How Could The United Kingdom Achieve A Carbon-Neutral, Self-Sufficient Electricity Supply by 2050?

How could the United Kingdom achieve a carbonneutral, selfsufficient electricity supply by 2050?
How could the United Kingdom achieve a
carbonneutral, selfsufficient electricity supply
by 2050?
Dissertation for MSc. Science, Culture & Environment
Andy Rolfe
Birkbeck, University of London
Andy Rolfe Page 1 of 79
Contact: rolfe.andy@googlemail.com Submitted: 8th July 2005.
Abstract
It is the policy of the United Kingdom (UK) government to reduce overall carbon emissions to
20% below 1990 levels by 2010, in support of the United Nations’ Kyoto Protocol, an
international program to mitigate climate change. The government has also indicated its
desire to achieve a 60% reduction by 2050. The electricity generation sector was the largest
carbon emitter in 2003, accounting for onethird of all UK carbon emissions. Although the
UK has more than enough renewable energy resources to meet reasonable estimates of
electricity demand in 2050, progress to date has been slow: renewable electricity generation
(currently at only 3%) looks unlikely to meet even the meagre 10% government target for
2010, and there is significant public resistance to onshore wind farms. This is largely because
the government has so far largely relied on ‘command and control’ policies (such as the
Renewables Obligation) and on the deregulated electricity market to reduce carbon emissions
from electricity generation. Left to the market alone, only existing, relatively cheap renewable
energy technologies such as onshore wind will be used, and the public response (coming after
the choice of technology) will most likely be negative.
But there is ample time for new, efficient and socially acceptable renewable energy
technologies to be created, and to diffuse to the extent where they can deliver all of our
electricity needs, by 2050. This paper briefly sets out the reasons that a carbonneutral, self
sufficient (e.g. sustainable) electricity supply is desirable for the UK, and explores how it
could be achieved using a portfolio of policy instruments to achieve technological ‘regime
change’ in the complex socioeconomictechnological system that is the UK electricity supply
industry. It proposes an alternative policy process, which starts with assessing the available
natural resources, engages public opinion on their appropriateness, and stimulates
technological innovation to extract energy from the preferred sources, in socially acceptable
ways, at economically acceptable costs. Recent government initiatives (such as the DTI
Renewables Innovation Review and development grants to tidal and wave energy projects)
indicate a new willingness to employ such a wider range of policy instruments to encourage a
lowcarbon electricity industry. However, significantly stronger political commitment will be
needed if the ‘regime change’ necessary to achieve a sustainable electricity supply is to be
achieved by 2050.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction................................................................................................................6
2 UK Renewable Energy Resources............................................................................12
2.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... ...........12
2.2 Photovoltaic................................................................................................................. .12
2.3 Biomass Energy............................................................................................ ...............13
2.4 Wave, Tidal and Marine Currents.............................................................................. 14
2.5 Wind.................................................................................................................. ...........15
2.6 Other Lowcarbon options............................................................................... ...........16
3 A Renewable UK Electricity Supply System: What Needs to Change....................18
3.1 Theory of Technological Systems............................................................................... .18
3.2 The Existing UK Electricity System..................................................................... ......20
3.3 Paths of Change.................................................................................................. .........23
3.4 UK Renewable Energy Options........................................................................... .......24
3.5 Invention and Innovation ............................................................................... ............27
3.6 Diffusion.................................................................................................................... ...28
3.7 Technological Regime Shifts....................................................................... ................32
4 Social Aspects of Regime Change in the UK Electricity Supply System ...............35
4.1 Technical Change as a Social Process............................................. ...........................35
4.2 Social Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply System .......................... ...37
4.3 Analysis of Social Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply System..........42
4.4 Policy Responses to Social Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply System
........................................................................................................................... .................47
5 Economic Aspects of Regime Change in the UK Electricity Supply System.........52
5.1 Technical Change as an Economic Process.......................................................... ......52
5.2 Analysing Economic Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply System.....56
5.3 Policy Response to Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply System.........61
6 Conclusion................................................................................................................68
7 Appendix Extracts from the Atlas of UK Marine Renewable Energy Resources
(DTI, 2004c)................................................................................................................71
8 References.................................................................................................................72
8.1 Print References:...................................................................................... ...................72
8.2 World Wide Web (WWW) References:.......................................... ...........................75
8.3 UK Political Party Policies WWW Sources:...................................................... ........78
8.4 WWW News Sources:......................................................................... ........................79
1 Introduction
The problem of climate change, caused primarily by energyrelated human activities,
is well established. The hottest ten years on record occurred between 1990 and 2003,
and in the past 100 years, world sea temperatures have risen by 0.6oC. The link
between climate change and the 50% increase in greenhouse gas concentration since
preindustrial times is now generally accepted (King, 2004, p176). The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change (IPCC, 2001a) has shown that stabilising
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration at 550 parts/million (ppm) by the end of
the 21st century would result in a global mean temperature increase of almost 3oC.
Even at this seemingly small temperature rise, there would be significant changes to
the climate, and major impacts on human well being are “very likely” (IPCC, 2003,
p1). The developed world (including the US) represents about 60% of global carbon
emissions (DTI, 2003, p24), but consumes more than 6 times as much energy per.
capita than the developing world (Boyle, 2003, p70). It is therefore clear that
significant reductions in emissions are required in the developed world, if
catastrophic climate change is to be avoided. This reflects the UNCCC principle of
‘contraction and convergence’. This is means that since the developed world has
caused most of the climate change problem, it therefore must be responsible for a
large part of its resolution. The developing world will be permitted to increase energy
use (within limits), and hence emissions (‘convergence’), while the developed world
reduces emissions (‘contraction’) (UFCCC 2005b).
The UK government is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol to mitigate climate change
(UNFCC, 2005a), and its policy is to strive for a 60% reduction in overall carbon
emissions by 2050. The desire to mitigate climate change has support from all of the
major UK political parties, and even from most minority parties1.
The Labour Party remains committed to Kyoto and renewable energy. According to
the party’s 2005 Election Manifesto, “a 60 per cent reduction by 2050 remains
necessary and achievable.” Similarly committed to Kyoto, the Conservative Party
supports a diverse approach to renewable energy, including offshore wind, wave,
tidal and biomass. Interestingly, the party commits to adjusting the Renewables
Obligation (RO)2 “to give more support for technologies that are close to market
breakthrough.” The strongest commitment from the leading parties comes from the
Liberal Democrats: 20% of UK electricity from renewables by 2020, increasing to 50%
by 2050. The party proposes to achieve this without replacing existing nuclear power
stations as they come to the end of their operating lives. Among the smaller parties,
the Green Party, the Scottish Nationalist Party and Plaid Cymru all support
renewable energy.
The primary anthropomorphic source of carbon dioxide is from the burning of fossil
fuels. Electricity power stations have been the largest source of UK CO2 emissions for
the last 30 years, and in 2003 accounted for one third of all emissions. However, over
1
Sources for party policies were taken from each party’s public web site on the 3rd May 2005. A list of
URLs is provided in the references section, but for clarity individual references have been omitted from
this paragraph.
2
The RO is a government set obligation for electricity generators to product 10% of their output from
renewable sources by 2010.
the same period, CO2 emissions per unit of electricity generated halved, mostly due
to the switch from coal to gas, and the increased contribution of nuclear power (DTI,
2004e, p18). This demonstrates the capacity of the electricity generating system to
reduce overall emissions.
Generating our electricity does not need to rely on fossil fuels. As I shall show
(Section 2), the UK has more than adequate natural, renewable energy resources to
meet likely 2050electricity demand. If a carbonneutral electricity supply can be
achieved, then we can use our carbon ‘budget’ for heating, where zero emission is
much more problematic. We can potentially also use carbonneutral electricity to
generate hydrogen for fuel cell powered transport.
In addition to carbonneutral, I have deliberately set out to investigate the options for
a selfsufficient UK electricity supply for two reasons. Firstly, Britain has enjoyed high
levels of energy selfsufficiency since the industrial revolution, initially through coal
and later oil and gas (Boyle, 2003, p72, 73). This energy selfsufficiency has protected
our economy (to some extent) from fluctuations in world energy prices. For instance,
when oil prices are high, UK oil company profits and government tax receipts
increase, partially offsetting the higher cost of energy to the overall economy. Both
British Gas (Macalister, 2005a) and BP (Macalister, 2005b) recently reported record
profits as a result of higher oil and gas prices. Fluctuating fossil fuel prices can only
persist, as most of the world’s oil and gas supplies are in politically volatile areas. The
remaining reserves of fossil fuels are mostly in the Middle East (with more reserves
in Iran than in the UAE and Saudi Arabia combined), in the former Soviet Union, and
in Nigeria (Foss, 2005). Also the pipelines that bring Russian gas to Western Europe
pass through politically unstable countries including the Ukraine and Belarus
(Hirschhausen et. al, 2005). The International Energy Association recently expressed
concern about the growing dependence of the EU on supplies of Russian gas piped
through the Ukraine and the monopoly ambitions of Gazprom, the state controlled
gas company (Mandil, 2005). During the 2005 UK election campaign, shadow
chancellor Oliver Letwin warned of the risk of “Putin turning off our gas” (Today,
BBC Radio 4, 25th April 2005). It is desirable that the protection of the UK from
volatile world fuel prices continues, through selfsufficiency, which can also
contribute to UK energy supply security. During 2003, the UK still produced slightly
more gas (9%) than it consumed. But at current production rates, reserves will be
exhausted well before 2020. There has been no increase in reserves (meaning no new
discoveries) since 2000, and at the current rate of production, less than 12 year’s
reserves remain. Electricity generation accounted for 30% of gas consumption in 2003
(DTI, 2004e, p11,15).
Secondly, while there are certainly viable options for importing renewable energy
sources (e.g. biomass and biodiesel from South America), this is dually unacceptable
on environmental grounds. Firstly, the energy costs of transport, and secondly the
ethical objection of exploiting peoples in other parts of the world, so that the UK can
enjoy a higher standard of living at their expense. In the past, the UK has itself
suffered most of the consequences of its own energy needs, in the form of soot and
smoke, coal mines, slag heaps, and North Sea rigs and oil/gas terminals in unspoiled
parts of the country. It would be a retrograde step to ‘export’ these consequences to
people in other parts of the world.
Essentially a carbonneutral and selfsufficient UK electricity supply, based on
renewable sources, would meet the definition of sustainable development defined by
the United Nations. That is “development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”
(United Nations, 1987, cited in Boyle, 2003, p6).
But to replace fossil fuel based electricity generation with renewable sources is a
major undertaking. The current cost and reliability concerns with renewable energy
will need to be addressed by further technological development. Public and
institutional acceptance of the impact of new and existing renewable technologies
will be necessary, and electricity generators will need to be encouraged to switch to
renewables. Essentially, major technical, economic and social changes need to happen
in the complex UK electricity supply system. The government has set a target for
generators to product 10% of their output from renewable sources by 2010 (the
Renewables Obligation). However, the choice of renewable energy type has been left
to the market, leading to an emphasis on onshore wind, as this is the cheapest
existing renewable technology. This in turn has led to public and institutional
opposition on aesthetic, environmental and economic grounds. Although recent
government policies have been more direct at encouraging the development of other
forms of renewable energy, I believe that the current policy process will not achieve a
sustainable UK electricity supply by 2050. I hope to establish that a revised policy
process could work, but renewed political commitment would be required to
implement it.
To design the revised policy process, I shall adopt a multidisciplinary approach to
evaluating how system change can be achieved, using frameworks from technology
theory (e.g. Hughes), environmental economics (e.g. Kemp and theories of induced
technical change), Science and Technology Studies (STS), Public Engagement with
Science and Technology (PEST), and environmental ethics. As well as drawing on
academic frameworks, I will examine the arguments for and (mostly) against
renewable energy as presented in the UK mass media.
Firstly, I shall briefly establish that the UK does indeed have the realisable natural
resources to met reasonable estimates of 2050 electricity demand (Section 2). Then I
shall briefly describe the current UK electricity supply system, and discuss the
changes that would be necessary to achieve sustainability by 2050 (Section 3). Having
established the changes to the system, I shall explore the accompanying social
(Section 4) and economic (Section 5) barriers to change, and suggest policies to
address or overcome these objections. In conclusion, I shall bring the technological,
social and economic policy process together.
2 UK Renewable Energy Resources
2.1 Introduction
The UK has significant renewable energy resources. This section describes the main
resource types, to establish that there are indeed adequate, exploitable resources to
meet reasonable estimates of 2050 electricity demand (see Section 3.4 for demand
assumptions).
2.2 Photovoltaic
The average sunlight energy falling on the surface of the United Kingdom is between
2 and 3kWh m2/day (Hill et all, 1995, Figure 7.3), equating to over 175 thousand
TWh/year3 falling on the whole country. This is over 400 times the UK’s energy
consumption. Current photovoltaic (PV) solar cell technology can convert sunlight to
electricity, at efficiencies of around 12% (e.g. Sharp, 2005). So with currently available
technology, about onefiftieth the UK land area could theoretically supply our total
electricity needs4. Rather than using valuable land, current initiatives are mostly
based on Building Integrated Photovoltaics (BVIP). The technical potential of this
resource has been calculated at 250TWh/year, but less than 40TWh is currently
achievable at reasonable cost (Gross, 2004, Table 1). While solar cell technology is not
new, there is still substantial scope for improvement: efficiencies as high as 30%have
been achieved with new experimental PV cells, and 40% might be achieved in the
future (Landsberg, 2002, p63). However, there is greater than 50:1 variation between
3
2 kwh/m2 times 365 days times UK area in meters (24 x1010) = 175.2 x1015 Wh = 175.2 thousand TWh.
4
175 thousand TWh x 12% divided by 50 = 420TWh. The DTI Renewable Innovations Review (DTI,
2004b p20) came to almost the same conclusion.
the best and worst days (Hill et all, 1995, Figure 7.5), with worstyear December
