The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity

Author(s): Ayşe Kadioğlu

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), pp. 177-193
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283799
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The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the
Construction of Official Identity
AYtE KADIOOLU

Civilization is a book to be written internationally:Each chaptercon-

tainingthe cultureof a single nation.
Ziya Gokalp

On an ordinaryday in 1986, a group of Turkishstage actors dressed in Nazi

(SS) uniformsasked randomlythe people walking in the streetsof Istanbulto
show theiridentitycards.Interestingly,they hademployed a mixed language-
semi Germanand semi Turkish- in approachingthese people and asked for
'kimlik bitte!'. What was more interestingwas thatthe majorityof the people
who were approachedby these actors in SS uniforms showed their identity
cards without questioning any part of the staged act. The whole event was
meantto be humorous,yet it also revealed the unquestionedauthorityof any-
body dressedin a uniformin a countrywith a strongstate tradition.
A studytryingto come to grips with the official Turkishidentity,first of all,
makes referencesto the strong state traditionin this countrywhich evolved in
such a way as to stifle the civil society. It is possible to argue that in such a
country, the question of national identity was hardly posed as 'Who are the
Turks?',but ratheras 'Who and/orhow are the Turksgoing to be?'. The latter
question was clearly more prevalentthroughoutTurkishhistory indicatingthe
manufacturedcharacterof the Republican Turkish identity. Secondly, the
study of official Turkishidentity makes referencesto the paradoxof Turkish
nationalism.Such a paradoxis a characteristicof Easternnationalismswith a
derivativediscourse.In fact, it is possible to arguethat the paradoxof Turkish
nationalismenhanced the power of the state elites in Turkey and paved the
way to a manufactured,official identity.
In what follows, first of all, the paradox of Turkish nationalism will be
unravelled.Secondly, the role of the state elites in Turkey, especially during
the single partyregime in manufacturingan official Republicanideology will
be portrayed.
The theme that a patrioticTurkshould try to achieve a balancebetween the
benefits of the West and the East by opting for adoptingthe science and tech-
nology of the formerand the spiritualityof the latteris repeatedquite often in
178 TURKEY: IDENTITY, DEMOCRACY, POLITICS

the schooling system designed by the educational establishmentin Turkey.

This difficult endeavour is almost like a mission for every patriotic Turk.
Hence, it is possible to argue that since the days of the early Westernization
efforts, the Turkishpsyche has been burdenedwith the difficult task of achiev-
ing a balance between the Western civilization and the Turkish culture.
Perhaps,one can argue that the women's world is like a microcosm of this
paradox ingrained within the Turkish psyche. Since the early days of
Westernizationat the beginning of the nineteenthcentury, women have been
burdened with the task of being tight-rope walkers between tradition and
modernity.'They are expected to be modem in appearancewhile retaining
some traditionalvirtues such as modesty which would keep them away from
stepping into men's realm. Those women who are unable to achieve such a
delicate balance by either being too modern as to warrantpromiscuityor by
being too traditionalfor not keeping up with novel fashions are usuallypushed
to the marginsof society. The formerare usually portrayedas too ambitious,
and promiscuous 'loose women' while the latter as old-fashioned and out-
moded types. The tension between modernity and traditiondepicted in the
behaviourand dress codes of women exists albeit in a less apparentway in
other domainsof the Turkishsocial life as well. PatrioticTurkstry to resolve
this tensionby achieving a balancebetweenthe materialityof the West andthe
spiritualityof the East. However, the achievementof such a balance is quite
enigmatic since a combination of Western civilization and Eastern culture,
when transposedto the realm of nationalism renders itself as an insoluble
problem.
ParthaChatterjeeidentifies nationalismas a problemin the historyof politi-
cal ideas.2This is especially apparentin the deeply contradictorymission of
Easternnationalismopting for transforminga nationalcultureby adjustingit
to the requirementsof progresswhile at the same time maintainingits distinc-
tive identity. In trying to shed some light on to the contradictionembedded
within Easternnationalism,it is necessary to point to a distinction between
Western and non-Westernnationalisms that is employed quite often in the
literature.Such a distinction is made by Hans Kohn, for instance, between
Western and non-Westernnationalismsthat are referredto as good and evil
nationalisms, respectively.3Accordingly, while the former is taken as the
normaltype, the latterbecomes the devianttype of nationalism.One of the dis-
tinguishingcharacteristicsof Westernnationalismis its cosmopolitanoutlook,
universalism, and its acceptance of civilization along with the materialand
intellectualpremises of the EuropeanEnlightenment.Frenchnation-statethat
was established in 1789 emerged concomitantly with such a nationalism
which 'representedto the rest of continentalEuropethe modernityof a nation
based upon individualliberty,equality,and a cosmopolitanoutlook'.4German
nationalism,on the otherhand,which emergedabouthalf a centurypriorto the
TURKISHNATIONALISMAND OFFICIALIDENTITY 179

