Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Carlyle A. Thayer *
[Paper to The Incorporation of Asymmetric Threats in Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
Training Activities, Fourth FPDA Professional Forum, co-hosted by Australia and Malaysia,
Crown Princess Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 20-22, 2003]
I would like to start by thanking the co-hosts for the invitation to address you today. It is
I would also like to enter the standard caveat that I am speaking in my personal capacity
and that my views do not represent the official policy or position of my employer.
for you to meet the Professional Forum’s objective of exploring how the Five Power
My presentation is divided into four parts: asymmetric threat, asymmetric threat and
Southeast Asia, the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) and asymmetric threat,
and a conclusion.
I. Asymmetric Threat
When I was first approached about this topic I conducted a search of the Internet. The
key words ‘asymmetric threats’ generated 8,310 hits, while the related key words
‘asymmetric warfare’ generated 11,600 hits. I will, of course, summarise this enormous
*
Carlyle A. Thayer is Deakin University’s On Site Academic Coordinator at the Centre for Defence and
Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College. He is currently on secondment from the
Australian Defence Force Academy where he holds a personal chair as Professor of Politics.
2
definition of the term asymmetric threat, and asymmetric warfare is as old as warfare
itself. Weaker opponents have always sought to neutralize their enemy’s technological or
One writer argues that the term is nonsense because it implies a dichotomy - symmetry
contested term. That is what we academics do best. We invent terms and then argue
Definition
Let me table for your consideration the following definition coined by Colin Gray of the
University of Reading, ‘asymmetric threats are those that our political, strategic and
Let me repeat: ‘asymmetric threats are those that our political, strategic and military
cultures regard as unusual’. I think this definition is pertinent because of the multinational
nature of the Five Power Defence Arrangements which brings together different
• Unconventional
laws of war
1
Vincent J. Goulding, ‘Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare’, Parameters, Winter 2000-01, 21.
2
Colin S. Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror’, Parameters, Spring 2002, 5 and 14.
3
Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror’, 5.
4
Adapted from Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror’, 5-6.
3
• Raise the prospect of the ‘unknown unknown’. We do not look for what we do not
• Difficult to deter
The asymmetric threats of concern are those that do regional FPDA members, Malaysia
Asymmetric Warfare
Now let me turn to the allied term asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare is a broad
and inclusive term coined to recognize that two sides in a conflict may have such
drastically different strengths and weaknesses that they resort to drastically different
(asymmetric) tactics (or strategies or methods of warfare and conflict) to achieve relative
defined as any conflict deviating from the norm, or an indirect approach to affect a
counter-balancing of force. 5
5
David L. Grange, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern’, National Strategy Forum Review,
Winter 2000, 1.
4
Traditionally, since the emergence of the Westphalian system of states, warfare was
conducted on a state versus state basis. Asymmetry is not just the province of the weak;
It is not my intention here to go into a detailed narrative of the history of modern warfare.
But I would like to introduce the idea that as warfare has evolved we may identify at least
Second generation warfare was characterized by the use of mass firepower and its
second generation armies with the defender often the winner by virtue of being able to
which a vast mismatch exists between the resources and philosophies of the combatant.
In the contemporary world state on state conflict has receded in scope and intensity.
Conflict today is more likely to be between a state and a non-state actor. Non-state actors
that form on the basis of ideology, religion, tribe, culture, zealotry, and illegal economic
6
Gary Eason, ‘Analysis: Asymmetric Warfare’, BBC News Online, April 1, 2003 citing U.S. Brig. General
Vincent Brooks.
7
Jason Vest, ‘Fourth-generation warfare’, The Atlantic Monthly Online, December 2001, 2 and Center for
Defense Information, ‘Reshaping the Military for Asymmetric Warfare’, CDI Terrorism Project, October 5,
2001, 2.
5
and the use of information warfare they have pushed many regions of the world into
anarchy. 8
Non-state actors are difficult to target and engage by conventional means. 9 Non-state
actors may not wear distinctive uniforms so as to be hard to tell apart from the local
community. They have shown themselves willing to fight and die for their causes, most
notably by employing the tactic of suicide bombers. Non-state actors are not constrained
by conventional norms and international law. They employ new and innovative means to
national power, however crucial, is not the decisive factor. Non-state actors cannot be
as well. 10 Indeed, the overwhelming use of force (being seen as too successful), or a
Conflict provoked by non-state actors has no quick fix solutions. Instead non-state actors
cultural elements of national power designed to erode their support base. In addition,
states must often cooperate with neighbours and friends more distant to degrade the
I would now like to turn to a discussion of asymmetric threats and Southeast Asia.
