The Structure and Subject of "Metaphysics " Author(s): Helen S. Lang Reviewed work(s): Source: Phronesis, Vol.

38, No. 3 (1993), pp. 257-280 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182447 . Accessed: 27/11/2011 10:35
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The Structureand Subjectof MetaphysicsA

HELEN S. LANG

Introduction Metaphysics A has long puzzled its readers not only in the particularsof its arguments, but in its very subject: what is Metaphysics A about? Indeed, perhaps A deals with several topics; we should not immediately assume that it concerns only one. Ross claims that it is theology, a proof of a first mover, god, culminating in a vision of divine life.' Along with this claim, he argues both that in relation to the rest of the Metaphysics, A "must be considered an entirely independent treatise" and that "Book A is rightly regarded as the coping-stone of the Metaphysics."2 More recently, Graham follows Ross, asserting without argument that Metaphysics A is indeed theology.3 But Owens has argued that Metaphysics A is "a study of Entity [o',oaL], first in sensible Entity and then in immobile Entity".4 On this view, theology disappears, replaced by a science of first sensible and then separate Entity, which includes god.' His claims, like Ross', appear to rest on the particular arguments of Metaphysics A. (Although we shall not take them up here, the same case can be made for claims about the chronology of the particulararguments, the best known being Jaeger's claim that Metaphysics A, 8 is a late insertion breaking the continuous argument that begins in 7 and is completed in 9.)6 So Owens points to the sections of Metaphysics A
' W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introductionand Commentaryvol. I, (Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1953), pp. xxix, cxxx-cliv. 2 Ross, pp. xxix, cxxx. - D. Graham,Aristotle's Two Systems (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 266. 4 J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Instituteof Medieval Studies, 1978), p. 453. s Ibid. 453-54. 6 WernerJaeger,Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Developmenttrans.with the author'scorrectionsand additionsby RichardRobinson.2nd ed. (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1948) p. 346. Phronesis 1993. Vol. XXXVIII13 (AcceptedApril 1993)

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that deal with "sensible Entity" and "immobile Entity", while Ross points to arguments about god. But in fact, these claims about the logos as a whole do not derive from its particulararguments but are prior to and determinative of these arguments. For example, the claim that it is theology presupposes that the arguments concerning god in Chapters 6-8 somehow dominate the book while those concerning sensible things, Chapters 1-5, prepare for, lead to, or are completed by these arguments. The topic of Chapters 9 and 10 must be understood as god, even though god is never mentioned in them. Likewise, Owens' claim that A concerns first sensible and then separate substance divides the logos in half (with little sense of how, or if, the halves are related) and so, produces two quite independent arguments within A as a whole. In both these cases, the logical structure assumed (without specific evidence or argument) for the whole is reflected in the force and domain assigned to particulararguments within that whole. I shall assume that Metaphysics A should be examined as a unified piece of reasoning. As I shall argue, Aristotle announces the subject of the logos immediately and unambiguously: an investigation of substance. He then divides it into two parts, sensible substance and unmoved substance, and examines them in order. Within each part, as with the larger whole, the main topic is announced immediately and is then followed by its analysis. The main topic, substance, and its rubrication raise two further problems that are not addressed until after the analysis of substance is complete. But their solution is crucial to the investigation of substance and Aristotle's return to them provides further evidence for the overall structureof Metaphysics A. Indeed, these problems conclude the investigation of substance. The first concerns voig and the second how nature as a whole contains the good and the best. The relation of these problems, especially vovs, to the investigation of substance is problematic. Traditionally, the argumentabout vovf; (A, 9) is understood as a returnto the account of god in A, 7 - an argument that has been interruptedby the separate (and out of place) argumentconcerning how many gods there are (A, 8). I shall argue that A 8 continues, indeed completes, the analysis of god begun in 7; hence A, 8 is in the right place. A, 9 begins "there are some problems concerning mind"; hence it does not consider specifically god's mind, but broader problems concerning voi; raised by but left unanalyzed in the argument in A, 7. The final problem, how nature contains the good and the best, completes the account of substance by returning to a problem raised at the outset of the logos before substance was rubricatedinto sensible and separate substance. This view of A makes better sense of it as a logical whole and makes better sense of its 258

particulararguments than do traditional readings.7 Two brief points before turning to Metaphysics A. (1) Although the issue itself lies beyond the bounds of this paper, the claim that Aristotle announces his topic immediately is supported by oft repeated speculations that these writings are, or are based on, teaching texts. Within an oral setting, announcing the main topic first provides a mnemonic device for remembering what follows.8 (2) The claim that Metaphysics A possesses substance as its primary topic does not deny that arguments about god, and hence theology, appear in the logos. Such a denial would be absurd in the face of the text. But it does deny that the main purpose of the argument is to prove the necessity and nature of god and divine life; rather, god appears within a larger investigation of substance. So, the investigation of substance and what such an investigation entails is at stake in the question of the structure and subject of Metaphysics A. A. The Topic of Metaphysics A The opening words of Metaphysics A announce: "The inquiry concerns substance; for the principles and causes we seek are of substances." JrlHQiL 41]TOvyaQ oboCdv Ca excRiXCTtCa 'TLUL T'g o0'utWg f OEwQ(a- TIWV TM] (Metaphysics A, 1, 1069al8). Without pause, Aristotle indicates the importance of the subject. Philosophically, the investigation is important because whether "the all" (To ru&v)is some sort of whole or a succession [of parts], substance must be first.9 Even though contemporaries rank universals as substance, the ancients bear witness, Aristotle claims, to the importance of substance. Hence the most respected opinions confirm his view of the importance of this investigation. And with his next words he goes to work on his announced subject: "oCoIal be TQ Lg, .. ." In short, the introduction is over, the investigation begins. Aristotle, master of efficiency, has done considerable work in just over ten lines. He announces his subject and its importance: substance because
7 Although a full developmentof the point clearly lies beyond the bounds of this paper, Dr Sharples has suggested that the concerns of Theophrastus'Metaphysicsmake better sense with this interpretation of A thanthat of others. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr Sharplesfor his thoughtfuland constructivecriticisms of this paper. ' For a full account of this thesis, cf. John P. Lynch, Aristotle's School: A Study of a Greek Educational Institution(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 75-86 and I. During, "Notes on the Historyof the Transmission of Aristotle's Writings" Aristotle and His Influence. Two Studies (New York and London: Garland,1987), pp. 37-70. 9 Aristotle,MetaphysicsA, 1, 1069al9-20.

