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When the Will Is Free Author(s): John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6, Ethics (1992), pp. 423-451 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214255 . Accessed: 05/11/2012 08:50
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1992 6, Ethics, Perspectives, Philosophical

WHEN THE WILL IS FREE

and MarkRavizza John Martin Fischer Riverside University of California,

ifthe tothefollowing worry: attention usually direct their Incompatibilists than todo other noneofus is free is true, then ofcausaldeterminism thesis most frequentposes the determinism although causal what does.But heactually only itmaynotbe their to freedom for incompatibilists, threat lydiscussed whoalso acceptthe ofworry, at leastnotfor thoseincompatibilists source todo otherwise. most ofus,most ofthetime, arefree intuition that common a In his article"WhenIs The WillFree?"' Petervan Inwagenoffers discussed sideofinofthis lessoften and systematic creative development should He maintains whois an incompatibilist anyone (1)that compatibilism. who he calls'Beta,'and (2) that"anyone which accepta ruleofinference one is false] concedethat[evenifcausaldeterminism acceptsBetashould that ifever, isanyone abletodo otherwise hasprecious little free will, rarely, by van suggested thanhe in fact We willcall theposition does" (p. 405).2 for short. or'restrictivism' 'restrictive incompatibilism' arguments Inwagen's holdboth incompatibilists becauserestrictive Thisnameseemsappropriate ofincomandthat whoaccepts thetruth that istrue, anyone incompatibilism restrictions ofaccepting Beta)acceptradical must also (invirtue patibilism to thisposition, if causal on one's ability to do otherwise.3 According andifcausaldeterare free to do otherwise, determinism is true, we never ifever"are free to do otherwise. is false, minism we "rarely, must all incompatibilistsg we, accept-that that allegedly The conclusion tomany. todo otherwise-will comeas a shock at best, free areonly rarely when itiscombined evenmore disquieting this conclusion becomes However, and vanInwagen which ofthe"classical tradition" with another assumption that freedom Thisis theassumption embrace. other incompatibilists many this ofmoral Accept responsibility. to do otherwise is a necessary condition is right-if Iftherestrictivist arises: andthefollowing worry quickly premise to do on one'sability to a severerestriction are committed incompatibilists on therange limitation notalso accepta similar must otherwise-then they Andifthis ofaffairs for which onecanbe heldmorally ofstates responsible?

Ravizza 424 / John Martin Fischer / Mark itself seemto be incompatible is thecase,then wouldnotincompatibilism praise heldbeliefs aboutthetype ofrespect, with many ofourmost deeply and blamemerited by persons? In whatfollows theseissuesby outlining thearguments we willaddress tothis andthen bydiscussing someresponses for restrictive incompatibilism In particular, position. we willarguethatone can acceptincompatibilism Thatis,we without a fortiori to therestrictivist position. beingcommitted thatfreedom to do otherwise willmaintain that one can acceptthethesis without being committed is incompatible with causaldeterminism implicitly tothefurther that "rarely, ifever, isanyone abletodo otherwise conclusion to thanhe in fact thisposition, we do notintend does" (p. 405). In taking butrather to or incompatibilism, argueforthetruth ofcausaldeterminism theincompatibilist therestrictivists' claim that thelogic behind argue against that also acceptsevererestrictions on position requires anyincompatibilist ofourearlier we will argue that, irrespective freedom todo otherwise. Finally cannot restrictive suggests they (as van Inwagen criticisms, incompatibilists still a satisfying ofmoral while remaining theory accountability can)provide requires within tradition accepts that suchaccountability theclassical (which freedom to do otherwise).
I. From Incompatibilism to Restrictive Incompatibilism

must find whyincompatibilists purportedly Let us beginby considering todo otherwise. with if freedom Therestrictivist argues themselves little, any, 'Rule termed that theincompatibilist rests upona ruleofinference position "'Np'stands Beta'.Betasaysthat "from NpandN(p D q) deduceNq"(where aboutwhether for p"') (pp.404-5). 'p andno one hasoreverhadanychoice To appreciate this stress on RuleBetawe needonlydigress thereasonfor which fora moment to consider one form oftheConsequence Argument with that free willis notcompatible therestrictive incompatibilist persuades causaldeterminism:4 RuleAlpha:FromZp deduceNp. truth in all possible "standard circumstances.) ('E' represents necessity": RuleBeta:FromNp and N(p D q) deduceNq. the whatever. Let 'L' represent Nowlet'P' represent anytrueproposition Let'Po' represent a single ofall lawsofnature. into conjunction proposition world ofthewhole a complete andcorrect a proposition that description gives there wereanyhuman at someinstant in theremote beings. past-before from theconsequence Ifdeterminism istrue, then E(Po & L. D P).Weargue ofthisas follows.

When the Willis Free / 425

1. O(Po & L. D P) 2. LO(Po D (L D P)) 3. N(Po D (L D P)) 4. NPo 5. N(L D P) 6. NL 7. NP

logic 1; modaland sentential 2; RuleAlpha Premise 3,4;RuleBeta Premise 5,6;RuleBeta

that no one has entails determinism then is sound, Iftheaboveargument with is incompatible a choiceaboutwhatshe does; hence,determinism that no insists incompatibilist Sincetherestrictive todo otherwise. freedom or RuleAlpha, either ofthepremises couldtakeissuewith one reasonably upon depends argument oftheincompatibilist thesoundness that heconcludes goesso faras to say that"ifone thevalidity ofBeta.Indeedvan Inwagen andif oneisan incompatibilist, be an incompatibilist, oneshould Beta, accepts one should acceptBeta"(p. 405). who anyperson that argument istoclaim stepintherestrictivist Thenext 'Beta-prime'. termed a similar rule ofinference alsoaccept Betashould accepts the "from andNx,(pD q) deduceNx,q" (where us that Nx,p tells Beta-prime 'N' is usedas follows: 'p and x now 'Nx,p'abbreviates operator two-place hasnochoice about an agent about whether p') (p.408).When hasnochoice that we will obtains proposition saythat a proposition whether (orstatement) forhim. is "power necessary" ifBeta-prime toshowthat three arguments presents Finally therestrictivist is false)we are notable to do is validthen(even ifcausal determinism ofallactions. themajority ofcaseswhich represent otherwise inthree types in section ofthesearguments III; herewe need thedetails We willdiscuss is one ofduty byinclination; unopposed cases.Thefirst notethethree only an actheconsiders morally reprehensible" that is,"nooneis abletoperform "no one is inclination; thus, (p. 405).The secondcase is one ofunopposed thathe wantsverymuchnot to do and has no able to do anything we case is one in which to do it"(p. 406).The third desire countervailing an actas theone thus "ifwe regard or deliberation; reflection act without but to do, we cannot do anything or theonlysensible thing obvious thing the that concludes therestrictivist thesepoints, that thing" (p. 406).Given theagentis are times in which is free to do otherwise an agent onlytimes itis evenafter alternatives suchthat, reflection, with confronted conflicting tells van Inwagen situations, to himwhatto do. Suchconflict notobvious three into andcanbe divided categories: (1)"Buridan's general rarely us,occur with inclinaor general conflicts policy Ass"cases,5 duty (2) casesinwhich one must choosebetween and(3) casesinwhich or momentary tion desire, values.6 incommensurable must all incompatibilists holds that acceptBetaand Sincetherestrictivist

Ravizza / Mark Fischer Martin 426 / John concede must Beta-prime whoaccepts anyone and that henceBeta-prime, ofall majority make up the which inthecases do otherwise that we cannot hold that must incompatibilist that "the concludes he therefore ouractions, a very even rare condition, is a comparatively otherwise beingable to do (p. 404). rarecondition"
II. Who Needs Beta?

thisdeniala nonone shouldacceptBeta."7To support incompatibilist, offormulatoanyofa number refer couldsimply incompatibilist restrictive whichdo not forincompatibilism Argument tionsof the Consequence akin to Beta.8If valid,these make use of modal principles explicitly wouldgive one reasonto acceptincompatibilism apparently arguments Then,evenifall one to acceptBetaor Beta-prime. without also requiring tobe valid, onecould should prove remaining arguments oftherestrictivist's to commitment anycorresponding without having acceptincompatibilism will. ifever,have free thatwe rarely, conclusion accepttherestrictivist's might therestrictive incompatibilist ofobjection In response to this type eventhose which oftheConsequence Argument, that all formulations insist dependuponsome implicitly formulated Beta,must using aren't explicitly is suggested by van to Beta. Such a response similar rule of inference oftheConsequence ofhisformulations all three ownclaimthat Inwagen's This or falltogether."9 inAn EssayOn Free Willshould"stand Argument vanInwagen's becauseonly toourdiscussion, is particularly claim germane "I am hewrites: uponBeta.Nevertheless, depends third explicitly argument to one ofthearguments and detailed objection anyspecific quitesurethat tothe anddetailed into others; translated objections canbe fairly specific easily will be a goodobjection tooneofthearguments andI think that anyobjection to theothers objections ifand onlyifthecorresponding to thatargument to them."10 are goodobjections this view.Evensomecompatibilists, is notaloneinholding VanInwagen vanInwagen's reasoning, agree totakeissuewith want whoinother respects for oftheargument form incompatthat with hisintuition anyrespectable this akintoBeta.Pursuing ofinference must uponsometype ibilism depend to attackthe incompatibilist's have sought such compatibilists intuition, rests. One itpurportedly on which inference themodal byblocking position in particular, "I wantto argue, writes: Michael Slote, such"beta-blocker," van Inwagen, Peter James ofGLVW Lamb, that thearguments Ginet, [Carl thevery form ofinference, all rest on thequestionable and DavidWiggins] marks of'Np'and'N(pD q)' to'Nq'which from thedouble inference modality

clusion is simply to deny the initial contentionthat "... if one is an

individual in the detailsof the restrictivist's involved Beforegetting hisconan immediate wayto circumvent notethat we should arguments,

