DivisionAdvisor TheJordanWaters

Coupsand Military Assistance

December 67

UNITED STATES ARMY COMMANDAND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH,KANSAS

COMMANDANT Major General Michael S. Davison ASSISTANT COMMANDANT Colonel David S. Henderson

The Military Review is pubkhed by the United States Army Command and General Staff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides a forum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, national security affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command,

.,

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

Coups. and Military Assistance FinishThem W~thFirepowar . SovietAirpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . LTC David R. Hughes, USA 3
11
16
21
26
34
41
46
56
65
12
78
85
88
97
LTC George M. Shuffer,Jr.,USA . . . John W. R. Taylor

CivicActien Purpose and Pitfalls OhisionSenior Advisor Is It Credible? . . . . . . . . . . .

LTC Hoyt R. Livingston,USA

and LTC FrancisM.Watson,Jr.,USA, Ret . . LTC RichardJ. Tallman,USA

COL H. B. C. Watkins,British Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LTC Lrvin M. Kent, USA . . . Brian Bond

Strengthin Retirement

The Indecisiveness of Modern War TheJordanWaters . . . . . . . . . . . .

COL Sidney Gritz, USA . . . . . .

SwissConceptof Defense Mobilityon the Battlefield FrenchArmoclB40 SovietGround Forces WarGaming MilitaryNotes kWlitary Books . . . . . . . . . .

LTC Robert B. Tully, USA . . . John A. Lynn

Marshal Ivan 1.Yakubovsky,Soviet Army . . . . . . . . . MAJ EdwinS. Tankins,USAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 107

TheVIEWS expressedin this maesine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessarily those of the ~ Army or the Command and GeneraStaftCollege. f

p---.,

Editor in Chief
COL Donald J. Delanay
Assooiate Editor
CO1 Thomas J. CJeary, Jr.
Army War College Assistant Editor
LTC A. Leroy Covey
Features Editor LTC Charles A. Gatzka Production Editor Helen M. Hall Sparrish.American Editor
MAJ Juan Horta-Merly
Brazilian Editors
LTC Paulo A. F. Viana
LTC Samuel T. T. Primo
Publication Oflfcer
LTC Edward A. Purcell

Art and Design

Charles A. Moirre

MfLITARY RkVIEW+ubliahed menthly by tha U. S. Arm Cemmand andGeneral StaffWege, FortLsew enwerth, Ssnsas m EnIish,Spanish, end Pmfu ese. i se of fundsfor printing of this pubtiaation has. 28 May1-. been approved ky Hea%quarfere, Department #the
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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

(Estracted from a speech by General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, US Army, New Orleans, Louisiana, 21 August 1967)

A question raised many times deals with a subject which has become known by several names-the other war: pacification,and now revolutionary development. What ia revolutionary development in our terms? It is social, political and economic development. Social progress means reducing illiteracy by constructing additional class rooms, training additional teachers, and making it possible for more youngsters in Vietnam to go to school Ad to have a longer school day
than is presently possible in many places. Social progress also includes improving health standards by building and staffing clinics and ctispen saries, and employing the other means that can raise the level of the health of the Vietnamese, particularly of the man in the rice paddy, and hi~ family. Economic development meana improving rice yields per acre, diversi fying by growing more vegetables, producing more than one crop a year from the same plot of ground where this is possible, and improving the qualityof live stock and poultry. Then main routes and farm roads must be opened so that the farmer can move his rice and other produce into the urban areas either for sale and use by the people or for export when surpluses ar$ once again produced. Opening roads and canals to enable produce to move will, of course, bring back the many other vital activities associated with commerca and industry. With regard to this social and economic davelopmant there is definite progress. More rice land is under cultivation and farmers are even going out into areas beyond the limits to which security can be assured as they work their fields. This is a clear indication of their eagerness to get back on the land and put it under cultivation. This is also an indication of the extent of government control. More people are comihg under control; and people will support their govern ment when it can provide some security for them.

Lieutenant Colonel David R. Hughes, United .Wtes Armu

The views expreseed in this arti cle are the authora and are not rzec eesatily those of the Department of the AIWW, Depwrtme%t of Defense, or the US Army Command and General Staff College.Editor. NE of the mythe revived each year in Congress during the hearings on military assistance is that US military aesietence encour ages military estahlishmente in the less-developed world to take over their governmentsby force. Therefore, the argumentgoee, US military aesiatance is a primary cause of unconstitutional kernbw 1967

changee of government throughout the world. If thie argument were true, we ehould expect to be able to verify it by taking a global survey of COUPS, dividing them into thoee which & curred in countries receiving US mili tary aeeietance and thoee which do not, and finding a general correlation of incidence of coupe and Military As sistance Programs (MAPe). How ever, we cannot, for there is no such correlation. US military assie~nce ie but one emall factor in the tendency of miHtary forcee to intervene in the political proceee in the Iese-developed 3

--MILITARY

cows
army of any type, whatever the social group from which it springs, The problem ie tyranny, not military rule, per se. And there ie no question that,, in the present age, the role of military forces in the less-developed countries is a crucial one. Whether it is for good or ill is far more a function of atti tudes and intentions than capabilities.

countries, There is as much evidence that US MAP is associated with longterm moderation of military tenden cies to so intervene ae there is to the contrary. There is evidence that other factors loom much greater in the po litical instability of less-developed na tions than outside aesistence. There is no question but thak on

CmIps and US Mllitsry AssistanceProgrmm

Total (i#10 countries) 3 (i: 7 countries) 2 6 (i~l10 countries) 31

! 961 Military AssistanceProgram, grant, cssh, and sales (over one milliondollsrs) Very smrdl Military Assistance Program (under one milIion dollars) No MilitaryAssistanceProgram 1

962 1968 1964 32 4 . .

0 so

Total

5 Figure L

principle, the United States opposes milits~ takeover of civilian govern ment. But it is equally true that the United States opposes political tyr . Lieutenant Colonel David R. Hughes ie nth the 18t Battalion, %%h Infaw tty, 25th Dtviaioni in Vietnam. A graduate of the US A?wqI War Col lege, Carlisle Barracke, Pennsylvania, he baa attended the New Zealand Staff and Tactics CoZSege, served in Korea and Thailand, was ewigrwd to the Of fice of theDeputv Chief of Staff for Operations, and was with the O&e of the Secretmw of Defw$ee where he 8STV8d as Assistant for @U??te~?h Ssbrgencg. 4 ~

We have only begun to understand that role, and to understand how it can be influenced toward supporting the broader interests of the kind of liberal demecracy we believe to be the best social order for manldnd. . Today, in the non-Communist, less developedcountries of the world, there are approximately eix million men un der arme who provide eecurity for 1.5 billion people and their 8R gover nments. By 1980, there will be two bS lion people in thoee same countries. The enormous atreeees caueed by such burgeoning populations will put these military establishment to the test of , MlIii Revise &