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substancemustbe first. But hereinlies a however"the all" is constituted, - is it some sortof whole [4); bXov question."The all" remainsunknown ' of AristotTnTo Tav] or a succession[T fj;pEt] of parts?No indication here, perhapsbecausein eithercase substance mustbe le's answerappears rests on the priorityof subof this investigation first and the importance in orderto proceed stance.Hencean answerto this questionis not required with the investigation.But the meaningof "first" and hence our underas priorto all else cannotbe completewithoutknowstandingof substance of "the of "the all"; at the same time, the construction ing the construction all" cannotbe known withoutknowing substance,which is first. In this and the natureof "the all" are insepaof substance sense, an investigation in the openinglines of A. rableand bothare announced when he notes his topic and affirmsits importance Aristotledemarcates - they (probably its priorityfor the ancients.Criticalof his contemporaries Plato or his followers) rank universalsas substance-, his link with the of his own view. This referenceto the ancientsemphasizesthe superiority of mark:it declaresthe importance ancientsserves almostas a punctuation the subject with the force of a tradition(with which Aristotleexplicitly of an examination of subconnectshimself)thatestablishesthe worthiness of the topic at hand.The first mostance.So concludesthe announcement mentof the logos is complete.
B. The Rubric of the Analysis

subdividesit into threekinds, Turningto substance,Aristotleimmediately This division presentsthe rubricwithin two sensible and one unmoved.'0 topic which substancewill be treated.As such, it presentsnot the primary of the logos, but a first step in the argument. However,althoughthe topic properlyspeakingof MetaphysicsA is establishedas obia( priorto this of this divisionimpliesboththatthereis no oioGCt division,the immediacy apartfrom or in additionto sensible and unmovedsubstanceand that an of substance must set out fromthese three"kinds", i.e. from investigation thansome genericcategoryapartfromor priorto these kinds beings rather and the beings thatthey present. But this division of substanceinto threekinds raises a second question and Aristotle turns to it directly. Sensible substancesare the subject of belongsto physics becausethey involve motion,while unmovedsubstance with the two has no commonprinciple a differenttheoria,if this substance
10

Aristotle,MetaphysicsA, 1, 1069a30-33.

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sensible substances." Is there such a common principle? Again, Aristotle gives no indication of his view - either of what this first principle might be or even if there is one. Rather, the examination of the immediate topic at hand, sensible substance ('H 6' acdCOriTio0io(ta tcaT3XpkT),begins without pause.12 The methodological question concerning sensible and unmoved substances - whether they belong to the same theoria - rests upon a metaphysical question - whether they possess a common principle. And in this question we see what is at stake in defining the larger structureof the logos. If Metaphysics A considers first sensible and then unmoved substance, a division between these different kinds of substance is presupposed at the outset and the need for a common principle is muted - the three kinds seem grouped loosely together and so the examination of them is sequential, first sensible and then unmoved. But if, as I am arguing, the subject of the inquiry is substance, a topic recognized even by the ancients, then the division of substances into kinds is the first step in implementing the inquiry into substance. Consequently, these three kinds must possess a common principle sufficient to include them within a single investigation, i.e. the investigation of substance announced in the opening lines. The problem posed here by A appears as an explicit topic in other books of the Metaphysics. So Metaphysics E mentions mathematics, physics and theology as separate sciences bearing on different objects and specifies "the first science" as that which concerns immovable and separate things.'3 Furthermore, Aristotle continues, if there is a science of immovable substance, this science will investigate being qua being and the things that belong to it quabeing [xai iTci oIOV XcalT tOTL 6VTOgj OVTcUOTln] Ev ' OE awpOcCL, XcLi Tlt fAdovra fi 6v. (Metaphysics E, 1, 1026a31-2; cf. also K, 7, 1064a28-bl3)]. The mention of being qua being and its possible identification with theology, cannot but in its turn recall us to Metaphysics F."4 Is Metaphysics A the science of immovable substance, theology, mentioned in Metaphysics E and so, by implication, the science of being qua being described in Metaphysics F? Aristotle himself never addresses this question, but his readers find it irresistible. And the topic and rubrication of Metaphysics A provide food for speculation. A investigates both sensible and immovable substance as well as answering an importantquestion about the
" Aristotle,MetaphysicsA, 1, 1069a36-1069b2. 12 We may note here that the chapter division does not altogether coincide with the division of the argument.Chapter2 begins some five lines into the argumentconcerning sensible substance. 3 Aristotle, MetaphysicsE 1, 1026al5-20. '4 Aristotle, MetaphysicsF 1, 1003a21.

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construction of "the all". Hence, insofar as the "theology" mentioned in E seems restricted to an investigation of separate and immovable things, Metaphysics A cannot be this theology. It certainly contains theology, but it is not just theology. Metaphysics A presents an investigation of substance, first sensible and then immovable. But what of the science of being qua being in Metaphysics f? Setting aside the problematic relation between E and F, we can ask how the topic and rubricationof A relate to the account of the science of being qua being in Metaphysics r. There Aristotle argues that being falls immediately into kinds and therefore the sciences follow these kinds [ibrd&Q%t y&e EOiV; Ey'vr {xov no fv [xcd t6 Ev]J 6L xai at EOTiiJT aL dxoXovUO1ouoL (Metaphysics r 2, 1004a5-6)]. Thus he accounts for the so-called totitoLg special sciences, i.e. each takes up some "part" of being (Metaphysics F 1, 1003a24-25). But there is another science, the science of being qua being that investigates being as such (Metaphysics r 1, 1003a21). He declares unambiguously that all beings are related - and so insofar as they are related presumably fall under one science - because there is one central point, a tQo Ev, for all (Metaphysics r 2, 1003a31-b18). Whatever this relation entails, it reappears, as we shall see, at the end of Metaphysics A.'5 Here we may note that the methodological point of F, i.e. there is a science of being qua being even though all beings fall immediately into kinds, reflects the procedure of A which declares an investigation of obmoWt, immediately divides it into kinds and concludes by referring all things together as tQo; tv. In Metaphysics A, I the question of a common principle among substances returns us to "the all". If it is some sort of whole, then there must be a common principle among the three kinds of substance because substance is "first" in its constitution; but if "the all" is a succession of parts, then either there is no common principle or only a very weak one. As with the question of "the all" and of how substance is first, an immediate answer to the question of whether there is a principle common to all substance may be unnecessary because the argument can (and should) proceed without it. However, if the theoria of Metaphysics A concerns otoC(a, the unity of this logos and the coherence of its analysis rests squarely on the answer to this question. Consequently, the integrity of Metaphysics A requires that it be addressed at some point within the logos. And, as we shall see, it is addressed when Aristotle concludes this book with the claim that all things in the world are indeed related "7rQboEv".'6
'5 Aristotle,MetaphysicsA 10, 1075a18.
16

Aristotle,MetaphysicsA 10, 1075a18-20.

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Here the second moment of the logos is complete. Aristotle has subdivided the topic announced in the introduction and so presented the rubric of the upcoming analysis. Oboia is divided into three kinds, two sensible and one unmoved. They are now considered in order. C. Sensible Substance The examination of sensible substances now begins, and like the logos as a whole, begins immediately with the topic at hand. "Sensible substance is changeable," Aristotle begins, and his analysis establishes first that the causes and principles of sensible substance are three, namely form, matter, and privation and, second, that neither matter nor form comes to be, but only their combination. With these terms he analyses sensible substance as changeable and in so doing establishes and spells out the claim with which the argument begins. When the analysis of sensible substance as changeable is complete, one might expect this section of the logos to conclude. But before concluding, Aristotle raises a broader question: in what way are the causes and principles of different things different and in what way are they the same? In order to answer this question, he characterizes substances generally - and this characterizationis telling: "Since some things can be apartwhile others cannot, the former are substances. And because of this the same thing is a cause of all things because without substances, affections and motions will b(dIva. oOfCxLaL b' TI Ta [LEV TC b' oib XWQLCTcL, not be." ['EJTFA XwQ^Toa
xcc &Q TO^ITO TUaVTWV TcTa ctLTLLa Ta V ObUCILWV &VE10Ob)X ECOTL TW , 6TUL

