THE

STRUCTURAL DESIGN OF TALL BUILDINGS,

Vol. 5, 29-44 (1996)

PROFESSIONAL STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING EXPERIENCE RELATED TO WELDED STEEL MOMENT FRAMES FOLLOWING THE NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE
WILLIAM E. GATES Dames & Moore, Inc., 91 I Wilshire Blvd, Suite 700, Los Angeles, CA, U.S.A AND MANUEL MORDEN

Brandow & Johnston Associates, 1660 West 3rd Sr, Los Angeles, CA, U.S.A

SUMMARY The experiences of professional structural engineers with welded steel moment frame connections following the 1994 Northridge earthquake were gathered by personal interview. This paper captures their experiences in inspecting and repairing these connections following the earthquake. The engineers interviewed represent a wide cross section of Los Angeles structural engineering firms.

1. INTRODUCTION The 17 January 1994 Northridge earthquake produced a brittle form of failure in the supposedly ductile steel moment resisting frames of numerous buildings in the San Fernando Valley, West Los Angeles and surrounding areas. This form of damage had not been anticipated by the engineering profession and construction industry. To capture the history and lessons learned from this event, a series of interviews was conducted with key professionals involved in the inspection, repair and reconstruction of the damaged buildings. The interviews were conducted to document the significant experiences of structural engineers involved in the discovery, inspection, and evaluation of the steel moment resisting frame buildings. The structural engineers are listed in Table I. The interviews were designed for systematically gathering, synthesizing and analysing perishable data, such as impressions and unusual experiences that may have been encountered during the process, and for identifying key issues or concerns and lessons learned.

2. METHODOLOGY
The structural engineers listed in Table I are representative of the professionals in the Los Angeles area directly involved in the review and assessment of the damaged steel moment frames. Group interviews were organized with each of the engineering firms in order to capture the full spectrum of first-hand experience in damage assessment, repair design and field observation of CCC 1062-8002/96/010029- 16 0 1996 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Received July 1995 Revised August 1995

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W. E. GATES A N D M. MORDEN

Table I. Interview participants Organization Individuals (Roy Johnston-SE Manny Morden-SE Peter Maranian-SE ( Eugene Ungermann-SE David Houghton-SE Richard Fallgren-SE Ken Odell-CE Jesse Karns-CE Barry Schindler-SE Steve Hagen-CE Chuck W hittaker-CE Joseph Stewart-SE Ramzi Hodall-SE Roger Young-SE Rick Davis-CE John Gavan-CE Tom Sabol-SE Barrett Bunce-SE Alan Shiosaki-SE Dani Llovet - CE Jay Allen-SE Clarkson Pinkham-SE

Brandow & Johnston, Associates

Myers Nelson Houghton

John A. Martin & Associates

KPFF

Englekirk & Sabol The Allen Company

S. B. Barnes & Associates
SE = Registered Structural Engineer. CE = Registered Civil Engineer.

construction. In addition, senior structural engineers in the community familiar with the history of steel frame seismic code development were interviewed. The interviews were conducted over the period 30 January through 24 March 1995. The interviews were organized into four parts with specific questions developed for each part. These four parts inciuded the following.

(1) Introduction to the survey with objectives defined; experience and training of participants identified; and the program of questioning outlined. (2) Experience and lessons from damaged welded steel moment frame (WSMF) buildings in the Northridge earthquake. This part of the interview focused on how WSMFs were designed and constructed before the Northridge event and how the participants inspected, assessed damage and implemented repairs or retrofits to WSMFs following the Northridge earthquake. (3) Theories and opinions on the probable causes for the unexpected brittle failures in the WSMF connections. (4) Specific solicited recommendations on future design practices for WSMFs and inspection, damage assessment and repair of WSMFs in future earthquakes, based on the Northridge experience.

