the pure succession of the now*sequence#, "time# $Heidegger uses in1erted commas& is always and necessarily identical with space !ecause the now*sequence is the intra*temporal notion of time. "Howe1er, it is not in this form !ut as pure self*affection that time is the primordial ground of transcendence# and space is not !ecause "the making manifest of space# depends on "time as pure self/affection# which "is also the condition of the possi!ility of all formati1e acts of representation# including "the making manifest of space#. /ime or self can !e staked against nothingness when taken as "the primordial ground of transcendence#. 3t is only this "Eothing# the possi!ility of the essent or o!*0ect, not their presence that determines time as primordial time, that allows "the self*affection of time#. Similarly, the self !ecomes "self* consciousness# only in this 1ertiginous contrast with nothing*ness. "/he self as finiteQis essentially 'spatialQ precisely !ecause it is !ased on primordial time#. 3t is the "finitude# of self or "!eing*toward*death# that turns finite self into "self*consciousness# !ased on the "possi!le e.perience of its o!0ects or essents#. /ime in its form as self*affection is the primordial ground of transcendence. "4s such#, it is "the condition of the possibility of space, or of the making manifest of space#. ,ut when time is understood "intra* temporally# as "the pure succession of the now*sequence#, then this "time# !ecomes identical with space. Space does ha1e a "transcendental function# in the Schematism. ,ut "as long as time is understood as the succession of the now*sequenceQ the schematism cannot be grasped in its innermost essence#L /he key to "penetrating# Heideggers philosophy is to understand how he conceptuali5es notions such as "!eing# and "time# and "self# !y standing outside them, thus "animating# them with "!eing*outside*oneself# $Oowith, p=;&. /hus, time "temporali5es#, the Eothing "nullifies#, the essence "essentiates# $das 6esen west&, the thing "thingifies#, language "speaks#, the world "glo!alises#, truth "re1eals#, the e1ent "appropriates#. Finally, ,eing "lightens# and "has a !eing#, the "!eing of !eing# which lowers human status where (asein had ele1ated it $Oowith, =;&. 3t is !y "standing outside time*as*now# that Heidegger can ideate the concept of "primordial time#, time as not*essent, not*now, and from its "perception# or "intuition# mo1e to the concept of (a*sein, the "thrown*ness of human !eing not a "su!0ecti1ity#, !ut an "ec*stasis#- precisely, "standing outside oneself#L /hat is why "!eing# is always de*

fined !y its "nothing*ness#, its "finitude# and, in the case of (a*sein, the awareness of "!eing*toward*death#. ,eing is ")osition# $Cacciari, ')E, pA=&. /his "opening up# of (a* sein, this standing on the a!yss, this "temporalisation# must mean that (asein does not recogni5e "history# as ha1ing any "truth# !ecause it is the mere "succession of now* sequence#, of pre*sent moments. 4nd in this "gap# or a!yss (a*sein in its "thrown*ness# must "decide#, !e "resolute# whence, "?nt*sclossenheit#, this "opening# of (asein that in the 'Kehre will !ecome the "a*letheia# of ,eing with its mystical religious "tone#. /here is little left for Heidegger to do than to summarise his critique of Kants 'K9:. /he critique hinges on well*nigh identical points to those made !y Schopenhauer- First, the illicit 'separation of su!0ect and o!0ect, which Heidegger has o1ercome !y making time the hori5on of pure intuition, thus "temporalising# the o!0ect of intuition, turning it from a "thing# to an "essent# that is an "aspect#, not a presence, of "!eing*there#, so that the "!eing# is not "intra*temporal#, not per*manent or su!*stanti1e. Schop does something analogous !y turning the :orstellung into the o!0ectification of the 6ill. Second, the dichotomy !etween intuition and understanding is a!olished through the mediation of transcendental imagination. Schop achie1es this !y 'instrumentalising the :erstand and :ernunft, that is, !y confining them to the sphere of "mechanical# $mechane& perception and causation. /his is why Heidegger prefers the first edition of the 'K9:# to the second.
/he modes of pure synthesisVpure apprehension, pure reproduction, pure recognitionVare not three in num!er !ecause they are relati1e to the three elements of pure knowledge !ut !ecause, originally one, they are time*forming and thus constitute the temporalization of time itself. Only !ecause these modes of pure synthesis are originally one in the three* CI> fold unity of time do they constitute the ground of the possi!ility of the original unification of the three elements of pure knowledge. /his is why the primordially unifying element, the transcendental imagination, apparently only a mediating, intermediate faculty, is nothing other than primordial time. Only !ecause the transcendental imagination is rooted in time can it !e the root of transcendence. )rimordial time makes transcendental imagination, which in itself is essentially spontaneous recepti1ity and recepti1e spontaneity, possi!le. Only in this unity can pure sensi!ility as spontaneous recepti1ity and pure apperception as recepti1e spontaneity !elong together and form the essential unity of pure sensi!le reason. Howe!er, if, as ta#es place in the second edition, the transcendental imagination is eliminated as an autonomous fundamental faculty and its function is ta#en o!er by the understanding as pure spontaneity, then the possibility of co prehending the unity of pure sensibility and pure thought in finite hu an reason is lost$ 3ndeed, it cannot e!en be entertained as an hypothesis$ 'he first edition is more faithful to the innermost character and de!elopment of the problematic which characteri2es the laying of the foundation of metaphysics because, by !irtue of its indissoluble primordial structure, the transcendental imagination opens up the possibility of a laying of the foundation of ontological #nowledge and, hence, of metaphysics$ 'herefore,

relati!e to the problem which is central to the whole wor#, the first edition is essentially to be preferred to the second$ ,ll transformation of the pure imagination into a function of pure thoughtLa transformation accentuated by <erman idealism following the second editionLis the result of a misunderstanding of the true nature of the pure imagination$

