Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Carlyle A Thayer
Professor of Politics and
Director UNSW Defence Studies Forum
The University of New South Wales at
the Australian Defence Force Academy
c.thayer@adfa.edu.au
Paper to panel on
Southeast Asia and China:
A North-South Relationship of a New Kind
47th International Studies Association Annual Convention
Carlyle A. Thayer
Abstract
This paper provides an overview of China’s international security cooperation diplomacy with
the states of Southeast Asia. China has pursued international security cooperation both
multilaterally and bilaterally.
In March 1997, China broached for the first time what it termed its “New Concept of Security” at
a meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF). In 2003, in a
major development, China and ASEAN reached agreement on a “Strategic Partnership for Peace
and Prosperity” that included cooperation in security matters.
Between 1999 and 2000, China negotiated long-term cooperative framework agreements with ten
of the region’s states (East Timor excepted). Six of these agreements included a clause covering
security cooperation. The six signatories included: Brunei, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand. China already had long-standing defense links with Myanmar. In
addition, China developed security cooperation ties with, Cambodia, Vietnam and Indonesia.
The paper reviews the nature and scope of China’s bilateral international security cooperation in
the period after 2002 when China revised this concept and began a renewed effort to promote
security cooperation on a multilateral basis within the ARF.
Wu Baiyi, “The Chinese Security Concept and its Historical Evolution,” Journal of Contemporary
1
current concept signifies two major changes… For the first time economic
security is treated as equally important with those of ‘high politics’. Second, it
focuses more on the interrelationship between external and internal security
challenges.
Other specialists point to the catalytic events of 1996 as having a major impact in
shaping China’s new security concept. For example, Chu Shulong, Senior Fellow
at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, argues:
[s]ince the early 1970s till the middle of the 1990s, China actually liked to see
America remaining [sic] its military presence and alliance system in Asia as a
useful counter force against the Soviet threat. That position changed since
1996 when the U.S. and Japan started to negotiate the new guideline for their
security cooperation. The Chinese feel offended and threatened by the
enlarging area of American-Japanese security cooperation from defending
Japan to dealing with events in the areas of ‘surrounding Japan’… Since then,
in the public statements, Chinese position has been strongly against U.S.-
Japan security alliance and no longer welcome American military presence in
the region. 2
Chu also noted, however, that “the real Chinese position is complicated and
flexible. It opposes U.S.-Japan security alliance but does not challenge U.S.-
Korean alliance in Northeast Asia.”
Banning Garret and Bonnie Glaser, two American China specialists, argue along
similar lines. They claim that China’s paradigm shift was not only a reaction to
the revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, but also due to the dispatch two
carrier groups to the Taiwan Straits in March 1996 as a response to Chinese
military threats against Taiwan. 3 These twin developments led Chinese military
and civilian leaders to re-evaluate whether the U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S.
forward deployed forces were a strategic benefit or a greater threat to Chinese
security. According to Garret and Glaser: “this strategic conundrum has led
Beijing to search for a means to counterbalance the strengthening of the U.S.-
Japan alliance and bolster Chinese leverage over Washington while not
foreclosing the possibility of improving relations with the United States.” 4
2
Chu Shulong, “The Chinese Thinking on Asia-Pacific Regional Security Order,” Paper delivered
to a seminar at the East-West Center, Honolulu, May 2001, 1.
3Banning Garrett, and Bonnie Glaser, 1997. “China Works on its Design for a New Asian
Security Structure,” International Herald Tribune, June 28-29, 1997, 44.
4Ibid.
4
5People’sRepublic of China, State Council, Information Office, China’s National Defense, “Full Text
of the White Paper on China’s National Defense,” Xinhua News Agency [Beijing], July 27, 1998.
6People’s Republic of China, State Council, Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2000,
’Text’ of PRC White Paper on National Defense in 2000,” Xinhua Domestic Service [Beijing],
October 16, 2001.
7Ronald Montaperto, “Thinking Globally, Acting Reginally,” Comparative Connections: An E-
Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 6(4), 4th Quarter, October-
December 2004.