WELDED STEEL MOMENT FRAMES

31

The interviews were conducted by Bill Gates and Manny Morden with Allan Porush as an alternative and often third participant. They were conducted in the offices of the engineering firms. Most of the interviews were conducted at lunchtime to minimize lost productive hours on the part of the participants. The typical interview lasted 1.5 to 2 hours. The entire interview was recorded with a cassette tape recorder as well as by hand-written notes. The taped interview was transcribed to hard copy for interpretation, analysis and summary in this report. To prioritize the opinions and observations of the engineers interviewed, a formal questionnaire was mailed to each individual. The questionnaire was prepared along the lines of questioning in the interviews and was based on input from the engineers. The survey form provided an opportunity for independent expression of opinions and impressions on the causative factors for the WSMF damage. The major structural engineering firms and individuals (see Tabie I) selected for the interviews were the original designers for many of the steel moment resisting frames in the Los Angeles region. The structural engineering staff in these firms has hands-on experience in the review and repair of approximately 50% of the damaged WSMFs as a result of the Northridge earthquake. The majority of the engineers interviewed have either participated in or are currently involved in developing seismic design standards used in WSMF construction. Before the Northridge event, none of the engineers interviewed anticipated that WSMF construction would fail in brittle fracture at the welded connection in an earthquake. All expected susbtantially ductile behaviour to occur with local plastic deformation of the connection similar to that witnessed in the university test programs that were used to qualify the welded beam-to-column joint for modern steel frame design. In hindsight, a few of the engineers admitted that they were somewhat skeptical of the ability of the welded joints to develop fully plastic hinges before some form of failure might occur in the highly stressed weld zone. One of the engineers was even suspicious that welded joints might behave in a brittle manner when subjected to very rapid strain rates under intense seismic loading. However, none of the engineers had a basis on which to reject the building code premise that ductile yielding in this type of construction could be achieved in an earthquake. Most of the engineers interviewed referred to the components of the moment connection as follows: (a) Joint-the welded attachment of a flange of a beam to a column. (b) Connection--the full interface joining a beam to a column, including the means of fastening.

3. CHRONOLOGY O F DISCOVERY
It was the general impression of the structural engineering community, immediately following the Northridge earthquake, that WSMFs survived the event with no significant damage. None of the buildings showed signs of plastic deformation that would normally have been anticipated as an indication of structural distress and none of the steel frames had collapsed. The first indication that steel frame structures had experienced damage was reported from new construction in which the steel frames were still exposed. Within days, it became apparent that several of the steel frame structures in the cities of Santa Clarita, Valencia and Woodland Hills (Canoga Park) were out of plumb and could not be maintained in alignment during the series of aftershocks. As the interior surfaces and fireproofing were removed from the steel frames of these buildings, it became evident that significant brittle fractures had developed in the welded

32

W. E. GATES AND M. MORDEN

beam-to-column joints. The damage consisted of cracks through the beam-to-column welds, or through the base metal of the beam or column flanges. These cracks resulted in a loss of seismic moment resistance in the damaged connections; however, the connections still transferred gravity loads which, in the opinion of the engineers interviewed, may explain why there were no collapses. By the end of two months, more than 17 to 20 WSMFs had been identified as having damage to the welded beam-column connections. In the succeeding months up to the present, the number of damaged WSMF structures has continuously increased. As of August 1995, it is estimated that over 150 steel frame buildings, or roughly 75% of the building structures investigated, have some form of brittle cracking in one or more of the beam-column connections.
4. DAMAGE SURVEY AND TESTING

4.1. Methods of damage assessment Initially, the steel frame structures were surveyed for damage using standard pre-Northridge methodologies. This consisted of visual inspection of the fireproofed steel members to verify that the flanges in the beams at the column joint of the WSMF had not buckled. Shear tabs in the joints were also checked. Unfortunately, the cracks in the welds and flanges of the joint elements were not visible through the fireproofing. However, as soon as the engineering community learned that steel moment resisting frames had suffered a brittle form of damage, resulting in cracked welds and flanges, the engineers turned to new methods for surveying and testing to locate and identity the damage. When trying to estimate whether a WSMF building had been damaged in the earthquake, all of the engineers interviewed indicated that they were generally misled by the state of damage or lack thereof observed in the building cladding surrounding the steel frame. There are a few instances where the non-structural elements were heavily damaged and it appeared that the buildings frame must also be damaged. However, when the moment connections were fully exposed by removing the fireproofing, the joints were found to be essentially undamaged. In other cases, the non-structural elements of the building had virtually no signs of damage, yet when the steel frame connections were exposed and examined, in some cases they were found to have cracks extending through the columns, leaving the beams of the frame free to separate from the columns at a floor level. Thus, the normal damage survey conducted by the City of Los Angeles and adjacent communities in which buildings were red, yellow, and green tagged based on the visually observed degree of damage and risk to life, turned out to be unreliable for identification of damaged WSMFs. Instead, as engineers discovered damaged WSMFs in a cluster of similar structures, they would extend the survey process to the nearby buildings simply to verify that these structures were structurally safe, even if the buildings appeared totally undamaged. The engineers resorted to a series of post-Northridge survey techniques that had rarely been used in the past for assessing earthquake damage to WSMFs. These included the following: (a) plumb bob and transit surveys for potential vertical misalignment; (b) visual inspection for major cracks through welds, flanges and shear tabs-with fireproofing removed; (c) ultrasonic tests (UT) for cracking in welds and parent materials, including root cracks hidden by the back-up bars; (d) magnetic particle and dye penetrant tests.

