IN THE LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND AQL627-11 BETWEEN Blodwen Patricia May Allan, Esther Ann Allan, Donna Rebecca

Allan Applicants AND Fraser Coast Regional Council Respondent STATEMENT OF ESTHER ANN ALLAN I, Esther Ann Allan, of 73 Constitution Road Windsor in the State of Queensland make oath and state as follows: Preliminary
1. I own the property described as the Allan Farm at Doongul Creek via Torbanlea with my sister Donna Allan. This property is our family home and has been in the family since at least 1908. I grew up on this property and have knowledge of the history, locality and the geography of the place. The house I grew up in is in the same location today. 2. The road access to the house and improvements was historically across Logbridge Creek by a timber log bridge via Allans Road. The road access was unchanged until Wide Bay Water Corporation (WBWC) built two new causeways at their current locations in Logbridge Creek and Powell Creek. These new causeways were built in 2007. The Powell Creek causeway was initially a piped dirt bank culvert but was changed to a dipped concrete culvert after the initial piped culvert was washed out in February 2008. To obtain access to and from the property on the post gazettal route, one crosses Logbridge Creek (across a culverted causeway), Powell Creek (across a piped causeway that dips like a gully in the centre) and a small flat and saddle on the home paddock before arriving at the house. 3. The location is remote and the property has always been reliant on the water sources associated with Doongul and Logbridge Creek. The family farm house has never to my knowledge, prior to the installation of the Lenthalls Dam Gates in or around December 2007, been subject to inundation.

1950s 4. Our local understanding was that the farm house was located above all known flood events but not too remote from the creeks to carry water in the early days. The experience in the

2 1950s as retold to me bears this out. As children we were told that in the 1950s flood, our family had moved equipment and were concerned about the event. As the weather event worsened, the family prepared to evacuate, planning to leave chickens and household pets including a goat inside the house but the evacuation never occurred as water did not end up under the house. This story was told to me by my father, Alfred George Allan, now deceased.

1974 Flood Event 5. I was a child at home on the property in the 1974 flood event; water was not under our home and did not cut us off at the area identified as the saddle. We did not have egress from the property via Doongul or Logbridge Creek during this event. I do not recall this event being a concern to the family as the farm house was a safe refuge in extreme weather events and not viewed as at risk in any way. Installation of Dam Gates 6. Since the installation of the dam gates in December 2007 family members have been stranded, at the farm house in flood events on 3 occasions with concerns that the raised dam levels would inundate the area where the house is. This has been distressing and frightening. 7. There have been a multitude of warnings issued by WBWC over the four months of each wet season at all times of the day and night. There have been numerous evacuation calls and the dam gates have failed at least 12 times since installation and it is believed 3 times in 2013, the last gate failure was on 6 March 2013 Exhibit A. In this event four gates rose up during the event. The ongoing and regular nature, each wet season of the gate failures has caused us to worry continually for equipment, machinery, property and stock as all of our holding yards and storage are in this location. We have never experienced anything like this prior to the Dam Gate installation.

8. The first time stranding occurred was in February 2008, on this occasion WBWC did not notify us that the dam gates had failed and the Emergency Action Plan (EAP) was blank. Exhibit B. When I contacted the Dam Safety Regulator (Department of Natural Resources) during the event for advice I was told by Ron Guppy NRM, the dam gates were working. 9. Ron Guppy confirmed by email that the dam gates were not commissioned yet and were therefore held down. The gist of the advice was that the river should be functioning as though the gates werent there, this was the advice WBWC had given him Exhibit C1. I was surprised by Ron Guppys response as local people had told me it was common knowledge the dam gates were stuck were stuck in the up position and had not worked in a flood event in January 2008. Later we were notified by Ron Guppy in an email that the dam gates had not worked in this event. Exhibit C1. In March 2008 Peter Care provided further confirmation to

