Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist Discourse within NU

Martin van Bruinessen

[published as: Martin van Bruinessen, 'Traditions for the future: the reconstruction of traditionalist discourse within NU', in: Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, traditional Islam and modernity in Indonesia, Clayton, VIC: Monash Asia Institute, 1996, pp. 163-189.]

When the Muslim modernists of the early 20th century were thinking about developing an Islamic practice appropriate to the modern age, they raised the slogan of return to the original scriptural sources, Qur'an and hadits, throwing off the intellectual ballast accumulated during the intervening thirteen centuries. They attributed the stagnation of the Muslim world to the heavy weight of established practice and the blind following (taqlid) of earlier generations of Muslim thinkers, and they were convinced that the exercise of ijtihad, independent interpretation of the Qur'an and hadits (though within definite limits) would make Islam much more adaptable to new circumstances. When in the early 1980s the Nahdlatul Ulama made a radical break with its recent past as a political party and withdrew from formal politics, this too was explained as a return to an earlier past, to the spirit of the founding fathers, to the strategy (khitthah) of the year 1926, when the organization was established. It was hardly a coincidence that simultaneously with this alleged return to tradition, leadership of the organisation passed from the tired old men who had unimaginatively been at the helm into the hands of two younger men who were, each in his own way, very much concerned about the future of Islam and of the people whom they were going to lead. The very concept of the Khitthah of
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1926 was, in fact, first formulated by one of them, Kiai Achmad Siddiq, as recently as 1979.1 Both modernist and traditionalist Muslims, when planning to take a step forward, thus appealed to an older tradition - although what was understood thereby in these two cases was quite different. There is a growing awareness among historians and anthropologists that the relationship between tradition and change, or tradition and modernity, is not as straightforward as earlier generations used to think. Not only is the body of tradition in any society continually evolving, it is also often subject to deliberate innovations.2 We have for some time now been aware that many allegedly ancient traditions are in fact quite recent inventions.3 This may be true of religious traditions as well as of court ceremonies or the rituals surrounding sports events. Bearing this in mind, there is no a priori reason to presume that a self-consciously traditionalist organisation (such as the Nahdlatul Ulama) is less dynamic or less prone to change than a self-proclaimed anti-traditional one.

NU and Islamic tradition Any attempt to define what the Nahdlatul Ulama is, what it represents and what it stands for, involves the concept of tradition; tradition is the essence of its self-perception and self-definition. There is no single Indonesian (or Javanese) term covering the entire semantic range of this self-conscious traditionalism. Instead, the foreign loanwords tradisi and tradisional are often used. Thus one may speak of Islam tradisional; a recent study of the pesantren world by a person of NU background was titled Tradisi Pesantren,4 and a textbook for use in NU-affiliated schools discusses a few points of difference with modernists under the heading of tradisi keagamaan kaum Nahdliyyin, the religious
Kiai Achmad Siddiq published a booklet titled Khitthah Nahdliyah just before the 1979 NU congress. The ideas had been germinating for more than a decade, however, before receiving their final shape. An earlier version appeared in 1969 as Pedoman Berfikir "Nahdlatul Ulama". I am grateful to Greg Fealy for providing me with a copy of this document. Dutch adat law scholars believed that they were uncovering such ancient and unchanging traditions. It is satisfying to observe that one of the chief works of this school, C. van Vollenhove's The Discovery of Adat Law, in Indonesian translation has been given (though not deliberately, I fear) the fittingly ambivalent title of Penemuan Hukum Adat - the first word of which may mean "invention" as well as "discovery".
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Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kyai (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982). This is a translation of the author's 1980 ANU dissertation, The Pesantren Tradition. 2

traditions of NU's followers.5 The absence of an indigenous term suggests that the present awareness of the tradition as such is relatively recent. What does the NU's traditionalism consist of? There are several key concepts in Islam that are frequently translated as tradition, the most important of them being hadits, sunnah and adat. None of these terms is co-extensive with Muslim traditionalism, and with the last it has had a highly ambivalent relationship. Adat (Ar. `dah) is local practice, the way of the ancestors; since for the first generations of Indonesian Muslims the ancestors obviously were not Muslims, Islam and adat have at some times and places been at odds. As time went by, however, inevitably more and more of the ancestors were Muslims, and adat was gradually adapted to Islam (or even came to incorporate elements from Muslim law). Conversely, much of adat came to be seen as part and parcel of Islam. In the view of Muslim reformists, the religious practice of the traditionalists is pervaded with local practices of non-Islamic origin, it is a mixture of Islam and adat. The traditionalists themselves strongly object to this view; they emphasise that traditionalist ulama have played leading roles in the struggle against adat practices that are in conflict with the syari`ah. The sunnah of the Prophet, i.e. the precedents set by him for the believers' behaviour in all matters, constitutes a core element in the self-conscious traditionalism of the NU ulama. Traditional Muslims refer to themselves as Ahlussunnah wal Jama`ah (abbreviated to Aswaja), people of the sunnah and the (orthodox) community. This term explicitly excludes rationalists (who depend on reason rather than the sunnah) and all sorts of sectarians, notably the Shi'is (who have de facto broken with the Sunni community), but the traditionalists most commonly use the term to distinguish themselves from modernist and reformist Muslims, whom they also see as deviating from the sunnah. The latter, however, firmly claim that they are the true Ahlussunnah wal Jama`ah themselves, and point out that for many traditionalist beliefs and practices no Prophetic precedent can be found. Reformists and traditionalists have different perceptions of the sunnah, rooted in different attitudes towards the hadits.