WELDED STEEL MOMENT FRAMES

33

The plumb bob and transit surveys for vertical misalignment were found to be relevant in only a few instances. The magnetic particle and dye penetrant tests are only applicable at the surface of the welds and are normally used for the fillet welds on shear tabs. This testing procedure was used more extensively in the repair of cracked welds. The visual inspection for major cracks as well as the ultrasonic tests for cracking in the welds and parent materials turned out to be the dominant mode of damage inspection used on WSMFs. The ultrasonic test proved to be the most effective method in locating cracks within the weld and base materials. These cracks were generally found to start at the root weld in the bottom and top flange joints of the beam and to propagate through the weld zone into the base metals of the beam or column flange. The presence of the back-up bar at the root weld pass often resulted in erroneous readings, indicating the presence of a minor crack (e.g. AWS-D1.1 Type W1) in the root of the weld. When the back-up bar was removed and the weld retested ultrasonically, it was reported that generally 50% of the welds turned out to have no cracks. Thus, the engineers had to be rather cautious about calling a building damaged until all the minor (Wl) cracks identified ultrasonically were confirmed through direct visual inspection or ultrasonic retesting with the back-up bar removed. Metallurgical tests were conducted on some of the first steel frame buildings found to have weld failures. This sampling and testing process was not normally carried out on other buildings in the investigative phase; however, the metallurgical test procedure is sometimes used in testing to establish the repair procedure.
4.2. Selection

of

candidate connections

Inspection of connections in the WSMF buildings turned out to be a costly process that involved removal of architectural finishes and surfaces, scraping away fireproofing (some of it including asbestos), wire brushing the steel surfaces, then conducting the non-destructive visual and ultrasonic tests and finally replacing fireproofing and non-structural surfaces and finishes after the inspection process was completed. Since the damage did not occur in every moment connection, and tended to follow a random pattern, the engineers attempted to minimize the costly inspection process by identifying the probable locations or hot spots where seismically induced failures might have occurred. Each engineering firm interviewed had its own methodology for identifying the most probable hot spots in the structure for inspection. Most of the engineers reviewed the design drawings to identify the critically stressed connections and large member sizes that represented connections with a high potential for damage. They often relied on prior design and analysis experience with similar structures and on Northridge experience gained from other damaged buildings. This Northridge experience included directionality in the earthquake damage patterns as reported to them by other engineers. For WSMFs located in the San Fernando Valley, the north-south oriented frames were generally more heavily damaged, while in the Santa Monica and West Los Angeles areas, the frames that were oriented in the east-west direction parallel to Santa Monica Boulevard tended to be more heavily damaged. The engineers also took advantage of information from other engineers on the distribution of damage in low-rise and high-rise structures. For low rise (e.g. two to six stories), there was a higher percentage of connection failure in the first two floors above ground than in the higher stories of the building. The damage was also more random in these structures. For high rise (e.g. ten stories and up), the damage tended to be concentrated in the upper two-thirds of the building.

34

W. E. GATES AND M. MORDEN

Other engineers attempted to locate the hot spots in the WSMFs using computer models to simulate the dynamic earthquake response. These analyses were generally performed with the ETABS computer program using the most readily available design earthquake such as the Uniform Building Code design response spectra; or the analyses were performed using recorded ground motion time-histories of historic earthquakes. Generally, earthquake records from the Northridge event near the particular building site were not available for the initial screening study. The success ratio in identifying potentially damaged joints by either analysis or engineering judgment was significantly lower than the engineers had anticipated, particularly in low-rise buildings.
4.3. Minimum inspection

Since location of the damaged moment resisting connections was not readily predictable with any degree of certainty by either linear elastic analysis or engineering judgment, a preliminary guideline for inspection practice was developed by the City of Los Angeles Department of Building and Safetys Task Group on Steel Buildings. This Guideline specified that the minimum inspection should include 5 to 10% of the welded connections in high-rise buildings over six stories and approximately 15% of the connections in low-rise buildings of six stories and less. These percentages would vary depending on the total number of connections per level and in the entire building. For buildings with heavy external damage or those in which there was obvious misalignment as evidenced by vertical alignment surveys, the engineers normally had little difficulty in convincing the owner to let them expose the connections and inspect. However, where the building appeared undamaged, the engineers often found it difficult to convince the building owner of the need to expose 10 to 15% of the connections, or at least the percentage necessary to satisfy the engineer that the structure had little risk of hazardous performance in future earthquakes due to connection damage. Typical inspection costs ranged from $800 to $1200 per beam-to-column connection in a commercial building without asbestos removal. If asbestos removal was necessary, the costs could increase by an added $1000 to $2000 per connection. For high class residential buildings with gypsum or plaster walls and ceiling enclosures, the cost to inspect a typical frame connection could range from $2000 to $5000. For institutional structures such as hospitals, the soft cost (i.e. dislocation of operations) often equalled the hard costs, where the hard costs generally include: ceiling and wall access and restoration; fireproofing removal and restoration; clean-up; testing services of an inspection laboratory and engineering fees.

