C hinas D eterrence Paradox Explaining C hinas M inimal D eterrence Strategy

Jonathan Holslag
1

This text is written for a handbook on nuclear weapons.

Abstract. For a state with the potential and ambition to re-emerge as a great power, China has invested remarkably little in nuclear weapons, to a degree even that its current minimal deterrence capacity is questioned. While a lack of knowhow and internal consensus about the nuclear doctrine were important explanations for this seemingly paradoxical situation until the nineties, Beijing is now trying to redress the deficiencies and to make its limited number of arms more survivable. Moreover, Chinas holistic view of deterrence is prompting it to further enhance its conventional military capabilities and to prevent its minimal nuclear deterrent from being neutralized by American supremacy in missile defence or space. Hence, it will be key to observe how China, the United States and the other Asian powers will interact in their attempt to expand or maintain their deterrence capacity across a growing number of sectors in warfare. Key-words: deterrence, arms race, nuclear weapons.

Introduction Why does China as a regional power that could develop into a new great power, and, hence, might face resistance of the United States, keep its nuclear force so small in comparison to the incumbent superpower and adhere to a no-first-use strategy even if it reckons that its nuclear arsenal might not survive an American first strike?1 Clearly, this situation is at odds with the assumption of a large segment of the realist school that if a power is successful and expands its capabilities, the anarchic structure of international politics will instigate it to use a part of its wealth for boosting its nuclear arsenal. The baseline for realists is that a rising power needs to defend itself against the possibility that the superpower might try to derail its growth or try to contain it. But the rising star might also have expansionist aspirations, seek to maximize its power and therefore need a nuclear umbrella under which it can practice coercion and exploitation.2 China would

Jonathan Holslag is research fellow at the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies. His research focuses on regional security in Asia. He wrote the books Macht of Mythe? (VUB Press 2006, with Gustaaf Geeraerts), China and India: Prospects for Peace (Columbia University Press 2010), Trapped Giant (IISS Adelphi Series 2010), and The Price of Fear (Forthcoming in 2011). Recent articles appeared in Asian Survey, International Spectator, Journal of Common Market Studies, Issues and Studies, the Washington Quarterly, Journal of Strategic Studies, Parameters, Journal of Contemporary China, etc. Jonathan writes regularly for international newspapers and coordinated various study projects for European and international institutions.

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be foolish not to try to imitate the United States, because regional hegemony greatly enhances a states prospects for survival, John Mearsheimer stated.3 From both perspectives, the minimum objective for China should be to reach parity with the United States, and even though parity does not necessarily require matching the number of American nuclear weapons, it would demand a reliable second-strike capacity or, with other words, the guarantee that at least some of its missiles can survive a first strike.4 But again, most reports of Chinas nuclear arsenal show that it is probably not on par with the United States and that the latter might not feel so much deterred at all. Now, from the same strands of the realist school one might calculate that those reports should not really be trusted. A loyal adept of Sun Tzu, China might be simply hiding its true capabilities and secretly have a much larger nuclear arsenal. Another explanation could be that Chinas self-restraint is just a matter of biding its time, to use the words of Deng Xiaoping, and that while it now still tries to avoid the costs of a confrontation with the United States because it concentrates on its economic development, it will start expanding its arsenal as soon as it expects collision to be inevitable or becomes confident enough in the socioeconomic fundamentals of its power. Related to this scenario, it might also be probable that Chinese leaders simply do not believe that parity is possible, given Americas enormous lead, or that it will be adequate to meet their countrys security interests. Nuclear parity in the eyes of China might have become a casuistry, to quote late Soviet leader Mikael Gorbachev, or a paper tiger as Mao Zedong put it. In that case the underlying security dilemmas, namely the fear of an attack or military containment, could still prompt China to explore different forms of military deterrence and to engage in an arms race with different means. As much as nuclear weapons changed the game after World War II, electronic warfare or war in space could set the standards for deterrence in the new century. However, some realists also consider it possible that China does have a genuine interest in avoiding another arms race and therefore wants to signal its benign intentions.5 Liberalists, counter that military arms races are just to no avail anymore, and that the price of war has become so high that states would no longer see the relevance of shifting precious means away to military modernization.
China Operational warheads ICBM IRBM Other BM Bombers Theater missiles 180 26 100 0 100 0 US 4,000 488 0 288 115 325 Russia 5,000 430 0 176 79 2079 India N.a. 0 50 0 0 30 Pakistan N.a. 0 100 0 0 25 France 348 0 0 48 0 60 UK 150 0 0 48 0 0 Israel N.a. 0 50 0 0 0

Table 1. Inventory of vehicles for nuclear attacks. Source: IISS Military Balance and Federation of American Scientists.

This paper argues that rather than considering atomic weapons an anachronism, the aim of China is to reach parity by enhancing the survivability of a relatively small number of weapons instead of building very large stockpiles. This policy of minimal deterrence had the advantage that it signalled restraint and temporarily helped reassure the United

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States. Furthermore, apart from building nuclear parity, China prioritizes the development of its conventional forces to deal with various contingencies in its periphery and tries to avoid that its minimal deterrence nuclear capacity becomes neutralized by American supremacy in space. This study starts with a concise historical account of the Chinese nuclear arms programme, subsequently elaborates on the concepts of no-first-use and minimal deterrence, and finally presents some of the consequences for international security.