5
8Quoted in Carlyle A. Thayer, “China‘s ‘New Security Concept’ and ASEAN,” Comparative
Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 2(3), 3rd
Quarter, October 2000, 65-75.
9Mark Mitchell and Michael Vatikiotis, “China Steps in Where U.S. Fails,” Far Eastern Economic
Review, November 23, 2000, 20-22.
10LyallBreckon, “Beijing Pushes ‘Asia for the Asians’,” Comparative Connections: An E-Journal on
East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 4(3), 3rd Quarter, July-September
2002.
6
stability of the relevant region and the world as a whole; and it must not be used
to interfere in the recipient state’s internal affairs.” 11
Chapter nine of the 2004 White Paper deals with international security
cooperation in five main areas: strategic consultation and dialogue; regional
security cooperation; cooperation in non-traditional security fields, participating
in UN peacekeeping operations; and military exchanges. Chapter nine clearly
stresses the importance China places on its interaction with ASEAN and the
ASEAN Regional Forum (see discussion below).
The following section will review briefly the structure of China-ASEAN relations
and China’s bilateral relations with Southeast Asian states.
11People’s Republic of China, State Council, Information Office China’s National Defense in 2004
in joint development” in the South China Sea during the course of state visits to
Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines. 15
Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity
In October 2003 China’s relations with ASEAN moved to a new plane with
Beijing’s accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the
declaration of a “strategic partnership for peace and prosperity” by the heads of
government. 16 This latter document was given flesh in December 2004 with the
adoption of a five-year Plan of Action (2005-2010). Included in this plan, inter alia,
was a commitment to increase regular high-level bilateral visits, cooperation in
the field of non-traditional security, security dialogue and military exchanges
and cooperation. The Plan of Action set out the following:
• Promote mutual confidence and trust in defense and military fields with a
view to maintaining peace and stability in the region;
• Conduct dialogues, consultations and seminars on security and defense
issues;
• Strengthen cooperation on military personnel training;
• Consider observing each other’s military exercises and explore the
possibility of conducting bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises;
and
• Explore and enhance cooperation in the field of peacekeeping.
The China-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity is the first formal agreement of this type between China and a
regional organization, as well as a first for ASEAN itself. The joint declaration
itself is wide ranging and includes a provision for the initiation of a new security
dialogue as well as general cooperation in political matters. China raised the
prospect of “enhanced strategic relations” with ASEAN in discussions between
State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan and ASEAN Secretary General Ong Keng Yong in
Beijing in July 2004.
But ASEAN has been shy of advancing too quickly. In May 2004, during the
course of a visit to Beijing by Malaysia’s new prime minister, Abdullah Badawi,
his Chinese counterpart, Premier Wen Jiabao, suggested they consider a joint
undertaking to maintain the security of sea lines of communication through the
Malacca Strait. The following month, the deputy director of China’s National
15
Xinhuanet, Beijing, July 19, 2005 in People’s Liberation Army Daily, July 20, 2005.
16Lyall
Breckon, “A New Strategic Partnership is Declared,” Comparative Connections: An E-Journal
on East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 5(4), 4th Quarter, October-
December 2003.
9
for intervention, and “separatism was gaining ground. All these will endanger or
jeopardize the security and stability of the region. That’s why we advocate that
all countries adopt the new security concept built upon equality, dialogue,
mutual confidence and cooperation.” 20
China hosted the first ARF Security Policy Conference in November 2004. 21
China and Myanmar co-hosted two inter-sessional meetings on confidence
building measures, one held in Beijing and the other in Yangoon. At the 11th
ARF Meeting in 2004, China tabled a series of proposals for the future
development of the ARF. These were summarized in the 2004 White Paper as
follows:
To maintain its forum nature and adhere to the basic principles of decision-
making through consensus, taking an incremental approach, and moving at a
pace comfortable to all member so as to encourage the initiative and active
participation of all members; to continuously strengthen and consolidate
confidence-building measures (CBMs) while actively addressing the issue of
preventive diplomacy, so as to gradually find out cooperative methods and
approaches for preventive diplomacy that are suitable to the region and
fitting the current needs; to increase participation of defence officials,
promote exchanges and cooperation among militaries of the countries
concerned and give full play to the important role of the militaries in
enhancing mutual trust; to highlight cooperation in non-traditional security
fields such as counter-terrorism and combating transnational crimes. 22
In March 2005, China hosted an ARF Seminar on enhancing cooperation in the
field of non-traditional security issues on Hainan Island.
