Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No.

L-42808 January 31, 1989 ROSARIO VDA. DE SUANES, petitioner, vs. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Public Highways), respondents. Dante Q. Barbosa for petitioner. Jose A. Oliveros for respondent Provincial Engineer of Batangas. The Solicitor General for public respondent.

FELICIANO, J.: The petitioner asks the Court to review and set aside the decision dated 31 December 1975 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC) R04-WC Case No. 163691, entitled Rosario Vda. de Suanes, claimant versus Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Highways), respondent. Artemio A. Suanes was a government employee for most of his life. From 1933 to 1945, he served as market collector of the Municipal Government of the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas. He served as a Municipal Councilor in Rosario, Batangas from 1956 to 1959. From 2 January 1964 until 30 June 1970, Artemio was a construction capataz of the Bureau of Public Highways (BPH), Batangas Provincial Office. His Service Record 1further shows that thereafter, from 1 July 1970 up to the time of his death on 21 June 1973. Artemio Suanes was a construction capataz in the Office of the Provincial Engineer, Batangas Province. The certificate of death issued by Dr. Salvacion Altamira of the Magsino General Hospital in Lipa City, Batangas, attributed Artemio's demise to 'Cardio-respiratory Arrest due to Cerebrovascular Accident'. 2 On 5 March 1975, petitioner, as surviving spouse of Artemio Suanes, filed with Regional Office No. IV of the Workmen's Compensation Unit (WCU), Department of Labor, a claim for compensation under the applicable provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended). In this claim, the decedent's illness was described as "Internal Hemorrhage due to Hypertension. 3 Petitioner's claim was referred by the WCU to the BPH which, however, controverted the claim of petitioner. In a letter dated 26 June 1975, BPH asserted that there was "[l]ack of causative relation of the illness alleged in [petitioner's] claim with the nature of the decedent's employment" and that petitioner had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 24, Act No. 3428, as amended, regarding the giving of notice and subsequent filing of claim. BPH, further, asked the WCU Regional Officeto dismiss petitioner's claim upon the ground that claim had been filed against the wrong party, Artemio's employer at the time of his death being the Provincial Engineer's Office of the Provincial Government of Batangas, rather than the BPH.

In an Order dated 29 August 1975, the Referee of the WCU dismissed petitioner's claim "for lack of interest, claimant having failed to appear for the scheduled hearing despite notice. 4 Petitioner moved, 5 on 24 September 1975, to set aside the order of dismissal, denying that she had lost interest in the prosecution of her claim and asserting that she had left her old address at No. 73-J Panay Ave., Quezon City having moved to a new address at 2829 Felix Huertas St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, and that she had left her new forwarding address at her old residence but that apparently no one had received the WCU notice of hearing or that no one at the old address had informed the process server of the claimant's new address. The respondent Commission denied petitioner's Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal upon the ground that that Motion had not been accompanied by an affidavit of merits setting forth the facts constituting fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence as required under the Rules of the Commission. 6 Hence, the present Petition, which was filed on 15 March 1976. Petitioner claims that respondent Commission erred in denying her Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal, since there was no law which required an affidavit of merits to be attached to her Motion, and that she had a valid claim for death benefits considering that at the time of her husband's death, he was a permanent employee of the BPH and considering further that the compensable nature of his death had not been effectively controverted by the BPH. The BPH upon the other hand, took the position that an affidavit of merits was an indispensable requirement for setting aside the order of dismissal and that, in any case, there was no employer-employee relationship between Artemio Suanes and the BPH at the time of the former's death since he was then employed by the office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province. Nine years later, on 29 February 1985, this Court issued a Resolution which, after reciting very briefly the facts described above, went on to state that: A perusal of the copies of the Statement of Service Record in the government of the late Artemio A. Suanes and of the Information for Membership Insurance in the Government Service Insurance System shows that said Artemio A. Suanes was employed as construction capataz of the Provincial Engineer's Office of Batangas and not an employee of respondent Bureau of Public Highways, particularly the Office of the Highways District Engineer in Batangas. ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to consider the Provincial Engineer of Batangas as IMPLEADED party respondent, to direct the Clerk of Court to FURNISH him with a copy of the Petition for Review and to REQUIRE him to file a comment thereon within ten (10) days from receipt. ... (Emphasis supplied) We consider first the procedural issue of whether or not petitioner's Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal issued by the WCC Referee was properly denied simply upon the ground that it had not been accompanied by an affidavit of merits. We believe that this issue has to be resolved in favor of the petitioner. Section 3 of Rule 22 of the Rules of the respondent Commission provides as follows: Sec. 3. Time for Filing Petition; Contents and Verification. The petition under Section I hereof must be verified, filed within thirty (30) days after the petitioner learns-of the decision, award, or order or other proceedings sought to be set aside and not more than three (3) months after such decision or award was entered or such proceedings were taken, and must be accompanied with (sic)

affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake' or excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied) There is no dispute that petitioner did not attach an affidavit of merits to her Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal. It scarcely needs to be pointed out, however, that the basic purpose of such a requirement was to enable the Commission to evaluate the merits of the Motion or Petition to set aside the dismissal order. Petitioner did clearly allege in her Motion the grounds she relied upon for setting aside the order dismissing her claim for failure to attend the scheduled hearing: (a) she had failed to attend the scheduled hearing because the notice of said hearing was sent to her old address and not to her new forwarding address and hence was not received by her; and (b) her husband was a permanent employee of the BPH whose death was compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. To our mind, the allegations in petitioner's Motion constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 3 of Rule 22 of the Commission's Rules. That petitioner's Motion was not a sworn motion is not a fatal defect in the circumstances of this case. There is no suggestion in the record that petitioner had not in fact changed her address or that she had not left her forwarding address at her old residence. If the Commission felt that an affidavit of merit was absolutely indispensable to enable it to resolve petitioner's Motion, then the Commission should have required petitioner to supplement her Motion with an affidavit of merit or to simply verify her Motion, instead of dismissing that Motion out of hand. We believe that there is here an appropriate occasion for invoking the principle that rules should not be so interpreted as to "sacrifice substantial rights in the sophisticated altar of technicalities with [consequent] impairment of [the] sacred principle of justice, 7 a principle which is embodied in the Rules of the Commission itself. Section 1 of Rule 10 of the Commission provides as follows: Rule 10. General Rule to Govern Proceedings Section 1. The hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy in workmen's compensation cases shall be without regard to technicalities, legal forms and technical rules on evidence. Substantial evidence shall be sufficient to support a decision, order or award. The next issue to be resolved relates to the legal consequences if any, of the fact that petitioner's claim had been originally filed against "the Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Highways)' and not against the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province, the employer of Artemio Suanes at the time of his death. Once more, we believe that this issue should be resolved in favor of petitioner, in line with the principle which enjoins a liberal rather than a technical view of pleading and procedure in Workmen's Compensation cases. It is true that the petitioner's original claim (on a mimeographed form of the Workmen's Compensation Commission) named the BPH as the decedent's employer. However, in her Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal, petitioner designated the Republic of the Philippines. as the respondent, while parenthetically referring to the Bureau of Public Highways, as part of the caption which the Commission itself had adopted in R04-WC Case No. 163691. It is appropriate to recall that the "Republic of the Philippines" or "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" is a comprehensive term which has been defined in Section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, in the following manner: xxx xxx xxx

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines' is a term which refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the function of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the central Government or the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the BPH, which is an instrumentality of the Central or National Government and the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas, and office under the supervision of the Chief Executive Officer (the Governor) of the Province of Batangas, are both governmental offices and both are embraced in the term Republic of the Philippines,' for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The funds of the BPH and the fund of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas, are equally government funds. It must be recalled that the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act are extended not only to employees in the private sector but also to all officials and employees of both the national government and of provincial, municipal and other local governments. Section 3 of Act No. 3812, as amended, provides: Section 3. Applicable to Government. This Act shall also be applicable to all officials, employees and laborers in the service of the National Government and its political subdivisions and instrumentalities: Provided, however, that officials, laborers and employees insured with the Government Service Insurance System, and their dependents when entitled to the benefits of the said insurance system shall, in addition to the same, be entitled to the benefits granted by this Act.' (Italics supplied) The BPH was quite aware of the fact that Artemio Suanes, previously an employee of the BPH, was, just before his death, an employee of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province. The BPH conveyed this fact to the respondent Commission, when it (BPH) notified the Commission through the Office of the Solicitor General of the filing of the claim against the BPH. In a "third indorsement, August 6, 1975' to the WCU, the BPH said: Respectfully returned thru the Honorable Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Manila, to the Chief, Workmen's Compensation Section, Department of Labor, Regional Office No. IV, Manila, the within papers relative to the claim for compensation in R04-WC Cass No. 16391, filed by Mrs. ROSARIO VDA. DE SUANES, widow of ARTEMIO SUANES, alleged to be a former ConstructionCapataz under the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Batangas City, inviting attention to the 2nd indorsement dated July 25, 1975 of the District Engineer of Batangas City informing that the decedent was an employee of the Batangas Provincial Engineer's Office at the time of his death. It is informed that officials and employees of the Provincial Engineer's Office are not under the administrative jurisdiction of this Department but under the Executive Head of the Province to which they are assigned. In view thereof, it is requested that steps be taken to dismiss the case against the Republic of the Philippines (BPH) for lack of employee-employer relationship.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied) Since both the BPH and the WCU are presumed to know the law-in this case, the Workmen's Compensation statute including Section 3 thereof-one or the other office or the Office of the Solicitor General, should have notified the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province of the filing of the claim by petitioner and referred such claim to that office. Instead, the BPH simply asked for the dismissal of the case against the BPH 'for lack of employeeemployer relationship" and, worse, neglected to inform petitioner of the asserted lack of an employer-employee relationship between the decedent and the BPH and where the claim should have been filed. In fact, petitioner's claim was denied by the Referee, as already noted, not on the ground of lack of an employer-employee relationship between the BPH and Artemio Suanes but rather because of petitioner's failure to attend a scheduled hearing and her failure to attach to her Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal an affidavit of merits. Both the respondent Commission and the WCU Referee failed to inform petitioner of her error in designating the specific employer of her deceased husband, and in effect waited for this Court to issue its Resolution of 29 February 1985 considering the Provincial Engineer of Batangas as having been impleaded as a party respondent. In view of the foregoing circumstances and considering particularly that no prejudice was sustained by the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province by the misdirecting of petitioner's claim, we hold that the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province may be held liable on petitioner's claim. The respondent Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province, in his Comment dated 8 April 1985, asserts that petitioner's claim against his office has already prescribed. The ordinary rule is that the statutory right to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act prescribes in ten (10) years 8 counted from the time of accrual of the claim, in this case from the time of the death of Artemio Suanes. Artemio Suanes died, as noted earlier, on 21 June 1973; the court impleaded the Office of the Provincial Engineer of Batangas Province on 29 February 1985, i.e., about twelve (12) years later. We do not, however, believe that petitioner's claim may be so cavalierly defeated, given the circumstances of this case. In the first place, petitioner's original claim was filed, again as already noted, on 5, March 1975. While this original claim designated the wrong employer, we believe that, given the insistent demands of substantial justice in this case, such original claim should be regarded, as we hereby so regard it, as having effectively tolled the running of the prescriptive period. We note that the petitioner lost no time in filing her Petition for Review with this Court on 15 March 1976 when her claim was denied by the respondent Commission on 13 December 1975. This Court was able formally to rectify the erroneous designation of the respondent BPH only after almost nine (9) years from filing of the Petition for Review. Under the principle ofnunc pro tunc, we do not believe that this failure to act earlier on the part on the Court itself may be allowed to prejudice the petitioner. The defense of prescription must, therefore, be rejected. Turning, finally, to the merits of petitioner's claim, there is no dispute about the fact that Artemio's ailment supervened in the course of his employment either with the BPH or the Office of the Batangas Provincial Engineer. It is well settled that, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 9 petitioner is accordingly relieved of the burden of proving causation between the illness and the employment in view of the legal presumption that said illness arose out of the decedent's employment. 10 The burden of proving non-compensability of the cause of death is shifted to the employer. Respondent Batangas Provincial Engineer had failed to discharge this burden. Indeed, none of the respondents even attempted to present any evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability; all of them chose to rely upon the formal defenses discussed above. But those defenses do not constitute evidence to overthrow the

statutory presumption. In legal effect, no evidence was introduced by the respondents to offset that legal presumption. The Court, therefore, is left with no alternative but to rule in favor of petitioner's claim. 11 WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 31 December 1975 of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission is hereby REVERSED. The Petitioner is hereby AWARDED the Pl,500.00 claimed as reimbursement for the doctors, medical and hospital bills incurred in connection with the decedent's last illness, in addition to any other applicable death benefits under Act No. 3428, as amended. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

SUANES VS WCC Facts: The employee died on June 21, 1973. The claim for compensation was filed on March 5, 1975. The claim, however, designated the wrong employer, who was impleaded about 12 years later. Ruling: The claim may not be so cavalierly defeated. Ordinarily, the statutory right to compensation under the workmens compensation act prescribes in 10 years counted from the nature of accrual of the claim from the time of the death of the employee. But where the original claim designated the wrong employer, given the insistent demands substantial justice, such original claim should be regarded as having effectively tolled the running of the prescriptive period. The defense of prescription must therefore be rejected. In line with ruling, the ECC has laid down the rule that Notice in any form by the employer to the system of any compensable contingency within 3 years from accrual of the cause of action suspends the running of the prescriptive period.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-46443 June 28, 1988 NONATO ROSALES, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and The DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PADILLA, J.: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, dated 17 April 1977, affirming in toto the ruling of the Employees' Compensation Department of the Government Service Insurance System, dated 23 August 1976, which denied petitioner's claim for benefits. Petitioner, at the time of his retirement on 31 July 1976, was an employee of the Development Bank of the Philippines, Ilagan, Isabela, specifically, a Collateral and File Clerk. Prior to holding said position, he held the positions of clerk-typist, clerk-stenographer and collection clerk, respectively, in the same bank. On 6 to 10 April 1976, petitioner was confined in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital where his ailment was diagnosed as Rheumatoid Arthritis. Following his disability, petitioner filed on 12 August 1976 with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for employees' compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626. His application was denied on 23 August 1976. 1 Petitioner twice moved to reconsider the denial of his claim with the GSIS, but the latter denied both motions for reconsideration. On appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), the order of denial was affirmed in toto. 2 Hence, the instant petition. In his three-page petition, petitioner raises as errors allegedly committed by the ECC, the following: A. That respondent Commission have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared that petitioners ailment, DIAGNOSED as 'Rheumatoid Arthritis is not an occupational disease; B. Likewise, respondent Commission has acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared that petitioner miserably failed to offer proofs substantial enough to show that such disease arose or has aggravated in the course of his employment due to working conditions; C. Finally, respondent Commission has acted in excess of its jurisdiction in denying altogether petitioner's compensation benefits. and contends that the decision of the GSIS, thru its Employees' Compensation Department, and that of the ECC are "not in accord with the applicable decisions of this Tribunal and in violative to (violation of) the spirit of Social Legislations which are designed for the benefit of retiring employees of the government." 3

The petition is without merit. Petitioner filed his claim under PD No. 626 which took effect on 1 January 1975. Under said law, for an illness to be compensable, it must be done definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by working conditions. 4 The ECC denied the claim of petitioner for compensation on the ground that the ailment, Rheumatoid Arthritis, was not an occupational disease, and that, as required by law, petitioner failed to show proof that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working conditions. We quote from the assailed decision: Perusal of the evidence on record in the instant claim will disclose the miserable failure of the appellant to discharge the burden required of him by the new law on employees' compensation. Much as we may postulate the Identity of liberality, we cannot go so far as to cast favorable reflection on what is otherwise a claim clearly lacking of support in evidence, which is mandatory requisite under PD No. 626, as amended, for finding the ailment in question as an occupational disease, or that, its contraction was the result of the appellants' working conditions, it follows then that the appealed decision is in accordance with the law and cannot be disturbed. 5 In denying, petitioner's claim, the ECC properly applied PD No. 626. In workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date on which the claimant contracted his illness. 6 Thus, where an ailment supervened before the new Labor Code took effect, the governing law is the old Workmen's Compensation Act. On the other hand, were an ailment occured after 1 January 1975, the new law on Employees' Compensation applies. 7 Applying the foregoing rules to the present case, we find nothing in the allegations as to when petitioner contracted the disease. For failure to do so, and having filed his claim under PD No. 626, the presumption is that he contracted the disease after the effectivity of PD No. 626 on 1 January 1975. The ECC, therefore, in rendering the assailed decision and resolution, denying petitioner's claim, could not be faulted in applying the governing law, which is PD No. 626. Moreover, the doctrine enunciated by this Court in Caparas vs. WCC, et al., 8 cited by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration of the ruling of the Employees' Compensation Department of the GSIS, is not applicable in the present case. In that case, the Court granted compensation, on the basis of the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it appearing that claimant contracted the disease prior to the effectivity of PD No. 626. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. With costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera and Sarmiento, JJ., concur. Paras, J., concur in the result.