An Uncomfortable Embrace We cannot do without this thing, Mao Zedong asserted at an enlarged Politburo Meeting on 25 April 1956, We need to have the atomic bomb. In todays world, we should not be bullied.6 Fear for aggression by great powers has been an important reason for China to start developing nuclear weapons. Barely a year after the Chairman proclaimed the Peoples Republic of China, the very existence of the juvenile state was threatened by nuclear bullying.7 In November 1951, the Associated Press reported that President Harry Truman seriously considered using atomic bombs against China. His successor, Dwight Eisenhower, instructed the deployment of nuclear missiles in Okinawa. Nuclear-armed bombers were stationed in Guam. During the 1954-55 Taiwan Strait Crisis, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended using nuclear weapons against China. At the same time, Moscow was refusing to take China under its nuclear umbrella. Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev were reluctant in helping China build its own nuclear arms. Summarizing this strategic quandary, Deng Xiaoping, then the General Secretary of the Central Committees Secretariat, stated: The Soviet Union has the atom bomb. Where does the significance lie? It lies in the fact that the imperialists are afraid of it. Are the imperialists afraid of us? I think they are not The United States stations its troops on Taiwan because we have no atom bombs and guided missiles.8 In a statement that followed the first test with an atomic bomb in 1964, the Chinese leadership highlighted the US efforts to surround China by basing nuclear submarines in Japan and deploying Polaris submarines in the Strait of Taiwan. Apprehension of nuclear coercion implying a threat to Chinas sovereignty, its aspiration to regain control over Taiwan, and the objective to prevent America from dominating the Korean Peninsula seemed thus to have been the main motivation for the Chinese leadership to start developing nuclear deterrence. These concerns were confirmed when Moscow, after military skirmishes on the border in 1969, threatened to launch a nuclear attack and only backed down after pressure from the White House. As the Cold War winded to an end, Deng Xiaoping stated that Chinas nuclear weapons had restrained the imperialist powers from aggression. In 1985, Defence Minister Zhang Aiping posited that: The enemy no longer dared to strike first or to underestimate China.9 While the nuclear threat became less imminent, the enhancement of the PLAs deterrence capacity remained on the agenda and nuclear power continued to be an

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important building block. The baseline was that as long as other superpowers could freely use their military clout in the Chinese periphery, the Peoples Republic would never be secure, not be able to determine the outcome of an armed conflict with Taiwan, or enforce its territorial claims. The war between Iran and Iraq (1980-88) showed the importance of a credible deterrent to ward off intensive and high-tech wars. The collapse of the Soviet Union revoked none of these concerns, mostly because the United States, now obtaining a virtual military monopoly in Asia, shifted its attention to China as the main challenger of its hegemony, attempted to condition Chinas rise, and appeared to consolidate its web of alliances in the region as a preventive form of counterbalancing. Americas invasion of Iraq (1991), its decision to position its Navy in the Strait of Taiwan during the crisis in 1996, and the deployment of the Navy in the South China Sea to protect the freedom of navigation all demonstrated that the superpower would not refrain from using its clout. The uncertainty about Americas strategic intentions was strengthened by the shift in military posturing from the Atlantic to the Pacific, including the consolidation of its bases in Northeast Asia, the expansion of the Seventh Fleet, and the inclusion of Japan into the new missile defence programme. Apart from the United States, China also started to take the nuclear aspirations of India more seriously. Delhi itself did not hide that its nuclear programme was partially aimed at its northern neighbour. In 1998, a few days before the detonation of five experimental nuclear devices, Defence Minister Georges Fernandes famously stated that he saw China as potential threat number one. By 1999, it was assumed that India possessed enough weapon-grade plutonium to build 65 warheads. At that time, India was also working on two new generations of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the Agni II and III, which would be mainly used as a deterrent against the Peoples Republic. So it seemed China became locked into the sort of tit-for-tat game that realists have identified as the main driver of great power rivalry and arms races. China wanted to have nuclear arms because it felt insecure, and because of Chinas progress in developing them, others would likely make countermoves. But there are still other considerations to be taken into account. For a developing country like China, an additional advantage of nuclear arms was that they are fairly cheap compared to major conventional systems. Especially for Mao Zedong, the creation of nuclear capabilities might also have compensated to some degree for in the failure of the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) and his poor performance in handling various environmental hazards like the drought of 1960. After the test in Lop Nor of 1964, reports and pictures of the mushroom cloud where widely used for internal and external propaganda. Probably more for the diplomats in Beijing than for Chinese compatriots, state television broadcasted the detonation with a strong sense of drama, showing cheering crowds in the desert, all kinds of sophisticated machinery, and soldiers on galloping horses with gasmasks. Nuclear arms formed thus an important tool for cultivating Chinese nationalism. As Princetons Thomas Christensen argued, the threat to China and the related need for vigilance, unity, and sacrifice was used for the purpose of domestic mobilization and harnessing support for new ambitious economic reforms.10 Under Mao and Deng Xiaoping, atomic weapons were seen as a precondition for gaining

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international status. Even more than forty years later, at the national parade of October 2009, new types of nuclear missiles were put on display as the absolute highlight. While domestic mobilization and international status might have been important motivations during the sixties and seventies, the development of nuclear arms were at odds with some of Chinas foreign goals. Already in 1964 the Chinese government was quick to assert that nuclear weapons had to be seen in the light of the combat against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. More and more countries are coming to realize that the more exclusive the monopoly of nuclear weapons held by the US imperialists and their partners, the greater the danger of war, a government statement argued, We are deeply convinced that as long ass all peace-loving countries and peoples make joint efforts an persist in the struggle, nuclear war can be prevented.11 Beijing also called for a complete ban and announced that it would give up its atomic weapons if the two superpowers reciprocated. Concerns about Chinas international image were temporarily suppressed during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), but they resurfaced as soon as Deng Xiaoping sought to restore reassure the rest of world about his countrys intentions and to promote national development by attracting foreign capital and knowhow. At that stage nuclear nationalism became a liability in Beijings attempt to present China as a factor of regional stability.