8
Grange, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern’ 2.
9
Vest, ‘Fourth-generation warfare’, 2 citing Franklin C. Spinney, Donald Vandergriff and John Sayen,
Spirit, Blood and Treasure: The American Cost of Battle in the 21st Century.
10
Grange, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern’ 3.
6
Southeast Asia. Almost every state in the region has experienced some form of violent
domestic challenge to the legitimacy of the state. These challenges have arisen from pro
and anti communist insurgencies as well as ethnic, religious and regional separatist
succeeded in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) but failed in the Philippines,
Malaysia, Burma, Indonesia and Thailand. All of these states were characterized by low
levels of economic development. This has meant that the most important security
challenges to the state have been internal. This has had an important impact on national
But there have been several state on state conflicts, notably between North and South
As we move through history from the end of the Second World War through the Cold
War to the present post-Cold War era it is notable that our conception of what constitutes
security has expanded. Traditionally national security was defined in terms of state or
regime security from threats by other state actors. This meant the military element of
national power played a dominant role in national security policy. Alliances were formed
The notion of national security in Southeast Asia, as I have noted, has always been
security was altered by the adoption of a new paradigm called comprehensive security.
7
During the 1970s and mid-1980s, Indonesia and Malaysia both enunciated doctrines of
In 1973 Indonesia’s National Defence Board drew up a Guideline for State Policy which
borrowed from the doctrine of Total People’s Defense and Security. The 1973 Guideline
identified economic development as Indonesia’s top priority and introduced the concept
membership in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and endorsing the
concepts of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a nuclear weapons
During the 1980s the term comprehensive security crept into Malaysia’s political
vocabulary. In March 1984, for example, Datuk Musa Hitam spoke of ‘Malaysia’s
doctrine of comprehensive security’. Two years later, Prime Minister Mahathir stated that
‘security is not just a matter of military capability’ and ‘national security is inseparable
from political stability, economic success and social harmony’. In July 1986, former
prime minister Tun Hussein Onn noted in a speech: ‘national security is dependent on the
satisfaction of two very basic conditions. First, there must be a tolerable level of harmony
between individual security, group security and national security… Second, our external
Let me note briefly that Japan adopted a doctrine of comprehensive security in the late
1970s. The doctrine of common security made its appearance in Europe in the early
1980s, while Canada advanced the notion of cooperative security nearly a decade later.
The final security paradigm that I would like to mention is that of human security. The
end of the Cold War, rapid economic growth in a number of countries, and the spread of
global communications, has resulted in what Samuel Huntington has called a ‘Third
Indonesia and Cambodia. Many of these transitions to democracy have not yet been
consolidated. The point I am trying to make is that economic growth has resulted in the
emergence of a middle class and what is termed ‘civil society’. Civil society refers to the
emergence of a wide variety of local groups that are autonomous from the state, including
issues but are most prominent for their advocacy of civil and human rights. This
development has led to the emergence of the latest security paradigm that of human
security.
Up until this point my entire presentation has implied that the state is a legitimate
political form and that violent challenges to its authority are illegitimate. But what about
the case of totalitarian states like that of the Khmer Rouge, or authoritarian states such as
Suharto’s New Order that decimated the Communist Party of Indonesia and its supporters
and sympathizers? What about repressive military regimes in Burma and Thailand? Is it
Advocates of human security argue that the duty of the state is to provide for the security
of all its citizens from threats of all kinds, such as state violence, not just external military
9
threats. Human security is concerned the totality of factors that can affect the well being
of all individuals – women and men, the aged and the young, ethnic minorities, poor and
rich. Human security is generally focused on multiple risks arising from economic
large-scale refugee movements and pandemics. The advocates of human security argue
that international organizations such as the United Nations as well as local community
emergencies. Rizal Sukuma, an influential advisor in Indonesia, has written, ‘an ASEAN
Security Community should balance its concern over state security with a greater
To sum up, the theme I have been trying to develop is: our conceptualization of national
security has enlarged over the past five decades from security against external aggression
While the role of the military still remains central for the provision of national defence,
the expanded definition of security has resulted in the involvement of many more
government departments and agencies than before. In some cases, the armed forces have
providing comprehensive security. This may have implications for regional members of
the FPDA.
