Justice

Every human person within a community must seek to realize and respect the human goods not merely in himself and for his own sake but also in common and in the community. This brings forward the principle of justice. However not justice as understood by the terms courts of justice. The concept of justice embraces3 principal elements namely: Other-directedness: Justice has to do with ones relations and dealings with other persons. It is inter-subjective or interpersonal. The question of justice arises only when there are a plurality of individuals and some practical question concerning interactions vis--vis each other. Plato treated justice as concerned with the relationship between three aspects of the soul reasonableness, desire and spiritedness. Thus justice in the soul becomes the model for and the cause of justice as the right order in society. Duty: That is what is owed or due to another, and correspondingly, what another person has the right to do. Justice, thus concerns, not every reasonable relationship or dealing between one person and another but only those relations and dealings which necessary or appropriate for the avoidance of wrong, thus, something that in reason must not be done. Equality: This must be taken in the analogical sense, that is, it may be present in various ways. Finnis theory of justice involves how one person ought to treat another regardless of whether or not another are being treated. A principle forbidding torture, for instance, is in all cases a principle of justice.

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General Justice The requirements of justice may be outlined as the concrete implications of the basic requirement of practical reasonableness that is that an individual is in favour of fostering the common good of his community. This principle is closely related to the basic value of friendship and to the principle of practical reasonableness which excludes arbitrary selfpreference in the pursuit of good. The principle of justice looks to the common good of the relevant community, not to the good of any individual or group in disregard of the well-being of others and common good with reference to the basic aspects of human flourishing. Aristotle regarded justice as signifying comprehensive virtue, in Finnis terms, full practical reasonableness. Therefore, the theory of justice is a theory of what is required to outline the common good.

Distributive Justice Few will flourish within a community unless there is an effective collaboration of persons and an effective co-ordination of resources and enterprises which will enhance the well being of all members of a community which can be termed as common good. Therefore, attainment of justice implies attainment of common good. Realisation of common good can be divided into 2 broad classes: 1. Firstly there are the problems of distributing resources, (opportunities, profits, roles, advantages etc.) the common stock and incidents of communal enterprise which do not serve the common good unless and until they are appropriated to particular individuals or groups 2. Secondly there are other problems, concerning what is required for individual well-being in the community, which arise in relations and dealings between individuals and groups, where the common stock and what is required for communal enterprise are not directly in question.

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A subject matter is common in the sense relevant to distributive justice if it is part of no individual person and has not been created by anybody but is for everyones use or benefit, for example solar energy, light, the sea, etc. Another sort of common subject matter arises out of the willingness of individuals to collaborate to improve their position. E.g. A community stricken by famine. None of them can secure their own safety by individual un-coordinated efforts but all may be saved by collaboration which involves the task of deciding what is to be done and how The problem of distributive justice is to whom and on what conditions to make the allocation. Human experience shows us that many enterprises are best conducted by charging particular individuals with the responsibility of settling co-ordination problems which must be settled if the enterprise is to go forward. Few are the armies without officers! Authority is in the good of the common enterprise that the officer is to pursue and not his own private advantage. A political party that appoints party boys to public office violates distributive justice. It must be remembered that the fundamental task of practical reasonableness is selfconstitution or self-possession. An attempt for the sake of the common good to absorb the individual altogether into common enterprises would be disastrous for the common good however much the common enterprise may prosper. It is thus a fundamental aspect of general justice that common enterprises should be regarded not as ends in themselves but as means of assistance as ways of helping individuals to constitute themselves. It is therefore unjust to require individuals to sacrifice their private initiative by demanding them to participate in public enterprise even if the material dividend they receive would be greater than that they would receive alone. The personal autonomy of a community is also a requirement of justice, which suggests the opportunity of exercising some form of private ownership including the means of production. A regime of private ownership including the means of production. A regime

