SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary 421 SCRA 656 G.R. No.

159085 February 3, 2004 Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion. Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit? Held: Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members,

and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement. At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it[']s right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution. However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONALVs.THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILAG.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004 FACTS:Ligangmga Barangay National (Liga for brevity) is the national organization of all the barangays in thePhilippines. By virtue of the provision in the Local Government Code of 1991, the Liga adopted and ratified its ownElection Code. Section 1.2, Article I of the Liga Election Code states: Liga president duly assisted by the governmentofficer aforementioned, shall notify, in writing, all the above concerned at least fifteen (15) days before the scheduledelection meeting on the exact date, time, place and requirements of the said meeting. Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, for the election of representatives of theDistrict Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after thebarangay elections. Liga sent respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoedconsidering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation, a function whichwas clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council. ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner observes the hierarchy of courts rule? Whether or not it is correct to assail the petition of writ of certiorari? Whether or not it is correct to assail declaratory relief? HELD: Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari(as well as of prohibition,mandamus,quowarranto,habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. As aptly stated in People v. Cuaresma: This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs anabsolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefore will be directed. There is after all ahierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinantof the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy mostcertainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should befiled with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed onlywhen there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention whichare better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of theCourts docket.Respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicialfunctions. The

enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondentMayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively,and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie. On declaratory relief Although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied). As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.

THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS G.R. No. 135945 March 7, 2001.

FACTS: Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in Baguio City, was mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). It was eventually foreclosed and acquired later on by the said bank as the highest bidder. On 11 April 1983, through its President Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the subject property was donated to the Republic of the Philippines. The deed of donation stipulated that Dominican Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects, activities in human settlements and economic development and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human Settlements. On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 85 abolishing the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies under the its supervision as well as all its assets, programs and projects, were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS). On 18 October 1988, United (Dominican Hills) submitted its application before the PMS to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property. In a MOA, PMS and United agreed that the latter may purchase a portion of the said property from HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATIO, acting as originator, on a selling price of P75.00 per square meter. Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED. The deed of conditional sale provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price would be paid upon signing, with the balance to be amortized within one year from its date of execution. After UNITED made its final payment on January 31, 1992, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992. Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor. Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an action for injunction before RTC Baguio City. Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied.

The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages, injunction and annulment of the said MOA. It was later on dismissed upon motion of United. The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court of Appeals. The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City Mayor and the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned and reconstructed the demolished structures. To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents filed a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public respondent COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo. Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.

ISSUES:

1. WON petition for prohibition and declaratory relief seeking the

annulment of a status quo order dated September 29, 1998 issued by the public respondent Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP, for brevity) in COSLAP Case No. 98-253 may be taken by the Supreme Court? 2. WON COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a TRO and to issue a status quo order and conduct a hearing thereof?

RULING: On the first issue To the extent that the instant case is denominated as one for declaratory relief, the SC initially clarify that it does not possess original jurisdiction to entertain such petitions. Such is vested in the Regional Trial Courts. On the second issue COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It discharges quasi-judicial functions: "Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers observed in our system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary each department being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Arturo F. Pacificador and Jovito C. Plameras, Jr., vs COMELEC G.R. No. 178259 March 13, 2009 Facts: The present petition, the Court gathers from its allegations, is one for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction. During the May 14, 2007 elections, Arturo F. Pacificador and Jovito C. Plameras, Jr. (petitioners), and Salvacion Z. Perez (private respondent), then the incumbent Governor of Antique, ran as candidates for the position of Governor. Alleging violation of Section 261, paragraphs O, V and W of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioners filed on April 23, 2007 with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor a case for disqualification (disqualification case) against respondent and other members of the Nationalist Peoples Coalition-Antique ticket. After the elections or on May 18, 2007, petitioners filed a petition for suspension of the canvassing of votes for the position of Governor and/or suspension of the proclamation of private respondent before the COMELEC which docketed it as EM07041 (suspension case). They alleged that the canvassing of votes on May 15, 2007 by the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) composed of Atty. Gil Barcenal as Chairman, Prosecutor Napoleon Abiera as Vice-Chairman, and Corazon Brown as Member-Secretary (Barcenal PBOC) was attended by fraud because the election returns were prepared under duress and bore fraudulent entries. By Resolution of May 21, 2007, the Barcenal PBOC ruled against petitioner Pacificador due to insufficiency of evidence, hence, he appealed to the COMELEC, which appeal was denominated as REF No. 07-066 (PBOC appeal). Meanwhile, the COMELECs Second Division, by Resolution of May 28, 2007, ruled against petitioners on the suspension case, finding "no overwhelming need to suspend the canvassing of votes as well as the proclamation of the candidate who garners the most number of votes for the election for Governor of the province of Antique."