When the Willis Free / 427

ofincompatdefenses toearlier ofargument ofthenewkind thesuperiority is found in TerenceHorgan's forthisposition Further support ibilism.""l among wellthedeepfamily resemblances that hasdescribed "Slote comment incompatibilism], Argument for [of theConsequence formulations thevarious or fall stand versions probably that thedifferent and he too has suggested and incomon thepartof compatibilists Thissharedopinion together."12 it ofBetato which thedebateoverthevalidity alike, alongwith patibilists whoaccepts that anyone contention therestrictivist's rise, support hasgiven to is committed implicitly Argument oftheConsequence any formulation when ground might seemtobe on firm therestrictivist Beta.Thus, accepting Beta"andwith accept oneshould that "if oneis an incompatibilist, heinsists restrictive arguments) it (assuming the soundnessof his subsequent incompatibilism. many Admittedly, is false. this claim toarguethat we want Nevertheless, intuitions similar upon oftheConsequence Argument do depend formulations for incompatibilism theargument to thosewhich underlie Beta.However, insucha waythat itdoesnotexplicitly makeuseofBeta, canbe formulated toshowhowsucharguments on therestrictivist andhence theonusremains to accepting Beta.13 their proponents commit do, in fact, ofan argument which thefollowing sketch this consider To illustrate point ofGod's theincompatibility concerning is adapted from a parallel argument restsupon two principles and freewill.14 The argument foreknowledge Thefirst principle expresses notimplausible. arecontroversial though which thepast, that onecannot affect causally ofthepast;itsaysnotonly thefixity from thepastwould havebeendifferent so actthat butalsothat one cannot as can be formulated ofthepastprinciple whatitactually was. The fixity follows: (FP) ForanyactionY, agentS, and timeT, ifit is truethatifS to T aboutthepastrelative wereto do Y at T, somefact at T do Y at T. thenS cannot wouldnothavebeen a fact, similar ofthelaws;ina manner thefixity Thesecond expresses principle that but also the laws, change that one cannot causally toFP itsaysnotonly from different have been nature would of so that the laws one cannot act can be formulated The fixity ofthelawsprinciple are.15 whatthey actually as follows: (FL) ForanyactionY, and agentS, ifit is truethatifS wereto do obtains wouldnotobtain, law which actually Y, somenatural do Y. thenS cannot at from A actually refrains doing someactX which agent Nowconsider of the that a the thesis to be description determinism complete T2.Taking ofthelawsentails formulation a complete with world at T in conjunction

/ Mark Ravizza 428 / John Martin Fischer state ifdeterminism is true, andS1is thetotal every subsequent truth, then be true: conditionals must oftheworld at T1,one ofthefollowing (1) IfA wereto do X at T2,SI wouldnothave been thetotalstate at T1. oftheworld actually law which (2) IfA wereto do X at T2,thensomenatural obtains wouldnotobtain. (3) IfA wereto do X at T2,theneither SI wouldnothavebeen the totalstateoftheworld at T1,or somenatural law which wouldnotobtain. actually obtains if(2) is true, do X at T2;similarly, Butif(1) is true, then (viaFP)A cannot that A cannot then do X at T2.Finally, if(1)'struth implies (viaFL)A cannot A cannot implies that do X at T2,thenitfollows do X at T2and (2)'struth ofthis that if(3) is true, A cannot do X at T2.Theconclusion argument then other thanwhat then A cannot do anything is thatifdeterminism is true, claims that this result, theincompatibilist he actually doesat T2.Generalizing ifdeterminism thanwhathe does. is truenoneofus is freeto do other itnottoraise however, oftheargument for ourpurposes, Theimportance to for serves banner theargument incompatibilism.16 Rather, yetone more notbe reduced to a that thedebateoverincompatibilism should illustrate share basicbeliefs about ofBeta.Incompatibilists discussion about thevalidity ofthepastand therelationships between free thefixity will, determinism, indifferent forms thefixity ofthelaws.Butthese beliefs can find expression ofargument, notall ofwhich involve thesamecommitments. necessarily adhere to her showthat an incompatibilist canconsistently Sucharguments to Beta or restrictive without being committed position automatically vanInwagen that depends claims incompatibilism Aswe pointed outabove, an argument for which incompatibilism uponBeta,butwe havepresented that does notappearto dependin anyway uponBeta.We thus conclude ifwe are correct, Slote's vanInwagen's is false. then strategy claim Further, isnotnearly hasbeendescribed as a "pioneering article") byDennett (inwhat there tobe.18 Slotealleges that so promising as itmight havebeensupposed and toBeta, tomodal arecounterexamples principles structurally analogous that that flawed. He concludes incompatibilism he suggests Betais similarly Slote'sclaimthatBeta is flawed.19 should be rejected. We takeissuewith evenifSlotewerecorrect toourdiscussion hereis that Butwhat is relevant ofthetroubling versions andBetawere onecould argument generate invalid, the a Beta-blocking cannot for easily assuage strategy incompatibilism. Thus, issuefrom theincompatibilist's argument. panicthatmight inorder that Betaisnotnecessary claims There isanother which approach has recently Bernard to generate theincompatibilist's Berofsky argument. the use of Beta.20 without arguedthatone can developthe argument
incompatibilism.17

When the Willis Free / 429

Thissort ofcontingent necessity'. whathe callsa 'system Berofsky presents kind ofprinciple, with restrictions: certain ofsystem validates thefollowing
p N(P D Q)

hence, N(Q)

a modal that this ofmoveinvolves itisoften sort fallacy, Whereas alleged restrictions on the (with suitable to justify this inference Berofsky attempts and he claims thatit ofthepropositional variables), substitution-instances ina valid fashion. argument a wayofformulating theincompatibilist's provides does theincompatibilist's theclaimthat argument We sharewith Berofsky then theincompatibilist's argument notrequire Beta.Butifwe are correct, of ofBerofsky's and hissystem thevalidity principle does notevenrequire Itis useful tosee that theincompatibilist's argument necessity.21 contingent to Beta. similar does notrequire any modalprinciple theincompatibilist's argument can theaboveconsiderations-that Clearly, theuse ofBeta-do notinanyway invarious be formulated wayswithout that Betamight ofBeta.22 areoftheopinion bearon thevalidity We,infact, which seemsvalidbutwhich can intractable wellbe one ofthose principles the restrictive this, be easilyprovednor disproved. Recognizing neither ofitsdecisive roleinmany independently might contend that, incompatibilist Betashould be accepted byallincompatibilists arguments for incompatibilism, alonewouldbe sufficient becauseBetais valid.Andthesegrounds simply therestrictivist's position. to confirm that this claim. Letus consider letus entertain Forthesakeofargument, ofthevan or at thevery leastthat incompatibilists Betamaywellbe valid, thatsuch to itsvalidity. Does it now follow sortare committed Inwagen To evaluatethis must also be restrictive incompatibilists? incompatibilists three that establish tovanInwagen's arguments purportedly we turn question, ifever,is one freeto do otherwise. thatifBeta is valid,thenrarely,
III. Free to Ignore the Obvious

In order to showthat mostofthetimeone is notable to do otherwise, a series In thefirst, he argues ofthree therestrictivist arguments. presents indefensible. that heconsiders that nooneis abletoactina manner morally runsas follows: The argument A as indefensible). (1) N I, (I regard D I am notgoing to do A). A as indefensible (2) N I, (I regard Hence(via Beta), (3) N I, (I am notgoingto do A) (p. 409).

430 / John Martin Fischer / Mark Ravizza The intuitive idea behind theargument is thatat thismoment I don't I nowconsider haveanychoice about thefact that someaction A indefensible, ifI regard and I also don't haveanychoiceaboutitsbeing thecase that an I am notgoing todo it;these action as being morally indefensible then two premises beingtrue, it follows thatat thismoment I'm notgoing to do A In short, itis powernecessary for and I don'thaveanychoiceaboutthis. me thatI am notgoing to do A. Generalizing theresults ofthisargument an actheconsiders therestrictivist concludes that "nooneisabletoperform morally reprehensible" (p.405). then extends VanInwagen thetype (ourmodel restrictive incompatibilist) ofreasoning aboutmorally indefensible actions totwo usedinthis argument he claims, themajority ofall actions: other caseswhich, constitute (1) cases ofunopposed inwhich to do one thing and inclination we wantvery much in which have no opposing desires; and (2) cases ofunreflective action we knowwhattheobvious thing to do is after little ifanydeliberation. In the inwhich case ofunopposed we areaskedtoconsider an example inclination, a person, a phone hevery Nightingale, isanxiously awaiting callwhich much thephone, desires toreceive. hasa very desire toanswer Nightingale strong is:CanNightingale andno countervailing desires nottodo so. Thequestion refrain from answering thephone? The restrictivist reasons that he cannot, in this he used and support of conclusion offers thesame argument-form above. Skipping theformalization, therough idea behind theargument is as follows: moment (1) Atthis Nightingale does nothaveanychoiceabout toanswer he very thephone, and(2) he also has thefact that much desires desires to answer no choiceaboutitsbeingthecase thatifhe verymuch from thephone(and he has no countervailing desireto refrain doingso), toanswer thephone; these twopremises itfollows then heisgoing being true, andhe doesn't that at this moment is going toanswer thephone Nightingale Van Inwagen "no one is able to concludes that haveanychoiceaboutthis. thathe wants do anything much notto do and has no countervailing very desireto do it"(p. 406). In thelastargument, to coverthebroadest which is supposed rangeof "with or no deliberatherestrictivist turns to actions which little actions, on them at all-to be the seem-or wouldseemifwe reflected tion...just to do in thecircumstances" obvious thing (p. 412).Againwe are askedto a situation inwhich a phone anda person answers consider rings immediately a secondthought. of itwithout thematter thesamestyle giving Following theargument that theagent reasoning as intheNightingale example, claims runs from theargument is notfree torefrain thephone. answering Roughly hasno choice about as before: thephone theperson (1)Atthemoment rings, or to thathe has no reasonnotto answer thephoneimmediately thefact he has no choiceaboutits deliberate aboutanswering it;(2) furthermore, thephonethen beingthecase thatifhe hasn't anyreasonnotto answer

