TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC [289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO.

132922; 21 APR 1998]

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides: Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign. Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such. Issues: (1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation. Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them. The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Comelec Freedom of expression 323 SCRA 811 November 10, 2010 FACTS: Comelec came up with a resolution prohibiting the conduct of exit polls during elections for the reason that exit polls have the tendency to cause confusion. HELD: Conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid exercises of freedom of speech and of the press. A limitation on them may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. The concern of the Comelec cannot be justified since there is no showing that exit polls cause chaos in voting centers. SWS vs Comelec

Facts: Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. Issue: Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional? Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

AM 01-4-03-SC RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN FACTS:

The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded and the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition.

HELD: Petition is denied. "In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4, the Court through 'Mr. Justice Clark, identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated:

"'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his own performance. Judges are human beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from the effective presentation of his defense.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.[6] When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence [7] tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [259 SCRA 529; G.R. NO. 119673; 26 JUL 1996] Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression. Held: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTCs ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. attack is different from offend any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies. SORIANO vs. LAGUARDIA

FACTS:

Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on TV, made derogatory remarks. Two days later, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan and was later on suspended for three months due to said utterances. ISSUE: WON the suspension is a violation of his freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Sec. 4, Art. III of the Constitution? HELD:
There is no violation of the freedom of expression.

The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is not absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not being protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. In the oft-quoted expression of Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee obviously was not intended to give immunity for every possible use of language. From Lucas v. Royo comes this line: [T]he freedom to express ones sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others. Unprotected speech or low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading advertisement, insulting or fighting words, i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security.

Petitioners statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an average adult, the utterances Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! may not constitute obscene but merely indecent utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the context they were used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated G or for general viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children. Petitioner cannot avail himself of the constitutional protection of free speech. Said statements were made in a medium easily accessible to children. With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.

Petitioners offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.

Newsounds Broadcasting Networks Inc. vs. Hon. Ceasar Dy April2, 2009 FACTS:

Bombo Radyo Philippines (Bombo Radyo) operates several radio stations under the AM and FM band throughout thePhilippines. These stations are operated by corporations organized and incorporated by Bombo Radyo, particularly petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (Newsounds) and Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS). Among the stations run by Newsounds is Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station operating out of Cauayan City, Isabela. CBS, in turn, runs Star FM DWIT Cauayan (Star FM), also operating out of Cauayan City, airing on the FM band. The service areas of DZNC and Star FM extend from the province of Isabela to throughout Region II and the Cordillera region.[6] In 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting stations, management office and transmitters on property located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela. The property is owned by CBS Development Corporation (CDC), an affiliate corporation under the Bombo Radyo network which holds title over the properties used by Bombo Radyo stations throughout the country.[7] On 28 June 1996, CDC was issued by the then municipal government of Cauayan a building permit authorizing the construction of a commercial establishment on the property.[8] On 5 July 1996, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a Zoning Decision certifying the property as commercial.[9] That same day, the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) of Cauayan affirmed that the commercial structure to be constructed by CDC conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is classified as a Commercial area. [10] Similar certifications would be issued by OMPDC from 1997 to 2001.[11] A building was consequently erected on the property, and therefrom, DZNC and Star FM operated as radio stations. Both stations successfully secured all necessary operating documents, including mayors permits from 1997 to 2001. [12] During that period, CDC paid real property taxes on the property based on the classification of the land as commercial.[13] All that changed beginning in 2002. On 15 January of that year, petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayors permit. The following day, the City Assessors Office in Cauayan City noted on CDCs Declaration of Real Property filed for 2002 confirmed that based on the existing file, CDCs property was classified as commercial.[14] On 28 January, representatives of petitioners formally requested then City Zoning Administrator-Designate Bagnos Maximo (Maximo) to issue a zoning clearance for the property.[15] Maximo, however,

required petitioners to submit either an approved land conversion papers from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land, or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of the property from agricultural to commercial land. [16] Petitioners had never been required to submit such papers before, and from 1996 to 2001, the OMPDC had consistently certified that the property had been classified as commercial. Due to this refusal by Maximo to issue the zoning clearance, petitioners were unable to secure a mayors permit. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus[17] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City to compel the issuance of the 2002 mayors permit. The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Cauayan City RTC. When the RTC of Cauayan denied petitioners accompanying application for injunctive relief, they filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,[18] but this would be dismissed by the appellate court due to the availability of other speedy remedies with the trial court. In February of 2003, the RTC dismissed the mandamus action for being moot and academic.[19] In the meantime, petitioners sought to obtain from the DAR Region II Office a formal recognition of the conversion of the CDC property from agricultural to commercial. The matter was docketed as Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002. Then DAR Region II Director Abrino L. Aydinan (Director Aydinan) granted the application and issued an Order that stated that there remains no doubt on the part of this Office of the non-agricultural classification of subject land before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.[20] Consequently, the DAR Region II Office ordered the formal exclusion of the property from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and the waiver of any requirement for formal clearance of the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to non-agricultural use.[21] On 16 January 2003, petitioners filed their applications for renewal of mayors permit for the year 2003, attaching therein the DAR Order. Their application was approved. However, on 4 March 2003, respondent Felicisimo Meer, Acting City Administrator of Cauayan City, wrote to petitioners claiming that the DAR Order was spurious or void, as the Regional Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (RCLUPPI) supposedly reported that it did not have any record of the DAR Order. A series of correspondences followed wherein petitioners defended the authenticity of the DAR Order and the