3Td01 xl

at xLvrw;Lg. (Metaphysics A, 5, 1070b36-1071a2)]. In this sense,

he concludes, the principles of things are the same by analogy, for example, form is always actuality and matter potency.17 This is not to say that these things, i.e. form and matter, are universally, (for example some one form "man" causing all men, as Plato would have it) because an individual is a source of individuals.'8 Rather, within individuals actuality and potency always operate analogously and in this sense are the same. Although the immediate topic of this part of A is sensible substance this question and its answer return to the two problems raised but left unresolved at the outset of the logos. (1) Is there something common to all substances? Yes. They can all be apart. Furthermore,in all substances actuality and potency are the same by analogy. (2) In what sense is "the all" one? Analysis of sensible substance shows that because substances can be apart,
"
18

Aristotle, Metaphysics A 5, 1071a4-5. Aristotle,MetaphysicsA 5, 1071a 19-20.

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affectionsandmotionsdependuponthem.Consequently, everything is one insofaras everything dependsuponsubstance andin this sense, substance is
first.

As we noted, because these issues are entailedboth by the announced subject,substance,and by the rubrication of the argument into an analysis of first sensibleand then unmovedsubstance, they mustbe addressed if the largeranalysisis to be coherent. The completionof the accountof sensible substanceas changeablepresentsthe first set of substantiveconclusions withinthe logos. And these conclusionsreturnthe accountimmediately to the broader issues concemingsubstance andthe nature of "the all". As we shall see, these issues will be addressed againin termsof the resultsof the and finallyas a conclusionto the logos as a analysisof unmovedsubstance whole. In short,the conclusionsof "local" arguments withinMetaphysics A are consistentlyreturned to the topic raisedat the outset of the logos: substance. And this fact supports the claimthatas a unifiedpiece of reasonA concernssubstance. ing Metaphysics aboutsensible subNow, at the end of Metaphysics A, 5 the argument stance(along with the implications of this analysisfor the inquiryconcernwhatandhow manythe &QXCct of concludesunambiguously: ing substance) sensiblethingsare, how the same andhow different,has been stated.'9 The thirdsection of the logos, the analysisof sensible substance as changeable as well as the implicationsof this analysis for substanceas first and the construct of "the all", is complete.
D. Unmoved Substance

established Aristotleturnsimmediately to the remaining kind of substance his division of substance into three kinds. he by Again, begins by asserting the topic of the upcominganalysis:since there are three o&o(uiL, two of them natural and one unmoved,concerning the unmovedwe must say that theremust be some eternalunmovedsubstance.['Eti 6' iGoav TQEg o0b6CiaL 6 i etXL'V1TO5, 7tEQL TlUTlg XEXTE0V 6TL JLCL,biio IE'V at qAJOLXai dtL6Lov tVa otActv EwVQL &xLCVT]TOV. (Metaphysics A, 6, dEvayx1J this claim first that such 1071b3-5)].And he now establishes by showing mustbe. substance mustbe and then whatits nature An analysis of motion, i.e. actualization always occurringin sensible revealsboththattheremustbe an unmovedmoverandthe nature substance, of this substance.Its substancemust be actualitybecauseit causes eternal
'9 Aristotle,MetaphysicsA 5, 1071b-2.

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motion in sensible substance while something else (the first heaven) causes differences; these two together cause eternal variety.20 Why, then, seek other causes?2' Here we see that the order of the arguments in A is not arbitrary.Because the principle of sensible substance as changeable and the analogical unity of potency and act is established first, motion in sensible things may be treated as an effect of unmoved substance. Given that such a cause must be, Aristotle identifies the nature of this cause: pure actuality that causes as an object of thought and desire. "Since then, there is some mover being itself unmoved, being actuality, this mover is in no way able to be other than it
obVx is" [?tEAL&eUOTLTLXLVO1V ctnTo &XLiVfTOV6v, tVEQYELa 6v, TOUTO There1072b7-8)]. 7, A, (Metaphysics dk(Xw tV&TXETaL EYX6LV O0168%t6.

fore, it is necessary and, insofar as it is necessary, it is good and in this 6v Xcd vyxV xck;, v a LIWOT'V sense a first principle [t &viyxr;g &iQC (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b10-1 1)]. xcaLob-Twg Q As with the logos as a whole and the analysis of sensible substance, the opening assertion establishes the immediate topic of analysis: that there must be a first mover and what its nature must be. Following the account of sensible substance as changeable, this account rests on the dependence of motion in sensible things upon a prior cause. Given Aristotle's definition of motion, this dependence shows both that there must be a first mover and that this mover must be pure actuality acting as an object of thought or desire. And the analysis continues with just these points. "And on such a T diQa &Q)xn; principle depend the heavens and nature" [Ix TOUWtfl IQT1qVL 6 obQavog xac f cpiVoi. (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b13-14)]. That is, because unmoved substance causes motion, both kinds of movable substances depend upon it. This point echoes the conclusion of the analysis of sensible substance: without substance, affections and motions will not be and in this sense they depend upon substance. In short, substance must be first and all things must share a common principle, unmoved substance. This conclusion appears here as an immediate implication of the analysis of unmoved substance. It articulates the opening claim that there must be such a substance and leads to the closely related question: what is the nature of unmoved substance? This substance is life at its best, actuality fully actualized, thought which thinks itself [1 &e vO6i]ot f XcL0'acbTTV TOr xaO' ATO &dQioToU, xaXl [aULctLX TO' [uaktWLa. (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072bl8)]. An account of this thought now follows and at its conclusion it is identified as god. Each
20 21

Aristotle,MetaphysicsA 6, 1072al5-17. Aristotle, MetaphysicsA 6, 1072bI0- 1.

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momentin the development of this accountis definedby the topic at hand, unmovedsubstance. Aristotlefirst shows thatit mustbe - it is required by - andwhatits nature motionin sensiblesubstance mustbe. The forceof the analysisis to establisha full characterization of unmovedsubstance. Therefore, characteristics such as "life at its best" and "thought thinking thought" appearas predicatesrevealed by an analysis of unmovedsubstance,god. For example,thoughtthinkingthoughtis active when it possesses its object and so possessionratherthanreceptivityseems to be the divine elementof thought(Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b22-23).And the analysis retumsimmediately to god becausegod is the proper subjecthere:if god
is always well, as we are sometimes, we must marvel .. . (Metaphysics A,

7, 1072b24-25).Finally,Aristotleconcludes,"Therefore, we say thatgod is living, eternal,best, so thatlife andduration, continuous andeternalbelong to god; for this is god" [a(Ev b6i T'OVOEOV Evai lJov &t6lOV 6QLoTOV, (oTe 4wi1 xati ctbWv ouVcxiTg xai dtLbLog ftaQXt& T( OF^UoUTO yaQ 6
0O6; (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b28-30; cf. N. Ethics X, 8, 1178b21-23)].

