technical

Prevention and integrity monitoring to assist with pipeline leak detection

By Joseph Pikas, Schiff Associates, Sugar Land, TX, USA Hazardous liquid and gas pipeline operators in the United States of America must comply with federal and state regulatory requirements for leak detection and monitoring on their piping systems. Selecting the right equipment and locations for this monitoring process has been a daunting challenge due to the various operating environments and limitations that the environment and the assets present. This article addresses how integrity-related data, information, and issues such as internal and external corrosion the root cause of many leaks and encroachment activities can be integrated with typical operating conditions so that these locations can be modelled should an event occur. The integration of the integrity-related data can provide a quantitative summary of the corrosion, construction, and encroachment activities along the pipeline.

n complying with federal and state regulatory requirements for leak detection and monitoring on piping systems, owners and operators have generally focused on an after the fact approach using advanced monitoring techniques that include pressure drops, mechanical threats, and changes along the rights-of-way. Yet most leaks have been detected by observation, and people have externally communicated this information at these occurrences. In addition, little has been done to communicate internal knowledge and integrity-related legacy data to the employees in the control room. It has not always been apparent how to use these data effectively within these organisations. The integration of data is recognised as an essential aspect in pipeline integrity management, and it is understood by the regulatory community that this information is essential in preventing and mitigating issues relating to pipelines. However, not all corrosion indications are directly examined and subsequently prioritised in accordance to their severity as related to the integrity of the pipeline. Therefore, this information should be available to all stakeholders within a company so that events can be anticipated. This is the exception rather than the rule. Back in the 1950s, 1960s, and even the 1970s this type of information was indirectly communicated because organisations were smaller and everyone talked to each other. Today, there is a trend for companies to purchase many different assets that are geographically separated by long distances, and the SCADA and control groups are remote from the pipeline systems. This means that integrity-related information typically does not get transmitted to all stakeholders unless there is a major incident.

information to the controllers. Because of these activities, no loss of life and no accidents occurred. There was good communication amongst everyone in this area, including the landowners: they talked to each other, and the gas control group was also located in this area. Today, this type of communication rarely occurs. Another case where the wrong information was transmitted involves El Paso Natural Gas Companys Line 1000, located in the south of the US, which was experiencing stress corrosion cracking (SCC) problems and recently had a few incidents with gas releases. Line 1000 was interconnected to the newer 1001 line, of similar size but which was not thought to have any problems. A failure occurred and the operator had a difficult time differentiating which line was experiencing the problem due to the multiple interconnects to customers and crossovers. The line with SCC problems was shut down, however this was the wrong line. Line 1001 had also experienced past problems due to hard spots, but no one remembered this information because it was some time back when the last failure occurred. It took some time before everyone realised the mistake, although there was no loss of life or additional damage. However this incident could have been a catastrophic case because of the precious time lost before the information was discovered.

Past history
There are very few references that address the concerns about integrating integrity information with operations and leak detection despite the fact that some companies are very committed in their prevention and monitoring activities without the use of regulations. A large natural gas transmission company located in the northeast of the US at one time was using line patrol personnel who daily patrolled nearly 100 per cent of its transmission lines in high-density populated areas. As a result of these activities, the company was able to reduce multiple near misses on a monthly basis because of construction and encroachment activities, while communicating this

Figure.1. A permanently-installed metal-loss monitor.

