People vs Lau Chu & Uy Se Tieng

Facts: On Nov. 1929, Uy Se Tieng, was the consignee of the Shipments of Opium coming from Hongkong, who represented agents of the real Owners of Shipments of Opium containing 3,252 tins. He collaborated w/ Samson & Natividad of the Customs by paying them an amount of P6K for the opium to be released safely from Customs. On Dec. 1929, upon arrival of the Shipment of Opium in the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng informed Samson that the former consult the real owners on how to proceed the payment of P6K & will come over to Samson house on Dec. 17, 1929 to inform the decision of the owners.On the same day Samson informed the Constabulary represented by Captain Buencosejo & the Provincial Fiscal requesting a stenographer to take down the conversation between Samson & Uy Se Teung.On the night of Dec. 17, 1929, Captain Buencosejo and a stenographer named Jumapao from a law firm and hid themselves behind the curtains in the house of Samson to witness the conversation between Samson, Uy Se Teung and Lua Chu. Captain Buencosejo & Jumapao noted the ff. important facts: 1. Uy Se Teung informed Samson that Lua Chu was one of the owners of the Opium. 2. Lua Chu informed Samson that aside from him, there were co-owners named Tan and another located in Amoy. 3. Lua Chu promised to pay the P6,000 upon delivery of the opium from the warehouse of Uy Se Tieng. 4. A Customs Collector had a conversation before when Samson was on vacation in Europe, with Lua Chu and agreed on the business of shipping the Opium. The following morning Uy Se Tieng and companion, Uy Ay presented papers to Samson & Captain Buencosejo showed up & caught them in the act & arrested the two Chinese. The Constabulary then arrested Lua Chu & confiscated P50K worth of Opium (3,252 tins). Ruling: But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the opium in question. Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears him out. A public official who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take the steps necessary to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before having obtained the profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its introduction into the country through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers. The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime, as laid down by the courts of the United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows: ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy

solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary. As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendantsappellants to import the opium in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad who had promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the customhouse was concerned not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal.

Araneta vs CA
Facts: Complainant Gertrude Yoyongco is the widow of Antonio Yoyongco, an employee of NIA. She approached the appellant, Atty Aquilina Araneta, a hearing officer of the Workmens Compensation Unit at Cabanatuan City, to inquire about the procedure for filing a claim for death compensation. Learning the reqirements, Yoyongco prepared the forms and filed them at the Unit. When she went again to follow up on the status of the application, she was told by the appellant that she had to pay PhP100 so that her claim would be acted upon. She told the officer that she had no money then but if she would process her claim, Yoyongco would give her the PhP100 upon approval. To this, Atty Araneta refused and said that on previous occasions certain claimants made similar promises but they failed to live up to them. Yoyongco then went to her bro-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, the Chief of Criminal Investigation Service, Phil Constabulary, and informed him the demand of the appellant. The Col then gave her 2 PhP50 bills and instructed her to go to Col Laureaga. The latter concocted a plan to entrap the appellant. The 2 PhP50 bills were marked w/ notations CC-NE-1 and CC-NE2, photographed and dusted w/ ultra-violet powder. The complainant went to the officer along w/ CIC Balcos who pretended to be her nephew. She again requested the officer to process her claim but was again asked if she already had P100. In answer, Yoyongco brought out the 2 P50 bills & handed them to the appellant. As she took hold of the money, CIC Balcos grabbed her hand & arrested her. In the PC headquarters, Atty Aranetas hands were examined for the presence of UV powder & result was positive.

Appellant contends that the bills, w/c she never accepted, were rubbed against her hand and dress. Ruling: There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused was induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the crim intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. Wherefore, appellant is guilty of the crime of bribery, a violation of Sec 3 RA No 3019 known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Considering though that this case was pending since 1971 and she is a mother of four and the amount involved is only PhP100, it is recommended that petitioner be granted either executive clemency or the privilege of probation if she is qualified. Decision affirmed.

People vs Roberto Pacis

Facts: On April 6, 1998, Atty. Jose Justo S. Yap, supervising agent of the Dangerous Drugs DivisionNational Bureau of Investigation, received information that a certain Roberto Mendoza Pacis was offering to sell one-half (1/2) kilogram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" for the amount of P950.00/pgram or a total of P475,000.00. The NBI Chief of the Dangerous Drugs Division approved the buy-bust operation. In the afternoon of the same day, Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon and the informant went to the house of appellant. The informant introduced Atty. Yap to appellant as interested buyer. They negotiated the sale of one-half (1/2) kilogram of shabu. The total price was reduced to P450,000.00. It was agreed that payment and delivery of shabu would be made on the following day, at the same place. On April 17, 1998, around 6:30 in the evening, the NBI agents and the informant went to appellant's house. Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper bag with markings "yellow cab". When he opened the bag, Atty. Yap found a transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance inside. While examining it, appellant asked for the payment. Atty. Yap instructed Senior Agent Congzon to get the money from the car. When Senior Agent Congzon returned, he gave the "boodle money" to Atty. Yap who then handed the money to the appellant. Upon appellant's receipt of the payment, the officers identified themselves as NBI agents and arrested him. Ruling: It has been held in numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is sanctioned by law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminal elements engaged in the sale and distribution of illegal drugs. A careful examination of the records shows that the operation that led to the arrest of appellant was indeed an entrapment, not an instigation. Furthermore, courts generally give full faith and credit to officers of the law, for they are presumed to have 12 performed their duties in a regular manner. Accordingly, in entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an incident by prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law and presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of evidence to

the contrary. Appellant did not submit any plausible reason or ill motive on the part of the arresting officers to falsely impute to him a serious and unfounded charge. Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved, and that their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and (2) he 15 knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug. These elements were duly proven in the case herein. To bolster his claim, he presented his sister-in-law's driver, Ramon V. Ty, who testified that he was with the former in Urdaneta, Pangasinan on that same day; hence, appellant could not have been with the poseur-buyers in Manila to discuss the quantity and the price of the shabu to be delivered the next day. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The excuse must be so airtight that it admits of no exception. Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that the positive identification of the accused -- when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses -- prevails over alibi and denial which are negative and self-serving, undeserving of weight in law.