commercial character of the property, while respondent Meer demanded independent proof showing the authenticity of the Aydinan Order. It does not appear though that any action was taken against petitioners by respondents in 2003, and petitioners that year paid realty taxes on the property based on the classification that said property is commercial.[22] The controversy continued into 2004. In January of that year, petitioners filed their respective applications for their 2004 mayors permit, again with the DAR Order attached to the same. A zonal clearance was issued in favor of petitioners. Yet in a letter dated 13 January 2004, respondent Meer claimed that no record existed of DAR Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002 with the Office of the Regional Director of the DAR or with the RCLUPPI. [23] As a result, petitioners were informed that there was no basis for the issuance in their favor of the requisite zoning clearance needed for the issuance of the mayors permit.[24] Another series of correspondences ensued between Meer and the station manager of DZNC, Charmy Sabigan (Sabigan). Sabigan reiterated the authenticity of the DAR Order and the commercial character of the property, while Meer twice extended the period for application of the mayors permit, while reminding them of the need to submit the certifications from the DAR or the Sangguniang Panlalawigan that the property had been duly converted for commercial use. The deadline for application for the mayors permit lapsed on 15 February 2004, despite petitioners plea for another extension. On 17 February 2004, respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, arrived at the property and closed the radio stations. Petitioners proceeded to file a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking enforcement of the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibited the closure of radio stations during the then-pendency of the election period. On 23 March 2004, the COMELEC issued an order directing the parties to maintain the status prevailing before 17 February 2004, thus allowing the operation of the radio stations, and petitioners proceeded to operate the stations the following day. Within hours, respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy issued a Closure Order dated 24 March 2004, stating therein that since petitioners did not have the requisite permits before 17 February 2004, the status quo meant that the stations were not in fact allowed to operate. [25] Through the intervention of the COMELEC, petitioners were able to resume operation of the stations on 30 March 2004. On 9 May 2004, or two days before the general elections of that year, the COMELEC denied the petition filed by petitioners and set aside the status quo order. [26] However, this Resolution was

reconsidered just 9 days later, or on 16 May 2004, and the COMELEC directed the maintenance of the status quo until 9 June 2004, the date of the end of the election period. Petitioners were thus able to continue operations until 10 June 2004, the day when respondents yet again closed the radio stations. This closure proved to be more permanent. By this time, the instant legal battle over the sought-after mayors permits had already been well under way. On 15 April 2004, petitioners filed a petition for mandamus, docketed as SCA No. 20-171, with the RTC of Cauayan City, Branch 20. The petition was accompanied by an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, both provisional reliefs being denied by the RTC through an Order dated 20 April 2004. Respondents duly filed an Answer with Counterclaims on 3 May 2004. Due to the aforementioned closure of the radio stations on 10 June 2004, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction dated 15 June 2004, praying that said writ be issued to allow petitioners to resume operations of the radio stations. No hearing would be conducted on the motion, nor would it be formally ruled on by the RTC. On 14 September 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition for mandamus.[27] The RTC upheld all the arguments of the respondents, including their right to deny the sought after mayors permit unless they were duly satisfied that the subject property has been classified as commercial in nature. The Decision made no reference to the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,[28] citing the trial courts failure to hear and act on the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction as a violation of the right to due process, and disputing the RTCs conclusions with respect to their right to secure the mayors permit. This motion was denied in an Order dated 1 December 2004. Petitioners initiated two separate actions with the Court of Appeals following the rulings of the RTC. On 13 December 2004, they filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA G.R. No. 87815, raffled to the Fourteenth Division.[29] This petition imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for denying their application for preliminary mandatory injunction. On the same day, petitioners also filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC, this time in

connection with the denial of their petition for mandamus. This appeal was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 88283 and raffled to the Eleventh Division. Petitioners lost both of their cases with the Court of Appeals. On 27 October 2005, the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 87815 dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, ruling that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in impliedly denying the application for preliminary mandatory injunction. On 30 May 2007, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88283 denied the appeal by certiorari, affirming the right of the respondents to deny petitioners their mayors permits. On both occasions, petitioners filed with this Court respective petitions for review under Rule 45 the instant petitions, now docketed as G.R. Nos. 170270 and 179411. On 23 January 2006, the Court in G.R. No. 170270 issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondents from implementing the closure order dated March 24, 2005, or otherwise interfering with the operations of Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (NBN) and STAR FM DWIT Cauayan (CBS) in Cauayan City until final orders from this Court.[30] On 21 January 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 170270 with G.R. No. 179411, which had been initially dismissed outright but was reinstated on even date.[31] Certiorari lies in both instances. II. The fundamental constitutional principle that informs our analysis of both petitions is the freedom of speech, of expression or the press. [32] Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.[33] Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of denial of the right to free speech and of the press. In their tale, there is undeniable political color. They admit that in 2001, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political

dynasty.[34] Respondent Ceasar Dy is the brother of Faustino Dy, Jr., governor of Isabela from 2001 until he was defeated in his re-election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca, a former assistant station manager at petitioners own DZNC Bombo Radyo.[35] A rival AM radio station in Cauayan City, DWDY, is owned and operated by the Dy family.[36] Petitioners likewise direct our attention to a20 February 2004 article printed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer where Dy is quoted as intending to file disenfranchisement proceedings against DZNC-AM.[37] The partisan component of this dispute will no doubt sway many observers towards one opinion or the other, but not us. The comfort offered by the constitutional shelter of free expression is neutral as to personality, affinity, ideology and popularity. The judges tasked to enforce constitutional order are expected to rule accordingly from the comfort of that neutral shelter. Still, it cannot be denied that our Constitution has a systemic bias towards free speech. The absolutist tenor of Section 4, Article III testifies to that fact. The individual discomforts to particular people or enterprises engendered by the exercise of the right, for which at times remedies may be due, do not diminish the indispensable nature of free expression to the democratic way of life. The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. Petitioners are authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City, and had been doing so for some years undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official capacities have taken actions, whatever may be the motive, that have impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all. These actions have ranged from withholding permits to operate to the physical closure of those stations under color of legal authority. While once petitioners were able to broadcast freely, the weight of government has since bore down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves. An elementary school child with a basic understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free speech animates these cases. Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents, we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.

[38]

While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality,[39] not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.[40] Nonetheless, there are added legal complexities to these cases which may not be necessarily accessible to the layperson. The actions taken by respondents are colored with legal authority, under the powers of local governments vested in the Local Government Code (LGC), or more generally, the police powers of the State. We do not doubt that Local Government Units (LGU) are capacitated to enact ordinances requiring the obtention of licenses or permits by businesses, a term defined elsewhere in the LGC as trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit. And there is the fact that the mode of expression restrained in these cases broadcast is not one which petitioners are physically able to accomplish without interacting with the regulatory arm of the government. Expression in media such as print or the Internet is not burdened by such requirements as congressional franchises or administrative licenses which bear upon broadcast media. Broadcast is hampered by its utilization of the finite resources of the electromagnetic spectrum, which long ago necessitated government intervention and administration to allow for the orderly allocation of bandwidth, with broadcasters agreeing in turn to be subjected to regulation. There is no issue herein that calls into question the authority under law of petitioners to engage in broadcasting activity, yet these circumstances are well worth pointing out if only to provide the correct perspective that broadcast media enjoys a somewhat lesser degree of constitutional protection than print media or the Internet. It emerges then that there exists tension between petitioners right to free expression, and respondents authority by law to regulate local enterprises. What are the rules of adjudication that govern the judicial resolution of this controversy? B. That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most other forms of behavior.[41] We had said in SWS v. COMELEC: Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a

measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.[42] At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a contentneutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.[43] Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression.[44] Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.[45] Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied to a radio station, as content-neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or business enterprise within the LGU. However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a content-based restraint. In their petition for mandamus filed with the RTC, petitioners make the following relevant allegations:
6.1. With specific reference to DZNC, Newsounds, to this date, is engaged in discussing public issues that include, among others, the conduct of public officials that are detrimental to the constituents of Isabela, including Cauayan City. In view of its wide coverage, DZNC has been a primary medium for the exercise of the people of Isabela of their constitutional right to free speech. Corollarily, DZNC has always been at the forefront of the struggle to maintain and uphold freedom of the press, and the peoples corollary right to freedom of speech, expression and petition the government for redress of grievances. 6.2. Newsounds only rival AM station in Cauayan and the rest of Isabela, DWDY, is owned and operated by the family of respondent Dy.[46]

xxxx 35. Respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives. 35.1. It must be pointed out that in the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty. It is just too coincidental that it was only after the 2001 elections ( i.e., 2002) that the Mayors Office started questioning petitioners applications for renewal of their mayors permits. 35.2. In an article found in the Philippine Daily inquirer dated 20 February 2004, respondent Dy was quoted as saying that he will disenfranchise the radio station. Such statement manifests and confirms that respondents denial of petitioners renewal applications on the ground that the Property is commercial is merely a pretext and that their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latters voice. This is a blatant violation of the petitioners constitutional right to press freedom. A copy of the newspaper article is attached hereto as Annex JJ. 35.3. The timing of respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is also very telling. The closure comes at a most critical time when the people are set to exercise their right of suffrage. Such timing emphasizes the ill motives of respondents. [47]

In their Answer with Comment[48] to the petition for mandamus, respondents admitted that petitioners had made such exposes during the 2001 elections, though they denied the nature and truthfulness of such reports.[49] They conceded that the Philippine Daily Inquirer story reported that Dy said he planned to file disenfranchisement proceedings against [DZNC]-AM.[50]While respondents assert that there are other AM radio stations in Isabela, they do not specifically refute that station DWDY was owned by the Dy family, or that DZNC and DWDY are the two only stations that operate out of Cauayan.[51] Prior to 2002, petitioners had not been frustrated in securing the various local government requirements for the operation of their stations. It was only in the

beginning of 2002, after the election of respondent Ceasar Dy as mayor of Cauayan, that the local government started to impose these new requirements substantiating the conversion of CDCs property for commercial use. Petitioners admit that during the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored Respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty. [52] Respondents efforts to close petitioners radio station clearly intensified immediately before the May 2004 elections, where a former employee of DZNC Bombo Radyo, Grace Padaca, was mounting a credible and ultimately successful challenge against the incumbent Isabela governor, who happened to be the brother of respondent Dy. It also bears notice that the requirements required of petitioners by the CauayanCity government are frankly beyond the pale and not conventionally adopted by local governments throughout the Philippines. All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents to ultimately shut down petitioners radio station were ultimately content-based. The United States Supreme Court generally treats restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm violation of the First Amendment.[53] The facts confronting us now could have easily been drawn up by a constitutional law professor eager to provide a plain example on how free speech may be violated. The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. [54] The immediate implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason,[55] the burden lies with the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression. III.

We first turn to whether the implicit denial of the application for preliminary mandatory injunction by the RTC was in fact attended with grave abuse of discretion. This is the main issue raised in G.R. No. 170270. To recall, the RTC on 20 April 2004 issued an order denying the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, claiming that [t]here is insufficiency of allegation[t]here is no certainty that after the election period, the respondents will interfere with the operation of the radio stations x x x which are now operating by virtue of the order of the COMELEC. [56] Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on 13 May 2004. The refusal of the RTC to grant provisional relief gave way to the closure of petitioners radio stations on 10 June 2004, leading for them to file a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on 25 June 2004. This motion had not yet been acted upon when on 14 September 2004, the RTC promulgated its decision denying the petition for mandamus. Among the arguments raised by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration before the RTC was against the implied denial of their motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, claiming in particular that such implicit denial violated petitioners right to due process of law since no hearing was conducted thereupon. However, when the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration in its 1 December 2004 Order, it noted that its implied denial of the motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was not a ground for reconsideration of its decision. Petitioners maintain that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it impliedly denied their motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction without any hearing. The Court of Appeals pointed out that under Section 5 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the granting of a writ of preliminary injunction that mandatorily requires a hearing. The interpretation of the appellate court is supported by the language of the rule itself:
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to

be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. x x x

Section 5 of Rule 58 prescribes a mandatory hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined if preliminary injunction should be granted. It imposes no similar requirement if such provisional relief were to be denied. We in fact agree with the Court of Appeals that if on the face of the pleadings, the applicant for preliminary injunction is not entitled thereto, courts may outrightly deny the motion without conducting a hearing for the purpose.[57] The Court is disinclined to impose a mandatory hearing requirement on applications for injunction even if on its face, injunctive relief is palpably without merit or impossible to grant. Otherwise, our trial courts will be forced to hear out the sort of litigation-happy attention-deprived miscreants who abuse the judicial processes by filing complaints against real or imaginary persons based on trivial or inexistent slights. We do not wish though to dwell on this point, as there is an even more fundamental point to consider. Even as we decline to agree to a general that the denial of an application for injunction requires a prior hearing, we believe in this case that petitioners deserved not only a hearing on their motion, but the very writ itself. As earlier stated, the burden of presuming valid the actions of respondents sought, fraught as they were with alleged violations on petitioners constitutional right to expression, fell on respondents themselves. This was true from the very moment the petition for mandamus was filed. It was evident from the petition that the threat against petitioners was not wildly imagined, or speculative in any way. Attached to the petition itself was the Closure Order dated 13 February 2004 issued by respondents against petitioners. [58] There was no better evidence to substantiate the claim that petitioners faced the live threat of their closure. Moreover, respondents in their Answer admitted to issuing the Closure Order.[59] At the moment the petition was filed, there was no basis for the RTC to assume that there was no actual threat hovering over petitioners for the closure of their radio stations. The trial court should have been cognizant of the constitutional implications of the case, and appreciated that the burden now fell on respondents to defend the constitutionality of their actions. From that mindset, the trial court could