ROSALES VS ECC Facts: Petitioner, at the time of his retirement on 31 July 1976, was an employee of the Development Bank of the Philippines, Ilagan, Isabela, specifically, a Collateral and File Clerk. Prior to holding said position, he held the positions of clerk-typist, clerk-stenographer and collection clerk, respectively, in the same bank. On 6 to 10 April 1976, petitioner was confined in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital where his ailment was diagnosed as Rheumatoid Arthritis. Following his disability, petitioner filed on 12 August 1976 with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for employees' compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626. His application was denied on 23 August 1976. 1 Petitioner twice moved to reconsider the denial of his claim with the GSIS, but the latter denied both motions for reconsideration. On appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), the order of denial was affirmed in toto. and contends that the decision of the GSIS, thru its Employees' Compensation Department, and that of the ECC are "not in accord with the applicable decisions of this Tribunal and in violative to (violation of) the spirit of Social Legislations which are designed for the benefit of retiring employees of the government." 3

Ruling: The petition is without merit. Petitioner filed his claim under PD No. 626 which took effect on 1 January 1975. Under said law, for an illness to be compensable, it must be done definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by working conditions. 4 The ECC denied the claim of petitioner for compensation on the ground that the ailment, Rheumatoid Arthritis, was not an occupational disease, and that, as required by law, petitioner failed to show proof that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working conditions. We quote from the assailed decision: Perusal of the evidence on record in the instant claim will disclose the miserable failure of the appellant to discharge the burden required of him by the new law on employees' compensation. Much as we may postulate the Identity of liberality, we cannot go so far as to cast favorable reflection on what is otherwise a claim clearly lacking of support in evidence, which is mandatory requisite under PD No. 626, as amended, for finding the ailment in question as an occupational disease, or that, its contraction was the result of the appellants' working conditions, it follows then that the appealed decision is in accordance with the law and cannot be disturbed. 5 In denying, petitioner's claim, the ECC properly applied PD No. 626. In workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date on which the claimant contracted his illness. 6 Thus, where an ailment supervened before the new Labor Code took effect, the governing law is the old Workmen's Compensation Act. On the other hand, were an ailment occured

after 1 January 1975, the new law on Employees' Compensation applies. 7 Applying the foregoing rules to the present case, we find nothing in the allegations as to when petitioner contracted the disease. For failure to do so, and having filed his claim under PD No. 626, the presumption is that he contracted the disease after the effectivity of PD No. 626 on 1 January 1975. The ECC, therefore, in rendering the assailed decision and resolution, denying petitioner's claim, could not be faulted in applying the governing law, which is PD No. 626. Moreover, the doctrine enunciated by this Court in Caparas vs. WCC, et al., 8 cited by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration of the ruling of the Employees' Compensation Department of the GSIS, is not applicable in the present case. In that case, the Court granted compensation, on the basis of the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it appearing that claimant contracted the disease prior to the effectivity of PD No. 626. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. With costs against petitioner. In this case, the Court considered the claimant to have contracted his ailment after January 1, 1975 and applied the new law on Employees' Compensation in view of the absence of any allegations on when the claimant got sick.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-46556 May 28, 1988 NAPOLEON O. CARIN, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents. Napoleon O. Carin for petitioner. The Chief Legal Officer (ECC) and The Government Corporate Counsel for respondents.

PADILLA, J.: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, dated 15 June 1977, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System which denied petitioner's claim for compensation. Petitioner Napoleon O. Carin was a Special Counsel in the Fiscal's office of Cebu City. Sometime in October 1975, he felt a severe pain in his left leg while getting the expedientes of cases scheduled for trial on that day. Petitioners illness was subsequently diagnosed as ostemoyelitis. As recommended by his physician, petitioner underwent surgery at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. He was confined therein from 1 to 5 December 1975. On 12 May 1976, petitioner filed a claim for income benefits for his disability under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance System. His claim was denied by the System on the ground that the cause of his disability was neither an occupational disease nor caused by hs employment and that the risk of contracting the same was not increased by his working conditions. Reconsideration of the claim's denial was likewise denied. Petitioner appealed to the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission which, on 15 June 1977, issued the assailed decision. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that his illness, chronic ostemoyelitis, although not an occupational disease as enumerated in Presidential Decree No. 626, is nonetheless compensable, anchored on the theoretical concept of "increased risk" as defined under Rule III, Section (b) of the implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 626. According to petitioner, he had presented sufficient evidence to show that his sickness arose out of, and was caused by his employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working conditions. The evidence consisted of a report on his sickness, ostemoyelitis, which he submitted on 12 May 1976 to the GSIS, together with the attending physician's report showing that he was working at the time of the illness and the affidavit of Assistant City Fiscal Felix Barral attesting to the fact that he (petitioner) suffered the attack or pain in his left leg at the City Fiscal's office of Cebu City while taking the expedientes for the day's scheduled trial.

We sustain the finding of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission that petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that his illness was caused by his employment or that the risk of contracting it was increased by his working conditions. 1 Under the new law on employees' compensation, or Presidential Decree No. 626, in case the sickness or illness is not an occupational disease, as in the present case, to be compensable, proof must be adduced that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. 2 The evidence presented by petitioner does not, in any way, show a reasonable connection between his ailment and the nature of his employment nor a direct causal relation between his employment and the illness he suffered. Although the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in compensation claims, 3 still, petitioner failed to show with substantial evidence that his illness was reasonably workconnected, to be entitled to compensation. 4 Further, petitioner's contention that the rule of compensability under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, is a revival of the old law on workmen's compensation or Act 3428, particularly Section 44 thereof, which recognized the presumption of compensability, is not meritorious. The principle of presumption of compensability no longer obtains under the new law on Employees' Compensation.5 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, under review, is AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

CARIN VS WCC

Facts: Petitioner Napoleon O. Carin was a Special Counsel in the Fiscal's office of Cebu City. Sometime in October 1975, he felt a severe pain in his left leg while getting the expedientes of cases scheduled for trial on that day. Petitioners illness was subsequently diagnosed as ostemoyelitis. As recommended by his physician, petitioner underwent surgery at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. He was confined therein from 1 to 5 December 1975. On 12 May 1976, petitioner filed a claim for income benefits for his disability under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance System. His claim was denied by the System on the ground that the cause of his disability was neither an occupational disease nor caused by hs employment and that the risk of contracting the same was not increased by his working conditions. Reconsideration of the claim's denial was likewise denied. Petitioner contends that his illness, chronic ostemoyelitis, although not an occupational disease as enumerated in Presidential Decree No. 626, is nonetheless compensable, anchored on the theoretical concept of "increased risk" as defined under Rule III, Section (b) of the implementing rules of Presidential Decree No. 626. According to petitioner, he had presented sufficient evidence to show that his sickness arose out of, and was caused by his employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working conditions. The evidence consisted of a report on his sickness, ostemoyelitis, which he submitted on 12 May 1976 to the GSIS, together with the attending physician's report showing that he was working at the time of the illness and the affidavit of Assistant City Fiscal Felix Barral attesting to the fact that he (petitioner) suffered the attack or pain in his left leg at the City Fiscal's office of Cebu City while taking the expedientes for the day's scheduled trial.

Ruiling: Claimants contention is meritorious. Petitioner failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that his illness was caused by his employment or that the risk of contracting it was increased by his working conditions. 1 Under the new law on employees' compensation, or Presidential Decree No. 626, in case the sickness or illness is not an occupational disease, as in the present case, to be compensable, proof must be adduced that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. 2 The evidence presented by petitioner does not, in any way, show a reasonable connection between his ailment and the nature of his employment nor a direct causal relation between his employment and the illness he suffered. Although the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in compensation claims, 3 still, petitioner failed to show with substantial evidence that his illness was reasonably work-connected, to be entitled to compensation. 4 Further, petitioner's contention that the rule of compensability under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, is a revival of the old law on workmen's compensation or Act 3428, particularly Section 44 thereof, which recognized the presumption of compensability, is not meritorious.

The principle of presumption of compensability no longer obtains under the new law on Employees' Compensation.5 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, under review, is AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-47414 May 23, 1988 ELIODORO T. ISCALA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of Education & Culture, Bureau of Public Schools), GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SERVICE SYSTEM, and the EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. Victorio L. Rodriguez for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.: A Motion for Partial Reconsideration of our decision promulgated on December 11, 1987, was filed by the respondent Government Service Insurance System; by way of comment, the correspondent Republic of the Philippines (Department of Education, Culture and Sports) categorically interposed no objection to the motion. We find the foregoing motion to be grounded on the doctrine that when GSIS is made to pay for compensation benefits under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it has a right of reimbursement from the employer, which doctrine was laid down by this Court in Corales vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (No. L-44063, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 501) and reiterated in a number of subsequent cases including the very recent case of Reyes vs. ECC (No. L-43828, March 19, 1988). WHEREFORE, it is hereby resolved to GRANT the Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Accordingly, our decision in this case is MODIFIED in that payment of compensation by the GSIS to the petitioner shall be without prejudice to its right of reimbursement from the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, the employer of the deceased Nena S. Iscala. As modified, the decision will, therefore, read as follows, the modification being in bold: xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated October 12, 1977 denying petitioner's claim for compensation for the death of Nena Iscala is hereby SET ASIDE and the GSIS is hereby ordered to AWARD to the petitioner such compensation as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act without prejudice to its right of reimbursement from the DECS. NO COSTS. xxx xxx xxx SO ORDERED.

ISCALA VS REPUBLIC Facts: A Motion for Partial Reconsideration of our decision promulgated on December 11, 1987, was filed by the respondent Government Service Insurance System; by way of comment, the correspondent Republic of the Philippines (Department of Education, Culture and Sports) categorically interposed no objection to the motion. the foregoing motion to be grounded on the doctrine that when GSIS is made to pay for compensation benefits under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it has a right of reimbursement from the employer, which doctrine was laid down by this Court in Corales vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (No. L-44063, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 501) and reiterated in a number of subsequent cases including the very recent case of Reyes vs. ECC (No. L-43828, March 19, 1988).

Ruling: WHEREFORE, it is hereby resolved to GRANT the Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Accordingly, the decision in this case is MODIFIED in that payment of compensation by the GSIS to the petitioner shall be without prejudice to its right of reimbursement from the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, the employer of the deceased Nena S. Iscala. As modified, the decision will, therefore, read as follows, the modification being in bold:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated October 12, 1977 denying petitioner's claim for compensation for the death of Nena Iscala is hereby SET ASIDE and the GSIS is hereby ordered to AWARD to the petitioner such compensation as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act without prejudice to its right of reimbursement from the DECS. NO COSTS.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. L-65680 May 11, 1989 JOSE B. SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (National Power Corporation), respondents. Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioner. The Solicitor General and The Government Corporate Counsel for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 2134 on August 25, 1983 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits as surviving spouse of the late Flordeliza Sarmiento. The findings of the respondent Commission are as follows: The record shows that the late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. History of the deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as early as April 1980 as a small wound over the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy of the mass revealed cancer known as "differentiated squamous cell carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in various hospitals, namely, Veterans Memorial Hospital, United Doctors Medical Hospital and Makati Medical Center. In March 1981, a soft tissue mass emerged on her left upper cheek as a result of which her lips became deformed and she was unable to close her left eye. She continued treatment and her last treatment at the Capitol Medical Center on July 12, 1 981 was due to her difficulty of swallowing food and her general debility. On August 12, 1981, she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma. She was 40 years old. Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by her during employment was service-connected, appellant herein filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. On September 9, 1982, the GSIS, through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out that parotid carcinoma is "Malignant tumor of the parotid gland (salivary gland)" and that its development was not caused by employment and employment conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondent System's decision of denial, claimant wrote a letter dated October 8, 1982 to the GSIS requesting that the records of the claim be elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review pursuant to the law and the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. (At pp. 17-18, Rollo)