US vs Phelps
Facts: The defendant, J. O. Phelps, a man 30 years of age, testified that Smith, who was then going under the name of Lockwood, came to his house one night in Jolo and said that he was accustomed to smoking opium and asked him (the accused) if he knew of any Chinaman in the town who could assist him in obtaining opium to smoke; that he answered Smith that he did not; that Smith then asked him if the Chinaman (the one charged in criminal case No. 292), who was the accused's servant, could look for someone to furnish him (Smith) with a pipe until he became acquainted in town; that on the following night the witness Smith came again to his house, and after being there about twenty minutes became very nervous, saying that it was necessary for him to have some opium; that he told him (Smith) to go to the hospital, and received the reply that he (Smith) was working for the quartermaster and was looking for a position as clerk, and that they probably would not give him this position if they learned that he was an opium smoker that he again asked to have the Chinaman assist him, and he (the accused) believing that he (Smith) was acting in good faith and was really sick, told the Chinaman to do so; that by agreement and the witness Smith went to the house of the Chinaman in Tulay, where the Chinaman prepared the pipe and gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving the Chinaman P2, and that he (Smith) then left, without the accused noticing whether he smoked or not, and that he (the accused) was arrested about forty minutes later, and that he called for the doctor to examine him about one and half hours after he left the Chinaman's house. Ruling: Smith admits having visited the house of the appellant three times for the purpose of making arrangements for himself and the accused to smoke opium. He urged the accused to have

the Chinaman make arrangements so they both could smoke. He went to the house of the Chinaman with the accused and paid the said Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1 for the preparation of the opium. If he had, by these means, induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession either opium or any of the prohibited paraphernalia, his testimony would be more reasonable, since the mere possession of the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law within itself. But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused had in his possession any of these things. According to the statements made by the witness Smith, he not only suggested the commission of this crime, but he (Smith) also states that he desired to commit the same offense and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the commission of the prohibited act. Such conduct on the part of a man who is employed by the Government for the purpose of taking such steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the offense and which would tend to the elevation and improvement of the defendant, as a would-be criminal, rather than further his debasement, should be rebuked rather than encouraged by the courts; and when such acts as those committed by the witness Smith are placed beside the positive testimony of the defendant, corroborated by the Chinaman and the doctor, the testimony of such witness sinks into insignificance and certainly does not deserve credit. When an employee of the Government, as in this case, and according to his own testimony, encourages or induces persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible. We desire to be understood that we base our conclusions as to the conduct of the witness Smith and the incredibility of his testimony on his own acts according to his own testimony. We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the appellant is not guilty of this crime. The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.

to give her money. It was only Carpio & Mandap who denied having sexual intercourse w/ her. RTC found them guilty of the charge & sentenced Nunag, Mandap & Salangsang to suffer reclusion perpetua while Carpio & Manalili, who were both above 16 & below 18 at the time of the commission of the offense, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 yrs of prision mayor as min to 17 yrs & 4 mos of reclusion temporal as max. Ruling: There is no merit in the appellants' appeal. We find no cogent reason for altering the trial court's appreciation of the credibility of the testimony of the complainant. Thus, the variance 13 between the testimony of the complainant in court and her sworn statement, as to the exact date when she was raped, if this be so, does not materially affect her main claim that the five (5) appellants had sexual intercourse with her, against her will. Besides, it would appear that the complainant had no motive whatsoever to testify falsely against the appellants, some of whom were her very close neighbors, and impute to them the commission of so grave a crime. This Court has consistently held that the testimony of a rape victim as to who abused her is 14 credible where she has no motive to testify against the accused. Consequently, each of the five (5) accused-appellants must be found guilty of three (3) distinct and separate crimes of rape, the first three, namely, Mario Nunag, Arnel Mandap and Diosdado Manalili, by direct act and participation and the other two, namely Danilo Carpio and Efren Salangsang, by indispensible cooperation Accused-appellants Mario Nunag, Arnel Mandap and Efren Salangsang are each sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua while accused-appellants Diosdado Manalili and Danilo Carpio, both being above sixteen (16) years and below eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offenses, are each sentenced to suffer three (3) indeterminate penalties of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, and seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

People vs Mario Nunag

Facts: Complainant, Lorenza Lopez, then about 15.5 y.o., declared that in the 2nd wk of May 1978, at 730PM, while she was watch a TV program in the house of her neighbor, Laxamana, she saw the accused Mario Nunag, 1 of her neighbors, coming towards her. Nunag, staggering & drunk, came to her & asked her to go w/ him. Because she refused, Nunag held her by the hand & poked a knife at her stomach & threatened to kill her. Nunag placed something in her mouth & led her to a nearby ricefield, about 15m. away from Laxamanas house. Very soon thereafter, the accused was joined by 4 others, whom she knew also. After conspiring in whispers, Mandap & Salangsang held her hands while Carpio & Manalili held her feet & forced her to lie on the ground. Nunag undressed her & had sexual intercourse w/ her. After him, Mandap followed. She lost consciousness & only regained it while Manalili was abusing her. The 5 accused left w/ a threat that they would kill her & her family. After the incident, the complainant missed her menstruation period when it became due and noticed that her stomach was getting bigger. Yet she didnt tell anybody until her family noticed. In Oct 1978, she gave birth prematurely to female twins who died after baptism. Accused Nunag admitted having sexual intercourse w/ Lopez but denied the charge of rape. He asserted that it was while he was sleeping when she came on to him and they went to the ricefield to relieve their lasciviousness. She asked money after the act and he gave her PhP4.00 and went home. Accused Salangsang offers the same testimony but asserts that he gave Lopez P2 instead. Accused Manalili also contends that it was Lopez who came on to her but he refused

People vs Sulpicio De La Cerna

Facts: Early in the morning of February 3, 1958, Rafael Cabizares, accompanied by his wife, Hospicia, his brothers Margarito and Romualdo, and his sons Gumercindo, Marcelo, Casiano, Juan and Lamberto, left Barrio Cebuano headed for the poblacion of Tupi, Cotabato, bringing five sacks of corn loaded on a bull cart to be milled in Tupi. Juan, Marcelo and Lamberto, who were all minors, were then going to school. Upon approaching a hilly part, they had to stop since the carabao could not pull the bull cart uphill. Rafael then requested his two brothers and his son Gumercindo to accompany him up the hill and carry on their backs the sacks of corn. With Rafael leading, the four proceeded uphill. As the four approached Sulpicio de la Cerna's house on top of the hill and were about to put down the sacks of corn, appellant Sulpicio, who was in the house, fired at and hit Rafael, who fell down. Sulpicio then ordered his companions to burn his house so that they would have an excuse. Meanwhile, Casiano, Gumercindo, Marcelo and Romualdo brought the wounded Rafael Cabizares to the house of the latter's father, Demetrio, 100 meters away. Felisa Bastismo, Rafael's mother, Ursula Cabizares and Segundino Cabizares were there at the time. After the group reached the house, Rafael's wounds were washed with hot water and then he was brought inside the third room of the house. Subsequently, appellant Sulpicio and the