averages being only one twentieth of the annual average.
2.3 Biomass Energy
Short rotation crops such as coppice willow can provide carbonneutral energy. Dry
wood is burnt in modified boilers to generate steam, which is then used to drive
conventional turbines and generators. Although burning energy crops releases
carbon into the atmosphere, the short croprotation cycle effectively means that the
same quantity of carbon is recycled between crops and the atmosphere on a 35 year
cycle. In the United Kingdom, indications are that average yields of over 10 oven
dried tonnes/hectare/year are possible (Forest Research, 2003, p25). Each tonne of
dry willow is equivalent to an energy output of 19Gj (DeMonfort, 1998), or
approximately 278 KWh (Boyle et. al, 2003, table A2). At a 10 t/ha yield, one hectare
yields just over 50MWh, or perhaps 20MWh of electricity at a 40% efficiency factor.
So 10% of the total land area of the entire United Kingdom could yield almost
50TWh.6 Bauen, quoted in Gross, (2004, Table 1, note d), is more optimistic,
suggesting that 140TWh could be met from 10% of UK arable land. This would
require an electricity yield/hectare of three times greater than the calculations above:
for instance, generating efficiencies matching the best CCGT rates (60%), and a
doubling of the willow yield.
5
Although the source data are noted as ‘preliminary and not to be quoted’, they do give an approximate
indication, which is consistent with other sources such as DeMonfort, 1998.
6
The UK land area is just over 24 million hectares (DEFRA, 2004)
2.4 Wave, Tidal and Marine Currents
In 2004, the DTI published the Atlas of UK Marine Renewable Energy Resources
(DTI, 2004c), which gives power densities for offshore wind, wave and tidal
resources. While this is a very valuable source, it stops short of assessing the total
available or realisable resource. Therefore other sources have been used, but generally
there is a good correlation between the Atlas and other sources as noted. Extracts
from the Atlas are shown in Sections 7.1 through 7.5.
Wave. According to the WEC’s Survey of Energy Resources 2001, the UK is “arguably
one of the world’s best locations for establishing wave power, owing to the strength of
the resource” (WEC 2001e). Annual wave energy off the west of England are between
200 and 300 MWh/m, and as much as 700MWh/m off the west coast of Scotland and
Ireland (Hill et. al., 1995, Figure 7.36). Section shows a large area off Scotland with
wave energy above 50kW/m. This is equal to over 400MWh/m/year. Taking a
conservative average of 300MWh/m/year, it would take 1333km of wave power to
supply the entire UK electricity demand7. This is about the length of the United
Kingdom. Gross puts the technical potential at 700TWh, with a practicable potential
of 50TWh.
Tidal. The west of the UK has a tidal range of 10 meters (Hill et all, 1995, Figure 7.34),
providing some of the “most favourable conditions in the world for the utilisation of
tidal power “. Tidal power is best harnessed in estuaries. There is an estimated
potential of 50TWh from large barrages (WEC, 2001a), with an additional 36 TWh
7
400TWh at 300MWh/m is 1.333 x106 meters, or 1333 Km.
technically feasible from tidal stream (Gross, 2004, Table 1). Feasibility studies have
been carried out for the Severn estuary (8.6GW) and Mersey estuary (700 MW), and
for four smaller schemes totalling almost 200MW. These schemes have not yet been
implemented, due to high cost and possible environmental concerns about wildlife in
the estuaries (WEC, 2001a).
Marine Currents. According to the WEC, the UK has an exceptionally high marine
current energy resource. While “few studies have been carried out to determine the
total global marine current resource”, (WEC, 2001d), it has been estimated that the
UK could have as much as 25GW (Bryden & Macfarlane, 2000, p893), equal to one
third of our current total electricity generation capacity (ref. Table 1). Commercial
undersea turbines are at the technology demonstration phase: Marine Current
Turbines Ltd. installed a 300kW prototype turbine at Lynmouth in 2003 (MCT, 2003).
Capacities are expected to grow to over 1MW in the near future (MCT, 2005). It is
estimated that over almost 40 turbines can be installed in a square kilometre of
seabed (WEC, 2001d), such that harnessing the potential 25GW would require about
650 square kilometres of seabed, or an area 10 kilometres wide by 65 long – smaller
than the Isle of Wight. Assuming a conservative 60% dutycycle (because energy
production is lower as the tide turns), 25GW is equal to almost 100TWh.8
2.5 Wind
Wind is the most substantial UK renewable energy resource by far. Average wind
speeds are greater than 12.5 m/s off much of the East Coast, and up to 17.5 m/s off
8
25GW x60% = 15GW, x24 x365 = 95.4TWh
the West Coast of Ireland. Section 7 shows the locations of the offshore wind
resource. A substantial part of the mainland averages better than 10 m/s (Hill et. al.,
1995, Figure 7.32). Most wind turbines deliver their full rated power at wind speeds of
between 12 and 25 m/s (e.g. Vestas, 2001). Wind is a variable resource, but while
some onshore areas of the UK experience calm days almost half of the time, for the
offshore areas only one day in 5 (20%) are calm on average. Wind also tends to be
strongest in the winter, when energy demand is highest (Hill et. al., 1995, Figure 7.33).
The onshore technical potential has been estimated at over 300 TWh, but offshore
resources are ten times that, standing at 3,000 TWh. Gross quotes DTI assessments
that 100TWh of offshore power are practically realisable, but this is from a 1998
report and only includes thencommercially viable sites. In fact, the DTI proposed
strategic offshore regions could provide almost 700TWh within territorial waters, and
more than a further 400TWh outside. These are all at water depths of between 5 and
30m. (Gross, 2004, Table 5).
2.6 Other Low-carbon options
Other renewable energy sources such as geothermal and hydroelectric do exist, but
the UK does not have substantial geothermal resources (WEC, 2001b), and has
already exploited large available hydroelectric resources. 9. Currently hydro accounts
for about 2% of UK generating capacity (DUKES 5.11, 2004). Gross gives the practical
potential of additional small hydro at only 3TWh/year (Gross, 2004, Table 1). The
WEC estimates that the UK has a theoretical potential of 40TWh of hydroelectricity,
of which only 3TWh is technically realisable today (WEC, 2001c, Table 7.1).
There are also a number of other (nonrenewable) lowcarbon technologies emerging,
such as pumping CO2 emissions into exhausted oil and gas reservoirs in the North
Sea. Like carbon sequestration and nuclear (fusion or fission), these do not meet the
renewable objective (and therefore are not sustainable), although they can
significantly reduce carbon emissions. Nuclear fusion is considered even by the
scientists working on its development to be at least 30 to 35 years away from
demonstration (EFDA, 2003, page 4), let alone commercial viability, and has therefore
been discounted.
3 A Renewable UK Electricity Supply System: What Needs to Change
3.1 Theory of Technological Systems
To assess what needs to change, we need to analyse the UK electricity supply system.
The point of considering large technological enterprise as a system is that all the
components are interrelated, and changes in one will influence the whole. Hughes
defines the components of a technological system as artefacts or organisations.
Artefacts include the physical components such as electrical generating and
distribution equipment, while organisations include manufacturers of equipment,
utilities, investors and regulators. According to Hughes, technological systems are
“both socially constructed and society shaping” (Hughes, 1987, p51). Natural
resources, such as coal and wind, are also considered as part of the overall system.
(Hughes, 1987).
Technological systems evolve over time, and pass through distinct patterns of
evolution. Once a technology or technological component of the system becomes
commercially viable, the market development phase involves the marketplace and
potential users (in the case of electricity, the electricity utilities) as well. Hughes
differentiates between invention (new technologies, products) and innovation, with
the latter being the process by which inventions are incorporated into the overall
system, and refined and made less expensively. An important aspect of this phase is
technology transfer, where new technologies diffuse into the marketplace and
become standardised (Hughes, 1987).
Hughes describes the emergent characteristics of a given technological systems as
“technological style”, which feeds the social criteria into the evolution process. The
role of people and politics is not just in the initial creation of the system, but also that
of completing the feedback loop between system performance and system goal, to
“correct errors in system performance” (Hughes, 1987, p54).
While Hughes’ model was developed to describe the emergence of new technological
systems, it can also help in analysing how mature technological systems can be made
to change, in response to changing ‘system goals’. For instance, reducing greenhouse
gas emissions has emerged as a new system goal for the UK electricity system, but
long after that system reached maturity. Hughes gives us two specific concepts that
describe potential barriers to change in established technological systems:
Technological momentum is the tendency of large technological systems to resist
change, sometimes called ‘lockin’. As technologies mature, ‘learning curve’ effects
reduce costs (see section 5.1). Any new technology starts from a high costbase, and
will appear uncompetitive, creating ‘lockin’ to the old technology. Hughes points
out that the ‘momentum’ concept does not contradict ‘social construction’ theories of
technology, and does not imply technological determinism, since although a system
may possess momentum, its direction can still be changed (Hughes, 1987, p7680).
Technological momentum is the process by which the incumbent (existing) system resists
change.
Reverse Salients are elements of a technological system that fall behind the
development of the overall system, and hold back further progress. Hughes describes
how the best engineers assess these as a set of ‘critical problems’ whose resolution
would bring the system back into line (Hughes, 1983, p79/80). Reverse salients are
problems with a new technological system, which delay it supplanting an incumbent system.
3.2 The Existing UK Electricity System
Changing the UK electricity system to renewable sources starts from the existing
(incumbent) system. This acts a single system, most obviously for the technical reason
that electricity cannot currently be stored, at the scale of national electricity
consumption (Patterson, 1999, p4). Since 1990, electricity supply in the United
Kingdom has shifted from a stateowned monopoly to a regulated competitive
market. Although only the regulator Ofgem (ofgem, 2005a), and BNFL, remain under
government ownership, there is still a distinction between the monopoly parts of the
business (distribution and transmission) and supply and generation that are subject
to competition. Since the original flotation on the stock market of 7 generators, the
National Grid (responsible for transmission) and the regional electricity companies
(responsible for distribution and supply) (Electricity Association, 2002, 2003), there
has been considerable consolidation. Generation remains very competitive, with
electricity traded under the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA10). Under
this scheme, both bilateral contracts and trading on power exchanges are permitted.
To balance supply and demand, generators must notify the National Grid one day in
10
Now extended to Scotland as British Electricity Trading Arrangements (BETA)
advance the level at which they wish to supply for each halfhour (Helms, 2003,
p315). Since privatisation, many more generation companies have emerged, but the
market is still highly concentrated, with the top 10 generators holding over 75% of
total generating capacity (Table 1). These powerful institutions, many of which are
involved in distribution and retailing of electricity as well, create considerable
technological momentum as they are strongly aligned to fossil fuel and nuclear
generation.
Table 1: UK Electricity Generating Companies, May 2004
Share of
total UK Retail Business
Company Distribution
generating supply supply
capacity
British Energy (nuclear) 16% y
Scottish Power 12% y y y
RWE Innogy Plc 11% y y
EDF Energy 7% y y y
PowerGen 6% y y
Scottish & Southern Energy plc 6% y y y
American Electric Power 5%
Drax Power Ltd 5%
BNFL British Nuclear Group 3%
Centrica 2% y y
More than 25 others 26% na na na
Total (73.7 GW) 100%
Source: data from DUKES, 2004, 5.11 and Company web sites, accessed 20th May 2005.
When considering a shift to renewables, as well as understanding the institutional
structure, the physical infrastructure is important. For generators, the size and
location of power station, and fuel used is an important factor: most equipment is
designed for only a single fuel type, and the life of generating systems is measured in
tens of years, creating longterm momentum against change in fuel type. The
technological momentum under the nationalised Central Electricity Generating
Board (CEGB) was for large power stations, mostly coalfired, and large nuclear
stations mostly in remote coastal areas – as can be seen from Section 7, many of these
are still in operation. Table 2 indicates the current fuel sources: importantly almost all
of the current nuclear capacity will be retired by 2023 (except Sizewell B: 2035)
(Nuclear Industry Association, 2005) and the gas generating capacity is all relatively
new, having been installed since 1990 (DTI, 2004e, p18).
Table 2: UK Generating Capacity by Fuel Type May 2004
Fuel Share
Coal 39%
Gas 31%
Nuclear 16%
Other 13%
Total 100%
Source: data from DUKES, 2004, 5.11
The recent change in momentum to smaller, more distributed Combined Cycle Gas
Turbines (CCGT) was as a result of the breakup of the monopoly CEGB following
privatisation, technological innovation in CCGT design (they became cheaper
through economies of scale as more units were sold world wide), and the falling cost
of natural gas. This is a negative technological momentum for renewables, as the
plant is all relatively new, and the mature technology is cheap causing lockin. On the
other hand, the retiring of the nuclear plant is positive for renewables, creating
opportunities for replacement (renewable) generating plant.
3.3 Paths of Change
The changes in the UK electricity supply system required to support the shift to
renewable energy sources would be significant. Patterson (1999, p119) describes the
transition as “bumpy”, believing that both winners and losers will emerge, along
with changes that may appear arbitrary, incoherent and inconsistent, especially in the
early stages. To Patterson, the most significant change is that from centralised to
decentralised generation (ibid, p129). Patterson classifies the choices as technical,
financial and institutional.
Technical choices include:
 Fuel or energy sources: fossil fuel/nuclear or renewables?
 Centralised or distributed? For example, 15 very large nuclear power stations
(Section 7) currently account for 16% of generating capacity, but even with the
largest current wind turbines, over 5,000 units would be needed11.
Financial choices include:
 Government or private funding
 Government or market price determination
Ignoring the lower load factor with wind, which would in reality mean perhaps twice as many wind
11
turbines for the same annual energy output. Load factor is the proportion of time that generating
systems are able to operate at their rated output.
 Who bears the risks: government or shareholders
Institutional choices include:
 Centralised (government, monopoly supplier) or decentralised (market,
social) decision making about the evolution of the system. (Patterson,
p138/9).
3.4 UK Renewable Energy Options
Electricity demand in the United Kingdom grew at an annual rate of almost 9%
between the world wars, and by almost 7% during the 1950’s and 1960’s: but after
1980, annual growth slowed to under 2% (Janes, 2002, p23, chart 3), and since 2000 it
has averaged just over 1%. In 2003, total demand was just under 400TWh (DUKES,
2004, table 5.2). It is reasonable to assume that energy saving initiatives can have
some impact on demand: indeed the 3 of the four 2050 scenarios created by the Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP, 2000, p173) significant demand
reductions are assumed. For the purpose of this analysis, I have used a 2050 annual
demand of 400TWh. This allows for savings of electricity from energyefficiency
initiatives to be used to reduce other carbonemission sources such as transport,
probably through using renewable (carbonneutral) electricity to generate hydrogen
for fuel cell powered transport.
We can apply Patterson’s ‘choices’ to the renewable energy options for UK electricity.
New, renewable generating plant needs to be built: from the assessment of the UK’s
renewable resources, it is clear that a mix of centralised and decentralised will be
needed, but with a major shift towards decentralised generation. There is also a
current regime of government funding for early technology and market development,
but with private industry providing the bulk of funding. Private businesses also own
the assets, and therefore their shareholders bear the financial risks. And finally,
regulation is through Ofgem (ofgem, 2005a) but with a largely privatised, market
based industry. Achieving a carbonneutral and selfsufficient electricity supply by 2050
will require a reevaluation of each of these choices.
Table 3 shows the renewable options and possible contribution to this level of 2050
demand, and summarises the ‘reverse salients’ and social impacts that are holding
back exploitation of these resources.
In the following sections, I combine Hughes’s model and classification of the
invention, innovation and diffusion stages of technological systems, with Patterson’s
more specific choices for electricity supply systems, to analyse the specific changes
necessary in the current UK system to achieve the renewable objective.
Table 3 – UK Renewable Energy Options
Renewable Practical Current Indicative Technological Distributed