In the meantime, the COMELEC First Division, by Resolution dated June 7, 2007, dismissed petitioners PBOC appeal and created a new PBOC to be composed of Atty. Renato A. Mabutay as Chairman, Atty. Tomas Valera as Vice-Chairman, and Atty. Elizabeth Doronila as Member-Secretary (Mabutay PBOC). It noted that petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal on May 21, 2007, but that no appeal was filed within five days as required under Sec. 20 (f) of Republic Act No. 7166 and Sec. 9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Petitioners contend that the Majarucon PBOC is illegal, being violative of Sec. 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 7859 promulgated on April 17, 2007 which provides that the relief of the Board of Canvassers (BOC) must be for cause, and Sec. 21 of Republic Act. No. 6646 (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other Purposes) which states that the substitute BOC must be composed of the therein named officials in their order of appearance, viz, the Provincial Auditor, the Register of Deeds, the Clerk of Court nominated by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, and any other available appointive provincial official. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are correct in questioning the creation of the new PBOC and proclaiming the new officials of the province. Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. In issuing the June 22, 2007 Resolution relieving the Mabutay PBOC and creating the Marajucon PBOC, the COMELEC First Division was merely exercising its mandate under Sec. 227 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads: Sec. 227. Supervision and control over board of canvassers. - The Commission shall have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers. Any member of the board of canvassers may, at any time, be relieved for cause and substituted motuproprio by the Commission. Petitioners contention that the COMELECs choice of officials to substitute the members of the BOC is limited only to those enumerated under Sec. 21 of Republic Act. No. 6646 is untenable. The said provision provides: Sec. 21. Substitution of Chairman and Members of the Board of Canvassers. In case of non-availability, absence, disqualification due to relationship, or incapacity for any cause of the chairman, the Commission shall appoint as substitute, a ranking lawyer of the Commission. With respect to the other members of the board, the Commission shall appoint as substitute the following in the order named: the Provincial Auditor, the Registrar of Deeds, the Clerk of Court nominated by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, and any other available appointive provincial official in the case of the provincial board of canvassers; the officials in the city corresponding to those enumerated, in the case of the city board of canvassers; and the Municipal Administrator, the Municipal Assessor, the Clerk of Court nominated by the Executive Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, or any other available appointive municipal officials, in the case of the municipal board of canvassers.

Contrary to petitioners assertion, the enumeration above is not exclusive. Members of BOCs can be filled up by the COMELEC not only from those expressly mentioned in the above-quoted provision, but from others outside if the former are not available. It bears noting that pursuant to Rule 18 of the Omnibus Election Code, decisions and resolutions of any division of the COMELEC in special cases become final and executory after the lapse of five days, unless a timely motion for reconsideration is lodged with the COMELEC en banc. The pertinent provision reads: Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. - (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation. (b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court. (c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special actions and Special cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation. (Emphasis supplied)

NILO T. PATESvs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMELITA B. ALMIRANTE G.R. No. 184915 June 30, 2009 Facts: Our Resolution of November 11, 2008 dismissed the petition in caption pursuant to Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which provides: SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. Taking into account the following material antecedents: a. February 1, 2008 The COMELEC First Division issued its Resolution (assailed in the petition); b. February 4, 2008 The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates ( petitioner) received a copy of the February 1, 2008 Resolution; c. February 8, 2008 The petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration ( MR) of the February 1, 2008 Resolution (4 days from receipt of the February 1, 2008 Resolution) d. September 18, 2008 The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying the petitioners MR (also assailed in the petition).

e. September 22, 2008 The petitioner received the COMELEC en banc Resolution of September 18, 2008 Under this chronology, the last day for the filing of a petition for certiorari, i.e., 30 days from notice of the final COMELEC Resolution, fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the petitioner only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his petition, after using up 4 days in preparing and filing his Motion for Reconsideration. Effectively, the last day for filing was October 20, 2008 the following Monday or the first working day after October 18, 2008. The petitioner filed his petition with us on October 22, 2008 or two days late; hence, our Resolution of dismissal of November 11, 2008. The petitioner asks us in his "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Reiteration for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order" to reverse the dismissal of his petition, arguing that the petition was seasonably filed under the fresh period rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in a number of cases decided beginning the year 2005. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is correct Ruling: The Court did not find the motion for reconsideration meritorious. As a Matter of Law Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause "except as hereinafter provided. Even a superficial reading of the motion for reconsideration shows that the petitioner has not challenged our conclusion that his petition was filed outside the period required by Section 3, Rule 64; he merely insists that the fresh period rule applicable to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should likewise apply to petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64. Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to is Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides).