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International Relations: One World, Many Theories Author(s): Stephen M. Walt Source: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 2932+34-46 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149275 . Accessed: 31/12/2010 03:53
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International

Relations:
One

World,

Many Theories
M. Walt byStephen

link one mustadmit,with goodreason),but thereis an inescapable We worldof theoryandthe realworldof policy. betweenthe abstract that bomof information need theories to makesenseof the blizzard of "theory" who are contemptuous bards us daily.Evenpolicymakers ideasabouthow the world mustrely on theirown (often unstated) in order to decidewhatto do. It is hardto makegoodpolicyif works areflawed, one'sbasicorganizing justasit is hardto construct principles uses realworld. a about the without lot theories Everyone knowing good about he orsheknowsit ornot-and disagreements theories-whether about the rest fundamental basic on more disagreements usually policy thatshapeinternational outcomes. forces to China. the current debateon how to respond Take,forexample, of the tenascentis the latestexample From one perspective, China's
andmaster science science S TEPHEN M. WALTisprofessor ofpolitical of thesocial colledivision attheUniversity He isa member editorial board. giate ofFOREIGN ofChicago. POLICY'S
SPRING 1998

shouldpolicymakersand practitioners care about the scholarlystudy of international affairs?Those who conductforeign policy often dismiss academictheorists(frequently,

Why

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of powerin potento alterthe globalbalance dencyforrisingpowers influence makes as theirgrowing them tiallydangerous ways, especially Fromanotherperspective, the key to China's future moreambitious. willbe modified its behavior conductis whether into by its integration markets andby the (inevitable?) of democratic world spread principles. relations betweenChinaand the restof Fromyet another viewpoint, and identity: Will China the worldwill be shaped of culture by issues asa normal member of the world comsee itself(andbe seenbyothers) or a that deserves treatment? munity singular society special In the sameway,the debateoverNATO expansion looksdifferent on whichtheory one employs. From a "realist" depending perspective, is an effort to influence-well extend Western beyond NATO expansion the traditional of U.S. vital interests-during a period of Russsphere ian weakness and is likelyto provoke a harshresponse fromMoscow. From a liberalperspective, however,expansionwill reinforcethe nascentdemocracies of CentralEurope and extendNATO'S conflictmechanisms to a potentially turbulent management region.A third viewmightstress the valueof incorporating the CzechRepublic, Hunand Poland within the Western memwhose gary, security community, bersshare a common thathasmadewarlargely unthinkable. identity No singleapproach all the complexity cancapture of contemporary world we are better off with a diverse of comTherefore, politics. array ideas rather than a theoretical peting single orthodoxy. Competition between theorieshelps reveal their strengthsand weaknesses and while revealing flawsin conventional refinements, spurssubsequent wisdom.Althoughwe shouldtake care to emphasize inventiveness over invective,we shouldwelcomeandencourage the heterogeneity of contemporary scholarship.

WHERE ARE WE COMING FROM?

The study of international affairs is bestunderstood as a protracted combetween therealist, andradical traditions. Realism liberal, petition emphasizes the enduring for conflictbetweenstates;liberalism propensity identifies several theseconflictive andthe tendencies; waysto mitigate radical tradition describes howtheentire system ofstate relations might be
transformed. The boundaries betweenthese traditions aresomewhat fuzzy and a numberof important worksdo not fit neatlyinto any of them, but debateswithin and amongthem have largely definedthe discipline.
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theirsecurity powerscouldguarantee by formingbalancingalliancesand defensive nuclearforces). choosing militarypostures(such as retaliatory Not surprisingly, Waltz and most other neorealistsbelieved that the United States was extremelysecure for most of the Cold War.Their
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Realism Realism was the dominant theoretical tradition the Cold throughout as a struggle affairs forpoweramong War.It depictsinternational selfinterested statesand is generally about the for pessimistic prospects in the ColdWar conflictandwar. Realism dominated eliminating years it provided because butpowerful forwar, alliances, simple explanations obstacles to cooperation, andotherinternational imperialism, phenomand its because on wasconsistent withthe ena, emphasis competition central features of the American-Soviet rivalry. Realism is not a singletheory, of course, andrealist evolved thought the Cold War. "Classical" realists such asHans considerably throughout and ReinholdNiebuhrbelievedthat states,like human Morgenthau hadan innatedesire to dominate whichledthemto fight others, beings, wars.Morgenthau alsostressed the virtues of the classical, multipolar, andsawthe bipolar between the Unitsystem balance-of-power rivalry ed Statesandthe SovietUnionas especially dangerous. advanced By contrast,the "neorealist" theory by KennethWaltz human nature and focused on the effects of the international ignored For of a number of system. Waltz,the international systemconsisted each seekingto survive. Because the systemis anarchic greatpowers, to protect statesfromone another), (i.e., thereis no centralauthority each statehas to survive on its own.Waltz that thiscondition argued wouldlead weaker statesto balanceagainst, ratherthan bandwagon rivals.And contrary to Morgenthau, he claimed with, morepowerful thatbipolarity wasmorestablethanmultipolarity. An important refinement to realism was the additionof offensedefensetheory,as laid out by RobertJervis,GeorgeQuester,and These scholars that warwas morelikely StephenVan Evera. argued whenstatescouldconquer eachothereasily. Whendefense waseasier thanoffense, wasmore incentives to expand however, security plentiful, could blossom.And if defensehad the declined,and cooperation andstates coulddistinguish between offensive anddefensive advantage, then states could acquire the meansto defendthemselves weapons, withoutthreatening the effects of anarchy. others, thereby dampening Forthese"defensive" states to survive andgreat realists, merely sought