5. TYPES O F DAMAGE
5.1. Introduction-moment

resisting connections

The various types of failure patterns to the WSMF connections are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. In general, the dominant mode of observed failure in the moment resisting connections was a brittle fracture initiating at the bottom beam flange, generally starting in the root of the welded joint. The fracture followed various paths from the root weld into the base materials or heat affected zone and resulted in a wide variety of fracture patterns, as illustrated in Figure 2. Once the bottom flange failed, the bolted and welded gravity shear tab would often unzip, starting from the bottom and working up the connection (see Figure 1, S3). The most striking and potentially hazardous mode of failure was the brittle fracture propagating from the root of the weld through the column flange and web (see Figure 1, P5).

WELDED STEEL MOMENT FRAMES

Note: See Relerence Schedule lor Description

Relerence Detail: MRF Joint Damage Types

Figure 1. Types of connection damage

BY TESmG

Relerence Detail. MRF Joint Damage Types Note: See Relerence Schedule for Description

Figure 2. Tvpes of weld damage

36
5.2. Degree of damage

W. E. GATES AND M. MORDEN

The degree of observed cracking in the welded moment connections varied from building to building and from engineering office to engineering office interviewed. For purposes of discussion, three degrees of damage were defined during the interview based on the severity of cracking. These were as follows.
(1) Minor cracks. Non-visual root weld cracks identified through ultrasonic tests (UT) and

defined as AWS D1.l, Class W1 depth or less). (2) Signijcant cracks. Non-visual, UT cracks of structural significance (greater than i in depth). (3) Severe cracks. Visually identified and extending through the weld or base metals of the beam or column flange and of major structural significance. Table I I illustrates the variation in the degree of observed weld damage in the moment connections. David Houghton, of Myers Nelson Houghton, noted that when you can visually find weld connection damage, it is pretty much going to be widespread. And its going to be severe, as opposed to a little minor damage. In contrast, Brandow & Johnston Associates engineers found 60 to 75% of the cracks to be minor in the buildings they surveyed. One of the major issues brought up by all engineering firms interviewed was the significance of minor cracks in the root weld. These are the non-visible cracks identified through ultrasonic testing and defined under ASW D1.l, Class W1, as acceptable flaws (non-rejectable under normal construction). The engineers were nearly unanimous about accepting minor root weld cracks as insignificant relative to structural safety. However, they were split on their interpretation of the cause of the cracks. Some thought they were a pre-existing condition while others believed they represented minor crack damage caused by the Northridge earthquake. When the extent of cracking reached AWS D1.l, Class W2 or W3, the cracks were considered structurally significant in terms of safe performance in future earthquakes. Most of the engineering firms interviewed had found that, by removing the back-up bars when Class W2 cracks were found in the UT inspection and retesting, the cracks were downgraded to Class W 1-which was considered acceptable. The back-up bar introduced an additional degree of crack depth in the UT inspection process that made the connection appear to be damaged to an unacceptable degree. Thus, much of the significant damage in the form of root cracks was downgraded to acceptable flaws by simply removing back-up bars and repeating the ultrasonic tests. The engineer would then replace the back-up bar with a fillet weld.

(a

Table 11. Degree of observed weld damage (%) Engineering firm Degree of damage Minor cracks Significant cracks) Severe crackd3) Number of buildings represented MNH

B&JA 60-75 20-30 5-10 30

JAMA

KPFF

E&S 50-60 20-30 10-20 20

TAC

10-20 50-60 30-40 20

20 60 20 30

10-15 25-30 10 4

15-30 60-70 10-15 10

W E L D E D STEEL MOMENT FRAMES

37

Table 111. Ratio of beam top flange to bottom flange weld cracks and weld or base metal fractureengineers impressions based on buildings surveyed

