ALFRED SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE Author(s): MAURICE NATANSON Reviewed work(s): Source: Social Research,

Vol. 35, No. 2 (SUMMER 1968), pp. 217-244 Published by: The New School Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40969905 . Accessed: 26/04/2012 16:50
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ALFRED SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

BY MAURICE NATANSON
"Familiarthings and manhappen, kinddoesnotbother aboutthem. It a very unusualmindto unrequires of theobvious." dertake theanalysis - Alfred North Whitehead American and socialscientists It has taken thirtyphilosophers to five catch with work of Alfred His the Schutz. years up early Der sinnhafte in die AufbaudersozialenWelt:eine Einleitung verstehende in first was An Soziologie published 1932. English version hasrecently under The the title, appeared Phenomenology editionwas of theSocial World.1 It is clear thatthe German studied of of and some the ablest minds the 'thirties closely by 'forties whowereconcerned ofthephilosophy and withproblems of the social to sciences. References Schutz's book methodology of suchthinkers as JosOrtegay Gasset, appearin thewritings von and Felix Kaufmann.AlMises,Raymond Aron, Ludwig it is notunlikely thattheEnglish edition will be studied though withequal careby American the fundamental scholars, assumpoftheEuropean tions reader abouttherelevance ofphilosophy for
i Translated by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert with an Introduction by George Walsh (Evanston, Illinois: NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1967). A glossary of German-Englishterms has been provided along with a selected bibliography of writingsby Schutz and titles to which he frequentlyrefers. Although the quality of Schutz's German does not come through easily in English, the translatorshave done conscientious job. I happened upon one howler, more amusing than damaging: In the original, Schutz, referringto Rudolph Stammler, writes: "In seinem Stammleraufsatz Translated (footnote,p. 200): "In zeigt Max Weber ..." his essay on stammering,Max Weber demonstrated . . ." The book is carefully proofread. I came across only one typographical error: On p. 70, Je-Meinigheit should read Je-Meinigkeit.

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fromthoseof been ratherdifferent social sciencehave heretofore in the United States. Thus, forexample,Ludwig his counterpart von Mises, unlike mostAmericaneconomists, begins his treatise on economics, Human Action,witha substantial sectionon "The Problemofa GeneralTheoryof Human Action/' Epistemological withman in is thatto be concerned The fundamental assumption the social world is necessarily whichunderto explore the reality and "World." Philosothe "Social" lies and characterizes "Man," who seeks clarityand phy is inescapable for the social scientist in who takesthe term"discipline"seriously. Nor rigor his work, is it solelya questionof interest in the logic of scientific a inquiry, matterof payingattentionto the statusof propositions, models and laws. Philosophy is rather concerned withthephenomenaof the social world: men actingin the contextof an intersubjective sharedand sustainedby temporalbeings aware of themreality, selvesno less than of one another. Oddly enough,today'sreader of The Phenomenology of the Social World may be closer to his thanwould have been the case even fifteen European counterpart in phenomenology, existentialism, ago,fortherecentinterest years and has and existential psychology psychiatry broughtmanyindividuals to the realizationthatthe verylanguage of social science in its presuppositions, inherent bearsthe philosophicalinflections which cannot be examined within a methodopresuppositions a circleviciousnot withoutdangerof entering logicalorientation but also foritsconceptualinsularity.A onlyforitslogicaldistress forcreatingthe audience for his good measureof responsibility book belongs to Schutz himself. Through his teachingin the United States and the publication of the three volumes of his has found its way into social Collected Papers, phenomenology science. If we have had to wait thirty-five yearsfor The Phenothatdurremembered be it the Social should World, of menology forcehas risento shape signifiing thoseyearsa new philosophical to audience the appropriate the book, a forcewhich owes cantly to thecareerof AlfredSchutz. muchof itsqualityand momentum

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In itshistorical The Phenomenology focus, oftheSocial World is an attempt to vindicate and deepenMax Weber'stheory of socialaction forit a philosophical which byproviding grounding derives from someof thecentral ideas of EdmundHusserland HenriBergson. In its systematic is the Phenomenology aspect, an effort to establish the outlines of a conception of meaning whose constitutive character in thereality of inneris grounded timeconsciousness. In its programmatic the Phedimension, is an adumbration a of of social nomenology reality, philosophy notsimply a methodology butan anatomy ofman'sexistence with hisfellow-men in themidst ofeveryday within whatHusserl life, calledthe"natural attitude."The axis on whichthisthreefold movement turns is phenomenology taken bothas a method itself, and as a modeof philosophical The bestway comprehension. to approach Schutz's is to see it at workin his phenomenology characterization of the socialworld. The socialworld is primarily theworld ofeveryday lifeas lived and appreciated and interpreted men carrying by common-sense on the cognitive and emotive traffic of daily life. "Commonsensemen" includesall of us insofar as we act in the world rather thanobserve it formally as disinterested scientists. Thus, and sociologists are also common-sense althoughphilosophers and are men,philosophy sociology notpartof thefabric of daily life. Philosophy a reversal of theunderlying attitude is, in fact, of common-sense life,a primordial glanceat whatthemundane has without even the intimation of serious eye simply accepted Within the "natural of attitude" life question. daily epistemolhaveno status, their fundamental ogyand metaphysics problems are unadmitted becausethey are unrecognized, and theirimplicationsfor a philosophy of human existence are simplyand excluded.To beginwith, man in thenatural then, ingeniously attitude takesforgranted his being in a world,his havinga

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of Otherslike himself, the on-going world,theexistence realityof with those fellow-men, and, just as important, communicating the assumption thateverything just said holds equally well from the standpointof the "other guy," the alter ego. Daily life mundanereality is "ours" fromthe outset,i.e., all elementsof the world of everyday existenceare taken as "real" for you as well as forme and foranyonewho entersthe human scene. The of inference "takingas real" whichis involvedhereis not a matter a peror formalpredicationbut an initial seeing and grasping, ceptual seizingof the object or event as real and as real for all for of us. Later we will turnto the phenomenological grounding the "taken-as-real," but for the moment it is the naive, the "prepredicative" graspof the experiencedworld as "ours" which needs consideration. To say thatthe worldis experiencedas "ours" fromthe outset is initiallyrecognizedas a "someis to hold thatmy fellow-man a "someone like me." 2 one" (not a "something")and, further, In my face-to-face encounterwith the Other, it is he as person who is graspedratherthan a creaturewith the anatomical features which permit the human observer to classifyhim as a member of the same species. It is in what Schutz terms the "Thou-orientation" that the Other is experiencedas a person: "I am alreadyThou-orientedfromthe momentthat I recognize an entity whichI directly (as a Thou), experienceas a fellow-man him. to life and consciousness However,we must be attributing quite clear thatwe are not here dealing with a consciousjudgment. This is a prepredicative experiencein which I become aware of a fellowhuman being as a person."8 one in several senses: The social world is an intersubjective it is the locus of my encounterwith the "Thou"; second, first,
2 A fewcautionsare necessary: are not to be "fromthe outset"and "initially" to eventsin the earlylives of individuals. takenas chronological terms, referring which It is the phenomenological genesisand not the causal originof experience is at issue here. s The Phenomenology to referred of the Social World,pp. 163-164(hereafter onlyby page number).