Aliy As'ad, Ke-NU-an. Buku pertama (Yogyakarta: Pengurus Wilayah Ma'arif NU Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, 1981), pp. 31-3. The traditions described and defended here include ziarah kubur (visiting the graves of ancestors and teachers), tahlilan (reciting the formula la ilaha illa'llah, "there is no god but God"), shalawatan (invocations of divine blessing on behalf of the Prophet and his family). 3

Hadits (literally meaning reports but commonly translated as traditions) are sayings attributed to the Prophet or, occasionally, eyewitness reports concerning his acts. They constitute the major source of knowledge of the sunnah of the Prophet and thereby embody the most authoritative doctrinal and behavioural norms. The hadits have in fact had a much greater impact on the life of the Muslim community the Qur'an has; there is no belief or practice that is not ultimately legitimated by some hadits. In the light of what was observed on tradition in general above, it should come as no surprise that numerous hadits can be shown to be later fabrications, apparently invented in order to legitimate existing local practices, to support one faction as against others, or to address problems arising long after the Prophet's lifetime.6 When the modernists and reformists raised the slogan of return to the Qur'an and hadits, they meant by the latter in the first place the canonical collections of sound (shahih) traditions, from which the most obvious falsifications had been weeded out. Traditionalists also acknowledged the central importance of hadits, but before the early 20th century, the canonical collections of Bukhari and Muslim were not studied in the pesantren. Many santri, it is true, got to know one or more of the shorter Forty Hadits collections that were popular throughout the Muslim world, or even one of the larger collections of devotional and moralistic hadits.7 Mostly, however, they encountered hadits in the processed form, as they are quoted in support of an argument in the texts on fiqh (jurisprudence) and doctrine that made up most of the pesantren curriculum.8 For in matters of law and doctrine, traditionalist Muslims - and here we come to the core of the tradition - follow the great ulama of the
European scholars such as Ignaz Goldziher, Joseph Schacht and G.H.A. Juynboll have emphasized that the hadits literature is to a large extent a product of later centuries. Muslim scholars reject their conclusions but agree that there are hadits of various degrees of reliability, the canonical collections of Bukhari and Muslim being considered as the most reliable. Reformists insist on stricter criteria of reliability of hadits than traditionalists, and have in fact declared numerous popular hadits to be false or unreliable. Of the "Forty Hadits" collections, those by Nawawi and `Ushfuri are the most popular among traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia. Nawawi's Forty exist in numerous editions and translations, and they are for instance appended to the Indonesian translation of Hasjim Asj'ari's Muqaddimah al-Qanun al-Asasi, the most authoritative early statement of what NU stood for (the translation was published by Menara, Kudus, 1969). `Ushfuri's Forty (known as Ushfuriyah) were recently translated into Indonesian by the santri-journalist Mustafa Helmi with the explicit intention of acquainting an urban public with the pesantren atmosphere. A more voluminous collection used in many pesantren is Riyadl al-Shalihin, also by Nawawi. Many of the hadits in these collections do not stand up to the reformists' stricter criteria of authenticity, and the same is true of numerous hadits quoted in the fiqh textbooks referred to below. See Martin van Bruinessen, "Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu", Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 146 (1990), 226-269; idem, "Pesantren and Kitab Kuning: Maintenance and Continuation of a Tradition of Religious Learning", Mizan (Jakarta) vol. V no. 2 (1992), 27-48. 4
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past rather than deriving their own conclusions from the Qur'an and hadits. In other words, they adhere to one of the orthodox madzhab or schools of law and practise taqlid, i.e. follow the rulings of the founding father and other major scholars of this school as they are found in standard fiqh works.

Fiqh, madzhab and taqlid Taqlid and madzhab are perhaps the most central concepts of the learned variety of traditionalist Islam. A few ulama of exemplary learning and piety in the early Islamic period laid down the principles of jurisprudence and legal practice in more or less fixed madzhab (lit. path). In doing so, they practised ijtihad or independent interpretation of the scriptural sources; later generations modestly refrained from ijtihad and practised taqlid instead. In the traditionalist view, depending on one's own reading of Qur'an and hadits is most perilous and may be the source of sinful error. The average believer, and even learned scholars, can only avoid going astray by strict adherence to one of the madzhab, i.e., by relying on its standard works of fiqh. Out of a larger number existing in the past, only four Sunni schools of law survive, the Hanafi, Syafi'i, Maliki and Hanbali madzhab (sometimes the Shiite Ja`fari madzhab is counted as the fifth). Indonesian Muslims almost without exception used to adhere to the Syafi'i madzhab, which was also the dominant one in South Arabia and southern India. Fiqh is, for the traditionalists, the queen of the sciences; it is the guide for all behaviour, prescribing what the believer should and should not do. In the other religious sciences of doctrine (`aqidah) and mysticism (tasawwuf), they also practice taqlid, following in matters of belief Asy'ari and his school (with lip service to the rival school of Maturidi) and in mysticism the moderate Ghazali, while rejecting Ibn `Arabi's mysticism and metaphysics. Reformists reject Asy'ari and Ghazali (as well as, of course, Ibn `Arabi) and elevate the puritan Ibn Taimiyya to the status of the greatest scholar of the past. Ibn Taimiyya's works, in turn, are anathema in the pesantren world. The traditionalist insistence on taqlid appears to be rooted in a pessimistic view of history, according to which knowledge and piety necessarily decrease with increasing distance from the Prophetic intervention. The periodical appearance of mujaddid, great scholars who revitalised and

renewed the old teaching, could only temporarily stall this process of general decline.9 Today's ulama are believed to be but pale shadows of the great scholars of the past, and presuming to improve upon their rulings by practising one's own ijtihad is seen as unwarranted arrogance. Reformists and modernists, on the other hand, vehemently criticised blind taqlid and the accompanying medieval mentality as responsible for the backwardness of Indonesia's Muslim community. Their call for a return to the Qur'an and hadits often amounted to a radical rejection of most of the religious literature of the intervening period, and especially of fiqh and its madzhab.10 Both traditionalists and reformists, incidentally, have tended to exaggerate the rigidity of the madzhab. It is true that fiqh books prescribe in great detail what has to be done in numerous specific situations, but a fair amount of flexibility and freedom has always existed because fiqh is neither a complete nor a consistent system. It is not complete, for many concrete problems are not covered by it, so that the expert has to choose which known problem he considers most relevant to the case at hand. And the casuistry of the fuqaha is proverbial; a skilled legist can find arguments in support of almost any opinion. This is further facilitated by the fact that on many questions that are explicitly treated in the fiqh works there appear to exist not one but several answers, derived by different leading lights of the madzhab or sometimes by the same expert in different periods of his life. Due to the willingness to accommodate different opinions and inconsistencies, the madzhab have retained a certain potential for development and adaptability. Taqlid is not necessarily rigid. Ironically, in the late 20th century, traditionalist ulama often appear more flexible than the spokesmen for reformist Islam, many of whom have not evolved beyond the positions taken at the beginning of this century.