On August 25, 1983, the respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS' decision. It found that the deceased's death causation by parotid carcinoma is not compensable because she did not contract nor suffer from the same by reason of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial growth. It may be noted that the petitioner was earlier paid GSIS benefits in the amount of P142,285.03 but the claim for employee's compensation was disallowed. Hence, the instant petition. The petitioner, while principally stressing the compensability of the deceased's ailment, attacks the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the law on employees' compensation which superseded the Labor Code and the of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He alleges that provisions the said law infringes upon the guarantees of promotion of social justice, substantive due process, and equal protection of laws, and also permits unjust discrimination and amounts to class legislation in its enforcement. He prays for the application of the Old Workmen's Compensation Act which provided for a presumption of compensability whenever an ailment supervened during the course of the employment. We dismiss the petition. We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attach against the constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari. The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights. It is now settled jurisprudence (see Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92) that the new law discarded the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" to restore what the law believes is a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employees' rights to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. In the case of De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation, (supra), this Court explained the new scheme of employees' compensation as follows: The new law establishes a state insurance fired built up by the contributions of employers based on the saries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled. On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a find under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. (At pp. 99-100) The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. These is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds. The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. Under the present law, a compensable illness means any illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276). Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an occupational disease considering the deceased's employment as accounting clerk and later as manager of the budget division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was caused by her employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness. The petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased visited regional and field operations and was, naturally, exposed to the elements. According to the petitioner, the deceased's field trips necessitated her to take frequent plane travels which caused deafening and numb sensations in her ears. This, he says, caused her "differentiated carcinoma" which, according to the certificate of Dr. Ariston Bautista, "apparently started on external auditory canal." We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of parotid carcinoma is still not known. A medical authority, however, declares that: SALIVARY GLANDS Painless swelling of the parotid glands is often noted in hepatic cirrhosis in sarcoidis, in mumps, following abdominal surgery, or associated with neoplasm or infections. The common factors may be dehydration and inattention to oral hygiene. The latter promotes the growth of large numbers of bacteria which, in the absence of sufficient salivary flow, ascend from the mouth into the duct of a gland. Another cause of a painful salivary gland is sialolithiasis (salivary duct

stone). The submandibular glands are most commonly affected. Pain and swelling associated with eating are characteristic. Saliva promotes retention of artificial dentures because of its mucin content. Thus, conditions characterized by diminished saliva flow often adversely affect the ease with which dentures may be worn. Calcium phosphate stone tend to form because of a high pH and viscosity of the submandibular gland saliva which has a high mucin content. Stones are removed by manipulation or excision. Autoimmune sialosis is the MikulicsSjogren Syndrome, a unilateral or bilateral enlargement of the parotid and/or submandibular gland, and often the lacrimal glands. Occasionally painful, it is associated with xerostomia (dry mouth) due to impaired saliva formation that is most common in older women. Beriow et al., The Merek Manuel, 14th Edition, pp. 2095-2096). Another author states the following regarding squamous cell carcinoma: Moreover, when the salivary gland is almost totally destroyed and replaced by epidermoid cancer it may be difficult or even impossible to ascribe the origin of the growth to salivary gland tissue. Indeed many squamous cell carcinomas, especially of the parotid, may be metastatic lesions that develop in lymph nodes included within the parotid. And it is important to stress that the juxtaparotid and intraparotid lymph nodes are not merely accumulations of lymphoid tissue but nodes with efferent and afferent lymphatics. Squamous cell carcinomas of the major salivary glands are generally fixed to the skin and the underlying tissues and, in the case of the parotid, are often the cause of facial palsy. Epidermoid cancers grow swiftly and the clinical course is usually rapid. A few tumours, however, have been present for as long as two years before the patient seeks advice. Some patients remain alive and asymptomatic after radical surgery, but ordinarily the lesions are highly malignant, infiltrating locally and metastasizing to the regional nodes Distant metastasis is seldom a prominent clinical feature. In the case of the submandibular gland the tumor may simulate osteomyelitis of the mandible or an abscess in the gland itself, and if such lesions are incised a chronic sinus is liable to persist until radical treatment is undertaken. (Evans and Cruickshank, Epithelial Tumours of the Salivary Glands, Vol. 1, p. 254) Given the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the public respondents which found no proof that the deceased's working conditions have indeed caused or increased the risk of her contracting her illness. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Sarmiento vs ECC Facts: late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. History of the deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as early as April 1980 as a small wound over the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy of the mass revealed cancer known as "differentiated squamous cell carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in various hospitals, namely, Veterans Memorial Hospital, United Doctors Medical Hospital and Makati Medical Center. In March 1981, a soft tissue mass emerged on her left upper cheek as a result of which her lips became deformed and she was unable to close her left eye. She continued treatment and her last treatment at the Capitol Medical Center on July 12, 1 981 was due to her difficulty of swallowing food and her general debility. On August 12, 1981, she succumbed to cardio respiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma. GSIS denied the claim for death benefits under PD no. 626, on the ground that parotid carcinoma which is a Malignant tumor of the parotid gland ( salivary gland) is not caused by employment conditions of the deceased. ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS.

Ruiling: The SC affirmed the ECC decision. Parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an occupational disease considering the deceased's employment as accounting clerk and later as manager of the budget division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was caused by her employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness. The petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased visited regional and field operations and was, naturally, exposed to the elements. According to the petitioner, the deceased's field trips necessitated her to take frequent plane travels which caused deafening and numb sensations in her ears. This, he says, caused her "differentiated carcinoma" which, according to the certificate of Dr. Ariston Bautista, "apparently started on external auditory canal." We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of parotid carcinoma is still not known.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. L-46684 April 27, 1988 ROSALINA G. NAVALTA, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System and denied the claim for income benefits filed by Rosalina Navalta, widow of the late Alberto Navalta. The facts as found by the respondent Commission are as follows: Before his death on September 8, 1976, Alberto Navalta was employed as Port Administration Checker in the Office of the Special Commissioner on Port Administration, Bureau of Customs. It appears that his actual duties consisted of controlling receipts, storing and distributing supplies and equipment; conducting periodic inventory supplies, materials and equipment; disposing obsolete and unserviceable properties; and doing related work. Sometime in August, 1976, while deceased was assigned at warehouse 12 to assist in the inventory of properties of the defunct CAS per Office Order NO. 15-76, he suddenly complained of extreme abdominal pain, for which reason, he was confined at the Philippine General Hospital for nineteen (19) days. He died in the hospital on September 8, 1976 due to Cancer of the Pancreas. Deceased's widow filed a claim for income benefits with the Government Service Insurance System. On the basis of a finding that deceased's fatal ailment, Cancer of the Pancreas, is not an occupational disease, the System denied compensation to the claimant. ... (p. 18, Rollo) After the respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System, the petitioner went to this Court on petition for review. The petitioner alleges that the deceased as a member of the customs inventory team and later as port administration checker was exposed to various cargoes stored inside warehouses, which included carbons, ink, concentrated toners and chemicals such as alphanaphtylamine, betanaphtylamine, or bensidrine auramine or magenta in their raw forms. The petitioner argues that since the deceased's cancer has spread to the gallbladder, it may be concluded that papilloma of the bladder, which is listed in the employee's compensation law as an occupational disease, was one of the causes of his death. The petitioner's views have no merit.

Since the deceased's ailment is not an occupational disease listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, it became incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that the employee's working conditions increased the risk of his contracting the fatal illness (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276). This task was not satisfactorily discharged by the petitioner. As a general rule, cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed (Milano v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 52). Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions or environment, we cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease. The nature of cancer of the pancreas is discussed by a medical authority as follows: Cancer of the Pancreas Gen. Considerations. Carcinoma of the pancreas is now the 4th commonest cancer causing death in the US; only cancer of the lung, colon and breast occur more frequently... The disease is more common in males than females (1.5:1), and the peak incidence is between the ages 60 to 70. Although the etiologic factors in most cases are not known, incidence of carcinoma of the pancreas is 2.0 to 2.5 times greater in smokers than in non-smokers, and about 2 times greater in patients with diabetes mellitus. Patients with calcific pancreatitis also have an increased incidence of pancreatic carcinoma. Some reports have suggested an association between heavy coffee intake and increased risk of pancreatic cancer, but whether a true causal relationship exists is uncertain. The tumors are usually adenocarcinomas arising from ductal epithelium. The head of the pancreas is involved in about 65%, the body and tail in 30 percent, and the tail alone is 5%. At the time of diagnosis the tumor is confined to the pancreas in only 15% of patients; 25% demonstrate local invasion or regional lymph node spread, and the remaining 60% exhibit distinct metastases. (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 10th Ed., p. 1845) These medical findings support the evaluation of the Government Service Insurance System that "(P)ancreatic carcinoma is a malignant new growth of the said organ, characterized by loss of weight, pain and yellowish discoloration of the skin. It affects predominantly patients over forty-five (45) years of age. Predisposing factors are age, sex, genetic influence and presence of diabetes mellitus. Diabetic patients are believed to have increased susceptibility to the disease. (p. 19, Rollo) We do not find merit in the petitioner's contention that Mr. Navalta's cancer was caused by his exposure to certain chemicals. As the respondent Commission opined "exposure to the (above named) chemicals is the risk involved in the contracting of cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder." (p. 19, Rollo) The petitioner's contention that cancer of the bladder was also one of the causes of her husband's death was correctly denied due to the fact that the employee's bladder was affected as a result of metastatic spread only. The real and direct cause of his death remains cancer of the pancreas. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Navalta vs. GSIS

Facts: Before his death on September 8, 1976, Alberto Navalta was employed as Port Administration Checker in the Office of the Special Commissioner on Port Administration, Bureau of Customs. It appears that his actual duties consisted of controlling receipts, storing and distributing supplies and equipment; conducting periodic inventory supplies, materials and equipment; disposing obsolete and unserviceable properties; and doing related work. Sometime in August, 1976, while deceased was assigned at warehouse 12 to assist in the inventory of properties of the defunct CAS per Office Order NO. 1576, he suddenly complained of extreme abdominal pain, for which reason, he was confined at the Philippine General Hospital for nineteen (19) days. He died in the hospital on September 8, 1976 due to Cancer of the Pancreas. Deceased's widow filed a claim for income benefits with the Government Service Insurance System. On the basis of a finding that deceased's fatal ailment, Cancer of the Pancreas, is not an occupational disease, the System denied compensation to the claimant.

Ruiling: The petitioner's views have no merit. Since the deceased's ailment is not an occupational disease listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, it became incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that the employee's working conditions increased the risk of his contracting the fatal illness (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276). As a general rule, cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed (Milano v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 52). Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions or environment, we cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease. We do not find merit in the petitioner's contention that Mr. Navalta's cancer was caused by his exposure to certain chemicals. As the respondent Commission opined "exposure to the (above named) chemicals is the risk involved in the contracting of cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder." The petitioner's contention that cancer of the bladder was also one of the causes of her husband's death was correctly denied due to the fact that the employee's bladder was affected as a result of metastatic spread only. The real and direct cause of his death remains cancer of the pancreas.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-45484 April 8, 1988 ZOSIMO CAPACIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Bureau of Public Schools) respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC) denying the claim of petitioner Zosimo Capacio for compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act against respondent Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Public Schools. The petitioner was an elementary grade public school teacher assigned in Barrio Matambong, Palapag, Northern Samar. He started working as a substitute teacher and progressed to that of a regular teacher. His service covered a span of 33 years. Finding himself suffering from peptic ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis he retired from the government, service on August 13, 1974 at the age of 60 years. Immediately upon retirement he was called to the Workmen's Compensation Commission Regional Office in Samar for medical check-up by the office physicians. These ailments complained of started from March 19, 1973 and continuously bothered the petitioner up to August 13, 1974, his last day of work. After this medical examination on the petitioner, and after the lapse of almost a month he was treated up to September 15, 1974. A further examination was conducted on August 13, 1974, when an EKG test was taken. He stopped teaching after August 13, 1974. Another EKG examination of petitioner was made on July 22, 1975. He sought workmen's compensation after this disabling sickness. The claim of the petitioner was initially heard by the hearing officer, Romeo M. Resuello of Regional Office No. 9, Department of Labor, Tacloban City, Leyte. After the hearing, petitioner was awarded the amount of P5,693.57 as sickness compensation and reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses on November 24, 1975. The award statesIt appearing upon perusal of the records, that claimant Zosimo C. Capacio contracted illness (Peptic ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis on March 19,1973, which either supervened in the course of his employment as a public school teacher (with an average weekly wage of P90.53) of the respondent, or was aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, and it appearing further that the respondent failed to controvert the claimant's right to compensation within 14 days from the date of disability or within 10 days from knowledge thereof, pursuant to Section 45 of the Act, as amended, resulting as it did, in the loss of its non-jurisdictional defense and ultimate admission of the compensability or work connection of claimant's illness, an outright award of compensation in favor of the claimant is, under the circumstance, in order. 1 The dispositive portion of this award states: Award, therefore, is hereby entered in favor of the claimant of the aforementioned compensation benefits, and the respondent is directed to pay the following:

1. To the claimant, thru this Office, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY-THREE PESOS and FIFTY-SEVEN centavos (P5,693.57) as compensation and reimbursement for medical and hospital expenses; 2. To this Office, the amount of FIFTY SEVEN PESOS (P57.00) as fee, pursuant to Sec. 55 of the Act. A motion for reconsideration of this Award was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General. The Workmen's Compensation Commission, upon review, reversed the aforesaid award. The Workmen's Compensation Commission took exception to the findings of the Regional Labor Office and reached a contrary opinion. In its Decision, the Commission said: Gleaned from the record of this case, claimant had alleged to have been sick of the aforementioned illness sometime on March 19, 1973 and stopped working on August 13, 1974. This was also the exact date when he retired, It is sad to note however, that nowhere in the records could We find any documentary evidence which would substantiate claimant's allegations. While it is true that Dr. Ramon Rabino was once his attending physician, the first and last treatment was conducted only on September 15, 1974, which was one month after the employer-employee relationship had ceased to exist. True, that there is attached to the record on EKG results, likewise, the same should not be given any evidentiary value, it appearing that it was conducted only last July 22, 1975, Of course, there is a showing that claimant was on leave from July 22 to August 13, 1974, there is no showing that it was on account of the; illness subject of this claim. his Commission believes that the aforementioned leave of absence was merely preparatory to his retirement, which eventually took effect on August 13, 1974. This Commission is further convinced that claimant retired not as a result of any disabling illness, but rather with the sole aim and purpose of enjoying the benefits afforded him by the Retirement Law after rendering 33 years of service with the government and reaching the age of 60. 2 We reverse. The records of the case reveal that the petitioner suffered from peptic ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis Feeling that he could not withstand the rigors and continuous strain of his teaching job with his assignment in a remote barrio which entailed the stamina of walking for one and one-half hours, he retired on his 60th birthday. All along he could have served the whole length of a normal civil service tenure of work with the retirement age of 65. He served a continuous 33 years. His daily hike from the town proper passing through rivers, creeks, streams and rough roads, trails and woodland affected his health. The streams in that region were infested with parasitic worms known as schistosoma haematobium. Indeed, this physical strain took a toll upon his health. It does not take a stretch of the imagination to conclude that this strain had its consequence and adversely affected his health. There is on record the fact that after retirement, he immediately filed his claim for sickness compensation with the Department of Labor Regional Office No. 9, Workmen's Compensation Unit in Tacloban City. He submitted himself to medical examination by the physician of the Workmen's Compensation Unit. After this examination, the medical officer studied his case and then ordered that the petitioner be hospitalized in Tacloban City. These facts show that the illness of the petitioner occurred during the course of his employment. The petitioner took the Commission to task for not taking into consideration the mandatory provision of Section 45, Act No. 3428, as amended, wherein the employer (in this case the

Bureau of Public Schools) is given up to 14 days from disability, or 10 days after it had knowledge of the alleged illness, to controvert the right of the claimant; otherwise, by operation of law, the employer waives or renounces the right to dispute its liability for said compensation. This provision has been consistently applied by this Court when a condition of this nature confronts Us. In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission and Crispin Pineda, 3 We ruled: "The company's failure to controvert the claim on time amounts to a renunciation of the right to dispute compensability." Again, in Dinaro vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 We set aside the Commission's dismissal of the claim made by a clerical aide in the District Engineer's Office in Marawi City who contracted pulmonary tuberculosis and rheumatism in the course of his employment. This Court held: The Commission inexplicably failed to apply the express mandate of Section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and issue outright an award, since a failure to controvert is a renunciation of the right, to challenge the claim and a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defenses and there is nothing that the employer can legally prove in relation thereto. Regarding the point of presumption of compensability, We had occasion to rule as follows: Once the illness supervened in the course of employment, rebuttable presumption arises that such illness arose out of or was at least aggravated by such employment and the burden to overthrow such presumption shifts to the employer ... 5 Lately, in Buyco vs. Secretary of Labor 6 We ruled that the presumption of compensability shifts the burden of proof on the employer to show the contrary. Where the illness supervened during the time of employment, there was rebuttable presumption that the illness arose out of or at least was aggravated by the employment. 7 Thus, the government's stand that failure to file an employer's report did not divest the Workmen's Compensation Commission of its power to review the Decision of the Regional Office and seek reconsideration is plainly without merit. We held before that: ... Failure to seasonably controvert the compensation claim renders the claim beyond challenge and a waiver of the employer's right to do so. 8 ... Main consideration for compensability of illness is that the essential hypertension of the deceased was constracted during and by reason of her employment. 9 We also stated that an: Employer has the burden to establish the contrary to the presumtion of compensability of illness by substantial evidence. 10 Another point raised by the respondent Commission in its Decision reversing the award is that the petitioner submitted to medical treatment after the employer-employee relationship had ceased. This implies that petitioner's illness was not work connected as he got sick after his retirement; that the documents submitted proved the existence of petitioner's illness after he retired from his employment, not before.