formationof the Germannation-statein 1870, acquiredan ethnic and cultural

characterwith anti-Western,anti-Enlightenment,and Romanticpremises.The
nationalistyouth movement in Germanyat the turnof the nineteenthcentury
was fraughtwith the purposeof 'reconstructingthe Volk along more genuine
and naturalprinciplesthanmodernityhad offered'.' These Volkish ideas were
adoptedby the Germanyouth immediatelyprecedingthe National Socialists'
rise to power as well. In an analysis of the intellectual origins of the Third
Reich, George Mosse maintainsthat the discovery of such ideological pre-
suppositionsof the Germanyouth is much more importantthanthe searchfor
some individualprecursorsof National Socialism such as Herder,Wagneror
Nietzsche.6Germannationalismis loaded with such Volkish ideas. Perhaps,
the most distinguishing feature of these ideas is the distinction they put
between culture and civilization which, accordingto Mosse, 'was always on
the lips of its adherents'.7While regardingculture as an entity with a soul,
Germannationalistsregardedcivilization as external and artificial, a feature
which had forgottenits genuine, Germanicpurpose.In the words of Mosse:
The acceptance of Culture and the rejection of Civilization meant for
many people an end to alienationfrom their society. The word 'rooted-
ness' occurs constantlyin theirvocabulary.They sought this in spiritual
terms, through an inward correspondencebetween the individual, the
native soil, the Volk, and the universe.In this mannerthe isolation they
felt so deeply would be destroyed.8
These people opted for 'a spiritual revolution which would revitalize the
nationwithoutrevolutionizingits structure',thatis, 'a revolutionof the soul'.9
Both the Frenchand the Germanmodels of nationalismand the nation-state
deeply influenced the characterof rising nation-stateseverywhere.The para-
dox of Easternnationalismstems from its attemptto combine the missions of
both the French and the German models. Chatterjee,who focuses on anti-
colonial, Easternnationalism,maintainsthat such an attemptis deeply contra-
dictory since 'It is both imitative and hostile to the model it imitates. It is
imitative in that it accepts the value of the standardsset by the alien culture.
But it also involves a rejection . . . of ancestral ways which are seen as
obstacles to progressand yet also cherishedas marksof identity."0The search
of Eastern nationalism, then, is to transformthe nation culturally while at
the same time retainingits distinctiveness. Such a contradictoryattemptis a
leitmotiv in Turkishnationalismas it evolved alongside Turkishmoderniza-
tion.
Turkishmodernizationbegan in the course of the eighteenthcenturyat the
end of the first systematic attemptsto understandthe difference between the
Ottoman and the European military systems. As a result, first traces of
modernizationinvolved the establishmentof disciplined troops trainedupon
180 TURKEY: IDENTITY, DEMOCRACY, POLITICS

the recommendationsof Western, mostly French, advisers in an effort to

replace the janissariesthat had become an organic partof the state ratherthan
its instrument.At the turn of the nineteenthcentury, modernizationinvolved
areas other than the military as well. Between 1839 and 1908, the reforms
increasingly involved civilian mattersthat resulted in the 'revampingof the
civil and political institutionsof the Ottomans'."These reforms were intro-
duced by the TanzimatCharterwhich was proclaimedby Sultan Abdulmecid
in 1839. Tanzimatreformswhich involved a majorreorganizationat the levels
of provincial administration, education, and the judiciary brought the
Ottomansto a point of no returntowardsinstitutionalmodernization.The ulti-
mate aim of the Tanzimatreformerswas the achievement of sivilizasyon as
seen throughFrencheyes.'2This aim later became the slogan of the Republi-
can reforms in the 1920s that strove to elevate Turkeyto the level of muasir
medeniyet(contemporarycivilization).
With the initiationof Tanzimatreforms,the dilemmaof the achievementof
a balance between the materialityof the West and the spiritualityof the East
became quite clear. The main problematiqueof the Tanzimatwriterswas the
achievement of a balance between these reforms and Islamic teachings by
delineatingthe possibility of a compatibilitybetween the two. The writingsof
the Young Ottomans- a new literarymovement that was inspiredby French
writing- became crucial in coming to terms with the ongoing modernization
by focusing on such a balance. The extent of modernizationand its compati-
bility with Islam, for instance,constitutedthe problematiqueof the writingsof
Namik Kemal (1840-88), a leading young Ottoman.
In a study that focuses on the implications of the Tanzimat reforms on
women, NiluiferGole depicts a similartheme within the literarymovementsof
the periodthatopt for achieving a balancebetween the materialityof the West
and the spiritualityof the East.'3She maintainsthatauthorslike Namik Kemal,
Ahmet Midhat, who thought with the conventions of West-East, and/ora' la
Franca-a la Turca,distinguishedbetween the good and the bad aspects of the
Western civilization corresponding to its material and spiritual aspects,
respectively. These authorsopted for a balance between Islam and Western
civilization by making references to the practices associated with the early,
golden age of Islam (Asr-1Saadet). In so doing, they triedto manifestthe com-
patibilitybetween Islamic cultureand Westerncivilization. Tanzimatwriters
were critical of the adoption of certain Western codes of conduct and life
styles on the partof the Ottomanelites. All the debates regardingmoderniza-
tion and Westernizationwere, in fact, about how to set limitations to this
process. As serif Mardinputs it:
One of the questionsraisedwas the extent to which Europeanor western
civilization is an indivisible force . .. Every time the questioncame up,
TURKISH NATIONALISM AND OFFICIAL IDENTITY 181