3 the Dam Safety Regulator of his interpretation of events, Exhibit C2. 10. At no time prior to the dam gate installation have we ever needed to know what was occurring on the river downstream as, in flood events, our home was always a safe refuge. We have not needed to ask for anyones help in any prior weather event before the installation of the dam gates on or around December 2007. We have never needed to evacuate the property or the house prior to dam gate installation. 11. Once the risks were acknowledged by the Dam Safety Regulator (DNR) WBWC were asked to include contact details for our family in the EAP. My contact details and those of my sister-inlaw Nicole Condon, were included in the Emergency Action Plan (EAP) later this was changed to my father-in-law, James Carstens. Later, I became the contact on the EAP as the frequency of incidents and gate failure reports made the role too disruptive, distressing and intrusive for Nicole Condon, she asked to be removed as a contact. 12. Our role was to take messages from WBWC and relay them to anyone we were aware of or could locate on the property. Some times this involves calling a variety of numbers and when we receive a call on the contact number, I am never certain of the farm occupants where abouts, or who is on the property, we must call around to establish this. This is why the agreed process was that WBWC as the dam gate developer would advise us of conditions, gate operation and tell us what to do, I could then relay this message as I located people. WBWC have in recent times refused to cooperate with the process and have been very unhelpful. This has added to the stress of situation. If I dont know what WBWC want , what conditions are or how they plan to evacuate or what the evacuation plan is, because if WBWC wont tell me, I cannot pass this information on effectively. 13. This was the agreed process, as the farm phone at the house is a solar radio phone and is unreliable and not accessible from all parts of the property. Mobile phone signal is extremely variable and often nonexistent. The second small dwelling on our northern lot has no phone what so ever. As the contacts are family members, those at the farm trust that the nominated contact will persist until they get the WBWC EAP messages through. 14. WBWC were also asked to investigate the extent of the increased risks to upstream properties and subsequently engaged Gutteridge, Haskins & Davey (GHD) to undertake studies, completed in 2009 and 2011. The 2011 document being authored by Ricky Kwan and submitted to the QLD Flood Commission. Exhibit D O in Damian Carstens Statement relevant sections are pages 20 and 21. 15. The Director Dam Safety Peter Allen (DNR) wrote to WBWC on 14 May s 2009 stating At a meeting with David Wiskar and Peter Care last Tuesday I was handed a final copy of a report entitled Lenthalls Dam Flooding February 2009. The report examined the backwater effects Lenthalls Dam has on upstream properties during flood events with some emphasis on the Allan Property Because the flood immunity of the Allan house is well in excess of the 1% AEP flood resumption level applying on many other major storages in Queensland, I would therefore recommend that Wide Bay Water seriously consider either: (a) Relocating the Allan house above the 1% AEP flood level at the house; ... Exhibit E and E1. This was not the situation prior to the installation of the Lenthalls Dam Gates. The dam gates have failed to operate as designed in almost every event at least twelve times and it is believed 3 times in from January to March of 2013. We now receive warning notifications when the Dam Level is 35cm above full supply, as we understand it, because our egress can

4 be cut off in relatively small events and if an event worsens the risks at the farmhouse leave our family members with no way of evacuating the site. On some occasions it has been apparent that due to localised flooding the Powell Creek causeway (lowered by WBWC after the first piped dirt culvert was washed away) has been flooded before the first notification from WBWC EAP F3 at 26.35, in past years due to the low level of immunity the EAP F2 to notify us was at RL26.10 Exhibit F.