other accused arrived at the premises, armed with firearms, bolos and canes. They stoned the house and trust their bolos thru the bamboo walls and flooring. Finding that there were women inside the house, the accused ordered them to get out or else they would be killed also. As Felisa Bastismo and Ursula Cabizares alighted from the besieged house, Marcelo Cabizares followed them, and although held by accused Conrado Pardillo and boxed by Serapio Maquiling, he was able to escape to the nearby forest. Serapio Maquiling then climbed up the window of the kitchen, and with the carbine which he got from appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna, shot at Rafael Cabizares who was sitting in the third room. At this moment, Casiano Cabizares jumped down from the house thru the kitchen door and ran away. Serapio Maquiling followed him and shot the latter at the back, killing him a few meters away from Demetrio's house. Appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna then got back the carbine, climbed up the house and fired once more at Rafael, who was now lying down on the floor, killing him finally. Thereafter, the cadaver of Casiano Cabizares was tied to a bamboo pole, carried by accused Ramon Alquizar and one Wilfredo Malias (at large) and placed near the burned house of Sulpicio de la Cerna, as some of the accused followed while the rest proceeded to Rafael's house. Sulpicio having reason to resent and kill Rafael than the latter would have as to him. The source of the possible motive is the same: land trouble between Rafael Cabizares and Sulpicio's father, and the ejectment suit instituted before the Agrarian Court against the latter by the former. Considering that Rafael was the prevailing party in the land dispute before the NARRA, it is quite hard to believe that he would be the one entertaining a grudge against those over whom he had prevailed. Rather, it was the accused, who were defeated and who were now facing an ejectment suit which was set for hearing, that harbored resentment against the deceased. Ruling: The killing of Rafael Cabizares was attended by treachery. Appellant Sulpicio contends that the first shot, fired by him, was not attended with treachery since there is evidence that 41 Rafael was warned by his son Gumercindo just before he was hit in the lower abdomen. However, even assuming the argument to be tenable, the second shot, by Serapio Maquiling, was definitely treacherously fired since Rafael was then in the third room of Demetrio's house, wounded and defenseless. The treachery here has to be independently considered 42 due to the sufficient lapse of time from the first shot, in which the following events intervened: (1) the bringing of Rafael to Demetrio's house 100 meters away after being hit; (2) the washing of his wounds and his being brought to the third room to rest; (3) the arrival of the accused and their ordering the two women to get out. It was only after the women left that Serapio climbed up the kitchen and fired the second shot at Rafael. Appellant Sulpicio is chargeable for the treacherous shooting of Rafael by Serapio Maquiling since both were acting as co-conspirators pursuant to their understanding in the meeting held the day before in Andres Abapo's house, as will be shown presently. Anyway, the third shot, fired by Sulpicio, was treacherously done. Rafael was then flat on the floor and although still alive, was completely defenseless, having been shot twice already. The portion 43 of Dr. Garcia's testimony cited by appellants shows that Rafael died after the third shot hit him Evident premeditation was also present in this case. The previous plan to kill Rafael Cabizares was testified to by witness Maximo Caa who was present in the meeting of February 2, 1958, in the house of Andres Abapo. Of the many persons present, he recognized only appellants Sulpicio de la Cerna, Antonio Bautista, Severino Matchoca and Serapio Maquiling. Bautista told the group that the purpose of the meeting was to plan the killing of Rafael

Cabizares. Then both he and Serapio Maquiling signified their willingness to execute it. Appellant Sulpicio also offered to do it provided his family would be taken care of. To this offer, Bautista and Maquiling replied that they would take care of Sulpicio's family. Caa testified further that none of those attending voiced out any objection but all agreed to the plan. Caa was also present in the early morning of February 3, 1958, when Matchoca, accompanied by Bautista, gave the magazine of bullets to Godofredo Rotor. He was likewise with the accused when Rafael was shot at the hill top, and when he (Rafael) and Casiano were killed in Demetrio's place. However, appellant Sulpicio cannot be held liable for the killing of Casiano Cabizares notwithstanding a conspiracy between him and Serapio Maquiling. The conspiracy was to kill Rafael only and no one else. Nothing was said or agreed upon about the members of Rafael's family. In fact, in executing their plan appellants let the two women inside Demetrio's house leave unhurt and they did no harm to the remaining companions of Rafael in the house. Their target was solely Rafael Cabizares. And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence 52 of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Here, only Serapio killed Casiano Cabizares. The latter not even going to the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away when shot. We find therefore all five appellants guilty as co-principals in the murder of Rafael Cabizares. The aggravating circumstance of treachery, applicable against appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna only, is offset by his voluntary surrender after the incident. This mitigating circumstance however can not benefit the remaining appellants who did not voluntarily surrender. For all the appellants, therefore, the penalty for Rafael Cabizares' murder must be imposed in the medium period. For the killing of Casiano Cabizares, appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna must be acquitted.

People vs Agapinay
Facts: The evidence of the prosecution shows that the Agapinays are brothers, except Romeo, who 3 is Delfin's son, and that along with Virgilio Paino, Amor Flores, and Eufemio Paino, they were hirelings of Julia Rapada, an operator of fishing boats. On April 12, 1981, they set out, along with other complement, on a fishing venture in the sea of Batangan, in Gonzaga, Cagayan. They returned to shore the following day, April 13, 1981, whereupon, they unloaded their catch and spread out their fishnet on the sand to dry. Thereafter, except for 4 Romeo Agapinay, they mended the net, with thread and small knives, under portable shed. Meanwhile, Virgilio Paino took the shed and placed it where he and Alex and Cirilo Agapinay were. Moments later, Romeo Agapinay appeared and confronted Virgilio, and berated him for taking the shed without permission. Virgilio said that they were going to use it. Shortly, the two exchanged words and tempers apparently flared. Romeo lunged at Virgilio with a hunting knife, six inches long, that hit his right arm. Virgilio ran away but Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay met him and held on to his arms. Romeo approached him and dealt him a second stab at the right side of his back. Virgilio, however, managed to extricate himself again and ran away. While he was running, Delfin, Alex, Fortunate, Dante, and Cirilo took turns in stoning him. All of a sudden Amor Flores appeared and plunged a knife at the back of Virgilio. It was then that Virgilio collapsed. Meanwhile Julia cried, "Kill him and we will bury 5 him."