whetherin the nineteenthcenturyor in the twentieth,the idea of equality

as a fundamentalvalue of the Ottomansystem emerged as one which
competed with the idea of an untrammeledbourgeoisie.This is possibly
one of the subtlest strains of 'survivals' which cannot be neglected in
considering the position of Turkey vis-a-vis Western Europe. In the
nineteenthcentury,one of its manifestationswas the disapprovingatti-
tude of much of the Ottoman middle- and lower-class population
towards the behaviour of westernized Tanzimat statesmen. Ottoman
grandeeswho had borne the responsibilityand the risk of initiatingnew
policies had also developed Western Europeanconsumption patterns.
Crinolines, pianos, dining tables and living-room furniturewere new
ideas which the official class soon adopted,and these were often seen as
foolish luxuries by the section of the populationthat had lived on the
modest standardsimposed by traditionalvalues.'4
It is obvious that a seemingly cosmetic Westernizationadopted by the
Ottomanelites was only skin-deep.Nevertheless, it generatedcriticism in the
society that was crystallized in the Tanzimat literary tradition. Cosmetic
Westernizationwas criticized as imitationof Westernways. It was also main-
tained that modernizationwas possible without resortingto Westerncodes of
conduct that were usually portrayed as ridiculous for being artificial and
phony.
Since the literarytraditionbetween Tanzimatand the Republicis like a gold
mine in unravellingthe problematiqueof modernization/Westernization, it is
worthwhileto referto a couple of cases in this context. One of the most impor-
tant novels written at the end of the nineteenthcentury that focuses on the
theme of the extent of Westernization is Felatun Bey ile Rakim Efendi
by Ahmet Midhat which was published in 1876.'5 The main theme of the
novel is the description of the difference between an imitative, cosmetic
Westernizationwhich is ridiculedas phony and a ratherpreferredone which is
characterizedby a relentless effort to hold on to indigenous cultural traits.
WhereasFelatunBey is portrayedas an archetypeof the former,RakimEfendi
representsthe latter trend. Felatun Bey, for instance, prefers the name Plato
ratherthan the OttomanFelatun.He is the heir to an abundantinheritanceand
spends his life on the Europeanside of Istanbul gambling and entertaining
with women. Rakim Efendi, on the other hand spends his time working dili-
gently in orderto achieve his goal of leading a modest life. He is someone who
was sent to school as a result of the self-sacrificingefforts of his guardian.He
not only graduatedfrom Ottoman educational institutions but also studied
French. He is a serious, hard-workingperson, in contrast to the affluent,
flagrantand spend-thriftFelatun Bey. It is obvious that Rakim Efendi repre-
sents a preferredmodel of Westernizationwithout falling into the trap of
182 TURKEY: IDENTITY, DEMOCRACY, POLITICS

engaging in conspicuous consumptionand by retainingdistinctive traits such

as modesty.
Another well-known example is Bihruz Bey, an ostentatious Western
characterin Recaizade Ekrem's novel Araba Sevdasi which was publishedin
1896.'6BihruzBey is a man who became a public official throughhis father's
connections despite the fact that he was a lazy, incompetent,fool for Western
materialism.He inheritshis father's fortuneswhich is more than adequatein
guaranteeinga comfortablelife for him andhis motheron the Europeanside of
Istanbul.Bihruz Bey refers to Turkishcustoms as barbaric.He makes fun of
the traditionalcostumes of the Turks.He, on the otherhand,dresses himself in
the Europeanstyle with expensive, tailored costumes. He spends his fortune
on carriagesto roam aroundin the style of the Europeanaristocrats.He con-
stantly makes remarksin French.In short,he behaves and lives like a French
noblesse de robe in Istanbulat the end of the nineteenthcentury.The Bihruz
Bey syndrome which is so eloquently depicted in Recaizade Ekrem's novel
generatesa criticismagainst such cosmetic Westernization.
It is obvious that there were many Bihruz Beys in the Ottomansociety at
that particularhistoricaljuncture who were characterizedby their imitative
Westernization.The criticisms that were directed against them focused on
their exaggeratedadoption of Western materialismat the expense of indige-
nous culturaltraits.The criticismsthat were directedagainstFelatunBeys and
Bihruz Beys point to the evolution of what Mardincalls the 'just discourse' in
Turkishsociety.'7Drawing on the dichotomousclassification of the Ottoman
Empirewith an elite stratumof militaryand civilian establishmenton the one
hand, and a folk stratumof the administered,on the other, Mardinmaintains
that the ensuing duality appearsin a numberof guises that sets a neat separa-
tion between Ottomanpolitical society and civil society. In raisingthe issue of
the 'cause of the just' or the 'just discourse', Mardinportrays 'the lingering
modernfeeling that the folk are a partof a 'team of the just"'.8 More signifi-
cantly, Mardinpoints to the way the 'just discourse' is embedded within the
Islamic discourse in modernTurkeyenabling the folk to seek protectionfrom
the changes introducedby Western-orientedRepublicanreforms. Hence, the
rift between the teams of the unjustand the just was producedand reproduced
in the course of the modernizationof the Ottomans,representingthe 'high',
'palace' culture or the culture of the elites and the 'little', 'folk' culture,
respectively.
It is obvious that with modernizationefforts while the 'cause of the unjust'
was affiliated with the Westernizing elites - hence critically portraying
their affluent and spend-thriftlife styles, 'the cause of the just' which is
characterizedby a sense of grievance graduallybegan to be embracedby the
Islamic discourse. The reforms introduced by the young Turks and the
Republicanswhich continueda modernizingtrendthat was set with Tanzimat,
TURKISH NATIONALISM AND OFFICIAL IDENTITY 183

purportedto replacefrom above the Islamic teachings about a 'good andjust'

life.'9 This eventually paved the way to the identification of the Kemalist
secularistswith the rule of the unjust.The Republicanregime simply could not
fill the vacuum that was formed with the estrangementand delinking of the
discoursesof the just and the unjustfrom each other.
A preoccupation with this balance between modernity and tradition,
Westernmaterialismand Easternspiritualityas well as Civilization- based on
the premises of Enlightenment- and Culture - based on the premises of
Romanticism- is a recurringtheme accompanying Turkish modernization.
The desire to achieve such a balance is nowherebetterexpressed than in Ziya
Gokalp's (1876-1924) work(s.Ziya Gokalp's ideas were wavering between
the three trendsof lslamism, Turkism,and Westernism,hence, reflecting the
political climate of the context in which he was located. As Niyazi Berkesputs
it: 'He was fighting within himself the battle that intellectualsand politicians
were ragingon otherlevels'.21
Ziya Gokalp producedhis basic writings between the years 1911 and 1918
when he was associated with the Party of Union and Progress against the
emotional backgroundof the period laden with nationalistmovementsamong
the non-Muslim and non-Turkishpeoples of the decadent OttomanEmpire.
While on the one hand, there were those intellectuals and politicians who
opted for a social reconstructionby way of reversionto 3eriat (Islamic law),
there were those who staunchlysupportedthe idea of Westernization,on the
other. In addition to these two groups, there were others who longed for the
romanticideal of the pre-IslamicTurkicunity. Ziya Gokalp was influencedby
all of these trends. Yet, he envisaged a middle road in the traditionof Namik
Kemal: 'thatonly the materialcivilization of Europeshould be taken and not
its non-materialaspects'.2' Yet, contrary to Namik Kemal's thought, Ziya
Gokalp did not think that the individual and his reason could be a criteria
for social reconstruction.Ziya Gokalp rathersignified a shift from Tanzimat
rationalism inspired by the eighteenth century thinkers of the European
Enlightenmentto the nineteenthcenturyRomanticthought in the traditionof
the German philosophers by accepting the transcendentalreality of society
identified with the nation instead of individualreason. Berkes sums up Ziya
Gokalp's convictions in the following manner:'As the ultimaterealityof con-
temporarysociety is the nation, and as national ideals are ultimate forces
orientingthe behaviorof the individuals,so the most urgenttask for the Turks
consisted of awakeningas a nation in orderto adaptthemselves to the condi-
tions of contemporarycivilization'.22
Ziya Gokalpbelieved thatit was the primarytask of sociology to determine
'whatthe Turkishpeople alreadypossessed or lacked to be a modernnation'. 23
He diagnosed the major ailment of the existing cultural climate in Turkey
within the dichotomousrepresentationsof the East and the West. Accordingly,
184 TURKEY: IDENTITY, DEMOCRACY, POLITICS