When the Willis Free / 431 at themoment that itfollows he is goingto answerit.Fromthesetwopremises the agentis goingto answerit and he has no choice about the phone rings, van thisconclusionand thatof the precedingargument this.Generalizing Inwagen concludes: a little on which-atleastafter in life fewoccasions Thereare therefore, isn't absolutely intothefacts-it someinvestigation and perhaps reflection thenan are correct, clearwhatto do Andiftheabove arguments do theagentcannot on suchoccasions believethat should incompatibilist theonly that seemsto himto be clearly other thanthething anything to do" (p 415) thing sensible not.To We think have to accept thisconclusion? Does an incompatibilist premise the second we want to take issue with challengethese arguments, in the first in each. The most detailed defense of premise (2) is offered is true premise the second that argument,here van Inwagen maintains has a choice one and no truth is a necessary conditional because thefollowing about a necessarytruth. of act, given the totality (CI) If X regardsA as an indefensible available to him,and if he has no way of relevantinformation and if he lacks any further relevantinformation, getting positivedesire to do A, and if he sees no objectionto not of relevantinformation doing A (again, given the totality available to him),then X is not going to do A (p. 407).23 and are similar, threearguments Van Inwagenclaimsthattherestrictivist's parallel thatthere are conditionals thuswe assumethatvan Inwagenimagines two ofthelatter theparallelpremisses to (Cl) whichare supposedto support Here, we will begin by discussingthe lattertwo argumentsarguments. action. We will deny and unreflective to unopposed inclination pertaining supportthe second the claim that the relevantconditionalssuccessfully on the argument We shall focusour remarks premisesof these arguments. thisargumentappears to us to be the concerningunopposed inclination; and the considerations arguments, of the lattertwo restrictivist stronger Then we adduced againstit can readilybe applied to the thirdargument. actions. indefensible argument-concerning willturnto van Inwagen'sfirst our from van Inwagen'sorderof presentation, we are departing Although in thisfashion. can be developed more naturally criticism therestrictivist arguesthatin cases ofunopposed In hissecond argument, the agent cannot do otherthan what he actuallydoes (despite inclination has thesame form thathe can so act).The argument theintuitive impression actionssketchedabove, but now indefensible as the argument concerning is: the second premise(upon whichwe shall concentrate) to do A D X is goingto do A). (2) N X, (X has an unopposedinclination

/ Mark Ravizza 432 / John Martin Fischer thesecond premise which allegedly supports Andparallel totheconditional we have: oftheargument aboutindefensibility, to do someact A giventhetotality of (C2) IfX verymuchdesires and ifhe has no way of availableto him, relevant information relevant information, and ifhe lacksany getting further thanA, and ifhe sees anyact other positive desireto perform no objection from doinganything to doingA and refraining information available else (again, giventhetotality ofrelevant to him), thentheperson is notgoingto do anything other thanA. twooftheargument (C2)can support premise Now,theonlywayinwhich Thatis,(C2)must be true is if(C2)ispower for therelevant agent. necessary (This is parallel to the andX must haveno choiceaboutwhether C2 is true. ofthefact itis invirtue that no one hasanychoice point madeabovethat of(CI) that is supported.) aboutthetruth argument premise (2) ofthefirst the can be made clearby employing The problem withtheargument oftwointerpretations. rather familiar sort ofstrategy. (C2)admits following to be trueand power On one interpretation, (C2) is plausibly thought And oftheargument. butitdoesnotsupport thesecond premise necessary, but(C2)is not thesecondpremise is supported on theother interpretation to which itis thecase there is no interpretation according plausible. Thus, to be powernecessary and therelevant both(C2)is plausibly thought that is true. premise oftheargument theinterpretation towhich (C2)isplausibly according Letus first consider Thisinterpretation is motivated by takento be trueand powernecessary. a desire. somesort of"pro-attitude"-say, thebasicideathat action requires from mereevents that are distinguished Thatis,itmight be argued actions ofevents: in virtue ofbeingpreceded (in a suitable way)by specialsorts that a volition be based(ina itmight be claimed must "volitions." Further, Ifthese itwould follow onatleast weretrue, suitable somedesire. claims way) for toperform anaction without itwould be impossible an agent having that for that ofdesire action could somedesire todo so.Wesuppose thenecessity Inanycase, involitions. whodoesnotbelieve be posited evenbya theorist toperform that itis impossible for an agent itisa plausible claim conceptual in question.24 to perform theaction somedesire an action without having truth thealleged cannot Thekeypoint is that support premise conceptual truth that canbe regimented twooftheargument. Note the alleged conceptual as follows: that stateofaffairs obtain: thatthefollowing (C2*)It is notpossible X performs an act other thanA without having anydesireto suchan act. perform

WhentheWill is Free/ 433 that(C2*)doesnot imply Andnotefurther to do A). desireto do A D X is going (2) N,X (X has an unopposed thedesire todo other having is noobstacle totheagent's As longas there (2) can be false interval, we believe that relevant temporal than A during the of(C2*).(2) would be false thefact that with if, despite thetruth compatibly A; and,given from doing desire todo A,hecouldrefrain X hasan unopposed X can acquire sort ofdesire, this temporal period) that (during therelevant X can do other than A. (We that we believethat itis reasonable to suppose willargueforthisbelow.) simple analogy. this toimply (2)canbe seenbyconsidering That(C2*)fails stateof that thefollowing true that itis notpossible It is uncontroversially andJones interval: Jones issitting atallpoints insometemporal affairs obtain ifJones issitting truth doesnotimply that, conceptual isstanding up.Butthis stand at some then Jones cannot in sometemporal interval, at somepoint itdoesseemplausible true-and inthat interval. Thus, evenif (C2*)were point ofthesecondpremise of securethetruth to us-it wouldnotsuccessfully van Inwagen's argument. (2): (C2) suchthatit does entail Nowletus interpret A. than do other than todo other A,X cannot (C2**)IfX doesnotdesire Thisis We concedethat (C2* *) supports (2),butat thepriceofplausibility. thanA, he desireto do other because,even ifan agentdoes notactually togenerate therelevant temporal interval) (during might wellhavetheability Anditis extremely to and to act on thisdesire. implausible sucha desire, therelevant that lackthe powertogenerate quitegenerally suppose agents ofdesires. sorts thathe is can summon Just aboutanybody We elaborate. up theworry Thatis,one can worry thepervasive that, despite notfree to do otherwise. that freedom todovarious things, intuitive frequently we havegenuine feeling whothinks aboutthe we do notinfact havesuchfreedom. anyone (Indeed, he might notbe that certainly has reasonto worry restrictivist's argument Thisworry generate some can then free todo otherwise inmany contexts.) to do otherwise to provethat one can do simply a desire) reason(perhaps, therestrictivist doesnot which so.25 barring special circumstances-to Thus, whoactually doesnothaveanydesire inhisarguments-even an agent allude sucha desire(during to do other thanA can have thepowerto generate Andinsofar as: (i) theagentcan generate therelevant temporal interval). and toacton this than can try thedesire todo other desire, A, (ii)theagent then we believe hewould toacton this desire, succeed, (iii)ifheweretotry than do other A.26 therelevant that theagent can (during temporal interval) The leadingidea hereis thatthereis no reasonto supposethatagents reasons to lackthepowerto generate (insomewayor another) generally

434 / John Ravizza Martin Fischer / Mark

in so acting.

orthe tosucceed do otherwise, the totry toactonthose power reasons, power

van Inwagen's in which wants Consider ownexample Nightingale very much toanswer thephone IfNightingale can calltomind as soonas itrings. thedoubt that he is able to do otherwise insuchsituations, this doubt very can givehim the a reason to pausebefore receiver. he picking up (Perhaps simply does notanswer thephoneon thefirst butwaitsuntil itrings ring, five times; this he might toprovehewas free todo otherwise.) suffices, feel, Inthis scenario, a normally routine Nightingale's worry hastransformed phone callinto a situation inwhich must between two Nightingale decide conflicting toanswer thephoneas soonas itrings, and(2) a desire desires: (1) a desire toprove to himself that he doesn't itas soonas itrings. havetoanswer We claimthat insofar can generate a desire ofthesecondsort, as: (i) theagent (ii) he can try to act on thisdesire, and (iii)iftheagentwereto try to act on this sort ofdesire, hewould succeed indoing other than A,then theagent can (during therelevant do other than he temporal period) A, eventhough thanA.27 actually lacksanydesireto do other We believethattheabove considerations showthat, even ifan agent lacksanydesire toperform a given actually that act,hecan perform action, insofar as certain conditions are met.Theseconditions involve theability togenerate certain reasons andtotranslate into these reasons action. Further, we suggested that itis extremely plausible to supposethat (absent special about orparticular assumptions causaldeterminism orphysical psychological theseconditions are frequently met.28 impairments) Thus,we believethat (C2* *) is notin general true. We haveargued, that then, whereas (C2*) is it does notimply plausible, (2); and whereas(C2**) implies (2), it is not plausible. Inorder more to highlight ourposition, itis useful toconsider clearly the that we havesimply missed vanInwagen's VanInwagen's complaint point.29 claimis thatifin somepossible has a strong, unworld, WI, Nightingale inclination toanswer opposed thephone as soonas itrings, then, Nightingale is going to answer thephoneas soonas itrings and he is notable in WI todo otherwise. But-theobjector continues-all your ofthe reconstruction exampleshowsis thatifin someother possible world, W2,Nightingale's motivational setis changed so that he hastwoconflicting inclinations, then in W2 is able to refrain Nightingale from answering thephoneas soonas it rings. in W2, however, Nightingale's is a function ability of his having andinitself this doesn't showthat opposing inclinations, inWI, Nightingale without theopposing is able to do otherwise. inclinations, The issue, then, is notwhatNightingale can do inW2 with a different motivational set,but rather what Nightingale can do inWI given that hismotivational setis just as van Inwagen stipulates. isgenuinely Wereply as long as Nightingale able(during that, therelevant