No-first-Use Chinas attitude towards nuclear weapons was mostly an uncomfortable embrace. Atomic weapons were considered a necessary instrument to keep America and the Soviet Union at bay, but compared to the two superpowers the Peoples Republic did not show a great interest in keeping up with their doctrines of mutually assured destruction, countervailing, or first strike. A shortage of expertise was clearly one explanation. Political instability and Chinas capricious foreign policies until the seventies certainly contributed to the leaderships relative lack of interest and vision.12 But at the same time, and this is key, the top brass of the Party also took into account the image costs and reckoned that in the end historical missions like the reunification with Taiwan would not be completed by means of nuclear weapons, but with clever diplomacy and conventional forms of coercion. As a result, China nuclear strategy was centred on two core principles: no first use and limited deterrence. Immediately after the 1964 test, the Chinese government declared that it would never at any time or any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons. Obviously, principles are liable to change. In its 2009 report on Chinas military power the US Department of Defence expressed its concern about a potential revision of the nofirst-use policy. The Pentagon was clearly alarmed by a growing debate among Chinese strategists on this matter and several public statements that apparently heralded a policy shift.13 In 1996, when China assertively launched several short-range missiles into the Taiwan Strait to punish Taipei for its alleged secessionist behaviour, General Xiong Guankai hinted that the United States would not be prepared to trade Los Angeles for Taipei, which was a clear threat that China might consider nuclear force to retaliate

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against an American military intervention. In 2005, General Zhu Chenghu of the National Defence University echoed this statement by claiming that as China did not match the US in conventional capabilities, it might have to use nuclear arms to deter an American intervention. In a 2005 article, Fudan Universitys Shen Dingli highlighted that an American precision strike with conventional weapons could paralyze Chinas nuclear arsenal, and that China would then be a sitting duck as a consequence of its pledge not to use nuclear weapons against conventional threats. It is not viable for China to ignore its core national interests indefinitely, Shen wrote, If Chinas conventional forces are devastated, and if Taiwan takes the opportunity to declare de jure independence, it is inconceivable that China would allow its nuclear weapons to be destroyed by a precision attack with conventional munitions, rather than use them as a true means of deterrence.14 Zhu Qiangguo, a researcher at the China Defence Science and Technology Information Centre, noticed that Americas 2002 Nuclear Posture Review constituted a major challenge to Chinas nuclear capacity because it was aiming at conventional and nuclear tactical weapons that could first target hardened storages of Chinese nuclear missiles, and subsequently have the opportunity to launch a nuclear strike without risking a counterattack. In the past, nuclear weapons were always the weapon of last resort, of deterrence against the use of nuclear weapons. However, the new posture suggests the use of nuclear weapons against hardened, difficult-to-penetrate targets, and as retaliation against the use of weapons of mass destruction.15 Related was the concern about Americas missile defence ambitions. An article by a researcher from the Ministry of Defence in the China Daily argued: Once the United States gets rid of the fear of nuclear reprisal from countries with a few nuclear weapons, the possible use of US nuclear weapons in real combat will be further augmented.16 Yet, the Chinese government stressed that it still adhered to its initial principles. In 2004, Liu Jieyi, the Foreign Ministrys Director General of Arms Control, proposed that nuclear-weapon states had to conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons and unconditionally undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Once put into effect such moves will exclude the possibility of using nuclear weapons.17 The 2009 White Paper on National Defence stated: China has always stayed true to its commitments that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, and will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or in nuclear-weapon-free zones.18 Furthermore it explained that the nuclear missiles of the Second Artillery, which is responsible for most of Chinas strategic nuclear force, are not aimed at any other country in peacetime.19 The PLA reportedly also conducts war planning and training under the assumption that China will absorb a first nuclear blow.20 Responding to the apparent calls for revising the no-first-use strategies, Chinese experts gave several reasons why it would not be in their countrys interest to do so. General Pan Zhenqiang, who earlier listed three scenarios under which China might abandon its nofirst-use approach, later claimed that such a change would actually threaten and complicate rather than stabilize the situation across the Taiwan Straits, and that it would negatively affect Chinas international reputation.21 Another prominent strategist, general Peng Guanqiang, maintained that no-first-use policies are better to avoid

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escalation. When both sides suffer from imbalance of information and mutual distrust, the natural tendency would be to assume the worst: the first use of nuclear weapons, he posited, In such case, when one side has declared a first use policy, the other side would be more inclined to launch a pre-emptive attack in an effort to destroy or at least alleviate the formers destructive power. Even in a conventional war, the general continued, a nuclear superior state will face a huge threshold to use arms and would show restraint because of international norms and interdependence.22 In the same way Chinese experts refuted the option to abandon the strategy of minimal deterrence and to significantly expand Chinas arsenal. Discussion the relevance of building a mutually assured destruction capacity, Pan Zhenqiang listed several consequences. Not only would relations with the United States become confrontational and be held hostage by a nuclear arms race. Pan also insisted that it would take a long time to develop such capacity and that during the transition period the other side might be under great pressure to seize small incidents for launching a pre-emptive strike.23 Sun Xiangli, the Deputy Director of the Arms Control Research Division, cautioned that the possibility of a large scale offensive against China by any country is almost zero and that Chinas capabilities to resist conventional offensives by conventional means has been greatly improved.24 Li Bin, a leading nuclear strategist at Tsinghua University, stated that instead of developing a very large number of nuclear arms, it would opt for, what he coined, credible minimal deterrence. It is not economic or efficient for China to enlarge its silo-based nuclear force in response to an American missile defence deployment, he wrote, It would be a more reasonable option for China to overwhelm the defence with fully mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles or very survivable submarine-launched ballistic missiles when these technologies are ready. In an 2009 article in the Liberation Army Daily, retired Major General Xu Guangyu stated that China should convince the other side that it faces an intolerable second-strike nuclear capability and that it will continue to improve the survivability of its missiles.