Similarly with Schop- if the understanding and representation are di1orced as noesis and aesthesis, then the unity of causation is !roken in that understanding $and pure reason& !ecomes toto genere different from representation. Met, as we argued a!o1e, Heidegger remains tightly imprisoned within that "%erman idealism# he !elittles !y his 1ery "temporalisation# of time and "ec*statisation# or "de*centring# or "positioning# $standing outside itself& of !eing. K> 'H1 01<3??3?< ,?C K> 'H1 M,S' 'H3?< History and ?ature ,efore the !eginning and after the last thing there lies the unknown or not*!eing. /his is the "a!yss# that Heidegger, continuing Eiet5sche, confronts and on this side of "nothing* ness# there is "!eing#. /o focus on "!eings# as o!0ects or essents !egs the question of the "purpose# and "foundation# of this acti1ity. /hat is why metaphysica generalis ends up as specialis and, in "measuring# the cosmos, ends up "1aluing# human !eings. So human !eings !ecome "the o!0ect# of a specialis that arrogates to itself "the truth# as science without questioning the "foundations# of this science, lost in the empeira or autopsia, incapa!le of understanding genesis and eschaton and autourgia. /he "finitude# of human !eings lea1es room to reflect on the agon that aspires for completeness. 6hat this "finality# or "destiny# may !e depends largely on how the role of human "!eing# is understood. 4nd to understand we must start from our perception or intuition or apprehension of "!eing itself# not this or that !eing, !ut ,eing itself. Heidegger sets out !y "de*centring# the question of !eing. 3f human !eing is taken as "su!0ect#, that already pre*empts the question of what might make it a "su!0ect# and it poses all !eing as "o!*0ect#. ,ut this dualism is unwarranted. 4nalysing the concept of "!eing# we find that there is a spatial and a temporal component in that "!eing# cannot "!e# without !eing in time and in space. ,ut Heidegger confines himself to "pure intuition# that is dis*em!odied not 0ust in not*!eing in space, !ut also in a!stracting from material time, the now*sequence, which is seen as "intra*temporal# !ut not comprising the essence of time, primordial time. 3t is this phenomenological foundation, this transcendental origin, that condemn (a sein to "ultra*mundanity# as primordial time on one side and to "intra*mundanity# on the other as !eing*in*the*world, as :or*handen*heit and, in resolution, Su*handenheit. /hus we ha1e a "!eing*outside*itself# and a "time*outside itself#, and the two are identified in the most primordial identity pure intuition. ,ut this "pure intuition# is now a!stracted from the "intra*mundanity# of space and time. ?1en in its "temporalising# aspect, pure intuition can ec*sist as (a*sein, as !eing*there, ec*static !eing una!le to understand its essence e.cept as "!eing*in*the*world# in its "actuality# and as "possi!ility# of its not*!eing, which is "the transcendental imagination# that is "the possi!ility of

e.perience# arising from the finitude of !eing primordial time, time as contingency, as finitude, as limitation, as possi!le nothing*ness and therefore as !eing*toward*death. /his "open*ness# of !eing, the possi!ility of !eing and not*!eing, in1ites its "resolution#, its ?nt*sclossen*heit that Schop and Eiet5sche descri!ed as "6ill#. 4nd the im*materiality of (a*sein, dictated !y its ec*static !eing as primordial time and pure intuition, requires also the a!straction from all essents as "Eature# or "the Other# or "the thing in itself#, all e.*pressions of "o!*0ects#. Here it is (a*sein that is not an o!*0ect !ut is transcendental hori5on, primordial time !ecause it is primordial intuition. Eature is percei1ed only as :or* handenheit, as "the world# into which (asein is "thrown#. Eor can (a*sein !e the "off* spring# of this nature, the physis. (asein "utili5es# the world in its resolution, in its "e1enientiality#, using it as Su*handenheit. ,ut, Oowith asks, does not the 1ery finitude of (asein presage its "physis#, its dependence on "nature#N 4nd if so, how can this nature !e encompassed, let alone !e "com*prehended#, through the pure intuition of primordial timeN /he same enigma arose with the "intuiti1e# nature of Schopenhauerian 6ill. 4nd if nature is missing, so must any notion of history that is not founded on the 1ery Historismus and idealism that Heidegger pretends to confute $from (escartes to :ico and Hegel to (ilthey Oowith, pJ>&. Furthermore, primordial time can ha1e no history, it is only "e*1ent#, e1enientiality acti1ity that cannot !e comprehended through historiography, as culture or history or ci1ili5ation. 3ndeed it cannot e1en !e seen as "communion# or inter*action !ecause (a*sein is not e1en a "su!0ect# that can make sense of its finitude, and !ecause as (asein it must indeed !e in*communica!le to other (a* seienden $a contradiction in terms for Heidegger !ecause (asein is not a Seiend, an essent among many !ut rather the "Oichtung# of other essents&.
+an would not !e a!le to !e, qua self, an essent thrown 7geworfene8 into the world if he could not let the essent as such !e.HGGH Howe1er, in order to let the essent !e what and how it is, the e.istent essent 7man8 must always ha1e already pro0ected that which it encounters as essent. ?.istence implies !eing dependent on the essent as such so that man as essent is gi1en o1er to the essent on which he is thus dependent. 4s a mode of ,eing, e.istence is in itself finitude and, as such, is only possi!le on the !asis of the comprehension of ,eing. /here is and must !e such a ,eing only where finitude has !ecome e.istent. $C;A& 3t is on the !asis of his comprehension of ,eing that man is presence X(a8, with the ,eing of which takes place the re1elatory 7eroffnende8 irruption into the essent. 3t is !y 1irtue of this irruption that the essent as such can !ecome manifest to a self. /ore pri ordial than an is the finitude of the Dasein in hi .01234

Eor can (asein peer into ,eing itself a task Heidegger a!andoned after >DCJ. ,ut the 1ery "facticity# of (asein, its !eing sur*rounded !y :or*handene and Su*handene means also that it is lia!le to forget ,eing and lose itself in the Hol5wege. /hat is how the focus on the essent has led to the decline of authenticity and the triumph of nihilism the desert has spread to the point that metaphysics has accomplished its mission to conceal ,eing.