Transnational Threats
undergone a similar redefinition. These new security threats are mainly transnational in
11
Rizal Sukma, ‘The Future of ASEAN: Towards a Security Community’, Paper presented to the seminar
on ASEAN Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects in the Current International Situation, New York, June
3, 2003, 4.
10
nature and are generated primarily by non-state actors. The list of what constitutes a
transnational threat to security is ever enlarging. But for our purposes let me identify the
most prominent: illegal drug smuggling, trafficking in small arms, people smuggling (for
notable that several transnational threats are found together in conflict zones.
The non-state actors involved include warlords, criminal gangs, criminal syndicates, and
terrorist groups. In some instances non-state actors may receive the support of a rogue
state or support from one state organization, such as the military or intelligence service.
The activities of non-state actors often overlap and there is a close connection between
criminals, black marketers, drug lords, arms dealers, zealots and terrorists. 12
Transnational threats by definition affect more than one state and are generally beyond
the capacity of any one state to address. For example, no one country can effectively halt
the illegal drug trade originating in Afghanistan or the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia.
national level and cooperative efforts internationally. Non-state actors attempt to exploit
Some critics have argued that the inclusion of transnational threats in our definition of
security has so stretched the concept of security that it has become meaningless from a
defence point of view. Or to express this objection more colourfully, ‘you can’t stop
I would argue that the broadening definition of what constitutes security has implications
for the armed forces of each country, both domestically and externally. Transnational
12
Grange, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern’ 4.
11
threats, to use an expression coined by Lt. Gen. Hank Stackpole, the president of the Asia
Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, is like ‘rust eating away at the fabric of
society’. Transnational threats threaten the legitimacy of a state by undermining the rule
of law and good governance. Warlords and criminals corrupt state officials (politicians,
police and the judiciary) through bribery. Not so long ago the nexus between drug
traffickers and Cambodian officials led to that country being called a ‘narco-state’.
exports, smuggling and the sale of weapons and equipment to non-state actors.
Transnational threats divert and consume resources that could be put to better purposes.
This undermines the capacity of the state to efficiently meet the needs of its citizens. The
combined effects of these forces may serve to weaken a state to the point where it
becomes a failing or failed state. Non-state actors take advantage of weak or failing states
for refuge and they exploit the discontent of the local population for support. Weak,
failing and failed states negatively impact on their neighbours and the neighbourhood.
Finally, to round off this discussion of transnational threats and security, nothing I have
said is meant in any way to suggest that armed forces or the military have no utility in the
new security environment. While the post-Cold War security situation in Latin America
led one country to disband its military entirely, the security environment in Southeast
Asia is not so conducive. There are a number of unresolved territorial and maritime
boundary disputes. I would not go so far as to argue that there is an arms race in the
region; but I would submit that the arms procurement policies of some states have led to
the introduction of what could be considered offensive platforms. At the very least there
12
is no effective arms control regime in Southeast Asia. There is still disagreement in the
region about the long-term implications of China’s rising military power. And finally,
some non-state actors are continually at war with ‘the state’ and violence is a way of
life. 13
Several states, such as Burma and the Philippines, face low intensity conflicts by
relatively large armed groups. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines may
have 10,000 persons under arms, for example. Conventional military forces still have a
role to play.
The most important source of asymmetric threat to the state in Southeast Asia today
comes not from the aggressive actions of another country but from regionally and
internationally networked terrorist groups. 14 Before discussing this subject I would like to
diverge slightly to discuss some new research on the root causes of terrorism.
It is often argued by regional leaders that the root causes of terrorism are to be found in
underdevelopment and poverty and/or U.S. policies in the Middle East (support for Israel,
and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq). I would say that while these factors may
contribute to the mobilization of terrorists, they are not its root causes.