I
0 31 , 9s

To lpril !96J !966

1 1

MILITARY COUP3

conscience and capability as nothing has hefore. The judgment made in 1961 by Millikan and Blackmer re mains crucially important for a huge proportion of mankind. Ths military-the one traditional 8ocial order tiketg to survive the proc ese of social change-may be able to play a keg role in promoting mobility
Attempted

these nationa in facilitating change while preventing chaoe, not to speak of their role in preventing armed Com munist takeover. However, we must understand these military establishment better, and be able to tell whether a current inter vention by a foreign military group is simply part of the stresses of na

Coups snd US Mllitssy Assistsnse Programs

1961 btilitary Assistance Program (over one million dollars) Military Assistance Program (under one million dollars) No Military Assistance Program 1

1962 9

196s 3

1964
0

1965 2

Total (i: 7 countries)

(in22 countries)
o

1 . 5

1 4

s s

1 . 3

Total 2

(in65 countriee) 17

Figure 2. while maintaining .Wubilitu, in facili tating change wtie Wev&iing ehaoe. Upon the efiienqi with which the dtitnry sector am be made to per. fOTMthis rota wag hinge the succees fcd otktcome of the transition in many societiee. It might be added that the effective ness of the approximately 10,000 US miStary personnel who are in daily contact with thoee 88 military estab lishmentsis a key factor in the success of the program. Although only a lim ited number of the 88 countries re ceiveUS military aeeistence, it can be a greet aid to the military forces of Msernber 1867 tion growinz or a real indication of reacti-onaryrnSitarism. We must pred icate our military assistance as much on long-term effects on professional attitudes as well as short-term impact on a given military elite. In a speech in Montreal on 18 M&y 1966, Secretary of Defenee Robert S. McNamara revealed that there had been 164 instances of internationally significant violence in the eight years between 1968 and 1966. Fifteen, or nine percent, of theee were overt, mil itarily conventional conflicte; 76, or 47 percent, were prolonged irregular or gkerrilla-type insurgences; and 73, 5

MILITMY or

COUPS

44 percent, were relatively brief COUPS, revolts, and uprisings. All of these events were serious threats to the governments concerned. . Secretary McNamara revealed that these worldwide conflicts correlated far better with the general level of economic development of nations than

In brief, there has besn a grsat deal more political violencs going on in the world than has been generally recog nized, and much of it is associated with the must fundamental ills of transitional secieties. The newness of nations can be cor related with these figures. Between

Embaenu

of Pakistan

The US mutual defense assistanceagreementwith Pakistanmay be a factor in that countrysstability with communism or any other general factor. He found that 87 percent of the very poor nations, 69 percent of the poor nations, and 48 percent of the middle income nations suffered at least one conflict in the eight-year pe riod. Only 38 percsnt of the 149 insur gencies involved commnnism in any degree. i. 8 k. 1960 and 1966, there were 30 new na tions created. Since thsir independ ence, 22 of these have suffered con flicts and 10 have suffered military COUPS. Obviously, there is more at work here than a restive military es tablishment. In the public mind, it is the mili tary :oup which is the most conspic ,Wlitery Review . ...

MILITARY COUPS

UOUS. Actually, in the perspective of all this political instability and vio lence,it is only one part of the contlict phenomenonassociated with the proc ess of modernization. An examination of those coups which occurred since 1961 shows a little more clearly any relationship or lack of relationship with US military assistance. Worldwide, between January 1961 and April 1966, there were 31 COUPS and 17 attempted COUPS. This does not include eight in Vietnam and Laos, events which are overwhelmingly as sociated with the etruggles there. Re lation of the successful coupa to US MAP deliveries is shown in Figure 1.
No Apparent Correlation

dom analyzedattempted COUPS which failed (Figure 2). Once again, there is no correlation worth mentioning. But if great sig nificance is read into the previous table, where at least some MAP was present in 20 of the 31 coup cases, what is the significance of finding some MAP present in 11 of the 17 aborted cases ? These COUPS failed bePercent of Latin-American 6overnmenta
With Military Men aa Presidents or
Haads of State

1917-27 1927-37 1937-47 1947-57 1957-67 Figure 3.

28.7 38.5 49 45.5 27

These figurea hardly substantiate the view that MAP is the determining variable in the incidence of coups. Ac tually, COUPS occurred in more coun tries receiving little or no MAP deliveries as in countries receiving substantialassistance. If ?wegroup to gether those countriee which received some help from MAP, there are 20 coups against 11 in those that re ceived none. But a two-week orienta tion tour in the United States by four military officers from a country which is the extent of one of the small MAPehardly constitutes a major influence. If we group such very small MAP recipient countries with the no MAP countries,we find that 19 of the coupe occurred where MAP was absent or insignificant, and 12 where it was presentin eubst.sntialamounte. Either way, there is no apparent correlation of US MAP with coups which resulted in an overthrown government. This judgment is confirmed by data from a side of military takeover eelOSsmbur 1S67

cause they were successfully oppoeed by military elements loyal to their governments. Could it not be argued that it waa US MAP which armed the men who prevented COUPS ? Yes, but this would be perpetuating the came type of myth that is made by the critics of MAP. In the short term, there is no coneietent evidence that MAP ia directly coupled to the decision of military groups to over throw governments by force. Another argument advanced ie that most COUPS are from the right or from conservative elements. ThkI is broadly true, but what is seldom men tioned ia that the regime they displace may be extremist leftist to begin with, Ueually, this has resulted in a regime, not with rightest: but with moder ate, center of the road policies. Military COUPS are not a function 7

MILITARY

COUPS
power to preserve the nation as a po litical entity, the military forces have taken power tu act in a caretaker role until civil authority with popular su~ port can be reeatahlished. The democratic ideal always takes a Mow when military coups occur whether it is, on balance, good or bad, It indicates a failure of the poiitieal ,,. ; .. ... . ; . ~1:1%% ,;s4S-rm

of US miiitary ~sistarrce. Military groups the world over have taken power recently for as many and as multiple reasons as there are societal and poiitical probleme in the nations they serve. In numerous states, they have taken power only after the na tional political institutions have failed and there is a vacuum at the top, or IT.?, r)., ,. ...-~~ ,,, ., . -. ..,.