Met how is this decadence possi!le if all we ha1e is the "isolation# of (asein in pure intuition, in that temporalised time that a!stracts from "the intra*temporal pure now* sequence# and the "intra*mundane world of essents#N $Oowith, pJB& 4nd why then should this decadence !e solely philosophical and not only 6estern, !ut also circum1enting the whole of Christianity $p<C&N Or is it that, as with Hegel, the history of the world, understood philosophically, now coincides with the history of philosophy in the Oichtung of ,eing $p<>&N Finally, is not Heideggers phenomenology gored on the horns of a dilemma, whether natural death e.tinguishes all nature and history with the e.istence of (asein, or else it is the Oichtung of ,eing which needs to !e 'located $e1en the light of the sun has a 'source Oowith pJJ& and when it is drawn out of its mystique turns into yet another idealistic construction like "the entire metaphysics of su!0ecti1ity# that spans from )lato to Hegel $pJB&N
/he ela!oration of the !asic question of metaphysica generalis, i.e., the question ti to on, has !een thrown !ack upon the more fundamental question of the intrinsic essence of the comprehension of ,eing as that which sustains, actuates, and orients the specific question concerning the concept of ,eing. 'his more primordial interpretation of the basic problem of metaphysics has been de!eloped with the intention of bringing to light the connection of the problem of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics with the question of the finitude in man$ 3t now appears that we do not e!en ha!e to as# oursel!es about the relation of the comprehension of 0eing to the finitude in man$ 'his comprehension of 0eing itself is the innermost essence of finitude$ /e ha!e thus acquired a concept of finitude which is fundamental to the problematic of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics. 3f this laying of the foundation depends upon the question of knowing what man is, the indefiniteness of this question is in part o1ercome, since the question as to the nature of man has !ecome more determinate. 3f man is only man on the !asis of the (asein in him, then the question as to what is more primordial than man can, as a C;J matter of principle, not !e an anthropological one. 4ll anthropology, e1en philosophical anthropology, always proceeds on the assumption that man is man. 'he problem of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics is rooted in the question of the Casein in man, i$e$, in the question of his ultimate ground, which is the comprehension of 0eing as essentially e istent finitude$ 'his question relati!e to Casein as#s what the essence of the essent so determined is$ 3nsofar as the 0eing of this essent lies in e istence, the question as to the essence of Casein is an e istential one$ 1!ery question relati!e to the 0eing of an essentLand# in particular# the question relative to the Being of that essent to whose constitution finitude as the co prehension of Being belongsLis metaphysics$ Hence, the laying of the foundation of metaphysics is !ased upon a metaphysics of (asein. ,ut is it at all surprising that a laying of the foundation of metaphysics should itself !e a form of metaphysics, and that in a pre*eminent senseN Kant, who in his philosophi5ing was more alert to the pro!lem

of metaphysics than any other philosopher !efore or since, would not ha1e understood his own intention had he not percei1ed this connection. He e.pressed his opinion concerning it with the clarity and serenity which the completion of the Critique of )ure 9eason !estowed on him. 3n the year >JB>, he wrote to his friend and disciple, +arcus Her5, concerning this work@,n inquiry of this sort will always remain difficult, for it contains the metaphysics of metaphysics$) HH /his remark once and for all puts an end to all attempts to interpret, e1en partially, the Critique of )ure 9eason as theory of knowledge. ,ut these words also constrain e1ery repetition of a laying of the foundation of metaphysics to clarify this @metaphysics of metaphysics@ enough to put itself in a position to open up a possi!le way to the achie1ement of the laying of the foundation.

/he entire initial section of )art 3: of the Kant!uch is dedicated to showing that the question of "how we can know a!out an essent# is really only a question a!out "what is man# which is what Kant poses at the end of metaphysics. ,ut there is a "metaphysics of metaphysics# !ecause the "what# of "what is man# does not relate only to human "faculties#, !ut it refers a!o1e all to the "!eing# of humans and therefore not 0ust to the "possi!ility of knowledge# !ut to the 1ery essence of "!eing#, "!eing as such#, "the !eing of !eings#. Met in addressing the question, we must ensure that the "ec*stasis#, the "!eing* outside*oneself# that is made possi!le linguistically !y certain languages $man, on, si& does not decei1e us. 3t is not that "agency#, a 'su!0ect, is logically necessary the impersonal shows that it is not. ,ut the ec*stasis required to ena!le us "to 1iew e.istence# almost as if a "soul# suddenly le1itated out of our !odies or of our "e.istence# as essent or !eing is one that inelucta!ly will !e tied to our "faculties#, !y definition. 3t is not possi!le for human !eings to 1iew or inter*pret themsel1es or !eing, "stand outside their sel1es or !eing# without using those 1ery "faculties# $thought, reflection, imagination, intuition call it what you like& that form the "spring# of our !eing and our "1iew# of all !eing. ,y insisting on ?k*stasis and "thrown*ness#, Heidegger ends up making this fundamental error. (a*sein is literally in/com/prehensible * it cannot !e "grasped# or "sei5ed# in its totality * !ecause a condition of our awareness is that we utili5e the "faculties# that we ha1e. ,ut it is a regressio ad infinitum for us to pose the question of the "!eing# of these faculties, and then the !eing of the !eing of those faculties and so on indefinitely. Somewhere, something has to gi1e. 4nd Heidegger, like Hegel, makes nothing*ness the "limit# of ,eing. ,y de*limiting the essent through the possi!ility of its not*!eing, its finitude, Heidegger is a!le to show that this "comprehension of ,eing#, this awareness of "finitude#, of death, the eschaton, this "!eing*toward*death# $memento mori&, this a!yss of nothing*ness, is the way in which ,eing dis*closes itself to us !ecause we are a!le to see its o!*1erse, the other side. 4nd that is how "!eing# acquires an "intuitible dimension# through finitude. ,ut this "finitude#, intuited as the a!straction from "intra*temporal time#, the "pure now* sequence#, to "primordial time# is an "untena!le# a!straction !ecause this "finitude# or primordial time, delimited as it is !y nothing*ness, is inconcei1a!le e.cept as a "totality# for the simple reason that "nothing*ness# cannot de1our "!eing#, and if it did, it would !e a "something*ness# in any caseL /he "tension# cannot last !ecause e1ery time we imagine