he believed in the necessity of an adjustmentbetween the two aspects of social

life, namely civilization and culture. Ziya Gokalp believed that civilization
simply became a matterof mechanicalimitationwithout a culturalbasis. The
source of culturalvalues was located in the social unit that he called 'nation'.
Hence, he tried to give momentum to the rise of the concept of a modern
Turkishnation as an independentculturalunit within the confines of contem-
porarycivilization. He placed a lot of emphasis on the concept of 'nation' in
coming to termswith the adjustmentof cultureand civilization. Ziya Gokalp's
analyses contained the premises of both Enlightenmentand Romanticism
symbolized in the concepts of civilization and culture, respectively. By the
same token, the nationalismthathe describedcontainedelementsof individual
liberty, rational cosmopolitanism, and universalism while at the same time
tended for its own self-preservation.In short, it containedelements of both a
cosmopolitan French nationalism and an organic, anti-Western and anti-
enlightenment German nationalism. This paradoxicalsynthesis, first of all,
posed the national question in the Turkishcontext as an insoluble problem;
secondly it assigned a particularrole to the refinedintellectin transformingthe
popularconsciousness by an elitist project from above. The latterhad paved
the way to the evolution of an official Turkishidentitywithin the confines of a
peculiar Turkishnationalismthat was adopted in the course of the formative
years of the TurkishRepublic.
The nationalquestion poses itself theoreticallyas an insoluble problem in
the Turkish context. Chatterjeeexplains the theoretical insolubility of the
nationalquestionin colonial countriesby pointingto a distinctionbetween the
thematicandproblematiclevels of nationalistthought.In so doing, Chatterjee
draws a great deal from Anouar Abdel-Malek's distinction between the
thematicand problematiclevels of Orientalism.24 Accordingly,Orientalismat
the level of the thematicis 'codified in linguistic conventions'.25 It is a style of
thought based on an ontological and epistemological distinctionbetween the
Orientand the Occident,the East and the West. Orientalism,at the level of the
problematic,on the otherhand,involves a separationof the Orientas an object
of study stampedwith an othernessthatis passive and non-participant.Edward
Said's descriptionof Flaubert'sencounterwith an Egyptiancourtesan,which
produced a widely influential model of an Oriental woman portrays
Orientalismat the level of the problematic:
. . .she never spoke of herself, she never representedher emotions,
presence, or history. He spoke for and representedher. He was foreign,
comparativelywealthy, male and these were historicalfacts of domina-
tion that allowed him not only to possess KuchukHanemphysically but
to speak for her and tell his readers in what way she was 'typically
Oriental'.26
TURKISH NATIONALISM AND OFFICIAL IDENTITY 185

It is obvious that Said's descriptionpoints to a power relationbetween the

Orient and the Occident that enables the latter to dominate the former.
Therefore,the subjectivity of the object is denied to him/her. Orientalismat
the level of the problematicis analogous to 'an understandingof meaning in
termsof the subjectiveintentionsthatlie behindparticularspeech acts.'27
When these two levels of Orientalism are transposed to the nationalist
thought, the compatibilitybetween the two levels extinguishes. At the level
of the thematic, nationalist thought adopts the same essentialist distinc-
tion between the Orientand the Occidentor the East and the West. Therefore,
the object still retains the essentialist Oriental character.Yet, at the level
of the problematic, the nationalist thought, quite contrary to Orientalism,
relinquishesthe subjectivityof the object who thenceforthis no longerpassive,
and non-participant.Since the subjectis the advocateof an anti-colonial,anti-
Westernnationalistcause, 'he is seen to possess a "subjectivity"which he can
himself "make".', The active, autonomous, sovereign subject is burdened
with the mission of carryingan anti-colonialnationalistmovementat the level
of the problematic.It is obvious that in the nationalist discourse while the
object retains its essentialist, passive Oriental characterat the level of the
thematicwhich condemnsits subjectivity,it is also positionedin an active role
in the anti-colonialnationaliststruggle at the level of the problematic.These
two levels of nationalistthoughtare inherentlycontradictory.It is this contra-
dictoriness which places the national question as an insoluble problem in a
post-colonial country. As Chatterjee puts its: 'There is, consequently, an
inherentcontradictorinessin nationalistthinking,because it reasons within a
frameworkof knowledge whose representationalstructurecorrespondsto the
very structureof power nationalistthoughtseeks to repudiate.'29
Despite the fact that Turkey was not a colony, a similar contradictoriness
and insolubility results from the adoption of a Westernizationproject while
at the same time clinging on to distinctive cultural traits. The paradox of
Turkishnationalismwhich resultedin both a hostility towardsand an imitation
of Western ways has accompaniedthe modernizationprocess since the turn
of the nineteenth century. Accordingly, it is quite obvious that Turkish
nationalismwas not the awakeningof Turksto nationalconsciousness. It was
rathera project undertakenby intellectuals whose discourse was laden with
the dilemma of a choice between imitation and identity stemming from the
aforementionedparadox.The intellectuals,in Chatterjee'swords,
always face the crucial dilemmabetween 'westernizing'and a narodnik
tendency . . . But the dilemma is quite spurious:ultimately the move-
ments invariably contain both elements, a genuine modernism and a
more or less spurious concern for local culture . . . By the twentieth
century, the dilemma hardly bothers anyone: the philosopher-kingsof
186 TURKEY: IDENTITY, DEMOCRACY, POLITICS