Relations International

itsfavorable fearwasthatit mightsquander byadoptposition principle Thus, bytheendof theColdWar, foreign inganoverly aggressive policy. from dark about realism hadmoved human Morgenthau's brooding away moreoptimistic tone. nature andtakenon a slightly Liberalism The principal to realism camefroma broad challenge familyof liberal theories. of liberal One strand that economic interthoughtargued statesfrom using force againsteach dependencewould discourage otherbecause warfare wouldthreaten eachside's A second prosperity. often associated with President Woodrow strand, Wilson, saw the of as the to world on the claimthat spread democracy key peace,based democratic stateswere inherently morepeacefulthan authoritarian states. A third, more recent theory argued that international institutions such as the International Energy Agencyand the InternationalMonetary Fundcouldhelp overcome selfishstatebehavior, statesto forego immediate mainly byencouraging gainsforthe greater benefitsof enduring cooperation. flirted withthe ideathatnew transnational Althoughsomeliberals actors, especially the multinationalcorporation,were gradually on thepower of states, liberalism sawstates asthe encroaching generally central in international affairs. All liberal theories that players implied wasmore thaneventhe defensive of realversion cooperation pervasive ismallowed, buteachviewoffered a different forpromoting it. recipe RadicalApproaches Until the 1980s,marxism wasthe mainalternative to the mainstream realistand liberaltraditions. Whererealism and liberalism took the statesystem forgranted, marxism offered both a different explanation forinternational conflictanda blueprint forfundamentally transforminternational order. ing the existing Orthodox marxist sawcapitalism asthe central cause of intertheory national conflict.Capitalist statesbattled eachotheras a consequence of theirincessant forprofits andbattled socialist statesbecause struggle Neomarxist they saw in them the seeds of their own destruction.
"dependency"theory, by contrast, focused on relations between advancedcapitalistpowersand lessdevelopedstatesand argued that the former-aided by an unholy alliance with the ruling classes of the developing world-had grown rich by exploiting the latter.The solu32 FOREIGN POLICY