Engineering firm
Item

MNH
1
~

B&JA
1
~

JAMA
_-_

KPFF I
~

E&S
1
~

TAC
1 - .-

Weld cracks identified by UT or visual inspection

Weld or base metal fracture Number of buildings surveyed

10 1 10

20 I 40
~

10 1

5
-~

__

10 1

10
__

100

10
4

20

30+

30+

20 20+

40
10

5.3. Distribution of damage within the connection

The greater percentage of the observed damage in the welded moment connections was located in the bottom beam flange welded joint and its interconnected components (e.g. beam flange, shear tab, column flange and web). A small percentage of the top flange joints were found to be damaged. Table 111 summarizes the engineers impressions of the ratio between top flange and bottom flange weld cracks, as well as the ratio between weld and base metal fracture. The engineers impressions varied, in some cases significantly, as a result of their method of investigation and their lasting impressions of what they actually found. In general, the top- to-bottom flange ratio of weld cracks identified by ultrasonic testing and visual inspection range from 1 : 5 to 1 : 20. The ratio for fracture through the weld or base metal ranged from 1 : 10 to 1 : 100. Most of the engineers interviewed concluded that the composite action of the concrete floor slab in conjunction with the top beam flange minimized the potential for failure in this beam location. However, some of the engineers theorized that since the root weld in the top flange was not located in the extreme fiber of the beam, as it is in the bottom flange, there was a lower stress riser induced in the top flange by the root weld pass, thus reducing the probability of brittle failure in the top flange.

5.4. Distribution of damage within the building The damage within the building was found to be distributed in a pattern with height depending on whether the building was a low rise or a high rise. In the low-rise structures, there was a higher percentage of connection failure in the first two floors above ground than in the higher stories of the building. In the high-rise buildings, the distribution of damage tended to be concentrated in the upper two-thirds or upper half of the building. Several of the engineers observed a higher percentage of damage in the moment connections at the corner columns of the WSMFs than at the interior connections. Local directionality of the dominant earthquake motion played a significant role in the degree and distribution of damage in the WSMFs. For structures located in the San Fernando Valley, the north-south oriented frames were generally more heavily damaged, while in the Santa Monica and West Los Angeles areas, the frames oriented in the east-west direction parallel to Santa Monica Boulevard, tended to be more heavily damaged.

38

W. E. GATES AND M. MORDEN

5.5. Damaged gravity connections The gravity connections in the non-seismic frames of the WSMF buildings often became the second line of lateral load resistance when the moment connections of the WSMFs failed. Many of the engineers interviewed stated that when they had observed heavy damage in the form of cracking through beam or column flanges or heavy nugget tear-out of beam flanges from column flanges, there was also associated damage to the gravity connections in the non-seismic frames. The estimated ratio between WSMF connection damage (heavy cracking and fracture) to gavity connection damage, ranged from 3 : 2 all the way down to 20 : 1. The damage to the gravity connections typically included sheared bolts in the shear tab connection, or tearing of the shear tab. In one instance, an engineer reported that eight of the eight bolts at both ends of the beam had failed in the gravity connection, permitting the beam to hang by its shear studs from the concrete floor slab. In at least two other instances, it was reported by engineers that many of the gravity connections in the building surveyed had experienced damage as a result of a construction error in which A307 machine bolts, rather than the specified A325 bolts, had been used in the gravity shear tab connections. In one building, over 80 sheared bolts were found lying in the ceiling by contractor when he opened it up for damage inspection. These examples indicate the degree of paritial structural collapse at gravity connections that may be associated with the brittle failures of WSMF connections. The engineers interviewed recommended that gravity connections in heavily damaged buildings be exposed and visually inspected as part of the routine WSMF earthquake damage survey.

5.6. Deterioration of W S M F connections

One case of progressive crack propagation was reported in an eleven-story high-rise building that had been designed with an importance factor of 1.5 in accordance with the Uniform Building Code Zone 4 requirements. Over a period of time, starting with July 1994 through December 1994, the building was ultrasonically tested three times and the size of cracks in the welds and base metals identified. In the second and third ultrasonic test programs, conducted in October and December of 1994, the cracks were found to have propagated from the welds into the base metal of the column or beam flanges. The engineers involved postulated that the crack propagation may have been due to continuing relaxation of the original residual stresses and readjustment of strains in the frames induced by the Northridge earthquake. This building showed no signs of frame damage in the form of non-structural or architectural damage.

6. FACTORS PERCEIVED T O CONTRIBUTE TO DAMAGE 6.1. Introduction

A series of factors may have contributed to the brittle mode of failure observed in the WSMFs following the Northridge earthquake. At the time of the interview, there was no clear evidence to identify which factors were most significant in contributing to the failures. Thus, it was not surprising to find that the engineers had differing opinions and theories as to the actual cause of the damage observed. The opinions and theories expressed were based on personal observation, information gained from reading and talking with others, training and background in the design and construction of WSMFs and personal research.

WELDED STEEL MOMENT FRAMES

39

The engineers opinions on the factors contributing to the brittle failure of welded WSMFs in the Northridge earthquake have been broken down into six key topic areas as outlined below.
(1) Education, training, and qualifications.