For the sake of discussion I would like to draw your attention to the research findings
published by Michael Mousseau and Audrey Kurth Cronin. 15 Mousseau argues that ‘the
13
Grange, ‘Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concern’ 4.
14
James Wise, Australian High Commissioner to Malaysia, quoted by Leslie Lau, ‘FPDA to focus on anti-
terror tactics’, The Straits Times, May 28, 2003 and Robert Hill, Minister of Defence, ‘Regional Terrorism,
Global Security and the Defence of Australia’, RUSI Triennial International Seminar, National Convention
Centre, Canberra, October 9, 2003, 1.
15
Michael Mousseau, ‘Market Civilizations and its Clash with Terror,’ International Security, 27(3),
Winter 2002/03, 5-29 and Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International
Terrorism’, International Security, 27(3), Winter 2002/03, 30-58.
13
social origins of terror are rooted… in the values and beliefs associated with the mixed
to the prevalence of patron-client relations in developing mixed economies and the values
and expectations these relations generate. Patrons provide goods, services and protection
while clients provide labour and other forms of support. Globalization breaks this
relationship. But it is not the clients – those on the bottom rung of the economic ladder –
who lose the most. It is the ‘patrons and their lieutenants who hold privileged positions in
the old clientalist hierarchies. This is why leaders of terrorist organizations frequently
Mousseau goes on to argue that Muslim rage over U.S. policies in the Middle East has
deeper roots than just identification with Islam. He states: ‘the underlying cause is not
Islam but rather a deeply embedded antimarket and thus anti-American passion – a fury
that extends beyond the Islamic world and whose origins are not understood even by
those espousing hatred for the West’. 18 Globalization is the cause because it not only
erodes the patron-client relationship but introduces new values that are at odds with the
over the individual, and an incomprehension for objective truth and individual
innocence’. 19
In a separate study Cronin takes a broad historical view of terrorism and argues that its
16
Mousseau, ‘Market Civilizations and its Clash with Terror,’ 6.
17
Mousseau, ‘Market Civilizations and its Clash with Terror,’ 19.
18
Mousseau, ‘Market Civilizations and its Clash with Terror,’ 22.
19
Mousseau, ‘Market Civilizations and its Clash with Terror,’ 27.
14
unprecedented threats from nonstate actors, not only is a reaction to globalization, but is
facilitated by it’, she argues. 20 Globalization has produced a fourth wave of religiously
inspired terrorism. But, she concludes, ‘even though the newest international terrorist
threat , emanating largely from Muslim countries, has more than a modicum of religious
I have made this slight diversion to illustrate that the root causes of terrorism cannot be
eliminated quickly and the impact of globalization will continually be felt in Southeast
Asia. We live in a region where Indonesia and the Philippines, not to mention Myanmar
Terrorism
While there is no internationally agreed definition of terrorism, the United Nations lists
three organizations as terrorist groups: al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI). This forms the legal and normative basis for counter-terrorism by the
international community.
Al Qaeda
1989) hundreds of Muslims from Southeast Asia were drawn to Pakistan where they
received religious indoctrination and military training. Some even crossed over into
Afghanistan and fought with the mujihadeen. A few high level al Qaeda operatives, such
as Ramzi Yousef and Hambali, made their way to Southeast Asia to forge links with local
20
Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism’, 30.
21
Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism’, 35.
15
militant groups and to offer training in terrorist techniques including explosives. Other al
Qaeda operatives used Southeast Asia as a venue for planning terrorist attacks against the
United States.
During the Soviet occupation period, personal ties were forged between the leaders of al
Qaeda and the Abu Sayyaf Group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Jemaah Islamiyah.
When Southeast Asia jihadist veterans returned home some became active in local
militant groups. More Southeast Asian recruits continued to be sent to Afghanistan after
1989. The linkages between al Qaeda and local militant groups represented a new stage
in the development of ‘new terrorism’ in the region. New terrorism is a term used to
The U.S. attack on the Taliban regime, the occupation of Afghanistan and the prosecution
of the global war on terrorism has greatly degraded al Qaeda’s effectiveness and severed
many of its effective links in the region. It is difficult to know whether al Qaeda
maintains its own separate cell structure in the region. 22 It seems likely that al Qaeda
operatives have turned to professional terrorism as a career and have thrown in their lot
Jemaah Islamiyah
The most potent terrorist group in the region is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI); it pursues both a
global Islamist and local political goals. JI is headed by an amir. He heads four councils
with responsibility for governing; religion, discipline and fatwa. 23 Beneath this structure
lies four mantiqis covering territorial administration. Mantiqi 1 covered Malaysia and
22
Hill, ‘Regional Terrorism, Global Security and the Defence of Australia’, 3, argues ‘the links between JI
and Al Qaeda are less clear’.