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elitesandinstalla revolutionary theseparasitic tion wasto overthrow to autonomous committed development. government discredited before the ColdWar werelargely Bothof thesetheories of economic and even ended.The extensive military cooperahistory thatcapitalism tion among the advanced industrial showed did powers not inevitably lead to conflict.The bitterschismsthat dividedthe worldshowedthat socialism did not always communist harpromote similar suffered setbacks as it theory empirical mony. Dependency clearthat,first,activeparticipation in the world becameincreasingly a to was better route than autonomous socialist economy prosperity countries and,second,manydeveloping development; provedthemselvesquitecapable of bargaining with corsuccessfully multinational andothercapitalist institutions. porations As marxismsuccumbed to its variousfailings,its mantle was a assumed of who borrowed theorists by group heavilyfromthe wave of postmodern criticismand social theory.This writingsin literary "deconstructionist" was openly skepticalof the effortto approach devise generalor universaltheoriessuch as realismor liberalism. the importance of language and Indeed,its proponents emphasized in shaping discourse socialoutcomes. because thesescholars However, focusedinitiallyon criticizing the mainstream but did not paradigms offerpositivealternatives to them, they remained a self-consciously dissident formostof the 1980s. minority Domestic Politics Not allColdWarscholarship on international affairs fit neatlyintothe or marxist In particular, a number of imporrealist, liberal, paradigms. tantworks focused on the characteristics of states, governmental orgaorindividual leaders. The democratic strand of liberal nizations, theory fits underthis heading,as do the efforts of scholars such as Graham AllisonandJohnSteinbruner to use organization theoryandbureaucraticpoliticsto explainforeign and policybehavior, thoseof Jervis, and which socialandcognitive Janis, others, Irving applied psycholoFor the most didnot seekto provide a general thegy. part,theseefforts behavior but to identify otherfactors that might oryof international
lead states to behave contraryto the predictionsof the realistor liberal approaches.Thus, much of this literatureshould be regardedas a complement to the three main paradigmsrather than as a rival approachfor analysisof the internationalsystemas a whole.
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NEW WRINKLES

IN OLD PARADIGMS

Scholarshipon internationalaffairshas diversifiedsignificantlysince the end of the Cold War.Non-Americanvoices are moreprominent,a wider range of methods and theories are seen as legitimate,and new issuessuch as ethnic conflict, the environment,and the futureof the state have been placed on the agendaof scholarseverywhere. Yetthe senseof dejavu is equally Instead of resolving the strugstriking. between theoretical the end of the Cold Warhas traditions, gle competing even as manysocieties merelylauncheda new seriesof debates.Ironically, embracesimilaridealsof democracy, freemarkets, and humanrights,the scholars who studythese developments aremoredividedthan ever. Realism Redux Although the end of the Cold War led a few writersto declare that realismwas destined for the academicscrapheap,rumorsof its demise have been largelyexaggerated. A recent contribution of realisttheoryis its attentionto the problem of relativeand absolutegains.Responding to the institutionalists' claim that internationalinstitutionswould enable states to foregoshort-term forthe sakeof greater advantages long-termgains,realistssuchasJoseph Grieco and Stephen Krasnerpoint out that anarchyforces states to worryaboutboth the absolutegainsfromcooperationand the way that The logic is straightforward: If gainsare distributed amongparticipants. one state reapslargergains than its partners,it will gradually become and its partners will eventuallybecome morevulnerable. stronger, Realistshave alsobeen quickto explorea varietyof new issues.Barry Posen offersa realist explanationfor ethnic conflict, noting that the of multiethnicstatescouldplace rivalethnic groupsin an anarbreakup chic setting,therebytriggering intensefearsand temptingeach groupto use force to improveits relativeposition. This problemwould be parcontainedenclaves inhabitticularlyseverewhen each group's territory ed by their ethnic rivals-as in the formerYugoslavia-because each side would be tempted to "cleanse" (preemptively)these alien minorities and expand to incorporate any othersfromtheir ethnic groupthat lay outside their borders.Realists have also cautioned that NATO, absent a clear enemy, would likely face increasingstrains and that wouldjeopardize relationswith Russia. expandingits presenceeastward scholars such as Michael Mastandunohave arguedthat U.S. Finally,
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Relations International

Waiting

for

Mr.

