The Telengana Peasant Armed Struggle, 1946-51 Author(s): Mohan Ram Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.

8, No. 23 (Jun. 9, 1973), pp. 1025-1032 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4362720 Accessed: 23/11/2010 21:31
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SPECIALARTICLES

The

Telengana

Peasant
1946-51
Mohan Ram

Armed

Struggle,

Over 20 years ago, AcharyacVinoba Bhave launched his bhoodan movement at Pochampalli, a village in Telengana where communists had carried on an armed struiggle for five years around an agrarian programme. Bhoodan was to be the sarvodaya answverto the comnzunist challenge on the land problem and was meant to achieve what legislative action was not expected to do. The minuiscuzlar peasanztrevolt in Naxalbari (1967) was a reminder that neither the sarvodayga approah nor the legislative process (in wvhich communists had begun participating after abandoning the tactic of armnedstruggle) had solved the agrarian problem in India. There have been many Na.albaris since. The Maoist perspective in the Inidianicon7ninnist movement, which began with the Telengana struggle, has resulted inl anl extra-spectrum trend wvhichrejects the parliamentary systemnand seeks to achieve the people's democratic revolution throzugh people's war linked to an agrarian programme. The re-emergence of the MaCist trend in the Indian communist movement marks the retlurn of the "Telengana line". The 25th anniversary of the Telengana armedestruggle last year found the Indian communist m ovement indulging in polemics on the natulre and significance of the struggle. The main controversy was over the circutmnstances attending the withdrawal of the struggle in 1951. This article seeks to place the 'Telengana line' in perspective with particular reference to its relevance to the split in the Indian commzun-ist movement in 1964 and again in 1968.
THE Telengana peasanit armed struggle trend in the wN as the first independent Indian communist mnovement.Comimunists of the Telugu-speaking tracts of south-central India, noNwAndhra Praclesh, organised and led it, often in defiance of the central leadership of the Communist Party of Inidia and of the
international communiist movement.

Until 1953, the Telugu-speaking people lived in a contiguous ar-ea, a part of which was in the erstwhile Hyderabad state, a multilingual entity, and another in the erstwvhile Madras Presidency (later Madras state), also a entitv. The Telugu districts multilinaguial of Madras state wvere conistituted into the Andhra state in 1953. The Aindlhra state, together vith the Telengana neg(ion (as the Telugu districts of I-Iyderaibad staite were known) were grouped together to create the present Andhra Pradesh in 1956, breaking upi) thc I-Hderabad state. The first comuniiiiiist il-to grotips catme. being in Telengana in 1939-40. rhex Nvereillegal and functioned through the

The Communist Partv of India's zig-zags during the Second World War (the switch from the imperialist Nvarto the people's war slogan in 1942 and the consequent support to the British w7ar effort and the reluctance to support the dlemanidfor transfer of power) did not permit its Hyderabad unit to demand the end of NizamI'srule, the abolition of landlordism in the state and the implementation of a radical agrarian programme. A chanige in the CPI's policy, coiniciding with the post-war upsurge in the country, enabled the local unit to
plan more stlruggles. radical and more militanit

In Telengana, the contradiction betwveenthe mass of the peasants and feudalism was most advanced in 1945-46. The peasant mlovemenlt wNas initiallN orIganised aroundctsimliple demllands agaiinst eviction and oppressive feutdal extortions but it quickly escalated wheni it miiet w7ith the combined repressioni of the lanidlords and the Nizamii's governmiiental machinery. Peasant resistance to the attacks of organised hoodlumliis, police and the Nizam's military took the form of armed clashes wN hich eventtuallv were to swell into a movement for the overthrowv of Nizam's ruile.

feudal order. In the adjoining Andhra area (i e, the Telugu districts of Madras Presidency) the CPI had an efficient organisation and a wvell-trained cadre buit in Telengana it wvasnot so xvell established and the people of Telengana had no tradition of political participation. Yet the CPI found itself leading ani armed struggle in Telengaina that was to last five years.2 The Telengana region had been under a medieval fetudal monarchy while the Andhra area was directly under British rule and had the r-yotwariland tenutire system. The contradiction bet\veen the peasants and the landlords had become very sharp in Telengana wvhile it bad been blunted in the Anihra area. Sscondly, the inationalist movement in British India had been lecd by the national bouirgeoisie, whereas in Teleng(Yana the commtunistswere ini eff(ective
control of the smilall nationalist
mlove-

memit.

Finally, the decision of the Nizanmto reftise accession to India after Inclependenice (1947) placed him in clirect Anidhra Mahasaliha, a milass organisation contradiction to the new Indian governto promote the cuiltural and political ment. This factor malde it possible for interests of the Telugu-speaking people the commtinist-le(d in flIsderamiiovemllent bad state to take on the char-acterof a of the IHyderabadi state. In 1943, the n-iationial iberation struliggle,with the leadership of the Andhra MIahasalbha STRUGGLE AGAINST NIZA-M By imiid-1946, the miiovemiienithlad -stupport of the n.ational botirgeoisie leapassedl into communist hands. Fromii 1944 on, comimunists wvere organising (lerslhipof the, rest of the coontry, iutil ac(Iqiiredithe characteristics of' a national militant struggles against laildlordism liberation struggle to free the people Inidiainforces marched iilto the state to from the rule of the Nizam and the force its merger wvith the Indian Uniion. and feudal exploitation.'
1025