Dep@t&k of D@b South Korea has osed the US Military Assistance Progrem to prevent invasionby the Communists

there is not even 8 constitutional pro vision for an orderly change of gov ernment. Several COUPS have occurred only after extremist elements have at tempted to seize power. Others have occurred when economic and political deterioration have hecn accompanied by widespread public disorders which threaten pubiic chaos. In many in stances, where there is no other co hesive national institution with the 8

system. But we must know whetheror not we are looking at a primary cause when a military group takes power, or a symptom of causes apd ills which lie outilde the military and much deeper in the political fabric of the societies in wldch they occur. As often es not, such crises divide the military forces tbemselvw along ethni~ regional, or tribal stress iines within the eociety. Tids gives repdad emphasis to tbe fact that military , Military Rcvkw

....Ad

MILITARY COUPS

does not mean a wholly independent group within natione. Military men reflect their society. When that so ciety faile and a nation becomee di vided against iteelf, military men are generalIyobliged to follow their own conscienc~for they lack a whole en titY to Serve. @rr own Civil War dern. onstratedthie even among West point graduates. It may be that we have grosely overestimated our influence in any direction of indigenous military.
OUrer Parallels

There are certainly more striking parallelsbetween COUPS and other fec tors than with MAP. In at leaet one Latin-Americancountry, the long view reveals an astonishing parallel devel opmentof a moderate military estab lishmentwith the general political and economicmodernization of the natilon as a whole. In the first century of the independenceof this pafilcular coun try, it suffered 50 revolution which terminatedin the eeizure of power by a repressive military dictator in 1930. It was not until 1958 that he wae ousted, and it was by a military coup. The military group which ousted him eponsored a return to constitu tional government and conducted free electione. A wholly new constitution was framed while the military junta was in power. An elected civilian Pree ident took power. Since 1958, there have been no illegal cbangee of gov ernmentand the same constitution ie in force. Yet there have been three attempted takeoversinvolving military factions, two from the left and one from the right. They were all put down by the bulk of the armed forces which have remainedloyal to the government, and to their constitutional obligation, even thongh a widespread Communist inDecember 18s7

surgency hae been in progrees during the period. Is it a coincidence that thie nation ie aleo one of the per cap ita wealth~est countries which buye military equipment from the United States ? In all the literature on political development, economic modernization, and the role of the military forces in the developing countriee, there has been little comment ae to whether, in fact, military establishments parallel the political development of the na tion ae a whole-pati]cularly regard. ing their viewe toward intervention. It ie poeeible that ae natione become increasingly politically mature and de creasingly violent, so do their military establiehmente. This thesis needs sys tematic exploration.
Broader Trends

Another historical look shows that the tendency toward military rule is governed by far broader trende than can be set in motion or affected by US MAP (Figure 3). Although the United States has had military miesions in Latin America for over 30 yeere, ehe has extended military assistance to thle region only since the early 1950s. Yet this is the period in which the tendency toward military rule has dropped most dra matically. We cannot credit our own Military Asaiatance Program with this change, but certainly it cannot be argued that our aid has oppoeed come natural trend toward civil rule. But ie there euch a natural trend? Why do we aseume that isolated mili tary establishments will be any less prone to eeizing political power than once who are exposed to the attitudes of our military profession through the vehicle of MAP? It would seem that tbe woret traits of militarism could 9

MILITARY COWS

better flourish in em isolated military atmosphere where there is minimum contact with the military personnel of other nations which have successful records of subordination of military to civil rule. A case could be made that, if MAP is to be considered an influence, it is the most coup prone countries which could use this intlu ence most, not least. We should not confuse apparent US policy support for military rule with apparent US influence. There are far more powerful influ

ences at work in theee societies than outdde aid. Yet that aid can help moderate those influences. There is just enough evidence to support the theaie that our military assistance, on the whole, does help give foreign mil itary men an understanding of how powerful military establishments can exist within a democratic regime, without destroying its valuee, that it argues for continuation of such assist ance, rather than termination solely on the grounds of the old myth of COUPS and MAP.

There is etill among us an almost ineradicabletendencyto think of our security problem as being exclusivelya military problem-end to think of the mifitary problem as being,exclusivelya weapons-systemor bsrdware problem. The plain, blunt truth is that co~tempnrary man stilI conceivesof war and pesce in much tbe same stereotypedterms that his anceatoredid. The fact that these ancestors, both recent and remote, were conepicuouely un successfulat avoidhcgwar, curdenlargingpeace doesnt seemto dampenour capacity for cfichee. Secreta?y of Defense Robert S. McNamara

10

.MiliteIY Rod~

FIREPOWER

tsblished VC hideout lay astride the boundaries of Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Binh Duong Provinces and was the home of the 272d VC Regiment. It was aleo a favorite aeiembly area

Zones C and D. The 7th Army Repub lie of Vietnam (ARVN) Regiment was overrun during the latter part of No vember 1966 in the Michelin rubber plantation by Communist forces which

__=. --a-==-= _ ..____=__ ~>= _<__

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.Az+-.._=&=&.

Figure1. and way station for main force Com munist units moving between War .Ueutenant Coloasl Gsorgs M. Shuf fer, Jr., ie with the OJjiee, Depntg Chief of Staff for Milituw Opera tions, Washingtmt. A graduate of the US Armu War College, Carlisle Bar racks, Pennsylvania, he holds a B.S. degree in Militury Science and an M.A. in HistoW from the Univer sity of Mar@w@ College Park, Maqp land. His. aseignmente include duty with the MilitaW Assistance AdviaW Group in Taiwan: u commanding of ficer of the %d Batta&n, 2d Infantry, 1st Infantw Diviaian, in Vietnam; and with the Zd Field Force, Vistnam. 12 - ,. had trained, staged, and jumped off , from Lohg Nguyen. The VC throughout the area had been elueive since their defeat at Bao Bang on 12 November, and their vic tory over the 7th ARVN ~egiment. later that month. Their disappearance before the battle was especially frus trating to ue because of the casualties we were taking from mines, punji traps, local force enipere, and ths humid, dehydrating jungle during our eearch. Unknown to us at. the time, the meticulously camouflaged 272d regimental base camp waa little more than a mile south of our overnight .

Mlutlry Rahw . .~. i.,

FIREPOWER

perimeter and astride our route of ad vance (Figure 1). Meet membere of the 272d were in the base camp resting and recuperat ing from their heavy battle with the ith ARVN. Documente and captivee later identified the base camp force as being elements of two VC regi mentsthe 272d and 273d. Enemy moralewas high, although hie supplies were low because of the recent strenuous battles and the difficulty of resupplying in the short time that had lapsed since theee engagements. The battalion moved out at 0805 on 5 December. Parallel to a north-south jungle road, the battalion swept along with Companiee B and C abreeet and Company A in reeerve ae rear guard and primary ground-mo~lle reaction force (Figure 2).
Hugging Tactics

effort. The battalion command post (CP) elements were deployed thinly acrose the north flank to complete the beet perimeter defense under tbe cir cnmstancee. The refuge of numerous laterite anthills which were roughly three feet high and an arma length thick, and very rapid emall arms fire