Credible Minimal Deterrence So what would credible minimal deterrence look like? First, all sources confirm that the number of Chinese nuclear weapons has remained limited. Indeed, China releases no official figures on its nuclear force, but satellite images and information about nuclear processing permit some rough estimations. The Federation of American Scientists calculated that China might have 240 warheads, of which 180 are actually operational. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that China 186 deployed warheads and kept 54 in storage. This would imply that Chinas stocks remained smaller than those of France and Israel, and that make up less than ten percent of the nuclear arsenal of Russia or the United States. Hans Kristensen, a prominent nuclear arms expert of the Federation of American Scientists, assumed that China had approximately 120 land-based nuclear capable missiles.25 Out of this total, 95 were intermediate range ballistic missiles. According to the Pentagon, China increased the number of Dong Feng 21 missiles from 19 in 2005 to more than 60 in 2008, but several of them might be deployed with conventional warheads or serve for anti-ship or anti-

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satellite purposes. In 2010, the Pentagon reported that China had 20 silo-based Dong Feng 4 inter-continental ballistic missiles and 30 Dong Feng 31 variants. All together, China might have less than thirty missiles that are capable to hit the United States. No submarine-launched ballistic missiles were deployed, although experiments were carried out with the JL-2. By 2010, one third of Chinas missiles were still liquid fuelled, among which most of the intercontinental range missiles that could be pointed at the United States. This implied a tremendous handicap for the time needed to launch these vehicles, which could be as much as two to five hours, and their ability to survive a first strike. As they were few in number, based in silos, and deployed in only three brigades, the DF-5 would be a rather easy target for either nuclear or conventional preventive strikes. China probably maintains them in an unfuelled status as the fuel is highly corrosive and can affect the missile over a longer term. This means that it could take several hours to prepare them for launch. The DF-4, which would be mainly used against Guam and Hawaii, featurese the same constraints. China has been improving the survivability of its missiles against a first strike. By the late nineties, it started to operate the Dong Feng 21 missile, which was one of the first solid propellant missiles, and, hence, more suitable for road-mobile launchers. The Dong Feng 21 is has been deployed in seven different bases across China and is expected to replace the less accurate Dong Feng 3. In 2006, China unveiled a new variant, the Dong Feng 21A, that features an upgraded mobile launcher and off-road travelling capability. The same year, it deployed a new solid-fuel long-range and intercontinental ballistic missile, the Dong Feng 31 and 31A, which can both be mounted on trucks and trains. Li Bin clarified that this mobility enhances Chinas survivability in two ways. In wartime, both the Dong Feng 21 and 31 variants can be positioned far from their respective bases, which requires the challengers to launch a much larger number of missiles in a first strike. China could also periodically relocate its launchers in peacetime and hide them at new sites to escape monitoring by potential attackers.26 Mobility over short and long distances has become an important element in the training scenarios of the Second Artillery Corps. In 2009, CCTV 7, a Chinese state broadcaster, reported the completion of the so-called underground great wall (dixia changcheng), a network of more than 2,500 kilometres of tunnels in a mountainous are of Hebei Province. Pictures show an advanced system of large shafts with railways, oxygen systems and subsoil control rooms, which would certainly make launch platforms less vulnerable in case of a strike. Another similar facility was known in Taibai, Shaanxi province, with a complex network of tunnels and storages being located underneath hundreds of metres of granite rocks.27 The advantages of such facilities are that they are hard to penetrate, dispersed over very large areas, and allow covert transportation of missile launchers. Since decades, China has been trying to develop its sea-based nuclear deterrence, but progress has been slow at best. The Xia-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine and the Julang 1 submarine launched ballistic missile never became operational.28 Only in the last few years, it appeared that some successes were made. Since 2006, it started to deploy its new Jin class nuclear submarines, with each vessel able to carry twelve nuclear

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missiles. The US Office of National Defence expects that five of these submarines will be built, still way below Americas fourteen Ohio Class ballistic missile submarines. To mislead challengers, China built extensive underground tunnel facilities for its submarines in its naval base on Hainan and in Jianggezhuang. Particularly the new base in Hainan is important as it is surrounded by the fairly deep waters of the South China Sea, which in turn allow submarines to enter the Pacific Ocean via sea lanes like the Strait of Luzon. The Jin class subs inevitably will have to venture into the Pacific Ocean for the Julang 2 class submarine launched ballistic missile cannot reach continental America from Chinas coastal waters. This immediately shows the persistent limitations of Chinas sea-based deterrence. With their crews still being relatively inexperienced, Chinese ballistic missile submarines will have to navigate deep into the Pacific. In this area, Americas remains a very potent challenger with its robust anti-submarine warfare capacity and large number of attack submarines. In addition, the fact that Hainan is the only place from which China can stage long-range patrols without having to sail through very shallow waters, as is the case of most navy bases of the North and East Sea Fleets, makes it easier for the United States to start tracking them as soon as they leave the port. Finally, by the end of 2010, the Julang 2 missile still seemed to be in its testing phase after several failed launches.
Range (km) DF-11 + 11A DF-15 DF-21 DF-31 DF-31A DF-3A DF-4 DF-5A 300-800 600 2.000 7.000 11.000 3.100 5.000 13.000 Fuel Solid Solid Solid Solid Solid Liquid Liquid Liquid Number 500 300 60 6 6 17 17 20 Deployed since 1998 1995 1991 2008 2008 1971 1971 1981 Warhead C C C+N N N N N N

Table 2. Overview of Chinas ballistic missiles: minimal range and minimum numbers. Sources: IISS Military Balance, Federation of American Scientists.