23
International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, ICG
Asia Report No. 63, Jakarta and Brussels: August 26, 2003, 11.
16
and Sulawesi; and mantiqi four covered Papua and Australia. Each mantiqi was divided
into districts (wakalah) and cells (fiah). The Malaysian cell established linkages with
The JI attempted to forge a regional coalition of like-mined groups under the name of
Rabitatul Mujahidin. 25 Representatives from JI, MILF and militant groups from Aceh,
Sulawesi, southern Thailand, and Myanmar reportedly attended the first meeting.
Rabitatul Mujahidin met three times in Malaysia between 1999 and late 2000. The recent
A recent study of the JI by the International Crisis Group dated August 26th 2003 states:
organization and that the division into units known as mantiqis and wakalahs –
The ISG report notes that all senior members of JI trained in Afghanistan in the late
1980s and early 1990s. It was from among these Afghan alumni that instructors were
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The ISG put the JI’s strength at 2,000; the hard
core may number between 300-500. 27 The ISG Report also identified a JI special
operations unit, Laskar Khos. Another disturbing feature of the ISG report is the
24
Zachary Abuza, ‘Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network’, Contemporary Southeast
Asia, 24(3), December 2002, 453-454.
25
Abuza, ‘Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network’, 459.
26
International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, i.
27
International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, and Hill,
‘Regional Terrorism, Global Security and the Defence of Australia’, 2.
17
identification of new terrorist groups in Indonesia as well as the linkages between JI and
This abbreviated account points to a regional terrorist network that is able to recruit, train,
raise funds and provide logistics support for operations throughout Southeast Asia. MILF
Malaysia reportedly fought in Sulawesi when conflict broke out between Christians and
Muslims.
The JI network planned terrorist attacks on foreign targets in Malaysia and Singapore
including diplomatic missions, U.S. service personnel, and a U.S. warship. Their target
lists also included MINDEF HQ in Singapore, a radar near Changi Airport and the Caltex
Oil Company offices. There were also reports that terrorists considered attacking the
water supply system between Malaysia and Singapore in order to sow discord between
them.
Action by Malaysian and Singaporean security authorities in late 2001 and subsequently
shut down the JI. But key fugitives remain loose. 28 This means that terrorist groups
located outside Malaysia and Singapore could plan and execute terrorist attacks inside
Singapore and Malaysia. Such terrorist attacks could be mounted by a combined force of
JI and extremists from the MILF, Abu Sayyaf Group and other terrorist groups.
Southeast Asia faces other transnational threats in the form of criminal syndicates and
gangs who engage in smuggling small arms and traffic in people and illegal drugs.
Southern Thailand and Cambodia have been identified as the source for much of the
28
Hill, ‘Regional Terrorism, Global Security and the Defence of Australia’, 3.
18
small arms smuggling in the region including to rebels in Aceh. Small arms pass through
Finally, I would mention the prevalence of piracy in Southeast Asia. 29 This term is used
loosely in the literature and includes criminal acts on the high sea as well as robbery and
hijackings in ports and territorial waters. While most piracy appears local, there are
notable instances when international groups hijack a ship, repaint and renumber it and
sell its cargo in a distant port. There is at least one reported instance of GAM rebels in
Indonesia hijacking a supply ship in the straits. As Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister
noted recently, the maritime transport system has become particularly vulnerable to being
All of this discussion now brings me to the matter at hand: the FPDA and asymmetric
threats. The FPDA was formed in 1971 as a result of the exchange of bilateral notes
between its five members. The FPDA was formed in a specific context: the withdrawal of
British forces east of Suez, the end of confrontation with Indonesia, and withdrawal of
The core of the FPDA was IADS – the Integrated Air Defence System, headquartered at
Butterworth. The FPDA remains today the only functioning multilateral military
What is remarkable is that the FPDA has survived for so long and slowly evolved in the
process. There was a period when British naval forces were absent from air defence and
29
Matthew W. Flint, The Timor Sea Joint Petroleum Development Area and Gas Resources: The Defence
Implications, Working Paper No. 13, Canberra: Sea Power Centre Australia, 2003, 28-30.