the 'underdeveloped' world all act as westernizers, and all talk like
narodniks.3"'
The superior material qualities of the West, its science and technology,
however, can only be synthesized with the spiritualityof the East with a
project 'from without' which necessarily involves the intellectualswho take
upon themselves the task of transforminga popularconsciousness 'steeped in
centuries of superstitionand irrationalfolk religion'.-' By adopting a positi-
vistic stance that was intolerant towards the religio-mystical tradition, the
Republican elites in Turkey instigated a distancing of popular, religious
elements thatthenceforthrepresentedthe 'cause of the just.'
The proclamationof the Republic in 1923 was followed by the abolitionof
the office of the caliphatein 1924. Othersteps were taken in the course of the
1920s and early 1930s towardssecularizingthe Republic. These includedthe
abolitionof the Ministryof Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations,abolition
of religious courts, proscriptionof male religious headgear,namely the fez,
dissolution of the dervish orders,reformof the calendar,and adoptionof the
Swiss Civil Code. By the end of the 1920s, radicalreformswere passed such
as disestablishmentof the state religion (10 April 1928), adoptionof the Latin
alphabet (I November 1928), and the use of the Turkish language in the
Islamic call to prayer (3 February 1932).32 These reforms constituted an
onslaughton the existing culturalpractices.They opted for a general state of
amnesia which would lead to a process of estrangementof the people from
some of theirown culturalpractices.Feroz Ahmadrefersto the adoptionof the
Latinalphabetin place of the Arabicscriptas the 'most iconoclastic reformof
the period.'33He says: 'At a stroke,even the literatepeople were cut off from
theirpast. Overnight,virtuallythe entire nationwas made illiterate'.34
The notion of an Islamic state was anathema to the Republican elites
organizedaroundthe RepublicanPeople's Party.They wantedTurkeyto reach
to the level of contemporarycivilization by emphasizing notions such as
science, modem education, rationality and secularism. The 1920s and the
1930s were crucialyears in the makingof the new RepublicanTurkeyand the
emergence of the 'new Turks'.3 In the course of this transformation,there
were certaincriticalturningpoints thatportrayedthe graduallyincreasingcon-
flict between the state and the civil society. In fact, one of the first opposition
partiesthatwas foundedin November 1924, the ProgressiveRepublicanParty
- led by ex-officers like Ali Fuad Cebesoy and Rauf Orbay,opted for 'restor-
ing the sovereignty of the people over that of the state'.36 The Progressive
Republicansdeclaredtheir commitmentto liberalismand promisedto respect
religious opinions and beliefs. Yet, their attempts to pose themselves as a
viable opposition failed when an extraordinarylaw - Takrir-iSiikunKanunu
(the Law for the Maintenanceof Order)- was passed in March 1925 as a
TURKISH NATIONALISM AND OFFICIAL IDENTITY 187

responseto a Kurdishrebellionthatbrokeout in easternAnatoliain February.

Thereafter,all the oppositionto the Kemalistregime was eithercrushedor was
'created'by the regime itself which was acting as a 'referee'. After prompting
the establishmentof the token RepublicanFree Party in 1930 as the opposi-
tion, Ataturkadvised the leadersof the two political parties(Ismet tnonu and
Fethi Okyar)in the following manner:'I am now a father.Both of you are my
sons. As far as I am concernedthere is no differencebetween the two of you.
WhatI want from you in the GrandNationalAssembly is an open debateupon
nationalissues.'37
The February1925 rebellionwas launchedand sustainedin religious terms.
It confirmed the fears of the Republican leaders of religious reaction and
counter-revolutionin a society in which a revolutionwas being realized from
above. The Law for the Maintenanceof Ordergave the governmentvirtually
absolute powers for the next two years and on other occasions until March
1929. The 1924 rebellionand the ensuing extraordinarylegislationwas a dress
rehearsalof the dynamicsof the Republicanregime which was determinedby
the undisputedprinciple of the indivisibility of the country. It was through
such criticalturningpoints thatthe Republicanregime finally establisheditself
in a centralizedfashion.
Anotherturmingpoint which furtheredthe centralizationof the Republican
regime was the incidentin Menemen, nearIzmir,in November 1930, where a
violent reaction erupted which was directed against the secular military-
bureaucraticelites. The disturbancebegan when a reserve officer in the local
gendarmeriewas sent to Menemen to quell a disturbancecaused by Dervi?
Mehmedof the Nak?ibendimysticalorderwho claimedthathe was the Mahdi,
who had come to save the world. The reserveofficer was seized by the raging
crowd, beheaded, and his head was stuck on a flag pole and paradedaround
the town. The Menemenincidentis criticalin channellingthe subsequentroute
of the Republicanregime since it made it quite clear to the Republicanelites
thatthe reformsthatwere undertakenin the 1920s had not takenroot. It mani-
fested in no uncertainterms the erasureof the link between the causes of the
unjustand thejust, manifestedin the centreandthe periphery,respectively.As
Mardinputs it: '. . . between 1923 and 1946 the periphery- in the sense of the
provinces- was suspect and because it was consideredan areaof potentialdis-
affection, the political center kept it underclose observation'.38
In the period after 1930, the efforts of the Republican elites were more
systematically geared towards creating a new ideology. In May 1931, the
ideology of Kemalismwas launchedin accordancewith the principlesadopted
at the Third Party Congress of the RepublicanPeople's Party. Accordingly,
the six fundamentaland unchangingprinciples of the regime were defined
as Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism and
Revolutionism/Reformism.The insignia of the six arrows of the Republican
188 TURKEY: IDENTITY, DEMOCRACY, POLITICS