Source maximum generating social/environmental /economic or
contributio cost13 impact at practical ‘reverse centralised
n12 maximum salients’15 generation
contribution level14 model?16
Biomass 35% 515 10% of arable land Biomass yields Can be either:
under coppice willow. and generating transport
efficiency. costs lower if
distributed17.
Photovoltaics 9% 5080 300 million m2 of PV Cost and Highly
(UK, grid panels, equivalent to efficiency. distributed
connected) about 3x5m for every Backup and for UK as
UK household. intermittency. building
integrated PV.
Wave 23% 820 300km of offshore Immature Distributed
wave power devices. technology
Tidal estuary 22% 12 Major estuary Very high Centralised
barrages including capital cost. (e.g. Severn
Severn and Mersey. Barrage)
Marine 25% 815 Undersea turbines Immature Distributed
Current covering area similar technology
to the Isle of Wight.
Offshore 35% 610 16,000 offshore 5GW Grid and Distributed
Wind turbines, in 10km installation
deep strips, total challenges.
length 444km Cost. Backup
and
intermittency.
Onshore 2% 35 2,500 onshore 2GW Backup and Distributed
Wind turbines, occupying a intermittency.
total of about 420 km2
(a 21km square).
Total 150%
12
From Section 2
13
From Owen, 2004, Table 1 p 141. Eurocents/kWh. Compare to coal at 35, gas at 24, and nuclear at 46
(I believe that this excludes nuclear waste storage and decommissioning costs).
14
Author’s calculations based on nearterm technology options.
15
Author’s assessment based on Gross, 2004 and Boyle et. al., 2003.
16
Author’s assessment based on Gross, 2004 and Boyle et. al., 2003.
17
For example, the Elean Power Station (36MW) near Ely draws straw for its fuel from farms within a 50
mile radius (DTI, 2003, p56).
3.5 Invention and Innovation
Although there is a wide range of renewable technologies available, those for marine
current and wave are still immature (DTI, 2003, p57). Characteristic of this stage of a
technology, there are a number of competing designs, and we cannot be certain that
the best technological solution has yet emerged. Therefore further innovation is likely
to be required. Here there is the choice between government and private research
and development. It is estimated that wave and tidal technologies may become
commercially viable from 2015 (DTI, 2003, p55). For other, more mature, technologies
including photovoltaics, prices are still too high for this to be able to compete with
fossil fuel generated electricity (DTI, 2003, p55). Therefore further cost reduction will
be required. Cost is clearly an important part of the way in which new technologies
are chosen, particularly with a competitive market such like the UK electricity
market. Capital costs of generating equipment are not the only component of the cost:
installation and operating costs for some renewable technologies are presently
significant. In the case of offshore wind, this is because of the immature support and
installation infrastructure system in the UK at present18. Therefore there will need to
be changes to the support and installation system for the UK electricity system –
moving away from large, land based systems towards distributed offshore support
systems. The scale of this change is significant: installing and maintaining 16,000
turbines occupying over 4,000 square kilometres, probably in 4 or 5 separate offshore
For instance, in 2004 there were only 2 boats capable of installing offshore wind equipment in the UK.
18
Source: conversation with an nPower Renewables project manager at BIEE conference, October 2004.
areas is a major challenge. New firms, new support technologies and probably new
systems of regulation will be required. The technological momentum of the
incumbent organisational structures will need to be overcome. So as well as technical
innovation, institutional and organisational innovation will be needed: for instance,
new safety regulations for working on offshore turbines will probably be needed.
3.6 Diffusion
The most significant challenges will be in the diffusion of renewable energy
technologies from their current level of below 3% to 100%, over the 45 years to 2050.
Apart from the simple buildout of generating capacity, ancillary changes will be
needed in the electricity distribution system, and storage facilities will need to be
established to maintain security of supply in light of the intermittency of many
renewable sources.
Buildout: In their study ‘Sea Wind East’, Greenpeace (2002, piii) showed that 25% of
the UK’s electricity supply could come from wind farms situated offshore from East
Anglia by 2020. They modelled the installation rates (based on 3MW turbines) over
the period 2003 – 2020, and showed that with a steady rampup from 2010, that the
target installed capacity of 30GW was feasible by 2020 (ibid, p5 and Figure 3). Clearly
as Greenpeace described, significant infrastructure changes would be needed to
support this deployment: they estimate that, based on similar experiences in
Denmark, that 600,000 people would be directly employed in the new industry by
2020. On the basis of the Greenpeace study (which is perhaps optimistic since it
supports Greenpeace’s policies), achieving 35% of our electricity from offshore wind
will need significant but not impossible changes in the support industry, and is easily
achievable by 2050. Similar buildout rates can be expected for other renewable
technologies.
Distribution: Many renewable sources are remote from demand centres (Gross, 2004,
p1915). Sections 7.1 through 7.5 show the respective locations of offshore renewable
energy resources, along with the current National Grid. It is clear from these that
changes will be need to the electricity distribution system, primarily to the National
Grid. According to the Energy White Paper (DTI, 2003, p48), “distribution networks
will have to be capable of accommodating many more directly connected generators.”
However, as can be seen from Sections 7.1 and there is some correlation between the
location of nuclear power stations and offshore wind (particularly in East Anglia),
which could result in capacity becoming available as nuclear stations close down.
Apart from extending and reinforcing the grid to carry the output of offshore wave,
tide and wind generation, most biomass generation will be in the countryside to
minimise fuel transport costs and disruption, requiring further changes to the
distribution system. Because the technology to make the necessary changes to the
grid already exists, this is an example of technological momentum or lockin, which
must be overcome to enable the shift towards renewables.
Storage: Perhaps the most significant challenge (reverse salient) with renewable
energy sources is the intermittency of supply19. In the current National Grid, supply
and demand are constantly matched by adjusting the output of power stations. The
load can vary between about 20GW on a summer night, to over 50GW on a cold
winter evening (Boyle, 2003, p378). Storing large amounts of electricity is currently
difficult, but the UK already has a number of pumpedstorage facilities, where
during periods of low demand water is pumped up into reservoirs, to be used to
generate hydroelectric power to cope with subsequent peaks in demand. Currently
the total storage capacity in the UK is 2GW, or 5% of the typical winter demand.
However, both wind and PV sources are very unpredictable, with PV negatively
correlated with demand (most output on sunny days when demand is lower (Hill,
1995, p130)), and wind weakly positively correlated with demand (it’s generally
windier in the winter when demand is higher – see Section ). Luckily “wind regimes
are generally more stable offshore” (Gross, 2004, p1911). Of the renewable options,
biomass is both predictable and controllable, while tidal and marine current sources
are predictable. Backup through renewable overcapacity (or emergency CCGT
backup) can help to deal with demand peaks, but storage will also likely be needed to
cope with peaks in demand, when available resources are insufficient. For instance,
at night (no PV), on calm days (less wind resources), and even as the tide turns
(interruption to tidal resources). The ability to forecast sun and wind resources more
A detailed technical assessment of the challenges associated with integrating intermittent sources of
19
electrical power into distribution grids is outside the scope of this paper, but an overview will be found
in the Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity’s Position Paper on Integrating Wind
Power in the European Power Systems.
accurately for load planning is another ‘reverse salient’ which will need to be
resolved to enable the switch to renewable energy sources.
Referring back to table 3, the impact of 50% overcapacity can be seen – removing PV
(9%), tidal estuary (22%), and half of wind and wave (26%) still leaves 93% of current
demand available to be filled by stored energy. Clearly there is a tradeoff possible
between overcapacity, backup and storage – the optimum ratio will depend upon the
relative costs and social/environmental impact of each option. Pumped storage is not
the only option. Hydrogen fuel cell technology is maturing fast, to the point where
there are hydrogenpowered buses in London (TFL, 2005). According to a study
based on the Irish case, combining hydrogen production through electrolysis of water
with wind energy would not only provided storage, but in highpenetrations of wind
power allowed surplus energy, which would otherwise be wasted, to be captured for
use in transport (Gonzalez et. el, 2003). Technological innovation is needed to
continue the costreduction and improvement of fuel cell technology. While fuel cell
capacities need to increase for Grid connection, it is also possible to use multiple fuel
cells, either on a distributed basis near to load centres, or colocated with, for
example, wind turbines.
In summary, due to the intermittent nature of many renewable resources,
significantly increased electricity storage and better methods of resource and load
forecasting and management are essentially a ‘reverse salient’ in Hughes’ terms.
Without resolution, it will not be possible to maintain security and reliability of
electricity supply, which is a major government objective according to the Energy
White Paper (DTI, 2003, p76). However, moving to a diverse mix of renewable sources
such as that indicated in table 3 will decrease the UK’s dependence on imported
fossil fuels with increasingly volatile prices, which at least brings the control of
supply security within the span of control of the UK government.
3.7 Technological Regime Shifts
The changes necessary to achieve a sustainable (carbonneutral, selfsufficient) UK
electricity supply are resounding. In Kemp’s terms, they represent more than a
change to the existing technological regime: they represent the emergence of a new
technological regime. What is needed is a ‘regime shift’ in the UK electricity system.
The characteristics of technological ‘regime shift’ are: the emergence of new
knowledge and experience; the existence of early niche markets; the scope for
extension to overcome initial limitations and achieve cost reductions; and the
establishment of a new actor network including suppliers, customers and regulators.
The “semicoordinated actions” of these actors are needed to bring about regime
shift, and to overcome or accommodate social opposition and consumer resistance.
Understanding technological change on this basis can identify appropriate
inducement policies, aimed at achieving the various elements of a technological
regime shift. For instance, rather than just encouraging appropriate research (as
might be suggested by traditional economic models), it leads to policies to encourage
early niche markets, perhaps through government procurement, taxation, or subsidy
etc (Kemp, 1997, 13.4).
The key elements of a sustainable UK electricity regime, compared to the incumbent
system, are:
 Achieving better understanding of renewable resource potential and
predictability.
 Creating new, costeffective generating technologies to extract electricity from the
resources. Many such technologies exist already, but not in commercially viable
forms.
 Realigning the electricity distribution and control systems to accommodate a
greater contribution from distributed generation.
 Addition of storage and new load management methods to accommodate the
intermittence of many renewable sources.
 The shift from few, large projects (e.g. large power station construction) towards
repeatable, systemised implementation leveraging volumemanufacturing
economies (e.g. 16,000 offshore wind turbines).
Each of these implies technical, social, institutional and economic challenges and
changes. Old institutions and ways of thinking will be challenged, and through
technological momentum will resist change. But the transition to the new regime will
not happen without an “accumulation of sociocultural, economic, ecological and
institutional changes” (Kemp, 2003, p8). The need is to shift from ‘technical fixes’ to
systems change (Kemp & Loorbach, 2003, p5). The primary characteristic of such
resounding change is uncertainty, with the actual path being less important than the
longterm goal (Kemp & Loorbach, 2003, p4, p14). There is ample time for the
necessary technological solutions to emerge, diffuse and mature before 2050: the key
determinants of change will be society’s willingness to create change, and the
economics of how that change is stimulated and achieved. The following sections
explore these factors.
4 Social Aspects of Regime Change in the UK Electricity Supply System
4.1 Technical Change as a Social Process
To those groups of academics that have studied technology from the outside, the
process of technical change is as much as social process as it is a technical process.
Technological determinism, which suggests that technologies have inherent paths,
along which they proceed regardless of social and economic influences, is generally
rejected as a valid theory. For instance, in the field of Science and Technology Studies
(STS), Law and Callon (in Bijker & Law, 1994, p17) have shown that while it “is
possible to discern a trajectory”, for specific technological developments, that there
was “nothing natural or inevitable about that trajectory”. Rather, it is the result of the
“twists and turns as social and technical circumstances change”. In the same book,
Bjiker shows that the common ideas that science leads to technology, which in turn
leads to products, is far too simplistic. He cities the example of the fluorescent lamp,
which was designed during “what orthodox economic theory would call its diffusion
stage”(ibid, p18). Bjiker (1991) reinforces this view, describing how the development
of the bicycle was nonlinear, and included many failed developments as well as the
eventual successful design. Hughes’ argument, cited in Bjiker & Law (1994) is that
successful technologies are those where the entrepreneurs thought in system terms,
considering the technology’s “social, political and economic context” (p12). But
historical examples of technological evolution show that “technologies are born out
of conflict, difference or resistance.” (ibid, p9). What is important is how “closure”20 is
achieved (ibid, p13). Bijker concludes that “technology is never purely technological:
it is also social.” (1994, p305).
Although seldom a simple liner progression, new energy technologies pass through
Hughes’s phases: invention, innovation and diffusion. The innovation phase is
characterised by a search and selection process (Freeman & Soete, 1997), where
technological options are evaluated and tested, resulting in one or more successful
outcomes. During diffusion, these begin to be incorporated into the energy system,
and the new technology starts to take over from its successor. For energy systems, the
time scales involved are long (50 to 100 years – see Figure 1 as an example) – yet
comparable to the time scales involved in climate change. The obvious stage where
the public needs to be involved is at the diffusion stage, where promotional
techniques and government policies can encourage adoption. But recalling that
technology is a social process, this is too late to incorporate social considerations, and
is the cause of much of the current resistance to change in the UK electricity supply
system. Social considerations are just as important during the innovation phase of
new energy technologies: social inputs should be incorporated in the search and
selection process during the development of new technologies. This can help to
minimise public and institutional resistance, by avoiding technological options that
are socially unacceptable, or by addressing concerns earlier in the process.
“The process by which conflicting groups reach (or impose) a specific outcome and so conclude the
20
dispute” (Bjiker & Law, 1994, p13).
Figure 1 – Sources of Primary Energy, 18601998