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it is the scene of my own action which is directed toward my fellow-men.My action revealsthe world as "ours" no less than does myencounter withyou as my "Thou." And, of course,the social worlddoes not springmagicallyinto being with my birth or yours;it is historically groundedand bears the marksand signs of all the typifyof our ancestors, mostremarkable of the activity world has ing mediumof language. Finally,the intersubjective which is a future an open horizon; it is in movementtoward of future partly"ours" and in large part "theirs,"the possession world is the epistemic generations. In sum, the intersubjective horizon in termsof contextfor human action, the significative and even thingsare understood. It is whichindividuals, events, now possible to turn to the phenomenologicalgrounding for some of theseclaims. world of daily life, our social world, is The intersubjective of action is a centraltheme the domainof action,and the analysis of Schutz'sPhenomenology. In manyways,the problemof social action traverses and connectsall of his work. In the Phenomenology the starting point is Weber's conceptionof action. Although Schutz accepts and follows Weber's postulate of the of meaning (the meaning which the subjective interpretation actor bestowson his own act and forwhich he is responsibleas which the observer fromthe interpretation makes), distinguished he presents some salientqualifications. First,and mostgenerally, of his theories Weber exploredthephilosophical foundations only and the applias deeplyas the demandsof his empiricalresearch cation of related theoretical investigation required; the vast inwere not accompanied by sight and power of his methodology equivalentphilosophicalanalysis. Second, and more specifically, his conceptionof social action took forgrantedthe veryproblem of action. whichlies at the basis of all theory of intersubjectivity Weber not that does the are charges recognizethe Concretely, between of action, failingto distinguish complex time-structure of that his and action the act; analysis motivacompleted on-going between becausehe does not allow forthe difference tionis faulty

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thatmotivation whose explanatory principlelies in the past and that which demands the considerationof the future; that the entirestatusof meaningin social action has not been fullyclarifiedbecause the structure of intentionhas been left philosophiclear at this cally unexamined. Schutz's position is perfectly correctness point: convincedof the fundamental (let alone brilliance) of Weber'sentireapproachto the phenomenaof the social world,he conceiveshis taskto be thatof a diggerof foundations, to provide a philosophical underpinningfor the sociologyof Verstehen its phenomenological by clarifying presuppositions.It is in thisperspective thatSchutz'sown formulation of the nature of action is to be understood. There is a seriousambiguityin the term"action," for it can referto the on-goingcourse of an action's developmentor to the completed,finished product. Moreover,action may be predimensions: sentedto theego in one of threetemporal "My action as it takesplace presents itselfto me as a series of existingand thatare comingto be and passing experiences, present experiences itselfto me as a series away. My intended. . . action presents of futureexperiences. My terminated, completedact (which is itselfto me as a seriesof terminated my expiredaction) presents 4 I which experiences contemplatein memory/' The meaning further of an actionis bound up withthesetemporal distinctions; and action between Schutz is necessary. refinement distinguished is termed constitution act. The on-going "action"; the completed it builds up in a unit is the "act." Action is subject-bound, is alwayson the and its full significance temporaldevelopment, farside of theactor'sintention. The act is a unitary phenomenon is and whose which is object-oriented meaning graspable. Since to herein a particular way,it is necessary "meaning"is introduced in include some explanation of the phenomenological position which it is embedded. Action (includingact) and meaning are integralin their epistemicfunction. Meaning is not "added"
4 p. 39.

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or "attached'' to actionby wayof some sortof predication or addendum. Instead, is boundto thevery interpretive meaning of and action must be understood as vitalto itsformaconception tion. Meaningand actionare both grounded in temporality: . ". . meaning is a certain one'sgaze at an item wayof directing own one's This item is thus out' and 'selected of experience. rendered discrete Act. Meaningindicates, thereby a reflexive a on attitude the of flow the toward the fore, peculiar part Ego 5 of its own duration." These distinctions make it possibleto see thedialectical between "action"and "act." relationship In theprocess ofitsformation, socialactionis oriented toward certain we might goals;it is project-directed, say. The way in whicha goal is entertained the involves the following by ego theindividual his desired alprocedure: projects goal as having been fulfilled and fancies it as completed, as thoughit ready now were,in Schutz's in the future tense. formulation, perfect The goal thusimagined is the projected act; it is the meaning ofthecorresponding actionmeant to realizeit. The projecting, ofcourse, takes is timeplace in a present.The goal projected forunlikethe actionwithin transcendent, whichits formation the meaning of the goal, the projected occurs, act, is merely intended the of consciousness the imagining by ego and not an actual part of his stream of awareness. In phenomenological the intentional terms, act, in this unitymeant(the projected is of the on the instance) independent intending partof theego. A mathematical is trueor falseindependent of the proposition with which the student asserts its truth or and fervency falsity of theidiosyncratic he in use his calregardless techniques may culations.Whatis meant, in social action is in then, meaningful thepresent to theextent for Schutz to the that (and only extent) a fancying or phantasying consciousness a corresponding projects act. Thus, "the meaningof any action is its corresponding
5 P. 42. Note the distinction between"act" (Handlung) and "Act" (Akt),the latterreferring to the spontaneous ratherthan the passive aspect of the ego's experience.