After this characterization, Aristotlecriticizes Pythagoras and Speusippus:theirviews are inferior becausethey thinkthat"the mostbeautiful and best are not in the firstprinciple"[TO6 XcLXXLOTOV xait tQLOTOV tV &QX11 [d
EtvaL (Metaphysics A, 7, 1072b31)]. He then summarizes his arguments.

This summary returns us to the claim with which the analysisof unmoved substancebegan. "It is clear from what has been said that there must be some substanceeternaland unmovedand separate from sensiblethings.. .
And it is clear 'why' unmoved substance must be in this way."
[6TL [ItV

OVV {OTLV O1bOLa TLg etLbLo Xa Xai XEXWQLCFE1 TlOV dQXLCVTog atcoOrT6Ov,qxLvEQOvtx T6)V dQ?SVOV ... T.C. uTa pEV OWV 6iXCa 6LOT TOUTOV 9XEl T'OVTQO3Erov. (Metaphysics A, 7, 1073a3-5; 1073a13)I.22

But a question remains about unmoved substance, god, and Aristotle raises it now: is it one or many and if many, how many (Metaphysics A, 8, 1073al4-15)? We need not consider the chronology of Aristotle's writings in order to consider the proper topic of this argument: 1-lTEQov bE [ILLV T'iV ToLaUTriv OETEoV oboiav f 3TXE?oUg, xacf JToCtg, b86 [dl kavOdvELv

. . . "Such substance",i.e. unmoved,is his topic and insofaras this argumentconcernsunmovedsubstanceit continuesthe analysisdevelopedthus far.23 Aristotleconcludes that the primarytbO t' iV ELVaL does not have
22 We may note that in Ross' translation this sentence appearsas the opening sentence of A 8, even though in his Greek edition (cf. note 29) it is the closing sentence of A, 7. Jaegeralso makes it the closing line of A 7 in the OCT. 23 Speaking of A, 8, Owens concludes that "the necessary connection of the passage with the immediatelyprecedingargumentseems very apparent",The Doctrine of Being, p. 448.

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matter but is fulfillment; therefore the first mover, being unmoved, must be one in both definition and number [Ev dQa xatLkoyw xati dQL0[aCto 3TQCOYrOV XLVOUV LV1ITOV 6v (Metaphysics A, 8, 1074a36-38)]. With this conclusion, Aristotle tums to the ancients and their treatmentof this problem. In a suddenly expansive style, he explains that the most ancient of our elders have handed down in the form of a myth the view that there are gods and that the divine surrounds the whole of nature (Metaphysics A, 8, 1074b-4). If, Aristotle argues, we separate their view from later (inferior) additions, we can see that it is inspired and so has been preserved. And the ancient truth here becomes clear in the light of this account of substance (Metaphysics A, 8 1074b4-14). And, of course, it thereby attests to Aristotle's own (superior) position. What is the function of this fourteen line encomium to the ancient past? Obviously it adds further weight to Aristotle's view, especially in contrast to his opponents. But it does more: like the earlier reference to the ancients, it provides a punctuation mark indicating the completion of a major segment of the logos. ThroughoutMetaphysics A, Aristotle frequently refers to various philosophers, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Plato, but never in this expansive style. And these lines refer neither to a Presocratic nor a contemporary; they cast back to the most ancient and noble opinion - one that both accords with and can be interpretedby Aristotle's position. Aristotle underscores the virtues of his position by turning to the light of eternal truthknown first (however intuitively) by the ancients. And in doing so, he implies that the argument concerning unmoved substance is complete. Indeed we know both that there must be such substance, and what its nature must be (pure actuality, thinking about thinking, life at its best, activity) and that it must be one in both number and definition. The topic announced at the beginning of this section of Metaphysics A, i.e. unmoved substance, has been analyzed. This section of the logos is now complete. In the rubrication of his analysis, Aristotle divides substance into three kinds, two sensible and one unmoved. Since all three kinds have been examined, it would seem that the analysis of substance is now complete. The excursion into noble ancient opinion appears as a punctuation not only of the analysis of unmoved substance but also of the analysis of substance as such. It is complete. E. Metaphysics A, 9: Mind or God? But the logos is not complete. Two chapters, Metaphysics A 9 and 10, remain. Here we reach the most problematic part of the logos, especially 9. How we construe the overall topic of the logos is crucial not only for the 267

particulars of these arguments, but even for defining their topics. We can consider A, 9 and its topic first. There are two views of this argument. (1) If we think that the unmoved mover, god, is the topic of Meiaphysics A, two consequences follow for these particulararguments. First, the argument concerning mind and its object is out of place - it picks up and develops the account of A, 7, where god is characterized as thought thinking itself.24Or alternately, A, 8, the discussion of whether the first mover is one or many, is out of place; indeed, on this view A 8 is largely eliminated from any meaningful role in the logos - and as there is no other "obvious" place for it, it can be dismissed altogether as early and immature. Second, the subject of the argument is at stake here. For if the proper subject of the argument is god, thought thinking thought, then the introduction of mind and its relation to its object in effect furthers the analysis of divine being, namely god's mind and the relation of divine mind to its object. Because god stands as the subject of this argument and divine thought is thought at its best, this account of mind provides a model for what thinking is at its best and hence for what all thinking should be.25 When we turn to the analysis itself, we shall encounter a startling example of the interpretive force of this view. (2) If, however, with the conclusion that there must be separate substance, a first mover unmoved and one, the argument about unmoved substance, god, is complete, and with it the analysis of first sensible and then unmoved substance - a completion "marked" by the reference to the ancients - then this argument concems a different (albeit related) topic. Indeed, we saw that in the analysis of unmoved substance, "thinking about thinking" appears as a predicate but is not analyzed apart from its immediate implications for god. Indeed, it cannot be analyzed because the argument presents a characterizationof god. In effect, the strict definition of the analysis of unmoved substance - it is solely about god - leaves Aristotle with unfinished business. On the one hand, god has been described as "thought thinking thought" and so the topic of mind in relation to its object has been raised and its immediate implications for god developed; on the other hand, furtherproblems involved in mind could not be pursued earlier because that argument concerns unmoved substance (god) and such pursuit would change the subject. But with the analysis of unmoved substance (and substance) complete, Aristotle can consider, as a subject, a topic, vovs, raised by that analysis. In so doing, he will complete the unfinished busi24

W. Jaeger, p. 346.

2S Ibid. Owens seems to assume this view, moving from A 7 to 9 withoutcomment. Cf. Doctrine of Being, p. 444, n. 33.