Peoples' Party represent the premises of the Turkish Republic that were
formulatedat thattime. Since liberalismand democracyhad alreadybeen dis-
creditedin the eyes of the Republicanelites in the 1930s due to the instability
of the regimes in WesternEurope,they were not includedwithin the founding
principles of the Republic. Moreover, the principlesof liberalismand demo-
cracy did not coincide with the interests of the Republicanelites internally
since they were constantly trying to tighten their grip on the periphery.The
efforts of the Republicanelites to createa systematicideology led to the publi-
cation of a monthly called Kadro. Kadro, which began publicationin Ankara
in January1932, aimed at 'creatingan ideology original to the regime'.39The
Kemalist regime tightened its grip over the periphery in the aftermathof
revolts such as the 1925 Kurdishrebellion - which was actually a religious
reaction- andthe 1930 Menemenincident.In fact, the dynamicsof events that
paved the way to overt attemptsat creatinga Republicanideology from above
manifesteda latent fear of the Kemalistelites that Anatolia would be split on
primordialgroup lines.40That fear channelled the Kemalist elites towards
furthersocial engineering.
By 1930, it was generally agreed by the Republicanelites that the reforms
that were undertakenin the course of the 1920s had not taken root. This
problemwas to be remediedwith furtherreformsfrom above thatwere geared
towards creating a new Turk. The emerging new Turkishidentity, then, was
distinguishedby its manufacturedcharacter.Turks were a 'made' nation by
virtue of emphasizing their difference from the Ottomansalong the similar
Jacobin lines that the French revolutionaries followed in creating the
Frenchman.The ferventdesire to breakwith the past was clearly manifestedin
the ensuing reforms.From 1923 onwards,the new Turkswere to be governed
from their new capital at the heart of Anatolia, Ankara, in a mental state
that was havoc and can perhaps best be described as 'voluntary amnesia'.
The Republicanstate had the mission of elevating people to the level of con-
temporarycivilization. Since any peripheralrevolt was interpretedas an effort
to revive the old religious order,Republicanreformscontainedanti-religious
themes or in the words of Mardin'showed a clear distastefor religion'. 41 The
plain fact remained, however, that the Kemalist ideology could not replace
Islam in the lives of the people. The teachings of the Kemalist doctrinewere
internalizedonly by the intelligentsiawhich contributedto the widening of the
rift between the centerand the periphery.
The Republicanelites' attemptsto create an ideology was only skin-deep
and not espousedby all the classes. The Republicwas foundeduponprinciples
that were not genuine but were rathermanufacturedfrom above. In short, the
Republic was not democratic.Democracywas not one of the six arrowsof the
RepublicanPeople's Party.
In the aftermathof the militarycoup on 12 September1980, a trendwas set
TURKISH NATIONALISM AND OFFICIAL IDENTITY 189

in Turkeytowardschallengingthe early Kemalistprinciples.Such a trendwas

set in the political atmospherecreated in the aftermathof the 1982 Consti-
tution which curbed the numberof categories of the state elites, that is, the
appointedratherthanelected bureaucraticand militaryelites. The evolution of
the Turkish democracy involved a constant conflict between the state elites
and politicalelites, namely, the elected representativesof politicalparties,who
emphasized the vertical and horizontal dimensions of democracy, respec-
tively.42It is obvious that an undue stress on the vertical dimension maintain-
ing the long-terminterestsof the communitypaves the way to the evolution of
strong states that block the developmentof pluralismand/orcivil society. An
undue stress on the horizontaldimension, i.e. political participation,leads to
debilitating pluralism. Hence the problematiqueof democracy lies in the
achievement of a balance between these two dimensions. In the words of
Metin Heper:

The problematique democracy faces is the necessity of striking a

balance between political participationand prudentleadership.By defi-
nition, increased participationdemocratizes political regimes, but the
consolidation of democracy necessitates the less dramaticbut equally
significant process of the emergence of a prudent,not merely a respon-
sive government.43

It is obvious thatthe state elites reinstitutedtheirpowers throughoutTurkish

political history whenever they felt that the political elites gained too much
independence.Hence, the political elites were allowed to play their roles in a
system in which the state elites had traditionallybeen more established.Since
the time of the draftingof the early Republicanprinciplesthe state elites had
always felt that they had the last word on vital matters. They took it upon
themselves to protectthe early Republicanideals that came to be symbolized
in the six arrowsof the RepublicanPeople's Party. Hence, the three military
interventions (1960-61, 1971-73, 1980-83) were undertakenin order to
reinstitutethese early ideals thatthe political elites had ostensibly ignored.The
traditionof resolving the conflict between the state elites and the political
elites by reinstitutingthe powers of the formerand by punishingthe latterhad
among otherthings led to the mystificationof an official, absolute,and mono-
lithic Turkishidentity.
The 1980s opened up a new chapterin Turkey's political dynamics. Many
internationaland internalfactors were influential in promptingthis opening.
The end of Cold Warrhetoric,the opening up of new foreign policy arenasfor
Turkey,globalizationand a score of internalfactors pertainingto the Turkish
political structureheraldedthis new era in Turkishpolitics.44 Perhapsone of
the most critical consequences of the process of globalizationis the shattering
190 TURKEY: IDENTITY, DEMOCRACY, POLITICS