June 9, 1913
III 1946, the Hyderabad state unit of the CPI began campaigning for an interim government in the state as the intermediate step towards breaking utp the multilingual unit and merger of the various linguistic areas comprising it with the respective linguistic areas outside. This wvasthe genesis of the Andhra communists' slogan of 'Visalandhra' (an extended Andhra) to unify the Telugu-speaking people into a single, unilingual state. In the Andhra region, the CPI campaigned for an anti-feudal, democratic programme around the slogan of "People's Rule in Visalandhra" at the 1946 general elections3 and launched a limited struggle in the area to link up with the upsurge in Telengana where the Andhra Mahasabha had become a united mass organisation of all the anti-Nizam forces. When the British formally announced in June 1947 their decision to abdicate power in the subcontinent, the CPI found itself confused about the meaning of the transfer of power to take place on August 15. It settled for a non-class approach to the Congress leadership that was to take power from the British as a result of a compro.mise. At the inaugural meeting of the Cominform in September, Zhdanov made hig famotis speech characterisingthe world as b)eingdivided into two hostile camps and calling on communists to lead movements to oppose the imperialist plans for expansion and aggression.4 TIdian communists misread this to mean that in every non-socialist country the bourgeoisie had gone over to the camp of Anglo-United States imperialism and this new alignment of forces had created two camps in irreconcilable conflict in everyone of these countries. So India's independence was branded fake. Indian communists Nvent further than Zhdanov and embraced the views of Eduard Kardelj, a Yugoslav participant at the Cominform meeting. Kardelj had argued that democratic and socialist revolutions must "intertwine" and communists must attack not only the big bourgeoisie but the bourgeoisie as a whole. Adopting this Titoite line, the CPI concluded that India w-as already a capitalist country (and not a semi-feudal, semi-capitalistone) and that the party should intertwine the tw-o stages of revolution into a single stage through an attack on the entire Indian capitalist class. This was the essence of the party's thesis at its second congress in February-March1948. It was a swing from right opportunism to left sectaria-

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY these were fast maturing. Only prolonged armed resistance as in Telengana would bring abotut the needed situation.Andhra communists had invoked Mao Tse-tung's "New Democracy" to justify their strategy of a two-stage revolution in India. The new leadership of the CPI rejected the Andhra tbesis but the significance of this episode has not been adequately realised in India or outside. The first recorded (debate on the legitimacy of Mao Tsetung's theories as part of MarxismLeninism took place between the Andhra communists and the new CPI The ultra-revolutionary leadership. Ranadive, in his polemic against his country-cousins leading the Telengana armed struggle, suggestively bracketed Mao with Tito and Browder and denounced him as a charlatan (" .. some of Mao's formulations are such that no communist party can accept them; they are in contradiction of the situation. world understanding of the communist parties," he said).7 ANDHRA THESIS While the CPI's understanding was In May 1948, Andhra communists based on a wrong interpretation of the challenged the second congress thesis Europe-centred Zhdanov line, the and its reliance on the general-strike- Cominform did not seem to have a cuim-insurrection weapon. The Andhra clear line yet for former colonies like thesis said that the Indian revolution, India when Ranadive embarked on his in many respects, differed from the anti-Mao polemic. The Chinese Reclassical Russian Revolution and that it volution had not been brought to an was to a great ex-tent similar to the end. It was not until 1950 that the Chinese Revolution. The perspecthle Cominform endorsed the formulations should therefore be that of a dogged of Mao's "New Democracy". resistance and prolonged civil war in A Soviet academician, E M Zhukov, the form of an agrarian revolution advocated a four-class alliance in coloculminating in the capture of political nies and semi-colonies.8 A little later, power by the democratic front rather Academician V Balabusbevich hailed than a general strike and an armed up- the Telengana struggle as the "first rising. Therefore, where a good pro- attempt at creating people's democracy" portion of the masses were with the in India and the "harbingerof agrarian party (in Andhra, Kerala and Bengal) revolution".9 This was vindication of it wvastime to think in terms of guerilla the Andhra leadership's "Telengana warfare (the "Chinese way") against line". the military onslaughts of the Nehru govemnment bent on liquidating the FROM CHINA SUPPORT party. Armed guerilla resistance had Support to the Andhra leadership to be developed in several parts of the couintryand these areas were to be con- came also from the Communist Party verted into liberated areas with their of China wvithin weeks of the formal own armel forces and state apparatus, proclamation of the People's Republic later, townsvs ere to be liberated by of qhina (October 1, 1949). Ltu the armied(l forces from the liberated Shao-chi declared in Peking in November 1949 that "the road of Mao Tseareas. tuLng" w-as the path for other colonial The Andhra thesis also advocated a counitries an1d armede action was the uinited fronit, \vhieh iniclutdedthe rich mnain form of struggle Nwhenever peasantry ancd the miiiddle bourgeoisie as an(l wherever possible.10 the allies of the proletariat in the peoA few days- thereafter, an editorial demiiocratic rievolution, ple's anid in the Cominfoirn journal endorsed asserted that such a Nvide front of the most crucial of formulation of armeld struggle could take shape under Litu's declaration: the leadership of the party and that The experience of the victorious for realising t-he ol)jecti.ve conlditions national liberation struggle of the to the level of partisan armed struggle. "Telengana means communists and commuinists mean Telengana" thuindered B T Rana(live, the party's General Secretary-to-he at the second congress w-hich deposed the reformist P C Joshi. The Telengana armed struggle was a few imonths old and it wN-as not until the Telengana delegates had attacked the failure of the new political thesis to realise the "revolutionarv significance" of the struggle to the "present epoch of maturing democratic revolution in India" that the new leadership appeared to support the strtuggle seriouslv. The second congress called for similar struiggles in other parts of the country and for working class movements in support of Telengana, all ultimately leading to armed insurrection. The new albeit fonnally, because it might hasten the wvorkingclass general-strike-cum-armedinsurrection which it had banked upon in the post-war revolutionary

nism.5

The Andhra commiiunists had already taken the Telengana peasant movement
1026

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL W;EE?KLY Chinese people teaches that the working class must unite with all classes, parties antl groups, and organisationis willing to fight the imperialists and their hirelings to form a broad nation-wvidce united front, headed by the wvorking class and its vanguard the Communist Party.11 But when it came to the form of struggle, the Cominformii mentioned China, Vietnaam, Malaya and "other countries" as exainples of how armed struggle was becoming the "main form of struiggle"of the inational liberatioii movement inl many colonies and dependent counmtries. Theni it listed Vietnamn, South Korea, Malaya, thc Philippines, Inldoniesiaanid Burma as countries engaged in armed struggle, b)ut not India wvhichi vas mentioned merely as a country with "sham indlependlence"."2