(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Design practice. Connection qualification tests. Construction materials. Welding and inspection practices. Earthquake characteristics.

A summary of the interliew findings is also presented in Table IV.

6.2. Educationltraininglexperience

All the engineers interviewed, without exception, stated that they had not anticipated that steel moment frames would crack in a brittle fashion rather than deforming plastically, as demonstrated in laboratory tests on this form of connection. Without exception, the engineers felt that their formal education and background in material science and metallurgy did not prepare them adequately to cope with the design repair problems that they have faced on WSMFs since the Northridge earthquake. Most of the engineers feel that they have come up a very steep learning curve in the past year in welding technology and metallurgy. Many of the engineers felt that their formal education in welding was limited to the physical strength characteristics of the various types of welds with little training on the metallurgy associated with the weld materials and the base metals. Few of the engineers had ever been trained in non-destructive test procedures for welded connections and virtually none of the engineers had heard of or fully understood what a Welding Procedure Specification was supposed to accomplish in the construction of a WSMF. A few of the engineers stated that they had questioned whether the high state of stress calculated in the welded beam-column connection could be sustained without premature failure. However, they had no bias on which to refute the test reports from the universities or the fact that the design concept for the special welded moment connection was accepted as a building code standard. 6.3. Design practice
6.3.1. Redundancy. The engineers interviewed had strong opinions on the influence of structural redundancy on the observed earthquake damage to the WSMFs. Some of the firms stated that it was their standard design practice to use multi-bay WSMFs to resist earthquakes in all pre-Northridge designs, while others indicated that for economic reasons, they generally used single or two-bay frames. Table IV illustrates the wide spread of engineering opinion on the significance of redundancy in the damage observed. To validate the hypothesis that redundancy reduces the degree of damage, John A. Martin & Associates engineers presented two case studies from the Northridge earthquake. The first was a four-story building with four single-bay WSMFs, two in each principal direction. The structure had 4 inches of permanent lateral deflection at the roof after the earthquake. Of the 40 moment connections, 34 were damaged. Many of these connections had cracks through the welds or base metal with separations of $ to As a consequence of the heavy damage to the moment connections, 80% of the gravity connections in the structure were also damaged.

4".

40

W. E. GATES AND M. MORDEN

Table IV. Factors perceived to contribute to WSMF connection damage in the Northridge earthquake Relative importance
~

General/specific factor
r

H 28 5 50 28 50

M
39 44 39 56 33 33 22

L 28 56 11 17 17

N/A
5 0 0

Design practice

<

1 . Lack of redundancy in bays 2. Design force levels 3. Welded joint concept-is the prescriptive connection a flawed design? 4. High triaxiality (restrain in 3 directions) 5. Back-up bar (weld stress riser) 6. Stress concentration factors (column web against beam flange) 7. Added flexural stress in beam flange caused by column panel zone shear deformation 8. Lack of continuity plates 9. Low cycle fatigue 10. Poor understanding of material sciences by the designer 11. Other-poor understanding of welding procedures
1. Limited test program for prescriptive connection (static loads, small scale members, ideal welding conditions in the lab) 2. Over optimism reflected test results by engineer 3. O t h e r 4 i d not remember the poor test results
1. Toughness of welds

0 0

50 11
6 11 17 11

11 67
39 50 22

5 0 5 11 11

50 28 50

Test program

67 61 5
44 50 0 11 28

22 28

0 5

I1 6

Construction materials

2. 3. 4. 5.

Lower fracture resistance with higher strain rates Low temperature fracture resistance High strength steel (lower toughness and ductility) Base metal acceptance standards. (Beam strength greater than anticipated in design relative to weld and column strength.) 6. Residual stress from mill production (thick column flange) Non-conformance to AWS Standards and Practices Preheat and cool down (residual stresses) High deposition weld process (lack of fusion) AWS acceptance standard is too lax-permits inclusions that are stress risers 5. Welder qualification/certfication 6. Inspector qualification/certification 7. Inspection practices
1. Larger ground motion than previously expected by engineers 2. Large vertical component of ground motion from thrust faulting 3. Very rapid energy release (high strain rate in loading)

50 33 28 56 56
56
50 56 39

6 11

50
33 17 17 17 5 0 33 17 22 22
44

0 6 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0
5

28 33 39 61
11

Welding practice

1. 2. 3. 4.

5 5 17
22 5

56 78 67 56 33 33 22

Earthquake

56 6

72

Perceived factors contributing to the brittle welded connection failures have been ranked in relative importance using qualitative terms: high-H; medium-M; low-L; and not applicable-N/A. The relative importance has been quantified in the table using the percentage of the 18 engineers interviewed that selected the particular qualitative factor. The numerical values indicate the degree of consensus between engineers on each of the perceived contributing factors to the WSMF connection damage.