of homogenous, standardizedcultures in an internationalorder whose main

political actors were the nation-states. Globalization paradoxically led to
the emergence of local identities. The liberal economic policies which were
adoptedin Turkey in the early 1980s were geared towardsglobal integration.
This process was acceleratedby the exposure of the Turkishpublic to global
television channels such as CNN and BBC. Moreover, the emergence of
variousTurkishtelevision channelshas lessened the importanceof the official
TurkishRadio and Television that had been instrumentalin maintainingthe
monolithicTurkishidentity.
The internal political dynamics set in the post-1980 period had certain
characteristicswhich connectedTurkeywith the internationalglobal medium.
Firstof all, the post-1983 regime strengthenedthe political elites in Turkeyas
a preludeto furtherdemocratization.Secondly, the new discourse of the state
elites began to make references to the significance of the Islamic identity of
the Turks.This discourse led to the abandonmentof Kemalism as a political
manifesto. It is true that Kemalist principles were still emphasized in this
period although not for the sake of creating a monolithic Turkish identity
but rather arresting the spread of Marxism, fascism, and religious funda-
mentalism.The new discourseof the stateelites, on the otherhand,were laden
with references to the significance of religious values for the Turks. Such
references represented a stark contrast when compared with the early
Kemalist-seculardiscourseof the state elites. Despite the fact that such a shift
was probably prompted by an urge to fight communism rather than by a
genuine renewed interest in Turkish identity, it led to a legitimation of the
'cause of the just' representedby the Islamicperiphery.Islam had finally been
broughtfrom the peripheryto the centre of Turkishpolitics as the antidoteof
communism.Thirdly,many civil societal elements were able to find for them-
selves a breathingspace in this mediumin which the gripof the centreover the
periphery was gradually being removed. This has led to the emergence of
women activists marchingto protest against being batteredby men, environ-
mentalists, homosexuals and transsexuals seeking the protection of their
rights, and Islamic university students protesting against university dress
codes. The mushroomingof such civil societal elements coupled with the new
mission of the technocratic elites of the 1980s who 'defined their goal less
in terms of educating the people than of synthesizing Islamic values and
pragmaticrationality'gave rise to a political climate that allowed the search
for a more historicallyrootedTurkishidentity.45
In the course of these developmentsthere also emerged those groups who
were critical of these shifts in the discourseof the state elites and expressed a
clear wish for the reinstitutionof the official Turkish identity which was
viewed as secular,nationalist,statist,republican,populist, and reformistin an
early Republicansense. The debatesandclashes between the Kemalist-secular
TURKISH NATIONALISM AND OFFICIAL IDENTITY 191

groups and others who are toleranttowards religious images have begun to
representthe newly polarizedpoliticalcleavages in Turkeyin the 1990s.
It is meaningfulto refer at this point to the mannerin which the Westernist
and Islamic discourses are interwoven in the Turkishcontext in spite of the
fact that both trendsin their currentpolitical manifestationsare waging a war
to exclude one another. In other words, while the secular Westernists are
increasingly becoming more hostile to religious images by relying on and
commodifying the image of MustafaKemal Ataturk,the religious groups are
increasingtheir attacks on the decadent Western culture. Ironically, Ataturk
who set the trajectoryof Turkishmodernizationtowardsa zealous Westerniza-
tion, had never abandonedthe rhetoricof a synthesis between the West and
Islam. In fact, he adopted for himself and for the Turkish military the title
'gazi' (connoting a crusadingspirit sharedby the Muslims who waged wars
againstthe infidel). Ironically,the syntacticand semantic structureof the dis-
course of the Islamists who have attackedthe decadence of the West of the
past decade is laden with representationsof post-Enlightenmentrational
thought. ismet Ozel, for instance, who is a prominentIslamic poet in Turkey
has titled his autobiography:Waldo, Sen Neden Burada Degilsin? (Waldo,
Why Aren't You Here?), which is a statementmade by an Americanthinker
Henry David Thoreauwhen his friend Ralph Waldo Emerson came to visit
him in jail.46

The above analysis endeavouredto show the connectionsbetween the paradox

of Turkishnationalismand the emergence of a Jacobin, 'managerial'intelli-
gentsia duringthe early years of the Republic. Turkishnationalismcontained
the premises of an Enlightenment mentality as well as a brand of
Romanticism. It purportedto synthesize the materialism of the West and
certain indigenous culturaltraits such as Islam, as well as pre-IslamicTurkic
traditions.The origins of the attemptsto realize such a synthesis date back to
the beginnings of Turkishmodernizationwith the Tanzimatreforms. Such a
synthesis could only be realized by a social engineeringfrom above that was
undertakenby the early Republican elites. The early Republican reforms
which were representedin the RepublicanPeople's Party's six arrows con-
tained a clear distaste for religion. The reforms instigated during the early
Republicanyears representeda turningpoint regardingthe managerialrole of
the state geared towards revamping the old social institutions. It is at this
historicaljuncturethatthe links betweenthe discourseof the peripheryand the
centre were erased. The early Republicanprojectof social engineeringrepro-
duced itself whenever there emerged peripheral revolts challenging the
unquestionedauthorityof the centre.Even the oppositionpartieswere founded
in accordancewith the limitationsposed by the ruling centre.The Republican
192 TURKEY: IDENTITY, DEMOCRACY, POLITICS

state which fostered a Jacobin mentality, led to the creation of an official,

monolithic, absoluteTurkishidentityeither by suppressingor by ignoringthe
multipleidentitiesthatcame to be imprisonedin the periphery.
The political climate that prevailed in the 1980s and the early 1990s
has opened the Kemalist Pandora'sbox out of which have emerged multiple
identities making references to the different sects of Islam and the Kurds.It
remains to be seen whetherthe political dynamics of Turkey have reacheda
point of no returnin this context.