There is a widespread belief that every century there will appear a mujaddid in order to keep the ummah on the right track. Lists of such mujaddid have been compiled; the one most celebrated in NU circles is the prolific 15th century Egyptian scholar Jalaluddin al-Suyuti, whose work constitute a synthesis of classical Islamic scholarship and many of whose books are still studied in the pesantren. The origin of the madzhab, the potential for development within the madzhab, and the challenge posed to the madzhab by reformist thought are presented very clearly in Noel J. Coulson, "The concept of progress and Islamic law", in: Robert F. Bellah (ed.), Religion and Progress in Modern Asia (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 74-92. 6
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Respect and rituals for the dead The concept of taqlid is closely associated with the great respect in which the ulama, and especially those of the past, are held by traditionalist Muslims. The ulama deserve respect as the carriers of (religious) knowledge; they are, as a celebrated hadits has it, the heirs of the prophets. The transmission of religious knowledge, even if this concerns only a written text, involves a personal relationship between teacher and disciple, and the latter is acutely aware of being at the end of a long chain of such teacher-disciple links (the chain is called isnad in the case of hadits and other textual knowledge, silsilah in the case of mystical initiations). It is the disciple's duty to continue paying respect to his teachers and teachers' teachers, even after their deaths. He may also request a deceased teacher's, or another saint's, intercession, blessing or supernatural assistance. Pilgrimages to the shrines of the saints who introduced Islam and to those of great ulama - especially the kiai who allegedly possessed supernatural powers - are an important part of traditionalist religious life. Most pesantren organise annual celebrations, called khaul (Ar. hawl), to commemorate the deaths of their founders. The khaul is a special case of ziarah kubur, the visiting of graves that is considered as meritorious in traditionalist circles (and much frowned upon by reformists). It is part of a whole complex of practices relating to the dead, based on the assumption that some form of contact still exists. On the first seven nights after a death, relatives and friends come together for a ritual meal preceded by prayers and tahlilan (recitation of the creed la ilaha illa'llah). The participants present the merit (pahala, sawab) of prayers and recitation as a gift to the soul of the deceased. In the same way, one says prayers and Qur'anic verses when visiting a grave, as a present to the person buried there. In exchange, especially when visiting graves of saints, one may ask for intercession with God, the cure for a disease, business success or other forms of supernatural assistance, or seek a divinatory dream or vision. In the view of the Sufis, even after their death teachers remain indispensable as intermediaries in the chain of spiritual guidance from the Prophet to the individual believer. These practices are severely condemned by reformists, in whose opinion communication ends with death and all attempts at contacts beyond the grave are no less than syirk, idolatry. Much more than technical questions of taqlid versus ijtihad, it is these practices that maintain a sharp boundary between reformists and modernists on the one hand, and traditionalists on the other. On the former
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matter, both sides have evolved in converging directions (more emphasis on canonical hadits in the pesantren and more respect for the intellectual tradition of fiqh among reformists). On the point of relations with the dead, however, the difference is as wide now as it was seventy years ago. This is therefore, certainly at present, the most sharply distinguishing feature of Muslim traditionalism in Indonesia. It is recognised as such by several NU-affiliated authors, and the defense of the said practices receives much attention in their apologetic works.11 However, in the more self-conscious recent statements of the essence of Muslim traditionalism, the various reformulations of NU's Khitthah, these practices are hardly mentioned and certainly not given any emphasis.

Demise of the traditionalist-reformist conflict There is no disagreement as to the centrality of the above-mentioned traditions to the identity of NU. Taqlid with the Imam Syafi'i in questions of religious obligations, with Imam Asy'ari in matters of doctrine, and with Ghazali in mysticism and piety, extraordinary veneration for the ulama of the past, presenting prayers and other gifts to the dead and asking for their intercession are the elements of traditional religiosity most fiercely attacked by reformist and modernist Muslims in the first decades of this century. Traditionalism, which declared precisely the criticised aspects of religious practice to be essential, was the understandable defensive reaction to the reformist onslaught. In the 1920s and 1930s the debates between reformists and traditionalists were heated, but the emotions have since long subsided. In matters concerning the relations with the dead, the reformist and traditionalist viewpoints are as irreconcilable as ever, although this now rarely leads to open conflicts between neighbours anymore. In the taqlid versus ijtihad debate, however, there has been among the traditionalists a gradual shift towards accommodation with reformist positions. An early attempt at reconciliation was made by Kiai Machfoezh Shiddiq, who was the NU chairman from 1937 to 1942. In an influential booklet he argued that there was no real contradiction
A booklet by K.H. Ali Ma'shum, NU's Rois Aam from 1982 to 1984, discusses nine issues on which reformists vehemently disagree with traditionalists (K.H. Ali Ma'shum, Kebenaran Argumentasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah. Translated from the Arabic by K.H. Ahmad Subki Masyhadiy. Pekalongan: Udin Putra, 1983). Three of these concern matters of worship (non-obligatory prayers and the determination of beginnning and end of the fasting month), one the experiences of the soul after death, and the other five concern various aspects of relations with the dead. See also note 5. 8
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between taqlid and ijtihad. Strict ijtihad was only practised by the great imams of the past, but within the madzhab there remain numerous problems that cannot be solved by literal following those imams and that necessitate interpretation and creative thought of a lower order. Taqlid should never consist of the blind unthinking following that is so criticised by reformists, but in Machfoezh Shiddiq's view necessarily involves a certain amount of what the reformists term ijtihad. Reformists, on the other hand, agree that ijtihad may only be practised within very strict limitations.12 Kiai Machfoezh' younger brother Achmad Siddiq was later to develop this argument a little further in his Khitthah Nahdliyah, and as NU's Rois Aam was to preside over the formal reconciliation of Muhammadiyah and NU. It needs hardly be said that the heated reformist-traditionalist debates of a half century ago were not part of the idealised past that the return to the Khitthah of 1926 should recreate. Those thinkers in NU who attempted a formulation of the Khitthah were also for various reasons in favour of further accommodation with the reformists and wished for an emulation of their successes in education, welfare and social mobility. They therefore tended to underemphasise in their formulations the dimensions of traditionalism that used to define the boundaries with reformism.13 There were no antireformist overtones in any stage of the discussions on the return to the Khitthah of 1926.