article. The post-ColdWarworldstill awaitsits "X" Althoughmany to pen the sortof compelling have tried,no one hasmanaged analysis the foranearlier Kennan thatGeorge era,whenhe articulated provided the most of a new of containment. Instead vision, imporsingle theory on world affairs isthe conin post-Cold War tantdevelopment writings hasbeen (oris thosewhobelieveworld clashbetween politics tinuing who thatthefuture and those believe transformed being)fundamentally will looka lot likethe past. fallinto whoseetheendof theColdWar asa watershed Scholars see state the actor still the as main two distinct Manyexperts groups. frommilitary butbelievethatthe agenda of statesis shifting competitionto economic domestic andenvironmenwelfare, competitiveness, Bill Clintonhas embraced tal protection. the view Thus,President self-interest shared usto that"enlightened [and] values.., willcompel in moreconstructive Some writers attribute this cooperate ways." of democracy, othersto the nuclear stalemate, changeto the spread in international andstillothers to changes norms. An evenmoreradical the stateis whether perspective questions still the mostimportant international actor. Mathews believes Jessica of the Westphalian that "theabsolutes fixed system[of]territorially states. . . areall dissolving," andJohnRuggie thatwe do not argues even have a vocabulary that can adequately the new forces describe that (he believes) are transforming world politics. contemporary on the causes of this trend,the Althoughthereis still no consensus view that statesare of decreasing is surprisingly relevance common andpolicywonks. academics, among journalists, Prominent realists suchasChristopher andKenneth Waltz Layne continue to givethe statepride of placeandpredict a return to familiar of greatpowercompetition. Robert Keohane and patterns Similarly, otherinstitutionalists alsoemphasize the central roleof the stateand such as the European Union and NATO are arguethat institutions because in themidst ofdraimportant precisely theyprovide continuity maticpolitical shifts. Theseauthors allregard the endof the ColdWar asa far-reaching shiftin the global balance ofpower butdo notseeit as a qualitative transformation in the basicnature of world politics. Who is right? Toosoon to tell, but the debatebears watching in the yearsto come.

-S.W.

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asits insofar consistent withrealist principles, foreign policyis generally andto shapea to preserve U.S. predominance actions arestilldesigned American order thatadvances interests. postwar withinthe realist The mostinteresting pardevelopment conceptual the "defensive" and "offenhas been the between adigm split emerging VanEvera, of thought.Defensive realists suchas Waltz, sive"strands andJackSnyder thatstates hadlittleintrinsic interest in miliassumed that the costs of expansion outtaryconquestand argued generally the benefits. maintained that weighed Accordingly, they greatpower because fostered wars occurred domestic pergroups exaggerated largely andan excessive faithin the efficacy of military force. of threat ceptions asRanfronts. Thisviewis nowbeingchallenged First, alongseveral seek dallSchweller that states the neorealist notes, assumption merely to survive "stacked the deck" in favorof the status it prequobecause cludedthe threat of predatory revisionist states-nationssuchasAdolf or NapoleonBonaparte's Francethat "valuewhat Hitler's Germany far and to riskannicovet more than what they theypossess" arewilling hilationto achievetheiraims.Second,PeterLiberman, in his book DoesConquest a number of astheNazi uses historical cases-such Pay?, of and Western Soviet over Eastern occupation Europe hegemony of conquest oftenexceedthe costs, Europe-to showthatthe benefits doubton the claimthatmilitary is no longer thereby casting expansion cost-effective.Third, offensive realists such as Eric Labs, John and Fareed Zakaria all Mearsheimer, arguethat anarchy encourages statesto tryto maximize theirrelative no state because strength simply can everbe surewhena truly revisionist power mightemerge. Thesedifferences overissues such helpexplain whyrealists disagree as the future of Europe. Fordefensive realists suchasVanEvera, waris andusually results frommilitarism, rarely profitable hypemrnationalism, or someotherdistorting domestic factor. Because VanEvera believes suchforcesarelargely absentin post-ColdWarEurope, he concludes that the regionis "primed for peace." Mearsheimer and By contrast, otheroffensive realists believethatanarchy to forces compowers great of theirinternal characteristics andthatsecurity compete irrespective will return to assoonasthe U.S. pacifier is withdrawn. petition Europe
New Life for Liberalism The defeatof communismsparked a roundof self-congratulation in the best Francis infamous claim that West, exemplified by Fukuyama's
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International Relations

COMPETING PARADIGMS
Main Theoretical Proposition

REALISM
Self-interested states for compete constantly orsecurity power

LIBERALISM CONSTRUCTIVISMI
for power Concern overridden by economic/ considerations political for (desire prosperity, commitment to liberal values) States Varies (international economic institutions, exchange, promotion ofdemocracy) Michael Doyle, Robert Keohane Keohane, After Hegemony "The End of Fukuyama, (National History?" 1989) Interest, State behavior shaped beliefs, by l61ite collective norms, and social identities

Units of Analysis States Main Main Instruments Economic and especially military power Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz of Waltz, Theory International Politics "Back to Mearsheimer, the Future: Instability inEurope after the War" Cold (International Security, 1990) of Resurgence overt great power competition Does not account for