example, the PRC-Indonesia statement reads: “The Indonesian side reiterates its
continuing adherence to the One China policy and its recognition that the
Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government
representing the entire Chinese people and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of
China and supports the process of peaceful reunification of China.” The PRC-
Cambodia statement also includes support for the peaceful reunification of
China. The PRC-Laos joint statement declares: “the Lao side… stands firmly
against any attempt to create two Chinas or ‘a China and a Taiwan’.”
The 1999 PRC-Vietnam joint statement contains a more detailed elaboration on
relations with Taiwan than found in the other statements. This joint statement
declares: “Vietnam maintains only nonofficial economic and trade contacts with
Taiwan and will never develop any official relationship with Taiwan. The
Chinese side reaffirms that the Taiwan issue is purely that of China’s internal
affairs. It resolutely opposes the establishment of any form of official relationship
or any contact of an official nature with Taiwan by any country that has
established diplomatic relations with China.”
Eight of the joint statements contain a specific pledge by China to respect the
“independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” of the other party. This
commitment is omitted from the PRC-Brunei and PRC-Vietnam documents. The
PRC-Indonesia joint statement contains the further elaboration, “The Chinese
side holds that Indonesia’s stability, integrity and prosperity are conducive to
peace and development in the region, and supports the Indonesian Government
in its efforts to maintain national unity and territorial integrity and to facilitate
ethnic reconciliation and promote harmony in the country on the basis of
equality.”
The PRC-Vietnam 1999 joint statement contains the mutual pledge to reach
agreement on their land border by the end of the year, to demarcate maritime
areas in the Gulf of Tonkin by the end of 2000, and “to continue to maintain the
existing mechanism for talks on the offshore problem…” A land border treaty
was signed in 1999 and an agreement on demarcation of maritime areas in the
Gulf of Tonkin was signed the following year.
With the exception of the PRC-Vietnam and PRC-Thailand statements, all other
joint statements include the pledge to consult and cooperate in various
multilateral forums including the United Nations, ASEAN, and ASEAN Plus
Three (or some form of wording in support of East Asian cooperation). Seven
joint statements also include the ASEAN Regional Forum (Vietnam, Thailand
and Cambodia excepted). Five joint statements include APEC and AESM (PRC-
Malaysia, PRC-Brunei, PRC-Indonesia, PRC-Singapore, and PRC-Myanmar).
Four joint statements also included the WTO (PRC-Malaysia, PRC-Indonesia,
PRC-Singapore, and PRC-Myanmar). Only the PRC-Indonesia joint statement
includes a reference to the Non-Aligned Movement.
13
Joint statements between China and Laos, Myanmar and Thailand pledged
support for Quadrangle Economic Cooperation and for the Mekong Sub-region,
the China-Cambodia joint statement mentioned support for the Mekong Sub-
Region only. These references do not appear in the PRC-Vietnam joint statement.