We disagree. First, there is no proof that the respondent was able to overcome the presumption under Section 44 of Act No. 3428 that the illness or injury either arose out of, or was at least aggravated by his employment. With this legal presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the employer and not the employee. Second, the petitioner's ailment occurred while he was an employee a teacher working under the hazardous conditions of that far-flung town. There is a showing that his illness was caused or was aggravated by his teaching duties. He got his schistosomiasis from his daily hike to his place of work, the barrio school. As regards a teacher's ailment, We had occasion to say that: Presumption of compensability is rendered conclusive by reason of employee's employment as barrio school teacher and working conditions which increased the risk of contracting her illness and failure of employer to rebut presumption. 11 We likewise made the following observations: Reasonable work connection, not direct causal relation between the disease and employment is the only requirement to establish compensability, 12 and actual proof of causation is not necessary to justify compensability. 13 In one of Our latest rulings on employment compensation of teachers, We opined: The teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain in the teacher's health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with existing laws. 14 Accordingly, the Decision of the respondent Commission dated March 9, 1976 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered reinstating the original award made by the Hearing Officer of November 24,1975. No costs. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

Capacio vs Republic Facts: The petitioner was an elementary grade public school teacher assigned in Barrio Matambong, Palapag, Northern Samar. He started working as a substitute teacher and progressed to that of a regular teacher. His service covered a span of 33 years. Finding himself suffering from peptic ulcer, hypertension and schistosomiasis he retired from the government, service on August 13, 1974 at the age of 60 years. Immediately upon retirement he was called to the Workmen's Compensation Commission Regional Office in Samar for medical check-up by the office physicians. These ailments complained of started from March 19, 1973 and continuously bothered the petitioner up to August 13, 1974, his last day of work. After this medical examination on the petitioner, and after the lapse of almost a month he was treated up to September 15, 1974. A further examination was conducted on August 13, 1974, when an EKG test was taken. He stopped teaching after August 13, 1974. Another EKG examination of petitioner was made on July 22, 1975. He sought workmen's compensation after this disabling sickness. The claim of the petitioner was initially heard by the hearing officer, Romeo M. Resuello of Regional Office No. 9, Department of Labor, Tacloban City, Leyte. After the hearing, petitioner was awarded the amount of P5,693.57 as sickness compensation and reimbursement of medical and hospital expenses on November 24, 1975.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-42087 April 8, 1988 URSULA VDA. DE CLEMENTE, FOR HERSELF AND FOR HER CHILDREN NAMELY: MARITA, EDNA, AMELIA, ROBERTO, ANTONIO AND REYNALDO, ALL SURNAMED CLEMENTE, petitioners, vs. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND RATTAN ART AND DECORATIONS INC., respondents.

PADILLA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari, treated by the Court as a special civil action., 1 of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission 2 reversing the decision of the Acting Referee which granted death compensation benefits to the claimants. 3 The antecedents of the case are as follows: The deceased Ricardo Clemente was employed as a machine set-up man by respondent Rattan Art & Decorations, Inc., assigned to the Preparation Section, working six (6) days a week from 6: A.M. to 11:00 A.M. and from 12:00 noon to 3:00 P.M., earning a daily wage of P10.30. On 21 February 1974, at about 1:40 A.M., Ricardo Clemente, while asleep, died of acute cardiorespiratory failure, with manifest pulmonary infarct, cardiac dilatation and marked visceral congestion. 4 He was at the time of death forty-nine (49) years old. The deceased was survived by his widow, Ursula vda. de Clemente and six (6) minor children, who filed on 17 March 1975 a claim for death compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, on account of the death of said deceased. In a decision, 5 dated 10 September 1975, the Acting Referee of the Workmen's Compensation Commission rendered a decision in favor of the claimants. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent Rattan Art and Decorations, Inc., to pay through this office and in lump sum: 1. Claimants the death compensation in the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS ( P6,000.00 ) plus the burial expenses in the sum of TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00 ) PESOS, through Ursula Clemente, the legitimate mother of the abovenamed children; 2. Their counsel, Abraham M. Perez, the sum of P300.00; and 3. This Office the sum of SIXTY ONE ( P61.00 ) PESOS as fees pursuant to Section 55 of the Act, as amended.' On 22 September 1975, private respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision of the Acting Referee but the same was denied in an order dated 23 October 1975. 6 Pursuant to

Section 49 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the motion for reconsideration and the records of the case were referred to the Commission for review. The decision of the acting referee was reversed, the Commission upholding the allegations of the private respondent that the cause of death of the deceased is what is commonly known as "bangungot," that it is noncompensable, and that the claimants failed to establish the fundamental preliminary link to connect the death of the deceased to his work, thereby justifying a denial of the claim of herein petitioners, 7 hence, this petition. Petitioners claim that the work of the deceased was not only strenuous but debilitating and weakening on the constitution of the deceased, so much so that in the years 1973-1974, he was always complaining of dizziness, severe cough, chest and back pains, over-fatigue and was later found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB) and heart failure. 8 However, no proof was submitted by petitioners to substantiate their allegations as to the ailments of the decedent prior to his death. 9 It is further contended by petitioners that it is for convenience, rather than for accuracy, that some medical practitioners call or brand the causes of death similar to that of the deceased in this case as "bangungot" but the fact is, that no inference was ever made in the "post mortem certificate of death" that the late Ricardo Clemente died of "bangungot." 10 The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the cause of the death of the deceased had a causal relation to the nature of his work while in private respondent's employ. To be entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the illness which resulted in the death of the employee must be directly caused by his employment or either aggravated by, or the result of the nature of his employment. 11 In the interpretation of this rule, the Court has adopted a liberal stand to give effect to the compassionate spirit of the law as a social legislation, and has ruled that what the law merely requires is a reasonable work connection and not a direct causal relation of the illness or ailment to the job or working conditions present in the course of the performance of one's duties. 12 The degree of proof required to establish work-connection between the disabling ailment and the working conditions is merely substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 13 In testing the evidence on the relation between the injury or disease and the employment, probability and not certainty is the touchstone. 14 Moreover, when illness supervenes during employment, there is a disputable presumption that the claim is compensable. The claimant is relieved of the duty to show causation as it is then legally presumed that the illness arose out of the employment. 15 The law presumes, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim for death or disability benefits is compensable. The burden to disconnect, by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from the nature of the employment is laid at the employer's door. So rigid is this rule that, even where the cause of the employee's death is unknown, the right to compensation subsists. The reason for this is, that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social legislation. It is designed to give relief to the working man. To give effect to this purpose, the Act must be liberally construed in favor of the worker. 16 The exact medical cause of the illness of an employee is not significant for, granted for the sake of argument that the evidence of the claimant is insufficient to establish a causal link between the nature of his employment and his ailment under the provisions of Section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, still, it is to be presumed that the illness which supervened at the time of his employment, either arose out of or was at least aggravated by, such employment. 17 This presumption, rebuttable at its inception, becomes conclusive upon the failure of the respondent employer to overcome the same. 18

In the instant case, the deceased was found to have died of acute cardiorespiratory failure during his sleep, commonly known as 'heart failure" and not of what respondent claims as "bangungot." While it is true that the claimants failed to prove the causal link between the cause of the death of the deceased to the nature of his work, yet, the Court cannot discount the probability that his work, as a set-up man, caused or aggravated his illness that led to his death. Considering the nature of the job of the decedent, it may be fairly concluded that the strenuous physical activity required in the performance of his duties caused a heavy strain on his heart, which ultimately resulted in death. It is claimed by petitioners that the deceased was also suffering from PTB, and medical science has already established that any chronic lung disease, such as tuberculosis, may lead to a pulmonary heart disease. 19 The allegation of respondents that the medical records of the deceased, prior to his death, reveal that he was in good health 20 and the fact that the death of the decedent occurred at a time when he was already off from work is not material; the main consideration for granting death compensation to petitioners is the fact that the illness which resulted in the death of the deceased supervened in the course of his employment. The contention that the deceased had no history of cardiac ailment strengthens the presumption that his fatal heart attack, during the period of his employment, was work-connected or aggravated thereby and therefore compensable. 21 Respondents' claim that the cause of the decedent's death is 'bangungot," is without legal or medical basis, for it is apparent from the "Post Mortem Certificate of Death" that the deceased died of heart failure. The real cause of "bangungot" has remained a mystery up to the present, and no medical explanation has so far been established to unravel this phenomenon. There are several theories submitted in an attempt to explain the reason or cause for the death of reported victims of 'bangungot;' however, the exact cause of death is still unknown. However, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the deceased indeed died due to 'bangungot," still in Mercado, Jr. v. ECC 22 it was held that where the causes of an ailment are unknown and undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of causal link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized. The Court said: ... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed. Verily, by permitting compensation notwithstanding the absence of any showing of causal link between the ailment whose Causes are unknown and the working conditions which may be the probable origins of said ailment, We merely accede to the dictates of the social justice provisions of the Constitution. Where the causes are known, determined or determinable, the claimant must prove reasonable work- connection in order to receive compensation otherwise, the parity or balance between the competing interests of employer and employee with respect to Workmen's Compensation is destroyed. (Sulit v. ECC, L-48602 [June 30, 1980]). Where, however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and/or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any

causal link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in life will have more in law. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, dated 27 November 1975, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Acting Referee, dated 10 September 1975. No costs. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Clemente vs ECC Facts: The deceased Ricardo Clemente was employed as a machine set-up man by respondent Rattan Art & Decorations, Inc., assigned to the Preparation Section, working six (6) days a week from 6: A.M. to 11:00 A.M. and from 12:00 noon to 3:00 P.M., earning a daily wage of P10.30. On 21 February 1974, at about 1:40 A.M., Ricardo Clemente, while asleep, died of acute cardiorespiratory failure, with manifest pulmonary infarct, cardiac dilatation and marked visceral congestion. 4 He was at the time of death forty-nine (49) years old. The deceased was survived by his widow, Ursula vda. de Clemente and six (6) minor children, who filed on 17 March 1975 a claim for death compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, on account of the death of said deceased.

Issue: whether or not the cause of the death of the deceased had a causal relation to the nature of his work while in private respondent's employ.

Ruling: To be entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the illness which resulted in the death of the employee must be directly caused by his employment or either aggravated by, or the result of the nature of his employment. 11 In the interpretation of this rule, the Court has adopted a liberal stand to give effect to the compassionate spirit of the law as a social legislation, and has ruled that what the law merely requires is a reasonable work connection and not a direct causal relation of the illness or ailment to the job or working conditions present in the course of the performance of one's duties. 12 The degree of proof required to establish workconnection between the disabling ailment and the working conditions is merely substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 13 In testing the evidence on the relation between the injury or disease and the employment, probability and not certainty is the touchstone. 14 Moreover, when illness supervenes during employment, there is a disputable presumption that the claim is compensable. The claimant is relieved of the duty to show causation as it is then legally presumed that the illness arose out of the employment. 15 The law presumes, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim for death or disability benefits is compensable. The burden to disconnect, by substantial evidence, the injury or sickness from the nature of the employment is laid at the employer's door. So rigid is this rule that, even where the cause of the employee's death is unknown, the right to compensation subsists. The reason for this is, that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social legislation. It is designed to give relief to the working man. To give effect to this purpose, the Act must be liberally construed in favor of the worker. 16 The exact medical cause of the illness of an employee is not significant for, granted for the sake of argument that the evidence of the claimant is insufficient to establish a causal link between the nature of his employment and his ailment under the provisions of Section 44 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, still, it is to be presumed that the illness which supervened at the time of his employment, either arose out of or was at least aggravated by, such employment. 17 This presumption, rebuttable

at its inception, becomes conclusive upon the failure of the respondent employer to overcome the same. 18 In the instant case, the deceased was found to have died of acute cardiorespiratory failure during his sleep, commonly known as 'heart failure" and not of what respondent claims as "bangungot." While it is true that the claimants failed to prove the causal link between the cause of the death of the deceased to the nature of his work, yet, the Court cannot discount the probability that his work, as a set-up man, caused or aggravated his illness that led to his death. Considering the nature of the job of the decedent, it may be fairly concluded that the strenuous physical activity required in the performance of his duties caused a heavy strain on his heart, which ultimately resulted in death. It is claimed by petitioners that the deceased was also suffering from PTB, and medical science has already established that any chronic lung disease, such as tuberculosis, may lead to a pulmonary heart disease. 19 The allegation of respondents that the medical records of the deceased, prior to his death, reveal that he was in good health 20 and the fact that the death of the decedent occurred at a time when he was already off from work is not material; the main consideration for granting death compensation to petitioners is the fact that the illness which resulted in the death of the deceased supervened in the course of his employment. The contention that the deceased had no history of cardiac ailment strengthens the presumption that his fatal heart attack, during the period of his employment, was work-connected or aggravated thereby and therefore compensable. 21

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-45785 March 21, 1988 EDUARDO LAGINLIN, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE, C.J. YULO and SONS,respondents.