It was almost noon before lead ele mente made contact with the VC. As they neared the base camp, the enemy, practicing his newly adopted hugging tactice, came out of hls craftily for tified camp in force to meet us. Sev eral Chinese-manufactured 12.7-milli meter machinegune covered the VC movements from tall tree-mounted platforme, Companiee B and C were pinned down instantly. Artillery promptly responded to a request for fire on the base camp. Initial analysia revealed that the VC west flank was the weakest, and Com pany A was committed in a sweep around this flank. The companys ad vance was stopped completely by stronger VC forces which it met soon sfter deploymenton C Company>e west flank. In the meantime, Company B, tak ing moderate caeualtiee, wae forced west of tke road by the VCS main kmmbor 1$37

Figure2.

by individuals, prevented large-scale, hand-to-hand combat with the VC as sault waves, The west shoulder of the road gave Company B the beet cove$ Pinned down and practically sur rounded in a dense jungle, the bat talion held and coordinated available superior firepower delivered from above the jungle canopy to win the day. The commander of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Divieion, gave the hah talion priority on all available air and artilldry fires and alerted an airmobile company from the 2d Battalion, 28th

13

.
FIREPOWER

Infantry, for movement on order to a nearby landing zone. One battery each of 106-millimeter, 8-inch, and 175 millimeter artillery, three helicopter gun teame, and 43 sorties of fighter aircraft were available. Optimum use of this formidable arsenal required careful coordination and,unmistakable

brought their wounded with them when they were forced west of the road earlier. Air Force bombs, of course, had to be dropped a safe dis tance from the road, but cluster bomb units, 20-millimeter cannon, and na palm could be used almoat to the roads east shoulder. The well-entrenchedbase camp com plex opposite Companies A and C, to gether with the tree-mounted snipers and machineguns, were engaged by ar tillery. The light artillery battery was already firing at these positions. Moreover, this areawas couth of the battalion, permitting safe and unin terrupted artillery fire from guns of all calibers at Lai Kbe farther to the south: This was accomplished simul taneously with the airstrikes. An aerial forward observer rapidly ad justed the fire. This allowed elements of Companies A and C to begin moving again.
Curtain of Fire

CUti TIRCil LIKE

\\

Figure3. description of friendly forces and target areas. Simultaneous employ ment of all of these supporting fires would produce the best results (Figure 3). The most pressing threat came from the moving multibattelion VC force east of the road endangering Company B. The Air Force fighters were ae signed this target area, suggesting that fighters stay eaet of the road to leave a clear field for the artillery to the west. Fire team leaders equipped with colored smoke grenades marked B Companys linee. Company B had 14

The armed helicopters took the north flank. Several VC infiltration groups had moved around to cut off suspected friendly reinforcements from the north and to haraes the bat talion CP ekmente. After colored smoke grenades were used to mark friendly positions, the helicopters, flying just above the jungle canopy, delivered their aerial rockets and ma chinegun fire in area coverage against the VC infiltrator. For almost four hours, the Ah Force fighters, the artillery, and the armed helicopters hung a virtual cur tain of fire around the battalion. Tbe entire area shook as the fighter bombers broke the back of the VC main attack. Ra&lo messages from Companiea A and C confirmed their assault against the heart of the base MMterf R*

FIREPOWER

camp. The battalion CP group moved close on their heele. With their ammunition exhausted and their main fighting soldiers killed or wounded, the VC broke and ran, leavingtheir dead, weapons, and equip ment scattered over the battlefield. Artillery forward observers and Air Force forward air controllers pursued them relentlessly with their tires. The brigade commander attached Company C, 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, to our battalion. It landed in a nearby land. ing zone to assist in the destruction of the base camp and to help police the battlefield. The battalion remained in the base campfor three days, destroying it and denying the Communist use of their liaison and supply route between War Zones C and D. The area was per manently scheduled for surveillance and harassing fires from the Lai Khe perimeter, On two occasions after the battle, the battalion drove off nu merous VC porters and logistic units attemptingto return and scavenge the battle site. VC casualties amounted to 301 known dead and 250 estimated dead, plus weapons, ammunition, and rice seized: US loesee were 40 killed and 104 wounded. One lesson learned was the value of indhidual infantrymen firing their

weapons rapidly and accurately during VC assaults. The first five minutes of a VC attack are the most critical, because the enemy will do hie utmost to hug You quickly to escape the fury of superior US firepower. It is important to dominate captured base camps and supply routes physi cally or by fire after a sizable battle. The VC are likely to return to their favorite areas, hoping that US forces have left. Normally, the VC will resist in force only when surprieed or to protect camps or areas vital to them. Perhaps the key lesson learned from the action was the significance of mak ing coordinated use of supporting fire power, especially when the enemy has been located and fixed. This was greatly facilitated during the battle by describing the area to observere, in cluding the location of friendly forces and targets. Squad and fire team leaders should be equipped with col ored smoke grenadee to mark friendly positions. A code for using them must be agreed on before operations. Maxi mum uee should be made of identifi able terrain features such as roads, trails, tree lines, and etreams to as eist forward observers and forward air controllers in adjusting their firee and, where possible, to fire artWery safely while using air support. .

Otwaber 1987

15

da

E 1: v@d#

From NATOS Fifteen Natioru

.,4

AIRPOWER
John W. R. Taylor !. UMERICALLY, the Soviet military aviation forces, or N Voenwo-vozdushnv Silzi (VVS), are second to those of the United States, with some 10,000 aircraft and 500,000 otlicers and men. Technically and op erationally, the combat aircraft are good but generally lese advanced than their counterparts in the West. In view of thie, it would be logical to aesume that the VVS is not pa#lcu 1arIy effective-logical and euicidal. The Soviet Union lacks etrategic. bombers in the class of the Royal Air 18 r Forces Vulcan, but she bas no need for them. Several hundred intercon tinental ballistic missiles, backed up . by larger numbers of medium-range and intermediate-range missiles, offer an effective and considerably more convenient eubetitute. The Soviet Union became involved in long-range bomber development after World War II to provide vebi clee for her nuclear weapons in the period before the task conld be given to the strategic rosket forcee. She has always preferred to regard airpower MlliteIY llevh

SOVIET AIRPOWER

as a tactical weapon at the beck and call,of ground forces, and it is in this context that one should attempt to assess the capabilities of the VVS today. Far too little is known of what So viet tactical air forces achieved in the final stages of World War II. Many in the West still believe that the ma chines produced in the Soviet Union at that time were inferior in quality and few in number. In fact, the 40,000 aircraft built there in 1944 was greater than the number built in Great Britain, Germany, or Japan. Combat types such as the Yak-9 fighter and 12-2 Stermovik ground-support air craft were second to none. Tactical Warfare Soviet airpower is geared to tactical warfare, just as it was in World War II. The weapons that the Soviet Union has supplied to more than 20 other air forces throughout the world are the type best suited to local, non nuclear warfare. Until the last two years, the ex ports consisted mainly of subsonic MiG-15 and MiG-l? jet fighters and LL28jet bombers. In Czechoslovakia, EastGerqany, and Poland, these types havebeen supplementedby supersonic Swkhoi SCL-7BS. One can expect to see these formidable, close-support fight ers in many other countries soon. The SW7B (NATO code-named Fitter) is a primary aircraft of the Soviet tactical air force which is the largest and most important compo nent of the VVS. A comparatively * This articls wza digested from the originnl, published in NA TOS FIFTEEN NATIONS (The Netherlands) June-July 1967. C@yrighted @ 1967 by NATOS FIFTEEN NATIONS. Ouemher 1587

large fighter by Soviet etandarde, the SU-7B has a wingspan of 30 feet, is 56 feet long, and has an afterburning tur bojet producing from 19,840 to 22,050 pounds of thrust. Two 30-millimeter, high-velocity cannon in the wing-roots are supplementedby underwing bombs and rocket packs. WMh a stnrdy air frame and a maximum speed of around 920 knots at altitude, the SU-7B is well qualified to maintain the hard hi~lng reputation of Soviet ground attack forces.
No Shortage