the "possi!ility of not*!eing# we come up with "some*!eing# any howL /his result is identical to Humes with regard to "the self#- e1ery time we try "to imagine it#, we come up with a "particular image#. 4lthough we can accept with Hume that this throws dou!t on the notion of "su!0ecti1ity# or "identity#, it certainly does not throw dou!t on the notion of "self*consciousness#. 4nd here is where the notion of "immanence# gains strength in the "materiality# of intuition $howe1er "pure#& e1en in its e.treme as "primordial time# necessitating a "primordial space#. Fltimately, we are condemned to "this# space and time, "this# hic et nunc. Schopenhauer does something analogous to Heidegger !y "re1ersing# the locus of the Kantian qualitas occulta from the (ing an sich to the interior hominis $,erkeley& identified not as a Su!0ect or )ure 9eason $the a!ility "to com*prehend# finitude& !ut rather as the a!ility to intuit the "6eltprin5ip#, the Oife*force, the 6ill the dis*integration of "su!0ecti1ity# that will e1ol1e with Eiet5sche and 6ittgenstein to Freud and Heidegger. /his non*dialectical, a*historical and anti*historicist perspecti1e marks the !eginning of "negati1es (enken#. Heidegger also peeks through the hole of pure intuition, turns )ure 9eason into a function of the transcendental imagination, and comes out $like (escartes& with the primordial identity the identity of pure intuition and self*consciousness or "3 think# $cogito& with primordial time. ,ut Heidegger eschews qualitates occultae. 3f !eing is "finite# it is !ecause it has a "finis#, an "end#, !ecause it is "su!0ect to time#. Met this "time# cannot !e 0ust "the pure succession of now*sequence# !ecause this is merely the percepti!le "passing# of time, not its "!eing#, its "essence#. /he "!eing# of time is the finitude of ,eing. /hat is why we ha1e ",eing and /ime# simultaneously, that is to say, the ,eing of !eing is intrinsically $"innermost essence of finitude#, quoted a!o1e& "temporal# and not "intra*temporal#. 6e can percei1e this through our "innermost or primordial faculty#, that of pure intuition and its transcendental root, the imagination. 3ntra*temporally, time has a "spatial# dimension it determines our "image# of finite self and the ego as "presences# $(a&, as permanences, as "a!iding and lasting#, as "weights#. ,ut the primordial notion of time a!stracts from this "intra*mundanity# and reminds us that "!eing*in*the*world# is "!eing*among*essents# and is not the same as (a*sein. ,eing*in*the*world is the "condition# of (a*sein, not its transcendental actuality or essence. /he essence of (asein is to apprehend its own finitude, and there!y "un*co1er# the truth of ,eing, which is the "un* concealment of ,eing# the truth of !eing is the !eing of truth. /hat is why Oowith can say $pJI& that for Heidegger"Ouomo non e natura, ma, come per )ascal, condition humaine. 4nche la nascita e la morte non appaiono come realta di natura, ma riferite alla 'cura dellesisten5a temporale. 3l morire, che !iologicamente e un mero a1er fineQ 'essere*per*la*fineQ#

"Of the !eginning and of the last thing# Eiet5sche again. 4s Oowith shows $pJ>&, "7q8uesta determinazione negati)a della natura e nella tradi5ione del pensiero modernoQ# from (escartes onwards. Oater, Heidegger will gi1e more prominence to the role of nature as a manifestation or emanation of ,eing, starting with the 'physis of %reek thought $pJC& and re1erting thus to the more idealist positions of modernist philosophy $pJB&, whilst all the time failing to e.plicate how or why the process of "forgetfulness#

e.hi!ited !y 'techne !egins with %reece * and therefore has a istorein that seemingly conflicts with physis * and how or why techne. can co*e.ist with physis "quandoQ 1i e tutto la!isso che separa lartificialmente prodotto dal naturalmente formatoN# $pJ;& /his is a question that Cacciari attempts to answer and in the process engages in more contortions and sophistries than Heidegger himself e1er didL $Cf "Confronto con Heidegger#.& $Cf. also 9ichardsons discussion of "physis# 7and use of '6esen8 in 'Hth)to/, from p;ID.& Heideggers 1 istential %henomenology 1thics and 3deology ?1idently, the "!eing*!efore*death#, this stark "finitude# of (asein emanates a "concern# $Sorge, not "Care#L& a!out e.istence 0ust as the "openness# of e.istence its contingency and "possi!ility# make "resolution# $?nt*schlossenheit& a "destiny# of (asein $recall Sartres "man is condemned to !e free#, "to choose#, therefore "to decide#, to !e resolute&.
/he finitude of (aseinVthe comprehension of ,eing * lies in forgetfulness 7:ergessenheit8NH /his forgetfulness is nothing accidental and temporary !ut 7C=>8 is constantly and necessarily renewed. 4ll construction rele1ant to fundamental ontology, construction which stri1es toward the disclosure of the internal possi!ility of the comprehension of ,eing, must in its act of pro0ection wrest from forgetfulness that which it thus apprehends. /he !asic, fundamental*ontological act of the metaphysics of (asein is, therefore, a remem!ering 7 6iedererinnerung8 .