PADILLA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the now defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission absolving private respondents Canlubang Sugar Estate and C.J. Yulo and Sons from any liability to the petitioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Petitioner Eduardo Laginlin started his employment with the private respondents as a field worker on 12 December 1955, with specific duties to plant sugarcane and weed the sugarcane plantation owned by respondents, working seven (7) days a week from Monday to Sunday, with a salary of P4.60 a day. In 1967, and while working for the private respondents, petitioner started to suffer an illness which, according to the diagnosis of private respondents' physician, Dr. Bunye, was pulmonary tuberculosis. Petitioner was treated as an outpatient and was given free medicine by private respondents while he continued to perform his work. Despite said treatment, petitioner's health failed to improve, and as a consequence, Dr. Bunye recommended his retirement and, on that basis, he was retired effective 30 January 1970, receiving a disability retirement benefit from the private respondents in the amount of P1,800.00. 2 On 15 February 1975, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the ailment which he contracted as a result of his employment, docketed as R05-W.C. Case No. C-2772. 3 To facilitate the disposition of all unresolved cases pending before the Workmen's Compensation Unit of San Pablo City, the parties were required to submit their affidavit and counter affidavit to sustain their respective stands. Private respondents failed to seasonably controvert the claim of petitioner by not submitting their counter affidavit; thus, the case was deemed submitted for resolution on the merits. 4 On 15 October 1975, a decision 5 was rendered by the hearing officer in favor of petitioner. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the claimant and against the respondent, the latter is directed as follows: 1. To pay to the claimant, thru this Unit, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE AND FORTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P 4,963.45) representing disability benefits computed as follows: Claimant's disability began on January 30,1970 and up to October 15, 1975, date of decision, is 2,183 days or 296 6/7 weeks equals P4,963.45. (Section 14)

2. To pay to the claimant, thru this Unit, a weekly compensation of Pl6.72 beginning October 16, 1975 and weekly thereafter until his illness is declared arrested by competent authority but in no case shall the total benefits exceed P6,000.00 including the first lump sum; (Section 14) 3. To pay Mr. Feliciano Reyes, 339 Elizondo St., Quiapo, Manila, the sum of TWO HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT PESOS AND TWENTY CENTAVOS (P248.20) as attorney's fee under Section 55 of the Act, as amended. Respondent is further ordered to pay to this Unit, the sum of P 50.00 by way of decision fee pursuant to Section 55 of the Act, as amended. SO ORDERED. Private respondents appealed said decision to the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On 30 December 1975, the Commission reversed the decision of the hearing officer, thus absolving private respondents from any liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act; hence, this petition for review on certiorari. 6 The main issue presented for resolution in this case is whether or not the Workmen's Compensation Commission erred in reversing the decision of the hearing officer holding private respondents liable to petitioner. Before resolving the main issue in this appeal, we will resolve the incidental issue of the timeliness of the filing of this petition. Private respondents allege that this petition was filed out of time. In turn, petitioner claims that he received a copy of the WCC decision, dated 30 December 1975, only on 4 March 1977, after he went to the Department of Labor office in San Pablo City to verify the status of his claim. Under the rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the decision of a Commissioner or referee is appealable to the Commission en bancwithin ten (10) days from receipt of the decision; however, an appeal from the decision of the Commission en banc, through a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court may be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the Commission's decision. 7 The petitioner, in the case at bar, filed with this Court on 14 March 1977 his first motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari. The petition itself was filed on 13 April 1977, or within the extended period granted by the Court. It is further alleged by private respondents that copy of the WCC decision was served upon petitioner's representative, Mr. Feliciano Reyes, 8 on 18 February 1976, as evidenced by a copy of the notice of the decision.9 Upon careful examination of said notice of decision addressed to both petitioner's representative and to private respondents' counsel, we note that there is only one initial of the recipient thereof, and this appears at the bottom part of said notice together with the date and time of receipt, but it does not state as to whether it was received on behalf of petitioner's representative or for private respondents' counsel. Neither does the certification issued by the Workmen's Compensation Unit of San Pablo City that the case was terminated and considered closed as of 21 December 1976, 10 prove that copy of the 30 December 1975 decision of the Commission had been served upon the petitioner or his representative. Another piece of evidence presented by private respondents to prove their claim that the decision of the Commission has already become final and unappealable is a xerox copy of the registry return receipt addressed to petitioner's representative which is not, however, numbered or postmarked at all by the post office. 11 But assuming that this petition for certiorari was filed out of time, a few days of delay in filing the petition should not deprive herein petitioner of his right to appeal, based on a mere

technicality and where the decision appealed from is blatantly erroneous in denying the petitioner his right to disability compensation under the law. Dismissal of appeals based on purely technical grounds should be frowned upon. A hearing, on the merits, ofbona fide appeals should be encouraged. Rules of procedure are intended to promote not to defeat substantial justice; therefore, they should be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. 12 In Serrano vs. Court of Appeals,13 it was held that: And even assuming that a petition for review is filed a few days late, where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, this Court may relax the stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. In addition to the basic merits of the main case, such a petition usually embodies justifying circumstances which warrant our heeding the petitioner's cry for justice, inspire of the earlier negligence of counsel. Furthermore, the objective of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to secure workmen and their dependents from becoming objects of charity, by providing for a reasonable compensation for such accidental calamities as are incidental to their employment. 14 As a social legislation, its provisions should be interpreted liberally to give effect to its purpose and the Rules of Court are merely suppletory in the application of such Act. Coming now to the merits of the case, it is evident that the Workmen's Compensation Commission committed a grave error in absolving private respondents from liability. Ample jurisprudence has now been established that, where the illness or disease was contracted by the employee in the course of his employment, said employee is entitled to disability compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Compensability is presumed where illness supervened during employment and, with the presumption of compensability of illness, the burden of proof is shifted to the employer and the employee is relieved of the duty to show causation. 15 An x-ray examination is not even essential to prove the claim of the petitioner for disability compensation due to illness which he contracted while under the employ of private respondents. In fact, it was private respondents' company physician who examined the petitioner and, finding him to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, made a recommendation for petitioner's retirement before he reaches the retirable age under the law. In view of the approval by private respondents of the petitioner's early retirement, the fact of his disability was placed beyond question or doubt. 16 Furthermore, the disease of tuberculosis is an occupational disease or work-connected in such occupations, as that of a teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and other similar occupations; hence compensable. 17 As held in Aribon v. WCC, (139 SCRA 492): In this case, however, it is patent from the records that the diagnosis of the petitioner's illness was clinically obvious. The petitioner had undergone examination by three doctors who uniformly attested to the fact of his ailment was peptic ulcer. The petitioner was initially treated by the respondent company's Canlubang Hospital and no less than its own company doctor diagnosed his ailment as peptic ulcer and recommended him for retirement. There was no need, therefore, for the petitioner to produce any G.I. Series. Since the case of Vallo v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (73 SCRA 623 [1976]) this Court has categorically ruled in unbroken line of cases, the most recent of which isDonato Jereza v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (G.R. No. L42916, August 7, 1985) that a medical report of an attending physician may be received as evidence and used as proof of the fact in dispute and that an x-ray or some other laboratory report may sometimes be dispensed with.

Moreover, private respondents during the initial stage of the case before the hearing officer of the Commission, failed to controvert or refute the claim of petitioner, as a result of which, the presumption of compensability became conclusive, and the claimant was no longer required to substantiate his claim for compensation. 18 The holding of the Commission to the effect that it finds no valid reason to sustain the grant of disability benefit to petitioner because the report of Dr. Eusebio Panganiban, the attending physician with a finding that the petitioner is suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis far advanced, appears to be tampered and that no other evidence was presented, is not sufficient to overthrow the presumption of compensability. As held by this Court, the evidence necessary to destroy the legal presumption of compensability must do more than create a doubt. It should be such as a reasonable mind must accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 19 The early retirement of an employee due to work-related ailment proves that indeed the employee was disabled totally to further perform his assigned task, and to deny permanent total disability benefits when he was forced to retire would subvert the very essence and purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act to implement the social justice provision of the Constitution. 20 Where an employee was forced to retire at an early age due to his illness, and illness persisted even after retirement, resulting in his present unemployment, such condition amounts to total disability which should entitle him to the maximum benefits allowed by law. 21 The fact that petitioner received a retirement benefit from his employer does not bar him from being entitled to a disability compensation benefit under the Workmen's Compensation Act, having in mind that the purpose of the disability benefit is separate and distinct from the retirement benefit given to an employee upon reaching the age of retirement. The disability benefit under the Act is to compensate the worker for his actual loss, for his disablement to earn wages in the same kind of work which he is engaged in, or work of similar nature. On the other hand, the retirement benefit is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying for his financial support and as a form of reward for his loyalty and service to the employer. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, dated 30 December 1975, is REVERSED and a new one is hereby entered AFFIRMING the decision of the hearing officer of the Workmen's Compensation Unit of San Pablo City, dated 15 October 1975, This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

LAginlin vs WCC Facts: Petitioner Eduardo Laginlin started his employment with the private respondents as a field worker on 12 December 1955, with specific duties to plant sugarcane and weed the sugarcane plantation owned by respondents, working seven (7) days a week from Monday to Sunday, with a salary of P4.60 a day. In 1967, and while working for the private respondents, petitioner started to suffer an illness which, according to the diagnosis of private respondents' physician, Dr. Bunye, was pulmonary tuberculosis. Petitioner was treated as an outpatient and was given free medicine by private respondents while he continued to perform his work. Despite said treatment, petitioner's health failed to improve, and as a consequence, Dr. Bunye recommended his retirement and, on that basis, he was retired effective 30 January 1970, receiving a disability retirement benefit from the private respondents in the amount of P1,800.00. 2 On 15 February 1975, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the ailment which he contracted as a result of his employment, docketed as R05-W.C. Case No. C-2772.

Issue: whether or not the Workmen's Compensation Commission erred in reversing the decision of the hearing officer holding private respondents liable to petitioner.

Ruling: The fact that petitioner received a retirement benefit from his employer does not bar him from being entitled to a disability compensation benefit under the Workmen's Compensation Act, having in mind that the purpose of the disability benefit is separate and distinct from the retirement benefit given to an employee upon reaching the age of retirement. The disability benefit under the Act is to compensate the worker for his actual loss, for his disablement to earn wages in the same kind of work which he is engaged in or work of similar nature. On the other hand, the retirement benefit is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying for his financial support and as a form of reward for his loyalty and service to the employer.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988 GENEROSO ALANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.: The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident. The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission are as follows: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter. On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim for in come benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review. (Rollo, p. 12) The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System. It stated that Section I (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation specifically provides that: "For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions." (Rollo, p. 13) According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident did not meet any of the aforementioned conditions. First, the accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was dismissed.

The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on certiorari. He alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her employment." The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and is "ategorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44) The Government Service Insurance System which received a copy of the Court's resolution requiring the parties to submit their memoranda, however manifests that it does not appear to be a party to the case because it had not been impleaded as a party thereto. We rule in favor of the petitioner. This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual background, this Court held: It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)." WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.

Alano vs ECC Facts: Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter. On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim for in come benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law."

Issue: whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident.

Ruling: the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there. In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual background, this Court held: It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorneys fees. The court sees no reason to deviate from the ruilings of the court. Filomeno was on his way to his work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable under the laws as an employment accident.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 73867 February 29, 1988 TELEFAST COMMUNICATIONS/PHILIPPINE WIRELESS, INC., petitioner, vs. IGNACIO CASTRO, SR., SOFIA C. CROUCH, IGNACIO CASTRO JR., AURORA CASTRO, SALVADOR CASTRO, MARIO CASTRO, CONRADO CASTRO, ESMERALDA C. FLORO, AGERICO CASTRO, ROLANDO CASTRO, VIRGILIO CASTRO AND GLORIA CASTRO, and HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,respondents.

PADILLA, J.: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 11 February 1986, in AC-G.R. No. CV-70245, entitled "Ignacio Castro, Sr., et al., PlaintiffsAppellees, versus Telefast Communication/Philippine Wireless, Inc., Defendant-Appellant." The facts of the case are as follows: On 2 November 1956, Consolacion Bravo-Castro wife of plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. and mother of the other plaintiffs, passed away in Lingayen, Pangasinan. On the same day, her daughter Sofia C. Crouch, who was then vacationing in the Philippines, addressed a telegram to plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. at 685 Wanda, Scottsburg, Indiana, U.S.A., 47170 announcing Consolacion's death. The telegram was accepted by the defendant in its Dagupan office, for transmission, after payment of the required fees or charges. The telegram never reached its addressee. Consolacion was interred with only her daughter Sofia in attendance. Neither the husband nor any of the other children of the deceased, then all residing in the United States, returned for the burial. When Sofia returned to the United States, she discovered that the wire she had caused the defendant to send, had not been received. She and the other plaintiffs thereupon brought action for damages arising from defendant's breach of contract. The case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and docketed therein as Civil Case No. 15356. The only defense of the defendant was that it was unable to transmit the telegram because of "technical and atmospheric factors beyond its control." 1 No evidence appears on record that defendant ever made any attempt to advise the plaintiff Sofia C. Crouch as to why it could not transmit the telegram. The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, after trial, ordered the defendant (now petitioner) to pay the plaintiffs (now private respondents) damages, as follows, with interest at 6% per annum: 1. Sofia C. Crouch, P31.92 and P16,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages. 2. Ignacio Castro Sr., P20,000.00 as moral damages.

3. Ignacio Castro Jr., P20,000.00 as moral damages. 4. Aurora Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. 5. Salvador Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. 6. Mario Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. 7. Conrado Castro, P10,000 moral damages. 8. Esmeralda C. Floro, P20,000.00 moral damages. 9. Agerico Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. 10. Rolando Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. 11. Virgilio Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. 12. Gloria Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages. Defendant is also ordered to pay P5,000.00 attorney's fees, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00 to each of the plaintiffs and costs. 2 On appeal by petitioner, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision but eliminated the award of P16,000.00 as compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch and the award of P1,000.00 to each of the private respondents as exemplary damages. The award of P20,000.00 as moral damages to each of Sofia C. Crouch, Ignacio Castro, Jr. and Esmeralda C. Floro was also reduced to P120,000. 00 for each. 3 Petitioner appeals from the judgment of the appellate court, contending that the award of moral damages should be eliminated as defendant's negligent act was not motivated by "fraud, malice or recklessness." In other words, under petitioner's theory, it can only be held liable for P 31.92, the fee or charges paid by Sofia C. Crouch for the telegram that was never sent to the addressee thereof. Petitioner's contention is without merit. Art. 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages." Art. 2176 also provides that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done." In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent Sofia C. Crouch entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by telegram. This, petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of contravening its obligation to said private respondent and is thus liable for damages. This liability is not limited to actual or quantified damages. To sustain petitioner's contrary position in this regard would result in an inequitous situation where petitioner will only be held liable for the actual cost of a telegram fixed thirty (30) years ago.