Individuals (especially l61ites) Ideas and discourse

Modern Theorists Representative Modern Works

Post-Cold War Prediction

Main Limitation

international change

Increased cooperation asliberal free values, and markets,international institutions spreac Tends toignore the

Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie Is Wendt, "Anarchy What States Make ofIt" (International 1992); Organization, Koslowski & Kratochwil, "Underin standing Changes International Politics" (International 1994) Organization, it because Agnostic cannot the predict content ofideas Better atdescribing the

role ofpower

than past anticipating the future

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humankind hadnowreached the "endof history." haspaidlitHistory to but attention this the of the West did give a boast, triumph tle of liberal notable boostto all threestrands thought. andimportant hasbeenthe Byfarthe mostinteresting development lively debateon the "democratic Althoughthe most recent peace." of this debate had even before the SovietUnioncollapsed, phase begun it becamemore influential as the numberof democracies beganto andas evidence increase of thisrelationship beganto accumulate. Democratic of the earlier claimthat peacetheoryis a refinement wereinherently democracies more than autocratic states. Itrests peaceful the on beliefthat although democracies seemto fightwarsas oftenas other states,they rarely, if ever,fight one another. Scholars such as Michael Lee and Bruce have Russett a offered number James Doyle, Ray, of explanations forthistendency, the mostpopular beingthatdemocracies embrace normsof compromise that bar the use of forceagainst similar It to thinkof a moreinfluenespousing groups principles. is hard recent academic insofar the as belief that"democracies don't tial, debate, each other" has been an important for the Clinton fight justification administration's efforts to enlarge the sphere of democratic rule. It is therefore ironic thatfaithin the "democratic became the peace" basis forU.S. policy as additional research was to identify just beginning severalqualifiers to this theory.First,Snyderand Edward Mansfield out thatstatesmaybe moreproneto warwhentheyarein the pointed midstof a democratic which implies that efforts to export transition, make democracy mightactually thingsworse.Second,criticssuchas GowaandDavid haveargued thatthe apparent absence of Joanne Spiro warbetweendemocracies is due to the waythat democracy has been defined andto the relative dearth of democratic states(especially before 1945). In addition, Christopher Laynehas pointedout that when democracies havecomecloseto warin the pasttheirdecision to remain at peaceultimately hadlittledo withtheirshared democratic character. clearcut evidence thatdemocracies donotfighteachotherisconThird, finedto the post-1945 the absence of era,and,asGowahasemphasized, conflict in thisperiod to theircommon interest in conmaybe duemore the SovietUnionthanto shared democratic taining principles.
Liberalinstitutionalists likewisehave continued to adapttheir own theories.On the one hand,the coreclaimsof institutionalist theoryhave become more modest over time. Institutionsare now said to facilitate cooperationwhen it is in each state'sinterestto do so, but it is widely
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to behavein waysthatarecontrary thattheycannotforcestates agreed to the states'own selfishinterests. discussion, [Forfurther pleasesee suchas other institutionalists Keohane's On the Robert hand, article.] into have extended the McCalla and Robert theory new JohnDuffield the studyof NATO.Forthesescholars, mostnotably substantive areas, character institutionalized helpsexplain whyit hasbeen highly NATO'S of the its ableto survive andadapt, despite disappearance mainadversary. aswell.Inparofliberal isstillinfluential Theeconomic strand theory a number of scholars haverecently thatthe "globalizaticular, suggested tion" of world markets,the rise of transnational networksand the of commuand organizations, nongovernmental rapid spread global nications areundermining the powerof statesandshifting technology frommilitary toward economics attention andsocialwelaway security fare.The detailsarenovel but the basiclogic is familiar: As societies the globebecomeenmeshed in a web of economicand social around the costsof disrupting theseties will effectively connections, preclude unilateral stateactions, the use of force. especially This perspective impliesthat warwill remaina remotepossibility the advanced industrial democracies. It alsosuggests thatbringamong China Russia into and the relentless of embrace world is ing capitalism the bestwayto promote bothprosperity andpeace,particularly if this creates a strong middle classin thesestatesandreinforces process pressures to democratize. Get thesesocieties hooked on prosperity andcomto the economic realm. petitionwillbe confined Thisviewhasbeenchallenged scholars who argue thatthe actuby al scopeof "globalization" is modest andthatthesevarious transactions stilltakeplacein environments thatareshaped andregulated bystates. the belief that economic forces are traditionNonetheless, superseding al greatpowerpoliticsenjoyswidespread acceptance amongscholars, andpolicymakers, andthe roleof the stateis likelyto be an pundits, academic important topicforfuture inquiry. Constructivist Theories Whereas realism andliberalism tendto focuson material factors suchas ortrade, constructivist the of power approaches emphasize impact ideas.
Insteadof takingthe state for grantedand assumingthat it simplyseeks to survive,constructivists regardthe interestsand identitiesof statesas a highly malleable product of specific historical processes.They pay close attention to the prevailingdiscourse(s)in society because dis40 FOREIGN POLICY