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6 projectedact." Apart fromsuch projection,however,action, strictly speaking,has no meaning.7 We have been discussing action in the present. Clearly,past action is taken up anew in the presentand considered in its completed characteras act. an event as already having taken place, we Instead of fancying ' ' have the eventas actuallyhavingtaken place. In an 'irreal' or fictive way,or in a real way, the futureis essentialto the comand within the presentthe of action in the present, prehension to speakwithAugustine of actsis relived. One is tempted history of acts of a present of actionpresent (the projectedact), a present and a presentof action future(the past (the act remembered), structural The groundingof the distinction anticipatedact).8 has decisive betweenaction and act in temporalconsiderations Not of meaningthatemerges. forthe theory onlythe importance ongoingaction but the entirerange of awarenessrequires a reif thereis to be a looking-upon, momentin consciousness, flexive is made possible by experience. That reflexiveness meaningful and sustainsthe multivalent innertimeor dure whichgenerates here that Husserl's and human It is order of precisely reality. of human temporality provideSchutzwith the analyses Bergson's of the constitution account foundationfor a phenomenological of meaning. The projected act,it has been suggested, ing requiresa phantasy as future the for an event who already planned imagines ego which in a is taken activity complex Phantasying place. having the imagined objects are granteda peculiar ontological status: theyare taken as "irreal" or fictivebeings. Husserl speaks of from themas "neutral"(as distinguished "positional")projections. What is thus phantasiedis "real" in the mode of being enterbut not real in the sense of being taken tained by consciousness
6 P. 61. 7 Though it may still be considered as part of "behavior"in the genericsense of that term. clear on 8 Perhapsthe temptation oughtto be avoided,forit is not altogether of the projectedact is betweenthe futurity this accountwhat the relationship act. and thatof the anticipated

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as a mundane as actuallyexistentor having in fact transpired is similarto Husserl'snotion of phantasying event. The activity which the estheticobject modification" of a "neutrality through artwork.9 Phantasying, of the in as "rear* the emerges experience and to oneselfa possible state of affairs then,means presenting what One as consequent. phantasies takingthat state of affairs his alter ego will do in responseto a possible course of action and done with. whose projectedact is now envisagedas finished If thatcourseof action is indeed followedand the projectedact if what was phantasieddoes in actualitytake becomesa reality, the mode of attention given to the act by the ego in place, then reflective attitudechangesinto the "positional" attitudeof conhave that phantasying sciousness. It is essentialto consciousness momentin its procedureforthe experience the crucialreflective in question to be meaningful. Reflectionmarksthe difference it mustbe added, covers betweenlifeand thought.10 Phantasying, from richand dramatic a variegated of extending range attention, and reand unlikelypossibilities to highlyabstract envisagement sultants. The question of which possibilitiesare selected or of projectedacts leads to what Schutz chosenin the phantasying
'The Knight, Diirer'sengraving, ". . . (L)et us supposethatwe are observing herein thefirst place thenormalperception Death,and theDevil.' We distinguish thisprintin the portfolio. as a thing, is the'engraved of whichthe correlate print* withinwhich in consciousness in the secondplace the perceptive We distinguish thereappear to us the smallcolourless theblacklinesof thepicture 'knight figures, we do not consider observation on horseback,' 'death/and 'devil.' In aesthetic fixedon what is portrayed we have our attention theseas the objects(Objekten); of fleshand the knight on the 'depicted* 'in thepicture/ moreprecisely, realities, blood, and so forth. That whichmakes the depicting possibleand mediatesit, in which of the 'picture'(of the small greyfigurettes the consciousness namely, itself noeses the derived other, 'presents throughsimilarity, something through of the perception. is now an exampleforthe neutrality-modification as depicted*), as beingnor as non-being, standsbeforeus neither This depicting picture-object we are aware of it as havingits or rather, nor in any otherpositional modality; of Being."(Edmund in theneutrality-modification though being, onlya quasi-being, translated to Pure Phenomenology, Ideas: GeneralIntroduction Husserl, by W. R. BoyceGibson,London and New York: GeorgeAllen and Unwin Ltd. and The Macmillan Co., 1931, p. 311). io See p. 70.

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calls the problemof "relevance,"a topic I will turnto later. It of phantasythatthe theory is important at thispointto recognize at of human all social action levels for has serious ing implications experiencebecause the projectionof acts underliesthe meaningful structure of the social world fromthe domain of face-to-face and distant oftheThou to typifications ofquite remote experience and theirculturalrealities. fellow-men limited Social action takesplace in a context;it is situationally are qualified and defined. Even the fictive aspectsof phantasying act which within is projected. the and restricted by the context What is deemed to be "likely,""possible,"or "out of the question" depends,in part,on the situationat hand and the actor's to assessment of it. To understand action, then,it is necessary the actor in a situation. One of Schutz's turnto what motivates it of criticisms Weber, may be recalled,concernedhis account of is that motivation. What Schutzobjectsto in Weber's treatment of context both the actor'ssubjectivefeelingabout the meaning which is the groundof his behaviorand what the observersupin the put together poses thatgroundto be are indiscriminately concept of motive.11 Since it was Weber who introducedthe of meaning,which inpostulateof the subjectiveinterpretation sistson attentionbeing paid to the meaningan act has for the actor who performs thatact, it is curious that he failed to keep motiwhendiscussing and objectiveaspects separatethesubjective vation. The reason for the confusionis the failure to explore 'behavior'or 'action' of action. Thus, f< foundation the temporal is for Weber a discretedatum with which one can operate immediately,without furtherinquiry as to the principle of its of the temporalgrounding unity."12 A consequenceof ignoring of action towarda futureevent is thatthe orientation motivation cannotbe distinguished.The or itsreference to a pastexperience difference, however,is a profoundone, for the logic of future11See p. 86. 12P. 87.

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from that of its pastdirectedaction is qualitativelydifferent related corollary. Schutz marks the difference by naming the motive of action and the latter the formerthe "in-order-to" includesa detailed dis"because" motive. The Phenomenology cussionof the meaningof theseterms. of meaning of the subjectiveinterpretation The centralinsight the motive hingeson the question of how we are to understand of the actor. In responseto the question, "Why are you doing X?" twoanswers are both commonand appropriate:"I am doing X in order to accomplishY," or "I am doing X because of Y." one forminto the other: In manycases it is possibleto translate "I am entering the diplomaticcorps in order to serve my couninto "I am enteringthe diplomaticcorps because try"translates I want to servemy country"(and vice versa). When translation of this sort is possible,we are dealing with what Schutz calls a statement." In the case of a "genuine because "pseudo-because statement" translation is impossible:"I leftthe diplomaticcorps into an "in-order-to" because I was fired"cannot be translated lies in equivalent. The motiveof the genuinebecause statement must a completedexperiencein the past. Accessto it temporally motiveis not tense. The in-order-to be by wayof the pluperfect only directed toward the future but presupposesthe project which characterizes the course of action phantasiedby the ego. In the in-order-to relation,the project does the motivating;in the genuine because relation, the project itselfis motivated.18 The larger considerationinvolved here is that social action is initiallydefinedby the project, not the causal antecedentsof the project. This in turnmeans thatsocial action is fundamenwhichare, as theydevelop relations by in-order-to tallymotivated in the actualityof life,basicallytaken forgrantedby the actor. here that we locate the root of Schutz'sentire It is precisely world of "the as takenforgranted." The situationwithin theory of actionby wayof in-order-to motivestakes whichtheprojection
See p. 92.