Ruling: We also believe that conspiracy has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt to hold all six accused as co-principals in the crime of murder. As the lower court observed, the stabbing 29 happened in the "spur of the moment." Conspiracy means, however, an agreement 30 concerning the commission of a felony and a decision to commit it. If the tragedy was a chance stabbing, there can be no conspiracy to speak of.Hence, the parties' liability should be 31 considered individually. It is our considered opinion that only Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato should be held as principals in the crime of murder. Romeo is guilty, as he admitted in open 32 court, by direct participation, while Delfin and Fortunate are liable as principals by 33 cooperation. In holding the victim by his arms, both allowed Romeo to inflict upon him a 34 stab wound. 35 Alex, Dante, and Cirilo, on the other hand, should be held as simple accomplices for their acts of pelting the victim with rocks. Since the deceased had already sustained two stab wounds, the act of hurling rocks at him was not indispensable to justify holding them legally 36 liable as principals. There is further no doubt that murder has been committed, but not because of treachery, as ruled by the trial court. Treachery depends on the suddenness of the attack, by which the victim is rendered hors d'combat, as in an ambuscade, or any manner in which the victim is deprived of all defenses, and in which the malefactor faces no risk to 37 38 himself. The manner of attack must be shown. There is no such showing here. The fact that Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay held Virgilio Paino while Romeo stabbed him, does not demonstrate treachery. Rather, what it proves is abuse of superiority. It is indeed plain from the records that the trio of Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato had taken advantage of 39 their strength to overcome the victim who, at that time, was already injured. Abuse of 40 superiority qualifies the taking of the life of another into murder. As we noted, the trial court repudiated the accused's posturing of defense of relatives, so also do we. "Defense of relatives" requires the concurrence of three elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any 45 provocation have been given by the person attacked. Of these three requisites, "unlawful aggression" is said to be the most essential and primary, without which any "defense" is not possible or justified. Thus: "If there is no unlawful aggression there would be nothing to 46 47 prevent or repel." In that event, not even incomplete self-defense can be validly invoked. The Court is not persuaded that Virgilio Paino had acted with unlawful aggression that might have provoked the Agapinays' deadly wrath. The records show that all that Virgilio did was to 48 address offensive language to Delfin Agapinay. In one case, this Court held that 'injurious 49 words or threats do not amount to unlawful aggression. Assuming that Virgilio did strike Delfin and Romeo Agapinay with a paddle, the expedients reveals that thereafter and upon having been stabbed in the right arm by Romeo, he, Virgilio, ran away. It has also been ruled that: "Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating 50 from the fray." The Court finds, however, that the accused should be entitled to the mitigating circumstance 51 52 53 of provocation (or vindication of a grave offense or passion or obfuscation. ) since clearly, the deceased uttered offending words ("vulva of your mother, if you are talking as if 54 you have no debts, not like me, I have no debts" ) that made the Agapinays, especially Romeo, react violently. While the trial court disregarded this particular piece of evidence, the entire picture seems to indicate that Virgilio Paino did say bad words that made the Agapinays act in retaliation.

People vs Francisco Dacillo & Joselito Pacto

Facts: The victim, seventeen-year-old Rosemarie B. Tallada, was last seen alive at dusk on February 6, 2000, on the bridge near appellants house at Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City. Around 7:45 p.m. that evening, witness Jovelyn Dagmil, who was living with her aunt in the house adjacent to appellants, was looking for her cousin when she saw the victim Rosemarie on the bridge. Because it was drizzling, she invited Rosemarie inside their house but the 3 latter declined and told her she was waiting for someone. After a while, Jovelyn heard a man inside appellants house calling "Psst, psst . . ." Thinking the call was meant for her, she turned but instead saw Rosemarie walking towards and 4 entering appellants house. Not long after Rosemarie went inside the house, a struggle was heard therein. Witnesses Roche and Resna Abregon, who were in the adjacent house singing with a karaoke machine, suddenly felt the floor shaking as if a scuffle was going on at the other side of the wall. The houses were built on stilts above the seashore, adjoining one another with mere wooden partitions in between. Roche Abregon peeped through a hole on the wall and saw appellant 5 and another man grappling with a woman who was gagged with a handkerchief. When Roche saw appellant choking the woman, she informed her aunt about the commotion in 6 appellants house but the aunt brushed it aside as a simple family quarrel. For a while they heard the sound of a woman being beaten up. Then everything became quiet. Later that 7 evening, they saw appellant leaving his house. The following day, February 7, 2000, at around 8:00 a.m., appellant was seen entering his 8 house carrying lumber and screen. He was observed going in and out of his house several 9 times, each time carefully locking the gate as he left. At around 9:00 a.m., appellant was seen with ready-mixed cement in a plastic pail and, when asked what he was going to do 10 with the cement, replied that it was for the sink he was constructing. Later, appellant entrusted a bag of womans personal belongings to barangay tanod Allan Castaares and told the latter that it belonged to his woman companion. He allegedly could 11 not bring it home because his wife might see them. By February 11, 2000, neighbors started smelling the rotten odor of Rosemaries already 12 decomposing body. At 5:00 p.m. the same day, witnesses Roche, Resna, and Rachel were gathering seashells under appellants house when they saw droplets of blood and pus dripping from appellants comfort room. They immediately reported it to their aunt who in turn instructed her husband to get a stick and poke the sacks covering the comfort room. However, the husband instead climbed up the house and was greeted by the stink emanating from the corner where he saw a tomb-like structure. They immediately reported the matter to barangay officials who called 13 the police. At about 10:00 p.m., policemen arrived at appellants house, accompanied by his wife, and forcibly opened the lock. They proceeded to where the tomb was located. When cracked open, the tomb revealed the decomposing body of a woman. Ruling: The Court, however, finds that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on the ground that appellant admitted during re-cross examination that he had a prior conviction for the death of his former live-in partner. The fact that appellant was a recidivist was

appreciated by the trial court as a generic aggravating circumstance which increased the imposable penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. In order to appreciate recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, it is necessary to allege it in the information and to attach certified true copies of the sentences previously meted out to the accused.This is in accord with Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was not alleged in the information and therefore cannot be appreciated against appellant. Hence the imposable penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua

People vs Agapito Dela Cruz

Facts: Agapito de la Cruz was found guilty as principal by inducement of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, and sentencing him to death. The facts are such that Agapito met up w/ Mohamad Sagap Salip, Alih Itum and a certain Asmad and proposed to them the killing of Antonio Yu & the kidnapping of the Antonios younger bro Yu Chi Chong, for ransom. Agapito happened to be the oversser of Antonios rubber & coconut land for no less than 10 yrs He gave them instructions as to how and where to locate the Yu brothers at a given time and how they were to ambush the brothers. (But he didnt directly participate in actual crime). But Antonio had to go somewhere and so the younger Yu went with Isabelo Mancenido to Isabela (Isabelo Isabela hehe.. funny..). The younger Yu was ambushed as instructed but when Yu Chi Chong tried to escape by striking Angih with a piece of wood, Angih got so pissed he shot Yu several times, killing him. The gun shots alerted the villagers so the kidnappers fled. When the villagers left after seeing the body (they said theyll come back in the morning with police in tow), the kidnappers took the body and threw it in the ocean. Antonio testified and provided the possible motive for Agapito to commit such crime. Agapito was assigned manager and administrator of the farm but when the younger Yu came back, Agapito was demoted to overseer. Further, profits were higher with Yu as manager and Antonio became stricter with Agapito. Agapito was convicted as mastermind or principal by inducement Ruling: he requisites necessary in order that a person may be convicted as a principal by inducement are: 1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and 2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the 13 material executor. The foregoing requisites are indubitably present in this case. The two discharged witnesses 14 testified that Asmad and Amil contacted them to go to Basilan to do a job for AGAPITO. When the group was brought face to face with him, he lost no time in laying down the strategy for the killing of Antonio Yu and the kidnapping of Yu Chi Chong for ransom. It was

he who knew when the truck of the intended victims would go to Lantawan to load the copra to be delivered to Isabela. He knew the route that the truck would take and the approximate time that it was to pass by. He even selected the ambush place. Clearly, he had the positive resolution to procure the commission of the crime. He, too, presented the strongest kind of temptation, a pecuniary gain in the form of ransom, which was the determining factor of the commission of the crime by his co-accused. Without him the crime would not have been conceived, much less committed. Clearly, he was a principal by induction, with collective criminal responsibility with the material executors, his co-accused. Having found that AGAPITO is a principal by inducement and conspiracy being evident, he should, therefore, be held guilty of the same crime committed by the material executors in furtherance of the offense which he induced them to commit. And although the nefarious scheme was to kill Antonio Yu and to kidnap for ransom his brother Yu Chi Chong, considering the presence of conspiracy among the accused, the actuality that it was the latter instead who was murdered makes AGAPITO liable as well for all the consequences resulting from the carrying of the crime into effect. The crime committed is the complex crime of Kidnapping for ransom with Murder. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the more serious crime, or Kidnapping for ransom which under Article 267 of the same Code, as amended, is death, should be imposed. The penalty, being single and indivisible, consideration of the aggravating circumstances discussed by the trial Court need no longer be undertaken as that penalty will have to be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed (Article 63, Revised Penal Code). However, for lack of the required number of votes for the imposition of the capital punishment, the penalty to be imposed is the next lower in degree or reclusion perpetua.

US vs Panglima Indanan
Facts: n the 24th day of March, 1912, the accused sent Induk to bring to the house of the accused one Sariol. The following day, Induk, in obedience to the orders, brought Sariol to the house, whereupon the accused ordered the witnesses, Akiran and Suhuri, to tie Sariol. They obeyed the order in the presence of the accused, who was at the time lying upon a bed in the room. This was about 4:30 in the afternoon. Sariol remained there with his hands tied behind his back until night, when the accused, in the presence of several witnesses, ordered Sariol to be taken to the Chinese cemetery and there killed, the accused asserting at the time that he had an order to that effect from the governor. He gave strict orders to Akiran that he should be present at the time that Sariol was killed, and that he should aid in killing him. To make sure of the work being well done, the accused ordered Akiran to take his (the accused's) bolo with which to assist in the killing. Sariol was taken to the cemetery, in an isolated spot a considerable distance from the road and about 200 yards from the nearest house, and there killed. Kalyakan struck the first blow with his bolo, while Akiran joined in and assisted thereafter. The deceased at the time he was killed had his hands tied behind his back. On returning to the house of the accused after the death of Sariol, Unding told the accused that Sariol had been killed, whereupon the accused said that it was all right and appeared to be very much pleased. Issues: WON Indanan is guilty of murder by inducement?

Ruling: YES. A13(2), of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a crime who directly force or induce others to commit it. Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says: They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or grave fear, for example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening means, oblige another to commit the crime. In our commentary on par. 9 of A8 (page 28), we have already said that he who suffers violence acts w/o will & against his will, is no more than an instrument, & therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such case, the only guilty persons, are those who use the violence, those who force the other to commit the crime. One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a consideration, or by any other similar act w/c constitutes the real & moving cause of the crime & w/c was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act & was sufficient for that purpose. Weve already seen in our commentary on par. 12 of A8 that the 1 who physically commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility by showing that he acted w/ due obedience to an order; in such case the criminal responsibility falls entirely upon the 1 who orders, i.e., upon him who by his commands has directly induced the other to commit the act. But in case the obedience of the inferior isnt due to the superior & thus not necessary, & doesnt, thus, exempt him from criminal responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his command, directly induced him to the criminal act is considered by the law also as principal in the crime. The pacto by virtue of w/c 1 purchases for a consideration the hand w/c commits the crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers the consideration the principal in the crime by direct inducement, because w/o such offer or promise the criminal act would never have been committed. But this doesnt mean that the 1 who actually commits the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from criminal responsibility; on the contrary, such circumstance constitutes an aggravation of his crime. We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto & the pacto there are similar means by w/c another may be induced to commit a crime w/c also make the 1 who offers the inducement the principal in the crime by virtue of the provisions of A13(2). But it must be borne in mind that these acts of inducement do not consist in simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the time the act was committed. Such advice & such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have a great dominance & great influence over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself.