The Sez-7Bis probably far outnum bered by older MiG.s which still could do a great deal of damage in mace fighter-bomber raids. In any ease, the Soviet aircraft industry is capable of such prodigious production that there would never be a ehortage of the right kind of aircraft at the right time. Thousands of aging ZZ-28S have been replaced by hundreds of super sonic Yakovlev W]n-jet, multipurpose combat aircraft known in NATO as the Brewer. Developed from the Yak-25 all-weather fighter, they have been in service since the early 1960s and are fitted with a radar bombing system, utilizing an underfuselage scanner. Armament consists of cannon and an assortment of bombe, rockets, and other weapons. Although very little about these other weapons has been publishe~, it is logical to aesume that they in clude tactical nuclear weapons and air-to-eurface missiles of the same clase as the US BWpup and French AS.$0. However, Vietnam has demon strated the continued effectiveness of heavy cannon and rockete, and this fits in well with the Soviets liking for unsophisticated weapons. 17

SOVIET AIRPOWER

Lack of sophistication continuee to be evident when one studies closely even the latest types of Soviet air craft such as the ilfiG.21 fighter (NATO code-named Jisidwd). This single-seat, delta-wing fighter is stand ard equipment in the air defense forces, and has been supplied in large quantities to the Soviets friends. It is built under license in India and Czechoslovakia. Communist China is either building it under license or is producing a copy. When the Indian Air Force received its first MiG-21s, of the early Fishbed-C type, it reported $hat it wae faster than expected, with a speed of more than 1,140 knote at altitude. On the other hand, IndiaJ considered it deficient in range, firepower, and allweather capability. Theee shortcom ings have been remedied, in part, in the Fieitbed-D which ie now in service in Cz&hoslovakia, Poland, and India, and can be aeeumedto be the standard version for home defense. Hfwtiw RadarSystmt The intake on the Fiahbed-D housee a larger center-body, implying the in stallation of a more effective radar fire-control system. Deletion of the original cannon armament and en largement of tbe dorsal spine above the fuselage could make room for ad ditional fuel. But the normal arma ment of two Sidewhufer-type, infra red, air-to-air miesiIes (NATO codenamed Atoll) wonld seem to be light ~ current standarde. What should not be overfoolred is that the features criticized by tbe Indians reeult from tbe long-estab Iished Sovfet preference for small, highly maneuverable fighters. The MiG-21 is a pilots airplane which is easy b fly. This explains why it 18

can be supplied, without qualms, to air forces with no previous experience in flying supersonic aircraft. How. ever, it would seem to offer an inade quate defense against a determined attack by aircraft equipped with tbe latest countermeasures and standoff weapons like the British f?kw Steel, The MiG-21s larger contemporary, the Sukhot delta-wing fightar known to NATO .as Fi8hpot, bae a longer range, more powerful radar, and heavier armament. However, much smaller numbers have been built, and it does not appear that the aircraft bas been exported. PrototypesShown There ii no reason to believe that the Soviet Union intende to rely solely on miesiles for defense, anymore than she hze lost interest in tactical sup port aircraft now that she hae a large number of mobile artillery missilee. Prototypes of several advanced devel opments of the MiG-21 and Sukhoi Fiehpot were shown in Moscow in 1961, together with two new Ye.koidcv twin-jet, long-range fighters (NATO code-named FW.lEF>. The Fiddler was developed for the primary purpose of intercepting air craft like the Vulcan before it could launch standoff weapons. A massive nose radar, a huge underfuselage aux iliary fuel tank, and two outsize air to-air missiles show that it has not, inherited the MiG-21e shortcomings. In fact, with an estimated speed of around 1,000 knots, it looked like the meet formidable bomberdestroyer ever eeen up to that tim+providcd it had the support of efficient eerl~ warning radar on the ground and that ite own eearch and fire control radar could penetrate the countermeasures screen around its target. . Militsry ReW A?&

spaceprobes with the remarkable suc cess achieved by US Marimem. The !Fupotew supersonic bomber (NATO code-namedBlinder) was aleo first displayed in 1961. A unique air craft, it has two enorrnoua turbojets mounted above the rear fuselage on each side of ite tail fin, giving it a maximumspeed of around 860 knote. It eeemed to refute Niklta S. Kbru ahchev% statement that the Soviet Unionwas building no more etrategic bombers, having switched entirely to
Dcaember 1967

tegic bombing duties, but should not be regarded as a major threat in com parison with the Soviets Intercon tinental Ballistic Miseiles and Inter mediate Range Ballistic Mkeiles. The once-projected successor of these aircraft, the giant Myasishchev delta-wing supersonic bomber (NATO code-named Boundsr), seen in 1961, would be an anachronism today. It is aesumedthat it servee as a research and development aircraft, like its US counterpart, the XB-70. 19

---SOVIET AISPOWER

Another seeming anachronism, the Berie~ Be-lo twin-jet flying-boat (code-named Mallow) might have its uees for maritime patrol and antisub marine duties. In particular, its speed of more than 476 knote would enable it to operate with killer submarines, over short ranges, to forestall attack by Polaris submarines in the initial stages of a conflict. But it is doubtful if the Soviet Navy would rats it very highly for this difficult task. The Soviet Army continues .to put great faith in ite parachute troope, and the 1,000 transport aircraft op erated by the aviation of airborne troope includes hundreds f four-an gine-turhoprop An-12s ( $ ATO codenamed Cnb). Each can carry and air drop scores of fully equipped para troops, or up to 20 tons of supplies,

vehicles, guns, and other freight. It cruisee at 330 knots. Among Soviet helicopters, the larg est is the ML1O flying crane (NATO code-named Hav%), blg enough to carry the largest helicopter yet flown in the West. The smallest ia the Kavnoo Ku40 (NATO code-named Harp) which is used for antisubmarine du ties from platforms on small ships. In between are other turbine-pewered helicopters ae advanced as any in tbe world. The Soviet Air Force must stili be regarded as a highly potent tactical force, even if its strategic role has passed to the long-range rocket forces. This should be quite apparent at the next Moscow airshow.*
Seenfflltaw Note.44M.sc.w Air Show. lfi/i t,wvii13iCW, October 1967,m 196-197.