1. These calls and emails from WBWC are highly distressing and come through at all hours, often many times a night. Dam Gate Failures occur throughout the wet season some times more than once in a month for example in December 2010 the dam gates failed on December 12 and then December 28, with levels requiring warnings on Christmas Day and throughout the period. 12 December 2010 2. On the 12th of December 2010 Donna and I received calls from Damian Carstens my partner telling us that James Castle, WBWC had contacted him about rising water levels at the farm. James Castle had asked for Donna Allan and I to evacuate. We had been feeding cattle. Donna and I left as asked and unfortunately we became bogged in the State Forest, in a location where there was no mobile phone signal and it was some hours before we could make contact with Damian again to tell him that we had managed to leave the property. Damian told me he had difficulties finding anyone at SES or the local Police station who knew anything about conditions at Lenthalls Dam or what should be done. 3. Damian Carstens came to the farm on the 13th of December and took the pictures that he has provided as exhibits in his statement. We later established from the WBWC CEO Peter Scott that the dam gates had failed to operate as designed in this event. 4. We noted the damage to the causeway caused by the currents and notified WBWC of the immediate need for repairs just in case the structure was critically weakened. We wanted it repaired before another event to ensure safe egress. WBWC did not undertake repairs until much later in 2011 after the Dam Gate Failures of the 27th / 28th of December 2010.

27 December 2010 5. Around Christmas, on the evening of the 27thof December 2010 I was at the farm with my partner Damian Carstens, son Fletcher Carstens and Damians parents, Marie and James Carstens. There was driving torrential rain that evening. Damian, our eighteen month old son Fletcher and myself were part of a rushed and anxious evacuation of the Allan farmhouse. 6. I had received some calls/SMSs from James Castle of WBWC and so had Damians mother, Marie Carstens. These calls/SMSS had made both myself and Marie quite disturbed. James Castle WBWC said to me something like he had information that was not on the BOM and we really should get out now. I wondered what on earth he could mean. (Later when we

5 discovered the dam gates had risen up I wondered if he knew the gates might fail again). Marie Carstens, wanted to get off the farm as quickly as possible. We could hardly hear ourselves speak at the house for the roar of the creeks. Damian, James Carstens and I knew that we had time to pack and be considered in our departure, however, Marie Carstens level of anxiety lead to Marie and Jim leaving unannounced before the pack for evacuation was complete. They just panicked and drove off. Jim left with Marie just to appease her anxiety. 7. Damian, Fletcher and I left the farm not long after. The result of the panic caused by the calls Esther and Marie took was that suitable preparation was not made. We were left at the house without light as Marie and Jim had the generator and some other equipment loaded into their truck, in case it would get damaged by water. We did not have a winch / crow bar or torches when we approached Powell Creek. When we crossed the creeks, water was over the Powell Creek causeway and the Logbridge Creek causeway as well. Exhibit G

8. We crossed the Logbridge causeway with water over it knowing the extent of the toe scour damage that it had sustained from the 12th of December 2010 event and that this was unrepaired. We could not see the sides in the dark to assess the safety of the structure or the height of the water. 9. We caught up with Mum and Dad in Maryborough and the four of us spent a rather fraught night together at the Carriers Arms in a motel room with our baby Exhibit H1 & H2. The following morning we drove back out to the farm but decided not to drive through the flood waters of Logbridge Creek. Damian took some photos identified in his statement as Exhibit K to N - and we left. 10. We later found the dam gates had risen up during this event despite early reports from Peter Scott WBWC CEO that they were working. This was confirmed by GHD in their 2011 report submitted to the QLD Flood Commission see page 20 and 21. Exhibit O of Damian Carstens Statement. 11. We have experienced various events every wet season, with gate five seemingly inoperable at all times and unreliable functioning of the other four dam gates. We experienced dam gate failures again in March 2012 with our stock stranded by the rapid uplift in water levels when the dam gates rose up during the event Exhibit I.1 & I.2 The dam gates have failed at least twelve times since 2007 and we understand 3 times between January 2013 and March 2013.

26th January 2013 Australia Day Flood Event 12. On the 26th of January 2013 Donna Allan was stranded at the Allan Farm house by rising water, unable to evacuate the property. Later she needed to leave the house in gale force winds to seek refuge in the paddock as the house area became cut off and then inundated

6 underneath. I am the nominated contact in the EAP and my role is to relay any message provided by WBWC to any person I can locate at the property for example, Donna Allan, relatives, friends who use the dwelling on the Warrah Road side of the creek and business partners. This method was agreed with WBWC and the Dam Safety Regulators (DNR) involvement after the first time family members were stranded in February 2008 when the dam gates failed and when the EAP was found to be blank where upstream contacts should have been Exhibit B.