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Figure 2. An acoustic-emission sensor. Many other cases could be identified, such a scenario where an in-line inspection was conducted and the operations personnel, after excavating the site, decided it was too difficult to dig out the pipe due to rock and other backfill issues. The excavation project was therefore placed on hold until larger equipment, additional budget, an engineering study, etc. could be obtained. However, in the interim, this information was not communicated horizontally to the controllers who monitor the pressure and other leak detection equipment. This scenario can occur on both hazardous liquid and gas lines. assets? Can these areas of concern be properly identified, and can it be understood why there was failure at this location? Reaction time is of the essence during a catastrophic event. Can the mistake of operating a pipeline after the warning of a potential failure be avoided? Communication of the integrity condition of the pipeline over its lifetime can improve emergency response time and potentially save lives and property. It is interesting to ask: who has this vital integrity information, and why is it not being communicated and integrated within the various departments? The US Department of Transports Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) states that the integrity programme should work from the bottom up, and from the top down. What is missing in this equation? In addition to this vertical approach, a horizontal-style approach is needed, which doesnt always happen. Today, many companies tend to work remotely, and because of the size of the organizations it is often difficult to track everyone in a standalone department. Organisations have lost the neighbourhood effect, instead it has been replaced with webinars and other remote communication. Training is given according to the tasks that employees perform. However, if it falls outside an employees set task list, it is not considered their job. Another area in which information can be of assistance is how much and where excavation activities are taking place. Onecalls are now automated, and summaries of activities can be obtained relating to the number of calls and responses when new developments, trenching or construction are planned.

Role of the present players

Integrity integration offers a unique perspective into the leak detection and monitoring process. Traditional monitoring presumes that small leaks occur in hazardous liquid lines due to internal corrosion, and small external corrosion leaks occur in gas transmission lines. To some extent, this is true. Unexpected time-independent threats may occur on the pipeline. Examples include fatigue cracking, construction activities, encroachments, and third-party mechanical damage. Time-dependent threats include microbiologically-influenced corrosion (MIC), hard spots and SCC, and these are some of the threats that have caught even the most experienced controllers off guard. The role of the controller is extremely difficult under current data management protocols. How can the controller make the right decisions without all of the information? Can they shutin the right area of concern with minimal effects to safety and

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Integrated process development of prevention and monitoring

As discussed above, the effectiveness of integrity information on all pipeline systems is essential, and can be summarised in five steps. The first step is to open the lines of communication, as was done in the past using the neighbourhood concept. With internet and company intranet capabilities, this should be an easy task for most organisations. Secondly, controllers do not need to know where every indication is on the pipeline, however, they do need the essential information. Meetings need to take place to determine what is essential information and data that could impact the integrity of the pipeline now and in the future. Thirdly, training of both the controllers and integrity engineers needs to be accomplished so that everyone knows their roles and responsibilities. In addition, prevention monitoring is part of the process. For example, there are permanently installed monitors that can assess the metal loss of several hundred metres of pipeline at a time (see Figure 1), and there is also acoustic-emission (AE) technology that can be applied to hazardous liquid pipelines at critical low points for internal corrosion, and to gas pipelines at cased crossings for external corrosion. Another monitor is the underground or subsea AE sensor that can be engineered for mounting directly on submerged structures such as offshore platforms and ships, or can be used inside liquid-filled pipelines, vessels, chemical tanks, or any other liquid-filled or surrounded structure. Materials talk when they are in trouble: with AE equipment one can listen to the sounds of cracks growing, fibres breaking, and many other modes of active damage in the stressed material. These underground

sensors (shown in Figure 2) are 100 per cent insulated and nonconductive with an integral waterproof coaxial cable and can be installed in depths of 300 m. Lastly, new modelling can be created to include integrityrelated information and data. Integrity engineers can predict corrosion rates, which can be used in several places within the monitoring and prevention process. These data come from a variety of sources, ranging from in-line inspection, external or internal direct assessment, guided-wave testing, and hydrotesting. The results or summary of this information can be integrated into the controllers leak detection equipment and modelling systems to predict areas of concern. Where dynamic conditions exist, such as with internal corrosion on hazardous-liquid lines, PIMS and AE can be used to enhance the understanding of where issues can be prevented.

Conclusions
This article outlines a methodology involving the integration of integrity data, communication, and training to provide a refinement of the leak detection capabilities that can reduce pipeline incidents in a controlled manner. More importantly, the article discusses how to prevent incidents, and monitor integrity issues and problems before they become a reality. Regardless of how many bells and whistles are installed on a pipeline system, it takes communication with the public and within an organisation to manage problems effectively before they turn into a detectable leak. As a result of integrating integrity-related information into the leak and monitoring process, this can turn an after-the-fact process into a true proactive prevention system, thus making a safer operating pipeline as required by safety standards worldwide.

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Pipelines International digest | AUGUST 2010