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of private ownership is a requirement of justice provided that the increased stock of good yielded by that regime is not hoarded by a class of private owners but is made available to all the members of the community in good measure e.g. profit sharing. A theory of Justice is to establish what is due to a person, obviously not in the ideal world circumstances i/e/ those members of the community whose livelihood depends on the productive efforts and good husbandry of other members of the community. They can thus complain of injustice if they are yielded a lower standard of living than they would enjoy under a different regime of property operated by different members. Finnis opts for Aristotles definition of private property. Property aught to be common in a sense but private speaking generally. Possessions should be privately owned but common in use. Therefore it is suggested that individuals should have access either directly in private ownership (shareholder) or indirectly. The owner of a resource or capital good has the duty in justice to use it productively, or if not, he should dispose of it to someone who would willingly do so. Thus, hoarding of gold or withholding liquid assets from capital markets is contrary to distributive justice. Likewise, contrary to distributive justice is the development of monopolistic arrangements which restrict the availability of property to other individuals and prevent the working of a competitive market system which would encourage the unwasteful production and distribution of goods in larger quantities and less expensively than otherwise possible. The focal point where justice of private property is concerned is to give the owner first use and enjoyment of his property and its fruit as this enhances his reasonable autonomy and stimulates his productivity and care. But, beyond a certain point, what was commonly available but justly made private becomes again in justice part of common good though appropriated through private management. Thus at this point, the owner, in justice, has duties such as providing employment. Where owners do not perform such

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duties, then public authority must interfere by devising and implementing schemes of distribution like taxation for social purposes or by measure of expropriation.

Criteria of Distributive Justice Equality is a fundamental element in the notion of distributive justice. In particular, all members of a community equally have the right to respectful consideration when the problem of distribution arises. However, the objective of justice is not equality but the common good, the flourishing of all the members of the community and flourishing does not imply the treating of everyone as identical when it comes to distributing roles, opportunities and resources. There are no precise yardsticks when it comes to assessing questions of distribution. There exists no one criterion which is universally applicable for distribution in which the basic human goods are realised but a number of criterion. In outlining the criteria of distributive justice we are trying to assess what practical reasonableness requires of particular people in their dealings with other people. And what is therefore required of a particular person depends essentially on what responsibilities he has whether by: Virtue of his own commitments (assumption of ruler ship) Virtue of past or present receipt of benefits from another (child in relation to his parents) Virtue of the dependence of others upon him (parent in relation to his children) Virtue of a network of relationships of actual and potential interdependencies (those within a family) Therefore, distributive justice concerns whatever pertains to the community as a common but is divisible by allotment amongst its members.

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Commutative Justice The second class of problems where justice is concerned can be named corrective or commutative justice, that is, the justice that rectifies or remedies the inequlities which arise in dealings with individuals. These dealings may be either volontaryas in sale, hire or any other business transaction, or involuntary as one deals with another by stealing from him, murdering him or defaming him. Thus, the problem arises in such cases as when one person fulfils one side of a contract and another does not. Questions fundamental in the theory of Commutative Justice are: 1. What are the standards of conduct which one person must live up to in relation to his neighbours? 2. What should be the extent of reliability of one who fails to live up to those standards of conduct? 3. How should someone be injured by the wrong of another be restored to his former condition?

Therefore, a scheme for securing distributive justice seeks to compensate all those who suffer injury in the relevant course of common life, whereas securing commutative justice seeks to compensate only those who were injured by the act of one who failed to live up to his duties of care and respect for the wellbeing of others. E.g. if A fails to perform his contract with B without good reason he is commutatively unjust and thus is liable to pay damages under Maltese law (loss of deposit.) Therefore, adhering to the duties of commutative justice between one individual and another is an integral aspect of respect and favour of the common good. Persons holding authority within the state owe duties of commutative justice to their subordinates i.e. those subject to their authority.

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Justice and the State The origins of the analysis of the question of justice may be traced to Cardinal Cajetans famous commentary on Aquinas Summa Theologia. Cajetan stated that there are three species of justice as there are three types of relationships in every whole. These are: 1. The relations of parts amongst themselves 2. The relation of the parts as a whole 3. The relation of the whole to the parts Likewise there are three justices legal, distributive and commutative. Legal justice orients the parts to the whole, distributive orients the whole to the parts while commutative orients the parts to one another. It was further analysed that: Legal justice relates the citizens to the state. Distributive justice relates the state to the citizens Commutative justice relates one citizen to another

This diametrically opposes Nozicks theory of justice in the holding.

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