13. On the 26th of January 2013 I emailed Peter Allen DEWS to advise that the most recent version of the Emergency Action Plan was not uploaded on WBWC website. I enquired regarding the operability of the dam gates and asked for the most recent EAP 2012 to be made available. In a follow up email I advised Peter Allen that the property was occupied Exhibit J. 14. Peter Allen (DEWS) emailed me at 26th January 2013 ??:55pm to say that 4 out of 5 gates are operational as per previous situation. See Exhibit ?? found referred item 14 15. 26th January 2013 9:26pm I emailed Peter Allen to ask at what point should WBWC be contacting us as I thought it was at 26.35 this was showing on the BOM site but I had not heard from WBWC Exhibit K. 16. 26th January 2013 9:36pm Peter Allen emailed me to advise that the first gate had triggered and that WBWC will be in contact in accordance with the EAP. See Exhibit L. 17. 26th January 2013 9:55pm Peter Allen emailed me to advise me that all four gates have triggered successfully and to contact WBWC Exhibit M 18. 26th January 2013 10:28pm I emailed Peter Allen. Tony Marshall WBWC had left a message that EAP F3 had been triggered and I asked what it meant and how it should affect us. I was worried about Donna at the farm house as the paddocks were sodden from consistent rains and the creeks were running Exhibit M. 19. I had not been advised whether there should have been an evacuation or not so I contacted Peter Allen at 10:35pm 26th January 2013 asking him as he had the EAP should there be an evacuation and how should this be undertaken. Exhibit N. 20. 26th January 2013 11:04pm Tony Marshall WBWC contacted me via email reporting an EAP F3 with water levels at Lenthalls Dam currently R.L 26.4 and asked if we required assistance to evacuate to contact him Exhibit O. 21. I contacted Tony Marshall at 11:12pm on 26th January 2013 and asked him what he recommended we do? Exhibit O I dont recall getting a response. I tried to phone Donna.

7 22. I then texted Donna Allan at 11:37pm and said it was an F3 and to stay out of the water. I passed on the WBWC offer of evacuation and asked her if she was on the bank and asked if she had left the house yet as I was very worried. I texted her, as once she was away from the house and unreliable solar radio phone, mobiles have limited intermittent reception I needed her to get the message when she could. 23. On the 27th of January at 12:00am Tony Marshall emailed me and said it was inappropriate for him to offer advice, however, he could support us in whatever decision we arrive at. He said, If you decide to stay I will continue to provide you with status updates.Exhibit P 24. I found this advice from WBWC very odd as I understood Powell Creek to be cut and evacuation impossible, additionally I did not know how this could be any kind of informed decision on Donnas part. Tony Marshall WBWC seemed to be asking me to take responsibility and make a decision as to her going or staying. I was concerned and distressed to be put in this position of responsibility without any prior knowledge training or experience and would not think it would be possible for me. We have never had to deal with this situation in the past.

25. I was very worried for Donna Allan once she left the house, as we have always had the farm house to stay in during weather events. I was concerned about the wind speed and potentially airborne material, the rain was driving torrential rain and I was not too sure where would be the best place for her to take shelter. There are no structures in the upper paddocks and there is the risk of tree limbs and wind borne debri in the bush. I was extremely distressed to be asked by Tony Marshall WBWC to make a decision as to what to do. We do not have experience in evacuations as they have not previously been required and I was being asked to make a decision in what was likely a life threatening situation for my sister. 26. I responded to Tony Marshall at 12:19am on the 27th January 2013 Exhibit P. I confirmed that it was my role in the EAP to pass the messages on and that I could not pass messages on if I did not have advice from WBWC as to what to do. I was very distressed. 27. I was really worried about Donna, I was texting her as calls were not getting through and it was hard to hear her when I could make contact due to the rainfall. I thought she at least could respond to a text when she received it.