the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. In the morning of that date, Ortillano, Mandolado, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon, AFP trainees/draftees, were passengers of a bus bound for Midsayap, North Cotabato. After reaching Midsayap, while still in uniform, they decided to drink ESQ rum at the bus terminal. Erinada and Simon decided to join the accused in going to Pikit, North Cotabato, the home base of the accused. After an hour of drinking, Mandolado got drunk and went inside the public market. When he returned, he grabbed his .30 caliber machine gun and started firing. Companions tried to dissuade him but Mandolado just wont stop. Troubled enough, Erinada and Simon ran away, hailed and boarded a passing Ford Fiera with some passengers on board. The accused followed and also boarded the same vehicle. The soldiers forced the driver to bring them to the Midsayap crossing. On the way, Mandolado got his knife and tried to attack the driver. After appellants alighted at said crossing, the Ford Fiera sped away. Mandolado fired his machine gun at the speeding vehicle, hitting the back of the drivers sister who was also on board. At the said crossing, waiting for a ride, a privately owned jeep driven by Tenorio passed by. The appellants shouted at the driver, to stop vehicle and allow them to board it. While Mandolado and Ortillano were inside the jeep, they kept on firing their guns. Tenorio remarked: If you will not stop firing your guns I will ram this jeep into something. When Mandolado learned that the jeep was bound for Cotabato City and not Pikit, North Cotabato, he got so angry, cocked his gun and ordered the driver to stop. While the jeep was coming to a full stop, Erinida and Simon got off the jeep and ran towards their detachment camp which was just nearby. Then the killing transpired. Mendoza and Tenorio were dead. Issue: Whether or not the specific circumstance of abuse of confidence may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance Ruling: NO. In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that there exists a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and one against whom the crime was committed and the accused made use of such a relationship to commit the crime. (People v. Comendador). It is also essential that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused undue advantage or make it easier for him to commit the said crime. In the instant case, there is absolutely no showing of any personal or immediate relationship upon which confidence might rest between the victims and the assailants who had just met each other then. Thus, no confidence and abuse thereof could have facilitated the commission of the crimes.

People vs Ludovico Doctolero

Facts: On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico Doctolero met at the crossing of Bo. Banana and Binday road, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the brother-in-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn, p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera). Marcial Sagun and company were on their way home. (p. 8, Ibid). Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: "Where have you been cousin." (p. 8, ibid) He noticed,

People vs Martin Mandolado & Julian Ortillano

Facts: Martin Mandolado and Julian Ortillano, draftees assigned with the Alpha Company, 3rd Infantry Battalion, Second Infantry Division of the Philippine Army stationed at Pikit, North Cotabato, were accused for the murder of Herminigildo Tenorio and his driver Nolasco Mendoza in the afternoon of October 3, 1977 at Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao qualified with

however, Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his cousin Marcial Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward swing. He parried the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but he was hurt in the process (p. 10, ibid). At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed his bolo. They watched each other's step (p. 10, ibid) with the two women, Lolita de Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of Ludovico with a wood ( sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes were towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo (p. 11, ibid). Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the back. He retreated and then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid). Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was eating his meal, together with his small children upstairs, while accused-appellant, Conrado Doctolero was in the kitchen downstairs also eating his meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing June 8, 1971-Salazar). He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his children as he might meet something bad that night. He did not enter the house anymore: he was only until the door. Then he ran away. His father asked him what happened, but he did not answer anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4, Salazar). He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of his cousins, Juanito and Cresencia Doctolero. As he came near his house, he saw the house of Marcial Sagun, who was also his immediate neighbor. His blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house calling him to get down. When Marcial did not get down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial Sagun was not there. So he went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told him that Marcial Sagun went towards the South. He was about to leave when the old woman hit him at the back of his neck, causing him to see darkness and (he) boloed her several times. Ruling: The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an accomplice in the commission of the crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies having participated in the commission thereof and raises the effete defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the place where the crimes were committed. Appellant's pretension, however, was not corroborated by any evidence other than the testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While the testimony of a co-conspirator or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from a polluted source and must be scrutinized with great caution as it is 11 subject to travel suspicion. This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and categorical testimony of the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and between the positive declarations of the prosecution Witness and the 12 negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence. When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the 15 witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be given full credit. And when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the 23 criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.

Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought or impulse, thus negating a common criminal design in their minds. This pretension must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended by the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act. The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. The child required medical attention for fifteen (15) days, hence the liability of appellants therefor is for less serious physical injuries punished with arresto mayor under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances, a penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor should be imposed for said offense on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an accomplice. The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal terminated only 27 his criminal liability but not his civil liability. Also, while the death indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00 under current case law, the same should not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he having heretofore withdrawn his appeal and the judgment rendered by the trial court having long since become final and executory with respect to him.

People vs Restituto Roche

Facts: When arraigned on June 18, 1992, all of the accused, with the exception of John Doe, pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged, whereupon they were tried. The prosecution 3 presented Dr. Dario L. Gajardo, Helen Amarille, Rodel Ferol, PO3 Orlando Valencia, Rosalinda Ferol, and Rogelio Rossel whose testimonies and documentary evidence showed that, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of May 31, 1992, Roderick and Rodel Ferol were having drinks with a friend named Bobot inside the Ferol compound at Block 4, Lot 40, Bagong Silang, Kaloocan City. Without any warning, accused-appellant Restituto Roche and Francisco Gregorio barged into the compound. Francisco tried to hit Rodel Ferol with an empty beer bottle marked "Beer Grande" but failed because his common-law wife, Helen Amarille, pulled 4 him away on time. Roderick Ferol was not as lucky as his brother. Roderick was stabbed on the back with an ice pick by accused-appellant. Roderick ran towards the house of his friend 5 Bobot but, outside the compound, Dorico Caballes caught up with him. Roderick fell to the ground and was repeatedly stabbed with a knife by Dorico. Rogelio Rossel tried to stop Dorico but he was chased by the latter. A brother of the victim, Jon-Jon, threw bottles at Dorico, forcing the latter to run away, and leave his victim behind. Roderick was then taken 6 7 to his house by Rogelio and Jon-Jon. But at the time, Roderick was already dead. 8 Helen Amarille sought assistance from the police station in Bagong Silang. She led PO3 Orlando Valencia, PO3 Celerino Vertez, PO3 Jose Marle, and PO2 Gil Torres, all of the Kaloocan City Police Station, to the scene of the crime, but as the victim was no longer there, they proceeded to Roche's residence. Helen pointed to accused-appellant, Marcelino Fallore and Francisco Gregorio as the assailants of Roderick Ferol. The suspects were taken to the 9 Bagong Silang Police Station for investigation. Ruling: In the case at bar, Rogelio Rossel testified that he did not see Restituto Roche at the time Dorico Caballes was stabbing Roderick Ferol. Apart from Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol, whose testimonies are highly suspect, no other witness was presented to prove that accusedappellant directly participated in the commission of the offense or performed an act which would show community of purpose with Dorico Caballes. Even if it is assumed as true that

accused-appellant was responsible for telling Dorico Caballes it was Roderick Ferol who had tripped him (Restituto), this would not suffice to find accused-appellant in conspiracy with Dorico Caballes. For conspiracy to exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. In People v. Elijorde, Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a coprincipal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yield the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference. Indeed, there is no proof to show accused-appellant, together with Dorico Caballes, had resolved to attack Roderick Ferol. Instead, we think the assault on Roderick Ferol was an impulsive act by Dorico Caballes borne out of the desire to get even with him for the offense committed against his brother. In no way can such act be attributed to accused-appellant. Neither can accused-appellant be held liable as an accomplice for the crime charged. The following requisites must concur in order that a person may be considered an accomplice: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. There is no evidence to show that accused-appellant performed any previous or simultaneous act to assist Dorico Caballes in killing Roderick Ferol. In fact, it has not been proven that he was aware of Dorico Caballes plan to attack and kill Roderick Ferol. Absent any evidence to create the moral certainty required to convict accused-appellant, we cannot uphold the trial courts finding of guilt. Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all of them.