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lier notions of sovereignty and altered the legitimate purposesfor which state power may be employed.The common theme in each of these strandsis the capacityof discourseto shape how political actors define themselvesand their interests,and thus modifytheir behavior.
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course reflects andshapes beliefs andinterests, andestablishes accepted norms of behavior. constructivism is especially attentive Consequently, to the sources of change,andthis approach has largely marxreplaced ismas the preeminent radical on international affairs. perspective The end of the ColdWarplayedan important rolein legitimating constructivist theoriesbecauserealismand liberalism both failedto this event and had some trouble it. Construcanticipate explaining tivists had an explanation: formerpresidentMikhail Specifically, Gorbachev revolutionized Sovietforeign he embraced policybecause new ideassuchas "common security." Moreover, given that we live in an erawhereold normsarebeing once clearboundaries aredissolving, andissues of identichallenged, moresalient,it is hardly thatscholars have ty arebecoming surprising been drawnto approaches that place these issuesfrontand center. Froma constructivist in fact, the centralissue in the perspective, conceivetheiridentities post-ColdWarworldis howdifferent groups and interests.Although power is not irrelevant,constructivism how ideasandidentities arecreated, howtheyevolve,and emphasizes how theyshapethe waystatesunderstand andrespond to theirsituation. Therefore, it matters whetherEuropeans definethemselves priin nationalor continental whether andJapan terms; marily Germany redefine theirpastsin waysthatencourage theiradopting moreactive international andwhether the UnitedStatesembraces orrejects roles; its identityas "global policeman." Constructivist theories arequitediverse anddo not offera unified set of predictions on anyof theseissues. At a purely level, conceptual Alexander Wendthas argued that the realistconception of anarchy doesnot adequately explainwhy conflictoccursbetweenstates.The realissueis how anarchy is understood-inWendt's words, "Anarchy is whatstatesmakeof it."Anotherstrand of constructivist has theory on the future focused of the territorial that transnastate,suggesting tionalcommunication andshared civic valuesareundermining traditionalnationalloyalties andcreating new forms of political radically association. Otherconstructivists focuson the roleof norms,arguing thatinternational lawandothernormative haveeroded earprinciples

International Relations

Domestic PoliticsReconsidered As in the ColdWar, scholars continue to explore the impact of domestic politicson the behavior of states.Domestic are politics obviously centralto the debateon the democratic such as peace,and scholars andHelenMilner haveexamined howdomesFrieden, Snyder, Jeffrey tic interest candistort theformation of statepreferences andlead groups to suboptimal international behavior. David Downs, Rocke, George andothers havealsoexplored howdomestic institutions canhelpstates dealwith the perennial of uncertainty, whilestudents of psyproblem chologyhave applied prospect theoryandothernew tools to explain fail to act in a rational fashion.[For further diswhy decisionmakers cussion aboutforeign policydecision making, pleasesee the articleby Hermann andJoeHagan.] Margaret The pastdecadehas alsowitnessed an explosion of interest in the of a that with the constructivist concept culture, development overlaps on the importance of ideasandnorms. Thus,Thomas emphasis Berger andPeterKatzenstein haveusedcultural variables to explain whyGerand have thus far eschewed more self-reliant many Japan military poliKierhas offered a cultural of British and cies;Elizabeth interpretation French doctrines in the interwar andlainJohnston has military period; traced continuities in Chineseforeign to a rooted form of policy deeply realism." "cultural Samuel dire about an immiHuntington's warnings of civilizations" nent "clash aresymptomatic of thistrendaswell,insofaras his argument restson the claimthatbroad cultural affinities are now supplanting nationalloyalties.Thoughthese and other works defineculturein widelyvarying waysand have yet to providea full of how it works or how enduring its effects explanation mightbe, culturalperspectives have been verymuchin vogueduring the pastfive This trend is a reflection of the broader in cultural interest years. partly issues in the academic world debate aswell)and (andwithinthe public a response to the upsurge in ethnic,nationalist, andcultural conpartly flictssincethe demise of the SovietUnion. TOMORROW'S CONCEPTUAL TOOLBOX