June 9, 1973

in the cities aind working class centres was favourable for ariimed partisan oni the l)asis of the new line and tactics. struggle. The Telengana struggle, the coumnittee thought, was the beginniing of the liberation struggle and it was ENTRY OF IND)IAN Ainiy demonstrating that the Indian revoluIn the meantime, the entry of tion was more like the Chinese revoluforces into armed Indian Hyderabad tion than the Russian revolution. So the and the accession of the state to the Telengana armed struggle continued.16 created had a new situaIndian Union tion in the Telengana struggle areas. The Nizam's forces and the private army known as the Razakars had failed to suppress the armlledstruggle. But after the surrenider of the Nizam, it was a miiilitary camiipaigni (xith 50,000 to 60,000 Indiani troops throvn in) against the communists who had developed contiguous liberated zonies covering 3,000 villages, complete with village soviets, people's courts and people's militia. A formidable moodern army was fighting the ill-equipped squads. The guerilla squads retreated to the forests, leaving smiiall groups behind to operate in the plainis. The government tried a strategic hamlets plan similar to the familousBriggs plan in Malaya. They destroyed about 2,000 tribal hamlets in the forests and herded the people into concenitration camps. This wvaspart of the plan to isolate the guerilla s(luads from the tribal people inhabitinig the forests. The guerillas moved to newer forest areas. The correlation of political forces ill Ilvderabad state chang'ed significantly With the accession of the state to India. Though the state Congress party and some other non-communist forces were not part of all-ini front against the Nizam, each lhad fought his autocracy and there was sympathby for armed struggle even fromn the mnasses of the people. But with end of the Nizam's rule, this support was thinning. The all-India leadership of the CP'I was divided aboout continuing the armed struggle after the Nizam's accession to the Indian Union late in 1948. A section of the local party unit was also for wvithdrawal of the struggle." In fact, the present day CPI OwnS up the Telengaina struggle only upto this poinit anid regards the rest of it sectarian anid dogmatic and little more than a terror campaign. It thinks the struggle should have been called off when the Nizam's rule ended.15
OPPOSITION
WITHIN

CPI

With the Comiinforimadebunikilng Ranadive, the Andhra leadership founid itself heading the party. Rajeswvara Rao took over as General Secretary in May-June 1950. The Telengania line of peasant partisall warfare triumphed inside the CPI, but Moscow's intervention was to suppress this trend later. The new CPI leadership worked out a political line which briefly meant: (1) Rejection of the programmatic understanding of the second congress, subsequently elaborated in what was called the "Tactical Line" by the leadership; (2) Rejectioni of the thesis of the single stage revolution, i e, the intertwiining of the twvostages of the Indian
revolution into one;

(3) Rejection of the idea that the entire bourgeoisie, including the rich peasantry, had become enemies of the
people's democratic revolution;

(4) Upholdiing of the concept of the Chinese path for the Indian revolution which meant developing Telenganatype agrariani struggle extensively
wvherever possible.13 The nlew Central Commiiiiittee, oni

Junie 1, 1950 highlighted the rolC of armne'd struggle for secturing niational li)eration aind claiimed that preconditionls for starting such struggles were already there. But this did not meani that armed struggle could be launched iiniiniediatelyanywhere and under any conditions. The accent was on armed guerilla xx arfare linked to an agrarian p)rogrammie Nvherever the party's strength permitted it. The Central Committee pledged to extend the Telengana struggle to other parts of Inidia. It wx-antedto pnit the party ?n the rails of armed struggle in the countryside and rebuild the movement

But the Visalanclhra communist committee as a whole for continuing the struggle. The big gains of the Telengana peasantry, especially the one million acres of land distributed among them, had to l)e d(efendedi and not allowed to be snatched away. Secondly, the national and international situation

Opposition to the Andhra leadership and its new political line came not only from a group operating from the party headquarters in Bombay which included S A Danige, Ajoy Chosh anid S V Ghate, who had been released from prison, but also from the Cominunist Party of Great Britain. A letter fromi its Political Committee late in 1950 traced the CPI crisis to a perverse understanding of the Cominforin journal's editorial (January 27, 1950). Armed struggle was not ruled out for India but the situation in the Cl'I and the country did not hold iminediate prospects for such a struggle. The CPI could utilise all opportunities for legal activities and prepare for general elections (a whole year and more awayl). The letter also called for a change in the CPI leadership because the Rajeswara Rao leadership had not been "democratically" elected (a veiled call for revolt against the leadership determined to continue the Telengana armed struggle). The solution to the party crisis lay in "full and unfettered discussion" (which meant armed struggle as a tactic should be abandoned formally). The most inmportant references in the letter were to the CPI's failure to wvork out a policy on Korea, where the war was raging, and on the peace movement.17 This amounted to directing the CPI to step up pressure against Nehru's foreign policy. This letter could inot have been sent to the CPI without Moscow's clearance, it Inot a directive fron Moscow. It was addressed to the Cenitral Committee and wvastherefore iiot circulated to the ra.nks. But the Party Headquarters faction made it a point to circulate it three months after its receipt to exert pressure oni the Rajeswara Rao leadership on the eve of the December 1950 Central Committee meeting, which reorganised - itself as well as the Politbureau to provi(le representation to all the trends. The iewv leadership decided to seek the Soviet party's help in establishing political-ideological-organisational unity in the party. According to P' Sundarayya, one of the leaders of the Telengana struggle, differences in the CPI related to two
I
npy