The desire for change and definitions of the Khitthah When the Situbondo congress in 1984 decided to return to the Khitthah of 1926 there was little agreement as to what precisely was meant by those words. Different persons held and continue to hold different, sometimes even conflicting, views on this return to a better past, depending on what they

Ch.M. Machfoezh Shiddiq, Debat tentang Idjtihaad dan Taqlied. Soerabaia: H.B.N.O., n.d. My attention was first drawn to this publication by Professor A. Mukti Ali (who remembered it as a watershed in traditionalist-reformist relations). I thank Kiai Muchith Muzadi of Jember for finding this rare booklet and sending me a photocopy. This should not be thought to imply that the said aspects of traditionalism were less meaningful for these thinkers personally. Kiai Achmad Siddiq was also an associate of the unconventional peripatetic, highly charismatic clairvoyant, miracle-working mystic and living saint, Gus Mik (K.H. Chamim Djazuli) and he was later buried in a graveyard designed by the latter to become a centre of spiritual power by having 40 huffazh (persons knowing the Qur'an by heart) and 40 "heirs of the saints" buried there. It would have been hard to find anyone in NU more directly embodying the polar opposite of Islamic reformism than Gus Mik.
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perceived to be the major ills of the present. The sources of discontent had been numerous recently: the increasing political marginalisation of NU, its failure to contribute to the well-being of its constituency, the declining role of the kiai in the organisation. To some delegates at the congress, returning to NU's original platform implied a clean break with parliamentary politics, to others it meant that the ulama should take full control of the organisation again (after it had been hijacked by the politicians), to yet others that it should also represent the social and economic interests of its constituency. Since the NU had been forced to merge with other Muslim parties into PPP, its effectiveness as a channel of political and economic patronage had steadily declined. NU politicians faced heavy-handed government intervention in PPP to reduce their influence. NU-affiliated businessmen faced economic boycotts: not only were they not awarded government contracts, but even their dealings with private sector partners were often blocked by local authorities. These were reprisals for the oppositional role NU played in Indonesia's parliament during the 1970s. Many if not most of NU's local branch committees were dominated by businessmen, who desired to get rid of the odium of political opposition. Many kiai felt that they had lost their grip on the organisation; by name it still was an organisation of ulama but in practice it was run by urban politicians who had little time for the rural kiai. The kiai were, of course, not just loosing control of the organisation, their influence in society at large was declining even faster. They were no longer the highest educated persons of their villages, and the value of a pesantren education had fallen far below that of a western-type school diploma. The largely rural mass following of NU belonged to the most backward segments of Indonesian society, and Indonesia's pattern of economic development tended to exacerbate their relative backwardness. Some young members of the NU elite felt that the emphasis on political struggle during the past decades had led to neglect of NU's educational role and of its responsibility for the welfare of its following. They too looked back to a less politicised past to legitimise the community development-type activities they envisaged.

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The founding fathers, the Khitthah and the future Apart from discontent in various circles, there is another reason why around 1980 there was an increasing demand for an explicit formulation of NU's principles. This was the inevitable process of aging and death of the charismatic leaders of the first hour. The great ulama of the founding generation enjoyed tremendous respect in NU circles, and as long as they were alive it was they who embodied NU's values and aims. Until 1980, the highest position in the organisation had in turn been held by the three most respected founders, Hasjim Asj'ari (d. 1947), Wahab Chasbullah (d. 1971) and Bisri Syansuri (d. 1980). Each of them put a highly personal stamp on the organisation, resulting in quite different emphases in NU's traditionalism. It was not only due to changed external circumstances that NU's behaviour in their respective periods shows great differences. NU's unyielding support for Sukarno's policies was very much due to Kiai Wahab and his pragmatic attitude. The radical traditionalism of the 1980s, which several times brought NU into open conflict with the New Order government,14 was just as much due to Kiai Bisri's personality and his different views as to when one should be principled. The difference between the attitudes of Kiai Wahab and Kiai Bisri is often explained by their preferences of, respectively, qawa`id al-fiqh and ushul al-fiqh as methods of deciding which course of action is dictated by Islamic law in a given situation. To many concrete questions, as said above, the fiqh literature does not provide unambiguous answers. The qawa`id (sg. qa`idah, rule) are simple legal maxims, rules of thumb for quickly cutting through a problem. One of the most celebrated of these maxims may be paraphrased as the prevention of developments that could be detrimental or sinful has a higher priority than the pursuit of that which is beneficial or morally superior.15 Reliance on this maxim, to the unsympathetic observer, will be hard to distinguish from ordinary opportunism. Ushul al-fiqh, on the other hand, is a sophisticated methodology of fiqh, detailing how to arrive at a judgement from first principles (Qur'an, hadits, consensus of the great ulama of the past), allowing a
The expression "radical traditionalism" was first used by Mitsuo Nakamura to describe NU's political attitude during the 1970s. See his article in this volume. In Arabic: daf` al-mafasid muqaddam `ala jalb al-mashalih. This maxim was often referred to by NU politicians to explain that they cooperated with Sukarno in order to prevent worse, i.e. an even stronger influence of the communists on government policies. 11
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restricted form of reasoning by analogy (qiyas). It is a strict and severe intellectual discipline, that does not condition its practitioners for compromise. Kiai Bisri clearly was the better scholar; Kiai Wahab had the stronger political instinct. His use of qawa`id al-fiqh gave religious legitimation to what his instincts told him was in the best interests of NU. After Bisri Syansuri's death, none of the founding fathers remained, and there was nobody left who could be said to embody NU's principles (Kiai As'ad Syamsul Arifin tried to act that part but was not really successful). This made it more urgent for the principles to be laid down explicitly; it was necessary to define the traditions that until recently had been present in the form of the founding fathers. In a way, one could say that Kiai Bisri's real successor was the Khitthah.16 The idea that a new formulation of NU's aims and principles should take the place of the living presence of the ulama of the founding generation was expressed quite explicitly by Kiai Achmad Siddiq in the booklet in which he attempted this formulation.17 Kiai Wahab and Kiai Bisri were still alive then but according to the author the time had come for an authoritative statement. Not only was he worried about the widening gap between the founding fathers and the younger generation of NU members, but he also perceived that the latter had become very heterogeneous in educational and cultural backgrounds. One gathers that this observation referred to the fact that NU's becoming a political party had made the organisation dependent on leaders with different skills, and perhaps different basic values as well, than those transmitted in the pesantren. After the 1955 elections NU did not itself have sufficient educated members to fill all the parliamentary seats it had won, and it had to recruit outsiders (including two Chinese businessmen). This pattern continued into the 1970s, and even many politicians of solid NU family backgrounds lacked the exposure to pesantren education that could have made the kiai's norms and values second nature to them.