We find Art. 2217 of the Civil Code applicable to the case at bar. It states: "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." (Emphasis supplied). Here, petitioner's act or omission, which amounted to gross negligence, was precisely the cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo. As the appellate court properly observed: [Who] can seriously dispute the shock, the mental anguish and the sorrow that the overseas children must have suffered upon learning of the death of their mother after she had already been interred, without being given the opportunity to even make a choice on whether they wanted to pay her their last respects? There is no doubt that these emotional sufferings were proximately caused by appellant's omission and substantive law provides for the justification for the award of moral damages. 4 We also sustain the trial court's award of P16,000.00 as compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch representing the expenses she incurred when she came to the Philippines from the United States to testify before the trial court. Had petitioner not been remiss in performing its obligation, there would have been no need for this suit or for Mrs. Crouch's testimony. The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified and, therefore, sustained in the amount of P1,000.00 for each of the private respondents, as a warning to all telegram companies to observe due diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision appealed from is modified so that petitioner is held liable to private respondents in the following amounts: (1) P10,000.00 as moral damages, to each of private respondents; (2) P1,000.00 as exemplary damages, to each of private respondents; (3) P16,000.00 as compensatory damages, to private respondent Sofia C. Crouch; (4) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (5) Costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

Telefast vs Castro Facts: On 2 November 1956, Consolacion Bravo-Castro wife of plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. and mother of the other plaintiffs, passed away in Lingayen, Pangasinan. On the same day, her daughter Sofia C. Crouch, who was then vacationing in the Philippines, addressed a telegram to plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. at 685 Wanda, Scottsburg, Indiana, U.S.A., 47170 announcing Consolacion's death. The telegram was accepted by the defendant in its Dagupan office, for transmission, after payment of the required fees or charges. The telegram never reached its addressee. Consolacion was interred with only her daughter Sofia in attendance. Neither the husband nor any of the other children of the deceased, then all residing in the United States, returned for the burial. When Sofia returned to the United States, she discovered that the wire she had caused the defendant to send, had not been received. She and the other plaintiffs thereupon brought action for damages arising from defendant's breach of contract. The case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and docketed therein as Civil Case No. 15356. The only defense of the defendant was that it was unable to transmit the telegram because of "technical and atmospheric factors beyond its control." 1 No evidence appears on record that defendant ever made any attempt to advise the plaintiff Sofia C. Crouch as to why it could not transmit the telegram. Petitioner appeals from the judgment of the appellate court, contending that the award of moral damages should be eliminated as defendant's negligent act was not motivated by "fraud, malice or recklessness." In other words, under petitioner's theory, it can only be held liable for P 31.92, the fee or charges paid by Sofia C. Crouch for the telegram that was never sent to the addressee thereof.

Ruling: Petitioner's contention is without merit. In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent Sofia C. Crouch entered into a contract whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by telegram. This, petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of contravening its obligation to said private respondent and is thus liable for damages. This liability is not limited to actual or quantified damages. To sustain petitioner's contrary position in this regard would result in an inequitous situation where petitioner will only be held liable for the actual cost of a telegram fixed thirty (30) years ago. We find Art. 2217 of the Civil Code applicable to the case at bar. It states: "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." (Emphasis supplied). Here, petitioner's act or omission, which amounted to gross negligence, was precisely the cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo. the trial court's award of P16,000.00 as compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch representing the expenses she incurred when she came to the Philippines from the

United States to testify before the trial court. Had petitioner not been remiss in performing its obligation, there would have been no need for this suit or for Mrs. Crouch's testimony. The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified and, therefore, sustained in the amount of P1,000.00 for each of the private respondents, as a warning to all telegram companies to observe due diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-65216 December 1, 1987 FLERIDA OVENSON, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents.

PARAS, J.: This is a Petition to Review the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2009 dated August 30, 1983, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), to wit: Flerida Ovenson, appellant herein, elevated her case to this Commission for review of the decision of the respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying her claim for benefits under PD 626, as amended, for the death of her husband due to adenocarcinoma of the rectum. Records show that the late Serafin Ovenson started working in 1955 as laborer in the Central Bank of the Philippines and later on rose to various posts until he was appointed senior trade analyst. His duties include: assisting the supervising trade examiner in reviewing the verification, examination and evaluation work made by a group of trade analysts on reports of foreign sales, export declarations/permits and mark-up computation reports of embroidery exporters; preparing reports and memoranda on findings relative to pricing, payment terms and other conditions of sale which do not conform to export regulations; preparing periodic accomplishment reports and other duties that may be assigned to him by his superior from time to time. On March 29, 1981, Ovenson was confined at the Delos Santos General Hospital due to on-and-off LBM which started about one-and-a-half months before. This symptom was later accompanied by rise of temperature in the afternoon, Dr. Violeta Roda, diagnosed his condition as "septicemia ,adenocarcinoma rectum and hypothyroidism." The patient was sent home on May 4, 1981 after undergoing proctoscopy and chemotherapy. Two days later, on May 6, he succcumed to adenocarcinoma of the rectum at the age of 49 years. The claim for death benefits filed by the widow under PD 626, as amended, was denied by the respondent System based on its medical evaluation that the fatal ailment, a malignant new growth of the rectum which commences in the mucous membrane and gradually invades the deeper structure is attributed to genetic influence. Appellant requested reconsideration of respondent's adverse ruling. However, her request was also turned down by respondent reiterating its previous stand

that the ailment which resulted in the decedent's death is not in the lease causally related to his duties and conditions of work. Hence, this appeal. We have carefully reviewed the records and we believe that respondent System did not err in disallowing the instant claim. From our study of the etiology of the ailment in question, we failed to find any basis for attributing the same to the deceased's employment. According to medical authorities, adenocarcinoma of the rectum and lower sigmoid comprises approximately 7% of all malignant tumors of the body. Men are affected more commonly than women in the ratio of 3:2. While no age is exempt, the most common decade for the occurrence of this form of cancer is 50-60, although many cases have been reported under the age of 30 years. Though the true etiology of cancer is as yet unknown, certain lesions may be considered pre-malignant in the rectum. This is particularly true with multiple or single polyps. Malignant lesions of the rectum are spread by direct extension, and venous and lymphatic channels. Reference: Textbook of Surgery, 3rd edition, edited by Moseley, 1959. It is evident from the foregoing medical definition that cancer of the rectum could not be caused by decedent's employment factors. We have taken into consideration the decedent's duties as senior trade analyst at the Central Bank but we could not come up with any possible link between his work and his employment (sic). Even the decedent's working environment would not to our mind contribute in any manner to the contraction of his ailment. As regards the deceased's other ailments of "septicemia and hyperthyroidism the contraction of which being not traceable to decedent's employment are not compensable under the law. In view of the foregoing, we have no recourse but to affirm respondent's decision denying the instant claim. FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, should be as it is hereby, AFFIRMED and the instant case dismissed. SO ORDERED. Manila, Philippines. The sole issue postulated on appeal is whether or not cancer of the rectum was contracted by Serafin Ovenson by reason of his employment. Petitioner contends that the decision of the ECC overlooked the nature and conditions of employment of her late husband Serafin Ovenson. To convince Us that the illness causing the death of her husband was work- related, petitioner argues that cancer diseases may be caused by chemical, physical and parasitic carcinogens present in a man's environment. That her late husband was exposed to all these is confirmed by an examination of his employment records, petitioner alleging that during the early days of her husband's employment at the Central Bank, he worked as laborer and janitor. Petitioner claims that in those capacities, her late husband

was exposed to different chemicals in his painting jobs and in cleaning comfort rooms of the building with acids and disinfectants, not to mention possible parasitic infestation because of insanitary working environment. This exposure to health hazards was compounded by physical and mental stress in employment, the same stress which some scientists believe may have a much larger role in helping cancer cells to grow and that according to some experts, stress such as tension and agitation weaken the body's protective immune systems which hold some potential cancers in check (Times Journal, April 1, 1982)." 1 Claimant's contentions are palpably meritorious. Under the law 2 a "compensable sickness" means (1) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC, or 2) any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. A cursory reading of the law shows that cancer of the rectum is not listed by the ECC as one of the compensable diseases. The next question therefore is whether the working conditions of claimant's deceased husband predisposed him to contract cancer of the rectum. The record reveals that the husband of the claimant contracted the fatal disease only in 1981 or after 16 years from the time he started to work as laborer in 1955. Respondent GSIS, relying on its medical evaluation, found that the fatal illness of the deceased is attributed to genetic influence. Respondent ECC ruled that although the true cause of cancer is yet unknown, certain lesions may be considered pre-malignant in the rectum and may be aggravated during the course of employment if there is sufficient proof presented by the claimant. But as ruled by Us, this duty to prove exists only when the cause of the disease is known. In a case like the present one, even medical experts have not determined its cause, and therefore the duty to prove does not exist for it is absurd for the law to require an impossibility. Thus in the case of Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329. We ruled as follows: While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have abandoned under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists. ... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection, 103 SCRA 329, 336). ... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in fife will have more in law ... . ... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment

compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276). ... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law." (Ibid, p. 277). In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria, 3 Petitioner versus Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture), Respondents, promulgated October 28, 1987 and following the rule We enunciated in the Mercado case, We stated: Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another is rendered ordering the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the fun amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended. SO ORDERED.

Ovenson vs ECC Facts: On March 29, 1981, Ovenson was confined at the Delos Santos General Hospital due to on-and-off LBM which started about one-and-a-half months before. This symptom was later accompanied by rise of temperature in the afternoon, Dr. Violeta Roda, diagnosed his condition as "septicemia ,adenocarcinoma rectum and hypothyroidism." The patient was sent home on May 4, 1981 after undergoing proctoscopy and chemotherapy. Two days later, on May 6, he succcumed to adenocarcinoma of the rectum at the age of 49 years. The claim for death benefits filed by the widow under PD 626, as amended, was denied by the respondent System based on its medical evaluation that the fatal ailment, a malignant new growth of the rectum which commences in the mucous membrane and gradually invades the deeper structure is attributed to genetic influence. Petitioner contends that the decision of the ECC overlooked the nature and conditions of employment of her late husband Serafin Ovenson. To convince Us that the illness causing the death of her husband was work- related, petitioner argues that cancer diseases may be caused by chemical, physical and parasitic carcinogens present in a man's environment. That her late husband was exposed to all these is confirmed by an examination of his employment records, petitioner alleging that during the early days of her husband's employment at the Central Bank, he worked as laborer and janitor. Petitioner claims that in those capacities, her late husband was exposed to different chemicals in his painting jobs and in cleaning comfort rooms of the building with acids and disinfectants, not to mention possible parasitic infestation because of insanitary working environment. This exposure to health hazards was compounded by physical and mental stress in employment, the same stress which some scientists believe may have a much larger role in helping cancer cells to grow and that according to some experts, stress such as tension and agitation weaken the body's protective immune systems which hold some potential cancers in check (Times Journal, April 1, 1982)." 1

Issue: whether or not cancer of the rectum was contracted by Serafin Ovenson by reason of his employment.

Ruling: Claimant's contentions are palpably meritorious. Under the law 2 a "compensable sickness" means (1) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC, or 2) any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. A cursory reading of the law shows that cancer of the rectum is not listed by the ECC as one of the compensable diseases. The next question therefore is whether the working conditions of claimant's deceased husband predisposed him to contract cancer of the rectum. The record reveals that the husband of the claimant contracted the fatal disease only in 1981 or after 16 years from the time he started to work as laborer in 1955. Respondent GSIS, relying on its medical evaluation, found that the fatal illness of the deceased is attributed to genetic influence. Respondent ECC ruled that although the true cause of cancer is yet unknown, certain lesions may be considered pre-malignant in the rectum and may be aggravated during the course of employment if there is sufficient proof

presented by the claimant. But as ruled by Us, this duty to prove exists only when the cause of the disease is known. In a case like the present one, even medical experts have not determined its cause, and therefore the duty to prove does not exist for it is absurd for the law to require an impossibility. In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria, 3 Petitioner versus Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture), Respondents, promulgated October 28, 1987 and following the rule We enunciated in the Mercado case, We stated: Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-62157 December 1, 1987 EULALIO MORA JR., in representation of his deceased wife, LETICIA ADOR MORA petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Telecommunication), respondents.

PARAS, J.: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the decision dated July 29, 1982 of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 1524, which affirmed the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefits under the New Labor Code, for disability and subsequent death of Leticia Mora. The undisputed factual background is as follows: The late Leticia Mora was from 1963 until December 25, 1979 a telegraph operator of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Tacloban City. During the course of her employment, and more particularly in January 1978, she complained of frequent epigastric pain radiating to the periumbilical region. Biopsy conducted at the St. Paul's Hospital in Tacloban City revealed a diagnosis of adnocarcinoma of the ileocaecal junction (a certain portion of the small intestine). She underwent "exploratory laparotomy with resection of ileocaecal junction" but her ailment continued to recur. She filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The claim was, however, denied by the GSIS on the ground that her ailment is not an occupational disease considering her particular employment as telegraph operator. Not satisfied, she sent a letter to the Chairman of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) Minister Blas F. Ople, requesting for a review of her case. She averred that her cancer should be considered by the system as workconnected since she acquired the same during her sixteen (16) years of employment. On Nov. 22, 1980, Leticia Mora died. Her appeal to the ECC which was prosecuted by her husband after her death, was denied, the ECC ruling that the illness which caused Leticia Mora's death is not work-connected. Hence, this petition which We find to be meritorious. The law applicable to the case at bar is the New Labor Code, PD 442, as amended, which covers injury, sickness, disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975. The new law on employee's compensation makes compensable disability or death arising from an ailment under any of the following grounds namely: (a) when the illness is definitely accepted as an occupational disease by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or (b) when said illness is caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the work conditions. Thus, the New Labor Code particularly Art. 167 (1) as amended by PD 1368, defining compensable illness, provides:

(1) "Sickness" means any illness definitely accepted as occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. (As amended by Sec. 1, PD 1368). Implementing the foregoing provision, the Employees' Compensation Commission promulgated its amended Rules, Section 1 (b), Rule III , of which provides: Sec. 1 (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under "ANNEX "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The cause of the decedent's death, is not listed in said Annex "A" as occupational disease. To be compensable thereby the law requires that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the employment of the deceased. But this requisite proof can be given only if the cause of the disease cancer can itself be known. However, despite scientific advances on the matter, even professional experts have not as yet determine its cause. All that they can say regarding the ailment of the deceased is the following: Adenocarcinoma ileocaecal junction is malignancy affecting a certain portion of the small intestines. Carcinoma of the small intestine occurs more frequently in the male sex with the highest incidence in the fourth, fifth and sixth decades. Histologically, these carcinomas are classified into four types: adenocarcinoma medullary, scirrhous and colloid. The clinical manifestations are variable and depend upon the location, size and character of the tumor and the degree of malignancy. They are predominantly those of intestinal obstruction. A history of abdominal distress and pain is frequent. When the tumor becomes sufficiently large, a movable, palpable mass may be present." (Cecil and Loeb A Textbook of Medicine, 10th ed., p. 854). (Cited in Comment of respondent ECC, p. 34). As stated in Our decisions in Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation Commission, 139 SC0RA 270 citingCristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, and Flaviano Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture promulgated on October 28, 1987, the necessity of proof is present only when the cause of the disease is known. If not known, there is no duty to present proof, for the law does not demand an impossibility. Thus, in the Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation Commission case, We held: While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have abandoned under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists. ... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more

liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection, 103 SCRA 329, 336). ... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in life will have more in law ... . ... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment-the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science-was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275- 276). ... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law." (Ibid., pp. 277). In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture), (supra) we stated that: Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another is rendered ordering the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the full amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended. SO ORDERED.