30
Quoted in Nik Amran Abdullah, ‘Measures to protect shipping lanes from terrorism’, New Straits Times,
October 7, 2003.
19
maritime exercises (Lima Bersatu) in the decade prior to 1988. 31 Australia moved from
stationing aircraft at Butterworth and shifted to a policy of rotation. New Zealand ground
forces were withdrawn from Singapore. In the late 1980s the FPDA was revived. The
most recent development is the expansion from air defence to area defence. 32
Today we have been asked to explore how the how the Five Power Defence
upon the existing cooperation between FPDA members to enhance their individual and
collective ability to deal with emerging asymmetric threats. 33 My instructions today were
not to answer this question but to provide the background – or scene setting – for your
syndicate discussions.
In order to assist these discussions let me briefly address multilateral institutions that
have security roles and how these roles have changed over time. This might provide some
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is the only Asia-Pacific wide security body. It has
set itself the goals of building confidence, preventive diplomacy and elaborating
approaches to conflict resolution. Although much progress has been made in confidence
building measures, several key areas remain: a regional arms register and steps at arms
control. A mechanism has been set up for the ARF to exercise preventive diplomacy but
31
Khoo How San, ‘The Five Power Defence Arrangements: If It Ain’t Broke…’, paper presented to
ASEAN Regional Forum Professional Development Programme, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, April 23-
28, 2000.
32
The FPDA ministers redesignated the HQ Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) to Integrated Area
Defence System at a meeting held in Singapore, July 3, 2000.
33
According to Malaysia’s Defence Minister, Najib Razak, ‘the [FPDA] ministers agreed we should look at
non-conventional forms of threats, in particular global terrorism, piracy and illegal immigrants… The
ministers agreed that external threats in the conventional form have diminished’. Najib also noted that the
shift in emphasis to terrorism did not mean the FPDA ‘will be involved in operational terms but we are
looking at joint training, intelligence sharing and capacity building’; quoted in Agence France Presse,
‘Five-power defence group shifts focus to terrorism’, June 2, 2003, found in SpaceWar.com.
20
this has not been utilized. A regional center that could give early warning of likely
conflict has yet to be established. The ARF has not moved to meet its third goal of
conflict resolution because of the extreme sensitivity to sovereignty by China and other
members.
The ARF works closely with a track 2 body known as CSCAP – Council for Security
region’s leading think tanks. It makes recommendations to senior ARF officials. A study
of CSCAP’s agenda over recent years indicates that it has become increasingly
preoccupied with new security issues – transnational threat. So too has the Asia-Pacific
however, that this preoccupation has altered the ARF agenda which focuses on traditional
threats.
APEC – the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum was originally set up to
encourage trade liberalization. It is not a security body per se but there is initiatives to
have national leaders discuss security issues at APEC summits. Such discussions took
place at the APEC summit in New Zealand in 1999 and were crucial for laying the
ASEAN is not a security body either but it has slowly moved to put security issues on its
agenda. At the recent 9th Summit in Bali, ASEAN adopted a Declaration of ASEAN
Concord II that endorsed the concept of an ASEAN Security Community. Let me quote
The ASEAN Security Community, recognizing the sovereign right of the member
countries to pursue their individual foreign policies and defence arrangements and
21
taking into account the strong interconnections among political, economic and
broad political, economic, social and cultural aspects in consonance with the
ASEAN Vision 2020 rather than a defence pact, military alliance or a joint
foreign policy…
Maritime issues and concerns are transboundary in nature, and therefore shall be
cooperation between and among ASEAN member countries shall contribute to the
The ASEAN Security Community shall fully utilize the existing institutions and
transnational crimes; and shall work to ensure that the Southeast Asian Region
from around the region brought together by the International Institute of Strategic Studies
(IISS) based in London. The Shangri-la Dialogue has discussed terrorism and
la Dialogue took off because there was no comparable regional venue for defence
34
Extracts from paragraphs 2, 5 and 10, ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)’, October 7,
2003.