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of his the past acts of the ego and the history place presupposes of past performantecedentprojections. The practicalefficacy ances in a varietyof situationsassuresa base fromwhich each of new presentprojectingis oriented. Pragmaticjustification assured. new projectsof action typically thatbase in turnrenders In the momentof reflection the ego looks back on his fund of knowledgegained frompast acts and makes the assumptionthat what has typically workedreasonablywell in the past will also workequivalently well in the future. Of course,thereis nothing what was appropriate automaticabout the decisionas to whether in the past is appropriate forthe futurebecause the "Here" and "Now" statusof the individual is never quite the same as his earlierplacementin life Within the span of the projectof the in-order-to theproblematic relation, aspectof experienceis placed in abeyance. Thus, the taken-for-granted "is alwaysthatparticular level of experiencewhich presentsitselfas not in need of further analysis. Whethera level of experienceis thus takenfor of the reflective interest glance granteddependson the pragmatic whichis directedupon it and thereby upon the particularHere 14 and Now fromwhich that glance is operating." which If action is alwayssituated,it is a world of fellow-men human situation The of man's existence. the sociality guarantees is essentially intersubjective.At the same time,the range of the world is far largerthan is ordinarily recognized, intersubjective but overthe narrower forin additionto mycontemporaries (and withwhom I classof thosecontemporaries whelmingly important them Schutz calls sharea face-to-face "consociates") relationship thosewho lived beforeI was born,and thereare mypredecessors, thosewho will be born afterI die. It is a mistake mysuccessors, to limit the analysisof social action to the sphereof contemporaries,thoughit is indeed truethatwhat I knowof my predecesis dependenton the model of my experience sors and successors of contemporaries.The beginningpoint for an analysisof the
i* P. 74.

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I sharewiththose worldis the We-relationship intersubjective in directspatial-temporal fellow-men withwhomI participate - myconsociates.The experience encounter of the We is prinot mordial. It is gainedby thepresence of menin theworld, or a theoretical by induction proof. We come here to an exfacebedrock of social: the We of direct, the shared, periential to-face encounter oftheego'sparticipation thestandpoint is,from in thesocialworld, of an experience sui generis. The problem is a problem becauseof the factof the Weintersubjectivity In thissense, theWe is experientially relationship. priorto the for it who seek those to underphilosophical problem generates stand howa socialworldis possible. Nor is theWe-relationship to be explained on thebasisofa logicalconstruction ofthesocial madeby theego. Rather, "theworldof theWe is not private to either ofus,butis ourworld, theone common intersubjective worldwhichis right therein front of us. It is onlyfrom the face-to-face from of the common lived experience relationship, theworldin theWe, thattheintersubjective worldcan be constituted. This alone is the point fromwhichit can be de15 Withinthe social worldthusunderstood, duced." however, there stillremains the question of how knowledge of Others is At level this a one is possible. distinctively philosophical probissueforthemethodology lem;at another level,it is a systematic of the socialsciences. Even in the face-to-face witha fellow-man, the relationship individual knowsonlyan aspectof the Other. Although the Thou is givenas a person, the mode of givenness is essentially adumbrated. Someaspects of theOtherare manifest, are others in form or are To presented shadowy completely say opaque. thatI haveknowledge of the Otheris thento say thatI know him directly in verylimitedmeasurebut indirectly in vast constructs whichI form of himand of degree, through typified human behavior Of the Thou in the generally. course, paradigm
is P. 171.

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of love or friendship relationship presentshimselfvividly and and in all face-to-face encountersthe realityof the thoroughly, Other is more or less vibrantly presented. But when we move from a radicalchangeis introduced: consociates to contemporaries, and conthe ego knowshis contemporary by way of typifications behaves or is models of how "someone" traditionally structions, the ego knows expectedto behave in certainsituations. In short, hiscontemporaries a concatenated chiefly through complex, system of ideal types. Schutzdistinguishes betweentwo meaningsof the of all conceptof ideal typeof humanbehavior:"It can mean first himself or has the ideal typeof anotherpersonwho is expressing in a certainway. Or it maymean, second,the himself expressed ideal typeof the expressive or even of the outward processitself, resultswhichwe interpret as the signsof the expressive process. Let us call the first the 'personalideal type' and the second the 16 'material'or 'course-of-action type'." What happens then to the theory of the subjectiveinterpretation of meaningis that the social world is constituted, in large measure,by personal ideal typesand by course-of-action types, from a more with fellow-man or less varying specific acquaintance in relationships. The means by to almost completeanonymity whichsuch types of a perare constituted involvesthe postulation son and the attribution to him of thosetypicalattitudes, motives, which and would be sufficient to acinterests, skills, techniques countforthekindof act in questionwe seek to understand. The maybegin eitherwiththe personand end withthe act or analysis workback to the withthe act and fromits typicalstructure start construction ofthekindofpersoncapable of behavingin thatway. will be from whichthe construction What decidesthe perspective made is the interpreter's point of view. The personalideal type 17 the "is a function of Finally, veryquestionit seeksto answer" relatedto the course-of-action thepersonalideal typeis intimately and indeedmustutilizeitsmodelifit wishesto createitsown. type
ieP. 187. it P. 190.