Mora vs ECC Facts: The late Leticia Mora was from 1963 until December 25, 1979 a telegraph operator of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Tacloban City. During the course of her employment, and more particularly in January 1978, she complained of frequent epigastric pain radiating to the periumbilical region. Biopsy conducted at the St. Paul's Hospital in Tacloban City revealed a diagnosis of adnocarcinoma of the ileocaecal junction (a certain portion of the small intestine). She underwent "exploratory laparotomy with resection of ileocaecal junction" but her ailment continued to recur. She filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The claim was, however, denied by the GSIS on the ground that her ailment is not an occupational disease considering her particular employment as telegraph operator. Not satisfied, she sent a letter to the Chairman of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) Minister Blas F. Ople, requesting for a review of her case. She averred that her cancer should be considered by the system as work-connected since she acquired the same during her sixteen (16) years of employment. On Nov. 22, 1980, Leticia Mora died. Her appeal to the ECC which was prosecuted by her husband after her death, was denied, the ECC ruling that the illness which caused Leticia Mora's death is not work-connected.

Ruling: Claimant's contentions are palpably meritorious The law applicable to the case at bar is the New Labor Code, PD 442, as amended, which covers injury, sickness, disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975. The new law on employee's compensation makes compensable disability or death arising from an ailment under any of the following grounds namely: (a) when the illness is definitely accepted as an occupational disease by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or (b) when said illness is caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the work conditions. Thus, the New Labor Code particularly Art. 167 (1) as amended by PD 1368, defining compensable illness, provides: (1) "Sickness" means any illness definitely accepted as occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment. (As amended by Sec. 1, PD 1368). Implementing the foregoing provision, the Employees' Compensation Commission promulgated its amended Rules, Section 1 (b), Rule III , of which provides: Sec. 1 (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under "ANNEX "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The cause of the decedent's death, is not listed in said Annex "A" as occupational disease. To be compensable thereby the law requires that the risk of contracting the

disease is increased by the employment of the deceased. But this requisite proof can be given only if the cause of the disease cancer can itself be known. However, despite scientific advances on the matter, even professional experts have not as yet determine its cause. In the more recent case of Flaviano Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System (Ministry of Education and Culture), (supra) we stated that: Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-57889 October 28, 1987 FLAVIANO NEMARIA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Education and Culture), respondents.

PARAS, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1398 affirming the decision of respondent government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefits. Petitioner Rosario Nemaria was appointed classroom teacher in November, 1948. She was first assigned in the poblacion of Badian, Cebu. Later she was transferred to the municipality of Ronda, Cebu. From September 8-25 1978, Rosario Nemaria was confined at the Southern Islands' Hospital, Cebu City, for on and off severe abdominal pains, anorexia, weight loss and jaundice, indicative of cancer of the liver, duodenal ulcer and cancer of the breast. These ailments did not respond to medications and she died on October 16, 1978. She was at the time of her death 58 years of age (Rollo, p. 31). The service record of the decedent shows that she rendered government service for about thirty years (Rollo, p. 4). Alleging that the cause of his wife's death was due to her employment as a classroom teacher, herein petitioner filed with the respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended. Subsequently, the GSIS through its medical evaluation and underwriting denied the claim. Upon receipt of the order of denial, petitioner appealed his case to the now respondent Employees Compensation Commission for review. On August 13, 1980, respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision of respondent GSIS denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended, the dispositive portion of which reads: For all the foregoing, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed and the instant case dismissed. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31) In a letter-appeal dated October 13, 1980 the petitioner expressed his desire to appeal his case to the Supreme Court, but he could not come to Manila nor could he hire a lawyer because he was very poor (Rollo, p. 1). In the resolution of November 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court referred petitioner's case to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, Ministry of Justice, for possible legal assistance (Rollo, p. 12).

Hence, this petition. Upon manifestation of counsel for petitioner, the latter was allowed to litigate as pauper in the resolution of August 26, 1981 (Rollo, p. 5). In the resolution of September 21, 1981, this Court without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to comment thereon (Rollo, p. 52). In compliance therewith, respondent Government Service Insurance System filed its comment on November 19, 1981 (Rollo, pp. 65-77), and respondent Employees Compensation Commission on February 2, 1982 (Rollo, pp, 84-91). Acting upon the petition for review on certiorari as well as all subsequent, pleadings filed, the Court resolved in the resolution dated August 30, 1982 to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 97). Petitioner's brief was filed on January 20, 1983 (Rollo, pp. 105-108) while the Solicitor General's brief as counsel for respondent Employees Compensation Commission was filed on April 8, 1983 (Rollo p. 110). Finally, petitioner filed his reply-brief on June 1, 1983 (Rollo, pp. 120-126). The sole issue in the instant case is whether or not petitioner's wife's death is compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626. The petition is impressed with merit. A careful review of the records shows that the question must be answered in the affirmative. It is not disputed that the ailments of the deceased were not listed/enumerated under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation with respect to public school teachers but petitioner anchors his claim under the theory of "increased risk," that is, when said illness is caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions (Brief for Petitioner, pp. 3-4). Respondents, however, insist that the causes of the decedent's death, which are cancer of the liver, duodenal ulcer and cancer of the breast, had nothing to do with her work as a teacher and, therefore, do not fall within the compensable coverage of the law. They pointed out in particular that hepatoma is not an occupational disease in the decedent's particular employment (Rollo, p. 87). They further claim that the predisposing factors deemed largely responsible for the development of the decedent's ailments which resulted in her death were not inherent in or peculiar to her employment as a classroom teacher. Cancer of the liver has something to do with liver cirrhosis while predisposition to duodenal ulcer is traceable to one afflicted with cancer of the liver (Rollo, p. 89). To establish compensability of the claim under the theory of increased risk under Section 1 (b) Rule 111 of P.D. 626, the claim must show proof of reasonable work connection and not necessarily a direct casual relation. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 330 (1981)). Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. There are no stringent criteria to follow. The degree of proof required under P.D. 626 is merely substantial evidence (Sarmiento v. E.C.C. et al., G.R. No. 68648, Sept. 24, 1986). Thus, it has been ruled that a reasonable work-connection is all that is required or that there was a showing that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (San Valentin v. E.C.C., 118 SCRA 160 [1982]). The Court ruled further, that the uncertainty as to whether or not the disease was caused or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the decedent's working conditions cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment was work-connected (Cristobal v. E.C.C., supra),

Both petitioner and respondents are in accord that although the cause of liver cancer is not known, still it has been found to be mostly associated with liver cirrhosis which in turn is caused by alcoholic ingestion plus impaired nutrition; that a high percentage of hepatoma has been discovered also in Asia and Africa which was found to be due to certain hepatic carcinogens digested in food stuffs (Brief of Petitioner, p. 3). The decedent, a public school teacher assigned in a municipality several kilometers away from the provincial capital, rendered her services for more or less twenty-nine (29) years. She started in November 1948 as classroom teacher assigned in the poblacion of Badian, Cebu and from thence she was assigned to the Municipality of Ronda, Cebu, which is a blighted area, where she continued to discharge her duties as classroom teacher (Rollo, p. 68). Under those circumstances, the possibility would not be remote, that she suffered impaired nutrition and while working in a farflung rural area where foodstuffs are not closely examined before being eaten, it is not too far-fetched to consider that she was exposed to hepatic carcinogens which reportedly were ingested therein (ibid). Corollary thereto, it is undisputed that the deceased was in good health when she entered the government service, otherwise, she would not have been accepted for insurance purposes by the Government Service Insurance System. The conclusion is therefore inevitable, that the decedent's ailments developed during her employment while working under conditions which predisposed her thereto. It is enough that hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary may be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability not certainty is the touchstone (Sarmiento v. E.C.C., et al., supra). Respondent Employees Compensation Commission in its decision based its conclusion merely on the findings of the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Group and the medical opinion on references in medical etiology (Rollo, p, 38), concluding that no direct cause factors triggered the contraction of her ailments resulting in death (Rollo, p. 42). What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation (Sagliba v. E.C.C., 128 SCRA 723; Guevara v. E.C.C., 146 SCRA 64-72). In the case of Marte v. E.C.C., 96 SCRA 884, the Court ruled: "... . The findings, however, of the doctors and the Chief Medical Officer of the GSIS and ECC respectively are not binding on this Court as they are not considered experts. Opinion of the Medical Rating Officer who did not physically examine the claimant cannot be relied upon" (Nuguid v. WCC, 93 SCRA 374). The Labor Code is clear that it does not only confine compensable diseases to those enumerated therein as occupational. It also contemplates illness caused by employment where the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions thereof (2nd paragraph, Art. 208, P.D. 626). The Court has ruled that cancer of the liver though not an occupational disease, may be deemed work-connected (Abadiano v. GSIS, 111 SCRA 509, Jan. 30, 1982). Moreover, in the case of Abana v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1279, the Court held that under the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth development or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment had contributed even in a small degree. The Supreme Court applied a liberal interpretation in the case of Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, as follows: While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have abandoned under

the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists. ... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection (103 SCRA 329, 336). ... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in life will have more in law ... . ... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276). ... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law. (Ibid, p. 277). Thus the measurement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility. Moreover, cancer being a disease which is often discovered when it is too late, the possibility that its onset was even before the effectivity of the New Labor Code cannot be discounted. As a consequence the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be totally disregarded. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another is rendered ordering the respondents to pay the herein petitioner the full amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended. SO ORDERED.

Nemaria vs ECC Facts: Petitioner Rosario Nemaria was appointed classroom teacher in November, 1948. She was first assigned in the poblacion of Badian, Cebu. Later she was transferred to the municipality of Ronda, Cebu. From September 8-25 1978, Rosario Nemaria was confined at the Southern Islands' Hospital, Cebu City, for on and off severe abdominal pains, anorexia, weight loss and jaundice, indicative of cancer of the liver, duodenal ulcer and cancer of the breast. These ailments did not respond to medications and she died on October 16, 1978. She was at the time of her death 58 years of age (Rollo, p. 31). The service record of the decedent shows that she rendered government service for about thirty years (Rollo, p. 4). Alleging that the cause of his wife's death was due to her employment as a classroom teacher, herein petitioner filed with the respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 as amended. Subsequently, the GSIS through its medical evaluation and underwriting denied the claim.

Issue: whether or not petitioner's wife's death is compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626.

Ruling: The Labor Code is clear that it does not only confine compensable diseases to those enumerated therein as occupational. It also contemplates illness caused by employment where the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions thereof (2nd paragraph, Art. 208, P.D. 626). The Court has ruled that cancer of the liver though not an occupational disease, may be deemed work-connected (Abadiano v. GSIS, 111 SCRA 509, Jan. 30, 1982). Moreover, in the case of Abana v. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1279, the Court held that under the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth development or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment had contributed even in a small degree. The Supreme Court applied a liberal interpretation in the case of Mercado, Jr. v. Employees Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 270 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, as follows: While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have abandoned under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists. ... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection (103 SCRA 329, 336). ... Where however, the causes of an ailment are unknown to and or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any casual link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in life will have more in law ... .

... The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276). ... As an employee, he had contributed to the funds of respondent for 34 years until his forced retirement. In turn respondent should comply with its duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law. (Ibid, p. 277). Thus the measurement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law cannot demand an impossibility. Moreover, cancer being a disease which is often discovered when it is too late, the possibility that its onset was even before the effectivity of the New Labor Code cannot be discounted. As a consequence the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be totally disregarded.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-29670 October 9, 1987 CENTRAL AZUCARERA DON PEDRO, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and NEMESIO TANIO, respondents.

NARVASA, J.: Nemesio Tanio started working at the Central Azucarera Don Pedro (hereafter simply referred to as the CENTRAL) as a laborer, picking up strewn cane, during the 1946-1947 milling season. Starting with the 1954-1955 milling season, he was assigned as operator of an electrically operated cane-unloading machine. 1 Tanio stopped working on February 9, 1960, allegedly because he began to spit blood at this time. An x-ray examination conducted by the CENTRAL's physician revealed that Tanio was suffering from minimal pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB) in the right lung. He was consequently confined at the CENTRAL's hospital, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement then in force, but after three (3) days, he refused further treatment and at his request was discharged. Tanio then opted to retire, and the CENTRAL paid him P400.00 as gratuity. On March 30, 1960, he executed an affidavit affirming his volunteer refusal to be treated at the CENTRAL's hospital. 2 Three years later, or more precisely on October 8, 1963, Tanio filed a complaint against the CENTRAL with Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor at Manila, seeking disability compensation and reimbursement of medical expenses. The CENTRAL moved to dismiss, alleging that Tanio was statutorily barred from presenting and prosecuting his claim. 3 The Hearing Officer to whom the case was assigned rendered a decision on August 15, 1965 dismissing the case for lack of merit. The decision pointed out that Tanio's averment of having spat blood was corroborated by neither an eyewitness nor medical proof; there was no showing of any resulting disability for labor; and proof of illness alone does not entitle an employee to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 4 On appeal taken by Tanio, the Workmen's Compensation Commission reversed the judgment of the Hearing Officer. It declared that since Tanio was healthy when first admitted for employment by the CENTRAL and he was afterwards found to be suffering from minimal PTB, the presumption was that his illness had been caused or aggravated by his employment, a presumption that had not been overthrown by the evidence on record. It accordingly ordered the CENTRAL to pay Tanio P4,000.00 as disability compensation; P1,300.00 as reimbursement for medical expenses; P400.00 as attorney's fees, and P41.00 as costs. It also commanded the CENTRAL to provide medical services to Tanio until his illness was cured. 5 Subsequently, in a Resolution dated September 27, 1968, the Commission denied the CENTRAL's motion for reconsideration. 6 However, the Medical Member of the Commission dissented. According to her, Tanio's PTB was minimal, was not in an aggravated stage at all but was in fact just being, hence, there could be no causal relation between Tanio's illness and his employment. 7