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ness raised by, but not formally a part of, the analysis of unmoved substance. And he turns to this subject immediately after praising the ancients. On this view, different conclusions follow. Because voig presents a topic raised but left unexamined by the analysis of unmoved substance, it is in the right place - properly presented within the logos, but postponed until after the account of unmoved substance, is complete. Co-relatively A, 8 is also in the right place because it continues and completes the account of unmoved substance by asking if it is one or many. Furthermore,if the analysis of unmoved substance is complete at the end of A, 8, then A, 9 cannot, strictly speaking, develop further the account of divine being and cannot present an account of god's mind as a model for all thinking. Rather, divine mind raises some general problems concerning mind. By considering mind and the relations obtaining between mind and its object, the special case of divine mind can also be considered. In short, divine mind on this view is not a model for all thinking, but a special case of thinking. On both views, A, 9 furthers the development of the analysis of god; consequently, on both views it belongs to the larger account of Metaphysics A. But on the first view it does so by developing a new step and further conclusions for the argument begun in A, 7; that is, the subject of A 9 is divine mind, i.e. god. On the second view, A 9 resolves a problem involved in and raised by what has already been established in A 7 - god is a thinking on thinking; but it reaches this resolution by presenting an analysis of voi,; - now taken as a topic in its own right - that includes divine mind as a special case. Here we can see quite clearly how decisions about the topic of Metaphysics A as a whole effect decisions about the topic and status of particular arguments within that whole. How can we decide what the argument of Metaphysics A 9 is about? We have already seen some evidence: (1) the coherence and efficiency of the argument concerning unmoved substance from its announcement in A 6 to its conclusion in A 8 that the first mover must be one in both definition and number and (2) the larger structure beginning with the claim that the investigation concems substance, the immediate division of substance into its kinds, the completion of the analysis of each kind and the encomium to the ancients as a closing "punctuation mark" to the argument as it has proceeded thus far. To this we may add as furtherevidence the opening sentence of A 9. The first words after the excursion to the ancients announce the topic at hand: 4EL TnVog aToQL'Ctg-8oXEl [V Ta 6E JEP T'OVvo'v yaQ ,vLL TOV QaLVoEvWv OE6OTaov. .. "There are some problems concerning mind for it seems to be the most divine of things observed" (Metaphysics A, 9, 269

1074b15-16).Aristotledoes not say thatthereare some problemsconcerning unmovedsubstance,or god; rather,he says there are some problems concerningmind. And he is entitled to be taken at his word. Therefore, the topic of analysis. voug now constitutes whatis the relation But if vovs;is now the topic, we face a new problem: of this topic, vovsg,to substanceand why should a discussionof vovs; be includedwithin an investigationof substancethat has been divided into sensible and unmoved?As I shall now argue,the analysisof mind and its relationto its object appearshere as a topic because it has been raisedby of god and involves difficultiesthatremainunresolved the characterization A, 9 takes up a predicateestablished within that analysis. Consequently, (A, 6-8), considersit in andof withinthe analysisof the unmovedsubstance the analysisof thinkingto the specialcase of immaterial itself, andnarrows eternalthinking. A, 9 belongsto the investigaHereinlies the sense in whichMetaphysics tion of substanceeven though it does not develop a furtherstep in the - an analysisthathas been completed.A 9 analysisof unmovedsubstance of god as the actualityof takes up a problemraisedby the characterization thought,namely the relationbetween mind and its object. This problem could not be consideredearlier (A 7 and 8) because the topic there is strictlydefinesthat and as its topic unmovedsubstance unmovedsubstance analysis.With its close, Aristotlecan take up a problemraisedby it and considerthis problemin itself. Finally,the solutionto the problemof the relationof mindto its objectis appliedto eternalthinkingas a specialcase. A 9. Let us brieflyconsiderMetaphysics whatmindthinksaboutand, Severalquestionsarenow raisedconcerning thesequestions norgod arementioned, neitherunmovedsubstance although at its best. In this of clearly seem to bear upon the special case thinking sense, they reviewandamplifythe accountof minddevelopedto characterize god. Does it think about nothing?If so, where is the dignity in such thought, for it resembles someone who is asleep (MetaphysicsA, 9, 1074b17-18)?What does it think about?For if it thinksaboutsomething else, then it dependson thatobjectfor its activityand so cannotbe the best A, 9, 1074bl8-20)? Does it matterwhat it thinksaboutor if (Metaphysics AnswerA, 9, 1074b21-24)? the objectof its thoughtchanges(Metaphysics ing these questions,Aristotleconcludes "therefore,it thinksitself, if it is the most excellent thing, and this thinkingis a thinkingaboutthinking" f v6joatsvoijoEW; toi xT ?QTLV dia vo'i, EticEQ to rtXCUTov,xaiL [t5bTOv A, 9, 1074b33-35)]. vO6qMg (Metaphysics We seem here to be exactly where we were in A, 7. So why is this argumentnot a returnto MetaphysicsA, 7 and its argumentconcerning 270

god? A, 7 is partof an analysisof unmovedsubstance- an argument that begins in 6 and ends in 8 - and as such it reachesconclusionsaboutunmoved substance. Metaphysics A, 9, as Aristotleannouncesat the outset,is aboutmind, i.e. the problemsof the relationof mind to its object.Hence, neither unmoved substancenor god are mentionedin 9. Insofaras both unmovedsubstanceand mind at its best turnsout to be a thinkingabout thinkingthe arguments clearly go togetherand the argumentabout mind belongs within MetaphysicsA, i.e. an investigationof substance.Neverwhatcomes theless,the topicsbeing analyzedin A, 7 andA, 9 aredifferent: out in the analysisof unmovedsubstanceas a necessarypredicate, thinking about thinking,now forms a topic of analysis in its own right, mind in relationto its object. And the conclusionsreachedby an analysis of the problemsconcerningmind do not develop further the argument aboutgod; rather, they resolveproblemsinvolvedin a predicate of unmovedsubstance. Hence A, 9 possesses a differenttopic, mind, thandoes A, 7, which concerns unmovedsubstance,but both are includedwithin an investigation of substancebecause mind, the subject of A, 9, is a predicateof god, the subjectof A, 7. The problemsconcerning mindand its relationto its objectare seriousin partbecausethey involve not just thinkingaboutthinking,but all formsof thinking.In the next sentenceAristotle'slanguageshows how broadlyhe casts these problems.The differentkinds of thinking involved here are emphasized by the repetition of the conjunction "and" - a rhetorical device called polysyndetonthat lengthens and slows the pace of the sentence: "But, it seems, knowledgeand sensationand opinion and thoughtare always of anotherand of themselves only indirectly" [tcqxivTcaL 6' &d('L
o ftJTLCT'[tTI xcii f CifoOfloCL 6' ?iXOV xCaift 866a xL h &6LVOWa, ctfig tv tctQE`Qy (Metaphysics A, 9, 1074b35-36)].Generally,to thinkand to

be thoughtare not the same;in virtueof whichdoes "goodness" belongto mind [Ett F d ko 10 vosiv xaL TO voELoOcu, xacTct m6TTEQov (naTy To E?t
ftcnQx?L; 06? yCpQ 'tct0rr T6OELVaiL VOiJOEL XCii VOU[LTVp.

(Metaphysics

A, 9, 1074b36-38)]? In some cases, e.g. the productive sciences,the knowledge is the object [ij ?r' tVLwV f t 1JTLCTijn] TO 7rQy&Lca,tTIL[tEV TJV 'T i~v alvaL ... (Metaphysics A, 9, JTOLTITLIXV 6iVEU R5Yr ftoCWLa xcaiTo
1074b38-1075a2)]. But in the case of the theoretical sciences, the act of thinking is the object of thought; in short, thinking and the object of thought do not differ when matter is absent and, therefore, such thinking is one with the object of thought [tni 6E TOV OwQTITLXOwV 6 kXdo0gT0oaQ&yic xciitf 6VtO; o?iX TE'QOU TOlU OrV xai toi5 VoU, 6ota [i1 VOTJOLg; VOOiU[tEVOU xcii f v6rToTL CdTo go-TctL, iXknV9y(c1, T6o TqOVOO'U[Vp [iAa.(Metaphysics A, 9, 1075a2-5)].