Source: Versluis, 2002, Figure 7.
4.2 Social Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply System
There are inherent contradictions in the public responses to climate change and
renewable energy. While opinion polls over the last 20 years or more demonstrate
that the majority of the public support renewable energy, there is significant public
opposition to onshore wind, the most advanced (and hence currently cheapest) form
of renewable energy. I believe that the lack of sensitivity to public concerns about
onshore wind farms (and to a lesser extent biomass power stations) has resulted in a
bad public image for all renewable energy sources. If the UK is to achieve a
sustainable electricity supply by 2050, these social objections need to be understood,
and accommodated or overcome.
Public opinion surveys since the early 1980s (even before the problem of climate
change was well known) have consistently shown that more than 50%of the UK
population is in favour of renewable energy, rising to between 60% and then over
80% in the early 1990s. Over half even supported wind power (Walker, 1995, Tables 1
and 2). More recently, a Guardian/ICM poll (Guardian/ICM, 2005, table 12) showed
that 69% of the sample supported the building of a wind farm within 20 miles of
their homes, compared to only 19% supporting the building of a nuclear power
station. Significantly, the support for wind farms was fairly consistent across social
class and age groups, gender, region and political views: the lowest level of support
(62%) was among 1824 year olds, while the highest (77%) was among those in social
class C1. Similarly, 78% felt that “people like themselves” should fit solar panels to
their houses (lowest 69%, highest 80%) (ibid table 14).
But when wind farms are proposed, objections are raised. To assess the type of
objection being raised, I reviewed the online editions of several national newspapers
and the BBC News on the 22nd June 2005, backed up by print copies of several recent
articles. A search was carried out for “wind farm” and “windfarm” on each web site,
and the resulting ‘hits’ since the start of 2005 were analysed. While this is by no
means a statistically valid exercise, it does give an indication of what the general
public is saying and being told about objections to renewable energy: the latter is
important because it is part of the process of opinionforming.
The Daily Mirror and Daily Mail had little coverage, with only one negative report
between them (in the Mirror, 6th June). This was about the suspected link between
the death of baby seals and an offshore wind farm. Coverage in the Mail was
generally favourable, including an online reader’s poll that indicated 58% in favour of
more wind farms.
The Telegraph online search yielded over 30 pieces mentioning wind farms, roughly
half against and half neutral. These included several letters and one opinion column
(Peter Simple, 22/4/05), which included the following quote: “should everything which
is still called the "countryside" be absorbed in the industrial system by which we are doomed
to live?” Stories included coverage of botanist David Bellamy’s objections to wind
farms (30th May 2005), neutral coverage of potential expansion of wind farms in the
Lake District and Yorkshire Dales (6th May 2005), and a report of falling property
prices due to a wind farm (26th Jan. 2005).
As would be expected for a leftleaning paper, Guardian Unlimited site (The
Guardian, The Observer) had the highest number of pieces on wind farms, many
favourable, but also several reports about wind farm controversies. For example
Tilting at windmills: nation split over energy eyesores (22nd May 2005, Observer), which
includes coverage of ecologist James Lovelock’s opposition to wind energy and
support for nuclear power to combat climate change. A similar report in The
Guardian (20th April 2005) Battle of the turbines splits green lobby, in which a protestor
summed up the problem as: “essentially comes down to this. The colour, shape, form and
movement of the physical infrastructure is obviously manmade”.
Not all of the coverage in The Guardian was favourable: author Robert Mcfarlane’s
‘comment’ piece on 26th February 2005 describes a proposed development on the
island of Lewis: “you may as well take a knife to a Constable”. He describes wind farms
as a “wounding of British culture” and a “young industry of uncertain effectiveness”
(Mcfarlane, 2005). But on April 26th 2005, Guardian correspondent George Monbiot
summed up opposition to a wind farm at Winash as follows:
“The people fighting the new wind farm in Cumbria have cheated and exaggerated. They
appear to possess little understanding of the dangers of global warming. They are
supported by an unsavoury coalition of nuclearpower lobbyists and climatechange
deniers. But it would still be wrong to dismiss them.”
This aggressive claim has some basis, as the campaign group Country Guardians
(which was cofounded by Sir Bernard Ingham, a consultant to the nuclear industry),
had been found by the Advertising Standards Authority to have exaggerated the size
and number of wind turbines planned (Monbiot, 2005).
Finally, the BBC News search yielded about 70 stories since the start of the year. Due
to the large number, the only the most recent 20 were reviewed. Reports were mostly
factual, but they included an article about a Welsh offshore wind farm, described by
the Campaign for the Protection of Rural Wales as "a quick energy fix" that spoiled the
landscape (BBC News Wales, 16th June). There was also a report (19th May, BBC
Election Bus in Windermere) about the controversy over plans for Cumbrian wind
turbines, where the protagonists clearly displayed their entrenched positions:
“Even from several miles away, it is clear that a major wind farm on the ridge of the fell
would change the wild landscape irrevocably, something the 'No Whinash Wind Farm"
group is determined to prevent”
“But Whinash is the perfect site, counters Steve Molloy, project manager for West Coast
Energy, … The wind resource here is excellent, and this is a very remote site.”
The Winash public enquiry is a good example of the allegiances and objections that
are being raised about onshore wind farms. According to the Guardian (Ward, 2005),
it has “split [the] green lobby”. National Parks authorities, the Campaign for Protection
of Rural England, the Countryside Agency and popular figures including David
Bellamy, Melvyn Bragg and Chris Bonington are lined up against the developers
(West Coast Energy), who are supported by both Greenpeace and Friends of the
Earth. The local pressure group ‘No Winash Wind Farm’ were reported as saying that
the development would “desecrate a rare and delicate upland habitat”, continuing
“numerous reports now question the efficiency and economics of wind turbines” (Ward,
2005). The word “desecration” was also used by local landowner the seventh Earl of
Lonsdale, while the technical limitations of wind power were emphasised by the
Royal Academy of Engineering: “the National Grid could never cope with the unreliability
of wind” (Leake, 2005).
Feelings clearly run deep on both sides, with the visual impact being the most
significant concern. Importantly, most of the objections are very localised – compare
this with the support for wind farms within 20 miles uncovered by the
Guardian/ICM survey – especially as visual effects from wind turbines are generally
restricted to 6km (IEA, 2002, p150). This is supported by a report in the Financial
Times (Little, 2005) quoting a resident living near to a wind farm in the Humber
Estuary, who was initially swayed by anti arguments: “It was a bit of a damp squib.. no
one noticed them. In fact they look quote good.”
As can be seen above, objections are primarily against onshore wind farms, but are
starting to ‘overspill’ to offshore farms. There have also been objections to biomass
power stations (e.g. Upreti & van der Horst, 2003), and longrunning controversy
over the proposed Severn Barrage, where most objections are based on the impact on
the estuary wildlife (BBC, 2003). But as yet there are no significant objections to wave
or tidal power (perhaps because there are hardly any installations).
4.3 Analysis of Social Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply System
The objections to wind farms seem to fall into two distinct groups: perceived
problems with the technology itself (cost, reliability etc), and perceived problems
with the relationship of the technology to the environment. Cost and reliability
concerns are dealt with in Section 5.2, so that leaves us with wind farms (as a proxy
for renewable energy technology) in ‘nature’. It’s important to analyse these
objections, firstly to accommodate or overcome the current objections, but also to
help anticipate objections to other renewable energy sources, and to the systemwide
changes that the shift to renewables might entail.
Since many of the objections hinge around the ‘unnaturalness’ of wind turbines, it is
useful to understand what people mean by ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’. According to
Williams (1967, p223), since the 18th century, the word ‘nature’ has been associated
with goodness, innocence, countryside and unspoiled places – especially the contrast
between town and country. Environmental philosophers have suggested three
(somewhat contradictory) definitions of ‘nature’21:
 That which is independent of human agency (Mill, 1874)
 Anything done by any organism including human beings (Plotkin, 2003, p17)
 Those actions in human behaviour that are in harmony with our evolutionary
history (Rolston, 1989, p31)
Applying these to the Cumbrian Fells, the first is unworkable, as along with the rest
of the country, the Fells have been altered by Man over the millennia: the concept of
nature as wilderness is long gone in the UK (Adams, 1996, p102). The second does
nothing to illuminate the debate: both Fells and wind farms are ‘done by organisms
including human beings’. The third definition is most useful, prompting discussions
around what is ‘in harmony with our evolutionary history’. I believe that this is what
the debate is about: the conflicting objectives of (a) protecting our world from climate
change so that we can continue to thrive, and (b) protecting the few remaining areas
of Britain which are relatively untouched by humans, and enjoyable as ‘natural’
aesthetic spaces. Both objectives are in harmony with our evolutionary history.
What makes this debate even more problematic is that the usual roles and arguments
are mixed up. The objective of the wind farms is to mitigate climate change. With
climate change now supported by scientific evidence, the normal roles are reversed:
those protecting the environment (including Greenpeace) are using ‘rational’
21
References cited in Environmental Ethics MSc module lecture notes.
arguments, while those objecting (or protecting only their local environment?) use
emotion (including botanist – scientist David Bellamy). Importantly the word
‘rational’ has come to be associated with ‘reasonable’, and ‘irrational’ with ‘mindless’
(Williams, 1967, p255), making claims of ‘rationality’ difficult to dispute. The wind
farm developers insist, “Whinash is the perfect site” (implicitly informed rationally by
science), while the protestors use emotional language such as “eyesores”,
“desecration”, and “wounding”. Although the objective of wind farms is
environmental, the developers are acting on scientific logic alone (‘rationally’),
discounting ethics and emotions. In assuming that their technology is ethically
neutral, they do not understand nor accept the objector’s concerns, marginalizing
then discounting them. Yet the ends do not allays justify the means – the “character
of the ‘journey’ might affect the quality of the ‘destination’.” (Holland, 2004). To the
Cumbrian protestors, the quality of their relationship with the Fells is too great a
sacrifice, even in the face of the rational scientific evidence for climate change. As
Holland puts it (2004), this would be “overriding meaningful evolutionary and
ecological relationships.”
Wynne (1996) described this type of debate as “Misunderstood Misunderstandings”.
Although he was analysing the relationship between scientists and Cumbrian sheep
farmers (involving the Sellafield nuclear plant, coincidentally not 30 miles from
Winash), his conclusions apply here as well. He found that “beliefs and values are
functions of social relationships”, but that lay people showed “unacknowledged
reflexive capability” in articulating their response to science, which scientist did not
show in their relationship to the farmers. Suggesting the interactions were about
social groups “attempting to express and defend” their identity, he notes that these
social groups were “not completely predetermined and clear, nor were they immune
to interactive experience and negotiation.” This last point is very pertinent to the
process and conduct of the wind farm debate, as Wynne points out; alienation
changes the position “from acceptance to hostility”. We can see that the social groups
are not clear in the wind farm debate: as well as Greenpeace being on the ‘opposing
side’ to the National Trust, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, a supporter
of green energy “is fiercely opposing plans for Britain’s biggest wind farm to date” (Leake,
205). I believe that the uses of ‘rational’ arguments in support of wind farm
developments, and the marginalisation of ethical objections, are contributing to a
similar ‘hardening’ of objections. The opportunity that is being lost is that of better
understanding and reflexivity on both sides in the interest of consensus, rather than
conflict. Recall that almost 70% of the Guardian/ICM survey would support wind
farms 20 miles from their homes.
This process of forming opinions or ‘preferences’ has also been investigated by
economists, backed by psychology and anthropology. Slovic (1995), cited in Norton et
al (1998, p200201) summarises preference formation as “constructed, not merely
revealed, in the elucidation process”, and “sensitive to all sorts of contextual
pressures.” Norton et al (1998, p2089) conclude that there are at least two distinct
types of value in the context of sustainability: current value expressing individual
preferences in the short term and locally; and sustainable value as the expression of
community preferences in the long term and globally. It is my contention that the
existing process for approving wind farms creates entrenched positions rather than
debate, which damage the formation of longerterm sustainable preferences and
values. Economic psychologist Alan Lewis supports this view, believing that “a
heavy handed instrument is predicted to crowd out intrinsic motivation, reducing
environmental morale” (Lewis, 2004, p9).
The government has sought to promote renewable energy through the marketbased
electricity system by imposing an obligation on generators to product 10% of their
output from renewable sources by 2010 (the Renewables Obligation). This has created
a guaranteed market for renewable electricity, which is being satisfied by private
firms with a profit (rather than environmental) motive. This results in them using
sciencebased ‘rational’ arguments, and ignoring ethical or valuebased objections. It
also serves to hide the environmental objective of the wind farms. Research in
Holland, which relies on wind for 20% of its electricity, backs this up. Wolsink (2000,
p59) posits that the developers and utilities view negotiating successful sites as
“merely a market imperfection or bureaucratic obstacle”. Basically, the institutional
arrangements mean that the developers are not motivated to spend the energy and
time necessary to put wind farms in the ‘right’ place – i.e. to satisfy both the global
(climate change) and local (visual, relationship to ‘nature’) environmental objectives.
This may even extend to using the wrong type of renewable energy in the wrong
place: maybe these conflicting demands can not be satisfied for onshore wind, and
other sources or offshore locations should be used. For this reason, Wolsink (2000, p
62) concludes, “institutional constraints are more important than public acceptance”.
Holland (2004) concurs, stating that “ethical reflection needs to be concentrated …
upon institutions”, because “above all technology is an institutional phenomenon”.
Fortunately, institutional behaviour can be modified by government policy.
I also believe that there is an element of dislike of private wind farm developers and
operators making a profit from the ‘commons22’ behind the objections. Interestingly,
this objection is not specifically voiced, perhaps because we have lost contact with the
countryside as a ‘commons’, instead seeing it as just another commodity, managed on
our behalf by the government, and available for sale.
4.4 Policy Responses to Social Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply

System
The current policy process for renewable energy is struggling to deal with conflicting
local and global environmental values. As early as 1995, Walker (1995, p57) called for
“more effective and meaningful public involvement” in renewable energy decision
making. Munda (2003, p3) describes this as “social incommensurability”, resulting
from the “reflexive complexity of postnormal science” and “a multiplicity of
legitimate values in society.” He suggests that the “evaluation of public plans of
A term from economics, meaning assets that are not owned or are owned collectively: the sea, the air
22
etc.
projects” needs “the integration of a broad set of various and conflicting points of
view.” In this context, “Ethical judgements are unavoidable components of the
evaluation exercise” (ibid, p13). Irwin and Michael (2003, p151) sum up the problem
as a “firewall between ‘public engagement’ and technological innovation” – which
puts public opinion “permanently on the defensive, since the engagement takes place
only after the technological momentum has been firmly established” (my emphasis). This is
the critical problem with the current process: while there was a consultation (DTI,
2000), about renewable energy as input to the Energy White Paper, but this was
limited to seeking views on the details of the Renewables Obligation. In addition,
public enquiries are held for controversial wind farm locations such as Winash –
however these are confrontational in nature, and involve public representation and
the energy industry as protagonists. This is not an appropriate forum for deliberative
decisionmaking.
The public involvement and decisionmaking process therefore needs to address the
following issues:
1. Public opinion, values and ethical concerns should be involved in the selection of
which renewable resources should be exploited. This should be used to inform
the government policymaking process, and define the policy objectives for
stimulating technological and market innovations (Section 5.3). For instance, even
the recent DTI Renewables Innovation Review (DTI, 2004b, p45), concluded that
the scope for biomass was limited by planning and land use constraints. Yet
without consulting the public, how can policymakers be sure that the extensive
forestry development that would be required is not preferable to onshore wind
farms or nuclear power stations? Wind farms have been criticised as ‘unnatural’
objects in valued natural spaces. Ideal onshore wind sites do seem to coincide
with such values spaces. However, coppice willow is a ‘natural’ object in a natural
space, and less dependent on specific locations: it could be grown on land that is
less valued. Earlier public involvement would meet Irwin and Michael’s (2003,
p151) “forwardlooking public scrutiny” objective, but also incorporate the
“diverse and dynamic character of public responses within the decisionmaking
process” (ibid, p149). Not only can this inform policymakers about public values,
but also the right type of discursive process will help to shape those values. In
addition, local people “can imagine solutions and reformulate problems” in ways
that experts do “not find natural” (Munda, 2003, p6). The outcome does not have
to be absolute: as Munda puts is (ibid, p14), “ranking of all the alternatives is
more useful than just to select one alternative”. This is particularly relevant to
renewable energy with the diversity of resources available to the UK. To inform
the debate, more detailed information about the available resources, and the
impact of exploiting them, will be required. The Marine Renewable Resources
Atlas (DTI, 2004c) is a start, but many more specific details on the location,
realisable energy output and impact of each potential resource will be needed.
2. The process for reviewing specific sites for renewable energy needs to shift from
confrontational to discursive, and the ‘profit motive’ of developers and the
environmental motives need to be decoupled, such that the mitigation of climate
change is much more visible as an objective. Ideally the decision should be made
before developers are involved, to keep the ‘profit motive’ out of the decision.
This could be through both local and national forums like ‘consensus
conferences’ or ‘citizens juries’ (Munda, 2003, p6), aimed at finding “compromise
solutions i.e. the balance between conflicting incommensurable values and
dimensions” (ibid, p4). Irwin and Michael (2003, p113) call these groupings
“ethnoepistemic assemblages” which “can serve as a vehicle for examining more
difficult issues”. They incorporate science/technology and folk expertise,
involving many actors such as local people, scientists, commercial and industrial
concerns, civic bodies and nongovernmental organisations (ibid p141). These are
beginning to be used in the UK. Irwin and Michael (2003) offer guidance on the
mediation (p143), enunciation (p144), constitution (p146) and governance (p146)
of such assemblages, based on case studies of a chemical works in Jarrow and the
recent GM debate.
If these changes to the policy process can be achieved, I believe that we would see a
much greater level of support for renewable energy: but perhaps not the current
emphasis on onshore wind, which was disappointingly reinforced in the recent DTI
Innovation Review (DTI, 2004b). This saw “institutional barriers” as a constraint on
onshore wind (p33), with the only suggested response a publicity campaign to
“increase public acceptance and understanding” (ibid p35). As Irwin and Michael
(2003, p144) put it, policymakers have “gradually taken on discourses which citizens
are increasingly regarded as consumers.” Because of the impact on the public, the
success of renewable energy depends on people acting as citizens (exercising
sustainable value) rather than consumers. A change in the approach by policymakers
is thus the most significant dependency in the development of renewable electricity
for the UK. It is unfortunate that the DTI innovation Review (DTI, 2004b) concluded
that public opposition to onshore wind should be dealt with through and “awareness
campaign” aimed at “increasing public acceptance” (ibid, p35). The resulting page on
the “Renewable Energy it’s only natural” promotional web site (DTI, 2005b) consists
mostly of persuasive use of opinion polls, and does not mention participation once: it
seems to be treating the public as consumers rather than as citizens.
5 Economic Aspects of Regime Change in the UK Electricity Supply
System
5.1 Technical Change as an Economic Process
Climate change caused by electricity generation can be mitigated, by using
appropriate alternative renewable generating technologies. Some of these exist in
economically viable forms today; some exist but are not yet commercially viable
(figure 3; DTI, 2003, p55), while other new technologies may yet emerge. Most
technology development in the Western economies is done in the private sector
(Grubb et al, 2002, p272). Therefore government needs to influence private firms to
innovate and diffuse new technologies into the market. Since (as we shall see later),
‘command and control’ policies like the Renewables Obligation have proven to be
poor incentives to innovation, other, mostly economic policy instruments are
required. So we need to understand how economics and technological innovation
interact to be able to design the appropriate policy instruments.
According to Barker (2004), “[economic] models intended to guide policy must be ..
forward looking”, and due to the long term nature of the climate change problem,
must look forward 50, 100 or even more years. The static or short term nature of most
traditional economic models means that they are unsuitable for assessing the options
and impacts of climate change policies, yet incorrect modelling of technical change
can lead to counterproductive policies (Grubb et al, 2002, p273).
Early classical economists were concerned with exploring longrun economic change
and the impact of technological advance. Schumpeter considered technological
competition as the driving force of capitalist development. He insisted that
technology was endogenous to the economic world, and “subject to the gravitational
pull of economic forces.” (Rosenberg, 1994). But by the Second World War, theories
on the behaviour of firms operating within a given technology dominated economic
thought. This ‘neoclassical’ approach relies on profitmaximising firms operating in
a competitive environment, where they face a set of production and price choices.
There is an assumption that supply and demand are balanced at equilibrium,
primarily through price adjustment. These models rely on a linear relationship
between research expenditure and innovation, which assumes that the results of
R&D can be predicted in advance. (Freeman & Soete, 1997). But this is seldom the
case, as has been shown by many empirical studies of firms (e.g. Nelson & Winter,
1982). Most research and development is actually led by the private sector, and is
induced in response to government policies, market conditions, investment and
expectations (Grubb et al, 2002). In practice, technology involves partial knowledge
accumulated over time through learning processes. It is not freely available or a
‘public good’ (as assumed by neoclassical economics), often being proprietary to
individual firms, which differ in their selection decisions. This nonrational (or
bounded rational) behaviour varies between firms and countries, and over time,
introducing uncertainty to the innovation process (Dosi & Orsenigo, 1988). Firms also
tend not to base their decisions on pure maximisation: rather they exhibit ‘satisficing’
behaviour, making decisions based on ‘good enough’ rather than ‘optimal’,
introducing further dynamics (Gromulka, 1974).
In its original form, the induced technical change model only accommodated
responses to economic conditions such as prices and labour shortages, so still treated
technology as exogenous. The evolutionary economics model provided some
description of the workings of the technology ‘black box’ through examining the
routine behaviour of firms searching and selecting new technologies to meet
‘satisficing’ objectives. Pathdependent theories tried to explain the historical process
and technological lockin, but failed to show how new technologies broke out of lock
in. Ruttan (1997) suggested that a combination of these models would give a more
accurate picture of how new technologies emerged dynamically, stating that they
often started with a ‘technology push’ which was modified by ‘market pull’ and
policy factors. He also believed that models should account for the diffusion of new
technologies, not just the innovation process.
The induced, evolutionary and pathdependent models are essentially firm or
sectorlevel microeconomic models, which were complex to project to the macro
economy. But advances in computing power and algorithms have more recently
permitted “new” induced technical change models to emerge These include both
market and policybased induced changes, and “learning by doing” or
learning/experience curve factors. Learning factors, along with economies of scale,
cause the cost of new technologies to fall as the technology diffuses into society.
There is extensive evidence that policies can indeed induce technical change, for
instance, Danish and Californian wind energy and photovoltaics in Japan. In practice,
there is a mixture of autonomous and induced change: both knowledge investment
and learning by doing. Case studies and engineering data can be used to assess the
extent of learning on costs (Grubb et al, 2002).
Thus there are two important conclusions from the economic models of technical
change that are appropriate in assessing renewable options:
1. Technical change, and the rate of technological progress, can be induced by
appropriate government policies.
2. The cost of new technologies falls considerably as the technology diffuses, as
learning effects and economy of scale effects cutin. Government policies can
increase the learning rate.
Thus when comparing new technologies with mature technologies, the mature
technology will almost always have a cost advantage, as it has passed through the
‘learning curve’. However, learning rates reduce as technologies mature (Figure 2).
Therefore the comparative costs might be very different in 10 or more years, once the
new technology has matured. This is very important for climate change mitigation,
due to the long time scales involved: cost comparisons based on today’s costs for
mature fossil fuel energy and emerging renewable energy sources will lead to the
wrong policy decisions.
Figure 2 – Electricity Generating Technology Learning Rates
Source: Grubler and Nakicenovic, 1999, Figure 3
5.2 Analysing Economic Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply

