To say that terrorism is an existential threat to Pakistan means that if terrorism succeeds, Pakistan will cease to exist.

While the term reads well, and sounds even better as rhetoric, it couldnt be further from the truth. If one were to add up all the various terrorist groups operating across the country, their total strength, if grossly exaggerated, would not exceed 100,000: they would be outnumbered by the Pakistan Army five to one. Call in the reserves, and the figure goes up to 10 to 1. Hardly winning odds. Even with 500,000 terrorists, it still wouldnt be a fair fight, because the terrorists do not have the kind of ammunition reserves, communication apparatuses, and intelligence dragnet available to the state. If indeed, in a moment of lunacy, the TTP tried to invade one of the major cities, or conquer Pakistan, they would be wiped out within hours. Truong Chinh, the second in command to Ho Chi Min during the Vietnam War, wrote in his book Primer for revolt: the guiding principle of the strategy for our whole resistance must be to prolong the war. To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted?...if we throw the whole of our forces into a few battles to try to decide the outcome, we shall certainly be defeatedon the other hand, if while fighting, we maintain our forces, expand them, train our army and people, learn military tactics and at the same time, wear down the enemy forces, we shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become weak and will meet defeat instead of victory. Understanding the numeric superiority of the state, terrorists employ the death by a thousand cuts strategy, attacking the state, its institutions and its people whenever and wherever possible, then disappearing into ungoverned areas or densely populated urban and semi urban centres. The terrorists, as explained by the nature of their actions, are playing for time; time to strengthen themselves into a force that becomes an existential threat to Pakistan. Pakistans responses to terrorism have historically only been reactive to what the terrorists do. However, for terrorism to be dealt with effectively, the response needs to move from counterterrorism (CT) to counterinsurgency (CI). What is counterinsurgency, and how does it differ from counterterrorism? CI, compared to CT, is more holistic in what it aims to do. To simplify, CT tackles terrorism through military action, whereas CI not only defeats terrorists, but aims to plug the gaps through which terrorism breeds. Hence, if counterterrorism is defeat and dismantle; CI is defeat, dismantle, contain and prevent. To ones pleasant surprise, the draft of the national counterterrorism and extremism policy 2013 recommends this very shift from CT to CI. A vital ingredient of all armed rebellions is public support. If the rebels have the public on their side, they gain numerous advantages such as mobility, invisibility and legitimacy, all of which are hard to counter. Thankfully though, the TTP is still unpopular among the masses.

Even with this major disadvantage, it continues to inflict a lot of damage, attacking the state and its institutions at will, terrorising the population, exposing gaps and weaknesses in the countrys security and intelligence apparatuses and, most importantly, highlighting the lack of unity between all the major political forces on how best to deal with terrorism. Since an invasion or conquest is not on the cards, what this does is weaken the writ of the state and the resolve of the people, creating opportunities for an implosion. That is the current risk Pakistan faces in its fight against the TTP. However, the biggest question mark in all CI efforts is whether other institutions such as the government, police, the judiciary and the media are up to the mark. One of the core essentials of successful CI is the local police, playing an effective role as the first line of defence, and as an information and intelligence gathering unit in its area. However, a simple stroll through a local thana is enough to dispel any sort of confidence in the police. Rampant corruption and a lack of resources and modern training are just some of the problems that plague the countrys first line of defence against terrorists. In police reforms, the following key areas must be looked into: effective investigation techniques, methods of collecting evidence, interrogation skills and emergency response skills. If by some stroke of luck, some terrorists are arrested, the next problem is low prosecution and conviction rates. In many cases, people are not prepared to become witnesses because of threats to them or their families. A comprehensive victim protection plan, then, is also essential. There is also the issue of permissible evidence: if CCTV footage of a terrorist attack clearly identifies the perpetrator, can that be used against him in a court of law? There are many other loose ends countering terrorist propaganda, reforming the education sector (including madressahs), giving a greater voice to moderate Islamic thinkers and ulema all vital ingredients in a Pakistan-specific counterinsurgency strategy. And coordination. Ask any security expert to choose one fatal flaw in the countrys security apparatus and if he or shes worth their salt, the answer will be coordination. To say there is a lack of it would be an understatement, because it just does not exist, not on the federal or provincial levels. It doesnt exist vertically or horizontally. One wouldnt be surprised if two people in the same department didnt know what the other was doing. All this has to change and quickly. The terrorists must not be allowed the time and space to morph into the monster they think they already are. The writer is a media consultant and trainer. He tweets @aasimzkhan Email: aasimzk@gmail.com