One is reminded, of course, of Weber's well-known discussion of the transition from charismatic to legal-bureaucratic authority, of which this process of explicit self-definition is clearly a part. The reader will have no difficulty discerning Weber's third type, traditional authority, as a crucial factor in the selection of Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrahman Wahid to become the first new team to lead the organisation after the adoption of the Khitthah.
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K.H. Achmad Siddiq, Khitthah Nahdliyah (second edition, Surabaya: Balai Buku, 1980), pp. 14-15. 12

Kiai Achmad Siddiq's restatement of the Khitthah Kiai Achmad Siddiq emphasised that NU had been established as a purely religious organisation (jam'iyyah diniyyah) and that its participation in practical politics had been only an intermezzo that had in fact ended in 1973, when its political role was taken over by the PPP.18 This was not how most people then saw the situation: the general view was that NU was continuing its political life as one clearly identifiable stream within PPP. Even Kiai Bisri Syansuri, the Rois Aam, remained active in politics almost up to his death. There were in the late 1970s already voices in NU calling for a withdrawal from practical politics and Kiai Achmad Siddiq probably agreed with them, but rather than joining in the call for a change he chose to redefine the situation and state that the change had already occurred. Only the actors had yet to be made aware of it. Many individual NU members were and would remain politically active but, as Kiai Achmad implied, not in the name of their organisation. Kiai Achmad Siddiq was a past master in such semantic games, and he was to repeatedly have recourse to similar stratagems in the following years. The radicalism and confrontation with the government of the 1970s were, as Kiai Achmad implied (without explicitly referring to them, however), not part of the NU tradition. The most essential characteristics of Islam, he wrote, are the principle of tawassuth (moderation, keeping to the middle road) and the aim of rahmatan lil alamin (compassion and kindness towards the entire world). Both imply tolerance and accommodation towards all but the implacable enemies of Islam. Tawassuth and the cognate concepts of i`tidal and tawazun (equity and balance) should be applied in all spheres of life. In religious matters, Kiai Achmad continued, tawassuth means the avoidance of fanaticism, a balanced use of reason as well as tradition based in revelation, efforts to purify Islam of foreign accretions but tolerance towards Muslims whose religion still contains such foreign elements. This formulation appears to imply accommodation with reformist Islam and benevolent neighbourly relations with abangan. Like his brother Machfoezh Shiddiq before him (cf. note 12), Kiai Achmad

18

Siddiq, Khitthah Nahdliyah, p. 15-16. 13

appeared willing to meet the reformists halfway.19 No such religious accommodation was possible with abangan Kiai Achmad resolutely rejected all forms of syncretism but the emphasis on tolerance appears designed to cool down the confrontation of rural santri and abangan, that had divided Java's countryside since the 1950s. One may perhaps also perceive here an implicit criticism of NU's angry response to the recognition of aliran kebatinan by the MPR session of 1978, which had caused the NU deputies to stage a walk-out. In social and political life, tawassuth, i`tidal and tawazun imply acceptance of the variety of mankind, and mutual understanding and respect for others. The political consequences Kiai Achmad derives from his concepts of moderation deserve quoting in full: (1) The preservation of the national state (which was established by the common wish of the entire people) and the defense of its existence are obligatory. (2) The legitimate head of state (government) must be held in respect and must be obeyed as long as it does not deviate from, or issues orders in contravention of, God's commands. (3) If it so happens that the government is at fault, the way to admonish it is in a polite manner.20 This carefully worded statement allows various readings, probably deliberately so. It affirms acceptance of the status quo and accommodation with the government but has a built-in reservation. The government, it is implied, may well do wrong and will then have to be admonished - be it politely. Interestingly, the state is said to be legitimate because it is a national state and an embodiment of popular sovereignty. This is an implicit rejection of Islamic religio-politics. From this position it was not a great step to argue in favour of acceptance of Pancasila as the one-and-only ideological foundation of NU, as Kiai Achmad did in 1983. Also his affirmation at the 1984 Congress that the Pancasila-based Republic represented the final form of the Indonesian state i.e., his rejection of the