System
Renewable energy has been criticised in a number of reports on the basis of high cost,
often associated with concerns about intermittency and lack of storage. The most
influential report was commissioned by the Royal Academy of Engineering, and was
published in March 2004. This report compared 2004 costs for different fuels and
generating technologies, and concluded that on average, renewable sources23 where
23
Photovoltaic electricity was not included in the report.
twice as expensive as fossil fuel sources (RAE, 2004, figure 1.1). This cost
disadvantage for renewable sources has featured extensively in the public debate, but
is based on misleading models and assumptions, which would result in completely
different conclusions if varied. The assumptions in this report are typical of other
engineeringbased renewable cost assessments, as follows:
Technology costs: presentday costs are used for the main cost comparison, for all
technologies, which favours mature (fossil fuel) technologies against renewables.
Future costs are given in the appendix, but undated, and only assume a 15% capital
cost reduction for the most immature technologies (wave and marine – ibid table
A.20): since there are almost no current installations, this is very inconsistent with
energy system learning rates. Learning rates typically result in a cost reduction of
20% for each doubling of capacity during the R&D phase, falling to 10% in the
commercialisation (diffusion) phase (Gritsevski and Nakicenovic, 2000, p911).
Emissions costs: when the cost if carbon dioxide emission costs are added, the gap
between fossil fuels and renewables narrows significantly at a price of £30/tonne
(ibid, figure 1.3). While this is higher than the current traded price for CO2 (23 euro or
about £15 tonne at 23rd June 2005 – ECX, 2005), it is early days for carbon trading, and
as concern abut climate change grows the price can be expected to increase. At
£30/tonne, onshore wind electricity (at today’s costs) would be about the same cost
as electricity from coal (ibid, figure 1.3).
Fuel cost assumptions: In 1995, crude the oil price (inflation adjusted to 2004) was
$18.17/barrel (inflationdata.com, 2005). By 23rd June 2005, it hit $60 (BBC, 2005a). This
is more than a 200% increase in 10 years: if the same where to happen to natural gas
in the next 10 years, the cost of electricity from CCGT gas turbines would be
6.9p/kWh24, or within 10% of today’s cost for offshore wind, and more expensive
than today’s wave and marine current electricity. By then, equipment and installation
costs for offshore wind (the most significant aspects of output cost, as wind ‘fuel’ is
free) could easily have fallen by as much as 50% (through learning and economies of
scale25), making offshore wind electricity much cheaper than CCGT gas turbine
electricity. Comparing tables 1.1 and 4.3 in RAE (2004), it is clear that CCGT turbines
currently represent the best combination of low cost and low emissions for electricity
generation – therefore many countries can be expected to switch from coal to gas (as
has the UK over the last 10 years), forcing up the price of gas. But the RAE actually
assumed that gas prices would fall in the future (ibid table A.12).
Capital writeoff period: with ‘free’ fuel, the bulk of the costs for renewable
electricity is the writeoff of the capital investment over the life of the equipment. A
lifeexpectancy of 25 years was used for CCGT turbines (ibid table A.11), but only 20
years for wind (ibid tables A.15 & A.17), and 15 years for wave and marine (ibid table
A.19), with no explanation of the differences. Since the capital depreciation is 75% of
the RAE’s overall cost for wave and marine electricity, a simple increase in life
24
Calculated from the 20% fuel price variation impact shown in RAE, 2004, Figure 1.2.
25
For instance, Owen, 2004, Table 1 shows a better than 50% cost improvement by 2020.
expectancy to 25 years (comparable to CCGT) would reduce the electricity cost by
30% (calculated from ibid table A.20).
Other assumptions which, if varied, would result in more favourable costs for
renewables include backup and storage to deal with intermittency, and efficiency of
generating equipment: in each case, no allowance has been made for future cost
reductions, or even for new technologies such as fuel cell storage. Instead, gas turbine
backup has been costedin for wind: without this, onshore wind would be at a
comparable cost to coal generated electricity. Interestingly, the DTI have been
advised by consulting engineers Mott MacDonald that at up to a 15% contribution
from intermittent renewable sources, backup is unlikely to be needed (DTI, 2004b,
p33). In addition, waste management costs have not being included for nuclear: these
are being borne by the taxpayer, and the cost of cleaning up Sellafield alone has been
reported at £48 billion (BBC, 2005b). The assumptions in this report are more likely to
result more from constrained thinking caused by the institutional momentum of the
existing electricity industry than from a bias against renewable energy. This is
supported by Kemp’s view, that for a technological regime shift, such as the shift to
renewable energy, the vested interests and technological momentum of the status quo
must be challenged. Both consumer preferences, which are not autonomous but
shaped by the use of past technologies, and government policies, can play a part in
this shift (Kemp, 1997).
As a comparison, the International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE)
president Anthony Owens presents comparative costs for renewable and fossil fuel
technologies that do take account of learning (Owen, 2004, Table 1). These are
summarised in table 4: as can be seen, offshore wind is projected to be comparable in
cost to coal and CCGT gas even without major fossil fuel price increases.
Table 4: Comparative Electricity Costs by Energy Source: 2004 and 2020
Energy Technology 2004 cost Expected costs RAE cost for

Source (euro beyond 2020 comparison
cents/kWh) (euro cents/kWh) (euro cents/kWh)
Coal Grid supply 35 Small capital cost 3.75

improvement offset
Gas CCGT 24 by increased fuel 3.3
costs offset
Nuclear 46 35 3.45
Solar Gridconnected PC 5080 ~8 na

(UK)
Wind Onshore 35 23 8 (with backup)