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of ideal types, the ego is able to advance By meansof both forms from theexperience of theThou in theWe-relationship to the inwhich mark its genesis and creasing stages of anonymization as a with other as a sucdestiny contemporary contemporaries, cessorto predecessors, and as a predecessor to successors, II "Whoever. . . wishesto analyzethe basic conceptsof the social Schutzwrites, "mustbe willingto embarkon a laborious sciences," of the social philosophicaljourney, for the meaning-structure worldcan only be deduced fromthe mostprimitive and general 18 This turnto the of consciousness." characteristics "subjective" mustbe understood in phenomenological we are terms;otherwise in dangerof repeating what is by now the classicalerrorof interin individual,"interiorized" "consciousness" terms. It is preting not the privatecontentsof an introspective awarenessbut the structure of intentionality which is meant in the phenomenoof consciousness.The perceptualmodel,then, logicalconception is not that of a containerwith an "inside" and an "outside," hookedup bywiresto receivemessages from the "real" world,nor is it the consequenceof a separationbetweenmind and body,a case stillpendingbeforethe philosophicdomesticrelationscourt. consciousnessis conceived of as a Rather, for phenomenology in which the unity "subjective" is already in direct connection withtheobjectsof its intentional concernbecause those"objects" are partsof the unified of the streams structure of consciousness not "things"but meantcorrelates of the acts whichintendthem. To turnto consciousness, is to locate theessential of features then, whose is in meaning-structures universality guaranteed, part, by the fact that no predicationof existence,ontologicalstatus,or is eitherbeing made or is at issue in the psychological specificity attitude. phenomenological Schutz'sanalysisof the time-structure of social action is conis p. 12.

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cerned with what is necessarily presupposedfor any ego which a projectedact, not with the concrete, historicalindiphantasies vidual and his particularand special characteristics.It is irrelevantto the analysisto suggest, then,thatthe capacityto phantasy variesfrom individualto individual. It is because we can underas such thatit is possibleto speak here of indistandphantasying vidual differences.Certainly, thereare considerableand important variancesin individual psychological capacities and operabut they are measures ofthewaysin whichessential tions, response but not more is made. There are more or less giftedphantasiers or lessgifted phantasying. is thento be understood forthe phenomenologist, Subjectivity, as a domain which is readilyaccessibleto the inspectionof any who cares to make the effort, investigator providedthathe equip himselfproperly. More importantthan special knowledge of thatconsciousis thebroad recognition methodological techniques to be tappedby a haphazard nessis notan idiosyncratic wellspring or esoteric method of intuition but intentionality itself,that as whichby itsverynatureis as "public" and as "intersubjective" to be and language. Nor is subjectivity itsintimates, mathematics of personalintuitheories moresophisticated approachedthrough of translation the tion and empathy. Schutzexplicitly repudiates which triesto verstehende Soziologie into eitheran irrationalism seize thevitalaspectof lifein somenon-reductive wayor a hermewhich tries to enter directlyinto the neutics of fellow-feeling of the Other'slived experience: actuality and distinctdemandthe maximumof clarity "All truesciences ness for all their propositions. There is no such thing as an irrationalscience. We must never cease reiteratingthat the is a rationalone and thatthe position ofWeber'ssociology method withthatof in no waybe confused should ofinterpretive sociology Dilthey,who opposes to rationalscienceanother,so-called'interand incorpresuppositions pretive'sciencebased on metaphysical rigible'intuition/ science "It is true that the postulateof such an interpretive

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thebarriofbreaking from arose thenecessity through historically and the sciences ersthat therational wereerected between special it human ofliving experience.But was forgotten understanding are thatlifeand thought new this those by approach proposing a matter of thought remains and that twodifferent science things base itevenwhenitssubject matter is life. It cannot, therefore, on somevagueand confused or on valuepresupposiself empathy 19 in intellectual or on tions rigor." lacking descriptions seizethelivofreasons Therearea variety whytheego cannot his Here and Now is of the Other'sexperience: ing actuality his from is his stock of built knowledge unique, up and utilized and he aloneknows whenhisprojand byhischoice, perspective a great I can share and ends. As fellow-man, ectbegins however, to himas a Thou in deal withtheOther:I cangaindirect access of time dimension and I can sharea certain theWe-relationship But and I older alter the fact that together. through grow my ego ' ' nordo I evenin these I do not 'become'theOther immediacies, not invadis enter into his lived Sharing mysteriously experience. doesnotendthere, because ofcourse, myknowling. The matter in thetypificacomes with edgeoftheOther itsgreatest complexity tions and ideal types of sociallife. The form thematrix which matrix less andclarification is nothing ofthat description, analysis, thanthesubject ofa phenomenology ofthesocialsciences. matter insists The distinction whichSchutz between lifeand thought a rigorous ondemands of is not the It science subjective. possible, life he obin principle, forthescientist into the to enter directly and to build his science of directenserves from the materials ofdeparture for arepoints whatmaylater counter.At bestthese or work. Without doubt,the sociologist developintoscientific his their live with share dailylives, anthropologist may "subjects," enter and andactivitheir into concerns sympathetically genuinely ties. It is from thestandpoint thatthe of an observer, however, made and of such are are methodoscientific reports participation
i9 P. 240.

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of thesubjectas a Thou in a warranted. The experience logically eitherregenuinelyestablishedby the scientist We-relationship mains partof daily life or is made an explicitobject of reflective analysis. If it remainswithinlife,it is no morea partof science than the corresponding experienceof the subject. If it is examinedand reflected upon, the experienceis takenin its typified and ideal types. form and interpreted bythemeansofconstructions must For Schutz,adequate scientific begin with the analysis formation of objective typesbased on the knowledgegained of individualsthrough personalideal types. The sociologicalascent, of mundanelife to then,is fromlived experienceto typifications whichaccountforindividualsin actionto obpersonalideal types jective ideal typeswhich replace all prior constructs. With the "obreacheshis goal of establishing finalstage,the social scientist 20 And of subjectivemeaning-contexts.1* jectivemeaning-contexts which and anonymization he achievesthe formalization therewith scientist ultimately rigoroussciencerequires. In one sense, the findsin the social world he describesthe models he has placed there. Concretehuman beings have been replaced by artificial imcreatures designedby the methodologist.Yet it is extremely and type-buildto remember thatthe genesisof construct portant withinwhich natural attitude in the form back naive to ing goes men in daily life interactwith one another. To paraphase we mightsaythatthenaturalattitudegives Kronecker 's aphorism, the restis the workof the social scienus the primary constructs, thatlife and tortuous tist. In a strange thought way,it is through to its source. is able to return from the solitary ofSchutz's The Odyssey ego to Phenomenology of scienceis not withoutits internaldiscomforts the achievement and outline of his and challenges. From withinthe orientation invite criticaldiscussion: which issues three there are work, large and the thenatureof intersubjectivity, method, phenomenological problemofrelevance.
20p. 241.