While these debatesreflectthe diversity of contemporary on scholarship international therearealsoobvioussignsof convergence. Mostrealaffairs, ists recognize that nationalism, and other domestic militarism, ethnicity, factorsare important; liberals that poweris centralto interacknowledge
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admitthat ideaswill have and someconstructivists national behavior; whenbacked states andreinforced greater impact bypowerful byenduring material forces. The boundaries of eachparadigm aresomewhat permeforintellectual able,andthereis ample opportunity arbitrage. Whichof thesebroad shedsthe mostlighton contemperspectives which international and should affairs, porary policymakers keepmost in mind when our course into next the firmly charting century? are (and morethan a few policymakers) Althoughmanyacademics loatheto admitit, realism remains the mostcompelling framegeneral workforunderstanding international relations. Statescontinueto pay closeattentionto the balance of powerandto worry aboutthe possiconflict.Amongotherthings,thisenduring bilityof major preoccupationwithpower andsecurity Asians and explains whymany Europeans are now eagerto preserve-andpossibly expand-the U.S. military presencein their regions.As Czech presidentVaiclavHavel has if NATO failsto expand, "wemightbe heading fora newglobwarned, al catastrophe ... [which] couldcost us all muchmorethanthe two world wars." Thesearenot the words of a manwhobelieves thatgreat hasbeenbanished forever. power rivalry As fortheUnitedStates, thepastdecade hasshown howmuchit likes "number one" how and determined it is to in a predominant remain being The United States taken has of position. advantage itscurrent superioriitspreferences wherever evenat the riskof irritatty to impose possible, of itslong-standing allies. Ithasforced a series ofone-sided arms ingmany control on dominated the effort in agreements Russia, problematic peace takenstepsto expand NATOintoRussia's andbecome Bosnia, backyard, concerned aboutthe risingpowerof China.It has called increasingly for greater reliance on multilateralism and a larger rolefor repeatedly international but has treated suchas the United institutions, agencies Nationsandthe World Trade withdisdain whenever their Organization actions didnot conform to U.S. interests. It refused to jointherestof the worldin outlawing the production of landmines andwaspolitely uncoat the environmental summit. U.S. leaders are operative Kyoto Although atcloaking their actions in thelofty rhetoric of"world naked adept order," self-interest liesbehind mostof them.Thus,theendof theColdWar did
not bringthe end of powerpolitics,andrealism is likelyto remainthe sinmost useful instrument in our intellectualtoolbox. gle Yet realism does not explain everything, and a wise leader would also keep insights from the rival paradigmsin mind. Liberaltheories
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identify the instrumentsthat states can use to achieve shared interests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and societies must now contend, and help us understandwhy states may differ in their basic preferences.Paradoxically, because U.S. protecthe tion reduces dangerof regionalrivalriesand reinforcesthe "liberal peace"that emergedafter 1945, these factorsmaybecome relatively more important, as long as the United States continues to provide securityand stability in many partsof the world. Meanwhile,constructivisttheoriesare best suited to the analysisof how identities and interestscan change over time, therebyproducing subtle shifts in the behavior of states and occasionallytriggeringfarreaching but unexpected shifts in international affairs.It matters if political identity in Europecontinues to shift from the nation-stateto more local regionsor to a broadersense of Europeanidentity,just as it matters if nationalism is gradually supplantedby the sort of "civilizational" affinitiesemphasizedby Huntington. Realism has little to say about these prospects, and policymakers could be blind-sided by change if they ignorethese possibilitiesentirely. In short, each of these competing perspectivescapturesimportant would be impoverished aspects of world politics. Our understanding were our thinking confined to only one of them. The "compleat diplomat"of the futureshouldremaincognizantof realism's emphasison the role of power,keep liberalism's awareness of domesticforces inescapable in mind, and occasionallyreflecton constructivism's vision of change.

WANT

TO

KNOW

MORE?