/he "tension# that is needed in maintaining the distinction !etween "intra*mundanity# or "intra*temporality# and the "primordiality# of ,eing and time, the awareness of this pro0ection of (asein in the world of essents, and of the su!sequent "construction# !y the understanding, creates a "feeling# that ranges from "concern# in the "thrown*ness# of (asein a "tackling# of the world as a result of "!eing# in the world * to "4ngst# in the "feeling of finitude# and !eing*toward*death. ,ut on the other side, this "tension# or "concern# is then resol1ed with "forgetfulness# which is a "possi!le mode of !eing# of (asein due to its 1ery "thrown*ness# in the world of essents the :or* and Su*handenheit of the world.
,n analytic of Casein must, from the beginning, stri!e to unco!er the Casein in man according to that ode of Being which, by nature, maintains Casein and its comprehension of 0eing, i$e$, primordial finitude, in forgetfulness$ 'his mode of 0eing of CaseinLdecisi!e only from the point of !iew of a 676 fundamental ontologyLwe call )e!erydayness) 9,lltaglich#eit:$++ /he analytic of e1erydayness must take care not to allow the interpretation of the (asein in man to !ecome confused with an anthropo*psychological description of the @e.periences@ and @faculties@ of man. /his anthropo*psychological knowledge is not declared there!y to !e @false,@ !ut it is necessary to show that, despite its e.actitude, such knowledge is incapa!le of coming to grips with the pro!lem of the e.istence of (asein, i.e., the pro!lem of its finitude.

Heideggers concern $sit 1enia 1er!oL& a!out the confusion that may arise !etween the metaphysics of (asein this "remem!ering# or anamnesis of ,eing and anthropology or psychology is quite 0ustified. ,ecause what Heidegger is doing systematically is to translate aspects of "!eing human#, that is the immanent species*conscious materiality of humans, from historical into "transcendental or ontological# attri!utes. 4lternati1ely, he is "smuggling# human emotions in)ol)ing psychological and sociological experience $Sorge, 4ngst, :ergessenheit, 6ieder*erinnerung, ,efindlichkeit, :or* and Su*handenheit& into what are supposedly "ontological# categories such as "!eing# and "time# and "nothingness# and so forth. 6ith the consequence that Heideggers metaphysics !ecomes a phenomenological anthropo*psychology and indeed a "sociology of knowledge# and finally a "hermeneutics# quite in line with the "historicism# of post*Hegelian idealism.
Cf. the editorial note to "4lltaglichkeit# a!o1eCC. ?1erydayness and the associated concepts, @lapsing@ X:erfallen&, @the one@ Xdas +an&, and @unauthenticity@ $Fneigentlichkeit&, which are the su!0ect of an e.tended analysis in Sein und Seit are, as Heidegger is at pains to point out here and elsewhere, in no way to !e considered as ethical concepts $although that they are often so considered is, in part, HeideggerGs own faultVhe need not ha1e chosen terms which ha1e such o!1ious moral and religious o1ertones&. 9ather, these concepts refer to a mode of e.istence which is characteri5ed !y that @forgetfulness@ of ,eing discussed a!o1e. $R. S. C.& C=;

Here we must e.ercise great caution !ecause the line separating "intra*temporality# $to which :ergessenheit leads& from "primordial time# $the "dimension# attaina!le through the act of "6ieder*erinnerung# made possi!le !y the transcendental imagination& is 1ery thin and perilous indeed. /o understand and o1ercome this danger we must do a little "remem!ering# oursel1es, clim!ing our way !ack in the stream of thought an anadromous anamnesis. 9emem!er that we started with a reflection on the character of human intuition of space and time, and we determined that it is impossi!le to conceptualise time without space, and 1ice 1ersa. /he fact, then, that it is impossi!le to conceptualise "!eing# without a notion of "!eing in space and time# means that our intuition must ec*sist not only in time $ideally or "in here#&, !ut also in space $"out there#, through a sentient "agency# or organ&. 3t is true that "intra*temporal# notions such as "day, month, minute, second and now constitute a "spatial# notion of "time#. ,ut the inelucta!le truth of the matter is that it is simply not possi!le to a!stract from this "spatial, intra*temporal time# to a "primordial time# that lies outside this time. ?1en when we a!stract from intra*temporal time, we still remain "locked in time#L Heidegger is confusing the "specification# of a gi1en time or "length# of time which can e1en !e the im*mediate, instantaneous "now# a "point in time# with a su!* or intra* temporal notion of "time# from which we are a!le to a!stract miraculously !y a feat of "the transcendental imagination# to a "primordial time# that is "toto genere# different from the "specification# of time. Heidegger is falling into the same fallacy as Kant !y "a!stracting# from "the chain of causality#, which is indefinite, to a )ure 9eason that can "com*prehend# it. Schop showed that this "leap# is not possi!le !ecause the "link# !etween e1ents is purely "instrumental and mechanical# and does not allow us to e.trapolate or "transcend#