Apart from these measures to make Chinas nuclear weapons to withstand a first strike, the Peoples Republic has tried to improve the survivability of its missiles for once they are launched. It is assumed that Chinas latest generations of missiles are fitted with metal parts that can be dispersed as decoys against incoming interceptors. Progress has also been made to reduce the radar reflection of warheads by making them smaller. China has the technical capability to build multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV) and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV), which are important to penetrate missile defence systems. In 2002, China reportedly carried out the first successful experiment with decoys and MIRVs. Yet, it is assumed that it did not deploy these systems thus far. Chinese experts have urged to enhance their countrys ability to detect hostile missile launches in an early stage. Li Bin, for example, proposed to establish a hair trigger alert system. This would mean that China would need to launch its nuclear weapons after it detects a nuclear attack but before the incoming nuclear weapons arrive. Such system

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requires both reliable early warning and a very effective chain of command. Regarding the nuclear command and control structures, not much is known about the exact organization, their technicalities, or the procedures for launching nuclear missiles.29 The decision to launch a nuclear strike is made by the Central Military Commission that apart from the President and Vice-President assembles ten high-ranking generals. As the Party still controls the gun, the ultimate release authority probably lies with the president. It is assumed that launch instructions are subsequently passed on to the General Staff Directorate, located just outside Beijing, and that the Second Artillery Corps will proceed with launching a strike only if it gets its orders confirmed from both the Central Military Commission and the General Staff Directorate. While experts have pointed at low-standard communication mechanisms and the risk of a stalemate between the civilian and military members of the Central Military Commission, the truth is that we do not have sufficient evidence to back such claims up, but overall, it seems that the current structures are not yet fit for a hair trigger alert system or launch on warning. What we do know, is that China has invested a lot in its space and ground based early warning capabilities. Since the seventies, it has installed various long-range and over-thehorizon radars to detect incoming missiles or air strikes. If China continues to bring new Yaogan remote sensing satellites into orbit, these vehicles could also be important in monitoring possible launch preparations. Hence, the fragmented information available allows us to conclude that China does still adhere to a strategy of minimal deterrence, but that it faces a lot of challenges to make it more credible. It is still in the process of replacing its vulnerable silo based and liquid fuelled missiles by more capable road-mobile variants. Its sea-based deterrence is even more in its infancy and it remains to be seen whether China will start to deploy missiles with independently targetable re-entry vehicles in order to penetrate defence mechanisms.

Future ambitions and consequences for global security Minimal nuclear deterrence, however, does not imply that one has to minimize Chinas ambitions to shore up its military capabilities. First, in spite of all the guarantees of the government and modest changes in its nuclear arsenal, it cannot be taken for granted that China will continue to keep its promise not to use nuclear arms in case of a conventional attack. Important in this regard is the countrys interest in nonstrategic of tactical nuclear weapons.30 It is known that throughout the seventies, eighties and nineties, China has developed miniaturized warheads and also simulated the use of tactical nuclear weapons. In 1988 Chinese specialists tested a minus five kiloton nuclear device, which was considered an important step in the creation of nuclear artillery. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), China possibly tested a warhead for a cruise missile and a uranium artillery shell in June and September 1995.31 It is known that China has the tactical systems to deliver such miniaturized warheads, such as its large number of tactical ballistic missiles, new long-range land-attack cruise missiles, and advanced multirole combat aircraft. And it is also known that such tactical nuclear weapons could be relevant in major armed contingencies. But what we do not know is

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whether China has also deployed tactical weapons, whether this is a matter of China hiding its true capabilities, whether it assumes that still has the time to develop en deploy them should relations with Taiwan or other powers grow tense, or whether, in the end, Chinese political leaders show restraint because they fear image damage and escalating tensions. That notwithstanding, Chinas proven interest in the seventies, eighties and nineties, however short-lived it might have been, demonstrates that changing contexts or technological breakthroughs can have an impact on its nuclear posturing. China aims at broadening its deterrence capabilities. Clearly, its first objective is to match the other powers conventional capabilities by modernizing its own. Guided by the theories on limited war under high-tech conditions (jubu zhanzheng zai gaojijishu tiaojian xia), its navy and air force in particular have entered an important stage of reorganization and modernization. China is also looking at asymmetric warfare to deter potent rivals. The threat of asymmetric warfare raises a possible aggressors uncertainty about the effectiveness of its capabilities. Electronic warfare and sabotaging have been figuring prominently in Chinas operational handbooks since a long time. An important aspiration in this regard has been to blind enemies by taking on their satellites. In 2007 China reportedly pointed a laser at an American satellite and in 2007, after three failed attempts, it successfully tested an anti-satellite missile. China has an ambitious research and development programme in the field of anti-satellite technologies, including the development of radio frequency weapons for jamming satellite signals, ground-based lasers for blinding satellite sensors, and presumable a piggy-back satellite program. All these systems are highly relevant in warding off nuclear strikes. Even though Chinas space-based deterrent is by no means matching that of the United States, it seems to have become increasingly important to complement its minimal nuclear deterrence and in any case contradicts the Chinese governments appeal to prevent an arms race in outer space. In addition, there is growing evidence that the Peoples Republic is working on missile defence. Traditionally it has opposed the development of missile defence. In 1999, Tsinghuas Yan Xuetong wrote: Economically, China believes theatre missile defense would consume too many resources that should be used for economic development. Militarily, theatre missile defense is not required for its counterattack strategy, which rests on the military ability to respond to a first attack.32 Ten years later, at a Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that: Countries should neither develop missile defence systems that undermine global strategic security.33 At the same time, however, it purchased the latest Russian S-300 PMU surface-to-air missiles that could be deployed against ballistic missiles. In 2006, reports came out about a test involving the detection and interception of an incoming ballistic missile. In January 2010, Chinese media announced that the PLA had carried out a successful midcourse missile interception with Chinese variant of the Russian S-300, the Hong Qi 9. Jin Canrong of the Renmin University explained in an interview with the Global Times that this experiment did not change but reinforce Chinas defensive strategy. Because of its no-first-use and minimal deterrence strategy, Beijing believes that it cannot be expected to scale down its nuclear arsenal and shows itself highly sceptical about a