28. At 1:46 am on the 27th of January 2013 Tony Marshall WBWC contacted me to confirm that the EAP status was F4 at Lenthalls Dam Level 27.35 and rising. 4 crest gates had lowered and they were 1, 2, 3 and 4. Tony said he had contacted the Fraser Coast Regional Council (FCRC) Disaster Management Coordinator and his advice was that an evacuation at night under current conditions would be too dangerous. See Exhibit 0 29. I was very very worried for Donna and very distressed trying to make sense of what WBWC was willing or actually able to do in the situation. Recent enquiries with WBWC and the

8 LDMG have not managed to clarify the situation. 30. At 2:03 am on the 27th January 2013 I emailed Peter Allen of the Dam Safety Regulator (DEWS) as I had a message from WBWC telling us the level was 27.35 which did not seem to tally with the BOM site reading of 27.5. I told him Donna was now in the open paddock and asked what he recommended. I asked how high up in the paddock he thought she should go as with the wind you would want to keep low to avoid flying material. Exhibit Q

31. At 2:10 am on the 27th January 2013 I emailed Tony Marshall to notify that Donna Allan was now in the paddock and out of range I told him I would try to contact her later. Mobile phone signals or lack of it make it very hard to make contact with an individual once they have left the house. Exhibit R 32. At 2:35am on the 27th January 2013 I was becoming increasingly worried that WBWC did not have an evacuation plan as they still had not provided any advice as to evacuation points or routes etc. For example where Donna should try to get to etc. No one had followed up to coordinate anything. I contacted Peter Allen of the Dam Safety Regulator (DEWS) to find out if there was anyone in Disaster Management if we needed help. At 4:45am on the 27th January 2013 Peter Allen gave me the 132500 number for emergency response. Exhibit S 33. On the 27th after numerous calls and confused I managed to confirm that a commitment had been made by Sydney Shang of WBWC that something was to be done about Donnas stranding. Finally I took a call from a man called Elliot from Disaster Management in state Government contacted me to try to coordinate a helicopter, he had not been provided with any access or site location details regarding Donnas situation and was very confused trying to find an address. He eventually asked for a Longitude and Latitude as the FCRC LDMG and WBWC had not provided any forward advice, I contacted Peter Allen DSR for help with this not knowing who else to ask Exhibit T. 34. I was advised by Peter Allen on the ---- that the gates had risen up again during this event. Exhibit U 35. We have never needed to evacuate the house or the property prior to the Lenthalls Dam Gates being installed and have found being asked to evacuate in 2010 and 2013 dangerous. We were required to leave the at risk house and expose ourselves to further risks in the open weather and crossing rising creeks. 36. Exhibit V RTI search shows that on the 27th of January at 19:38 the Helicopter scheduled to collect Donna Allan was stood down by Lisa Desmond knowing that on the 27th of January Donna Allan could be stranded for several days this is inexplicable to me. ( Note exhibit 4 Donnas statement) 37. The current lack of a safe haven during weather events at the farm makes it extremely hard to manage, Mal Churchill the Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) coordinator for Fraser Coast Regional Council has advised us on occasion to stay off the property for up to

9 four days at a time, in the later events in 2013 he advised we may need to stay off the property for anywhere between four and six weeks at a time. Exhibit V1 &2 38. We have experienced a significant amount of property damage, our sheds were inundated, due to the inundation at the farm house and this has included the loss of equipment, farm chemicals, feed, stock and machinery. 39. Peter Care WBWC has stated at hearing in the QLD Flood Commission that one of the primary reasons the for utilising the crest gates was to prevent back flood to property. He also confirmed Well I cant confirm they will ever work as designed and when asked again I could not say Exhibit W. This being the case and given Peter Allens DSR advice in 2009 Exhibit E and E1, it is hard to understand why we have been exposed to this level of increased risk when WBWC has admitted on many occasion that the dam gates dont work. 40. The last time the dam gates failed was March 2013. Exhibit A.