not have properly denied provisional relief without any hearing since absent any extenuating defense offered by the respondents, their actions remained presumptively invalid. Our conclusions hold true not only with respect to the implied denial of the motion for preliminary injunction, but also with the initial denial without hearing on 20 April 2004 of the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Admittedly, such initial denial is not the object of these petitions, yet we can observe that such action of the RTC was attended with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court betraying ignorance of the constitutional implications of the petition. With respect to the subsequent implied denial of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court is even more glaring. At that point, petitioners radio stations were not merely under threat of closure, they were already actually closed. Petitioners constitutional rights were not merely under threat of infringement, they were already definitely infringed. The application of the strict scrutiny analysis to petitioners claims for provisional relief warrants the inevitable conclusion that the trial court cannot deny provisional relief to the party alleging a prima facie case alleging government infringement on the right to free expression without hearing from the infringer the cause why its actions should be sustained provisionally. Such acts of infringement are presumptively unconstitutional, thus the trial court cannot deny provisional relief outright since to do so would lead to the sustention of a presumptively unconstitutional act. It would be necessary for the infringer to appear in court and somehow rebut against the presumption of unconstitutionality for the trial court to deny the injunctive relief sought for in cases where there is a prima facie case establishing the infringement of the right to free expression. Those above-stated guidelines, which pertain most particularly to the ex parte denial of provisional relief in free expression cases, stand independently of the established requisites for a party to be entitled to such provisional reliefs. With respect to writs of preliminary injunction, the requisite grounds are spelled out in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. It may be pointed out that the application for preliminary mandatory injunction after petitioners radio stations had been closed was mooted by the RTC decision denying the petition for mandamus. Ideally, the RTC should have acted on the motion asking for the issuance of the writ before rendering its decision.

Given the circumstances, petitioners were entitled to immediate relief after they filed their motion on 25 June 2004, some two and a half months before the RTC decision was promulgated on 14 September 2004. It is not immediately clear why the motion, which had been set for hearing on 2 July 2004, had not been heard by the RTC, so we have no basis for imputing bad faith on the part of the trial court in purposely delaying the hearing to render it moot with the forthcoming rendition of the decision. Nonetheless, given the gravity of the constitutional question involved, and the fact that the radio stations had already been actually closed, a prudent judge would have strived to hear the motion and act on it accordingly independent of the ultimate decision. Since the prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction in this case was impliedly denied through the decision denying the main action, we have no choice but to presume that the prayer for injunction was denied on the same bases as the denial of the petition for mandamus itself. The time has come for us to review such denial, the main issue raised in G.R. No. 179411. IV. The perspective from which the parties present the matter for resolution in G.R. No. 179411 is whether the property of CDC had been duly converted or classified for commercial use, with petitioners arguing that it was while respondents claiming that the property remains agricultural in character. This perspective, to our mind, is highly myopic and implicitly assumes that the requirements imposed on petitioners by the Cauayan City government are in fact legitimate. The LGC authorizes local legislative bodies to enact ordinances authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the LGU.[60] A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.[61] Generally, LGUs have exercised its authority to require permits or licenses from business enterprises operating within its territorial jurisdiction. A municipal license is essentially a governmental restriction upon private rights and is valid only if based upon an exercise by the municipality of its police or taxing powers.[62] The LGC subjects the power of sanggunians to enact

ordinances requiring licenses or permits within the parameters of Book II of the Code, concerning Local Taxation and Fiscal Matters. It also necessarily follows that the exercise of this power should also be consistent with the Constitution as well as the other laws of the land. Nothing in national law exempts media entities that also operate as businesses such as newspapers and broadcast stations such as petitioners from being required to obtain permits or licenses from local governments in the same manner as other businesses are expected to do so. While this may lead to some concern that requiring media entities to secure licenses or permits from local government units infringes on the constitutional right to a free press, we see no concern so long as such requirement has been duly ordained through local legislation and content-neutral in character, i.e., applicable to all other similarly situated businesses. Indeed, there are safeguards within the LGC against the arbitrary or unwarranted exercise of the authority to issue licenses and permits. As earlier noted, the power of sanggunians to enact ordinances authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses is subject to the provisions of Book Two of the LGC. The power of the mayor to issue license and permits and suspend or revoke the same must be exercised pursuant to law or ordinance.[63] In the case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayors permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993 when Cauayan was still a municipality. We quote therefrom:
Sec. 3A.01. Imposition of Fee. There shall be imposed and collected an annual fee at the rates provided hereunder for the issuance of Mayors Permit to every person that shall conduct business, trade or activity within the Municipality of Cauayan. The permit fee is payable for every separate or distinct establishment or place where the business trade or activity is conducted. One line of business or activity does not become exempt by being conducted with some other business or activity for which the permit fee has been paid. x x x x

Sec. 3A.03. Application for Mayors Permit False Statements . A written application for a permit to operate a business shall be filed with the Office of the Mayor in three copies. The application form shall set forth the name and address of the applicant, the description or style of business, the place where the business shall be conducted and such other pertinent information or data as may be required. Upon submission of the application, it shall be the duty of the proper authorities to verify if the other Municipal requirements regarding the operation of the business or activity are complied with. The permit to operate shall be issued only upon such compliance and after the payment of the corresponding taxes and fees as required by this revenue code and other municipal tax ordinances. Any false statement deliberately made by the applicant shall constitute sufficient ground for denying or revoking the permit issued by the Mayor, and the applicant or licensee may further be prosecuted in accordance with the penalties provided in this article. A Mayors Permit shall be refused to any person: (1) Whose business establishment or undertaking does not conform with zoning regulations and safety, health and other requirements of the Municipality; (2) that has an unsettled tax obligations, debt or other liability to the Municipal Government; and (3) that is disqualified under any provision of law or ordinance to establish, or operate the business for which a permit is being applied. [64]