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This analysis is not about god in any obvious sense. It concerns what is announced at the outset of A 9: an aporia concerning mind, namely the problem of its relation to its object. And as such it is cast quite generally. Indeed, although a full examination lies beyond the scope of this paper, the analysis of mind in A, 9 most obviously compares with the analysis of vov'g in De Anima F. Thinking here includes perception and opinion - fonns of thinking that cannot possibly apply to immaterial divine mind.26Only within a general account of thinking, do we arrive at science, both productive and theoretical. Although science is a more specialized form of thinking including perception and opinion, nevertheless it than the very broad formns is a human activity and as such proves that we have not yet arrived at the narrowest case of thinking, uniquely divine activity; thus, the brief characterization of science is narrower than the class of all thinking but still does not apply exclusively to god. These sciences bring us to the special case of thinking in which there is no matter (or in which thinking may exclude matter as such). Since unmoved substance, god, is a thinking on thinking that also cannot involve matter, we reach here the kind of thinking appearing within and requiredby the earlier account of unmoved substance. And one sentence concludes the argument: when there is no matter, thought and the object of thought will not be different, in this case thinking will be one with its object [ob)x xal O1J v, boct [t'U To Iv PXEL, TErQOi OV'V 6VTog TOVi VOOU[EVOU rnlTo 90Tiza, xal f V6Oriot TO VOOtU[EVp [RCC.(MetaphysicsA, 9,

1075a3-5)].27
Although unmoved substance or god is not mentioned, this case certainly seems to return us to this substance - or the subset within all thinking of which this substance is a member - and the account of god as a thinking on thinking. If we are to account for Metaphysics A as an investigation of substance, then we must be able to explain both why there is no mention of unmoved substance, god, and why we seem to be back to it. God is not mentioned because, properly speaking, the subject of this argument is mind, voV5. We seem clearly back to god because god is thought thinking
26 Cf. De Anima F, 3, 427b7-26 where perception[a'LcGOr(cJL is comparedand contrasted with opinion [b66Ej, knowledge [I LQPlIj, thought [&6voLC] and imagination

[qQavTaoJa].

It seems impossible not to comparethis line to the accountof mind at De Anima F 4, 430a2-6: "And mind itself is among things that are thought. For in the case of things that are withoutmatter,the thinkingand the thing thoughtare the same. For theoretical knowledge and the thing thusly known are the same." xCf rnrlr6;g& voI]T6q t0TLV 6&MEQ Pi voiTd. tni tFEvyYQ T7V &VFV VXilg T0 OT6to?TL To VOOVV XaLiTo
27 VOOWEVOV 1

(AQ 2tOT?UTf

OiT0 Xacl TO OEW?T1TLXf

T1 CUTW60tLV. g tOTELCT1TOV

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thought: the predicate appearing in the analysis of unmoved substance, god, is identical with the special case of mind to which this argument narrows. Hence, this argument both concerns a different topic (vovs; rather than obki(ct)and completes business left unfinished within the analysis of obiMLta. By considering problems involved in vovs, Aristotle can complete the argument concerning substance. For this reason, the argument of A 9 is both properly postponed until after the account of unmoved substance in 6-8 and included within A, which as a whole concerns substance. A further tnoQica about the object of thought [in these cases] remains, and Aristotle with his next words turns to it: is it composite? (MT bl 6iFLrrETaC 6CROQAtc, &t 0iVV0ETOV TO VOO'uvov

(Metaphysics A, 9,

1075a5-6).28Because it is without matter, such an object of thought must be indivisible - "just as human vovs; (or the vov5gof composite things) is in some time" (Metaphysics A, 9, 1075a7-8). Thus too is "the thought having itself [as its object] for all time" [oDiTwg 6' EXEL wbTi1 CtiT'c ij vOTCtg ToV &TnaVTa atLWva;] (Metaphysics A, 9, 1075alO). Here the argument clearly concludes (as does the chapter); the next line begins a different topic (and opens A, 10). - Is the object of thought [when there is no matter] Again this &tJoQLa composite? - does not seem to be exclusively about unmoved substance, god. First, the principle cited in support of the solution, absence of matter makes a thing indivisible, applies to all cases in which there is no matter. Secondly, the concluding sentence reflects both on human mind and its object of thought as well as eternal thought having itself as its object. Indeed, these two look very much alike - eternity being the only difference cited. Aristotle does not call this eternal thought substance, or god; rather, he extends the point about thinking and the object of thought to the case in which the activity is thinking and the object of thought to the case in which the activity is eternal. Structurally,this argument too seems to be a general account of thinking when there is no matter present narrowing to a special case, i.e. when such thinking is eternal. That is, the proper subject is thinking and the special case to which the account narrows is unmoved substance and this special case reveals why this topic (yoV) appears in Metaphysics A. In short, Metaphysics A 9 does not possess unmoved substance as its topic and is not a returnto the account of god in Metaphysics A, 7. Rather, the topic here is exactly that announced at the beginning of Metaphysics A,
28

'ET!be regularlyintroducesnew moments in the argument.Cf. Physics A, 1, 208a34, b8, 209aI8, 23. 'ETi also introduces lists of arguments by itself, cf. Physics A, 8, 215al4, 19, 22, 24.

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9: problems concerning vovs. Problems concerning mind follow the completed argument about unmoved substance because they have been raised by that account but could not be treated within it (without changing the topic). And the analysis of these problems narrows to the special case of eternal immaterial thinking. Indeed, they appear after the account of substance is complete precisely because, although they do not concern substance per se, they are occasioned by that analysis and are intimately linked to its conclusions. Before turning to Metaphysics A, 10, I would like to consider a striking example of what is at stake in these decisions about the subject of the argument and ultimately Metaphysics A as a piece of reasoning. Ross argues that A, 9 continues the argument of 7: "Aristotle now turns to the consideration of 6 voV5;,i.e. of the supreme intellect, which has in ch. 7 been shown to be implied as the cause of the movement of the heavens."29 The identification of 6 voV5 with "the supreme intellect" is absolute for Ross. So when Aristotle begins "Tat be rQiL TOV VOUV 9XtELTLVQ dLtoQeit" Ross translates (the Oxford translation) "The nature of divine thought involves certain problems" (Metaphysics A, 9, 1074b15). Indeed, because he identifies vovsg with god so absolutely, Ross finds the next words ("for it seems to be the most divine of observable things") "strange" because divine reason is presumably not found among observable things; perhaps, he suggests, the phrase "observable things" could also apply to things examined by reason." Again, when Aristotle concludes that in the absence of matter, thought and the object of thought are one, the text reads: oiix TlEQOUo1&v6VTo; TOvU VOO1EVOU XaL TOU Wov, boa IAf iIXkIV 9yEL, To a?Tho 9OTC, xaC 9
VO6loiL Ti VOOu[tFiVW [da.