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global-zero scenario in which all powers would eliminate their nuclear weapons. As the current nuclear arsenal is considered the smallest possible, any reduction would render entirely ineffective this minimal deterrence. As Zhang Hui remarked: Given the huge qualitative and quantitative gap between the Chinese arsenal and those of the United States and Russia, however, Beijing cannot be expected to involve itself directly in the reduction of its nuclear weapons until the United States and Russia have made deeper cuts in their arsenals.34 Our warheads are not on trigger. That means if you count our arsenal according to the counting methods used by the US and Russia, the number of our nuclear arms is zero, Li Bin claimed, You cant make reductions from zero. Apart from this strategic calculation, there is also an important political argument, namely that the two nuclear juggernauts have no legitimacy whatsoever to climb to a new moral high ground without living up to the existing framework of international agreements and promises. Echoing the views of the 2009 Defence White Paper, the Chinese Delegation on Nuclear Disarmament posited: The two countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament. They should implement the current nuclear weapons reduction treaties in good faith and further cut their nuclear arsenals drastically in a verifiable and irreversible manner, in order to create conditions for the ultimate comprehensive and thorough nuclear disarmament.35 Several Chinese analysts go further and maintain that the main problem China has with global-zero is not such much a legitimacy issue or even not the fact that it would undermine the strategy of minimal deterrence. They see it as an attempt of the United States to restrain Chinas rise and to maintain its own position as military superpower. Fudan Universitys Zhang Guihong, for instance, posited that with promoting globazero, the United States was mainly aiming at absolute security and maintaining its superpower status.36 Yangcheng Jun of the National Defence University cautioned that: Even we reduce nuclear weapons to zero, as long as the United States does not abandon the attempt to dominate the world and practices aggression and expansion, the world will not be safer and more stable than it is today.37 This mistrust also affected Chinas position on non-proliferation. China formally acceded the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, supported extending the treaty indefinitely at the fifth review conference in 1995, and in the same year published three principles on nuclear exports, with the latter clarifying that China would export nuclear goods only if they served peaceful purposes, respected the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and if there was a guarantee that they would not be transferred to a third country without Chinese consent.38 These commitments, however, were in contrast with revelations that China contributed to the nuclear weapons programme of Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea. But rather than that this implied disinterest or cheating from the Chinese government, these events were the consequence of a combination of track-dependency, the role of non-state actors, problematic implementation of the three principles, a separation between nuclear and missile technology exports, and a strong interest in exporting knowhow for civilian nuclear installations. As far as evidence exists, Pakistan has been the only recipient of official Chinese support for the development of nuclear weapons. Several transfers of nuclear technology, missiles, and weapons-grade uranium took place in the late seventies and the eighties. Chinese nuclear knowhow arrived in Iran and North Korea mainly via Pakistani players like the infamous Abdul

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Qadeer Khan who headed Pakistan's nuclear program between 1975 and 2001. While Beijing was scaling down its cooperation in military nuclear programmes in the late eighties, it continued to deliver missile technology until in 1994 it agreed with the United States to work together in preventing missile proliferation.39 Even afterwards, reports circulated about the leaking of sensitive Chinese technologies to these trouble states, but these seemed to be mainly the work of non-official players benefiting from lacunae in the enforcement of export restrictions. In response, stricter regulations on arms exports were issued in 1997 and 2002. While China continued to expand its civilian nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, it had frozen its civilian with Iran and North Korea. Since the nineties, China has become more explicit in its support for an effective international ban on the proliferation of nuclear arms and ballistic missiles, yet, not without major reservations. The 2003, White Paper on non-proliferation emphasized that the nuclear ambitions of certain countries were the consequence of and insecure international environment, and that in order to address these root causes of proliferation, more efforts had to be made to democratize the international order and to end regional conflicts. Furthermore, the paper called to abandon unilateralism and double standards, a clear reference to Americas posturing on the Israeli and Indian nuclear aspirations. It also stated that whereas it is necessary to prevent any country from engaging in proliferation under the pretext of peaceful utilization, states should be able to utilize and share dual-use scientific and technological achievements and products for peaceful purposes.40 Since the turn to the new century, China is believed to be in compliance with national and international non-proliferation regulations. It strongly opposes the development of nuclear weapons and demands civilian programmes to be closely monitored, but differences with the West remain over how to exert pressure on Tehran and Pyongyang. So, how to interpret this apparent reluctance? As we remarked in the first section, Beijings official line has always been that nuclear weapons had to be abolished but that, in absence of a worldwide disarmament, secondary powers had the right to build up their defences against the superpowers. Moreover, nuclear weapons were considered a tool to advance the multipolar world order that would keep American preponderance in check. In other words, a nuclear oligopoly became sort of a second best option between an ideal world without atomic weapons and the scenario of a nuclear monopoly as the ultimate curse. As the Cold War winded to an end, and indeed, two other developing countries managed to join the league of nuclear powers, China became more concerned about the disadvantages that further proliferation might cause. There was the rivalry between India and Pakistan. North Koreas aspirations for bomb destabilized the Korean Peninsula and could be a justification for Japan to strengthen its military prowess or even to consider a preventive strike. Iran was in a similar situation with Israel and Saudi Arabia stating clearly that they did not tolerate another nuclear power in their backyard. Turmoil in Northeast Asia clearly had direct security consequences; in the other case Chinas energy interests could be severely affected. A second reason was that China wanted to be seen as a constructive force in regional and world affairs and avoid being singled out as a reckless power that does not take into account the interests of the other protagonists. It was thus Chinas choice for strategic self-restraint (kezhi or ziwo yueshu)