Petitioners do not challenge the validity of Ordinance No. 92-004. On its face, it operates as a content-neutral regulation that does not impose any special impediment to the exercise of the constitutional right to free expression. Still, it can be seen how under the veil of Ordinance No. 92-004 or any other similarly oriented ordinance, a local government unit such as Cauayan City may attempt to infringe on such constitutional rights. A local government can quite easily cite any of its regulatory ordinances to impose retaliatory measures against persons who run afoul it, such as a business owned by an opponent of the government, or a

crusading newspaper or radio station. While the ill-motives of a local government do not exempt the injured regulatory subject from complying with the municipal laws, such laws themselves do not insulate those ill-motives if they are attended with infringements of constitutional rights, such as due process, equal protection and the right to free expression. Our system of laws especially frown upon violations of the guarantee to free speech, expression and a free press, vital as these are to our democratic regime. Nothing in Ordinance No. 92-004 requires, as respondents did, that an applicant for a mayors permit submit either an approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land, or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the re-classification of the property from agricultural to commercial land.[65] The aforecited provision which details the procedure for applying for a mayors permit does not require any accompanying documents to the application, much less those sought from petitioners by respondents. Moreover, Ordinance No. 92-004 does not impose on the applicant any burden to establish that the property from where the business was to operate had been duly classified as commercial in nature. According to respondents, it was only in 2002 that the more diligent Respondent Bagnos Maximo discovered the mistake committed by his predecessor in the issuance of the Petitioners Zoning Certifications from 1996 to 2001.[66] Assuming that were true, it would perhaps have given cause for the local government in requiring the business so affected to submit additional requirements not required of other applicants related to the classification of its property. Still, there are multitude of circumstances that belie the claim that the previous certifications issued by the OMPDC as to the commercial character of CDCs property was incorrect. On 5 July 1996, the HLURB issued a Zoning Decision that classified the property as Commercial.[67] The HLURB is vested with authority to review, evaluate and approve or disapprovethe zoning component of subdivisions, condominiums or estate development projects including industrial estates, of both the public and private sectors.[68] In exercising such power, the HLURB is required to use Development Plans and Zoning Ordinances of local governments herein.[69] There is no reason to doubt that when the HLURB acknowledged in 1996 that the property in question was commercial, it had consulted the development plans and zoning ordinances of Cauayan.

Assuming that respondents are correct that the property was belatedly revealed as non-commercial, it could only mean that even the HLURB, and not just the local government of Cauayan erred when in 1996 it classified the property as commercial. Or, that between 1996 to 2002, the property somehow was reclassified from commercial to agricultural. There is neither evidence nor suggestion from respondents that the latter circumstance obtained. Petitioners are also armed with six certifications issued by the OMPDC for the consecutive years 1996 to 2001, all of which certify that the property is classified as commercial areain conformity with the Land Use Plan of this municipality and does not in any way violate the existing Zoning Ordinance of Cauayan, Isabela.[70] In addition, from 1997 to 2004, petitioners paid real property taxes on the property based on the classification of the property as commercial, without any objections raised by respondents.[71] These facts again tend to confirm that contrary to respondents assertions, the property has long been classified as commercial. Petitioners persuasively argue that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the property constitutes estoppel against respondents from denying that fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppel, but petitioners point out our holding in Republic v. Sandiganbayan[72] where it was clarified that this concept is understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its officials especially those which are irregular.[73] Indeed, despite the general rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistake or errors of its officials or agents, we have also recognized, thus:
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in a rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals.[74]

Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the government official whose acts are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the State, we have declined to apply State immunity from estoppel.[75] Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan Citygovernment had previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial use. One would assume that if respondents were correct, they would have adduced the factual or legal basis for their contention, such as the local governments land use plan or zoning ordinance that would indicate that the property was not commercial. Respondents did not do so, and the absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong. The RTC nonetheless asserted that the previous certifications, issued by Deputy Zoning Administrator Romeo N. Perez (Perez), were incorrect as he had no authority to make the conversion or reclassification of the land from agricultural to commercial.[76] Yet contrary to the premise of the RTC, the certifications issued by Perez did no such thing. Nowhere in the certifications did it state that Perez was exercising the power to reclassify the land from agricultural to commercial. What Perez attested to in those documents was that the property is classified as Commercial area, in conformity with the Land Use Plan of this municipality and does not in any way violate the existing Zoning Ordinance of Cauayan, Isabela. What these certifications confirm is that according to the Land Use Plan and existing zoning ordinances of Cauayan, the property in question is commercial. Compounding its error, the RTC also stated that following Section 65 [77] of Rep. Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, only the DAR, upon proper application can authorize the reclassification or conversion of the use of the land from agricultural to residential, commercial or industrial. The citation is misleading. Section 4 of the same law provides for the scope of the agrarian reform program under the CARL as covering all public and private agricultural lands, as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. [78] Section 3(c) defines agricultural lands as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.[79] Obviously, if the property had already been classified as commercial land at the time of the enactment of the CARL, it does not fall within the class of agricultural lands which may be subject of conversion under Section 65 of that

law. Section 65, as relied upon by the trial court, would have been of relevance only if it had been demonstrated by respondents that the property was still classified as agricultural when the CARL was enacted. It is worth emphasizing that because the acts complained of the respondents led to the closure of petitioners radio stations, at the height of election season no less, respondents actions warrant strict scrutiny from the courts, and there can be no presumption that their acts are constitutional or valid. In discharging the burden of establishing the validity of their actions, it is expected that respondents, as a condition sine qua non, present the legal basis for their claim that the property was not zoned commercially the proclaimed reason for the closure of the radio stations. The lower courts should have known better than to have swallowed respondents unsubstantiated assertion hook, line and sinker. We can also point out that aside from the evidence we have cited, petitioners contention that the property had been duly classified for commercial use finds corroboration from the Order dated 14 March 2002 issued by DAR Region II Director Aydinan in Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002. The Order stated, viz:
Official records examined by this Office indicate continued use of subject land for purposes other than agricultural since 1986. Back when Cauayan was still a municipality, the Office of the Planning and Development Coordinator documented subject land under a commercial classification. The Zoning Administrator deputized by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board certified in 1998 that subject lands attribution to the Commercial Zone is in conformity with the Land Use Plan of this municipality and does not in any way violate any existing Zoning Ordinance of Cauayan, Isabela adding the stipulation that a 15 meter setback from the centerline of the National Road has to be observed. If the area in which subject land is found was already classified non-agricultural even before urban growth saw Cauayan became a city in 2001, assuming its reversion to the agricultural zone now taxes logic. In any case, such a dubious assumption can find no support in any current land use plan for Cauayan approved by the National Economic Development Authority.[80]