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1. Phenomenological Method. In an Appended Note to the Schutzmakesa systematic first of the Phenomenology, chapter as phenomenological statement of thestatus of his investigation the is donewithin time-consciousness ofinner work. The analysis is a ofhisbook,however, reduction.The rest phenomenological whichdoes not,forthe attitude of thenatural phenomenology oftranscendental or problems most intotheprocedures enter part, attitude natural within the It is the phenomenology. phenomena of whichcorrespond to the correlative constituting phenomena the that are considered reducedsphere the phenomenologically time is said to holdfor of of The analysis object inquiry. proper the outwithin all analyses carried mundane problems:". . . since in also hold reduction true essentially psychophenomenological natural of the and within the thus sphere logicalintrospection, in our whatsoever we shallhave to makeno revisions attitude, whenwe time-consciousness the internal conclusions concerning 21 Phelife/' social ofordinary cometo applythem to therealm which instrument isnota special ofcourse, method, nomenological bound at hisloupe. Use is usesas a jeweler thephenomenologist and at theother ofperceptual oneendtoa philosophy experience whata probofwhatis beingsought, to pragmatic considerations to the is appropriate and whatlevelofclarification lemcallsfor, of in thisway,theprocedures goalsof theinquiry. Understood illumifor the be transcendental may unnecessary phenomenology
21P. 44. Compare the following formulations: "... a true psychology of intentionalityis, according to HusserFs words, nothing other than a constitutive phenomenologyof the natural attitude. In this eidetic mundane science (thus in the psychological apperception of the natural attitude), which stands at the beginning of all methodological and theoretical scientific problems of all the cultural and social sciences, all analyses carried through in phenomenological reduction essentiallyretain their validation. It is preciselyhere that the tremendous significanceof the results achieved by Husserl for all the cultural sciences lies."

(AlfredSchutz,CollectedPapers, Vol. I: The Problemof Social Reality,edited and introduced by MauriceNatansonwith a prefaceby H. L. Van Breda, The 1962,p. 132) and: ". . . Husserl himselfhas estabHague: MartinusNijhoff, lished once and for all the principlethat analysesmade in the reducedsphere are valid also forthe realmof the naturalattitude.'*(Ibid., p. 149.)

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nation of certainaspectsof mundane existence. However, the mirrorone anvariousstrataof phenomenological investigation withone anand in structural other, are, isomorphic implication, workdone at one level has its other. It followsthatdescriptive and analogues for other levels. It is not aldirectimplications his transcendental clear why Schutz restricts glance to together consciousness. Granted that time is the cardinal inner-time it is themeunderlying social action,as it is of all social structure, is not of mundanity, stillthecase thatthesocial itself, thecurrent need in but of transcendental investigation onlyequallydeserving of questionsrelatedto social actionare ofsuchinquiryifa variety forexamto be analyzedout to theirroots. The We-relationship, a primordial i.e., his startgivenforSchutz, ple,is in manyrespects is itsindubitable and function foritsform ing pointin accounting of the transand immediatepresentation. From the standpoint to ask, How is it possible that cendentalattitude,it is necessary Within the naturalattitudethe We-rethereis such a structure? attitudeit is a factof life,but in the phenomenological lationship how thequestionof the to see is deeplyproblematic. It is difficult can be givenits fullweight of theWe-relationship verypossibility Schutzimposes. Obviously,it is the authwithinthe restrictions of his investigation.What the province or's rightto circumscribe else: how the analogue of the transis at issue here is something cendentalproblemof socialityitselfcan be encounteredwithin of thenaturalattitude. Perhapsan ofa phenomenology thelimits evendeepermethodological difficulty appearswhenwe seek to put of into practicethe Husserlian postulateof the correspondence absolute it as Schutz levelsof phenomenological accepts inquiry. holds. But that insightcan be gained that the correspondence reduction. It would thevantagepointof transcendental onlyfrom havebeen ofenormous help to have had an accountofwhatI have of levels insteadof its being taken for termedthe isomorphism Such an accountmight as a principleof phenomenology. granted showthatthe unityof phenomenological conceptionand practice to limit himselfto the mundane permitsthe phenomenologist

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only by payingthe price of excluding some of the constitutive to the full illumination of the natquestionsultimately necessary ural attitude. 2. The Nature of Intersubjectivity. Settingaside transcendental questionsand methodalso has seriousimplications forSchutz's of intersubjectivity and his approachto an accountof conception theego'sknowledge ofhis fellow-man.The acceptance of theWemeansthattheepistemological issueof intersubjectivrelationship in certain set the ityis, respects, outside provinceof a phenomeof nologyof the naturalattitude. There is a sense of alternation in in the Phenomenology, emphasis the accountof thesematters forthough we are clearly told thatwithinthecommon-sense world ofdailylifeintersubjectivity is a primordial factof thatlifeand so is taken forgrantedby common-sense men,still the problematic status ofintersubjectivity and itsprimeimportance as a philosophical themeforsocial scienceintrudes obliquely into the discussion, a recognized, honored,but still unadmitted guest.22 Once again, it is not simply a matter ofcircumscribing thelimitsof the investiin gation. Inevitably philosophical analysisof social realitythere is a kindof circularity whichhas nothingto do withdeductionor thelogicof inquirybut is insteada seemingly inescapablecorrelation: thereality to be interpreted is alreadyunderstood in a naive or hiddenway. Intersubjectivity, then,is not onlya factof life,it is immanently a as fundamental comprehended accomplishment of the enterprise of social existence. When the social scientist turnsto the intersubjective worldand beginshis description of it, thedata he locatesare alreadymarkedand chargedwithintersubturnsto intersubjectivity as jectiveintent. When the philosopher an epistemological problem,he is takingan odd stancewith rea to familiar familiar in thesenseof immanent spect phenomenon, in pre-acquaintanceship. Not to presuppose intersubjectivity is to or erase it make believe it never philosophical inquiry hardly it is to turnto the conditionswhichaccount for the was; rather,
22 Cf. pp. 33 and 98.

