Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Enemy
Will Hutton
Summary:
Chapter One
Chapter 3
• Communism came to power in China during the period of Roosevelt, Stalin, and
Hitler – a period of popularity for state-directed economic success. The
nationalists in China had to rely on the landlords and gentry, and so had no power
over them – the communists, it seemed, were the only ones who could organize a
powerful state to direct such economic success.
• Mao’s concept of the “mass line” – converted unsystematic ideas of the masses
into systematic ideas and sold them back to them as their own. He used party
cadres to do this, customizing communism to each province and not forcing it
upon any election.
• If no good can come from evil, why has China risen to success on the heels of
Mao’s policies? It’s much like other revolutions, which made a clean break with
the failing past to inaugurate much-needed modernity. (Like the French
revolutionaries?) Scholars often ignore how rough and also state-led the
transformation was in the west from agrarian to capitalist market economies.
Chapter 4
• In China’s reform, there has been a lot of action based on responding to events
rather than political consensus at top.
• America won a victory for Capitalism when it opened full diplomatic
relations w/China in 1979 – this marked China’s embrace of developing a
market economy, however Chinese in nature.
• Huge victory has been spurred by Town and Village Enterprises, which,
though without proper legal standing or property rights, and outside the plan,
employed 52 million / 58% of Chinese in 1993, and 135 million by 2005. These
received less government involvement after 1994 and turned into more
conventional private firms. They are, however, in institutional no-man’s-land,
without clear property/legal/incorporation rights. State Owned Enterprises
were still used frequently. Entrepreneurs in the neglected regions managed
to cheat rules and pose as collective enterprises to form actual private
enterprise/informal banks. But this can only go so far before a full capitalist
institutional structure is needed.
• In 1993, the goal of the party was officially changed from building a “planned
socialist commodity economy” to building a “socialist market economy.” Small
state owned enterprise was “corporatized” or “let go” – not privatized, as
appointments and investment was still in the hands of the state.
• Internationally, China is increasingly dependent in the trade food chain. It has no
system for generating venture capital, and the only stock markets feed directly
into State Owned Enterprise.
(end history of China’s economy)
• It is impossible to assess how much of China is public and how much is private,
because the investment system is so well controlled by the state.
• China has a bad index of business competitiveness, which is worsening. It has a
disproportionate number of small-scale enterprises that can’t really compete.
• The state owned enterprise is barely profitable, and the financial drain on the state
has not really decreased; they basically employ people on welfare with state bank
credits.
• State often waits until a business does very well, then exerts legal rights to it to
capitalize on its success.
• The banking system is used to prop up the party, and until the last five years
there were a staggering number of nonperforming loans. Lending on
commercial terms to private businesses is only done on a limited basis. The
party appoints key bank executives.
• China needs $5.40 of extra investment to produce an extra $1 of output.
Twenty years ago, it needed just $4. The economy has actually become much
less efficient; Mao’s economy did better.
• If China accurately revalued its renminbi (as it is being pressured to do), it would
lose 30% of its current foreign currency assets. Its exports are artificially cheap.
This artificial valuing of China’s currency adds an estimated 0.45 percentage
point to china’s growth rate due to higher exports. In a free market, to counteract
this adverse effect on the currency, China would have to let its people take their
money abroad, which about ¼ of the population would do. That would reduce
growth from investment by ¼. Revaluing the renminbi would also cause a
lowering in price of agriculture.
• China’s healthcare system is ranked behind India and Bangladesh. Educational
improvements are a legacy of Mao, and progress has stopped. Rural schools are
forced to charge fees.
• The Chinese are unable to borrow against the collateral in their housing assets.
• To move to a lower-saving, higher-spending economy (which is central to a
modern capitalist economy), the party will have to allow property rights,
independent labor unions, and finance a better welfare system.
• The U.S. is becoming more tempted to deepen its protectionist policies due to
China taking advantage of open markets. This temptation has been accentuated
by a perceived decreasing economic security in the middle class. If it can resist
this temptation, it will be rewarded, not only by more economic success, but also
by transforming communist China.
• Enlightenment institutions, not protectionism, stimulated America.
• American egalitarianism is an “aspiring egalitarianism” rather than the “leveling-
down egalitarianism” that Europe embraced.
• Foreign trade doesn’t have an impact on job security as much as technological
revolution and restructuring to meet new preferences – 500,000 American jobs are
lost and created every week. This is the same number of the upper estimate of
how many US jobs are lost to outsourcing per year.
• Some former neoconservatives (e.g. Francis Fukuyama) are now arguing that rule
of law and multilateralism are better long-term success strategies for the US than
preemptive unilateralism.
• US economists Baumol, Blinder, and Wolff have found that downsizing in
companies results in the same or reduced output, but succeeds in paying less for
any given hour worked… corporate responsibility to workforce needs to be
revived.
• The UN should accept that preemptive action against terrorism may be required
while setting a high bar in terms of proof – rather than a general rule in favor of
preemption, or a continued unilateral approach.
Conclusion
• Regarding globalization, we need to be less alarmist and more forensic.
• Suzanne Berger of MIT has found that while a Chinese worker may earn 4%
of the wage of an American worker, he is usually only 4% as productive.
Wage costs are not the be-all and end-all of economics.
• China’s weak legal system means that intellectual theft is rampant, and
makes multinationals much less secure.
• The west shouldn’t panic re: China, because it has a superior knowledge
economy.
• The Chinese economy has grown around contradictions and distortion, and there
is a limit to this sort of growth.
• The leaders who will succeed President and General Secretary Hu Jintao and his
team will be chosen in autumn 2007. There is current political instability in
China, and a fairly conservative team is expected to be chosen.
• China absolutely cannot increase exports at its current rate, and it also
cannot afford to acquire an extra $200 bn. In foreign exchange reserves every
year. Also, the US cannot continue its current habits without Chinese and
Arab investors eventually owning half of the US’s capital stock. There is a
disturbing American trend of wanting to test the international system for
absorption of imbalances.
• America needs to hold fast to the Enlightenment agenda both domestically and
abroad.
• “Hard” economics, politics, and social realities need to be complemented,
corrected, and enriched by countervailing “soft” forces.