As NU's Rois Aam he was later to make overtures towards Muhammadiyah and, together with the latter organisation's chairman, A.R. Fahruddin, signal that the differences of the past had largely been ironed out in the interest of ukhuwwah islamiyah, brotherly relations among Muslims.
20

19

Siddiq, Khitthah Nahdliyah, p. 51. 14

idea of an Islamic state is already implicit in this earlier formulation.21 As important elements of the Khitthah, Kiai Achmad further mentions ma`arif (education), mabarrat (charity), mu`amalah (economic activities) and `izzul Islam wal Muslimin (glory of Islam and Muslims). All of these are well-known terms, but they are given a somewhat modern slant. Speaking of education, the kiai always mentions madrasah and school together, thereby implicitly attributing equal weight to non-religious and religious subjects. Charity is declared to be a social act of worship (`ibadah ijtima`iyyah) and thereby placed on a level with other forms of worship such as prayer and fasting. Establishing hospitals and orphanages (once this was an activity in which Muhammadiyah distinguished itself from NU) is an important this-worldly form of social worship, but other-worldly forms of charity such as prayers for the dead should not be forgotten either. In economic matters, to provide for one's own and one's family's basic needs is declared a fardlu 'ain, a religious duty incumbent upon each individual. It is, moreover, highly desirable to achieve more than a minimal standard of living, so that one can also fulfill the obligation of expending zakat and shadaqah.22 It is perhaps significant that Kiai Achmad does not mention performance of the hajj in this context; the hajj only results in the individual acquisition of merit, while giving zakat and shadaqah is also an act of social solidarity. Among the possible interpretations of `izzul Islam wal Muslimin, finally, Kiai Achmad mentions the need for Muslims to overcome their under-representation in politics and economics, nationally as well as internationally. Kiai Achmad Siddiq was, more than other ulama, acutely aware of how backward the Muslim ummah in general was compared to the West and Japan, how underdeveloped the Indonesian Muslims were compared to the Christian minority and the secular elite, and how far NU's following lagged behind the modernist Muslims. This awareness gave the old term of `izzul Islam wal Muslimin as he used it a new overtone of emancipation.

"... Republik Indonesia adalah bentuk upaya final seluruh nasion teristimewa kaum Muslimin untuk mendirikan negara di wilayah Nusantara." See: Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke 27 Situbondo (Semarang: Sumber Barokah, 1985), p. 89. Zakat is the obligatory "alms-tax," consisting of a fixed, precisely specified percentage of certain sources of income, to be divided among equally specified categories of recipients (including the poor); shadaqah are voluntary gifts to those recipients. 15
22

21

This reformulation of NU's Khitthah caused a few raised eyebrows even among the kiai. Some of the politicians no doubt felt Kiai Achmad's ideas to be an attack on their own interpretation of what NU stood for, and many of the kiai too were not at once convinced by his arguments against radicalism and in favour of moderation and accommodation. The terms he used in support, tawassuth, i`tidal and tawazun, were known to the kiai and understood to represent desirable attitudes. Many kiai privately said, however, that they had never before heard NU's ideals and values defined by these terms; Kiai Achmad's interpretation of them too was new to many.23 That in the end he carried the day was due to his excellent personal credentials, being Machfoezh Shiddiq's younger brother and having been Wahid Hasjim's personal secretary, and to the political skills he had acquired in his long bureaucratic career.

The Tim Tujuh and the Situbondo decisions Kiai Achmad was not the only one who attempted to lay down in writing what according to him was the essence of NU's tradition. Not long after Kiai Bisri Syansuri's death a grave conflict divided the organisation into two opposing camps, commonly called the Cipete and Situbondo groups, after the residences of the major protagonists, Idham Chalid and Kiai As'ad Syamsul Arifin. Idham Chalid had since 1956 been the chairman general (ketua umum) of NU and had given proof of great political flexibility and willingness to serve any government in power. He had since its establishment also been the president of PPP and in this function apparently had connived in chairman Naro's purging of vocal NU deputies from the party's list of candidates for the 1982 elections. Idham became the chief target of the general dissatisfaction of the kiai with the Jakarta politicians. On the eve of the 1982 elections, the four most senior kiai from East and Central Java visited Idham and persuaded him to resign the chairmanship for health reasons. A few days later, Idham withdrew his resignation under pressure from his closest supporters. For over two years, until the congress of 1984, the organisation remained practically without an effective leadership. Idham was recognised by none but his closest supporters, but his opponents refrained from designating another chairman. The conflict

K.H. Muchith Muzadi of Jember, who for many years acted as Kiai Achmad Siddiq's secretary, told with relish of the surprise of many of his colleagues when they first read Kiai Achmad's booklet. 16

23

was widely seen as one between kiai and politicians, even though kiai were to be found in both groups, as were politicians.24 A number of young and reform-minded concerned men belonging to NU's elite families made concerted attempts to overcome the crisis. They attempted to mediate between the Cipete and Situbondo groups, and at the same time used as best they could the opportunity provided by the crisis to place themselves and their ideas in position to take over. This group included Abdurrahman Wahid, Fahmi Saifuddin (a medical doctor and rapidly rising bureaucrat, the son of Saifuddin Zuhri), the kiaipoet Musthofa Bisri of Rembang and another medical doctor, Muhammad Thohir of Surabaya (a nephew of Machfoezh and Achmad Siddiq). Inviting a few other kiai, young intellectuals and community development activists, they established in mid-1983 a forum to discuss the changes they thought necessary in NU.25 The Majlis-24, as this forum came to be called after the number of its members, appeared almost unanimous in their perception that three decades of practical politics had prevented NU from devoting sufficient attention to its religious, social and economic functions. Empty slogans and emotional posturing had taken the place of constructive efforts. It was felt that NU had got off the right track a long time ago and that NU should attempt to regain its original purity by re-emphasising its identity as a jam`iyyah diniyyah, a religious association (the Arabic term as always suggesting a more profound meaning than could be expressed by its Indonesian equivalent). The forum called for the restoration (pemulihan) of the original Khitthah and gave a seven-man team (the Tim Tujuh) from their midst the task of formulating more explicit recommendations on the subject.26 The frequent references to the past and to the Khitthah of 1926 were not simply a transparent
24 25

The conflict will be discussed more extensively in my forthcoming book on the Nahdlatul Ulama in the 1980s.