from it to a "higher# plane of "consciousness# operating according to a rule or "9eason#. $See my notes on ,ayne for Kants emphasis on "rule# as the characteristic of 9eason, !oth )ure and, in the form of the 6ill, )ractical&. Such a feat is not possi!le. ")rimordial time# howe1er purified !y "pure intuition# remains "spatial time# 0ust as space remains "temporal space# !ecause the two notions com* penetrate each other into "space*time#, as ?instein finally reali5ed. Rust as we speak of a "length of time#, we speak of "motion#, which is mo1ement in space, !ut also change in timeL /here is no notion of "empty space#, of a space without a "space# in which mo1ement is possi!le, and therefore change and therefore time not this or that time or e1en any "length# of time, !ut time itselfL /his ?insteinian reali5ation destroys at once !oth (escartess dichotomy !etween res cogitans and res e.tensa as well as Heideggers "ontological synthesis# where!y time is a!stracted from "intra*temporal time# to the "temporalisation# of !eing in "primordial time# identical with pure intuition $!ut why must intuition !e "pure#, and how can it !e so if, as we ha1e shown, intuition cannot !e "concei1ed# without not only an "o!0ect of intuition# 7not 0ust its "possi!ility#8 !ut also without an "organ# of intuitionN&. ,ut this reali5ation or "remem!rance# $which is Heideggers mystical "temporal# term for "reflection#, e.cept that he prefers the contrast with :ergessenheit and the "concealment of ,eing# since the pre*Socratics& leads us to the conclusion that the human mind, howe1er contorted and con1oluted its thought processes, remains part of an immanent reality and is incapa!le of "transcendence# e.cept as self*deception. /his "materiality# of our cognition is what Kant was seeking to esta!lish, !ut his anthropology !ecame too transcendental and therefore "idealistic# 0ust as Feuer!achs "cult of humanity# hypostati5ed !eing human. 3t is only !y "forgetting# $rursus 1er!um 1enitL& this reali5ation that we can "dis*em!ody# !eing human from human !eing and end in the metaphysical desert of (asein. Once he has ethereali5ed human !eing !y a!stracting from its !eing human and ascending anamnesically to the empyrean of ,eing, the insu!stantiality of Oichtung $!oth the Oichtung of (asein and the later one of Sein&, Heidegger is then a!le "to translate# human reality systematically into "ontological# categories that !ear no relation to !eing human in its "material# historical and natural dimension. Heideggers "dimension# of human !eing !ecomes dis*em!odied, im*material "primordial time# a caricature of "historicity#, a reification called "facticity#. /hus, Heidegger is a!le to present anthropology and psychology and all human studies, including philology $the interpretation of te.ts&, as aspects of (asein or indeed of Sein. 3f we must "temporalise# e1erything, let us !egin with Heideggers notion of time as "primordial time#, as pure intuition and as (a*sein. Oest we forget that philosophy itself is part of our material !eing human in space and time, in history, which is also natural history. ,eing "species*conscious# means precisely this our a!ility "to situate# our !eing, not 0ust as a "species# !ut, precisely !ecause we are a "species#, also in the !roader unity of history and nature, of space and time.

/he ultimate failure of Heidegger to separate the question of !eing from "anthropo* psychology# and therefore from anthropology tout court is e1ident in what he writes !elow,efore presenting an interpretation of transcendence as @concern,@ the fundamental*ontological analytic of (asein purposely seeks first to pro1ide an e.plication of @an.iety@ 74ngst8 as a @decisi1e fundamental feeling@ in order to show concretely that the e.istential analytic is constantly guided !y the question from which it arises, namely, the question of the possi!ility of the comprehension of ,eing. ,n iety is declared to be the decisi!e fundamental faculty not in order to proclaim, from the point of !iew of some 5eltanschauung or other, a concrete e istence.ideal but solely with reference to the proble of Being as such$ 4n.iety is that fundamental feeling which places us !efore the Eothing. /he ,eing of the essent is comprehensi!leVand in this lies the innermost finitude of transcendenceVonly if (asein on the !asis of its essence holds itself into Eothing. Holding oneself into ?othing is no arbitrary and casual attempt to )thin#) about this ?othing but an e!ent which underlies all feeling oneself 9Sichbefinden: in the midst of essents already on hand$ /he intrinsic possi!ility of this e1ent must !e clarified in a fundamental*ontological analytic of (asein. C=. ,PPP3:,EKS,p. ;>. C=A ),n iety) thus understood, i$e$, according to fundamental ontology, prohibits us from interpreting )concern) as ha!ing the harmlessness of a categorical structure$ 3t gi!es concern the incisi!eness necessary to a fundamental e istential and thus determines the finitude in Casein not as a gi!en property but as the constant, although generally !eiled, precariousness 91r2ittern: which per!ades all e istence$ 0ut the e plication of concern as the transcendental, fundamental constitution of Casein is only the first stage of fundamental ontology$ >or further progress toward the goal, we must let oursel!es be guided and inspired with e!er increasing rigor by the question of 0eing$

Heideggers failure or fudging can now !e seen in all starkness- On one hand, he insists that "an.iety#, arising from the "feeling 7,efindlichkeit8 of concern# $which is the "tension# of the ec*stasis, of de*centredness, dis*em!odiment and "finitude#& is a!solutely not to !e mistaken for "some Aeltanschauung or other, a concrete e.istence*idealQ but solely with reference to the problem of 5eing as such#. ,ut then, in the same !reath, Heidegger warns us that "=a>nxiety.# thus understood, i.e., according to fundamental ontology, prohibits us from interpreting <concern< as ha)ing the harmlessness of a categorical structureQ 7!ecause i8t gi1es concern the incisi)eness necessary to a fundamental e.istential and thus determines the finitude in (asein not as a gi1en property !ut as the constant, although generally 1eiled, precariousness 7?r5ittern8 which per1ades all e.istence#.

,ut here e.istential "categories# that are to !e understood "solely with reference to the pro!lem of ,eing#, that is to say, metaphysically or ontologically, then are immediately "prohi!itedQ fromQ ha1ing the harmlessness of a categorical structure#, !ecause quite e1idently then they would lack "the incisi)eness necessary to a fundamental e.istential# and "thusQ 7would8 determine the finitude in (aseinQ as a gi)en propertyQ 7and not8 as the constantQ precariousness which per)ades all existence#. 3t is a!solutely e1ident that Heidegger is playing with words "the language makes merry# to in1oke 6ittgenstein again. /he fact remains that the "emoti1e# language adopted !y Heidegger is clearly and unmistaka!ly "deontological#- Heidegger is writing not 0ust anthropology and psychology, !ut also ethics !ecause he is "in1iting# us "to interpret# our ontological status in a dramatically "practical# perspecti1e. !t is time to transmute 2arx.s 6le)enth Thesis% 0Philosophers pretend to interpret the world, but in effect they mean to change it.1
3f one takes the e.pression @concern@Vdespite the specific directi1e that the term has nothing to do with an ontic characteristic of manVin the sense of an ethical and ideological e!aluation of )human life@ rather than as the designation of the structural unity of the inherently finite transcendence of (asein, then e1erything falls into confusion and no comprehension of the pro!lematic which guides the analytic of (asein is possi!le. $C=<&