is Free/ 435 WhentheWill he then to answer thephone, a desire inWI to generate interval) temporal to accessible as W2 isgenuinely Insofar thephone. is able inWI to answer can do inWI. Itis only Nightingale towhat W2is relevant then Nightingale, inWI. abilities toNightingale's that itis irrelevant ifW2is notso accessible W2 is intheappropriate ifsomeworld we relyhereon thefact, Ofcourse, to themodalproperties to WI, then W2 maybe relevant senseaccessible in WI. ofindividuals Free To Act Crazily IV. Free To Act Indefensibly, incases that argument therestrictivist's against we haveargued Thusfar We believe to do otherwise. theagentis notfree inclination ofunopposed to the argument mutandis, apply,mutatis thatthe same considerations to we havepointed we believethat Thus, unreflective actions. concerning are individuals evenifBetaweretrue, that, theintuition a wayofsalvaging andunreflective ofunopposed desire incontexts often to do otherwise free concerning parallelargument action.Now let us turnto van Inwagen's actions. indefensible tounopposed pertaining oftheargument thecriticism developed Having with theargument iswrong what toexplain itisnowextremely simple desire, to the argument our objection actions.In fact, indefensible concerning tothe thesameas theobjection is precisely actions indefensible concerning desires. unopposed concerning argument (2) of the of premise adduces(CI) in support Recallthatvan Inwagen argument: of A as an indefensible act,giventhetotality (CI) IfX regards and ifhe has no way of availableto him, information relevant and ifhe lacksany relevant information, further getting to not desireto do A, and ifhe sees no objection positive information ofrelevant giventhetotality doingA (again, to do A (p. 407). thenX is notgoing availableto him), he is of(2),itis clearthat adduces(C1)in support that van Inwagen Given in thefollowing way: oftheargument thesecondpremise interpreting to act and X lacksanydesire A as an indefensible (2) N,X (X regards do A D X does notdo A). so as to claimthatthe To proceedas above. (C1) can be interpreted has X regards A as indefensible, that ofaffairs is notpossible: state following does not A. But(C1),so interpreted, to perform A, and performs no desire so as to claimthatifX (C1) couldbe interpreted imply (2). Alternatively, X cannot do to do A, then andX lacksanydesire A as indefensible regards as X can(intherelevant temporal insofar A. But, so interpreted, (C1)is false,

Martin / MarkRavizza 436 / John Fischer thedesirein question. generate interval) above,itis notsupposed discussed desire ofunopposed Butinthecontext this belief indefensible. Might question is that theactin believes that theagent desire of the sort discussed an to a reason (or constitute obstacle generating actsrelevantly ofindefensible That is,isthecontext theact? above)toperform action? and unreflective desire of unopposed from the contexts different suggest that support of (C1) in adducedby van Inwagen The examples one literally such that special status do have some actions morally indefensible To makethis to desire to do (andto do) them.30 is unableto bring oneself Daniel Dennett by an example presented with van Inwagen begins point, to torture innocent victims makes theclaim that heisunable inwhich Dennett that the point of the Van Inwagen observes forsmallsumsof money.31 to torture these that Dennett would not be able exampleis notso much he simply character, if but rather that, given Dennett's innocentsheso chose, the unableto generate is unabletomakesucha choice(and,presumably, to show line of reasoning to extend this wishes VanInwagen relevant desire). thatcolleague's thathe also could not slandera colleagueto prevent and similarly that none oftheTenure Committee, toChairman appointment indefensible. do that he considers ofus could anything grantthattheremay be some actions-callthem Now,we certainly himself cannot bring a particular literally agent "unwillable" actions-which these not of all) to and some necessarily (although tochoosetodo (and do); be that are indefensible.32 Indeed, morally unwillable actionsmay ones seemsto be justsucha case. We innocents example oftorturing Dennett's an action's that itdoes notfollow from being wishto emphasize, however, thatthe That is, we suggest indefensible thatit is unwillable. morally on a from their focusing plausibility point heregains Inwagen Dennett/van which indefensible actions morally cases:those oftherelevant proper subset isnot eo ipsounwillable. Thus, arealso unwillable. Butan indefensible action thespecific case ofone's notbeingable we wishto blockthemovefrom an "noone is able to perform tothegeneral claimthat to torture innocents (p. 405). morally reprehensible" act he considers an agent believes that an act that there can be casesinwhich We believe it (ofthe has a desireto perform indefensible and nevertheless is morally desire. Anditis actson this sort mentioned successfully above)and indeed this that havethepowerto generate tosuppose ingeneral agents plausible ofindefensible thecontext ourclaimthat Inorder tosupport sort ofdesire. twocontexts, we present from theother different actionis notrelevantly theactinquestion believes that inwhich an individual thefollowing examples itand does indeed to perform has a desire butnevertheless is indefensible it. perform of pears in his famous first accountof the theft Consider Augustine's about thereason iswondering this before Augustine passage, Shortly boyhood.

When the Willis Free / 437 forhis stealingpears forwhichhe had no desire,and afteracknowledging the view thatall action mustbe forthe sake of some apparentgood, he dismissesthisexplanationin his own case: I find thatit had no I had in thattheft, .nowthatI ask whatpleasure beauty deceptive me. It didnoteven havetheshadowy, to attract beauty translation). II, vi,Pine-Coffin (Confessions makesvice attractive" which whenI was thusevilforno nowtellyouwhatit sought Letmyheart The maliceof save mywrongness no cause forwrongdoing having object, I theact was base and I lovedit-thatis to say I lovedmyownundoing, the I didtheevil,simply forwhich lovedtheevilin me-notthething II, iv,Sheedtranslation). evil (Confessions one because theyexemplify are disturbing precisely reflections Augustine's indefensible, morally he takes to be not onlyto do something man's ability This is because it is so indefensible. but to be drawnto the actionprecisely some desirable having as the robbery did notsee not to say thatAugustine thecrime thathe wouldnothave committed He himself admits consequences. in sin" of partners had it notbeen forhiscompanionsand the "thrill having wanted something because Augustine II, viii).However,simply (Confessions as good, or thisdoes not show thathe saw the thieving fromhis thieving, was willing of values he to an overall system thathe believed it conformed indefensible of as wholly see the pilfering pears to defend.A personmight to and stilldesireto do it,ifforno otherreason thanto assertone's ability saw that he suggest comments act againstmoralvalue. Indeed Augustine's a perverse to this desirefor connected to evilas beingintimately hisattraction sort of freedomand power-a freedomto ignorethe Good: ofmyLord's Which that Whatwas it,then, pleasedme in thatact oftheft? in a perverse and wicked way?SinceI had no real didI imitate powers ofdoing at leastthepretence powerto breakhislaw,was it thatI enjoyed ofliberty theillusion by doing whocreates forhimself so, likea prisoner a feeble under whenhe has no fearofpunishment, wrong, something hismaster ofpower? Herewas a slavewhoranawayfrom hallucination oflifet Whata parody Whatan abominationt and chaseda shadowinsteadt forno other reasonthat CouldI enjoydoing deatht wrong Whatabysmal thatit was wrong? I cannot truly speakof in it exceptthethieving, though I lovednothing thatI couldlove,and I was onlythemoremiserable thatas a 'thing' Pine-Coffin Translation) II, vi-viii, becauseof it (Confessions butone whichexpressesa relatedyearning A different typeof rebellion, ofa character quitedistinct is foundin thestory to flout moralprohibitions, at the outsetof that Dostoevsky'sRaskalnikov.Recall fromSt. Augustine: the old and pawnrobbing Raskalnikovis contemplating killing the story, Alena Ivanovna,and as he does so, he is keenlyaware of the evil broker, and he is repulsed at hand; he knows such acts are morallyreprehensible by his own musings:

438 / JohnMartinFischer/ MarkRavizza nonsense, "Oh God,howrepulsive' Can I possibly, can I possibly.. no,that's idea [i e, it'sridiculoust" he broke off decisively "Howcouldsucha horrible to roband murder Whatvileness myheart seems Ivanovna] enter mymind? horriblet" (Crime and capableoff The point is,thatit is vile,filthy, horrible, I 1) Punishment, In spite of thismoralaversion,Raskalnikovnonethelessfindsthathe is able to do the indefensible: he takesa borrowedaxe to the head ofnotonly back on themurder Alena Ivanovnabuthersister as well.Later,as he thinks and robbery, Raskalnikov dismisses theonlyreasonablemotive for thecrime: "Ifitall has been done deliberately and notidiotically," he ponders, "ifI really had a certainand definite object, how is it I did not even glance into the purse and don't know what I had there,forwhichI have undergonethese degrading agonies and have deliberatelyundertakenthis base, filthy, and Punishment, knowsthathe did not business7" (Crime II.2). Raskalnikov killthe old woman,as a more typicalcriminal mighthave, forher money. to Sonya,thedeeper motivation behindthecrime And later,as he confesses comes out: "that "I realized he wenton enthusiastically, poweris given then, Sonya," onlyto themanwhodaresstoopand takeit Thereis onlyone thing to have thecourage, and I killed I needed, onlyone-to dare .I wanted to dare,Sonya, that was theonlyreasont" onlywanted and find outas soonas possible, was . "whatI neededto find outthen, I was capable whether I was a louselikeeverybody else or a man,whether ofstepping or not DaredI stoopand takethepoweror overthebarriers not?" that it was onlyto test "ListenwhenI wentto theold woman's time, thatt" and Punishment, V 5) myselfUnderstand (Crime remarks are ofinterest to us because theygive an example Raskalnikov's and murder are morally of a man who (1) knowsthatrobbery indefensible, theseacts in thepursuit ofsome good whichcan (2) is notdrivento perform be separatedfrom thecrimeitself, and (3) nonetheless does rob and murder two people. Indeed, what is most important about Raskalnikovfor our he seemsdrawnto murder is that, purposes, givena straightforward reading, the agingpawnbroker, to see ifhe can do it:He wantsto discover precisely ifhe has the power to ignoremoralprohibitions; he wantsto know ifhe is freeto do the morallyindefensible.33 and Raskalnikovis about the crimesof both Augustine What is striking is merely that,unlikea more mundanerobberyin whichthe wrongdoing bound a meansto material behindtheir crimes is inextricably gain,themotive This is not to up witha desire to do wrongand to floutmoralconstraints. of Augustine and Raskalnikovcan be assimilated say thatthe motivations to do evil in order in everyrespect.WhereasAugustine seeks the freedom to show thathe to rebel againstthe good, Raskalnikov seeks thisfreedom is thatboth is beyondgood and evil. Butthecrucialpointforour discussion