NOTES

1. On the issue of women's paradox between traditionand modernity, see Ay.e Kadloglu,
'Women's Subordinationin Turkey: Is Islam Really the Villain', Mildlle East Journal,
Vol.48, No.4 (Autumn 1994), pp.645-61; Ay,e Kadioglu, 'Alaturkalik ile lffetsizlik
ArasindaBirey Olarak Kadin' (Women Between Being Traditionaland Unchaste), Giir4i,
No.9 (May 1993), pp.58-62.
2. Partha Chatterjee,Nationalist Thoughtand the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse
(Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1993).
3. See, for instance, Ken Wolf, 'Hans Kohn's LiberalNationalism:The Historianas Prophet',
Journal of the Historyof Ideas, Vol.37, No.4 (Oct.-Dec. 1976), pp.651-72.
4. Hans Kohn,Prelude to Nation-States,TheFrenchand GerrnanE.xperience,1789-1815 (New
Jersey:D. Van NostrandCompany,Inc., 1967), p.2.
5. George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins oJ the ThirdReich
(New York: Schocken Books, 1981), p.6. See also, Ay~e Kadioglu, 'Devletinin Araryan
Millet: Almanya Ornegi' (A Nation in Search of its State: the German Case), Toplum ve
Bilim, No.62 (Yaz-Guz 1993), pp.95-1 12.
6. George L. Mosse, The Crisis of GermanIdeology.
7. Ibid., p.6.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p.7.
10. ParthaChatterjee,Nationalist Thoughtand the Colonial World,p.2.
11. serif Mardin,'EuropeanCultureand the Development of Mcdern Turkey', Ahmet Evin and
Geoffrey Denton (eds.), Turkeyand the European Community(Leske, Budrich: Opladen,
1990), pp.13-23, esp.15.
12. Ibid., p.16.
13. NiluiferGole, ModernMahrem:Medeniyetve Ortunme(ModernPrivacy:Civilizationand the
Veil), (Istanbul:Metis Yayinlari), 1991, pp. 11-47.
14. serif Mardin,'EuropeanCultureand the Developmentof ModernTurkey',p. 18.
15. See serif Mardin, Turk Modernlemesi (Turkish Modernization), (Istanbul: Ileti?im
Yayinlarn,1991), pp. 36-37, for a review of FelatunBey and RaklmEfendiwithinthe context
of Turkishmodernization.
16. Ibid., pp.37-40.
17. aerif Mardin,'The Just and the Unjust', Daedalus, Journalof the AmericanAcademy of Arts
and Sciences, Vol.120, No.3 (Summer 1991), pp.113-29.
18. Ibid., p.114
19. Ibid., p.126.
20. Niyazi Berkes (ed.), TurkishNationalismand WesternCivilization:Selected Essays of Ziya
Gokalp(Westport,Connecticut:GreenwoodPress, Publishers,1959), p.20.
21. Ibid., p.21.
22. Ibid., p.22.
23. Ibid.
TURKISH NATIONALISM AND OFFICIAL IDENTITY 193

24. ParthaChatterjee,NattionialistThoughtand the Colonial World,pp.36-53. Chatterjeedraws

his analysis from the works of EdwardW. Said, Orientalism(New York: Vintage Books, A
Division of Random House, 1979) and Anouar Abdel-Malek, 'Orientalism in Crisis',
lDiogenes, No.44 (Winter 1963), pp.102-40. Chatterjee points to a characterizationof
Orientalismby Abdel-Malekat the level of the thematicand the problematicthat was largely
adoptedby Said.
25. ParthaChatterjee,NaJtionalistThoughtand the Colonial World,p.39.
26. EdwardW. Said, Orientailissm, p.6 (italics as in the originaltext).
27. ParthaChatterjee,Naitionzalist Thoughtand the Colonial World,p.39.
28. Ibid., p.38.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p.4 (italics as in the original text).
31. Ibid.,p.51.
32. serif Mardin,'EuropeanCultureand the Devepmentof ModernTurkey',p.20.
33. Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey(London and New York: Routledge, 1993),
p.80.
34. Ibid.
35. Eleanor Bisbee, The New Turks: Pioneers of The Republic, 1920-1950 (Philadelphia:
Universityof PennsylvaniaPress, 1951).
36. Feroz Ahmad,TheMakingof ModernTurkey,p.57.
37. Cited in Metin Heper, The StaiteTraditionin Turkey(Walkington,UK: The Eothen Press,
1985), p.52.
38. serif Mardin,'Center-PeripheryRelations:A Key to TurkishPolitics?', Daedalus, Journalof
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol.102, No.1 (Winter 1973), pp.169-91,
esp. 182.
39. Feroz Ahmad,TheMakingof ModernTurkey,p.65.
40. serif Mardin,'Center-PeripheryRelations:A Key to TurkishPolitics?', p. 177.
41. serif Mardin,'EuropeanCultureand the Developmentof ModernTurkey',p.2 1.
42. Metin Heper, 'Trials and Tribulationsof Democracy in the Third TurkishRepublic', Metin
Heperand Ahmet Evin (eds.), Politics in the ThirdTurkishRepublic,pp.231-41, esp.23 1.
43. Metin Heper, 'Transitionto Democracyin Turkey:Towarda New Pattern',Metin Heperand
Ahmet Evin (eds.), Politics in the ThirdTurkishRepublic (Boulder, San Francisco,Oxford:
Westview Press, 1994), pp. 13-20, esp. 13.
44. See Metin Heper, 'Trialsand Tribulationsof Democracyin the ThirdTurkishRepublic', and
also Metin Heper, "'lkinci Cumhuriyet"Tartimalari Uzerine; (On the Second Republic
Debates), TiirkiyeGunliug, No.20 (Guz 1992), pp.31-5.
45. NiluiferG61e, 'Towardsan Autonomizationof Politics and Civil Society in Turkey', Metin
Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds), Politics in the Third TurkishRepublic, pp.213-22, esp.213.
(italics as in the originaltext).
46. serif Mardinelaborateson this point in 'The Justand the Unjust'.