5.5 (no backup)
11 (with backup)
Offshore 610 25
8.3 (no backup)
Marine Tidal barrage 12 12 9.9
Tidal stream 815 815
Wave 820 57
Biomass 515 410 10.2
Source: Owens, 2004, Table 1; RAE, 2004, p8/9
These examples show the wide range of outcomes possible by varying assumptions:
essentially, when dealing with complex future technologies and economics, there is
always a very high level or uncertainty. The key variables are the learning rate, and
the cost of fuels. New modelling techniques, using stochastic techniques to model the
uncertainty of these and other parameters, were used in 2000 by Gritsevskyi and
Nakicenovic. They compared 520 ‘technology dynamics’ resulting in many thousands
of scenarios, finding that the 53 leastcost scenarios were equally split between high
and lowcarbon emissions (ibid, Fig. 1). The conclusion they reached was that
optimal future energy costs were influenced more by pathdependence than by fuel
source: renewable energy could be as cheap in the future as fossil fuels, so long as an
optimal path is taken (ibid, p920).
5.3 Policy Response to Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply System
So if pathdependence is the main determinant of future energy costs, we need to be
able to design policies that stimulate appropriate innovation, and reduce path
uncertainty. According to Foxon (2005, slide 12; 2003, page 39) the role of policy
intervention in environmental innovation is to:
 To create positive externalities – leading to both environmental and economic
efficiency benefits, and enabling environmental problems to be solved sooner
 To create technology options which reduce uncertainties and help to define
the technological path forward
 To create opportunities for cost reduction: through technology learning
leading to more competitive new technologies, and economies of scale
In the UK electricity context, the key technoeconomic “reverse salients” are the
immaturity (and hence high cost) of some of the current technologies for extracting
electricity from the UK’s natural energy resources, and the problems associated with
intermittent supply. These translate into the “critical problems” of developing
cheaper ways to extract energy from offshore wind, waves, the tide and marine
currents (and perhaps in the longer term the sun), plus developing technology to
store electricity at gridscale to manage the intermittency of many renewable sources.
Fuel cell technology seems capable of achieving this, but is currently an immature,
costly solution.
Improving the learning rate for emerging renewable and storage technologies is
clearly a key policy objective. Many of the technologies are at different states of
development (Figure 3), leading to the need for a variety of policy instruments.
Grubbler used different learning rates for mature (e.g. conventional coal),
incremental (e.g. nuclear) and radical (e.g. solar PV) technologies. He conclude that
most of the necessary technologies exist today, but at low penetration rates, showing
that policies should be aimed at ensuring that these technologies can diffuse at a
suitable rate, and therefore achieve learningbased cost reduction and improvement.
To achieve this, a number of things are important, giving insight into appropriate
policies. These include the emergence of early niche markets (perhaps through
public procurement), and the development of clusters of related technologies (for
instance, transport and static fuelcells, and hydrogen extraction and distribution
technologies) (Grubler and Nakcienovic, 1999, p276278). Work by Anderson and
Winnne (2003) focused on the problem of technology substitution, which is very
pertinent to the shift to renewable energy sources. They investigated ‘threshold
effects’ using a dynamic, nonlinear model of both new and incumbent technologies.
The conclusions drawn from this model were that relatively small investments could
result in disproportionately large cost reduction and environmental benefits in the
long run, so long as the policies persisted for sufficient time. They concluded that
shortterm policies were “no better than no policy at all”. Anderson et al (2001, p8)
reinforce the longterm nature of environmental policies, suggesting that due to the
long time scales involved energy technologies, that “the path of policy is as important
as its end point, with innovation policies being especially important in the early stages” (my
emphasis).
Figure 3 Renewable Electricity Technology Maturity
Increasing penetration
relative to market
potential (indicative)
Onshore wind
Biomass
Conventional cofiring
PV (UK, in
Offshore buildings) CHP
Biomass Micro wind
H2 from fuels CHP Biomass
combustion
Novel PV RE Biomass
Wave & advanced Technology maturity by ŌstageÕ
Bio & direct H2 tidal conversion
R&D Demonstration Pre-commercial Supported commercial Fully commercial
Source: Foxon, 2005, slide 23
The existing UK government policy on environmental innovation is closer to the ideal
then is the policy on public involvement (ref. Section 4.4), but still has some way to
go. The Renewables Obligation (RO), being neutral to renewable resources, favours
the most mature (and hence lowest cost) technology onshore wind – which is also
the least acceptable to the public. The RO has not stimulated the development or
diffusion of other technologies at earlier stages – although offshore wind
developments are beginning. This can be considered as a ‘systems failure’ of the
renewables innovation system (Foxon, 2005, slide 24). According to Anderson et al,
(2001, p13) this is a symptom of the UK government’s environmental policies, which
have “tended to focus on nearcommercial technologies most readily applicable in the
near term.” This is likely to reflect the relatively shortterm nature of the RO and the
2010/2020 objectives, compared to typical technology lifecycles. The specific failures
of the RO are: the market pull from RO is still too weak to support the scaling up of
technologies from the demonstration to precommercial phase; and the risk/reward
ratio (for technical, market and regulatory risks) is too weak to drive precommercial
technologies into he supported commercial phase. Foxon suggests niche market
support and risk/reward improvement policy response (Foxon, 2005, slide 24).
Figure 4 shows how policy instruments relate to the technology lifecycle.
Figure 4 Renewable Energy Policy instrument options
Increasing penetration
relative to market
potential (indicative)
Self sufficient given
environmental
taxation, regulations
or trading
ROCs, fiscal
incentives such as
fuel duty relief
Statutory
obligations (eg
ROCs) + grants or
cap ex- fiscal
incentives, public
procurement
Public procurement,
R&D
programmes demo grants, demo
and grants programmes
Technology maturity by ‘stage’
R&D Demonstration Pre-commercial Supported commercial Fully commercial
Source: Foxon, 2005, slide 26
In 2004, the DTI Innovation review did conclude that the RO was not a sufficient
policy instrument on it’s own, recommending incentives for the necessary Grid
upgrades to support renewables, and development plans “tailored by technology and
market” for wave/tidal, biomass, fuelcells, and building integrated PV. Each plan
should be tailored to the development stage of the specific technology: for instance,
collaborative research into nextgeneration PV, but precommercial trial programmes
for wave and tidal (DTI, 2004b, p26). However, there is still a major emphasis on
onshore wind in the DTI review (p 33): the danger is that policy efforts continue to be
aimed at shortterm objectives at the expense of more effective longterm polices. The
Review’s response to barriers, particularly public opposition where it advocates an
awareness campaign to “increase public acceptance” (ibid p35), supports this view.
Instead, a more coordinated set of policies are needed, based on the following
principles:
 A stable, longterm, consistent policy framework, looking ahead to 2050 rather
than 2010 or 2020, with clear, measurable, achievable social and environmental
objectives (Anderson at al, 2001; p14, Foxon, slide 25). These should avoid picking
technology ‘winners’ in advance, and allow maximum flexibility in the nearterm
(Anderson et al, 2001, p14).
 Need for shared vision of technology development between policymakers and
industry, and open dialogue with industry, consumers, and NGOs from the
beginning of process (Foxon, slide 25).
 A mix of policy instruments geared to the technology lifecycle, incorporating
policy learning to improve policies over time (Foxon, 2003, p40).
 Specific market development policies to “create markets for innovative new
products and processes” and to overcome system failures, most importantly
through strategic niche management – for example through public procurement
or demonstration projects (Foxon, 2003, p40). Niche markets are a valuable tool to
start the learning and hence cost reduction process early (Foxon, 2003, p15/16).
 Also needed are exit strategies when to remove policy support from specific
technologies (DTI, 2004b, p27; Foxon, 2005, slide 29).
The problem with the current situation is that too much is left to the privatised
electricity market, where competition forces generators to seek the lowest cost ways
to met their statutory obligations. The most pressing need is the establishment of
strategic niche markets for nonwind renewables to start the learning and cost
reduction process and begin to reduce the dependence on wind: early action will be
less costly in the long run (Andreson & Winne, 2003). This will require government to
get more involved in the actual process of renewable energy: not just the research (for
instance, the recently established UK Energy research Centre – Skea, 2004), but also
the implementation phase. It seems ironic that while the DTI is promising “wave and
tidal power to feed the grid within 3 years” (DTI, 2005c) that the world's first
commercial wave power station is to be built by a British company: not in Britain
(which has the best wave resources in Europe WEC 2001e), but in Portugal (Brown,
2005, OPD 2005).
6 Conclusion
To achieve a sustainable (carbonneutral, selfsufficient) UK electricity supply by 2050,
we need to resolve two key technoeconomic “reverse salients”: the immaturity (and
hence high cost) of some of the current technologies for extracting electricity from the
UK’s natural energy resources; and the problems associated with intermittent supply.
Unfortunately the ‘best’ economic option today is the ‘worst’ social option and a poor
technological solution for the existing electricity distribution network (onshore wind:
figure 5). But there is ample time for technology to solve these problems, so long as
the right policies are put in place to encourage innovation in socially acceptable ways.
The current policy process has failed, but as Foxon states, a key characteristic of a
good policy process is policy learning – analyse what worked and what didn’t, and
feed this knowledge back into new policy instruments and processes (Foxon, 2005,
slide 28). I am suggesting a new process, as follows:
 The need to turn the good start of the Renewables Atlas into details of
extractable electrical power, and to assess the local, national and global impact
of extracting power – to include both local considerations and the impact on
CO2 emissions.
 This should then be used to inform a public debate about which renewable
mix we should use.
 The public debate should inform innovation policies that encourage the
development of extraction technologies for specific sources, considering all
aspects of the regime change needed and the benefits of clusters and
thresholds. This is likely to include storage development and Grid changes.
 Involve the public in defining and refining the process for choosing sites,
which should decouple environmental considerations from the profit motive.
 Be open to public inputs to the search and selection process to incorporate
“local knowledge”.
 Employ strategic niche management to start the learning and cost reduction
process.
Figure 5 UK Renewable Electricity Options
Onshore
Marine wind
current
Level of man/nature con flict
offshore
wind
Tidal
estuary
Wave
Building
integrated
PV
Biomass
Level of environmental ‘intrusion’
Key: circle size is related to cost (larger = more expensive),
Shading is related to intermittency (darker = more intermittent)
Using technology sympathetically and appropriately to achieve a sustainable UK
electricity supply is possible, without major change in our electricity consumption, by
2050. In this context, ‘appropriate’ includes locally and globally appropriate: the
desire to mitigate climate change must be balanced with the needs of local
environments. But quick ’technological fix’ is not the answer: the UK electricity
system will need to undergo a ‘regime shift’, fraught with uncertainty and difficult
decisions. Thomas Hughes describes this type of change as establishing an
‘ecotechnical environment’, where we begin to take responsibility for “creating and
maintaining aesthetically pleasing and ecologically sustainable environments”.
Hughes hopes that “in the twentyfirst Century, engineers, environmental scientists
and the public will use technology to respond to global ecotechnical problems”. He
eschews the reductionist approach, instead believing that because the problems is
“messy”, being “laden with political, economic, social and aesthetic values” that
technology will necessarily be “deployed in complex, even messy ways” (Hughes,
2004, p153/154). Both Patterson (the engineer) and Kemp (the economist) support the
view of Hughes (the historian) that the transition will be “bumpy” and “messy”. Real
public participation in these messy, complex decisions is vital. Hughes concludes that
technology is socially constructed, meaning, “the public, through organisations and
as individuals, can make choices about the characteristics and the technology that
they use and the effects it will have upon them” (Hughes, 2004, p153/154).
For a sustainable UK electricity supply, time is of the essence. The key determinant is
whether the current or next government has the political will to allow the public more
real involvement in the early stages of the decision making process; and the will to take a
more active role in stimulating the necessary niche markets rather than the current
situation where this is left to the market, which effectively stifles new technologies
because they cost more than the incumbent technologies. Without this political
commitment to stimulate technological regime change rather than just changes
within the current technological regime, the UK electricity supply may meet the 60%
carbon reduction objective by 2050, but it will not met the sustainability objective.
7 Appendix - Extracts from the Atlas of UK Marine Renewable Energy
Resources (DTI, 2004c)
7.1 UK Electricity Supply System
7.2 Annual Mean Wave Power
7.3 Annual Mean Tidal Power Density
7.4 Annual Mean Wind Power Density within limits of 50 Metre Contour
7.5 Seasonal variations in Mean Wind Speed
Images removed to save space. Now (July 2009) available at:
http://www.renewablesatlas.info/
8 References
8.1 Print References:
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biomass fuel cycles: the case of Sweden and the UK, in: Sayight, A. A. M. (ed),
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2004. p2021.
 Slovic, P., 1995, The construction of preference: an economist’s perspective, Am.
Psycol. 50, 364371
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Commission on Environmental Development, Oxford University Press
 Upreti, B., R., van der Horst, D., 2004, National renewable energy policy and local
opposition in the UK: the failed development of a biomass electricity plant,
Biomass & Bioenergy 26, 6169, Elsevier
 Versluis, C., 2002, DRAMs, fiber and energy compared with three models of
market penetration, Technological Forecasting and Social Change 69, 263286, North
Holland
 Vestas, 2001, V802.0 MW offshore OptiSpeed Wind Turbine General Specification,
Vestas
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ButterworthHeinemann
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2005, page 11.
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 Wolsink, M., 2000, Wind power and the NIMBYmyth: institutional capacity and
the limited significance of public support, Renewable Energy 21, 4964, Pergamon
Press
 Wynne, B., 1996, Misunderstood misunderstandings: social identities and public
uptake of science, in Misunderstanding Science, eds. Irwin A., Wynne B.,
Cambridge University Press.
8.2 World Wide Web (WWW) References:
 BBC, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/2824971.stm accessed 26th June
2005.
 BBC, 2005a, BBC News, Oil price hits $60 a barrel level, BBC News, Thursday, 23
June, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4125066.stm accessed 25th
June 2005
 BBC, 2005b, Sellafield 'wind down' under way,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/cumbria/4399857.stm accessed 25th June
2005
 Brown, P., 2005, Scottish company to build world's first commercial wave power
station, The Guardian, May 20th 2005,
www.guardian.co.uk/business/story/0,,1488191,00.html accessed 27th June 2005.
 DEFRA, 2004, eDigest of Environmental Statistics, Table 1, Land by agricultural and
other uses: 2003, Published October 2004.,
www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/land/download/xls/ldtb01.xls
accessed 16th May 2005
 DeMonfort, 1998, IESD Wind Energy Training Course, Energy from Biomass,
www.iesd.dmu.ac.uk/wind_energy/sustainable_dev/wcbio.html accessed 16th
May 2005, DeMonfort University
 DTI, 2000, Conclusions in response to the public consultation – New and renewable
Energy: Prospects for the 21st century, www.dti.gov.uk/renew/condoc/policy.pdf
accessed 21st June 2005.
 DTI, 2003, Energy White Paper,
www.dti.gov.uk/energy/whitepaper/ourenergyfuture.pdf, accessed 12 May
2005.
 DTI, 2004a, [Reference not used]
 DTI, 2004b, The DTI Renewable Innovations Review,
www.dti.gov.uk/renewables/policy/policyconsiderations.pdf, accessed 19th June
2005.
 DTI, 2004c, Atlas of UK marine Renewable Energy Resources,
www.dti.gov.uk/renewables/renew_atlaspages.htm accessed 16th June 2005
 DTI, 2004d, [Reference not used]
 DTI, 2004e, UK Energy in Brief July 2004, Department of Trade and Industry,
http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/inform/energy_in_brief/energyinbrief2004.pdf
accessed 12 June 2005
 DTI, 2005a, [Reference not used]
 DTI, 2005b, www.dti.gov.uk/renewables/renew_3.1.htm accessed 29th June 2005.
 DTI, 2005c, Wave and tidal power to feed the grid within 3 years, DTI press
Release, 31st January 2005,
http://www.gnn.gov.uk/Content/Detail.asp?ReleaseID=143940&NewsAreaID=2
accessed 27th June 2005.
 DUKES 2004, Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES 2004), DTI 2004,
www.dti.gov.uk/energy/inform/energy_stats/electricity/dukes5_x.xls accessed
20th May 2005.
 EFDA, 2003, www.jet.efda.org/documents/brochures/energy.pdf accessed 26th
May 2005.
 Electricity Association, 2002, Introduction to the UK Electricity Industry, Electricity
Association web site accessed in 2004, but has since become unavailable: paper
copy on file.
 Electricity Association, 2003, Electricity companies in the United Kingdom – a brief
chronology. Electricity Association web site accessed in 2004, but has since become
unavailable: paper copy on file.
 EXC, 2005, European Climate Exchange
www.europeanclimateexchange.com/index_flash.php accessed 26th June 2005.
 Fouquet, R., Pearson, P. J. G, 2003, Long Run trends in Energy Services: The price and
Use of Light in the United Kingdom (15002000), Presented at the BIEE Conference,
September 2003, www.biee.org/downloads/conferences/HISLIG20.PDF
accessed 7 November 2004.
 Foxon, T., 2003, The Foxon Report,
www.thecarbontrust.co.uk/carbontrust/about/publications/FoxtonReportJuly03
.pdf accessed 26th June 2005.
 Foxon, T., 2005, Birkbeck Environmental Economics and Policy lecture notes,
http://www.bbk.ac.uk/manop/management/forstudents/restricted/pgrad_doc
s/EEP/Lecture%2010%20%20Environmental%20Economics%20&%20Policy.PPT
accessed 20th June 2005
 Guardian/ICM, 2005, Guardian/ICM poll on climate change,
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys
files/Politics/documents/2005/06/21/June2005climatechange.pdf, accessed 22nd
June 2005.
 Holland, A., 2004,
www.gw.utwente.nl/onderwijs/wijsb/ethicstechnology/papers/holland.doc/in
dex.htmlaccessed 23rd June 2005.
 IEA, 2002, Environmental and Health Impacts of Electricity Generation, International
Energy Agency, www.ieahydro.org/Environment/ST3020613b.pdf accessed 15
June 2005.
 Inflationdata.com, 2005,
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.a
sp published by Financial Trend Forecaster accessed 27th June 2005
 IPCC , 2001a,
www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/vol4/english/fig61.htm
accessed
15 June 2005
th
 IPCC, 2003,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications/caring_
for_climate/application/pdf/cfc_guide.pdf accessed 25th May 2005
 Janes, M., 2002, Trends in Electricity Production and Consumption, Energy Trends
(6th Edition, September 2002), Department of Trade and Industry,
http://www.dti.gov.uk/energy/inform/energy_trends/2002/sep_02.pdf
 Kemp, R., Loorbach, D., 2003, Governance for Sustainability Through Transition
Management, paper for EAAPA 2003 conference, Maastricht, November 2003,
meritbbs.unimaas.nl/rkemp/Kemp_and_Loorbach.pdf accessed 26th June 2005
 Landesberg, P. T., 2002, Theoretical limits of photovoltaic solar energy conversion,
RIO 02 World Climate & Energy Event,
www.rio02.de/proceedings/pdf/061_Landsberg.pdf accessed 26th May 2005.
 Lewis, A., 2004, Economic instruments for the environment: A psychological
perspective, www.heednet.org/ALpaperonEconInstfinal.pdf, accessed 19th June
2005.
 Mandil, C., 2005, Securing the RussianEuropean Energy Partnership,
International Energy Association,
www.iea.org/textbase/papers/2005/russian.pdf accessed 5th May 2005.
 MCT, 2003,
www.marineturbines.com/mct_text_files/Press%20Release%20MCT%2016%20M
ay%2003%20V2.0.pdf accessed 26th May 2005.
 Nuclear Industry Association, 2005: UK Nuclear Power Stations,
www.niauk.org/article_33.shtml accessed 22nd may 2005.
 Ofgem, 2005a,
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work, accessed 20th May 2005.
 OPD, 2005, Ocean Power Delivery, www.oceanpd.com/ accessed 27th June 2005.
 RCEP, 2000, Energy – The Changing Climate, Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution, June 2000, http://www.rcep.org.uk/newenergy.htm accessed 30th June
2005.
 Sharp, 2005, http://solar.sharpusa.com/files/sol_dow_140watt_SS.pdf accessed
26th May 2005.
 TFL, 2005, www.tfl.gov.uk/buses/fuelcellbuses.asp accessed 16th June 2005.
 UNFCC, 2005a,
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 UNFCC, 2005b,
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 WEC 2001c, Survey of Energy Resources, World Energy Council,
www.worldenergy.org/wecgeis/publications/reports/ser/hydro/hydro.asp
 WEC, 2001a, Survey of Energy Resources, World Energy Council,
www.worldenergy.org/wecgeis/publications/reports/ser/tide/tide.asp
 WEC, 2001b, Survey of Energy Resources, World Energy Council,
www.worldenergy.org/wecgeis/publications/reports/ser/geo/geo.asp
 WEC, 2001d, Survey of Energy Resources, World Energy Council,
www.worldenergy.org/wecgeis/publications/reports/ser/marine/marine.asp
 WEC, 2001e, Survey of Energy Resources, World Energy Council,
www.worldenergy.org/wecgeis/publications/reports/ser/wave/wave.asp
8.3 UK Political Party Policies WWW Sources:
 Labour Party:
www.labour.org.uk/fileadmin/manifesto_13042005_a3/pdf/manifesto.pdf
 Conservative Party:
www.conservatives.com/getfile.cfm?file=SportManifesto2005&ref=POLICYDOC
UMENT/1664&type=pdf
 Liberal Democratic Party:
www.libdems.org.uk/media/documents/policies/EnvironmentManifestoWord.
doc
 Greeen Party:
http://manifesto.greenparty.org.uk/site/downloads/file1292ManifestoSection2a
.pdf
 Scottish Nationalist Party: www.snp.org/policies/renewableenergy/
 Plaid Cymru: www.plaidcymru.org/ManifestoPlaidCymru2005.pdf
8.4 WWW News Sources:
 Daily Mirror: www.mirror.co.uk
 Daily Mail: www.dailymail.co.uk
 The Telegraph: www.telegraph.co.uk
 Guardian Unlimited: www.guardian.co.uk
 BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk

How Could The United Kingdom Achieve A Carbon-Neutral, Self-Sufficient Electricity Supply by 2050?

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How could the United Kingdom achieve a carbon­neutral, self­sufficient electricity supply by 2050?

Contact: rolfe.andy@googlemail.com Submitted: 8th July 2005.

2 UK Renewable Energy Resources

2.3 Biomass Energy

2.4 Wave, Tidal and Marine Currents

2.6 Other Low-carbon options

3 A Renewable UK Electricity Supply System: What Needs to Change

3.1 Theory of Technological Systems

3.2 The Existing UK Electricity System

3.3 Paths of Change

3.4 UK Renewable Energy Options

Renewable Practical Current Indicative Technological Distributed

3.5 Invention and Innovation

3.7 Technological Regime Shifts

4 Social Aspects of Regime Change in the UK Electricity Supply System

4.1 Technical Change as a Social Process

4.2 Social Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply System

4.3 Analysis of Social Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply System

4.4 Policy Responses to Social Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply

5 Economic Aspects of Regime Change in the UK Electricity Supply

5.1 Technical Change as an Economic Process

5.2 Analysing Economic Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply

Energy Technology 2004 cost Expected costs RAE cost for

Coal Grid supply 3­5 Small capital cost 3.75

Solar Grid­connected PC 50­80 ~8 na

Wind Onshore 3­5 2­3 8 (with backup)

Marine Tidal barrage 12 12 9.9

Tidal stream 8­15 8­15

Wave 8­20 5­7

Biomass 5­15 4­10 10.2

5.3 Policy Response to Barriers to Change in the UK Electricity Supply System

R&D Demonstration Pre-commercial Supported commercial Fully commercial

7 Appendix - Extracts from the Atlas of UK Marine Renewable Energy

Resources (DTI, 2004c)

8.1 Print References:

8.2 World Wide Web (WWW) References:

8.3 UK Political Party Policies WWW Sources:

8.4 WWW News Sources:

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How could the United Kingdom achieve a carbonneutral, selfsufficient electricity supply by 2050?

Coal Grid supply 35 Small capital cost 3.75

Solar Gridconnected PC 5080 ~8 na

Wind Onshore 35 23 8 (with backup)

Tidal stream 815 815

Wave 820 57

Biomass 515 410 10.2