When the Willis Free / 439 men claimto do whattherestrictive incompatibilist says theycannot-freely an act thatis perceivedby the agent to be morallyindefensible. perform We have argued,then,thatthecontextofindefensibility is notrelevantly different from thecontextof(say) unopposeddesire:an agentcan generate a certainsortof desire to perform an action even thoughhe believes that the actionis morally indefensible. Thus,our critique ofvan Inwagen'sargumentabout contextsof unopposed desire (and unreflective action) can be extended to apply to his argument about contextsof indefensible actions. Someone might object thatour examples onlypertainto contextsin which agentsbelieve thattherelevant actionsare morally indefensible, rather than indefensible from some broader (perhaps "all-things-considered") But it is clear thatvan Inwagen has in mind the notionof perspective.34 moral indefensibility. Further, ifthe broadernotionof indefensibility were employed, this would substantially reduce the incidence of contextsof indefensibility (thusvitiating the restrictivist's claim thatwe are rarelyfree to do otherwise). Finally,we do not see why individuals cannot generate desires(perhaps to do things theywouldbe "weak-willed desires") whichthey all thingsconsidered. considerto be indefensible, Before leaving the question of whether or not we are free to act which we want to considera finalworryabout such freedom indefensibly, Susan is suggested formulated Wolf. by two interesting examplesrecently by Wolfasks us to considerwhatitwould mean foran agentto have theability to act againsteverything he believes in and cares about: It wouldmean,forexample, a burning thatiftheagent's son wereinside thehousego up in theagentcouldjuststand there and watch building, and flames. Or that theagent, he thinks hisneighbor a fine though thedoorbell, couldjustgetup one day,ring and punch agreeable fellow, himin thenose One might think notbe that suchpiecesofbehavior should at all-thatthey that the classified as actions are rather morelikespasms Ifthey and an agent control are actions are verybizarre, agentcannot they whoperformed them wouldhaveto be insaneIndeed, one might think he would have to be insaneifhe had even theability toperform themForthe ofan agentwhocouldperform as these rationality suchirrational actions must thin thread.35 hangby a dangerously Before a wordofqualification is inorder. theseexamples, directly discussing whatitwould mean for Wolforiginally theseexamplesto illustrate presents whatsoever.One an agent'sactionsnot to be determined by any interests is thata of the pointsshe is making,ifwe have understoodher properly, could hardly be personwhose actionsweren'tdetermined by any interests said to be acting at all. Rather hisbehavior, sinceitdidnotreflect anyinterests of an or intention, would seem morelike spasmsor the bizarremovements in thisfashion Wolf'sclaim is certainly insane person.Understood unobjecto reflect the(alleged)conceptual seems merely tionable;indeed,thisinsight truth discussedabove thatall behavior,ifit is to be consideredactionat all,

/ Mark Ravizza 440 / John Martin Fischer reflect somepro-attitude. must claim more substantive inWolf's from another comes Ourinterest examples this is comments; andsubsequent by herexamples which is also suggested perform indefensible the ability to who even had that anyone thesuggestion inthenose orpunching herneighbor toburn, her children acts(like allowing is not thetrivial insane. This claim wouldhaveto be forno goodreason) would herinterests didnotreflect movements whose bodily onethat anyone anyone claim that itis themore interesting andsubstantive be insane; rather would goodinterests all seemingly to act against whoeven hadtheability passageby Daniel A similar is found in thefollowing be insane. sentiment do otherwise whenI sayI cannot "But inother cases,likeLuther's, Dennett: is whatthesituation and because I meanI cannot becauseI see so clearly Itistooobvious what isnotimpaired. todo;reason rational control faculty my I happen not since and dictates it;I wouldhaveto be madto do otherwise, Both and Dennett seeminclined do otherwise."36 Wolf to be mad,I cannot X would that that be crazy' toa stronger claim toslidefrom theclaim 'doing Ifthis "Wolf/Dennett to do X wouldbe crazy'. whohadtheability 'anyone ofus are notcrazy, itwouldseemto sincemost slide"werecorrect, then, indefensible manner-a ofus are notabletoactina crazy, follow that most wouldofcoursewelcome. which therestrictive incompatibilist conclusion slideis false.In via theWolf/Dennett theconclusion reached We think in van to exposethefallacy similar to theone usedearlier fact, a strategy hereto makecleartheproblem also can be deployed arguments Inwagen's things free todo insane arenot that sanepeople Theconclusion with this slide. itis notpossible for someone to from theclaimthat is supposed to follow Butthere are two that crazy. actually being do something is crazywithout butit theclaimis true, this claim.On one interpretation, waysto interpret the on the otherinterpretation, the desiredconclusion; failsto support buttheclaimis false. conclusion does follow, the to meanthat claimis construed On thefirst theinitial interpretation, that an agentbe sane andperform ofaffairs is notpossible: following state butitcertainly does So interpreted theclaimmaybe true, a crazyaction. to act crazily. has theability that no sane person notimply theconclusion theinitial claimneedstobe strengthened In order toreachthis conclusion, forherto do so as to claimthatifan agentis sane thenit is notpossible reason After seemsfalse. theclaim Butso interpreted all,what crazy things. should callone'srationality toactcrazily that isthere tothink themere ability intoquestion? between a distinction itiscustomary toaccept toother With vices, respect to eat theability it.Forexample, having and exercising an ability having nordoeshaving that one is intemperate; toexcessdoesnotimply anddrink this distinction make. Indeed a coward from thebattlefield, theability toflee to theability to a widerangeofcharacter traits-having seemsapplicable

When the Willis Free / 441

to act act generously does not make one generous, havingthe ability Thepoint hereis simply dishonestly doesnotmakeone a liar, andso forth. that someone that having thepower to actina certain waydoesnotentail this general fact, why is thetype ofperson whowillactthat way.Andgiven actions like shouldwe expectthecase to be otherwise withindefensible one'sneighbor for Why should simply having punching no goodreason?37 the ability to act crazilyrenderone crazy?Whyshouldtherebe this toactcrazily" dispositional notions? asymmetry between the"ability andother Anexample if we have might be helpful here. A traditional viewhasitthat a free will atall,we must havea perfect, will. Roughly theidea God-like free behind theviewis that whereas there can be impediments to action-i.e., cannot be any onecanbe unable toactinaccordance with one'swill-there to it,butrather impediments to willing.38 We raisethis viewnotto defend (If oneprefers science assume, for thepurposes ofthis example, that itistrue. that youhappen upon fiction and fantasy to tradition, then simply imagine a magical youdiscover that it has ring, and after placing iton yourfinger, willdescribed bestowed free bythetraditional view uponyoutheinfinitely above:a will that youdesire enables youtochooseornotchooseanyoption should be clear: irrespective ofyour morals orbestinterests). Nowonething tothe ofyour choices hasbeenincreased (thanks simply becausetherange Having this ring), yourability to listen to reasonhas notbeen decreased. orleaveyouwith freedom doesnotsomehow mute thevoiceofconscience, rational; itmerely gives no wayto know which course ofaction is themost to picka lessoptimal youtheability pathifyouso will.Likethemotorist a scenicparkway whoreachesa junction from which she can takeeither or toward a one-lane dirt roadthat crawls heading directly herdestination, in than acres of landfill the more direction, you likely through sanitary wrong Butsurely willpickthemostreasonable alternative. we won'tjudgethe motorist tobe crazy wereshecanchoose becausesheisat a junction simply should a route which is notin herinterests, andneither we judgeyoucrazy have to choose becauseyou thepower yourinterests. simply against showsthat at a crossroads "Still"-one scarcely might complain-"being turn After no sane motorist ever willtake is free to as she one pleases. all, ever will act and no thedirt knowingly against path, similarly sane person to act thiswaywouldappearto herinterests. Indeedhaving thefreedom theability for wouldanyone everwant than a curse; be lessa blessing why that the It it would seem fashion? short tobehaveinsucha contrary power as much ifwe haveitat all,is hardly andimmorally, toactboth irrationally flawwhichneeds to be character of an ability, as it is a disability-a overcome."39 theother One is easilydealtwith; are raisedby this Two points worry. of in the context touch can a broader issuewhich we broaches upon only will never a sane motorist As tothefirst this discussion. actually point-that