/hank you, Herr Heidegger ethics and ideology is precisely what this is a!out !ecause all metaphysics is deontology- it "tells# us what to do, how to li1e- to interpret the world is to form a "1iew#, a 1ision of it, and therefore a "pro0ect# for it. 4s in his "hermeneutics#, Heidegger refuses to admit and o!stinately denies the "1itiosum# of his "1iolence# $Oowith, pDI&, his ele1ation of self*ser1ing inconstancy and ar!itrariness into a "historial# interpretation of !eing human in the "4nalytic of (asein# that denies the "communica!ility# of !eing human and, under co1er of "hermeneutics#, affirms to the !itter end the ar!itrariness of freedom of (asein $literally, a kind of Kierkegaardian 'li!erum ar!itrium& only in the finality of death $Oowith, ppD=*< !ut recall also Cassirer a!o1e re language&. /he influence of Kierkegaard in all this is irrefuta!le and irresisti!le $Oowith, pB<, and cf Cacciari, '(eCd)&. /his is not to deny the merits of philosophical speculation. ,ut it is as foolish as it is futile to !elie1e that we can "a!*stract# or "asport# oursel1es from the materiality of life, from its immanence, and "transcend# it so as "to com*prehend# it- * !ecause the "com* prehension# oo5es out of the "trans*scension# $as Kierkegaard admonished Hegel e.istence oo5es out through the meshes of his philosophical net&. Schopenhauer returns to the identification of metaphysics and ethics in the introduction to "/he ,asis#, and in so doing he a!sor!s the latter into the former precisely !y taking that "neutral# standpoint, !y seeking to stand outside morality and therefore outside the "corpor*reality# of !eing, of life. Eiet5sche will flagellate him not for this, !ut for re*smuggling the ethical concepts !ack into the "immoralist# conception of the 6ill $cf '/ot3, part on "untimely thinker#&2 !ecause instead of "accepting Oife#, Schop "the pessimist, the decadent, the nihilist# recants his nihilism for the comfort of "sympathy# $+itleid "with*pain# or "co* suffering#&, an ethics akin to that of Christianity. 6hat Eiet5sche denies is mostly this

"renegade# flight from nihilism, not pursuing it to the end, not so much the notion of "the 6ill#, which returns as "6ill to )ower#, which is the "acceptance# of the "6orld#, the affirmation of "Oife#, not its re0ection and ?ntsagung, "renunciation#. )ro!lematic for Schops notion of "the 6ill# is its "unique*ness#, its lack of "differentiation# $see ",asis#, transl.s intro., p..iii& which cannot e.plain its indi1idual o!0ectifications. /his "metaphysical# pro!lem is what Eiet5sche and Heidegger a1oid in different !ut cognate ways $again, Oowiths essay on "%od is dead#&. 4nd it is what ,ergson will take up with gusto. .nfluence of Bergson and !chopenhauer Heidegger de1otes the final pages of the Kant!uch to the e.istential analytic of time.
/he ne.t and decisi1e stage of the e.istential analytic is the concrete e.plication of concern as temporality. Since the pro!lematic of the laying of the foundation of metaphysics has an intrinsic relation to the finitude in man, it might seem that the de1elopment of @temporality@ ser1es as a concrete determination of the finitude in man as a @temporal@ !eing. For the @temporal@ is commonly held to !e the finite. ,ut the fact that not only man !ut all finite essents are considered to !e @temporal@ in the ordinary sense of the term Va sense which, within its limits, is 0ustified Vis enough to indicate that the interpretation of (asein as temporality cannot mo1e within the field of the ordinary e.perience of time. One should also not !e led to !elie1e that the sense of @temporal@ in question is that which inspires modern philosophy $,ergson, (ilthey, Simmel& in its attempt to o!tain a more searching and a more intuiti1e understanding of the @Oi1eliness@ of life !y determining its temporal character. On the contrary, if the interpretation of (asein as temporality is the goal of fundamental ontology, then it must !e moti1ated C=J e.clusi1ely !y the pro!lem of ,eing as such. 3n this way, is first re1ealed the fundamental*ontological sense of the question of time, i.e., the only sense that it has in Sein und Seit.

3t may !e said that the limits of ,ergsons "e1olution creatrice# are analogous to those of Schops '6ille in the sense that the "su!0ecti1e intuition# of "duree# still re*fers $!rings !ack& to the "intra* temporal# notion of time as "now#, or "the permanence of presence# ,ergson italici5es "endure# often $cf c pC=, '?C, eng.edtn&. ?.cept that this "permanence# is not that of a "su!0ect# !ecause mental processes also are in a state of flu., so that the Ylan 1ital is the "temporal# element where e1erything else is "spatial# $see ch > of '?C&. 3t is similarly with (iltheys and Simmels "historicist# understanding of time. 4nd this "su!0ecti1e intuition or consciousness of time# $duree& does not "com* penetrate# the 6ill or the "elan 1ital# !ecause these are "life forces# that ha1e a "historical# or "temporal# dimension only as "e1olution# and not as "!eing# penetrated and permeated by "time#. 4lthough the intuition of time as duree against its "intellectual# mechanical and geometric "spatial# 1ersion resem!les Heideggers contrast of primordial time with "intra*temporal time#, ,ergson then en1isages the Ylan 1ital as a life force that "acts# within primordial time as an essent, howe1er indefinite and insaisissable * 0ust as Schops 6ille did *, whereas Heidegger deepens the ontological