Table 1
Military Exchanges Between China and Southeast Asia, 2002-06
Country Activity
Brunei 2002 June Commander Royal Brunei Armed Forces visits Beijing
2003 September PLA Chief of General Staff visits Brunei
2003 November two PLAN ships pay port visit
2004 September Commander of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces visits Beijing
2004 November PLA Commander, Shenyang Military Area Command, visits
Brunei
Thailand 2002 June Supreme Commander Royal Thai Armed Forces pays visit to Beijing
2003 September Defense Minister, National Security Adviser and the three service
chiefs join the Thai Prime Minister on an official visit to Beijing
2003 September Undersecretary of Thai Ministry of Defense visits Beijing to
attend 2nd defense security consultation
2003 November Commander of the Royal Thai Army visits
2003 November-December Commander Jinan Military Area Command visits
2004 March-April China’s Defense Minister visits Bangkok
2004 August Director of the Office of Strategic Research, Thai National Defense
Research Institute visits Beijing
2004 August two Royal Thai Navy frigates visit Shanghai
2004 October PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff visits
2004 December Deputy Director of the PLA General Political Department pays
visit
2005 June China’s Defense Minister meets the Thai Army Commander-in-Chief
2005 July Thai Minister of Defense visits Beijing
2005 December PLAN Shenzhen destroyer and supply ship make port visits and
hold joint search and rescue exercise with the Royal Thai Navy in Gulf of
Thailand
2006 January Thai Defense Minister visits Beijing
2006 February Delegation from the Thai National College and National Defense
Studies Institute visits Beijing
17
Vietnam 2001 November PLAN Jiangwei-II guided missile frigate makes port call in Ho Chi
Minh City
2002 October Chief of the General Political Department of the Vietnam People’s
Army (VPA) visits Beijing
2003 January the Commander of the Chengdu Military Region visits Vietnam
2003 September Delegation of young PLA service personnel visits Vietnam
2003 October-November VPA Chief of General Staff visits Beijing
2004 February-March PLA Deputy Chief of the General Staff visits
2004 December PLA Deputy Director of the General Political Department pays
visit
2005 October Defense Minister visits Beijing and reaches agreement on joint naval
patrols in Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu); the defense Ministers also discussed defense
industry cooperation
Table 2
China’s Security Dialogues with Southeast Asia, 2002-06
ASEAN 2003 October China and ASEAN issue a Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership
for Peace and Prosperity that includes, inter alia, a new security dialogue
2005 July ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the Declaration on the Conduct
of Parties in the South China Sea set up to recommend measures to implement the
agreement
Indonesia 2005 April President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and China’s President Hu
Jintao sign a joint declaration on strategic partnership
2005 July President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visits Beijing and signs an
agreement on defense cooperation
Malaysia 2005 September Defense Ministers from China and Malaysia sign MOU on
defense cooperation which sets out a framework for bilateral defense activities
2005 December China-Malaysia Summit issues joint communiqué on expanding
strategic cooperation which, inter alia, promotes exchange of information in non-
traditional security areas and consultation and cooperation in defense and
security areas, and military exchanges between the two countries
18
Philippines 2004 November the Philippines Secretary of Defense and China’s Minister of
Defense sign a MOU on defense cooperation with a provision for annual defense
talks
2005 May first dialogue on defense and security
Singapore 2005 November Defense Ministers meet in Beijing and agree to hold an annual
defense policy dialogue at permanent secretary level
Vietnam 2005 April China and Vietnam hold their first consultations on defensive security
in Beijing
Table 3
Chinese Military Sales to Southeast Asia, 2002-06
Country Activity
Malaysia 2004 July Malaysia and China sign a technology transfer agreement which
may include Malaysia’s procurement of Chinese medium-range surface-to-
air missiles
2005 September China and Malaysia sign MOU on defense cooperation
covering training, information exchange and a framework for bilateral
defense activities including a framework for bilateral defense activities
Philippines 2002 China offers the Philippines US$3 million in military assistance to
establish as Chinese-language program for Filipino military personnel and
donate engineering equipment
2005 March China pledges US$1.2 million in military assistance including
engineering equipment (six bulldozers and six graders)
Thailand 2003 September China offers a $600 million loan for the purchase of
weapons and spare parts
2005 May China and Thailand sign a MOU outlining a barter exchange of
Thai dried fruit for 96 Chinese armored vehicles (Type WMZ 551B). The
three-year contract will commence in August 2006.
Vietnam China’s NORINCO has provided Vietnam with ammunition for small arms
and artillery and military vehicles and assisted in co-production of
ammunition and heavy machine guns (Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 4,
2006)
China has not been an active arms merchant in Southeast Asia, except for sales to
Myanmar and Thailand during the Cambodian Conflict (1978-91). These details
are not captured in Table 3 above which covers the period from 2002 until the
present (March 2006). Since 1990, China has provided Myanmar with US $1.6
billion in military assistance and trained substantial numbers of its military
personnel. In particular. China has assisted with the modernization of
Myanmar’s navy, the construction of port facilities in Hainggik and Great Cocos
Islands, and the upgrading of the Mergui naval base. 24
In 2005 China reached agreements with Indonesia and Malaysia involving
defense industry cooperation. In particular, China indicated a willingness to sell
24
Bruce Vaughn, China‐Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States.