Ravizza Fischer / Mark 442 / John Martin willnever actually road,and a sane person actagainst her choosethedirt Nevertheless, cases this is true.40 can agreethat in most bestinterests-we herinterests never willactagainst as we saw above,thefact that someone nothing incoherent For surely there is she cannot do so. doesnotentail that Having given this she never exercises. a person having a power which about more complicated tothesecond, we areleadstraightaway response, however, she will everwantto havea powerthat worry: whywoulda sane person andbest all ofhermorals especially a powerto actagainst never exercise, to havesomething is,of we wouldwant lamentably, toaskwhether But, out not the whether we have for it might turn that it, sameas asking course, a freedom eventhough this is hardly toactindefensibly we havethefreedom incomworry cannot aid therestrictive we would liketo have.Hence,this in securing hisposition.42 patibilist thefact that slide is a slide, anditis notwell-motivated; TheWolf/Dennett further argumentation) andwithout X would be crazy doesnot(initself doing Just as agents whohadthe ability todo X would be crazy. imply that anyone with the power be gluttons, agents neednot with the powertobe gluttonous crazy. to act crazily need notbe considered
V. Restrictive Incompatibilism and Moral Responsibility: Tracing interests?4'

need not accept the Thus farwe have arguedthatincompatibilists able to do "rarely, ifever,is anyone claimthat restrictive incompatibilist's ifourcriticisms havenot than does."But what persuaded? otherwise heinfact committed still are conceptually Whatifincompatibilists believethat they In closing we wantto entertain to thethesis ofrestrictive incompatibilism? to the following to direct our attention thispossibility and in particular be howwouldan incompatibilist ofmoral account responsibility question: ofthetime that most we are notable to do ifone wereconvinced affected willshowthat, evenifincompatibilists this otherwise? Answering question should wish had. didnotfind ourprevious they compelling, they objections therestrictive attheoutset ofthis incompatibilist paper, Aswe mentioned This tradition.' what vanInwagen terms the'classical himself with identifies willand between free is an intimate connection tradition holdsthatthere will-if wereever ifthere werenofree such that moral nobody responsibility, This therewouldbe no moralresponsibility. able to do otherwise-then instances there aren't ofcourse, meanthat doesnot, particular requirement at thetime eventhough in which a person still be heldaccountable might ofthe todo otherwise. hewas unable oftheaction example (VanInwagen's ofaffairs that itdoessuggest drunk driver issucha case).However, anystate backto someprior must be able to be traced for we are responsible which

When the Will is Free/ 443 the principle van Inwagenoffers freeaction.To capturethis"tracing" following rule:
at a stateofaffairs unless there was a time An agentcannot be blamed for he couldso have arranged that stateofaffairs notobtain which matters that (p. 419)

ofprinciple anyincompatibilist whofeels Thistype doesnotbodewellfor to accepttherestrictivist's conclusions, butstill hopesto remain compelled must therestrictive incompatibilist within theclassical tradition. Remember inwhich we areabletodo otherwise: hold that there areonly three situations duty conflicts with inclination, and situations Buridan cases,casesinwhich with the ofconflict incommensurable values.Conjoin this premise between andnowtherestrictive incompatibilist iscommitted abovetracing principle, for toshowing that allstates ofaffairs which we areresponsible canbe traced kinds ofsituations. Butwhy should we think that backtoone ofthese three for we are responsible can be traced backto somefree which everything or choicebetweenequallyattractive alternatives, dutyand inclinations, incommensurable values? to adoptat this point for theincompatibilist Themost promising strategy theonesthrough istoargue that kinds ofconflict situations areprecisely these andstill hence, we can accepthistheory which ourcharacters are formed; for allstates ofaffairs which comeaboutas a result ofactions be responsible Intheend,however, that areproduced eventhis strategy byourcharacters. from thehabituation we receive in fail. Much ofourcharacter results must ofourcharacter don'tseemto be necessarily and theseportions early life, or of conflict connectedwith situations between duty,inclinations, incommensurable values. in a young whohasspent all ofherlife Consider call herBetty, woman, a small, rural Likemost ofthecitizens ofhertown, family Betty's community. almost is still tobe American, andovertheyears hasgradually, Betty proud mostly internalized a certain degree ofpatriotism. Being raised imperceptibly, theapathy oftheReagan hasnever beeninanysituation years, Betty during with hermild hascomeinto conflict anyofhershort-term where patriotism much inclinations or other values.Indeedshe has nevergiventhematter a loyalAmerican as flying hascomeas naturally thought-for Betty, being this mild is a fixed theflag on Independence patriotism Day. Eventhough ofBetty's therestrictivist mustholdthatshe is notyet feature character, to thisviewbecauseBetty has notyet forit; he is committed responsible inwhich shewas ableto makea free choicethat beenina conflict situation now her haveprevented herfrom having patriotic disposition. Imagine would a series ofstrange thefirst and through that travels abroadfor time, Betty her for a young a singularly mistakes foreign agent coincidences, incompetent inselling an interest secrets. American soldier whohasexpressed government tobetray hercountry. He approaches inso many andasksher, words, Betty

444 / John Martin Fischer / Mark Ravizza Ofcourse, Betty thinks that treason is morally indefensible; shehasa strong nottodo it, a moment's desire andwith scarcely deliberation sheturns down the agent'soffer without waiting forany further explanation. For the restrictive incompatibilist, Betty clearly wasnotabletodo anything but what shedid.Moreover that from ofher given her action resulted features character which inturn couldnotbe traced backtosomeearlier free decision, itseems that for heshould saythat Betty is notresponsible theensuing state ofaffairs that declined tobetray hercountry. Butsucha conclusion runs Betty directly counter toouractual ofholding practices peopleresponsible. Indeed ifBetty in thiscase, thenit wouldappearthat is notresponsible therestrictivist's position requires that he severely limit thedomain ofmoral responsibility, for a great ofoureveryday actions result from many other character traits likeBetty's anddispositions arenotabletobe traced back which, patriotism, ofconflict tooneofthese situations between andinclination orbetween duty incommensurable values. therestrictive Ofcourse, that is incompatibilist might object Betty really for responsible herdisposition topatriotism. "Undoubtedly"-the argument must havebeenmany more small conflict situations inherlife goes-"there for andthese taken than situations youhaveallowed (orsheisevenawareof), account for herpresent tomakesucha contogether disposition." However, for itwould cession would fatal totherestrictivist's undermine prove position, inwhich thesis that ifever, arewe inoneofthese situations hiscentral rarely, we are free to do otherwise. Thus, we leave therestrictive incompatibilist of with a dilemma: either accepta severerestriction on therangeofstates orelsereject affairs for which we canbe heldmorally theclaim accountable, that ofthetime Van Inwagen most we are unableto do otherwise. claims that a traditional restrictive incompatibilism canbe embedded within approach tomoral viaa tracing we haveargued this claim isfalse. responsibility theory; VI. Conclusion for norhave intended toargue We havenotinthis paper incompatibilism, we attempted howthewill canbe free inan indeterministic world. toexplain we sought tomakeseveral more minimal First Rather, we havetried points. van to undermine therestrictive incompatibilist's position by challenging Inwagen's initial claimthat"ifone acceptsBeta, one shouldbe an inone should and ifone is an incompatibilist, compatibilist, acceptBeta"(p. to showthat Beta an argument we presented 405).In particular accepting we also cited of incompatibilism. is nota necessary condition (In passing whichallege thataccepting Beta is nota severalcompatibilist strategies that one can be an ofincompatibilism.) The argument sufficient condition the without to acceptBetahasramifications incompatibilist having beyond Ifincompatibilism can ofrestrictive scopeofourdiscussion incompatibilism.

is Free/ 445 When the Will a recent trend-exemplified be secured without explicitly using Beta,then resemblance among various formulations bySlote-which seesa deepfamily forincompatibilism hopesto undermine them oftheargument and which ofBetamust all byquestioning be seento havea morelimited thevalidity have hoped. scope thanitsproponents might previously we argued thateven ifan incompatibilist does acceptBeta,he Second, one rarely, ifever, is free todo neednotaccept therestrictivist's thesis that that claim persons are otherwise. Specifically we challenged therestrictivist's morally indefensible, (2) refrain unableto (1) perform actions they consider toperform, and(3)refrain from desire performing actions which they strongly actions which taketobe theonly sensible thing todo. from performing they inthe Inconnection with we questioned a slide(suggested these arguments from theclaim that 'doing writings ofWolf andDennett) which sought tomove X would that 'anyone whocando X must be crazy' tothestronger conclusion be crazy'. we examined theconsequences thatrestrictive incompatibilism Finally ofmoral We concluded responsibility. wouldhavefor a traditional theory that we rarely ifincompatibilists to thethesis that wereindeedcommitted wouldbode ill forany are able to do otherwise, such a commitment within ofresponsibility which still hopedto remain incompatibilistic theory 43,44 tradition. theclassical
Notes 3, Perspectives, 1 Peter inPhilosophical "When Is TheWillFree?" van Inwagen, (Atascadero, Tomberlin ed. James Of MindAnd ActionTheory, Philosophy page pp 399-422Allsubsequent Ridgeview Publishing Co, 1989), California noted unless otherwise willbe to this article references term will' as "a philosophical usageandtreat 'free vanInwagen's 2 Wewillfollow will" that she "hasfree to say ofsomeone ofart" According to van Inwagen does isfree than what she,infact, todo other that shesometimes means roughly argues for thesecondhalf van Inwagen primarily Is TheWillFree?" 3. In "When that defense oftheargument tooffer a detailed ofthis thesis; he doesn't purport isincompatible provide such He does, however, determinism. with causal free will Press, inhisexcellent (Oxford Clarendon a defense bookAnEssayOnFreeWill Free?" and "When IsTheWill when taken together that 1983). Hencewebelieve as a defense oftheposition be construed AnEssayOnFreeWill canreasonably 'restrictivism' we are calling is quoted from "When Argument 4 Thefollowing formulation oftheConsequence andCarl pp 55-105, Is TheWill Free7" p 405 See alsoAnEssayOnFree Will, 44 (November Studies ofIncompatibilism," 1983), "InDefense Philosophical Ginet, pp 391-400 Buridan casesin to include both standard 5 Van Inwagen usesthis term broadly which clear things anditisn't incompatible "onewants eachoftwoormore which andthethings areinterchangeable" (p 415),andcases oneheshould (try to)get, in which"the cases" Theseare situations whichhe calls "vanilla/chocolate