June 9, 1973 sets of issues. One conicerned the programme - the class assessment of the tr-ansferof power in 1947, the exact stage of the Indian revolution and the class strategy or alliance for it - and another to tactics the posssible path of the Indian revolution - Russian or Chinese, the nature of the Telengana armed struggle, the different phases of partisan peasant struggle and the prol)lem of equatinig these peasant partisan struggles with the arme(d struiggle for political power, etc.18 Meanwhile the pressure from the British party contintued. The directives wverenow explicit and positive, indicating a clear shift in the Cominform line and the Soviet foreign policy requirements. The directives came in the form of answers by R Palme Dutt to five (luestions on the Indian situation. The peace movement had to be stepped up against Anglo-United States imnperialismand for the liberation of Asia. Nehru's foreign policy, it was not a "consistent peace policy" yet and Nehru's opposition to imperialism was "hesitant and limited", should be reappraised in the light of his attitude to the Korean war and to China's admission to the United Nations. Peace and freedom weent together and India needed a "broad democratic fronit" from albove on the basis of a common for peace and inaction programminie dependence. Finally, armed struggle was not the correct path for India for the present.'9 Dutt elaborated this in an interviewv to visiting Indian communists. I-le said that as stated in his party's letter to the CPI, "ultimately the revolution in India w'ill and must take the formiiof armed struggle. It is hardly to be debated". He had no idea of the exact situation in Andhra and could not say what would be the proper form of struggle there. But if the Andhra unit had adopted correct forms of struggle during the post-second congress period, ered the party should not have suiff any disruption there. "But from the reports we possess, this does not seem to be true. NVhenon the.,top of it, the so-called experience of Andhra is applied mechanically to all over Ifidia where the conditions of peasant organisation and the strength of the party were both wveakerthan in Andhra, the result cannot but be disastrous", he said. Elaborating the concept of armed struggle, Dutt was insinuating that the Telengana struggle wvas little mlore than individual or squad terror. (Thereby he was endorsing the faction demanding its suspension.) Armed struggle, he said,) was "the higher
1 AOa

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY form of struggle" anid "mtust bear a mass character", as distinct from the terrorismof individuals or small groups. Again, armed struggle was a "higher
state of mass movement, which there-

stressed the leading role of the wvorking class inl the worker-peasant alliance. The "Statement of Policy" was the legal or open version of a larger unpuiblished document prepared by the CPI team to Moscow. It was entitled "Tactical Line".23 Parts of it \vere not included in the "Statement of Policy" and the omitted passages dealt with the elaboration of some of the theoretical issues and principles which provided the theoretical-ideological basis for the "Statement of Policy" and liberation".2 0 In sum, Dutt's advice aimeid at inicluded details of the discussions persuading the CPI to giv'e up the 1)etween the CPI team and the Soviet party commission headed by Stalin. tactic of armed struggle at least for the Neither of the documents referred moment and to seek the broadest possible united front for peace, while to armed revolution as part of the im"Tactical the task of building a national demo- mediate programme. The Line" cautioned the party against cratic front could wvait. "premature uprisings and adventurist actions" and yet thought it wrong to SOVIET INTERVENTIION lay down that armed struggle in the The British advice strengthened the form of partisan warfare should be faction opposed to the Telengana arm- resorted to in every spacific area oi.ly ed struggle, but the CPI crisis conti- wrhenthe movemenit in all parts of the nued until a top-level delegation clan- country rose to the level of anl uprisdestinely visited Moscow early in 1951 inig. This was because the uineveni for consultations with the Soviet party levels of mass consciousness in a vast leadership. The CPI teanmlcomprised country like India would not permit two Andhra leaders (C Rajeswara Rao peasant movements of the same temlpo and M Basavapunniah)who were dlirect- everywhere. On the contrary situations ly leading the Telengana stirLggle and demiiandingarmed partisan warfare twvoleaders opposed to it (S A Dange might ar-ise in several areas. For inand Ajoy Ghosb). The Soviet party stance, when in a big and topographicommission comprised Stalin, MIalenikov, cally suitable area the peasant moveMolotov and Suslov. The main coinclti- menit rose to the level of seizure of sion on the issues concerning thie pro- land, the question of effective seizure were incorporated in the Draft and clefending the land seized would gramiime Programme published in 1951.2L b)ecome a burning one and "partisan The draft said the state that ca.mie w7arfare in such a situation, undertaken illto being with the transfer of power on the basis of a genuine mass movewvasthe samiieold imperialist sLate arnd nment and firm unity... if correctly the Congress government installed with constructed and led, can have a rousing the consent of imperialism had pledged and galvanising effect on the peasant to protect the British interests in India. masses in all areas and raise their own It rejected the second congress uinder- struggle, to a higher level". standing that the entire bourgeoisie including the rich peasantry wvere outSVITCH TroPARLIAMENTARISM side the pale of the people's demoThe proximity of the general eleccratic front. It recogniised the possiseems to have made it expedient tions all the Inidian overof winning bility bourgeoisie, barring some individuals for the new CPI leadership to withhold and groups of big bourgeoisie: It re- publication of the "Tactical Line". jected the theory of the intertwining Tlhrough the "Statement of Policy" the CPI was tiying to project the image of the twvo stages of revolution. As for tactics, an accompanying of a party that had virtually abjured document, "Statement of Policy"22 violence and was settling for parlia-

fore becomes the pre-requisite". Dutt's concern was with the peace movement because the cold war had replaced class struggle on the Cominform agenda to suit Soviet foreign policy interests. The peace movement plresented the CPI with "one of the most imnportant weapons for building a front of all sections of Indian people ... If we riecognise that -the building of the National Democratic Front is the key task for the national liberation struggle, then it should be obvious that the broad front that will emerge out of the peace movemnentimiaylay the basis for the National Front for national

said "nieither only the Russian path nor the Chinese path but a path of Leninism applied to Indiain conditions was the answer". Partisan warfare of the peasantry had to be combined with the other major wveapon,that of w,.orking class strikes, the general strike ancd uprising in cities led by detachments
of th'e working class. The statement

ECONONIIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY mentarism. The leadership feared that some of the formulations in the "Tactical Line" might prevent the party regaining its legality in states wvhereit had been bannedl (Travancore-Cochin and Hyderabad). Another reason could he that a more explicit reference to the tactic of combining peasant partisan warfare with utrban insurrection might provide the extremist elements in the party arguments for opposing the switch to parliamentarism. The "Draft Programme" and the "Statement of Policy" fornalised Moscow's decrees on strategy and tactics for India. The "Draft Programme" was published by the Cominform journal immediately after it was released in India and the "Statement of Policy" wvithina fortnight of its adoption. Rajeswara Rao had already resigned as General Secretary and Ajoy Ghosh had replaced him when the Central Committee met in May 1951 to hear about the Moscow discussions. The May 1951 Central Committee meeting decided to call off the Telengana c;truggle and asked its Andhra memnbers to ascertain from the partisan leaders whether they could hold on until the party negotiated with the government on the terms for withdrawal, which included the following: land in possession of the tenants should not be taken away to be handed over to landlords; all warrants against the struggle leaders should be withdrawn; all prisoners released; and the ban on the CPI lifted. The resolution made clear that the Telengana struggle was not started and was not being continued to overthrow the Nehru government, but to end feudal exploitation. It directed the newly-constituted Polibureau to review the Telengana problem and adopt all ways and measures to make the struggle successful.24 Nla(ldukuri Clhandrasekhara Rao, an Andhra leader, retorted that in that case the struggle leadership would be forced to disown him and his leadership. The struggle leaders were still talking to the partisan leaders in the forest hases when the government told the negotiating committee that declarations favouring wvithdrawal of the struggle wvereof no avail unless the leaders ill charge of the struggle announced its
w7ithdrawal.

June 9, 1973
\as settlinig foir )arliainciitarisni.

At the May 1951 Central Committee mceting, the Andhra members agreed that the struggle could not last long even as a partial partisan struggle in defence of land and should be withdrawvnafter securing the most favour- mnent". able terms. They had supported the (3) It was wrong to conifuse or charCentral Committee resolution in this acterise every struggle of the peasantry spirit. As Sundarayya rightly records, or other exploit,\ miasses, whenever the dissensions that had plagued the they are forced to use ;zeapons, and party durinig the last two years caused especially peasant guerilla struggles, as "irreparable harTn to the Telengana the final revolutionary struggle or as armed struggle". There was the vicious the beginning of the final revolutionary propaganda that the movement in struggle or as an intermediate part of Telengana was nothing but individual such struggles. terrorism or squad actions and that (4) There was the danger of the there was no mass participation. The Central Committee's resolution was movement degenerating into terroristic hased on the new programme and a actions by squads and getting isolated new tactical line, but in complete from the masses. HIow long the armed contradiction to it the Politbureau peasant guerilla struggle should be issued a public statement condemning continued, and when it should be individual terror and squad actions and with(lrawn, dlepended on the ebl and this helped the slander caampaigni flow of the movement; (5) Stalin and the Soviet party against the Telengana struggle.25 Also, the releasing to the Press of the part leadeus had said that it seemed difficult of the Central Commitee resolution to continue the Telengana struggle expressing readiness for a niegotiated further, that is, during the first part settlement led the government to be- of 1951 and it was unfortunate that lieve that the movement was about to the Indian communist movement was collapse and the party was about to not in a position to continue it. But surrender. This hardened the governi- they had left it entirely to the CPI to decide whether it should be continuied ment's position. or withdrawn; (6) It was not possible to mechaniWVITHDRAWntAI OF STRUGGLE Taking advantage of this resolution, cally choose between the Chinese path the Ravi Narayan Reddy faction in Late in October 1951, A K Gopalan, and the Russian path and it was neTelengana and the party Headquarters On behalf of the Central Committee and cessary to learn froim the experience of faction at the all-India level launched the Andhra Committee, announced the both.27 a campaign for withdrawal of the wvithdrawal of the struggle. Though the The struggle wvascalled off late in struggle even before the terms of government had rebuffed the negotia- October 1951, but the struggle leaders withdrawal could be secured, and to tors, the CPI leadership was obliged could explain what was virtually a eliminate the fighting cadre from all to "advise the Telengana peasantry and fait accompli to the partisans in the levels of leadership. It began claiming the fighting partisans to stop all par- forests only later. A conference of party that the Central Committee had al- tisan actions" and to mobilise the leaders and guerilla fighters of the ready called off the struggle and that entire people to rout the Congress at Amarabad forest region was held in the what was going on in Telengana was the general elections.26 third week of November andc it approved mere individual or squad terror. The It was tanme surrender because the the decision to withdraw the strug,gle. open campaign by this faction forced party gave the peasantry no guarantee The iinderground(l leadership announcthe Politbureau to appoint a thre&- about protecting their hard-won gains. ed a reconstituted commnittee for Telenmember negotiating committee. Ajoy The withdrawal of the struiggle meant g-anawvith about 25 members drawn from the Ghosh, newv General Secretary, suirrenderof all the guerilla zones anid the underground cadre as well as those even threatened to disown the struggle liberated villages to the Indian army, released or still in prison. But General if it was not wvithdrawIn with ,and it, the other gains. immediately. The CPI Secretary Ajoy Ghosh, w7ithout consul1029

The following agreed conclusions were drawn by the party about Telengana at the end of the struggle, according to Basavapiunniah who was among its leaders: (1) It is a crime to characterise the struggle as individual terrorism or squad terrorism. (2) It was correct to have continued the Telengana armed struggle and guerilla struggle even after the Indian troops entered Ifyderabad, and to defenci land anid other democratic gains, but it was not correct to have had as the aimii"a people's liberation war for capturing political power and overthrowing the Central Congress Govern-

June 9, 1973

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY resolutely urged the seizure of power through armed struggle, that is, the path of the Chinese people, who were gtuided in their victories by Mao's Thought. "Some revisionist chieftains, howvever,feverishly pushed ahead witb the revisionist parliamentary road resulting in doing tremendouis harm to the Indian revolution." In 194651, base areas of armed struggle were establishedl in Telengana where landless an(d poor peasants were aroused to seize land by armed struggle "and become the banner of the Indian people's revolutionary strtuggle of the time". The commentary said though the Indian revisionists described peasant armed struggles as adventurism and individual terrorism, the Telengana struggle grew under the radiance of Mao Tse-tung's Thought. In a party document in September 1950 and an open document in 1951, they villified the Chinese people's revolutionary war led by Chairman Mao and had put fornvard the theory of India's exceptionalism, hysterically preventing the Indian people from taking the road of Chinese revolution. Long after the Telengana "sell out" and after many setbacks the inidian peasants had realised the "futility of the parliamentary path and the need for armed struggle", it said. It might be well to record here that there was even a veiled Chinese suggestion in June 1950 that the Telengana armed struggle might have been illtimed. The timing of this suggestion (June 1950) is significant. The Andhra leadership had just taken over fronm B T Ranadive, but the Chinese party seemed to have some reservations about the Andhra leadership's line of peasant armed struggle. The suggestion caine in the form of a reply to a reader froni the editor of the People's Daily, the CPC's chief organ. After referring to communist peasant warfare in China, the editor declared that characteristics of the Chinese revolution "can under certain historical conditions become the common characteristics of all revolutionaries of other colonial and semicolonial countries". He quoted from Liu Shao-chi's opening address to the Peking World Federation of Trade Unions conference on the desirability of armed struggle on the part of "many colonial and semi-colonial peoples" and from the Cominform journal's editorial of January 27. Quoting a statement lby B T Ranadive (when he was the General Secretary of the CPI) fully endorsing the conclusions of this editorial and the lessons of the Chinese revolution as the infallible guide for