Besides those already mentioned, the Majlis 24 included the then junior kiais Sahal Mahfudz (the first NU kiai to become actively involved in community development) and Muchith Muzadi of Jember (who often acted as Achmad Siddiq's secretary and is by many believed to be responsible for part of Siddiq's formulations), former student activist M. Zamroni, community development worker Abdullah Sjarwani, NU youth leader Slamet Effendy Yusuf, and the student leader and most promising young thinker, Masdar F. Mas'udi. The members of this "Tim Tujuh" were: H. Abdurrahman Wahid, M. Zamroni, H.M. Said Budairy, H. Mahbub Djunaidi, H. Fahmi D. Saifuddin, H.M. Danial Tanjung and A. Bagdja, all of them young men based in Jakarta. Not a member of the team, but making crucial contributions to the ideas formulated and their later implementation was K.H. Mustafa Bisri of Rembang. 17
26

attempt to disguise reformist intentions and to claim traditional legitimatisation. The initiators of these debates had a genuine interest in the past. They dug up the original statutes of the organisation and the Arabic preamble to the statutes (titled Muqaddimah Al-Qanun al-Asasi) written by Hasjim Asj'ari for guidance, and they later made both widely available.27 In its recommendations, however, the Tim Tujuh even more clearly than Kiai Achmad Siddiq was looking forward to the future.28 The team did take up several of Kiai Achmad's ideas but it added an emphasis of its own. The fact that none of the seven was a kiai and that all were concerned with the social and economic problems of the ummah is evident both from the overall tone of the document and from the specific topics taken up for discussion. Of the various fields of activity discussed in the recommendations, education received the longest paragraph. It concentrated on modern science and technology and did not even mention religious education. This section was followed by a paragraph on social and economic activities, pleading for training in entrepreneurship and cooperatives, family planning, care for orphans and the aged, and community development. The same concern with the social and economic problems of the ummah is perceptible in what the Tim Tujuh had to say on more strictly religious matters. It recommended that the concept of worship (`ibadah) be understood in a less restricted sense than had been common and that social solidarity and charitable work too be seen as acts of worship. The most formal, legalistic aspect of religion, the madzhab system should, according to the team, be made more flexible and responsive to new social developments and changing needs. In matters of organisation, finally, the team declared it urgent for NU to complete the transition from political party to jam`iyyah diniyyah; it clearly did not subscribe to Kiai Achmad's claim that the

The statutes were published as an appendix to a book by a journalist close to the reform-minded group, Choirul Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama (Sala: Jatayu, 1985). The Muqaddimah al-Qanun al-Asasi was translated into Indonesian by K.H. Musthofa Bisri and later appended to the Situbondo decisions (Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke 27 Situbondo, pp. 121-132). Comparison of this translation with the earlier one mentioned in note 7 shows how much interpretation is involved in translating even a relatively simple text like this. Pokok-pokok Pikiran Tentang Pemulihan Khittah Nahdlatul Ulama 1926 (Jakarta: Tim Tujuh Untuk Pemulihan Khittah NU 1926, 1983). I am grateful to Fahmi Saifuddin, a member of this team, for an enlightening expos on the process of "return to the Khitthah." 18
28

27

transition had in fact been made in 1973. What exactly this transition should imply was not made more explicit, and members of the Tim Tujuh would a few years later find themselves in conflict with each other over the consequences to be drawn from this recommendation. The team furthermore judged that supreme leadership in NU should be held by the Syuriah, the ulama council (and not, therefore, by the Jakarta-based politicians of the Tanfidziyah, as it had practically been for most of the past three decades). The reform-minded group had its lobbying well organised (which no doubt was facilitated by the fact its ideas were quite agreeable to the government). The recommendations of the Tim Tujuh were submitted to and largely adopted by the NU conference (Munas, national consultation) of December 1983 and the congress of the following year, both in Situbondo. The congress elected Abdurrahman Wahid as the new chairman, and no less than eleven other members of the Majlis-24 were also given positions on the new board. The greatest winner, however, was Kiai Achmad Siddiq, who had become the inevitable choice for Rois Aam, due no doubt to strong backing from the government as well as his own clever manoeuvring. The Situbondo decisions incorporate most of Achmad Siddiq's earlier formulations. The influence of the younger reformers is most clearly evident in the demand for a greater social relevance of NU activities at the Situbondo Munas and congress, which became even louder on subsequent occasions. The Munas discussed syu'un ijtima`iyyah (a new but traditional-sounding term meaning matters of social concern) and decided to carry out a number of modest community development projects: cooperatives, legal aid, a self-reliant transmigration project and clean water procurement. Clearly there was less than unanimity among the delegates as to what constituted matters of social concern, for among the matters of social concern listed in another recommendation by the same Munas we find the cost of the hajj, the need for a handbook on how to coach new converts to Islam, proper Islamic dress, the separation of boys and girls on the sports field, etc. The emphasis on social relevance come also to expression in a new and different approach to the discussion of religious questions, always an important part of the proceedings at any NU congress. Questions to which local branches had not been able to find satisfactory answers were discussed in a separate session at the congress, where NU's leading fiqh experts gave their opinions. In the past, these
19