446 / JohnMartinFischer/ MarkRavizza accessible andequally arenotreally interchangeable (astwoidentical alternatives the that constitute ofthealternatives theproperties pilesofhay)butin which desires" oftheconflicting theobjects them areprecisely between whole difference (p 415) we willnotdirectly lieselsewhere, thrust ofourcriticisms 6 Becausethecentral convan Inwagen's itis worth noting that this claim. However, takeissuewith only rarely occur we arefree) sorts ofcases(i.e casesinwhich tention that these cases that these is highly it seemsmore plausible to suppose debatableIndeed van ofcases in which ifnotmoreoften, types thanthethree occuras often, Schauber andNancy toCarl Ginet wearenotfreeWearegrateful claims Inwagen to ourattention. for this calling point "ifone accepts Betaone should be an incompatibilist, 7. VanInwagen claims that Beta"(p 405) Inwhat follows oneshould accept andifoneisan incompatibilist, half of thelatter wouldtakeissuewith howcertain incompatibilists we discuss accept Beta" However, oneshould one isan incompatibilist, claim-ie., "if this Beta,one one accepts oftheclaim-"if half it is worth that theformer noting compatibilists alsobe contested bycertain should be an incompatibilist"-would the takeissuewith one can acceptBetaandstill Suchcompatibilists arguethat do so either thefixity bychallenging for they basicargument incompatibilism, thefixity oflaws(van ofthepast(vanInwagen's 4) or bychallenging premise ofcompatibilism which offormer type 6). (Fora discussion Inwagen's premise "Compatibilism see Jan Narveson, compatibilism be called"multiple-pasts" might Andre Gallois, "van 1977), pp 83-87, 32 (July Philosophical Studies Defended," Studies 32 (July 1977), AndDeterminism," Philosophical On FreeWill Inwagen Analysis AndControl OverThePast," "Compatibilism Foley, Richard pp 99-105, AndFreeKeith Conditionals, "Preferences, 39 (March Lehrer, pp 70-74, 1979), D Reidel Publishing (Dordrecht. inTime AndCauseed Peter vanInwagen dom," Studies43 Philosophical Fischer, "Incompatibilism," Martin Co., 1980),John Fora discussion ofthelatter ofcompatibilism, type 1983), pp. 127-37. (January "Are We see DavidLewis, be called"'local-miracle" compatibilism', which might CarlGinet, 47 (1981,Part3), pp. 113-121, FreeTo BreakThe Laws,"Theoria and "Incompatibilism", John Martin Fischer, "In Defense of Incompatibilism"; and Kadri 22 (June AndMiracles," pp.235-252, Noius 1988), "Freedom Fischer, "HowAre We (AndAre Not)Free To BreakThe Laws Of Nature" Vihvelin, (manuscript) for two formulations of the argument 8 Indeedvan Inwagenhimself offers likeBeta.See van do notdepend on anyruleofinference that incompatibilism ofhisFirst Formal and hisSecond"Possible Argument Inwagen's presentation Foranother inAn EssayOn Free Will Worlds" example pp 55-93. Argument On Action 1990), pp. University Press, Cambridge see CarlGinet, (Cambridge: 90-123. 9. An EssayOn Free Will, p 57 10. Ibid of Journal and the Free-Will Problem," 11 MichaelSlote,"Selective Necessity 79 (January p. 9. 1982), Philosophy, and The ConsequenceArgument," 12. See Terence Horgan,"Compatibilism 47 (1985), p. 339. Studies, Philosophical a "finer-grained" we wantto arguethat and Horgan, Slote, 13. Pace van Inwagen, which isneeded for tothe various recognizes incompatibilism arguments approach the rulesor involve makeuse ofthesameinference that notall formulations vanInwagen's whereas Forexample, inthesamecommitments incompatibilist

When the Willis Free / 447 p. 94),hisFirst OnFreeWill, Beta(Essay useofprinciple makes argument modal rfalse, s canrender "If principle "entailment" usesa different Argument Formal p 72).Other On Free Will, (Essay q false" s can render r,then and ifq entails principle of"transfer" type onstill a different rely for incompatibilism arguments S cannot X is doing Y, Therefore, doing do X, In thecircumstances "S cannot pp 231-243) 1985), Mind, 94 (April in"Scotism," discussion do Y " (See Fischer's principles ofsuch Fordiscussions principles similar alsoemploy philosophers Other On L Quinn, "Plantinga see Philip arguments roles inincompatibilistic andtheir and E Tomberlin, eds James Plantinga, inAlvin AndFreedom," Foreknowledge B.Talbott, Thomas D Reidel Publishing Co, 1985), (Dordrecht Peter vanInwagen And AboutThe Past,"Philosophy And Bringing "Of DivineForeknowledge "On DavidWiderker, pp 455-469, 1986), 46 (March Research Phenomenological and pp 37-41, 1987), 47 (January Analysis ForIncompatibilism," AnArgument ed AndFreedom, inGod, Foreknowledge, OfFatalism," "TwoForms Widerker, On and Ginet 1989), Press, University Stanford (Stanford Fischer Martin John toone bearsomeresemblance principles Beta-like all ofthese ActionAlthough Moreover, arenotidentical they at least) (onthesurface itisclearthat another, insucha can be formulated argument theincompatibilist's as we arguebelow, nor principle entailment Beta,van Inwagen's use ofneither it makes waythat vanInwagen's weshall present, totheargument Inaddition principle anytransfer an exampleof an inworlds" argument-is "possible secondargument-the sort ofthis which does notdependon anyprinciples argument compatibilist "Scotism" see Fischer, argument ofthis anddiscussion presentation 14 Fora detailed the "Are WeFreetoBreak anddelicatesee Lewis, herearecomplex 15 Theissues and "Incompatibilism" Fischer, ofIncompatibilism", "InDefense Ginet, Laws?", To Break Free AreNot) "HowWeAre(And andVihvelin, andMiracles", "Freedom The Laws" ofincompatibilism proof tobe a definitive argument 16 Infact, we do nottakethis Fischer, Martin see John argument, tothis response ofcompatibilist Foronetype pp. 335-350. 65 (1984), Quarterly, Philosophical Pacific OverThe Past," "Power for oftheargument version a stronger that suggest inthis article Thecriticisms worlds" argument likethe"possible wellbe something might incompatibilism hasthe inAn EssayOn FreeWillThisargument develops van Inwagen which ofthepast fixity strong onneither Betanoronan overly itrelies that advantage poweroverthepast deniesone evennon-causal claimwhich employ doesnotexplicitly theaboveargument although that object 17. Onemight like Betawerevalidbecausesomeprinciple unless notbe sound Beta,itwould do notsee howthis leadsone to acceptFL andFP We,however, Betais what dependent FP orFL isindeed formally that toshow could be developed objection to Beta couldbe on Beta,nordo we see how the allegedcounterexamples itseemsto Rather oftheaboveargument. into criticisms translated successfully andthe lawshaveanindependent ofthe the past about fixity such usthat principles toaccept anything FP andFLwithout having onecould accept andhence appeal, ruleof inference likeBetaas a general Worth Wanting OfFreeWill Room TheVaneties Elbow 18 See DanielC Dennett, and "Selective Necessity The MITPress, p 148,and Slote, 1984), (Cambridge: Problem." theFree-Will 14(Fall1986), pp Topics, Philosophical "Power Necessity," Fischer, Martin 19. John 77-91. BasisofResponTheMetaphysical Necessity from Freedom Berofsky. 20. Bernard and KeganPaul,1987). sibility (NewYork:Routledge

448/ JohnMartin Fischer/ MarkRavizza without argument canbe formulated 21 Indeed, recognizing that theincompatibilist's ofthemotivation for principle callsinto question much either BetaorBerofsky's ofthesystem ofcontingent necessity. Themachinery developing sucha system insofar as one wishes developed by Berofsky is useful ofcontingent necessity butit is important to to havea modal version oftheincompatibilist's argument, isnotnecessary theincompatibilist's inorder togenerate see that this machinery argument Martin Fischer, 22 Forfurther thevalidity ofBetasee John discussion concerning ed.Fischer AndFreedom," inMoral Responsibility, "Introduction Responsibility " "Power Necessity Press, 1986), pp 9-61, andFischer (IthacaCornell University for ourpurposes conditional, '(C)', itwill be useful 23 Although vanInwagen callsthis to call it,'(C1)' is trueA Kantian theorist of this conceptual claim 24. Itis ofcourse notclearthat aloneandthat desire action that actions canbe motivated byreason might argue is nota necessary to suggest ofgenuine action. Thus, we do notwish precursor we onlysuggest that the(Humean) conceptual claimis obviously true, rather, conceptual Further, itisclear that iftheHumean that ithasa certain plausibility is indeed is evenin worseshape:in then van Inwagen's argument point false, no andthus interpretation would issueina falsehood this case eventheweaker for support (2) is calledinto question that whenone'sfreedom 25. InDe FatoAlexander suggests on other it can be reasonable to do something occasions be seenas (that might "Next in order one'sability to do otherwise to demonstrate irrational) simply which he it is notbycompulsion that thewisemandoesanyone ofthethings butas himself control alsoovernotdoing anyoneofthemFor having chooses, to thewisemannotto do on some it might also sometimes seemreasonable to occasion what would havebeenbrought aboutbyhim-inorder reasonably ifsomeprophet tohim that hewould showthefreedom ofhisactions, predicted ofnecessity do this (De Fato 2002-7) verything" isambiguous moved being ofsuccessfully acting ona desire between 26 Thenotion ofone'sdesireWe in getting theobject succeeding bythedesire and actually meanto adoptthelatter interpretation. this scenario that we always 27 Ofcourse, a critic objectthat presupposes might tocallsuch tomind. therestrictivist nothing do havetheability a worry However, must that we havethis and ability, that an incompatibilist deny hassaidsuggests is given until it seemsreasonable to adhere to thecommon suchan argument herepoint outthat wisdom tothink as we willAndonecannot that we arefree ifcausaldeterminism would follow with weretrue-together incompatibilism-it inquestion Thisis becausetherestrictivist's that we would nothavethepower is supposed to do free to showthat Betaimplies that we are rarely argument evenifdeterminism werefalse. otherwise, hisexample insucha waythat van Inwagen doeswant to construe 28. Admittedly tocalltomind theperson isunable theincompatibilist must that anyreason agree "But this hewrites we might thephoneTo ensure for notanswering condition, ormyenvironment inmypsyche there exists no basiseither also imagine that that would for thetelephone rings) anyofthese things [i e , things (atthemoment would thephone orthat nottoanswer keepmefrom answering givemea reason thetelephone at themoment that rings suppose it] We mayeven,ifyoulike, thephonewillpop notanswering it is causally that no reasonfor determined ifa person's inthenext few seconds " (p 413) Wewill into agreethat mymind toorpro-attitude toward that hehasnoreason motivational setissuch answering