Petitioners citation of this Order has been viciously attacked by respondents, with approval from the lower courts. Yet their challenges are quite off-base, and ultimately irrelevant. The Order has been characterized by respondents as a forgery, based on a certification issued by the Head of the RCLUPPI Secretariat that his office has no official record nor case docketed of the petition filed by CBS Development Corporation, represented by Charmy Sabigan and the order issued bearing Docket No. ADM. Case No. A-02200A-07B-002 of the subject case, did not emanate from RCLUPPI which has its own docketing system to applications for conversion/exemption under DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of [81] 1990. Respondents thus hint at a scenario where petitioners scrambled to create the Order out of nowhere in order to comply with the sought-after requirements. However, an examination of the Order reveals an explanation that attests to the veracity of the Order without denigrating from the truthfulness of the RCLUPPI certification. The Order notes that the petition had been filed by CDC with the DAR Region II to, in effect, officially remove from the agrarian reform sub-zone, in particular, and the broad agricultural, in general, Petitioners land holding embraced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-254786 which is located in [B]arangay Minante II of Cauayan City x x x.[82] It goes on to state:
Herein petition can go through the normal procedure and, after the submission of certain documentary supports that have to be gathered yet from various agencies, should be granted as a matter of course. However, a new dimension has been introduced when the unformalized conversion of the use of subject land from an agricultural to a nonagricultural mode has provided an excuse to some official quarters to disallow existing commercial operation, nay, the broadcast activities of Petitioner and, thus, perhaps threaten an essential freedom in our democratic setting, the liberty of mass media organizations to dispense legitimate information to the public unhampered by any extraneous obstacles. Hence, overarching public interest has made an official declaration of subject landholdings removal from the agricultural zone most urgent and, thus immediate action on the case imperative. To the extent that legitimate social interest are unnecessarily prejudiced otherwise, procedural rules laid down by Government must yield to the living reason and to common sense in the concrete world as

long as the underlying principles of effective social-justice administration and good governance are not unduly sacrificed. Thus, it is incumbent upon the Department of Agrarian Reform, or DAR for brevity, to take into account in decision-making with respect to the case at hand more basic principles in order to uphold the cause of conscientious and timely public service. Needless to say, this Office, given the latitude of discretion inherent to it, can simultaneously address the Petition and the procedural concerns collateral to it when subordinate offices tend to treat such concerns as factors complicating the essential question or questions and view the Petition as one that it is not amenable to ready problem-solving and immediate decision-making. To forestall a cycle of helpless inaction or indecisive actions on the part of the subordinate offices as customarily happens in cases of this nature, this Office shall proceed to treat the petition at hand as a matter of original jurisdiction in line with its order of Assumption of Direct Jurisdiction of 03 December 2001, a prior action taken, in general, by this Office over cases of Land-Tenure Improvement, Failure, Problematic Coverage, Land-Owners and Special Concerns, Other Potential Flash Points of Agrarian Conflict, and Long-Standing Problems Calling for Discretionary Decision Making. [83]

In so many words, DAR Region II Director Aydinan manifested that he was assuming direct jurisdiction over the petition, to the exclusion of subordinate offices such as that which issued the certification at the behest of the respondents, the RCLUPPI of the DAR Region II Office. Thus, the RCLUPPI could have validly attested that the subject case did not emanate from the RCLUPPI which has its own docketing system to applications for conversion/exemption under DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. One could quibble over whether Director Aydinan had authority to assume direct jurisdiction over CDCs petition to the exclusion of the RCLUPPI, but it would not detract from the apparent fact that the Director of the DAR Region II Office did issue the challenged Order. Assuming that the Order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, it does not mean that the Order was forged or spurious, it would mean that the Order is void. How necessary is it for us to delve into the validity or efficacy of the Aydinan Order? Certainly, any conclusions we draw from the said Order are ultimately irrelevant to the resolution of these petitions. The evidence is compelling enough that the property had already been duly classified for

commercial use long before the Aydinan Order was issued. Respondents, who had the burden of proving that they were warranted in ordering the closure of the radio stations, failed to present any evidence to dispute the long-standing commercial character of the property. The inevitable conclusion is that respondents very well knew that the property, was commercial in character, yet still proceeded without valid reason and on false pretenses, to refuse to issue the mayors permit and subsequently close the radio stations. There is circumstantial evidence that these actions were animated by naked political motive, by plain dislike by the Cauayan City powers-that-be of the content of the broadcast emanating in particular from DZNC, which had ties to political opponents of the respondents. Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the Cauayan City government that the property was commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none, that the local officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land. That requirement, assuming that it can be demanded by a local government in the context of approving mayors permits, should only obtain upon clear proof that the property from where the business would operate was classified as agricultural under the LGUs land use plan or zoning ordinances and other relevant laws. No evidence to that effect was presented by the respondents either to the petitioners, or to the courts. V. Having established that respondents had violated petitioners legal and constitutional rights, let us now turn to the appropriate reliefs that should be granted. At the time petitioners filed their special civil action for mandamus on 15 April 2004, their radio stations remained in operation despite an earlier attempt by respondents to close the same, by virtue of an order rendered by the COMELEC. The mandamus action sought to compel respondents to immediately issue petitioners zoning clearances and mayors permit for 2004. During the pendency of the action for mandamus, respondents finally succeeded in closing the radio stations, and it was possible at that stage for petitioners to have likewise sought the

writs of prohibition and/or certiorari. Petitioners instead opted to seek for a writ or preliminary mandatory injunction from the trial court, a viable recourse albeit one that remains ancillary to the main action for mandamus. We had previously acknowledged that petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction that would have prevented the closure of the radio stations. In addition, we hold that the writ of mandamus lies. Mandamus lies as the proper relief whenever a public officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [84] For the year 2004, petitioners had duly complied with the requirements for the issuance of the same mayors permit they had obtained without issue in years prior. There was no basis for respondents to have withheld the zoning clearances, and consequently the mayors permit, thereby depriving petitioners of the right to broadcast as certified by the Constitution and their particular legislative franchise. We turn to the issue of damages. Petitioners had sought to recover from respondents P8 Million in temperate damages, P1 Million in exemplary damages, and P1 Million in attorneys fees. Given respondents clear violation of petitioners constitutional guarantee of free expression, the right to damages from respondents is squarely assured by Article 32 (2) of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x (2) Freedom of speech;