22
ministers or their representatives. ASEAN Defence Ministers, for example, do not met
peace and stability. It is set within an international and regional context where the
threats. These threats are overwhelmingly transnational, in that they affect more than one
country, and find their origins in the actions of non-state actors. Modern day criminal
syndicates and groups that sponsor new terrorism can shift their geographical base. They
are hard to detect and deter. This raises the question how the FPDA might adopt to these
Transnational threats are dealt with by national government usually through a whole of
organs of government are involved now engaged in this task (police, intelligence, foreign
are very protective of their sovereignty. Yet they must cooperate with other states to
In Southeast Asia the threat of new terrorism has generated many forms of cooperative
responses. At the initiative of the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and several other
regional states have agreed to cooperate against terrorism. APEC, ARF and ASEAN have
all adopted declarations of policy to counter terrorism. ASEAN and the United States
Let me suggest that new terrorism is the main threat to regional security. Consider the
following scenarios:
• The targeting of FPDA assets including IADS HQ, naval ships and aircraft on
FPDA exercises or in ports. Terrorists could employ car bombs, shoulder held
destabilization.
Malaysia and Singapore bear the responsibility for reacting to these incidents and seeking
cooperation from countries of their choice. All I would like to raise is the question of how
35
The Electronic Warfare & Informational Operations Association estimates that there are 500,000
shoulder launched SAMs in circulation globally. U.S. intelligence estimates that 7,000 SAMs are on the
black market and that 27 terrorist groups have acquired SAMs. Over the last two decades it has been
estimated that between 29-40 civilian aircraft have been subject to SAM attack. See: Patrick Goodenough,
‘Australia Mulls Terrorist Missile Threat to Airlines’, CNSNews.com, September 5, 2003 and Associated
Press, ‘Missile fears for Bangkok airport’, The Straits Times Interactive, September 8, 2003.
36
Australia’s Incident Response Regiment has conducted joint training in chemical, biological and
radiological response with Singapore; Hill, ‘Regional Terrorism, Global Security and the Defence of
Australia’, 5. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the number of nuclear material
smuggling cases rose dramatically in Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia in 2001. During the period
1993-01, more than a hundred attempts to smuggle nuclear material into Turkey were discovered. See:
Representative Ellen Tauscher, ‘Countering the New Asymmetric Threats’, Blueprint Magazine,
November 15, 2001, found at New Democrats Online, NDOL.org.
24
if at all should the FPDA adjust its activities to meet these and other transnational threats.
IV. Conclusion
Asymmetric threats are here to stay. They will be employed by internationally and
military response alone is not the most effective way of dealing with such threats. A
element.
The rise of asymmetric threats and asymmetric warfare is taking place within the context
security.
New threats to security are transnational in nature and involve the actions by non-state
actors and sometimes the support of rogue states. The issue of transnational threats
naturally has led some states to consider the role of the armed forces in meeting them.
Southeast Asians are proud to note that since the foundation of ASEAN in 1967 no
member of the organization has gone to war with another member. At the same time, the
In these circumstances can the long experience of multilateral cooperation fostered by the
FPDA be adjusted or refocused to meet these new challenges? Can the FPDA serve as a
model for other regional security endeavours? Should the geographic scope of FPDA
exercises be expanded to include the states of eastern Malaysia? Should the FPDA
contemplate expanding its membership by including Brunei at some time in the future?
I would now like to conclude by offering some thoughts on two issues to assist you in
your syndicate discussions. These are drawn from the article written by Colin Gray cited
earlier. 37
• posing possible menaces so awful and awesome that countries dare not respond,
at least not until actual experience provides incontrovertible evidence of the threat
2. What factors should shape our response? Factors shaping our response include:
• We tend to focus on the most recent event and project it forward. But the
37
Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror’, 8-13.
26
• We need to be alert to the possibility that asymmetric threats can wreak their
undertake.
• We need to identify and think hard about threats to which we lack obvious
responses.
• What do our adversaries value highly, and how can we threaten or hurt those
values?
Thank you.