synthesis to re*define ,eing in this $fro5en& "temporal# dimension of primordial time whose "history# is certainly not such in the con1entional sense !ut in an "e.istential# or "e1eniential# one $the "Fakti5itat# of (asein&, and whose "nature# is only a "negati1e# and a!stract "physis#. 3t is possi!le to argue that ,ergsons philosophy is an "adaptation# $howe1er misguided and unfounded& of (arwins notion of "e1olution# $which itself has much that is "1italistic# a!out it in the sense of "sur1i1al of the fittest# or "adaptation# to what, and what forN& to Schops metaphysics of the 6ill $'?C, pp=I*<D passim, eng.edtn.& in terms of the "indi1iduali5ation# or "speciali5ation# $pCB&, and 'katagenesis or higher entropy in li1ing organisms $p;A&. 3t seems hard to imagine ,ergsons theory without Schops critique of Kant $and Hegel& and Eiet5sches "e1olution# of it as analysed !y Simmel $'SuE&. Met, ama5ingly, ,ergson fails to refer to Schopenhauer in '?CL
ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ 6hat is the significance of the fact that ancient metaphysics defined the ontos onVthe essent which is essent to the highest degreeVas aei onN /he ,eing of the essent o!1iously is understood here as permanence and su!sistence. 6hat pro0ection lies at the !asis of this comprehension of ,eingN 4 pro0ection relati1e to time, for e1en eternity, taken as the nunc stans, for e.ample, is as a @permanent@ now concei1a!le only through time. 6hat is the significance of the fact that the essent in the proper sense of the term is understood as ousia, parousia, C=B i.e., !asically as @presence@ 74nwesen8, the immediate and always present possession, as @ha1ing@ 7Ha!e8l HH /his pro0ection re1eals that @,eing@ is synonymous with permanence in presence.

For metaphysics since 4ristotle, ,eing is what "lasts# $"weight#&, the su!*stance or su!* stratum, the "ens# that "en*dures# in "time# $almost 'ens*durare, lasting !eing&. Heidegger instead stresses that ,eing is not "in# time, as a "dimension#, !ut it "is# this "dimension#, so that this primordial time !ecomes the hori5on of ,eing and ,eing is understood within the hori5on of time.
738t would !e easy to show that it is precisely 4ristotleGs conception of time that is inspired !y a comprehension of ,eing whichVwithout !eing aware of its actionVinterprets ,eing as permanent presence and, consequently, determines the @,eing@ of time from the point of 1iew of the now, i.e., from the character of time which in itself is constantly present and, hence, $in the ancient sense of the term& really is. $C<I&

3f one understands ,eing as "permanence#, then there can !e no "historicity# of ,eing, !ecause ,eing is not "permeated# with time. 4nd it is this "permeation# or near identity, this con*currence or "self*affection of time# that turns the historicity of ,eing into the history of metaphysics.
/he attainment of this o!0ecti1e of fundamental ontology insofar as it is accomplished !y the e.plication of the finitude in man makes an e.istential interpretation of conscience, guilt, and death necessary. /he transcendental e.position of historicity 7%eschichtlichkeit8 C<I

on the !asis of temporality will at the same time pro1ide a pre*conception of the mode of ,eing of that !ecoming 7%eschehen8 which takes place 7geschieht8 in the repetition of the question of ,eing. +etaphysics is not something which is simply @created@ !y man in systems and doctrines2 rather the comprehension of ,eing, its pro0ection and re0ection, takes place in (asein as such. @+etaphysics@ is the fundamental e1ent which comes to pass with the irruption into the essent of the concrete e.istence of man.

Certainly, ,eing is still "the !eing of !eings, of essents# "intra*mundane !eing#, !oth of (asein and of other essents. 4nd time is still also "intra*temporal time# as "permanence or en7s8*durance#. ,ut the com* or inter*penetration of ,eing and /ime, "the pure self* affection of time# is what defines the two !eing*as*time and time*as*!eing. XScience as the :ollendung 7fulfillment8 of metaphysica specialis.[
3f the problematic of the metaphysics of Casein is designated as that of 0eing and 'ime 9Sein und Neit: the e plication which has been gi!en concerning the idea of a fundamental ontology ma#es it clear that it is the con-unction "and" in the above title which expresses the central proble . Eeither ,eing nor time need !e depri1ed of the meanings which they ha1e had until now, !ut a more primordial e.plication of these terms must esta!lish their 0ustification and their limits. QQ.. 0ut at the same time this laying of the foundation must go beyond the ordinary conception of time to the transcendental comprehen. C<> sion of it as pure self.affection$ 'his self.affection is essentially one with pure apperception and in this unity ma#es possible the total structure of pure sensible reason$ II$ 'he Critique of %ure Reason thus threatens the supremacy of reason and the understanding$ )Mogic) is depri!ed of its traditional primacy relati!e to metaphysics$ 3ts basic idea is brought into question$ 3f the essence of transcendence is based on pure imagination, i$e$, originally on time, then the idea of a )transcendental logic) becomes non.sensical especially if, contrary to Kant*s original intention, it is treated as an autonomous and absolute discipline$ Kant must ha1e had an intimation of this collapse of the primacy of logic in metaphysics when, speaking of the fundamental characteristics of ,eing, @possi!ility@ $what*!eing& and @reality@ $which Kant termed @e.istence@&, he said- @So long as the definition of possi!ility, e.istence, and necessity is sought solely in pure understanding, they cannot !e e.plained sa1e through an o!1ious tautology.@ HH 4nd yet, in the second edition of the Critique did not Kant re*esta!lish the supremacy of the understandingN 4nd as a result of this did not metaphysics, with Hegel, come to !e identified with @logic@ more radically than e1er !eforeN

5hat is the significance of the struggle initiated in Ger an idealis against the "thing in itself" except a growing forgetfulness of what (ant had won# na ely# the knowledge that CA. 4 C==, , ;IC, EKS, p. CAC. C<C the intrinsic possibility and necessity of etaphysics# i.e.# its essence# are# at botto # sustained and aintained by the original develop ent and searching study of the proble of finitude?

Oet us recall that these were Schops aims- * to unseat 9eason from its Kantian throne as the su!0ecti1e requisite of "transcendental logic#, !y e.alting Kants distinction of "thing in itself# from "phenomenon# which opens the whole question of the difference !etween the "instrumental# connection of phenomena in the understanding and the "nature of the ground# of e.perience, the !oundary of intuition, the e.perience of "!eing#.