questions had always been haphazard and not related to each other, and they were usually answered very briefly, with a reference to an authoritative fiqh work but without any attempt to explain why this reference was relevant to the case at hand.29 The reformers wished both different, more relevant questions and a different, more intellectual, way of answering them. At the 1984 congress, participants in the sessions discussing religious questions were confronted with a number of questions prepared in advance, several of which appealed to a sense of social justice: "Which is more meritorious: performing the hajj more than once if one can afford it, or using those funds to improve social welfare?"; "Can zakat, or part of it, instead of being divided among the entitled recipients, be used to other purposes that are in the public interest?".30 On later occasions (the 1987 Cilacap Munas and the 1989 congress in Yogyakarta), the people who prepared the questions deliberately phrased them so that it was almost impossible to simply look up an answer in a fiqh book. Each question consisted of a number of sub-questions covering a range of situations, formulated in such a way that they could hardly be mechanically answered but required deeper reflection. Two of the problems discussed at the 1989 congress were medical questions reminiscent of important ethical debates in the West. "Is a testament valid that bequeaths one's organs for transplantation to some person who needs them, considering that one of the conditions for the validity of a bequest is one's full ownership?" The answer to this one after some discussion and quoting of appropriate texts was negative, because according to the syari`ah one's organs are not his own property but belong to God alone. The ulama decided to add to this answer, almost as an afterthought, that human organ transplants are allowed when medically necessary and when there is no alternative cure. The second question concerned euthanasia. The people who had prepared this one clearly intended to stimulate a fundamental discussion on the subject and presented a number of interesting hypothetical cases. May the costly treatment of an incurable patient (far beyond the financial capacities
The questions and answers discussed at the first twenty-five congresses have been collected in three slim volumes titled Ahkm al-fuqah, published by Toha Putra, Semarang.
30 29

Hasil Muktamar Nahdlatul Ulama ke 27, pp. 62-66. 20

of his family) be stopped at his own request? Or of a patient who has been in coma for a long time without any hope of his regaining consciousness? Or, out of pity, the treatment of the victim of an accident who is certain to remain a physical and mental cripple if he lives? Where, the questions continued, does Islam place the boundary between life and death, and which are the outward signs by which life or death may be defined? The ulama declined to be drawn into a debate on these choices; they agreed that Islam enjoins the protection of life under all circumstances and that euthanasia is therefore strictly forbidden. The only question that did engender a lively debate in which rational arguments were used and not just quotations from fiqh books, consisted of a rephrasing of a question negatively answered at the previous congress. May zakat, instead of being distributed in the form of money and/or food, also be spent on some productive investment on behalf of the same beneficiaries? Simply phrased, what should one give the poor, fish or fish hooks? This question was of course directly relevant to the role NU wished to play in alleviating the poverty and backwardness of most of its constituency. Many of the ulama tended to respond emotionally to this question and answer with arguments based in a conception of fairness. The discussion, incidentally, remained inconclusive (apart from the provisional stricture that any alternative uses of the zakat should be agreed upon by those who have a right to its enjoyment).

Conclusion Kiai Achmad Siddiq and the younger group of reformers have been successful in effecting a major shift in traditionalist discourse within NU. This shift was in congruence with the only partially voluntary realigment of priorities away from political to educational and community welfare-oriented activities. The emphasis in Kiai Achmad's formulations on the the middle path between extremes and on tolerance towards others was no doubt also favourably looked upon by the government. This did not mean, however, that these principles were simply stated for reasons of political expedience. Both Kiai Achmad and many of the younger reformers were genuinely convinced of the need for dialogue rather than confrontation with different sections of the ummah and with non-Muslims. Abdurrahman Wahid especially has repeatedly asserted his firm support for an inclusive
21

nationalism over and against all forms of sectarianism (a term that refers to narrower group loyalties and perception of non-Muslims as potential enemies). His strongest praise for Kiai Achmad Siddiq as a thinker concerned the latter's ideas on the concept of ukhuwwah, brotherhood. Ukhuwwah islamiyyah is a term commonly used in Indonesia to indicate the desirability of good relations between the various currents within Indonesian Islam, especially between NU and Muhammadiyah. Kiai Achmad put this ukhuwwah into practice when he presided over a formal reconciliation between both organisations. To this well-known ideal of brotherhood he added two new dimensions, which he named ukhuwwah wathaniyyah and ukhuwwah basyariyyah, indicating that they encompassed, respectively, the entire fatherland and all of humanity. These terms stood for his concern with the common interests of all Indonesians in their nation's economic and political welfare and with the common interests of all humanity in world peace and protection of the environment. He and Abdurrahman Wahid with a few others succeeded in introducing these concerns into traditionalist religious discourse. The same term of ukhuwwah, along with syu'un ijtima`iyyah and similar neo-traditional terms, also represent attempts to focus traditionalist discourse more on problems of social justice and economic development. In 1984 it was obvious that many of the ulama attending the congress failed to grasp what and how the reformers really wished to discuss, or simply refused to let themselves be drawn into that sort of discussion. In the following decade, however, many kiai gradually grew accustomed to new style of discussion of religious questions. One of the initiatives born out of the Situbondo conference was a regularly convening study circle (halqah) in which young committed ulama with a few senior kiai addressed contemporary social and political problems, that were presented to them by outside experts. These discussions forced the participants at times to overstep the boundaries of the worn fiqh book discourse and think creatively.31 Taqlid and the madzhab were challenged and given slightly different meanings. Instead of following Imam Syafi'i's madzhab, i.e. the ready-made answers of his school, some of the younger kiai suggested that taqlid should mean following his manhaj, his method which allows for much more flexibility. Thanks to the patronage of by now senior kiai such as Kiai Sahal Mahfudz and Kiai Imron Hamzah, the halqah discussions had a much wider impact than the relatively small number of
31

This halqah and its role in opening up fiqh discourse are discussed at some length in my forthcoming book on NU. 22

participants might suggest. Some of the problems first discussed in the halqah were later presented in the religious discussions sessions at NU's Lampung conference (Munas). The most remarkable decision of this conference was also an important victory for the halqah group. For the first time the assembled ulama accepted a form of collective ijtihad as a legitimate method of answering religious-juridical questions to which no unambiguous answer can be found by more established methods. This was a watershed decision, guaranteeing that not only what the ulama discuss is changing, but also the methods by which they discuss it.

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