For a fair-minded surveyof the realist,liberal,and marxistparadigms, see Michael Doyle'sWays of War and Peace (New York,NY:Norton, 1997). A guide to some recent developmentsin internationalpolitical eds., New Thinking in Interthought is Doyle & G. John Ikenberry, national Relations Theory (Boulder,CO: Westview,1997). Those interestedin realismshouldexamine The Perils of Anarchy: Realism and InternationalSecurity (Cambridge, MA: Contemporary MITPress,1995) by MichaelBrown,Sean Lynn-Jones, & Steven Miller, eds.; "Offensive Realism and Why States Expand Their War Aims" Summer1997) by EricLabs;and "Dueling Realisms" Studies, (Security Summer1997) by Stephen Brooks.Foralter(International Organization,
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of contemporary worldpolitics,see John native realistassessments in Europeafterthe Mearsheimer's "Backto the Future:Instability Summer1990) and RobertJervis' Cold War"(International Security, the Past?" "TheFutureof World Politics:WillIt Resemble (Internaof ethnicconA realist tional Winter1991-92). Security, explanation "The SecurityDilemmaand EthnicConflict" Posen's flict is Barry of offense-defense (Survival, survey theory Spring1993);an up-to-date canbe foundin "TheSecurity Dilemma Revisited" Glaser byCharles October 1997); and recent U.S. foreignpolicy is (WorldPolitics, in Michael Mastanduno's explained "Preserving the Unipolar Moment:RealistTheoriesand U.S. GrandStrategy afterthe Cold War"(International 1997). Security, Spring The liberal approachto international affairsis summarized in Andrew Moravcsik's Preferences A Liberal Theo"Taking Seriously: Autumn ry of InternationalPolitics" (International Organization, contributors to the debate on the democra1997).Manyof the leading tic peacecan be foundin Brown& Lynn-Jones, eds.,Debatingthe DemocraticPeace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1996) and Miriam the Answer? Elman, ed.,Paths to Peace: Is Democracy (Cambridge, MA:MITPress, of institutionalist and 1997).The contributions theory thedebate on relative are in summarized David NeoBaldwin, ed., gains realismand Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York, NY:Columbia of the Press,1993).An important University critique institutionalist literature is Mearsheimer's "TheFalsePromise of International Institutions" Winter1994-95),butone Security, (Intemrnational should alsoexamine the responses in the Summer 1995issue. Forapplicationsof institutionalist to NATO,seeJohnDuffield's "NATO's theory Functionsafter the Cold War"(Political Science Winter Quarterly, and Robert McCalla's "NATO's Persistence afterthe Cold 1994-95) War"(International Summer 1996). Organization, Authors the roleof the stateincludeSusanStrange in questioning The Retreatof the State:The Diffusion Power in the World Econof andJessica Mathomy(Cambridge: Press, 1996); Cambridge University ews in "PowerShift" (Foreign 1997). The Affairs, January/February of the stateis analyzed in The Sovereign emergence byHendrik Spruyt Stateand Its Competitors (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,
1994), and its continued importanceis defended in Globalizationin Question: The InternationalEconomyand the Possibilitiesof Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1996) by Paul Hirst and GrahameThompSPRING 1998 45

International Affairs

International Financeand the Global son, andGoverning Economy: MA:Harvard the State (Cambridge, 1994)by Ethan Press, University Anotherdefense(froma somewhat is "The source) unlikely Kapstein. WorldEconomy: The Futureof the State"(TheEconomist, September 20, 1997),anda moreacademic discussion of theseissuesis Peter Evans' "TheEclipseof the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization" October (World Politics, 1997). interested in constructivist Readers shouldbeginwith approaches Alexander Is Wendt's States What Make of It: The Social "Anarchy Constructionof Power Politics"(International Organization, Spring Politics 1992), while awaitinghis Social Theory of International A diverse (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,forthcoming). of cultural and constructivist array approaches mayalso be foundin PeterKatzenstein, ed., The Cultureof NationalSecurity(New York, NY:Columbia Press,1996) and YosefLapid& Friedrich University The Return Kratochwil, eds., of Cultureand Identityin IR Theory CO:Lynne (Boulder: Rienner, 1996). Forlinksto relevant Websites,aswell as a comprehensive indexof related access articles, www.foreignpolicy.com.

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