CRS Report for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, The Library of
Congress, February 8, 2005, 16.
20
25“RI, China to cooperate in rocket development,” The Jakarta Post, May 17, 2005.
26“Chinese missile aid for Indonesia,” IISS Strategic Comments, August 2006, 11 (6).
21
27Ronald Montaperto, “Find New Friends, Reward Old Ones, but Keep All in Line,” Comparative
Connections: An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 6(3), 3rd
Quarter, July-September 2004. Montaperto also offered this assessment, “[t]he agreement on
missile sales and technology transfer also may indicate a new Chinese willingness to adopt
policies that suggest that the centrality of Singapore to Chinese relations with ASEAN may be in
question.”
Xinhua, “China helps Thailand train landmine clearance personnel,” People’s Daily Online,
28
September 8, 2005.
22
Bilateral political relations between Vietnam and China were later codified by
party leaders who met in Beijing in early 1999. 29 Late the following year the two
sides signed a Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the New
Century between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam. 30 Although China signed similar long-term cooperative framework
agreements with all the other members of ASEAN, including six agreements
with a defense cooperation clause, it is notable that no such clause was included
in the Sino-Vietnamese agreement, perhaps because of the contentious nature of
unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea. According to the joint
statement, “[b]oth sides will refrain from taking any action that might complicate
and escalate disputes, resorting to force or making threats with force.”
Defense contacts were first opened with the exchange of delegations from the
Vietnamese and Chinese defense ministries’ External Relations Departments in
February and May 1992, respectively. There has been a marked imbalance in the
exchange of delegations at the ministerial level. Vietnam’s defense minister has
visited China four times, while China’s defense minister has made only one visit
to Hanoi. The exchanges at the level of Chief of the General Staff, General
Political Department and General Logistics Department are more balanced.
Contact at the level of service chiefs has been confined to one visit by the PLA
Navy Air Force in 1997. In November 1991, the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army Navy made its first port visit to Vietnam.
Defense relations between China and Vietnam up to 2005 almost entirely focused
on exchanges of views on regional security, ideological matters and border
security issues. Table 4 above sets out data on the exchange of delegations at the
Military Region level. Since the normalization of political relations both China
and Vietnam have undertaken to de-mine and to dispose of unexploded
ordnance in their frontier area. After the signing of a treaty on their common
border in December 1999, both sides have begun to physically demarcate this
area.
In April 2005, in a significant development, China and Vietnam held their first
round of consultations on defensive security in Beijing. 31 Xiong Guangkai,
deputy chief PLA Chief of the General Staff and his counterpart, Nguyen Duc
Soat, conducted the discussions. According to media reports, the two exchanged
views on “international and regional security”, “defense and army-building” and
“the relationship between the two nations and the two armed forces.”
Table 4
Exchanges at Military Region Level
Between China and Vietnam, 1996-2003
Soat also met with Xu Caihou, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission
and Liang Guanglie, PLA Chief of the General Staff. Xu quoted the famous
Chinese character depiction of Sino-Vietnamese relations popularized by former
President Jiang Zemin who said China pursued a policy toward Vietnam of
”looking to the future, boosting good neighborly friendship and exploring the
all-around collaboration.” Xu offered the view that the PLA was willing to
continuously strengthen the friendly and cooperative ties with the VPA and
promote all-round development of friendly ties. 32 In reply Soat stated that
Vietnam too hoped to reinforce the cooperation between the two armed forces.
This these of future cooperation also featured in the discussions between Liang
Guanglie and Nguyen Duc Soat. Liang stressed that China was willing to make
joint efforts with the Vietnamese side to push for new development of friendly
relations between the two militaries. 33
In July 2005, a PLA delegation led by chairman Zhang Yi Min paid a weeklong
visit to Vietnam at invitation of Deputy Minister of National Defense, Nguyen
Huy Hieu. During the course of his stay, Zhang held talks with the General
Department for National Defense and visited the Z.195 factory and the
25, 2005.