We noted in Lim v. Ponce de Leon that [p]ublic officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties [and] the object of [Article 32 of the Civil Code] is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith.[85] The application of Article 32 not only serves as a measure of pecuniary recovery to mitigate the injury

to constitutional rights, it likewise serves notice to public officers and employees that any violation on their part of any persons guarantees under the Bill of Rights will meet with final reckoning. The present prayer for temperate damages is premised on the existence of pecuniary injury to petitioner due to the actions of respondents, the amount of which nevertheless being difficult to prove.[86] Temperate damages avail when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. [87] The existence of pecuniary injury at bar cannot be denied. Petitioners had no way of knowing it when they filed their petition, but the actions of respondents led to the closure of their radio stations from June 2004 until this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction in January 2006.[88] The lost potential income during that one and a half year of closure can only be presumed as substantial enough. Still, despite that fact, possibly unanticipated when the original amount for claimed temperate damages was calculated, petitioners have maintained before this Court the same amount, P8 Million, for temperate damages. We deem the amount of P4 Million reasonable under the circumstances.[89] Exemplary damages can be awarded herein, since temperate damages are available. Public officers who violate the Constitution they are sworn to uphold embody a poison of wickedness that may not run through the body politic.[90] Respondents, by purposely denying the commercial character of the property in order to deny petitioners the exercise of their constitutional rights and their business, manifested bad faith in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive and malevolent manner.[91] The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages, [92] and the sought for amount of P1 Million is more than appropriate. We likewise deem the amount of P500 Thousand in attorneys fees as suitable under the circumstances. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately issue petitioners zoning clearances and mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners Respondents Caesar G. Dy, Felicisimo G. Meer, Bagnos Maximo, and Racma Fernandez-Garcia are hereby ORDERED to pay petitioners JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY the following amounts in damages:

(1) FOUR MILLION DAMAGES[93]; (2) ONE MILLION DAMAGES;

PESOS PESOS

(P4,000,000.00) (P1,000,000.00) PESOS

as as

TEMPERATE EXEMPLARY as

(3) FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND ATTORNEYS FEES. Costs against respondents. SO ORDERED.

(P 500,000.00)

VILLANUEVA vs. PDI FACTS: Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the May 11, 1992 elections. On March 30, 1990, Ricardo Nolan, another mayoralty candidate, petitioned for the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections. Said petition, however, was denied by the COMELEC. Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992 and a day before the elections on May 10, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin) and PDI published a story stating that the Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva
as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in 1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the mayors office of Bais City.

On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as scheduled. When results came out, it turned out that petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid.

Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the above-quoted stories, petitioner sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their publishers and editors for damages before the RTC of Bais City. He alleged that the articles were maliciously timed to defeat him. He claimed he should have won by landslide, but his supporters reportedly believed the news items distributed by his rivals and voted for other candidates. He asked for actual damages of P270,000 for the amount he spent for the campaign, moral damages of P10,000,000, an unspecified amount of exemplary damages, attorneys fees of P300,000 and costs of suit.[6] Respondents disclaimed liability. They asserted that no malice can be attributed to them as they did not know petitioner and had no interest in the outcome of the election, stressing that the stories were privileged in nature. [7] According to Manila Bulletin reporter Edgardo T. Suarez, he got the story during a COMELEC commissioners press briefing. He, however, came in late and only a fellow reporter told him that the disqualification case against petitioner was granted. He did not bother to get a confirmation from anyone as he had a deadline to beat.[8] PDI political section editor Carlos Hidalgo, on the other hand, said that he got the story from a press release. He claimed that he found the press release on his desk the day Manila Bulletin published the same story. The press release bore COMELECs letterhead and was signed by one Sonia Dimasupil, a former Malaya newspaper editor who was in-charge of COMELEC press releases. He tried to contact her but she was out of the office. Since the news item was also published in the Manila Bulletin, he felt confident the press release was authentic. He however failed to produce the press release in court. [9] On April 18, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner as follows:

WHEREFORE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, this Court holds that defendants Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and Manila [Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation with their respective officers are liable [for] damages to plaintiff in the following manner: 1. As moral damages, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, [Inc.] and the Manila [Daily] Bulletin Publishing Corporation are ordered to payP1,000,000.00 each to plaintiff; 2. Both defendants are likewise ordered to pay an exemplary damage in the amount of P500,000.00 each; 3. To pay plaintiffs attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000.00; 4. And to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[10]

The trial court found the news items derogatory and injurious to petitioners reputation and candidacy. It faulted respondents for failing to verify the truth of the news tips they published and held respondents liable for negligence, citing Policarpio v. ManilaTimes Pub. Co., Inc.[11] The trial court also ruled that because the news items lacked truth and fairness, they were not privileged communications. On appeal by respondents, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. It explained that although the stories were false and not privileged, as there is no proof they were obtained from a press conference or release, respondents were not impelled by malice or improper motive. There was also no proof that petitioners supporters junked him due to the reports. Neither was there any proof he would win, making his action unfounded.

Before us, petitioner raises the lone issue of whether:

[THE] HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO UTTER LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT UNILATERALLY, UNPROCEDURALLY AND ARBITRARILY CHANGED THE PLEADING-BORNE AND PRE-TRIAL ORDER DELINEATED THEORY OF QUASI-DELICT OF APPELLEE, THEREBY DISMISSING THE CASE FOR FAILURE TO EVIDENCE AN ESSENTIAL REQUISITE OF ITS IMPOSED IRRELEVANT THEORY.[12]

Simply stated, we are asked to resolve the issue of whether petitioner is required to prove malice to be entitled to damages. Petitioner argues that his cause of action is based on quasidelict which only requires proof of fault or negligence, not proof of malice beyond reasonable doubt as required in a criminal prosecution for libel. He argues that the case is entirely different and separate from an independent civil action arising from libel under Article 100[13] of the Revised Penal Code. He claims he proffered proofs sustaining his claim for damages under quasidelict, not under the law on libel, as malice is hard to prove. He stresses that nowhere in the complaint did he mention libel, and nothing in his complaint shows that his cause of action had some shade of libel as defined in the Revised Penal Code. He also did not hint a resort to a criminal proceeding for libel. [14] PDI and its officers argue that petitioners complaint clearly lays a cause of action arising from libel as it highlights malice underlying the publications. And as malice is an element of libel, the appellate court committed no error in characterizing the case as one arising from libel.[15] For their part, Manila Bulletin and its officers claim that petitioner changed his theory, which must be disallowed as it violates respondents right to due process. Although petitioners claim for damages before the trial court hinged on the erroneous