uip the agrecd conclusions and ting the iunidergrouLnd leadership, consti- stLnI11me(t tutedl a1 "Electioni Committee" an(l a uiite(l Telengania committee wvas form-ieed to lead the m-ovement.28 authorised it to ftunetionas the (le fleto The government's hunt against the State Commiiittee. The undergroun0 conmllittee asked the cadre to ignore und,ergroundsquiads did not stop even this body exc.ept for election purposes. after the elections and arrests and proWhile the underground committee secutionis continued. The government's continued to guide the undergrouundI argument was that arms had nlot been cadre, the Election Committee got the surrendered and therefore the hunt support of the open cadre. However, the could niot be relaxed. As the logical undergrouncd cadre worked for the step to the withdrawal of the struggle, success of the People's Democratic Front the CP-I decided to surrender arms. The (lutestion here is: did the 1951 through wbhichthe illegal partv conteslocumlents (onl programme and tactics) ted the elections. \varranitthe withdrawal of the Telengana struggle? The present-day MaoLESSON OF 1hE ELECTONS ist contenition is that they did .:ot and Over 2,000 CPI cadres were still in that the. withdrawal was an act of jail when the elections took place. l)etrayal by "revisionists" who wanted Over 1,000 were underground. The to take the party into the vortex of People's Democratic Front could run parliamentary politics by entering the candidates in only 42 of the 98 con1952 general elections.29 In their stituencies in Telengana. The extent of view, the Telengana armed struggle the CPI victory is underlined by the couild have continued as a struggle to fact 36 of the 45 candidates running protect the gains of the peasantry, under the PDF banner were elected. though not as a struggle for state In addition 10 Socialist candidates that power. had the PDF's support also won. The What followed the withdrawal was Congress won 41 seats hbit 25 of these the quiet abandonment of the perspecwere located in Mahbool)nagar and tive of armed struggle because the Hyderabad districts, where the PDF party settled for peaceful constitutiondid not put up candidates. In the alism, and eventually opted for peace'Red' district of Nalgonda, the PDF ftil transition to socialism. made a clean sweeprof all the 14 seats; One of the issues of controversy on in Warangal, another 'Red' district, the PDF won 11 of the 14 seats; in the Telenigana struggle is the Soviet Karimnagar it won 10 of the 15 seats. attitude to its withdrawal. Rajeswara Thns 35 of the 45 seats the PDF wvon Ilao, niow General Secretary of the wverelocated in those three districts CPI, conitends that the Soviet party wbherethe CPI had condtucted the anid Stalin did not support the struggle Telengana armed struggle. Of the 2.5 until it was withdrawvn.30 But Sundarmillion votes polled, the PDF got ayya, the CPI(M)'s General Secretary, approximately a third, while the Con- contenids that the CPSU and Stalin gress, which had contested evervonie of thought that it was unfortunate that the seats, could only poll abouit the the struggle could not be defended or same proportion of votes. It was un- continued and that, therefore, the time mistakable that communist gains in had come for its withdrawal. It was, Telengana were most spectacular pre- however, for the CPI leadership cisely in those areas where the CPI to decide when exactly and on had led the peasant partisan warfare what terms it should be withor guerilla squad actions, inviting mas- drawn and how long it had to be consive police and military repression. If tinuled to secure suitable tenns.31 Whether the Soviet leadersbip supthe vote meant anything at all, it was a vindication of the Andhra communist ported the struggle till the end or not, line of Maoist armed struggle. It was its withdrawal had more than its tacit convincing refutation of the vicious support. campaign that the Telengana armed CHINA'S ATrUDE struggle was isolated from the masses and was sectarian, anarchist and terroThough the Communist Party of rist in character. China now charges "Indian revisionists Even after the elections in January xvith betraying Telengana", it is silent 1952, the cadre in Telengana continued on the Soviet and Cominform roles. to be divided. Abouit 25 leaders, from An NCNA commentary on August 2. the fighting areas as well as those in 1967 noted that for a long time the the open, met in February 1952 for Indian communist movement had wita week to discuss the differences. nessed an intense struggle between Ajoy Ghosh, wvhoattended the meeting two lines. The revolutionaries had
1030

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 'WEEKLY tlle CPI, the editor uniderlinled the limited applicability of the Chinese example. It wN as in the liature of a warning to the CPI, against an unreserved acceptance of the Chinese ni)odel. Armed struggle againist imperialist aggression is essential for the liberation of many colonies and semicolonies. But the time and place for conducting this kind of revolutionary armed struggle must be decided according to concrete conditions. It can by no means be conducted in any colony or semi-colony at any time wvithoutthe necessary pre-conditions and preparations.32 Tlis, coupled with the absence of any critical comment on the withdrawal of the Telengana armed struggle later, suiggests that the CPC had no objection to the withdrawal. According to Sundarayya, at no time between 1951 and 1967 did the Chinese say that the withdrawal was wrong "though they could have conveyed it on innumerable occasions when we had the opportunity to meet them personally. Once when we said in a mood of self-criticism that if we had had the correct understanding we could have retreated with much less losses and with greater gains, they told us not to stress that aspect but to bring forth the revolutionary significance of the fact that the Nehru governmcnt could not suppress a peasant partisan struggle even in a small part of the country."33 C:ongress to undertake land iefornis. It. was a struggle for endinig the autocratic rule of the Nizam anid it contributed to achieving this objective. It was also a struggle for rcorganising the states oIn the basis of language an(d it not only resulted in the eventtual forination of a inified Telugu-speaking state but in the break-up of the Ilycderabad state anid the creation of other linguistic states (Maharashitra anid Karnataka). The Telengana struggle, as Sunidarayya says, brought to the fore "aliimost all the questions concerning the strategy and tactics of the Indian people's democratic revolution for correct and scientific answers and realistic solutions".34

June 9, 1973
not onily in Nehru's foreigi
policiCis

but ailso' in his (ldoimestic polcies. lecaime the pivot of Asia.