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and assurance (baozheng), the same strategies that made Beijing to adhere to a policy of minimal deterrence, which also required it to counter proliferation. Third, the Chinese government was alarmed that sensitive knowhow could fall in the wrong hands and eventually be used by terrorist organizations. Terrorism in general, has long been a main security concern for Beijing. Finally, the political leadership might have been personally embarrassed by its failure to rein in certain companies and parts of the military establishment. That said, we still do not have an explanation why the Peoples Republic remains reluctant in supporting sanctions or to participate in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).41 First, the importance of image works in two ways. As much as Chinese leaders want to reassure the other powers and particularly the West, they cannot afford being perceived as docile followers of an American dictate. That goes for Chinas foreign policy in general and non-proliferation in specific. It can be argued even that the more the West pressures China to give in to its demands; the more moderates in Beijing are under pressure to stand strong. Related to this explanation, it has to be stressed that there is a great deal of understanding, if not empathy, for the cause of Iran and Pyongyang. As the White Paper on non-proliferation pointed out, their nuclear plans in many ways are seen as a symptom of regional insecurity, and indirectly the negative influences of American hegemony, such as its support for Israel and the presence of large numbers of troops in South Korea. The Chinese also loathe Americas double standards in tacitly supporting the nuclear ambitions of India and Israel. Spectators and decision makers in Beijing also argue that restraint has not only to be practiced towards the West, but also to important historical or economic partners like North Korea and Iran. This is a matter of balancing the different interests that are at stake. Now, this combination of negative perceptions of the United States and awareness of the complexity of the evolving national interests have to be added to an outspoken dislike of sanctions. This is partially rooted in the historical policy of non-interference (buganshe), partially in the belief that America is using sanctions to defend its hegemony, and partially in the conviction that sanctions could just be counterproductive. Wang Baofu, a professor at the National Defence University, assumed that sanctions cannot solve the fundamental contradictions in the Iranian issue because the greater the pressure, the greater the resistance will be.42 Tang Chao of the China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) claimed that even though the Obama administration probably wants to avoid a showdown, he is pressured to continue the dangerous game of sanctions by powerful conservative elites.43 Going a step further, Zhang Zhaozhong, another scholar from the Defence University, argued that another round of sanctions could be so frustrating for Iran that it decides to continue to engage in nuclear fuel, and that in the end, the United States and Israel get what they want: a military solution.44

Conclusion What all Chinas decisions on issues like tactical nuclear weapons, asymmetric deterrence, the global-zero initiative, and non-proliferation, have in common, is that they tried to find a middle ground between on the one hand persistent distrust and since a

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few years even growing distrust vis--vis the United States, and on the other hand, the belief that self-restraint and reassurance were essential building blocks of its foreign policy. Chinas policy on nuclear weapons is a complex puzzle of security calculations, which we can only attempt to understand if we try to put ourselves in the position of its top leadership, the President, the members of the Small Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, the Central Military Commission, the Central Committee indeed a heterogeneous amalgamate of pragmatists, dark red Communists, Chinese capitalists, nationalists, and many more strands of political life. Whatever the shade of red of these Party members, the overriding consensus about Chinas security today is that it depends on development and development on its ability to coexist with other countries. This lies at the basis of strategic self-restraint and commands China to be modest in developing its own nuclear capabilities, to avoid a nuclear tit-for-tat with other regional powers, and ultimately to avoid frictions with the United States. Since Dengs opening-up, isolation has been the ultimate nightmare of Chinas diplomacy. Yet, none of the leaders, even not the most pragmatic ones, want to be seen as weak and certainly not risk direct or indirect criticism that they compromise on the national security because the United States or other powers expect them to do so. That is the price of nationalism, which together with economic growth, is the main pillar of the Communist Partys legitimacy. There can be no doubt that within the central bodies on international affairs, plenty uniformed or civilian hardliners make their case for standing strong against alleged Western bullying, and if they do not to that directly, there are plenty of experts or retired generals, some of them on record in this paper, willing to give a sermon on national security or the perils of American hegemony via popular news media. But all in all, it is clear that nuclear weapons do not figure so prominently in Chinas military deterrence compared to its efforts to boost its conventional capabilities, which should not be so surprising as those capabilities are most needed to engage in various territorial disputes or to protect the nations overseas interests. Finally, one should not underestimate the role of corporate interests in exploring new dual-use projects abroad. Like in most advanced countries, nuclear industries have tremendous lobbying power, but especially in a developing country like China, they are seen as vital players in the quest for national development and consequently get a lot of credit in making profits overseas. In sum, China has showed a remarkable degree of self-restraint in regard to its own nuclear weapons and there are no indications that this attitude is changing. It has experimented with various new technologies and introduced a small number of systems to replace older ones, but all together, it keeps its arsenal small and essentially focuses on conventional deterrence. In international security issues related to atomic weapons China has made a turn of, say, 170 degrees. While still being reluctant about sanctions, it has revised almost all its policies on non-proliferation in line with the expectations of the prevailing international norms. Two main factors will shape Chinas future thinking on nuclear weapons: the US and nationalism. The more China feels, and this has become an important risk, that the degree of restraint that was displayed in the past three decades is not sufficient for the United States and other powers to accept its rise, the more its constructive nationalism centred on development will be complemented by more negative variants that will only be more invigorated by the scepticism and suspicion in the rest of the world.