But Ross translates: "Since, then, thoughtand

the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, the divine thought and its object will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought." But the word "divine" does not appear here. Finally, when Aristotle asks if the object of thought is composite, Ross

translates "eTT 6I

C5V0OETV 10 voov[tevov" as "A XELJtEnaL 3To(La, Ect furtherquestion is left - whether the object of the divine thought is composite". Again, there is no reference to the divine here. Indeed, as we have just seen, the duTopia and its solution could hardly be cast more generally. How can we account for this extraordinarytranslation? Ross introduces

29 W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introductionand Commentaryvol II, (Oxford, ClarendonPress, 1953), p. 397. 30 Cf. his comment on MetaphysicsA, 9, 1074bl6, p. 397.

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words(indeeda subject)not foundin Aristotlebecausehe identifies6 vovs so radicallywith "supreme intellect." And he makes this identification becausehe presupposes thatMetaphysics A 9 continuesthe argument of A 7. But Aristotledoes not introduce hereandthe Greek god or divinethought cannoton any accountbe translated as Ross proposes. Ross, like Jaeger,(andmorerecentlyGraham) assumesthatMetaphysics A is theology.3'Becauseas theologythe logos possesses god as its subject, particular arguments must be interpreted relativeto this subject.And when the particulars do not fit the largerwhole, as Ross defines it, they must be changed.And these changesinclude(1) rearranging the orderof the arguA 8 fromthe treatise,(2) expandingthe transmentsby largelyeliminating lationso thatthe text discusseswhatis required of it, i.e. divinemindrather than mind, and (3) interpreting away difficultiesthat remain,e.g. how divine mindcan be foundamongobservable things.Virtually no aspectof the logos is untouched. Primafacie such a view can only be suspect.Finally, the origin of the difficulties that generatesuch changes lies in a misfit
between the presupposed topic of Metaphysics A - the logos is theology

in the accountof god in chapter culminating 7 - andthe logos itself, which announcesan investigation of obo(tC. The oppositeresultsobtainfromidentifying the subjectof the logos as an investigationof substance.(1) The argumentsare in the right order,i.e. MetaphysicsA, 8 continuesand completesthe analysis of unmovedsubstance,(2) the text readsas it stands,i.e. withoutintroducing "divine", and (3) the arguments form a consistentpattern, a generalproblemof thinking narrowed to the requisitespecial case. I shall suggest in conclusionthaton this construal the logos is remarkably coherentand well-ordered.
F. How The World Contains The Good And The Best

Metaphysics A, 10 raises a final problem:"Let us consideralso in which way the natureof the whole containsthe good and the best, whetheras somethingseparate, namelyitself in virtueof itself or as the order.Or [is it] both ways, as does an army?"['E7aLdXETTnEOV 8E' xai 7totEQw; gXF-L i TOi?
Xov (ptUCoLTO &vycO6v xC T6 dQLOTOV, CtfTo XEcxwQt[EVOV TO6TEQOV Tt X

xct0' act6, i 'iv TdIev. I &totK wgOrg 4DoJ?Q tTia; (Metaphysics A, 10, 1075a 1-13)]. The good, Aristotleconcludeshere, is found

both in the orderand in the general,althoughmorein the latterbecausethe orderdependson the generalbut not the converse.All things, e.g. fishes,
3' W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introductionand Commentaryvol I, (Oxford, ClarendonPress, 1953), pp. cxxx-cliv.

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together,all thingsare nQoQg fowls and plants,are somehowordered tv. completesAristotle'sanalysis.The remainder This fifteen line argument exceptthe last line, consistsexclusivelyof criticismsof other of the chapter, views. Hence, these fifteen lines raise and solve the final problemof the together. logos: in some sense all thingsare ordered of the good thatof mind:the problem parallels In one sense, this problem of unmovedsubstance and the best has been raisedby the characterization but, as a topic in its own right, it lies outside the direct examinationof substance.Thus it too presents unfinishedbusiness, the completion of A, 7. But in a which is closely tied to the accountof god in Metaphysics sense, this problemaloneformsa suitableconclusionto the moreimportant us to the nature of "the all", - an issue it returns investigation of substance: - and to into sensibleandunmoved was subdivided raisedbeforesubstance have a common the threekindsof substance the relatedquestionof whether
principle.

of the generaland the army(folthe metaphor Howeverone interprets the main andthe household), the householder concerning lowed by another point is clear: all things are orderedtogether,connected, rQogtv. The natureof the whole is notjust a successionof parts;it mustbe unifiedin a sense. stronger and or of god. The reader But thereis no mentionhereeitherof substance the to the analysis: must connect this account preceding the readeralone general is presumablythe unmovedmover, god, while the other things mentioned,fishes, fowls and plants, are sensible substances.And on the follows directly.Althoughthe an interpretation basis of this identification threekinds of substanceare not derivedfrom some one, and so cannotbe known by an examinationof it, nonethelessin the one to which they all In this sense, "the all" is one and relate,all thingspossess a firstprinciple. thereis a commonprinciplefor all substances. A These fifteen lines providea conclusionto the whole of Metaphysics by returningus to the problemsand subjectof the opening lines of the into its kindsis logos. The analysisthatfollows uponthe divisionof oOocLt mind that are raisedby the concerning formallycompleteat A 8. Problems analysis of unmovedsubstance,namely the relationof mind to its object of the general andthe natureof thatobjectare solved in A 9. The metaphor andthe household)shows the good and and the army(andthe householder in the analysis appearing the best as relatedto "the all". Again,a predicate own as a in its substance right. This identity of unmoved topic appears founds the conclusion that this argumentcompletes the account of substance and presentsthe relationbetweenunmovedand sensible substance both Hencethis argument to a commonprinciple. andthe whole as ordered 276

reflects on the highest characteristic of god and providesa fitting concluof sion to the constructive the analysis logos as a whole. F 2 seems irresistible. of Metaphysics Again, the relatedargument There lv they fall underone Aristotlearguesthat when things are related pQo6; science. Such a science deals with what is primary,because other things dependuponthese andeven derivetheirnamesthence.32 "If therefore substanceis this, then the philosopher mustgraspthe principlesandthe causes f oboCC, TGv otaLO'v 6Wv of substances" [1 oiv TOI,T' ?(oTiLV &OL T-ag TOV qtlkOOoPOV (Metaphysics F, 2, 1003bl7&QXagxacl TaS cdTiag 9xELv A we seem to do that by graspingthe "primary 19)]. And in Metaphysics instance",namelythe general,and, so, if we identifythe generalwith god, god. Here we face the question of the topic of MetaphysicsA in its most extremeform: if it is primarilyabout god, then why not understand it as theology?Theology(a wordapparently coinedby Plato)meansthe studyof god.33Aristotleuses the relatedword 0?oEk0YoX only twice and in both cases considersthreekindsof theoretical and science,physics,mathematics, And these texts agree:if natural theology.34 substance is the only substance, then physics will be the first science; but if there is an immovablesubstance, then the science of this will be first.35 But MetaphysicsA is not, strictlyspeaking,the science of immovablesubstance.It announcesan investigation of substance and, as we have seen, includes both sensible and immovable substance. At the opening of A, 1, the primacy of substance immediately raises the problem of "the all". And however one interprets its details, the intent of describing things in Metaphysics A 10 as JTQo;tv is to establish a science of many different (and different kinds of) things, sensible as well as immov-

able. Herewe see whatis at stakein determining the subjectof Metaphysics

A: theology gives us god and a science of separate substance, but a rQpO; lv relation gives us both the one and the world, "the all", as ordered to it. And the problem that opens Metaphysics A 1, the problem addressed by the metaphors of the general and his army, the householder and the household, is a problem that concerns both the primacy of substance and the structure
32

'" `4

Aristotle,MetaphysicsF, 2, 1003b16-17. Cf. Plato, Republic II, 379a5. Aristotle,MetaphysicsE 1, 1026a19 and K 7, 1064b2; cf. also Physics B 2, 193b25194al 1 for a parallel account of mathematicsand physics but no mention of theology. We may note that althoughAristotle refersto "the theologians" [ot Oox6yot] twice in MetaphysicsA (6, 1071b27 and 10, 1075b26) no other form of this word occurs in A. The word Ocokoy(a occurs only once in Aristotleaccordingto Bonitz, Meteorologica B, 1, 353a35. 35 Aristotle,MetaphysicsE 1, 1026a28-31; MetaphysicsK 7, 1064b9-13.