SEEDS OF

With

this shift in the Soviet attitude, India

Soviet policy for

SPlIT

THE

The C(Pf's 1931 prograiiiiiie ha(l aissnllXe(1 that Inidia was a semi-colonial atinddependent country ruled by a big
I )bourgedois-landlordl government wvhich

Telengana divided the CPI until the armed struggle there was called off on the basis of the 1951 documents. But the origins of the 1962-63 Indian commllunistsplit can be traced to the difference over the Telengana line during its last two years. Sundarayya rightly observes that these differences crystallised into two hostile trends and those who opposed the struggle are by and large with the present day CPI ,while those favouring it went t' the CPI(M). Though the CPI split synichronised with the international schism and was hastened by it, it did not represent a straight Moscow-Peking polarisation. The real ideological split in the Indian communist movement came after GANS Ok' 1HE STRUGGLE Naxalbari, in 1968. Immediately after the 1952 selectionis, Ihe more important fact here is that the struggIe was withdrawn and not the CPI found itself divided in its defeated. It w^asthe first armed strug- attitude to the Congress party and gle of the Indian communist move- its government headed by Jawaharlal ment over a vide area, resulting in a Nehru. Should it fight the Congress liberated zone of about 16,000 square all out or should it forge a uniited front vith "progressive"sections to fight the miles covering 3,000 villages. For 12 to 18 months the entire administration "right reaction" which was growing in these areas was in the hands of inside the Congress and outside, was village peasanit committees. About the issue. A united fronit would re4,000 party and peasant militants %vere (quire support to Nehru's foreign and domestic policies against his critics killed and over 10,000 commU.nist cadres and others were thrown into both inside and outside the Congress prisons or detentioni camps for three to party. four years. Soviet policies of the period had It Nvasa revolutionary agrarian arm- miuch to do with the CPI's dilemma. ed struggle to enid the feudal oi der. When, in the early 1950s, Nehru The village committees in the liberated showed an anti-West orientation and zones implemented the agrarian pro- sought closer ties, including econiomic gramme. Though this task could not aid, with the socialist camp, the Soviet be achieved completely, over 3 million Union supported India as a non-alignacres of land was redistributed, forced ed ally in the peace front. The CPI labour was abolished, illegal extrac- backed Nehru's non-alignment policy tions and feudal oppression of various without reservation because it served types were ended. Evictions were Soviet foreign policy interests. But the stopped and a minimum wage ensured party remained divided on Nehru's to agricultural labour. The struiggle domestic policies. Amidst the continupushed the question of agrarian revolu- ing OPI controversy, the Soviet adertion to the forefront, compelling thie ship began seeing progressive features

Was collaborating with British inmperialismi. This forimlulationi now cacme tinder attack froiii a pro-Soviet section of the CPI which insisted that Nehru had abandoned collaborationl with imperialism and had taken to peaceful co-operation anad co-existence with the socialist caImlp. This group argued that Iindia nieeded a niationalunited front as the prelude to a government of dermaocratic unity. Such a policy wvould re(quire an emergency alliance with the Congress to resist the rightist offensive. This line of thinking vas to be developed later into a slogan for a "national democratic government". In December 1955, a few mouths before the 20th CPSU congress, the CPI General Secretary, Ajoy Ghosh, outlined a programme for "uniting with and struggling against the Congress" to build a national democratic front. This programme implied not only peaceful traiisitioii to socialism (a concept which wvas to be proclaimed at the 20th congress in February 1956) buit also the conicept of national democracy (proclaimiied formiially through the Moscowv Statenielm t of 81 commiunist parties in 1960). The CPI had thus aniticipated two of the miost controversiail f ormuitilationis wbhichwere later to be coimmended to the initernationial commiiiunist movemenit b)y the Soviet leadership.5 The same coonceptsbccame the miajor issues in the SinoSoviet ideological dispute. The Moscow declaration of 1960 (lescribed the national dem.icratic state as a formiiof transitiojnto socialismi, especially in the nion-aligned countries of the peace zone, in whicb the national bourgeoisie played an objectively progressive role and deserved socialist economic and diplomnaticsupport. The national democratic state was one that had achieved complete economic independence from imperialism and was ruled by a broad anti-imperialist fronit that included the national bourgeosie. The working class was to evolve as its leader only graduall. The concept of national democracy was a corollary to the concept of peaceful transitioni, and India was onle of the countries of the peace zone where peaceful transitionl via the 1031