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Notes and references:
1

Mai Chinese works on this question: Li, Bin (2005), , Junbei

kongzhi yu Fenxu [Theory and Analysis of Arms Control], , Guofanggongye Chubanshe [National Defence University Press], Beijing; Li, Bin (2006), [Analysis of the Chinese Nuclear Strategy], [World Economics and Politics], September 2006; Zhu, Mingquan, Wu Chunsi and Su Changhe (2006), , Weishe yu wending: Zhongmei he guanxi [Deterrence and Stability: Sino-US Nuclear Relations], , Shishi Chubanshe [Current Affairs Press], Beijing; Wang Zhongchun (2007), , Hewuqi heguojia he zhanlue [Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Powers and Nuclear Strategies], , Shishi Chubanshe [Current Affairs Press], Beijing. 2 Mearsheimer for instance posited that that nuclear power does not stop states from using conventional capabilities in their quest for security and domination. 3 Interview with Foreign Affairs 4 Waltz, Kenneth (1990), Nuclear Myths and Political Realities, American Political Science Review, vol. 84 (3), 731-745. 5 Glaser, Charles (1997), The Security Dillemma Revisited, World Politics, vol. 50 51), pp. 171-201, Van Evera, Stephen (1999), Causes of War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 6-8; Walt, Stephen (1987), The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, Ithaca. 6 Gaddis, John-Lewis (1999), Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 211. 7 Ross, Robert and Jiang Changbin eds. (2001), Re-Examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, Harvard East Asia Monographs, Harvard; Christensen, Tomas (1996), Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Relations, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Wilson, John and Xue Litai (1991), China Builds the Bomb, Stanford University Press, Stanford. 8 Fieldhouse, Richard (1991), Chinas Mixed Signals on Nuclear Weapons, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 1991, p. 37. 9 Quoted in Mulvenon, James (2004), China and Mutually Assured Destruction, in Henri Sokolski ed., Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Destruction, Its Origins, and Practice, Strategic Studies Institute, Washington, p. 241. 10 Christensen, Tomas (1996), op. cit. 11 The statement can be found in Wilson, John and Xue Litai (1991), op. cit., pp. 241243. 12 Alastair Iain Johnston, Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control, The China Quarterly, June 1996, pp. 552-553.

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Johnston, Iain (1996), Chinas New Old Thinking: The Concept of Limited Deterrence, International Security, vol. 20 (3), pp. 21-23. 14 Shen, Dingli (2005), Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, China Security, vol. 1 (1). 15 Zhu, Qiangguo (2002), Meiguo heweishe zhanlue de tiaozhen - hetaishi shenyi baogao pingxi [Readjustment of US Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence: An Assessment of the Nuclear Posture Review], Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary International Relations], February 2002, pp. 28-3. 16 Zhu Qiangguo (2002), US Seeks Absolute Military Superiority, China Daily, 13 March, 2002. 17 Statement by Liu Jieyi, Director General of Arms Control and Disarmament Department, Foreign Ministry of China, on Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances, 4 June 2004. 18 White Paper on China's National Defense in 2008, Cap 1 19 Chap 6 20 Zhang, Hui (2010), Chinas perspective on a Nuclear-Free World, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 33 (2), pp. 142. 21 Pan, Zhenqiang (2005), China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons, China Security, vol. 1 (4). 22 Peng, Guanqiang and Yu Rong (2009), Nuclear No-First Use Revisited, China Security, vol. 5 (1), pp. 78-87. 23 Pan Zhenqiang (2005), China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons, China Security, vol. 1 (4)/ 24 Sun Xiangli Analysis of China's Nuclear Strategy China Security (World Security Institute China Program), Autumn 2005 Issue No 1. 25 Norris, Robert and Hans Kristensen (2008), Chinese Nuclear Forces, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 2008, pp. 42-46. 26 Li Bin (2007), Tracking Chinese Strategic Mobile Missiles Science and Global Security, 15:130, 2007 27 Stokes, Mark (2010), ChinasNuclear Warhead Storage and Hanling System, Project 2049 institute, Wahsingron. 28 McConnaughy, Christopher (2005), Chinas Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready? In Lyle Goldstein and Adrew Erickson eds., Chinas Nuclear Force Modernization, Naval War College, Newport, pp. 23-49. 29 Cheng, Ta-chen (2007), China's Nuclear Command, Control and Operations, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 7 (2), pp. 155-178. 30 Ferguson, Charles, Evan Medeiros and Philip Saunders (2003), Chinese Tactical Nuclear Weapons, in Brian Alexander and Alistair Millar eds., Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Brasseys, Dulles, pp. 110-128. 31 Norris, Robert and Hans Kristensen (2008), op. cit., p. 44. 32 Yan, Xuetong (1999), Theatre Missile Defence and Northeast Asian Security, The Non Proliferation Review, Spring and Summer 1999, p 69. 33 China warns against missile defence systems, AFP, 12 August 2009.
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Zhang, Hui (2010), Chinas perspective on a Nuclear-Free World, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 33 (2), pp. 139-155. 35 Statement by the Chinese Delegation on the Issue of Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Risks of Nuclear War, Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 31 May 2009.
34

, Wu hewu shijie zhen di hui daolai? [Might a World Without Nuclear Weapons Really Emerge?] Global Times, 27 September 2009. 37 Ibid. 38 China: Arms Control and Disarmament, Beijing Review, vol. 38 (46) 1995, p. 18. 39 Joint US-PRC Statement on Missile Proliferation." State Department fact sheet regarding a joint statement by the US and China to work together to prevent missile proliferation and promote a ban on the production of nuclear fuel for weapon, 4 October 1994. 40 Information Office of the State Council (2003), China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures, Information Office of the State Council, Beijing. 41 PSI: An American multinational initiative involving the interdiction of thirdcountry ships on the high seas on the basis of carrying nuclear materials.
36 42

, Zhicai nanyi jiejue yi hewenti hetan cai shi shengdao [To Solve the Difficult Iranian Nuclear Issue, Peace Talks are the Way, Not Sanctions], Voice of the Straits, 11 June 2010. Mai dui zhicau Yilang yin erbu fa di zhenzheng yuanyin [US Sanctions against might fall short in really tackling the true causes], Global Times, 13 April 2010. , Zhongguo zhichi zhicai Yilang de zhenzheng yuanyin [The Real Reasons for China to Support Sanctions on Iran], 18 July 2010, interview available via: www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=182423

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