The CENTRAL has filed a petition with us for the review of the Commission's judgment in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeking to persuade us that the latter has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by us or decided it in a way not in accord with law or our applicable decisions. Said petitioner submits the following particular issues: (1) whether or not the Regional Office No. 4, stationed in Manila, had jurisdiction over Tanio's claim; (2) the proper interpretation of Sections 24 and 45 (paragraph 2) of Act 3428, otherwise known as the Workmen's Compensation Act; (3) whether or not Tanio was entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses notwithstanding his voluntary waiver of proferred medical treatment; and (5) whether or not attorney's fees were correctly awarded despite the absence of any prayer therefor in Tanio's complaint. The CENTRAL maintains that Regional Office No. 4 stationed at Manila is, under the law, without authority to entertain the claim and that Tanio having admitted he is a resident of Bo. Talon, San Luis, Batangas, only Regional Office No. 5 could validly assume jurisdiction over the claim. Under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, a claim for compensation may be filed and heard in the regional office of any of the following places: where the accident occurred; where the claimant, or any of the claimants resides; or where the respondent or any of the respondents, resides, at the option of the claimant. The choice of any of these venues is solely the claimant's. Tanio having opted to file his claim for compensation at the Regional Office No. 4, stationed at Manila, and it having been established that Tanio was residing at Sta. Cruz, Manila, at the time of such filing, Regional Office No. 4 validly assumed jurisdiction over the same. The purpose of the rule is to foster the convenience of the claimant considering that he is the aggrieved party. 8 The CENTRAL contends that in order to maintain an action under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, it was necessary for Tanio to file with said employer notice of his illness and claim for compensation within two months after learning of such illness, as prescribed by Section 24 of the Act; and that, not having done this, his cause of action, if any, had already prescribed when he filed the compensation claim herein with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 4, on October 8, 1963, three years and some seven months after he first learned that he had tuberculosis and chose to retire. That contention is without merit, there being no dispute that as soon as he exhibited the first symptoms of his ailment, which the CENTRAL's physician diagnosed as minimal PTB, Tanio was confined and treated at the CENTRAL's expense at the latter's hospital for at least three days. The employer's act of extending and paying for medical assistance suffices for and obviates the necessity of giving him the notice required by law. Just as we have consistently ruled that compensation claims accruing under the Workmen's Compensation Act and prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code of 1974 prescribe in ten years, 9 so we have also held that delay or failure to give the employer notice of compensable illness or injury within the prescribed period does not bar a claim for compensation if it is shown that the latter, his agent or representative in fact knew of such injury or illness or that he suffered no damage by reason of such delay or lack of notice. 10 Whether, considering the nature of the private respondent's employment, minimal PTB is a compensable illness in his case, is also a settled question. As we held in Villones vs. Employees' Compensation Commission: 11 Moreover, this Court, in consistently holding that the disease of tuberculosis is an occupational disease or work-connected in such occupations as that of a teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and such other occupations, hence

compensable, aptly stated and WE quote: "Medical science has it that tuberculosis as an ailment is latent in man regardless of his age, sex and occupation. When given favorable conditions this disease becomes active and prominent. Some of these favorable conditions are: too much physical exertion without the corresponding rest; exposure to excessive heat and cold; lack of good food as to weaken the body constituents and contact with people suffering from tuberculosis ..." (Corales vs. ECC, supra). Moreover, the CENTRAL having failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act to controvert Tanio's claim within the limiting periods established in said section, 12 it is deemed to have waived by operation of law its right to controvert said respondent's claim on non-jurisdictional grounds. 13 Likewise, we find the CENTRAL's allegation that the Commission erred in awarding attorney's fees without a prayer for such fees and evidence to justify an award thereof, devoid of merit. The case of Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Agno 14 cited by the CENTRAL, is no longer applicable. The insertion of the phrase "which shall be chargeable against the employer" in Section 31 of the Workmen's Compensation Law by Rep. Act 4119, which was approved June 30, 1964 clearly indicates the intention of the law to make attorney's fees an integral part of the compensation or benefits due the employee or his dependents under the Act. As said Section 31 fixes the amount of the attorney's fees that may be recovered, prayer for such relief and proof thereof are no longer necessary. 15 We, however, find that the Commission incurred in legal error in awarding reimbursement for medical expenses and ordering that Tanio be given medical services until his illness is cured. As already observed, after three days of confinement following discovery of his illness, Tanio had refused further treatment and was discharged from petitioner's hospital at his own request, a fact he later confirmed in a sworn statement. The right of a disabled employee to medical attendance under Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, can be impugned or abated if he unreasonably refuses to accept the medical services proferred by the employer, or if he shall voluntarily impede or obstruct such services. 16 WHEREFORE, modified only by striking therefrom the award of P1,300.00 to reimburse medical expenses incurred by Tanio as well as the order that he be extended medical services until he is cured of his illness, the decision under review is affirmed in all other respects, with costs against Central Azucarera Don Pedro. SO ORDERED.

Central vs WCC Facts: Nemesio Tanio started working at the Central Azucarera Don Pedro (hereafter simply referred to as the CENTRAL) as a laborer, picking up strewn cane, during the 1946-1947 milling season. Starting with the 1954-1955 milling season, he was assigned as operator of an electrically operated cane-unloading machine. 1 Tanio stopped working on February 9, 1960, allegedly because he began to spit blood at this time. An x-ray examination conducted by the CENTRAL's physician revealed that Tanio was suffering from minimal pulmonary tuberculosis (PTB) in the right lung. He was consequently confined at the CENTRAL's hospital, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement then in force, but after three (3) days, he refused further treatment and at his request was discharged. Tanio then opted to retire, and the CENTRAL paid him P400.00 as gratuity. On March 30, 1960, he executed an affidavit affirming his volunteer refusal to be treated at the CENTRAL's hospital. 2 Three years later, or more precisely on October 8, 1963, Tanio filed a complaint against the CENTRAL with Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor at Manila, seeking disability compensation and reimbursement of medical expenses. The CENTRAL moved to dismiss, alleging that Tanio was statutorily barred from presenting and prosecuting his claim. 3 The Hearing Officer to whom the case was assigned rendered a decision on August 15, 1965 dismissing the case for lack of merit. The decision pointed out that Tanio's averment of having spat blood was corroborated by neither an eyewitness nor medical proof; there was no showing of any resulting disability for labor; and proof of illness alone does not entitle an employee to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 4

Ruling: That contention is without merit, there being no dispute that as soon as he exhibited the first symptoms of his ailment, which the CENTRAL's physician diagnosed as minimal PTB, Tanio was confined and treated at the CENTRAL's expense at the latter's hospital for at least three days. The employer's act of extending and paying for medical assistance suffices for and obviates the necessity of giving him the notice required by law. Just as we have consistently ruled that compensation claims accruing under the Workmen's Compensation Act and prior to the effectivity of the Labor Code of 1974 prescribe in ten years, 9 so we have also held that delay or failure to give the employer notice of compensable illness or injury within the prescribed period does not bar a claim for compensation if it is shown that the latter, his agent or representative in fact knew of such injury or illness or that he suffered no damage by reason of such delay or lack of notice. 10 Whether, considering the nature of the private respondent's employment, minimal PTB is a compensable illness in his case, is also a settled question. As we held in Villones vs. Employees' Compensation Commission: 11 Moreover, this Court, in consistently holding that the disease of tuberculosis is an occupational disease or work-connected in such occupations as that of a teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and such other occupations, hence compensable, aptly stated and WE quote: "Medical science has it that tuberculosis as an ailment is latent in man regardless of his age, sex and occupation. When given favorable conditions this disease becomes active and prominent. Some of these favorable conditions are: too much physical exertion without the corresponding rest; exposure

to excessive heat and cold; lack of good food as to weaken the body constituents and contact with people suffering from tuberculosis ..." (Corales vs. ECC, supra). Moreover, the CENTRAL having failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act to controvert Tanio's claim within the limiting periods established in said section, 12 it is deemed to have waived by operation of law its right to controvert said respondent's claim on non-jurisdictional grounds. 13 Likewise, we find the CENTRAL's allegation that the Commission erred in awarding attorney's fees without a prayer for such fees and evidence to justify an award thereof, devoid of merit. however,we find that the Commission incurred in legal error in awarding reimbursement for medical expenses and ordering that Tanio be given medical services until his illness is cured. As already observed, after three days of confinement following discovery of his illness, Tanio had refused further treatment and was discharged from petitioner's hospital at his own request, a fact he later confirmed in a sworn statement. The right of a disabled employee to medical attendance under Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, can be impugned or abated if he unreasonably refuses to accept the medical services proferred by the employer, or if he shall voluntarily impede or obstruct such services. 16 WHEREFORE, modified only by striking therefrom the award of P1,300.00 to reimburse medical expenses incurred by Tanio as well as the order that he be extended medical services until he is cured of his illness, the decision under review is affirmed in all other respects, with costs against Central Azucarera Don Pedro.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-62300 September 25, 1987 ANGELITA TAEDO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Agrarian Reform), respondents.

NARVASA, J.: Subject of the instant petition is the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) dated September 11, 1980 which affirmed the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death of her husband, Francisco Tanedo, under P.D. No. 626, as amended. Francisco Tanedo was a Janitor-Laborer in the District Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform at Tarlac, Tarlac. His duties included the cleaning of the comfort rooms of the office and the watering of plants. Prior thereto, he worked as laborer in the former Bureau of Public Highways commencing in February, 1955, then as "Capataz Timekeeper," and "Construction Capataz" before transferring to the Agrarian Reforms Ministry on June 29, 1972. In December, 1976 he was found to be suffering from "puffiness of face, pedal edema and progressive abdominal enlargement." He was accordingly confined at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital where his ailment was diagnosed as "renal insufficiency secondary to chronic renal disease." An apparent recurrence of his illness caused his hospitalization again, in January, 1978, this time at the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. He however failed to respond to the administered treatment; his condition gradually retrogressed. In September, 1978 he sought and obtained admission at the Tarlac Provincial Hospital where, twenty days later, he finally died. His widow, petitioner herein, filed a claim for death benefits with respondent GSIS. The latter denied her claim on the ground that the disease which caused her husband's death, "chronic glomerulonephritis," was not one of the compensable illnesses under the law; this, on the basis of the report (findings and recommendations) of its Medical Director dated May 7, 1979. 1 It overuled her claim that the final diagnosis and effective cause of death was "glomerulonephritis; renal hypertension and Koch's pulmonary." 2 Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the matter to the ECC which, as aforestated, affirmed the decision of the GSIS. She is now before us, praying for reversal of those decisions of the GSIS and the ECC and the award to her of the death benefits she has applied for. A compensable sickness according to the law, 3 is "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the game is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on the peculiar

hazards of employment." That list referred to, of illnesses definitely accepted as occupational diseases, is set out in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. 4 It is clear that in order that "sickness and the resulting disability or death .. be compensable," the claimant must show either: 1) that it is "the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of .. (the ECC) Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;" or 2) if not so listed, that "the risk of contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions. 5 It being at once apparent that "chronic glomerulonephritis" is not among the listed compensable illnesses in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules, it behooved the petitioner to adduce persuasive proof that her decease husband's death was caused not only by said disease but also and additionally by renal hypertension and that Identified by her as "Koch's pulmonary," as was the theory upon which she had founded her application for death benefits, and that, additionally, "the risk of contracting" those diseases was "increased by the working conditions" attendant upon her husband's duties as janitor-laborer. Regrettably, even under the less stringent evidentiary norm of substantial evidence obtaining in employees 'compensation proceedings, 6 petitioner has failed to adduce such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that she has urged the GSIS and the ECC to make. 7 What the evidence does establish, as the ECC observes, is that the disease and its complications from which petitioner's husband died bore no causal relation to the nature of his employment. His hypertension was only a manifestation of his chronic glomerulonephritis, was in other words "simply a complication," and was "not brought about by employment factors." 8 We perceive nothing in the record to warrant reversal of these findings. Neither may an award in petitioner's favor be justified upon any presumption that illness causing death or disability arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by such employment. That presumption was laid down by the old statute. 9 It is however now a thing of the past, abolished on effectivity of the new law on January 1, 1975. 10 Awards of compensation benefits for death or disability can now no longer be made to rest on presumption, but on a showing that the causative disease is among those listed by the ECC, or on substantial evidence that the risk of contracting said disease is increase by the employee's working conditions. 11 WHEREFORE, the petition is dismiss, without pronouncement as to costs. Teehankee, C.J., Cruz and Paras, * JJ., concur. Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Tanedo vs ECC Facts: Francisco Tanedo was a Janitor-Laborer in the District Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform at Tarlac, Tarlac. His duties included the cleaning of the comfort rooms of the office and the watering of plants. Prior thereto, he worked as laborer in the former Bureau of Public Highways commencing in February, 1955, then as "Capataz Timekeeper," and "Construction Capataz" before transferring to the Agrarian Reforms Ministry on June 29, 1972. In December, 1976 he was found to be suffering from "puffiness of face, pedal edema and progressive abdominal enlargement." He was accordingly confined at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital where his ailment was diagnosed as "renal insufficiency secondary to chronic renal disease." An apparent recurrence of his illness caused his hospitalization again, in January, 1978, this time at the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. He however failed to respond to the administered treatment; his condition gradually retrogressed. In September, 1978 he sought and obtained admission at the Tarlac Provincial Hospital where, twenty days later, he finally died. His widow, petitioner herein, filed a claim for death benefits with respondent GSIS. The latter denied her claim on the ground that the disease which caused her husband's death, "chronic glomerulonephritis," was not one of the compensable illnesses under the law; this, on the basis of the report (findings and recommendations) of its Medical Director dated May 7, 1979. 1 It overuled her claim that the final diagnosis and effective cause of death was "glomerulonephritis; renal hypertension and Koch's pulmonary." 2 Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the matter to the ECC which, as aforestated, affirmed the decision of the GSIS. She is now before us, praying for reversal of those decisions of the GSIS and the ECC and the award to her of the death benefits she has applied for.

Ruling: A compensable sickness according to the law, 3 is "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the game is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on the peculiar hazards of employment." That list referred to, of illnesses definitely accepted as occupational diseases, is set out in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. 4 It being at once apparent that "chronic glomerulonephritis" is not among the listed compensable illnesses in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules, it behooved the petitioner to adduce persuasive proof that her decease husband's death was caused not only by said disease but also and additionally by renal hypertension and that Identified by her as "Koch's pulmonary," as was the theory upon which she had founded her application for death benefits, and that, additionally, "the risk of contracting" those diseases was "increased by the working conditions" attendant upon her husband's duties as janitor-laborer. Regrettably, even under the less stringent evidentiary norm of substantial evidence obtaining in employees 'compensation proceedings, 6 petitioner has failed to adduce such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that she has urged the GSIS and the ECC to make. 7 What the evidence does establish, as the ECC observes, is that the disease and its

complications from which petitioner's husband died bore no causal relation to the nature of his employment. His hypertension was only a manifestation of his chronic glomerulonephritis, was in other words "simply a complication," and was "not brought about by employment factors." 8 We perceive nothing in the record to warrant reversal of these findings. Neither may an award in petitioner's favor be justified upon any presumption that illness causing death or disability arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by such employment. That presumption was laid down by the old statute. 9 It is however now a thing of the past, abolished on effectivity of the new law on January 1, 1975.10 Awards of compensation benefits for death or disability can now no longer be made to rest on presumption, but on a showing that the causative disease is among those listed by the ECC, or on substantial evidence that the risk of contracting said disease is increase by the employee's working conditions. 11