going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. Elisa shouted: Tama na. Tama na. Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded fist blows until they reached Aling Soteras store at the end of the street, about twelve to fifteen meters away from Elisas store. For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail. Joselitos intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselitos neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell how many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom. The victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear life. When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselitos head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselitos house and informed his wife and brother of the incident. Ruling: The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery. Abuse of superior strength likewise attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part.[41] In this case, the attack on the unarmed victim was sudden. Odilon, without provocation, suddenly placed his arm around the victims neck and forthwith stabbed the latter. The victim had no inkling that he would be attacked as he was attempting to pacify Edmar and Julian. Ronnie and the appellant, both also armed with deadly weapons, rushed to the scene and stabbed the victim, giving no real opportunity for the latter to defend himself. And even as the victim was already sprawled on the canal, Ronnie bashed his head with a hollow block. The peacemaker became the victim of violence. Unquestionably, the nature and location of the wounds showed that the killing was executed in a treacherous manner, preventing any means of defense on the part of the victim. As testified to by Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, the victim was stabbed, not just once, but eleven times mostly on the chest and the abdominal area. Six of the stab wounds were fatal, causing damage to the victims vital internal organs.*42+ The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery.[43] There is no mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the felony. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since no aggravating and mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

People vs Edmar Aguilos

Facts: On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian invited them to join their drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two newcomers obliged. In the course of their drinking, the conversation turned into a heated argument. Edmar nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An altercation between the two ensued. Elisa pacified the protagonists and advised them to go home as she was already

People vs Ronald Garcia

Facts: Atty. Romualdo Tioleco was jogging when he noticed a blue car parked at the corner of this 5 6 street. The car lurched towards him and stopped. Two (2) men quickly alighted from the 7 car. One of them pointed a gun at Atty. Tioleco while the other hit his back and pushed him 8 into the back seat of the car. Once inside, he saw two (2) other men, one on the driver's seat 9 and the other on the back seat directly behind the driver. He found out later the identities of the driver whom he undoubtedly recognized during the abduction to be accused-appellant Gerry Valler, and of the other person on the passenger seat behind Valler as accused10 appellant Roland "Ronald" Garcia. These two (2) persons have since the commission of the crime have remained at large. When the car finally stopped, Atty. Tioleco was told to alight, led to a house and then into a 18 19 room. He remained blindfolded and handcuffed and made to lie down on a wooden bed. During his captivity, one of the kidnappers approached him and told him that he would be released for a ransom of P2 million. The kidnappers had already begun contacting his sister Floriana Tioleco. 5 October 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Ronaldo Mendoza of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) arrived at Floriana's house to monitor her brother's kidnapping. Floriana received the following day about eight (8) phone calls from the kidnappers still demanding P2 million for 26 her brother's safe release. 27 By the end of the day on 7 October 1996 Floriana was able to raise only P71,000.00, which 28 she relayed to the kidnappers when they called her up. They finally agreed to set her 29 brother free upon payment of this amount, which was short of the original demand. The pay-off was scheduled that same day at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening. 36 Floriana and her friends left the "pay-off site" after waiting for two (2) hours more or less; 37 so did the blue Toyota Corona almost simultaneously. No payment of ransom took 38 place. P/Chief Insp. Cruz then ordered P/Chief Insps. Quidato and Tucay and their subordinates to tail this car which they did all the way to the De Vega Compound at Dahlia 39 Street in Fairview, Quezon City. Meanwhile, the kidnappers explained in a phone call to Floriana that they had aborted the pay-off on account of their belief that her two (2) 42 companions at the meeting place were police officers. But she assured them that her 43 escorts were just her friends. At around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 8 October 1996 Floriana received a call from the 44 kidnappers at her house who wanted to set another schedule for the payment of the 45 ransom money an hour later or at 2:00 o'clock. This time the rendezvous would be in front 46 of McDonald's fastfood at Magsaysay Boulevard in Sta. Mesa, Manila. She was told by the kidnappers that a man would go near her and whisper "Romy" to whom she would then hand over the ransom money. A team of PACC operatives under P/Chief Insp. Cruz again stationed 49 themselves in the vicinity of McDonald's. 50 Floriana arrived at the McDonald's restaurant and waited for a few minutes. Not long after, 51 the blue Toyota Corona was spotted patrolling the area. The blue car stopped and, after dropping off a man, immediately left the place. The man approached Floriana and whispered 52 53 "Romy" to her. She handed the money to him who took it. Floriana identified this man during the trial as accused-appellant Roland (Ronald) Garcia.

Ruling: There is no doubt that Gerry Valler and Ronald Garcia are principals by direct participation and co-conspirators in the kidnapping for ransom of Atty. Tioleco. Their respective participation in perpetrating the crime cannot be denied. As regards their liability as coconspirators, we find the same to have also been shown beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it for which liability is joint.[114] Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the felonious covenant itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during, and after the commission of the crime disclosing a common understanding between them relative to its commission.[115] The acts of Valler and Garcia in coordinating the abduction, collection of ransom and detention of their victim indubitably prove such conspiracy. Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense. In the instant case, we cannot deny knowledge on the part of Lariba and Rogel that Valler and Garcia had kidnapped Atty. Tioleco for the purpose of extorting ransom and their cooperation to pursue such crime. But these facts without more do not make them coconspirators since knowledge of and participation in the criminal act are also inherent elements of an accomplice. Further, there is no evidence indubitably proving that Lariba and Rogel themselves participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. As the evidence stands, they were caught just guarding the house for the purpose of either helping the other accused-appellants in facilitating the success of the crime or repelling any attempt to rescue the victim as shown by the availability of arms and ammunition to them. These items contrast starkly with the tried and true facts against Valler and Garcia that point to them as the agents ab initio of the design to kidnap Atty. Tioleco and extort ransom from his family. Significantly, the crime could have been accomplished even without the participation of Lariba and Rogel. As stated above, the victim had been rendered immobile by Valler and Garcia before the latter established contacts with Floriana Tioleco and demanded ransom. The participation of Lariba and Rogel was thus hardly indispensable. As we have held in Garcia v. CA, in some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor character.*119+ At any rate, where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking and doubt created as to whether the accused acted as principal or accomplice, the balance tips for the milder form of criminal liability of an accomplice.[120] We are not unaware of the ruling in People v. Licayan that conspiracy can be deduced from the acts of the accused-appellants and their co-accused which show a concerted action and community of interest. By guarding Co and Manaysay and preventing their escape, accused-appellants exhibited not only their knowledge of the criminal design of their coconspirators but also their participation in its execution.[121] But the instant case is different. Considering the roles played by Lariba and Rogel in the execution of the crime and the state the victim was in during the detention, it cannot be said beyond reasonable doubt