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of humanreality. The circle itself as a possiblefeature structure of man and fellowis comprised of a "pre-existent" relationship man being interrogated a who is alreadyin relaby philosopher at the moment withhis fellow-men he askshow thatrelationship the logical and the between tionshipis possible. Distinguishing chronological beginningof inquiryhelps to show thatthe results of analysisare not vitiatedby the circle but does not alter the double pull of the questionertowardwhat he knows,on the one on the other. It is in this hand,and towarda root unfamiliarity, betweenmundana in that the Phenomenology way playdevelops men and the knownand available to common-sense ityas typically viewed as structure of mundanity phenomenologically by the phiscientist. The uneasinessI sense here may have losopher-social to do with Schutz'spositionon Husserl's approach to something in Formal and Transcendental the problemof intersubjectivity Logic and the Cartesian Meditations. Like Husserl himself, with the attemptto account satisfied Schutzwas not completely of the transcendental of thedoctrine in terms forintersubjectivity the It be hindsight may of course providedby his essayof ego. in 1957 on "The Problem of TranscendentalIntersubjectivity that I but think thissuggestion, Husserl"whichleads me to offer alone it would be possibleto on the basis of the Phenomenology of his use of say thatpart of the reason forSchutz'scurtailment that realization the was transcendental increasing phenomenology of the it could not providea solution(apartfromthe clarification intersubof to the constitutive philosophicalproblem process) is an irreducible in and that, principle,intersubjectivity jectivity which and over which within struggles.23 philosophy against given 3. The Problem of Relevance. .Both social action by men in and analysisof thataction by social dailylifeand the observation
23For the intersubjectivity essay see Schutz's Collected Papers, Vol. Ill: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, edited by I. Schutz with an introductionby Aron Gurwitsch (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). Elsewhere Schutz writes: ". . . we may say that the empirical social sciences will find their true foundation not in transcendentalphenomenology,but in the constitutivephenomenology of the natural attitude." (Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 149.)

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in goals taken to be scientists interest presupposea fundamental forcarrying out the affairs of life and the desirableor necessary of workof science. Projectsof actionsituatedin complexsystems of man as a choice* and needs reflect the basic energy preferences because makingcreature. The entirediscussionof motivation, and in-order-to of and construction the statements, phantasying, which Schutz terms typesturnson a conceptof vast proportions thegeneralproblemofrelevance. It does not feature as a chapter or sectionof thePhenomenology, yetthereis hardlya page of the book whichdoes not implyor referto aspectsof the problem. It is onlyin the Conclusionthata directstatement of the natureof relevance and thenit is onlyindicatedin fleeting as a form occurs, future which Most subject requires development. simply,the " problemof relevanceis posed by . . . the questionof whythese facts and precisely theseare selectedby thought fromthe totality 24 of lived experienceand regardedas relevant." The question all levelsof man's involvement in the social world as well strikes as his involvement in science,art,and religionbecause it pointsto the source of his agency in life, the vital principle underlying whatI would call themotility ofconsciousness.Since theproblem 25 of relevancerequires "an over-allphenomenological analysis," it is hardlysurprising that Schutzwas unable to include a treatmentof it in thePhenomenology.A separatetreatise would have been necessary. Nevertheless, we do have hintsin later publications (broughttogether in his Collected Papers) of how he prohere in sumposed to approachthe problem. I am not interested or of views on details his the relevance;rather, marizing outlining I am concerned withdisplaying of theproblem. What thetaproot is profoundly in and necessary to the argument of the presupposed is an accountofthemotileimpulseofsubjectivity, Phenomenology thevalenceof action. In all motivation, choice,projection, phanthere the and decision is which the force drives action tasying, and expresses the vitality of the actor. I suggest that the
24P. 250. ss P. 249.

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of that nisus of consciousness identification and comprehension would be the solution to the source of relevance. The Phenogivesus somereasonto thinkthatrelevanceis grounded menology and a remarkin thephenomenology of inner-time consciousness, in a "On able passage later essay, Multiple Realities," may lend to thatclaim: support whichgoverns us withinthe ". . . thewholesystem ofrelevances naturalattitudeis foundedupon the basic experienceof each of us: I knowthatI shall die and I fearto die. This basic experience we suggestcalling the fundamental anxiety. It is the primordialanticipationfromwhich all the othersoriginate. From of the fundamental systems anxietyspringthe manyinterrelated of chances and risks hopes and fears,of wantsand satisfactions, whichinciteman withinthe naturalattitudeto attemptthe masand to of the world,to overcomeobstacles,to draftprojects, tery 26 realizethem." bound to the meaning The fundamental anxietyis necessarily not onlybecause death is the negation of inner-time consciousness is sustained and exbut because intentionality of temporality in thetemporality whichthefearofdeathmenaces. What pressed of thesource me as certainin thisveryhypothetical strikes tracing the analysis and ofrelevance is thathowever earnestly persuasively it is only of theproblemis carriedout withinthenaturalattitude, can be foundation its that transcendental phenomenology through it is through exposed and reconstructed.Perhaps paradoxically, transcendental of issues critical the horizonof relevancethatthe of the maketheirappearancein a phenomenology phenomenology naturalattitude. to the morethan twenty-five thePhenomenology Turningfrom of one is struckby the consistency yearsof workwhichfollowed, and clarityof the initial as well as the richness Schutz'sthought of his position in 1932. It is not only the cardinal statement of the essentialstructure visionof a philosophicalreconstruction
26 Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 228. Cf. Aron Gurwitsch,The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UniversityPress, 1964), pp. 342-343 and 394 ff.

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of the takenforgranted worldof dailylife whichis sustained and amplified in his Collected Papers,but thedetailedanalyses of fundamental whichare deepened features of social reality in beingappliedto a variety and extended of problems which wereforeseen in the Phenomenology but leftforfuture treatment. Although its authorwas in his earlythirties when the was published, it is evidentthatthiswas the Phenomenology workof a mature could mind,thatthe contents philosophical havebeenexpanded twice intoa volume the thesizebutfor easily factthatthe author choseto wait forthe timewhenthe most and meticulous statement of his findings could be prerigorous sented on themes in he wasstill theprocess of examining.The work is an accurate of to follow, what was early prediction despite the factthatthe Collected on manynew Paperscontainessays and ideasnotincluded in thePhenomenology. And in adtopics ditionto the freshness of essays like "On MultipleRealities," Schutz his and horizon enlarged sociologie philosophic bystudying theworks of suchthinkers on theAmerican sceneas GeorgeH. andCharles H. Cooley, as wellas Santayana, Mead,W. I. Thomas, in the and Dewey. Although thereare repetitions Whitehead, formulation ofcertain in theCollected notions there is no Papers, sense ofconceptual career of a Schutz The was redundancy. unity devoted to an exploration of the truephilosophical of grounds socialreality in theintentional structure ofhuman consciousness. Within thatcareer, thePhenomenology marks a majoreventin thehistory of thephilosophy and methodology of the socialsciences. To be sure, it is perfectly reasonable to takethebookas a forcertain in corrective sympathetic inadequacies philosophical it Weber's work as is to the sociology; equallypermissible classify an application ofHusserl's ofthesocialsciences. ideasto thefield Yetsuchaccounts wouldmiss in thenerve ofwhatis truly original Schutz's effort to cometo terms witha philosophy of manin the naturalattitude.The root originality is the illumination of as typified of inner-time structure mundanity by theintentional consciousness. back to that comes action, Everything projection,