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Mi!iifyReview .-4

CIVIC ACTION: ose and Pitfalls

Lieutenant Colonel Hoyt R. Livingston, Umted Stotee Armu and LieutenantColonel Francis M. Watson, Jr. United State8 Armu, Retired

.
HE term civic action has been applied to a host of activities. Some have achieved success; others have failed to accomplish any worth while objsctive. US units have epent money and manpower on almoet every kind of useful project. There is Iit tle doubt that we have done a tre mendous amount of good in the proc ess, hut there is equally little doubt that we have done harm too. The reason ie simple. We have grabbed the outer trappinge of ,a eound society improvement idea and have put it into practice without tiret making cure we had all the parts or that we thoroughly understood how to make them function. Joint Chiefe of Staff Publication 1, Dictienmv of US Militaw Terme for Joint Usage (JD) has defined civic eetion as: The u88 of preponderafitlu indi9e ~

Decernher 1967

21

CIVIC ACTION

now militarp fercea on project8 use ful to the local population at aU levets in such fields w educatien, training, public worke, agriculture, traneport~ tiCTC,Communication, health, aanita timc and others contributing to eco nemic and social development, which would aleo serve to improve the etaud tng of the milita~ forces with the poptdatien. The evidence is that, in spite of interdepartmental agreement on the definition of the term, military civic action has come progressively cloeer and cloeer to meaning anything that any soldier or unit does for the peoLieutenant Colonel Hoyt R. Living ston is aeeigned to the $5 Section, Headquarter, US European (Xwn mand. Prior to go@g to Europe, he was Director of Instructimt, US ArmU Civil .iffaiT8 School, Fort Gordon, Georgia. He and Colonel Watsen were teammatee on a Department of the Arrntt-eporwored trip to etudg the non combat acpect8 of the conflict in Viet nam. Colonel Living8ten eerwed iu Eu rope during World War II, and hokfe a B.S. in Economic8 from North western University, Evanston, Illinois, and an Bf.A. in Interaationai Rekt tione from Oklahomn State Vnivereity at Stillwater. Lieutenant Colenel Francis M. Wat eon, Jr., US Army, Retired, ia field representative at the Special Wavfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for the American Vtiiversitys Center for Re8earch in social Sy8tenw. Prior to hie reti~ement in 1966, he was asmgm?d to the Special Warfa?e and Civit Affaire Group, US Army Com bat Development Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginin. He served over8eaa in World War II and durrng the Ko rean Cenffict, and hoki8 B.S. and M.A. degree8 from the Vniver8itw of Geor gin, Athene. n k.

pie that appeare M the time and to the doer to be good for them. One military advieor in Vietnam sum marized the common misconception rather succinctly: Civic action is dc gnodism and PSYOP is advertising do-goodism.
Weapon of War

Civic action was prop?sed as one of the techniques for preventing or countering subversive insurgency. It ie not a public or community relations techniqne designed eimply to improve relatione between US forces and civilians among whom these forces happen to be operating or living. It ie not do-goodism. It ie not charity or an outlet for our emotione. Civic action is a weapon of war and, to be effective, it requires the same ac curacy, coordination, and support given any other weapon. If im properly handled, it can behave like any other mishandled weaponit can biow up in our faces. In the light of the original concept, it is the wrong approach to have some one write back home and say that X-battalion in Vietnam %vants to do come civic action, eo they need ee and-so; or ray brigade in Korea thinks it can help the people at . . . . In the deadly serioue businese of try ing to maintain a climate of order in the modernization of developing areas of the world, none of ue has any right whateoever to tamper with the minds, cnstoms, or material well being of a people simply because we want to, or becauee we thhk we can help them. Unfortunately, many of the same people whose combat maneuvere are planned, coordinated, and executed with sk~lland fhmme will allow a non

R$vla Mllitcry

.d

CIVIC ACTION

combat operation like civic action to be entered into haphazardly. Some al lowit to be used in ways and to ends that unwittingly make the task of countering insurgency more difficult. The civic action theory is not to he blamed. It really does not involve vaguetechniques upon which the aver age officer or noncommissioned officer is apt to flounder. In fact, civic actilon is based on commonsense principles of human relations that are really quite obvious. Like most other activities, bowever, if it is to work at all, it must be carried out with as much precision as time and circumstances will permit. It does have subtleties that require it to be staff planned and. commandcontrolled.
Improve Situations

that can be done with materials avail able in the local area and with skills that are present among the indigenous military forces. We tend to be too fascinated with materials which are often far too difficult for the people to obtain or replace. Our methods often are too sophisticated for the

Civic action involves making im provementsin the situations of people who have less than we, but it means doing so without injecting materials or methods into their lives that the people cannot, or will not, adopt for their own. It involves helping people see that progress toward a better life in a modern world can be made without sacrificing their chancee for building a free government. But it means helping them to do so without attracting so much attention to our selves that the. gratitude and Ioyalty of the people flows to us rather than to the government we are trying to help them build. Herein usually lies tbe most difficnlt part of the entire civic action effort. Our first priority in military civic action should be to sell the idea to the forcee we are advising. The forces carry out the action and they receive the credit. This is another difficult part of the civic action job. We should select as many projects as poesible Owember 1s87

A US Army instructor teaches well. , drilsingtechniqueste Honduransoldiers who will Iatsr be involvedin civic action people or their soldiers to use or to continue after we leave the areato say nothing of how they are going to repair or to get spare parts for some of the gadgets we have provided. We cannot expect technical precision that cannot be realistically met or sus tained. We must base our help on sound and thorough knowledge of the wants, needs, and capabilities of the local people in their own environment 23

.,

..,vT..=,=,a..--=.+L

-..