that these accused-appellants were in a real sense detaining Atty. Tioleco and preventing his escape. The governing case law is People v. Chua Huy[122] where we ruled The defendants statements to the police discarded, the participation of the other appellants in the crime consisted in guarding the detained men to keep them from escaping. This participation was simultaneous with the commission of the crime if not with its commencement nor previous thereto. As detention is an essential element of the crime charged, as its name, definition and graduation of the penalty therefor imply, the crime was still in being when Lorenzo Uy, Tan Si Kee, Ang Uh Ang, William Hao and Young Kiat took a hand in it. However, we are not satisfied from the circumstances of the case that the help given by these accused was indispensable to the end proposed. Our opinion is that these defendants are responsible as accomplices only

RULING: 1) Yes, Teresa Domogma was rightly convicted as an accessory to the crime. Her subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. With the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants Hence, the Supreme Court sentenced to DEATH Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

People vs Nemesio Talingdan

FACTS: 1) On the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived together in their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their relationship had pdf 2) been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2) different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them, go down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should she get pregnant, the child would not be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several times; the latter went down the house and sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he would kin him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as she approached them, she heard one of them say "Could he elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him". ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Teresa Domogma was rightly convicted as an accessory to the crime.

Jorge Taer vs CA
Facts: The accused Emilio Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived at Taer's house at 2:00 am with two male carabaos owned by and which Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The said carabaos were left at Taer's place. After searching in vain for the carabaos at the vicinity, Dalde and Palaca reported the matter to the police. Reyes informed Dalde that he saw the latter's lost carabao at Datag, GarciaHernandez. They found their missing carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near the house accused Taer. Accused Taer, allege that the carabaos reached his place tied together without any person in company. Accordingly, Taer told Dalde and Palaca that the carabaos were brought to his place by the accused Namocatcat who asked him to tell anybody looking for them that they just strayed thereat. Taer was convicted for the crime of cattle rustling, later affirmed by the CA in toto, finding the evidence of the prosecution that conspiracy indeed existed between Emilio Namocatcat and Taer. Taer appealed arguing that the extent of his participation did not go beyond the participation of the original defendants Saludes and Cago. Therefore, he submits that the acquittal of these two by the trial court should also lead to his acquittal. Issue: Whether or not there conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt to convict the accused as principal for the crime of cattle rustling as defined and punished by PD 533 Held:

No. Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. The same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. At most the facts establish Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet without having participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took part subsequent to the commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects. Taer is thus only an accessory after the fact. The decision rendered by the Trial Court and affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals were hereby MODIFIED. TAER is convicted as an accessory of the crime of cattle-rustling.

grounds to hold a person liable as a conspirator.[21] Therefore, the task in every case is to determine whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof reasonably yield that inference.[22] Unquestionably, the latter did not personally inflict any of the fatal flows, he can be held liable as a principal, only if conspiracy is proven. Not an Accomplice Neither can appellant be convicted as an accomplice. Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as those persons who, not being included in Article 17, [40] cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. To be convicted as an accomplice, it is necessary that the accused be aware of the criminal intent of the principal and then cooperate knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime.[41] To consider a person an accomplice in the commission of the offense, the following must concur: (1) community of design -- knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, one concurs therein; (b) cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material and moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (c) a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.[42] In the case before us, appellant did not concur in or lend support to the nefarious intent of That appellant helped Tolentino carry the victim from the house to the creek did not necessarily demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of purpose or action.[49] Quite the contrary, the formers attempt to dissuade the latter from killing Sagario was attested to by the prosecution witness.[50] With the nominal role appellant played in the drama that had been thrust upon him, we cannot declare that he was an accomplice in the crime charged.[51] Not an Accessory Either Appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory either. To convict an accused as an accessory, the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the crime and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes.[52] Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the concealment or the destruction of the body of the crime or of the effects or the instruments thereof must have been done in order to prevent the discovery of the crime.[53] That, precisely, is wanting in the present case.[54] In his testimony,[55] appellant stated that because he was afraid his co-accused would hurt him if he refused, he agreed to assist the latter in carrying the victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter likewise indicated his innocence of the charge.[56] Verily, he adequately explained his conduct prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear for his own life.[57] It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from assisting the victim if to do so would put the formers life in peril.[58]

People vs Wilfredo Tolentino & Jonathan Fabros

Facts: On February 28, 1996 around 7:30 in the evening, appellant and his cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their house in Luyahan, Pasonanca, Zamboanga City when their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When asked what was it all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to them to come to his house located just across the road. Once they were inside the house, Wilfredo immediately revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheilas stepfather. Wilfredo explained that it was the only way to free Sheilas mother - appellants aunt - of the sufferings being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed Merwin to go back to the house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave it to Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to go home and wait for Hernan. Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to the kitchen and fixed the bag of rice he was carrying. Meanwhile, appellant, together with Sheila and Merwin, just stayed quiet in the living room. Moments later, Wilfredo with a 2x2 piece of wood in his hand entered the house. He then followed Hernan towards the kitchen. When about an armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo, without saying a word, immediately walloped Hernan on the right side of the neck sending the latter unconscious and falling face down to the ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and Merwin to help him bring Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan out of the house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried Hernan towards the creek about seven meters away from the house. Ruling: No Conspiracy In theory, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[14] To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon.[15] Once conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes the act of all.[16] Well-settled is the rule that the existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed.[17] Quite the contrary, the evidence for it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Mere presence at the scene of the crime or even knowledge of the plan or acquiescence thereto are not sufficient