WELDED STEEL MOMENT FRAMES

41

In the second case, a building had single-bay, double-bay and triple-bay WSMFs that were all damaged. However, the degree of damage to the single-bay frames was found to be much more severe and the distribution of damage more extensive than in the multi-bay frames of the same building. Barry Schindler of John A. Martin & Associates summarized the issue on redundancy by simply stating One thing we learned from the earthquake was that single-bay frames probably are not a good idea. 6.3.2. Design force levels. Were the force levels used in the lateral earthquake design of the WSMF buildings too low? It was the opinion of the 18 engineers who completed the survey questionnaire that the design force levels used under the Los Angeles City Building Code were not a major factor contributing to the damage. Table IV indicates that in their opinion it wits ranked as a low-to-medium factor. 6.3.3. Welded joint concept. In the opinion of the engineers, the majority felt that the welded joint concept used in the standard prescriptive welded moment connection was flawed. It did not perform as they had anticipated. This factor was assigned a high-to-medium importance. 6.3.4. High triuxiality. Triaxiality is a condition in which deformation in the welded joint is restrained in all three directions. High triaxiality requires large stresses for plastic flow and reduces the fracture energy, while the fracture ultimate stress is relatively unaffected. This makes the fracture an easier energy dissipating mechanism than yielding. The engineers assigned to a medium-to-high importance to the high computed triaxial state of stress in the welded interface between beam and column flanges. 6.3.5. Back-up bar. The stress riser produced by the notch between the back-up bar and the column flange at the root weld pass was considered to high-to-medium contributing factor to the connection damage observed. 6.3.6. Stress concentration factors. Stress concentration factors or stress risers in the column-web/beam-flange interface were studied by a team of Jay Allen (The Allen Company), Ralph Richard and James Partridge (Smith-Emery Company). Their analytical and experimental investigations identified not only the high stress riser in the weld interface between the column web and beam flange, but also the significance of strain rate effect due to the stress concentration. Most of the engineers interviewed were aware of this analytical and experimental test program and were of the opinion that stress concentration had a high-to-medium importance in contributing to earthquake damage. 6.3.7. Beam Panye jlexure caused by panel zone shear deformation. The added flexural stresses were produced in the beam flange by shear deformations in the column panel zone. The flexural stresses and induced deformation patterns were studied analytically by the team of Jay Allen/Ralph Richard/Jim Partridge as well as by KPFF. The engineers who conducted the analytical investigations were of the opinion that the added flexural stress represented a significant contributing factor to the connection damage. However, the rest of the engineers interviewed felt that the added flange flexural stresses contributed little to the connection damage.
6.3.8. Lack of continuity plates. There are various opinions on the significance of continuity plates in the transfer of tension and compression forces through the column flange and webs

42

W. E. GATES AND M. MORDEN

zone under beam bending. In general, the engineers felt that the lack of continuity plates represented a medium-to-low contributing factor to the damage.
6.3.9. Low cycle fatique. In general, the engineers concluded that the contribution to failure from low cycle fatigue was probably low to possibly moderate. 6.3.10. Understanding of material sciences. As noted in Section 6.2, most of the engineers felt that their education in the material sciences and welding procedures was not adequate to cover the problems that they faced following Northridge. Poor understanding on the part of the engineers, fabricators and welders was considered to be a contributing factor to the damage. In the opinion of the engineers interviewed, the understanding of material sciences was ranked medium-to-low.
6.4. Connection qualification tests A series of university test programs was performed during the 1960s and early 1970s that served as the basis for development of the prescriptive connection used in welded moment resisting frames and specified in the Uniform Building Code. The connection design was based on a static cyclic test program with small scale members, constructed under ideal welding conditions in the laboratory. Even under these ideal conditions, some of the conclusions that were tested failed prematurely. It was the opinion of the engineers interviewed that the test program itself did not accurately reflect the behaviour of the larger size members and welding procedures being employed in the field, nor did they reflect the dynamic impulsive loading imposed by the earthquake. In the opinion of the engineers, these pre-Northridge test results were viewed by the profession in an overly optimistic manner. In fact, the poor test results were either not remembered or overlooked. By far the majority of the engineers interviewed identified the pre-Northridge prescriptive connection test programs as a high factor contributing to the use of the welded moment connection design in modern WSMF buildings.