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even relevance,in my opinion) are (and ultimately phantasying forwhichtemporality ofa typifying consciousness all thematerials of thesocialworld. The choiceofa phenomenological is thesecret approachto such problemsis hardlycasual, forthe veryconcept of transformation of the natural attitudedemands a wrenching ' that attitude,a reflexive procedurewhich Husserl calls 'reduc* can be understood tion1and whichitself only in phenomenologSchutz found the meaning ical terms. In phenomenology, then, of temporality, and with thatthe clue to social reality.27 is remarkable, The Phenomenology though,forits sociological no less than forits philosophicalbrilliance. It is, in fact, insight the union of philosophyand social science in Schutz's thought which accountsfor its power and establishesits importancefor social science. There are, of course,many ways in present-day and social sciencecan take whichan alliance betweenphilosophy of sociology, place. Looking at the matterfromthe standpoint a genfor the one mightsay that may offer sociologist philosophy in termsof which certainmethodological eral perspective problems and theoretical questionscan be approached. But thereis one in which the also a deeper dimensionof the relationship, absorbsthe full weightof a philosophicpositionand sociologist theconceptual ofhis sociologieproblems seesbasicaspects through who is a convincedDeweyan, eyesof thatposition. A sociologist that the verysyntaxof his thoughtand for example, may find affected by naturalistic expressionis molded or fundamentally was proHusserl to and concepts. Schutz'sindebtedness categories foundbut it was not of the sortthatI have just mentioned. To to realizethathe was it is imperative Schutz's understand sociology he was a philosopher! He was not not influenced by philosophy; he was a phenomenologist!Before influenced byphenomenology;
the whichpresented 27Interestingly enough,it was the problemof temporality work Schutz first The Schutz. and Husserl between meeting place philosophical which at the time he found read by Husserl was the Logical Investigations, told once "not he and me, but, reallyfor him." Later he impressive important and turnedto the Lectureson the Phenomenology of Inner-TimeConsciousness into phenomenology. was catapulted

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alsoa sociologist? it is necessary thequestion, Was he then asking and hewasa philosopher intotheclaimthat tolookmore carefully here. not at issue a phenomenologist. matter of is The training There are otherscholars who, like Schutz,were thoroughly in bothphilosophy but forwhomthe and socialscience trained a whoknows characterization "He is would be, sociologist proper a philosopher a great deal aboutphilosophy/5 Schutz wasneither nora sociologist whoknew dealaboutsociology a great intimately of an historian less was he with Still acquainted philosophy. Schutz tookas the and phenomenologist, ideas. As philosopher ofactionwhose content and focus ofhi$work thatfield precisely endemic to is defined ofconstructs status sociologie bythesystem as of thesocialscientist, and theideal types thenatural attitude wellas that consciousness theinvestigation of intentional ground ofwhich of the is theprivileged phenomenologist. responsibility In thisfocus a division of laborand say it is impossible to effect whereas the thatthesociologist himself with ideal concerns types It shouldbe withintentionality. himself concerns philosopher is ideal types clearbynowthatin Schutz's examining sociology, Conofall typification. constitutive theintentionality exploring ofinnerin Schutz's tothenature turning versely, phenomenology, of intentimeconsciousness is investigating theexemplifications lifein thenatural tional theoretical attitude.Attheir fundament, and one. are sociology philosophy ofthePhenomenolI suggested at theoutset that reader today's to thebookthanwouldhavebeen hasa different ogy relationship on thecareer tospeculate thecasesome years ago. It is interesting of the book had its Englishversion years appearedtwenty-five in America forthe or not the timewas right earlier. Whether but it is certain at this of sucha volumeis debatable, reception at lastat a ofthePhenomenology comes that thepublication time whenit in thedevelopment ofphilosophy and socialscience point on thebook'saudience. The to makenewdemands is necessary a Germanic wasconsidered whenphenomenology mystery period and social it is timeforbothphilosophers is over. Accordingly,

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to declare a moratorium scientists on, if not a finalhalt to, the and academic clichs which have clung about pseudo-questions not as gadfliesbut as fruitflies, the corpus of phenomenology, withoutknowledge or purpose. The time buzzingand pestering has come to leave behind such by now wearyqueries as "How does one phenomenologist check up on the reportof another?", "What if phenomenologists disagree?",and "How can private reverifiable intuitionever be expectedto yield intersubjectively when look like in practice, sults?", or,"Whatdoes phenomenology it's done}" With the publication of Schutz's book, phenomencome of age in America. And withthatcoming ologyhas finally of age ariseseriousand inescapablepedagogicquestionsfora new generationof philosophersand social scientists:What kind of and methodolis appropriate forworkin the philosophy training ogy of the social sciences? Are graduate facultiesequipped to guide students in the exploration of phenomenologicalrein the whosephilosophicalorientation search? How are students to be ensocial sciencesis genuinelyindebtedto phenomenology and sloabout work? labels to their couraged pursue Squabbles is the reality gans have no place in thisdiscussion;what matters of scholars and in endeavour the denoted. There, systematic aspiringscholars,is to be found the urgencyof our questions. Toward the resolutionof thosequestionsthe Phenomenology of both a promise and a warning. Phethe Social World offers nomenologyis a way into the common source which unites would mean the philosophyand social science; its fulfillment howof lifeby thought. The refusalof philosophy, illumination understand to science of social effort the ultimate fault will ever, man as a mundane being, for "when common-sense assumptions intotheapparatusof a science,theyhave admitted are uncritically 28 a wayof takingtheirrevenge."
28 P. 9.