When the Willis Free / 449 an instance ofthe thephone, then he willnotanswer thephoneThisis simply sortof consideration whichsupports the allegedHumeanconceptual point. with sucha motivational setcan However, what is at issueis whether a person hasnotpresented any answer thephoneAs far as we can tell, therestrictivist this motivational set lacksthepowerto argument to showthat a person with from answering the call to mind theworry that he might be unableto refrain ifheactually hasnoreason ordesire phoneIfa person hasthis power, then (even to refrain from answering thephone)he does havethepowerto call to mind a reason not toanswer the certain other conditions aresatisfied, phoneGiven that itis plausible to suppose he has thepowerto refrain from answering the that phone. ifitis supposed then theincomOfcourse, that causaldeterminism obtains, togenerate therelevant must the doesnothavethe power patibilist saythat agent from answering thephone Butin reasons andthus lacksthepowerto refrain of an assessment of restrictivism, the context it is notfair to assumecausal is that, claim evenifcausaldeterminism determinism; after all,therestrictivist's werefalse, we wouldrarely be freeto do otherwise 29 We are grateful and Eleonore Stump foreach to SarahBuss,Nancy Schauber this to ourattention. calling objection 30 See pp. 406-407 31. Dennett, ElbowRoom,pp 133ff 32. Harry usestheterm todescribe actions which an agent Frankfurt "unthinkable" to willto perform. to Frankfurt someactswill cannot himself According bring be unthinkable for but"ontheother inhibitions, an agent becauseofhismoral something is unthinkable maybe hand, theconsiderations on account ofwhich G.Frankfurt, andwithout See Harry significance." entirely self-regarding anymoral AndThe Unthinkable," OfWhat WeCare "Rationality chap.in TheImportance About(Cambridge. Press, 1988), p. 182.Another reason Cambridge University is given byLehrer's examples whyan agentmaybe unableto willsomething tochoosetodo something becausethey ofagents whocannot themselves bring "Cans Without suffer from a pathological aversion See Keith Lehrer, Ifs," Analysis InTheory AndPractice: A Possible 29 (October andLehrer, "'Can' 1968), pp 29-32, in ActionTheory, ed. MylesBrandand DouglasWalton Worlds Analysis," D. ReidelPublishing 1976), pp 241-270 (Dordrecht: Company, of Raskalnikov's 33 We do notmeanto suggest thatthisis a complete analysis for we want tolimit ourcomments rather thesakeofbrevity complex character; abouthismotivations to those which from thepassages citedA more emerge would haveto consider other among things: (1) complete analysis undoubtedly know after thefact Raskalnikov claims tohavefelt beforehand that hewould that man(III6) andhis thecrime that he was only a louseandnotan extraordinary insistence which which toconfirm this later demise seems suspicion, (2)hislater theprevious claim andsuggests that he now,liketheextraordinary challenges his no guilt for hiscrime (3) hisclaimto havesuffered man,feels (Epilogue.2), "somedecreeof blindfate"(Epilogue 2), (4) the promised downfall through to theneedfurther to at theendofthebook Allthesefacts point repentance ofRaskalnikov; we leavethis sketch refine andrevise ourabbreviated however, ofthese Foran interesting discussion task tomore critics issues, capable literary intheNorton Edition ofcritical Critical see thecollection on Raskalnikov essays & ed GeorgeGibian(NewYork W W Norton of Crime and Punishment, Company, 1975) hiscrime in order to commits 34 Forexample, one might that Raskalnikov object

450 / JohnMartinFischer/ MarkRavizza whom all things arepermitted, and showthat he is the"extraordinary man"for from thebroader perspective therefore hemust viewhisactas being defensible tosuch however, Raskalnikov still must available a personEvenonthis reading, be seenas doing he takes tobe indefensible given theconstraints of something man"is to want conventional morality, forto wantto be the"extraordinary imperatives. nothing less thanto be free to ignore suchmoral 35. SusanWolf, inMoral Responsibility p 206 emphasis "Asymmetrical Freedom," outlines this inhisexcellent article "FreeAction andFree added.Watson worry Mind96 (April Will," 1987), pp. 145-172 36. ElbowRoom,p 133 begins with an example37. Itis interesting to notethat Wolf, likevan Inwagen, ofallowing tobe incinerated-which isan action most people that one'schildren would find andunthinkable, andthen moves toan exampleboth indefensible that ofpunching most people would just find indefensible ones'neighbor-which of whether the mereability to do Sincewe wantto focuson the question wewill concentrate onher second indefensible things doesindeed make onecrazy, example. Descartes inhisFourth Meditation claims. "Itis free willaloneor 38 Forexample, I find inmethat I can conceive no other liberty ofchoicewhich to be so great itis indeed will thecase that it is for themost partthis idea to be moregreat, I beartheimageand similitude that causesme to knowthatin somemanner willis of God" For a modern defense of the view thatidea of an unfree A Dual AspectTheory The Will. (Caminconceivable see Brian O'Shaugnessy, of Albritton, "Freedom bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980);and Rogers Will ofAction," oftheAmerican andFreedom Presidential Address, Proceeding AsWatson outthetruth behind points PhilosophicalAssociation (November 1985). suchclaims seems tobe that "ourconcept ofthewill issuchthat there is nosuch isnecessarily successful", from this point, however, thing as failing towill; willing "itdoes notfollow that from notby having willing, one cannot be prevented as itweretoward one'swillpushed obstacles placedinthepath, butbyhaving onepathoranother"-see 96 "FreeAction andFreeWill," Mind, Gary Watson, (April 1987), p. 163 39 Watson raisesthis in "FreeAction and FreeWill," p 164. worry thatexamples likethoseofAugustine 40. Although we havesuggested challenge ifwe takeAugustine intuition for he seemsto be a case eventhis at hisword, ofsomeone in a manner he believed to whodidact against hisbestinterests, Andifthis ifone can exercise this be indefensible, andstill was notcrazy. true, one can simply possessthisfreedom freedom and notbe insane, thensurely without beingcrazy. 41 Wolf onewant theability this wellwhen sheasks:"Why would puts latter point be unpleasant or arbitrary? to pass up theapplewhento do so wouldmerely onthesandwhen todo so would would onewant tostay theability Why planted inother istowant notonly be cowardly andcallous?To want autonomy words, this latter butalso theability toactirrationally-but theability toactrationally ifit is an ability Freedom Within towant, at all."(Wolf, is a very strange ability Oxford Reason(Oxford. pp. 55-56.) University Press,1990), thefreedom to act 42. Although haveargued that authors likeDennett and Wolf that it may is notonlynotwanted butfurther agents, indefensibly byrational in quitean this to them, other writers haveviewed freedom evenbe a liability source ofhuman to itas a primary havepointed dignity. opposite fashion; they ofhimself, as a part want tobelieve Jeffrie asks:"Doesnoteachperson Murphy

When the Willis Free / 451 ofhispride in hishuman dignity, that he is capableofperforming, freely and responsibly performing, evil actsthatwouldquiteproperly earnforhimthe retributive hatred ofothers? Andshouldn't he at leastsometimes extend this compliment to others?" (See Jeffrie G. Murphy andJean Hampton, Forgiveness AndMercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 102.)Presumably, oftheintuition part hereis that ourrespect for others stems from seeing them as responsible agents who, eventhough they areabletodo thebad,refrain from doing so andchoose instead toactinaccord with morality. Indeed Watson suggests (inhisarticle "FreeAction AndFreeWill") that a Kantian conception ofmoral which agency an ability to set endsrequires emphasizes this offreedom type On this we want thefreedom toactindefensibly, view, notbecausewe want to be irrational, but rather because this freedom underlies ourunique status as moral it gives us theability agents, to reorder ourvaluesand to change the radically endswhich ouractions. govern 43 With tothis respect lastpoint, itis worth that there are goodreasons noting for abandoning this Fora representative tradition. ofarticles sample discussing this see Fischer, position, MoralResponsibility, Alsosee John pp. 143-249. Martin Fischer, "Responsiveness andMoral inResponsibility, Responsibility," Character, and theEmotions, ed Ferdinand Schoeman (Cambridge Cambridge University Press,1987),pp 81-106;MarkRavizza,"Is Responsiveness Sufficient For Responsibility" and Fischer and Ravizza,"Responsibility (manuscript), And Ethics101 (January Inevitability" 1991). 44. We are grateful to SarahBuss,DavidCopp,CarlGinet, Jonathan Lear,Nancy and Eleonore for Schauber, their comments on a previous Stump helpful draft ofthis versions ofthis paper Previous paperwerereadat theUCLALaw and Discussion Philosophy and at theUniversity ofCalifornia, Group, San Diego