CIVIC #CTION

rather than on a mental transposition of these people and their problems to our own home situations. We cannot let a hasty familiarization with the area and people substitute for the type of thorough etudy which we make when we, are concerned simply with terrain and tactics. why not use troop ieadmg proce dure for civic atilon? Analyze the

wai~~ng for materiale is woree than no Project at all. HOWdoes our mili tary-sponsored civic action project mesh with programs of other agen. ties ? Might we as soldiers be advo cating the building of classrooms which will be empty for lack of teach ers and books? Such questions as thes% and many more, must be con sidered if civic action is not to mis

mission and study the situation. What workz for the delta may have to be modified when ueed on the eoastel plain; what works for the violence area of Colombla may backfire in the Congo. Study the weather and eea sons and what restrictions they im pose on the people. During the her veet, for example, farmers cannot usu ally spare time to contribute labor to a civic action project that doee not help get in the crops. Study the people and their leaders. Doea what they want have priority over what we want for them? What about materials and the transportation to move materials and equipment? A half-eompletsd project 24

fire. One question sbmdd be examined in more detail. What is the mission? The miesion of military civic ec tion as defined by JD is to improve conditions for the people, but it pre vides that this will be done in a way that also improves the peoples opin ion of their own military forces. Such provisos are not unusual in military miseion statement. A commander is often told that be will conduct his operations in a manner that will per mit the achievement of objectives other than obvioue]y phyeieel ones. Failure to do so can be considered failure in the aecompliehment of his mission even though he seized a par ticular,target area. Militafy Reviw

CIVIC ACTION

Unilateral civic action by US troops doesaffect the chances for accomplish ing the basic miseion of improving the lot of the people in a manner that increases their, faith in constituted government.There is even the danger that assistance directly from US units to the people may actually create dis satisfaction toward the indigenous military forces, and hence their gov e~nment.One Vietnamese peasant put this into chilling words: Why are the Americansoldiers so good to us while ohr own government and soldiers do nothing for us ? This is not to say that the American should never con duct civic action unilaterally. Again, he must consider each situation sep aratelyand understand the particular probleminvolved. A1tkoughthe basic mission of civic action always remains the same, the situation on the ground may force temporary variations. A US unit, ac tively fighting the Viet Cong, may havean overriding reason for gaining the attention of the local villagers momentarily-to get intelligence, or to separate the people from the Com munists initially. Unilateral civic ac tion may be the only answer and its mission varies accordingly.

Even here, however, a local Viet namese official or military officer should become a part of the project as soon as possible. The US com mander who becomes involved with the loyalties of the people does so at great peril and must limit his involve ment to the absolute minimum. Civic action is a tool designed to strengthen, not weaken, the ties of the people with their government. Tbe over-all objective of civic ac tion in the developing countries is to help these nations toward moderni zation or toward attaining economic and political responsibility without destroying them in the process. Such high-flown terme as politics and economics describe the workings of humble systems of which the US sol dier becomes a part the moment he sets foot on their ground. This is par ticularly true in the societies w~ch are far less complex than our own. Perhaps the first civic action project we should undertake is to see that the US soldier understands the entire picture. We can then look toward his and his units supervised participa tion in a planned civic action program designed to accomplish the basic civic action mission.

December1957

25

DIVISION

Lieutenant-Colonel RichardJ. Tallman, Uaited State8 Armu

HALLENGING, exciting, pre feseionally rewarding, and, oc casionally, frustrating-theee adjso tives describe tbe position of a US senior advisor to a Vietnamese divi sion. A colonels assignment, it is sirnIilar to other military advisory jobs in Vietnam, yet it is unique. Even his immediate supervisor, the corps senior advisor, does not ax@erience responsi bilities of the came type. He is simul taneously a US troop commander,roil-. itary advisor to a foreiga general, civil administration advisor, and am bassador of the United States, all in a battlefield environment. The division eenior advisor cbm mands an advisory team that may vary in size from elightly less than 200 @ more than 400 US Army officers and men. These highly trained personneI are distributed over the dNision tzc , 2s -da

Military ROVI

ADVISORS tical.area (DTA) which normally in cludes several thousand square miles of enemy-infeatedterrajn. The bound aries of the DTA correspond to pro vincial borders and usually include two or more provinces. Each province is calleda secto;, while districts within each province are referred to as subsectors. The chart shows a typical di vision advisory team organization.
Command Authority

The senior advisor has full com mand authority over hie entire team. Therefore, he is responsible for the welfare, performance, and conduct of each member. Advisory personnel live near and work with their respective Vietnamese counterparts and accom pany them on all military operations. As a result, subordinate advisory teams are usually spread over the en tire DTA. Proper command supervi sion and adequate administrative eup port are difficult. For these purposes, the senior advisor must rely heavily on radios and helicopters. Although advisors at the lower ech elonsoften live and operate in remote areasfor long periods, the division ad visory teath maintains one or more largecompoundswhere advisors at the higher, more centralized level live. Lieutenant Colonel Richard J. Tal& manis commander of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 601et Infantcy, Iolst Air bern.e Division, Fort Campbell, Ken tucky. A graduate of the US Army War CoUege, Carliele Barraoks, Penn sylvania,his aesignmente include duty in Korea with the $d In fantw Divi sion; with the 8th Infant~ Division in Europe; ae Depnty Senior Advisor, 22d InfantW Division, Army Republic of Vietnam; and with the Ofice of the Depaty Chief of Sta# for Penwmnel, Department of the Armg, Washington, D. C. t krnhar 19S7

Theee compounds provide billets, laun dry, mese, post exchange, barber shop, and club facilities, and they serve as a home base for the lower echelon teams. In these compounds, scores of indigenous personnel are employed to operate the many activities. The proper conduct of these activities, rep. resenting transactions amounting to tens of thousands of dollars monthly, is another of the senior advisors com mand reeponsibllitiee. He must be concerned, too, with the security of these compounds.Vietnam. eee officials aesist in counterintelli gence screening of employees, and Vietnamese troops assist in the phys ical guarding of compounds. Never theless, the proper use of these serv icee and troopsthe actual security of his men, equipment, and facilities is a continuous problem for the senior advisor. Through command of his over-all advisory team, the division senior ad visor is able to influence the actions of key Vietnamese officials through out the DTA. The more effectively he accomplishes his command responei- bilities, the more effectively he can ac complish his advisory rolee.
Military Advisor

The division senior advisors pri mary assigned rale is that of military advisor. Here, he is concerned with tbq entire scope of military operations. Training, planning, intelligence opera tions, logistics, psychological warfare, civic action, and combat operations are in progress constantly throughout the DTA. The senior advisors counterpart ie the Vietnamese division commander. Their relationship is similar to that be~een eenior advisor and com mander at any level. ,In most cases, 27

ADVISORS

the advisor is junior in rank to his advi~ee; however, regardless of their relative rank, the advisor has no direet authority over the commander. In all cases, the Vietnamese com.mander bears the direct burden of reaponaibility for the performance of his unit. The advisor mnst sense an

proper conduct of military operations over which he has no command au. thority? He has two channels by which be can exert influence. One is the Vietnamese command channel through his counterpart, the division commander; the other ia his own advisory channel. Effective use of the Vietnamese

NPICA1 DIVISION ADVISORY

SfNIOR AOVISDR

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OEPUIV SENIOR AOWSOR

1
DSJSIDN ARTILLERY iIOVISORV TSAM

AiNVSDZS 10 OIVISID& SEPARATE SATTAIIONS, ANO COMPANIES (SPICIAL STAFF ADvISORS)

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ARIILLIRY SAllALION AOVISDRY TSAM

REGIMfNTAL
AOVISDRY TSAM

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equal responsibility, but he must have the courage to stand in the shhdows. From there, he should observe, sug gest, encourage, and assiat, but he must not interfere. Such a position de mands great empathy, tremendous pa tience, and a selflees dedication to duty. How can a division senior ad visor fulfill his responsibilities for the 28. k.

channel depends, in the main, on s rapport between advisor and advises. It ia a situation that can be a sourcs of profound frustration and also of rewarding achievement. In meet cases, it produces both. The advisor must earn tbe respect of his counterpart by demonstrating professional conY petence in every way, by K]a actions and by lds expressions. The advisor *
Miiitwy RwW .,,.. L..,A

ADVISDRS

must be persuasive and tactful. He must be respectful, yet he must not be fawning. He must appreciate the fact that his counterpart has played a continuous role in this struggle for years, perhaps as long as two decades. The advisor ,nmst consider the en vironment of political intrigue which surrounds and influences his advisee.