6.5. Construction materials

The following physical characteristics of the steels used in the fabrication of the welded WSMF connections were assessed in terms of their contribution to the connection failure.
(1) Toughness of the welds-medium-to-high contributing factor. (2) Low fracture resistance at high strain rates-high-to-medium contributing factor. (3) Low temperature fracture resistance-low-to-not a contributing factor. (4) High strength steels with their lower toughness and ductility-medium-to-low contributing factor. (5) Base metal acceptance standards-beam steel strengths provided by the mills are often greater than specified or anticipated by the engineer. As a consequence, the beam steel yields at a higher stress level than the column and weld material-medium-to-high contributing factor. (6) Residual stresses from mill production of thick flanged columns lead to weak through-thickness characteristics. The nugget type failures witnessed with column flange pullout may be related to this weakness-medium-to-high contributing factor.

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6.6. Welding and inspection practices

Table IV summarizes the key factors in welding practice that the engineers identified as significant. These included the following. (1) Non-conformance of the welding to AWS Standards and Practices-medium-to-high contribution. (2) The proper application of preheat and cool down to minimize residual stresses due to welding-medium-to-high contribution. ( 3 ) High deposition welding with the resulting lack of adequate fusion-high contribution. (4) The relatively lax AWS acceptance standards for inclusions and flaws in the weld, resulting in stress risers-medium-to-low contributing factor. ( 5 ) Welder qualification and certification-medium contribution. (6) Inspector qualifications and certification-medium contribution. (7) Inspection practices-medium contribution.
6.7. Earthquake characteristics

It is interesting that the engineers interviewed did not consider the Northridge earthquake to be unusual in terms of the amplitude of ground motion or the large vertical component from the near field blind thrust fault. These factors were considered low-to-medium in terms of inducing the brittle fractures. However, the very rapid energy release and associated high strain rates of loading was identified by three-quarters of the engineers interviewed as a high contributing factor to the brittle form of damage.

7. CITY INSPECTION ORDINANCE

On 22 February 1995, a little more than a year and a month after the Northridge earthquake, the Los Angeles City Council passed Ordinance 170406, addressing the inspection and repair of earthquake damaged welded steel moment frame buildings. The passage of this ordinance amended the Los Angeles Municipal Code by adding Section 91.8908, which deals with commerical buildings constructed with WSMFs and located in high damage areas associated with the Northridge event. The ordinance specifically requires that the building owner submit a report to the Department of Building and Safety (B&S) within 180 days of notification. This report must indicate the number, location and description of damaged welded connections located in the building along with proposed repair procedures. The report is to be prepared under the supervision of and signed by a registered structural engineer. Within 90 days of submittal of the report to the Department of Building and Safety, the repairs must commence and all repairs must be completed within two years of the date of the permit for repair. The ordinance applies to a limited class of WSMFs (commercial buildings), to a limited geographic area (the San Fernando Valley and West Los Angeles), and to a limited number of connections within the structure.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Funding for this research is provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through the SAC Joint Venture. SAC is a partnership of the Structural Engineers Association

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of California, the Applied Technology Council and the California Universities for Research and Earthquake Engineering. A number of engineering firms graciously donated the time of key individuals to participate in the interviews. Thanks are due to each of these organizations and the individuals listed in Table I of this report, who contributed time and effort to the interviews. Thanks are also due to the following, who contributed valuable suggestions, guidance and materials to the survey effort: SAC Task 2 Technical Advisory Panel members Professor Vitelmo Bertero, Professor Gary Hart, David Houghton and Ray Tide; SAC Project Managers Steve Mahin and Jim Malley; and alternative interviewer Allan Porush. APPENDIX: DAMAGE CLASS AND TYPE REFERENCE SCHEDULE FOR FIGURES 1 AND 2
G Girder damage GI buckled flange G2 yielded flange G3 flange tearout near weld G4 flange crack outside HAZ Column c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 flange damage incipient flange crack (detected by UT) complete flange tearout or divot full or partial cross-flange crack in HAZ full or partial cross-flange crack outside HAZ lamellar flange tearing

CF

Flange weld damage incipient crack, especially at weld root (detected by UT) W1 crack through weld metal, full or partial width of flange w2 w3 fracture at girder interface w4 fracture at column interface Shear connection damage column t o web or column t o shear tab weld crack s1 web to shear tab supplemental weld crack s2 web or shear tab crack, especially through bolt holes s3 web or shear tab deformation, especially at holes s4 loose, damaged or missing bolts s5 Panel zone damage fracture, buckle or yield of continuity plate P1 crack in continuity plate welds P2 buckle, yield or ductile deformation of doubler plate or column web P3 crack in doubler plate welds P4 Column web damage partial depth crack in column web or doubler plate (extension of C3 or C4) P5 full or near full depth crack i n column web or doubler plate P6

PZ

cw