40Vietnam News Agency, “Vietnamese Defense Minister visits China,” October 25, 2005. This
visit was undertaken in the context of the planned visit by China’s President and party Secretary
General Hu Jintao Hu visited from October 31-November 2, 2005.
25
In the meeting between Generals Cao and Tra, Cao promised that “China will
join hands with Vietnam to promote the comprehensive development of the
relations between the two nations and the two military forces” and “China hopes
the two sides can have closer military exchanges and greater mutual trust
through cooperation in wider areas.” 41 Tra noted in reply, “the continuous
consolidation and development of bilateral relations is a common aspiration of
the two peoples. It is in compliance with their interests and conducive to the
peace and stability of the region and the world at large.” Zhang Dinga, member
of the Central Military Commission and Commander of the PLAN, and Xiong
Guangkai, PLA Deputy Chief of the General Statt, were also present at the talks.
Cao, Zhang and Xiong are all members of the Central Military Commission
headed by Hu Jintao. The two Defense Ministers signed an historic agreement on
joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin/Beibu Gulf. In August, the two sides
agreed to speed up demarcation discussions of their border and were expected to
complete a border treaty that would also include Laos with a year’s time. 42 .
41Xinhuanet, October 26, 2005; and “China, Vietnam to further military ties,” Xinhuanet, October
26, 2005.
42ABC Radio Australia, October 28, 2005.
26
resources are found. In addition, China will also have in interest in maintaining
the security of maritime lines of communications, especially through Southeast
Asia and the Malacca Straits. China, India and other growing economies could
become competitors for energy resources to fuel their economic growth. Both
China and India are seeking oil from Iran. This factor already may be driving
naval force modernization in these two countries.
China’s economic rise will impact on Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific
region. China’s economic success will create competitive pressures in other states
to reform and open their markets to foreign investment. China’s “peaceful rise”
will stimulate trade and investment from its neighbors. For example, China’s
economic success has contributed to lifting Japan out of recession and keeping
the Philippines from falling into recession. China’s energy needs have been a
boon to Indonesia’s oil, gas and mining sectors. In short, there are grounds for
concluding that China’s growing economy will be a catalyst for growth in
Southeast Asia.
China’s economic growth will also provide a firm foundation for its defense
modernization. It is commonly assumed that real Chinese defense expenditures
range between U.S. $31-$38 billion in 2003, well above the official Chinese figure
of U.S. $22.3 billion. 43 By 2020, China will overtake Russia as the second largest
spender on defense after the United States. China’s projected economic growth
indicates that it will be able to spend between 2.3% and 5% of Gross Domestic
Product on defense. By 2025, these figures would result in expenditures in the
range of U.S. $185 billion (or 60% of the U.S. defense budget in 2003) and $403
billion (or one-third greater than the U.S. defense budget in 2003).
There are two main drivers of China’s military procurement program (1) the
perceived intermediate and long-term challenge posed by the United States and
(2) the desire to project power. Specifically, China’s objective of reasserting
control over Taiwan must take into account the possibility of U.S. military
intervention should a crisis occur. The People’s Liberation Army has devoted
extraordinary efforts to purchase and develop weapons systems to deter the
United States from intervening in a Taiwan contingency. These capabilities will
inevitably extend China’s military reach in Southeast Asia.
Dana Dillon and John J. Tkacik, Jr., “China and ASEAN: endangered American Primacy in
44
Southeast Asia,” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1886, October 19, 2005, 5.
29
45
Vaughn, China‐Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States, op. cit.
15.
Chien-peng chung, “Southeast Asia-China Relatons: Dialectics of “Hedging’ and ‘Counter-
46
Hedging’,” in Daljit Singh, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 2004. Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2004, 51.
47
Robert Sutter, “Emphasizing the Positive; Continued Wariness,” Comparative Connections: An E-
Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (Honolulu: Pacific Forum-CSIS), 7(4), 4th Quarter, October-
December 2005.