publications, which he alleged were maliciously timed, he claims in his petition before this Court that his cause of action is actually one for quasi-delict or tort. They stress that the prayer and allegations in petitioners complaint, which never alleged quasidelict or tort but malicious publication as basis for the claim for damages, control his case theory. Thus, it may not be altered unless there was an amendment of the complaint to change the cause of action. They claim that petitioners initiatory pleading and the trial courts pre-trial order and decision reveal that his cause of action for damages arose from the publications of the malicious articles; hence, he should have proved actual malice to be entitled to any award of damages. They added that the appellate court correctly ruled that the articles were not published with actual malice.[16] We rule in favor of the respondents. Basic is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. [17] The nature of a pleading is determined by allegations therein made in good faith, the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed, and the primary objective of the party filing the same. The ground chosen or the rationale adopted by the court in resolving the case does not determine or change the real nature thereof. The complaint was denominated as one for damages, and a perusal of its content reveals that the factual allegations constituted a complaint for damages based on malicious publication. It specifically pointed out that petitioner lost the election because of the bad publicity created by the malicious publication of respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin. It is alleged numerous times that the action for damages stemmed from respondents malicious publication. Petitioner sought that respondents be declared guilty of irresponsible and malicious publication and be made liable for damages. The fact that petitioner later on changed his theory to quasi-delict does not change the nature of petitioners complaint and convert

petitioners action into quasi-delict. The complaint remains to be one for damages based on malicious publication. Consequently, as the issue of malice was raised, it was incumbent on petitioner to prove the same. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof.[18] As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, while the questioned news item was found to be untrue, this does not necessarily render the same malicious. To fully appreciate the import of the complaint alleging malice and damages, we must recall the essence of libel. Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. [19] Any of these imputations is defamatory and under the general rule stated in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious.[20] The presumption of malice, however, does not exist in the following instances: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.[21]

We note that the publications or articles in question are neither private communications nor true reports of official proceedings without any comments or remarks. However, this does not necessarily mean that the questioned articles are not privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354 is not an

exclusive list of qualified privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.[22] The rule on privileged communication had its genesis not in the nations penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in United States v. Caete,[23] this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.[24] In the instant case, there is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the very public character of the election itself. For this reason, they attracted media mileage and drew public attention not only to the election itself but to the candidates. As one of the candidates, petitioner consequently assumed the status of a public figure within the purview of Ayers Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong.[25] But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it would not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment. For he could; for instance, if and when he would be involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The publics primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participants prior anonymity or notoriety.[26] In any event, having been OIC-Mayor of Bais City after the People Power Revolution, petitioner in this case as early as 1992 was already a well-known official and public figure. However, it must be stressed that the fact that a communication or publication is privileged does not mean that it

is not actionable; the privileged character simply does away with the presumption of malice, which the plaintiff has to prove in such a case.[27] That proof in a civil case must of course be based on preponderance of evidence. This, however, petitioner failed to do in this case. Under the current state of our jurisprudence, to be considered malicious, the libelous statement must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. Reckless disregard of what is false or not means that the author or publisher entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, or that he possesses a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity.[28] In the instant case, we find no conclusive showing that the published articles in question were written with knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard of what was false or not. According to Manila Bulletin reporter Edgardo T. Suarez, he got the story from a fellow reporter who told him that the disqualification case against petitioner was granted. PDI, on the other hand, said that they got the story from a press release the very same day the Manila Bulletin published the same story. PDI claims that the press release bore COMELECs letterhead, signed by one Sonia Dimasupil, who was in-charge of COMELEC press releases. They also tried to contact her but she was out of the office. Since the news item was already published in the Manila Bulletin, they felt confident the press release was authentic. Following the narration of events narrated by respondents, it cannot be said that the publications, were published with reckless disregard of what is false or not. Nevertheless, even assuming that the contents of the articles turned out to be false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the

choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. [29] A newspaper, especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for malice or damages, i.e. libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community. [30] Likewise, in our view respondents failure to counter-check their report or present their informant should not be a reason to hold them liable. While substantiation of the facts supplied is an important reporting standard, still, a reporter may rely on information given by a lone source although it reflects only one side of the story provided the reporter does not entertain a high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity.[31] Petitioner, in this case, presented no proof that respondents entertained such awareness. Failure to present respondents informant before the court should not be taken against them.[32] Worth stressing, jurisprudence instructs us that a privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds for malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.[33] Further, worthy of note, before the filing of the complaint, respondents herein received no word of protest, exception or objection from petitioner. Had the error in the news reports in question been pointed out by interested parties to the respondents, their publishers and editors could have promptly

made a rectification through print and broadcast media just before and during the election day deflecting thereby any prejudice to petitioners political or personal interest. As aptly observed in Quisumbing v. Lopez, et al.:[34]
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. [35] [Emphasis supplied.]

We find respondents entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our Bill of Rights. We cannot punish journalists including publishers for an honest endeavor to serve the public when moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by their sense of responsibility as news media to report what they perceived to be a genuine report. Media men are always reminded of their responsibilities as such. This time, there is also a need to remind public figures of the consequences of being one. Fittingly, as held in Time, Inc. v. Hill,[36] one of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy.
Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of

this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.[37]

On petitioners claim for damages, we find no evidence to support their award. Indeed, it cannot be said that respondents published the questioned articles for the sole purpose of harassing petitioner. Proof and motive that the publication was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate petitioner has not been clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the petitioner to damages. There remains unfulfilled the need to prove that the publications were made with actual malice that is, with the knowledge of the publications falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. [38] Thus, from American jurisprudence as amplified in Lopez v. Court of Appeals:
For liability to arise then without offending press freedom, there is this test to meet: "The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." TheUnited States Supreme Court went further in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,[39] where such immunity, was held as covering statements concerning public figures regardless of whether or not they are government officials. Why there should be such an extension is understandable in the light of the broad scope enjoyed by press freedom which certainly allows a full and free discussion of public issues. What can be more logical and appropriate, then, than such an expansion of the principle. As noted by a commentator: Since discussion of public issues cannot be meaningful without reference to the men involved on both sides of such issues, and since such men will not necessarily be public officials, one cannot but agree that the

Court was right in Curtis to extend the Times[40] rule to all public figures.[41] [Emphasis supplied.]

Furthermore, the guarantee of press freedom has also come to ensure that claims for damages arising from the utilization of the freedom be not unreasonable or exorbitant as to practically cause a chilling effect on the exercise thereof. Damages, in our view, could not simply arise from an inaccurate or false statement without irrefutable proof of actual malice as element of the assailed publication. WHEREFORE, the assailed Amended Decision dated May 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54134 isAFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.