277

of "the all". Indeed,as an investigation of substance thatbegins and ends with this problem, Metaphysics A appears to be not the science of separate F 2, the scisubstance,theology,but the science indicatedin Metaphysics ence of being qua being. In the remainder of MetaphysicsA, 10 Aristotlecriticizes alternative, inferiorviews, especiallythose of Platoand the Platonists. Insofaras these views differ from his own, they lead (Aristotletells us) to impossibilities (68vvaTa) and paradoxes(dToAa).36 And pathologiesof these problems further support Aristotle'ssuperior position. In its last line, the logos ends grandlywith a quotationnot from the or Plato,butfromthe most ancientandreveredauthor, Presocratics Homer. Homer, expressing an eternal truth, confirins Aristotle's own position: "The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be" ["oibx &ya0ov A, 10, 1076a4)].As ctg xoiQavoS 90TOr." (Metaphysics nroXtixoL(avL* Aristotlerefersto the ancientsat the end of his introduction andat the close of the analysis of the three kinds of substance,so too - and in this case without furtherado - an ancient returnsus to and completes Aristotle's view of substanceas first andproviding a commonprinciple for the all.
Conclusion

of the logos may be brieflysummarized. The overalllogical structure Arishis subject and confirms its totle announces first, oboCra, importance and - by referenceto the ancients.The priority his view in makingit important of the all; however of substanceleaves open the questionof the structure the all is structured, substancemust be first and the analysisof substance can proceed. With this subject in place, Aristotle subdividesobiCrainto threekinds,two sensibleand one unmoved.Again, a questionarisesbut is and so fall left unanswered: do these threekinds sharea commonprinciple The answerto this questionwill determine the undera single investigation? of substance. coherenceof the logos, since it is an investigation The examination of firstsensiblesubstances andthenunmovedsubstance follows directly.Withinthe analysisof sensiblesubstance (A 2-5) Aristotle to the general also announceshis subjectfirst and concludesby returning of unmovedsubstance(A 6-8) beproblemof substance.An examination of its subjectand ends with an extendedexgins with an announcement ancientopinion, cursion to most ancient opinion. As in the introduction, Aristotle'sview, closes the argument. confirming

36. Aristotle,MetaphysicsA, 10, 1075a25-27.

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Analysis of two topics raised within but different from the analysis of unmoved substance concludes the logos. The first concerns mind and its relation to its object. This analysis takes up as its subject a predicate (thinking about thinking) that appears in the analysis of unmoved substance. Several conclusions follow about the relation of mind to the object of thought and the nature of that object. These conclusions apply both to theoretical science and to eternal immaterial thinking that has itself as its object. Neither substance nor god is explicitly mentioned in this analysis. Finally, in A, 10 Aristotle considers how the nature of the whole contains the good and the best. Since unmoved substance has been characterized as "life at its best", this topic seems to return us to substance as first and the constitution of "the all". The metaphors of the general and the army, the householder and the household, address the ambiguity raised in the opening line of the logos. Again, unmoved substance, or god, is not mentioned in this chapter; so when Aristotle concludes that the good is found both (and more) in the general, because he does not depend upon anything else, and in the order of the parts that depend upon him, the reader must provide the connection to unmoved substance and ultimately the problem of the all with which the logos begins. With the primacy of the general (and the householder) it would seem that all things do relate to a one, to some common principle. Herein lies not only the coherence of the world but also the coherence of the logos as an investigation of substance. Having thus completed his own account, Aristotle criticizes opposing views and the logos, like its most importantparts, closes with a quotation from an ancient, in this case the most noble of all - Homer. This proposed structureraises two questions that must be answered if this analysis is to be persuasive. (1) What, finally, is Metaphysics A about? (2) How can we understand the order and unity of the logos, especially if it includes two arguments (A 9 and 10) that do not even mention substance and (on my account) concern different topics? (1) What is Metaphysics A about? Although it contains a discussion, i.e. A 7, in which unmoved substance is identified as god, it is about substance (ouo(a) properly speaking. Metaphysics A is an investigation of substance as first, however "the all" is constituted. While it is true that substance cannot be examined except as three kinds of substance (two sensible and one unmoved), nevertheless the subdivision of substance into these kinds comes after the identification of the subject of the theoria. Hence, this division and its resulting kinds constitutes not the subject of the logos but the first step in its analysis. Finally, the conclusions about substance (first as sensible and then as unmoved) are consistently referred back to the problem of substance as first and its relation to "the all". 279

(2) How can we understand the orderand unity of the logos as a fully developedformalargument? The investigation of substanceunifies the logos. It is announcedin the opening line and subdividedinto two parts, whichare takenup in order.Eachpartannounces its "local topic", i.e. first sensible and then unmovedsubstance,analyses this topic, and refers its conclusionsbackto the broadest problems associatedwith substance. Metaphysics A, 8 further developsthe argument startedin A 6 and continued in 7; at the end of 8 andonly at the end of 8 do we find the conclusionof the about unmovedsubstanceand the conclusionof the analysisof argument substance. Within the analysis of unmoved substance, two predicates appear, "thinkingaboutthinking"and "life at its best". However,each of these is also a topic in its own right; "thinkingabout thinking"raises problems the relationbetweenvovsgand its objectwhile "life at its best" concerning raises the issue of the independence of what is best and the relationof the best to the all. These topics and the problemsentailed by them present of subunfinishedbusiness, unresolvedambiguities,for the investigation stance.Hencethey are raisedandanalyzedin theirown rightas soon as the is complete.Althoughneitherunmovedsubstance nor accountof substance in eitherof thesearguments, god appears the fact thatpredicates established in the analysisof unmovedsubstanceappearhere as subjectsatteststo the in the logos. They functionsolely withinand as a role of these arguments in the openingline: the investiannounced completionof the investigation gationof substance. Hereinlies the order,the unity, indeedthe remarkable efficiencyof this in the openingline. Even when the topic announced logos. It is dominated the examinationof substanceleads to topics that must be treatedin their own right,the analysisof these topics is radicallyrestricted by the requireof substance.Indeed,for this reasonMetaphysics mentsof an examination of substance. A may be offeredas a perfectexampleof an investigation
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