June 9, 1973 nationial democratic state was possible. The "national deemocracy" concept added a new diinensioni to the CPI's conitiniuingstruggle for a new to replace the 1951 docuprogrammiiie 2 inent. As Nehru's domestic policies shiftedl to the right anid tenision grew on the Sino-Indianiborder, the attitude to the Indian bourgeoisic continued to be the central issue in the CPI debate xvhich took a predictable form: inational demiiocracyversus people's democracy. Thle right-wing of the CPI, which had 3 the Soviet backing contended that India's bourgeois democracy could metaior4 phose into a national democracy. It placed heavy reliance on Soviet aid as the instrument to secure national democracy. The left wing countered this 5 by arguinig that the bourgeoisie wvas; compromising with domestic reaction 6 and imperialism. Soviet aid, although necessary, was being used by the 7 bourgeoisie to bargain for more aid from the West. Rival programme drafts Nvere presented at the CPI's sixth congress and the split was averted 8 only by the intervention of NMikhail Suslov, who headed the high level CPSU delegation to the CPI congress. Suslov, anxious to preserve CPI unity, 9 mianaged to salvage the rightist line and to manoeuvre the congress into shelving the issue of a new CPI programlmie. The conflict continued behind 10 the scenies until the GPI split in 1964, after which the CPI as well as Nwhat later came to be known as the 11 CPI (M) adopted their own programnmes. Thuts the factors underlying the 1962-63 split date back to the Telen- 12 gana armed struggle and the diff- 13 14 erences over it. 15 The real significan(ce of Telengana howvever lies elsewhere: it was the first applicatioin of the Maoist revolutionary model outside China even be- 16 17 fIore the Chinese revolution had triumphed fully and China had proclaimed itself a people's iepublic. Over 20 years later, Naxalbari 18 19 brought to the fore once again all the theoretical and ideological questions concerning the strategy and tactics of 20 the Indian revolution but in a ehanged conitext: the international coinmunist niovenient had split on issues of 21 ideology and Moscow had ceased to be the sole centre of the international communist movement.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY 23 "CommuLinist Conspiracy at Miadurai", DemiiocraticResearch Seivice, B3omibay, 1954. This is the first publishedl version of the secret document and the CPI denounced it is "forgery". But Sundarayya has iioNv vouLchedfor its authenticity, see P Sundarayya, op cit, pp 409-14. 24 Text of resolutionii P SwLridarayya, op cit, p 417ff. 25 Ibid, p 428. 26 "CPI Advises Stoppage of Plartisain Action in Telengana", Crossroads, October 26, 1951. 27 P Sundarayya, op cit, p 415-6. 28 Ibid, p 432. 29 Chandra Pulla Reddy, "Veera Telengana Viplava Poratam" (Telugu), Janasakthi Publications, Vijawayada, 1968, P 51. 30 C Rajeswara Rao, "The Ilistroic Telengana Struggle," op cit, p 34. 31 P Sundarayya, op cit, p 415-16. Also, M Basavapunniab, "Lessons of Telengana Struggle - and the Revisionist Betrayal", Peoples Democracy, November 5, 1972. 32 "An Armed People Opposes Armed Counter revolution," People's Daily, June 16, 1950, Pcople's China, July 1, 1950. 33 P Sundarayya, op cit, p 438. 34 Ibid, p 4. .35 Mohan Ram, "Maoism in India," Vikas, New Delhi, 1971, Chapter 1.

mnovement in the area, see Ravi Narayana Reddy, "Veera Teletngana Na Atnubhavala'' (Telugu), AnidhraPradesh Communist Council, 1972. P Sundarayya, "TeleniganaPeople's Struggle and Its Lessons", Communist Party of India (Marxist)$ Calcutta, 1972, pp 7-27. Also, Raj B3ahadurGour, et al, "Glorious Telengana Armed Struggle", Comiiiunist Party of India, New Delhi, 1973. "WVhy the Ultra- 'Left' Deviation?" Communist Party of Inidia (Marxist), Calcutta, 1968. P Sundarayya, "Visaalandhralo Pl-ajaRajyam",Telugu, Vijayawada, 1946, p 6. A Zhdanov, "The International Situation", "For A Lasting Peace, For People's Democracy", Bucharest, November 10, 1947. See Mohan Ram, "Indian Communism - Split within a Split", Vikas, New Delhi, 1969, pp 7-21. P Sundarayya, "Telengana People's Struggle and Its Lessons", op cit, p 392-3. "Struggle for Peoples Democracy and Socialism - Some Questions of Strategy and Tactics", Communidst, Bombay, June-July 1949. E M Zhukov, "Problems of National and Colonial Struggle", Colonial People's Struggle for Liberation", People's Publishing House, Bombay, 1950, pp 1-11. V Balabushevich, "The New Stage in the National Liberation of the People of India", "Colonial el'ople's Struggle for Liberation", op cit, pp 32-59. For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy", December 30, 1949. "Mighty Advance of the National Liberation Movement in the Colonial and Dependent Countries", "For A Lasting Peace, For People's Democracy", January 27, 1950. Ibid. P Sundarayya, op cit, p 387. Ibid, p 392. C Rajeswara Rao, "The Historic Telengana Struggle", Communist Party of India, New Delhi, 1972, pp 31-33. P Sundarayya op cit, p 393-4. PHQ Covering Note to the Letter of the Political Committee of the CPGB to the Communist Party of India, December 6, 1950. P Sundarayya, p 399. "Palme Dutt Answers Questions on India," Crossroads, January 19, 1951. Deveni and Bal Krishna, "Talks With R Palme Dutt and Other Impressions Gained Abroad", PHQ Unit, Bombay, January 6, 1951. This was amended and adopted by the All-India Party Conference in October 1951, and later by the third (Madurai) congress of the party in 1953. But it was put in abeyance by the fourth (Palghat) Notes congress in 1956 on the ground that it needed important changes. 1 For the mnost comprehensive account of the Andhra Mahasabha's 22 Statement of Policy of the Commovement in Telengana and of the munist Party of India, Bombay beginnings of the communist 1951.

Bihar Alloy Steels

BIH-IAR ALLOY STEELS, whichl is setting up a project in liazaribagh district of Bihar for the manufacture of alloy constructional steels, alloy tool steels and high speed tool steels, expects to commence operationis of the plant before the end of May next. Constructiorl of various factory buildiiigs is in progress and machinery is expected to start arriving from July. The directors urged the govermment to declare H-lazaribagh as a 'backward' district on the plea that the employinent problemiiis very acute there. If it is declared a a 'backward' area, its development would be expedited and the people would have more employment opportunities. Meanwlhile, the company's project cost has gone up cwing to virtual devaluation of the rupee twice vis-a-vis the various European currencies. Also, increases in import duties on machinery and various other levies on steel, etc, imposed in the last two budgets have added to the cost. The directors say that the exchange rates of various foreign currencies are still in a fluid state and that as soon as the exchange rates are stabilised, the revised project cost Nvouldbe worked out and arraingements made to meet the shortfall.

1032