He has a responsibility to insure that military assistance funds, represented in the arme and equipment of each Vie@amese unit, are being used prop erly. The Vietnamese commander nor mally understands this and is usually receptive to advice from this direction. He represents air support. Friendly combat operations in Viet-

As the advisor develope empathy for the commander, he learns that there are reasona, often never expressed, frequentlynever understood, but there a~ reaaonswhy a certain suggestion mayhave been rejected. He learns not to let frustration become despair. To asaiet him in this persuasive effort, the divieion senior advieor has Certaintools at hand. . He represent the United States. owrber 1967

nam are almost universally dependent on some form of air supPort. Whether it is command and control, troop lift, supply, medical evacuation, or fire support, US Army helicopter and tac tical air support normally are ob tained hy Vietnamese commanders through coordination with their US advisors. This high degree of control over ajr support providee the division senior advisor an important entry 29

. ...

ADvfsons
into the planning and execution phases of Vietnamese combat operations, par ticularly the frequently employed air mobile operations. With this entry, the advisor is better able to inject his influence effectively into all areas. The helicopter is the senior advisors greatest tool; with it, he can assist bia counterpart to supervise, control, support, and deploy his command. This tremendous asset makes the advisor 8 welcome partner.
Influence Counterparts

Uss of advisory channels to influ ence tbe Vietnamese military endeavor depends, in turn, on the capability of subordinate advieore to influence their counterpart. Here, it is important for any senior advisor to realize that a subordinate advisor will have little success selling a point to his coun terpart if the senior advisor was un able to, sell it at his own level. Advisory channels must be used intel-. ligently and tactfully. The advisory ef fort should be consistent at all levels, but it is a delicate instrument. It must never undercut nor preempt the com manderte do so would certabdy fos ter resentment and destroy rapport. The best advisory results come from the simultaneous, coordinated use of both Vietnamese command channels and advisory chsnnels. when he does this, the division senior ad visor insures that his thoughts are interpreted properly as they are trans mitted through his counterparts or ganization. Subordinate advisors are able to evaluate and reinforce the ad visory effort at all levels. The division senior advisor, in this role se military adfisor, can assiet Vietnamese commanders to achieve unity in their operations within the DTA. Of pa~lcular interest is the re- ,.

lationship between the division com mander and tbe province chiefs whoas provinces comprise the DTA. Whereas the division commander clearly com mands hbi division, and oeeeeionally certain attached units, he does not have command authority over provin cial troops. Each province chief, normally a Vietnamese Army lieutenant colonel, commands a eiasble military and para military force. As a military com mander, the province chief is called a sector commander. Hie sector bound. aries coincide with the geographic borders of the province. Further, the province is divided into a number of districts referred to militarily se sub. sectors. The district chlefe, in their miiitary capacities, are known as sub sector commanders, and they report directly to the eector commander. into Regional Force (RF) companies snd Popular Force (PF) platoons. The province chief, as the sector com mander, commands all provincial RF and PF units. Moat PF platoons and some RF companies normally are made available to the subsector commanders for the seeurity of towns and vitlagcs within the subsectors. Others are re tained dlraetly under the sector corn. mander to guard key areas or serve as central reserves. The number of RF and PF unite varies among prov inces, but the cumulative personnel strength of provincial forces within a DTA may well exeaed the strength of organic division troops. The division commander has .a gen eral responsiblfity for coordinating military operations witbin the DT& but his responsibilities in this regard are somewhat emblguous. The sector .
Organization Provincial of Forces forces are organized

ao

Mllibry q J

ADVISORS

commanders,in their broader roles as provincechiefe, are the civil governors of their provinces. For many of their governmental functions, they report directly to the corps commander who also is a civil administrator and the direct supervisor of the divieion com mander. The division commander, on the other hand. is mimsril~ a rnilitar~

advisor. They must be perceived and accepted voluntarily. The division eenior advieore re sponsibilities extend deeply into the civil administration side of Vietnam ese activity. Ttieee responeibilities etem from two circumstances. First, his subordinates at the sector and subsector levels are intimately associated with civil government and adminie-

Advisory persennel live near and werk with thsir Vietnsroese cermterpartsand accompany themon miIitary operations man, not a full-fledged civil governoy as are the district chiefs, the province chiefs,and the corps commander. This setsthe etige for conflicting intereste betweendivieion commander and prov ince chief. Thro~gh hk advisory or ganization,the division senior advisor frequentlycsn detect such conflicts as theydevelopand can emooth out prob lems before they become serious. These responsibilities are not for mallysesigned to any division senior Becemher 1987 tration. Second, he is the senior US mission representative in the DTA. As such, he must aesume responsibil ity for the effectiveness of the over-all US advisory effort in that area. This ie true whether the US ad vieors at subordinate levels are for mally hk subordinates, whether they are soldiers or civiliane, or whether their advice is primarily military or essentially civilian in character. In the minds of come observers, the divi 31

ADVISORS

sion ttenior qdvisors contribution to civil administration is even more im portant to the counterinsurgency struggle than are his purely military oWlgatione.* At the division level, all US advisors are military, and they all are under the senior advisors command. Since the Vietnamese division commander

provinces must look to COIIPS level for the formal supervision and guidance that is provided from within their own agencies. However, the division senior ad visor, since he is the senior US mis. sion representative in the area, muet assume automatically a responsibility for the over-all advisory performance

US Anw

PKMI

The Vietnamesecommanderbears tbe direct responsibilityfor the performanceof his unit is not a civil governor, he is provided no US civilian advisors such as those representing the US Agency for In ternational Development or the United States Information Service. Thk means that US civilian advisors in the
Phumrti.1. w- written m% to the imr+e mentat$.. bY the ArmY of Vietnam of the 1967 Bevolutio.ur Dwehmme.t Pmgrqt. and the inte

urati.n of the Ua civilian and mditarr adviaorr efl.rt i. Bwv.k of rev.lutlonnrr dwel.pment and does not reflect some oranizsti.nal changes ad chamrfa in rfam..fbilities. The r.rincildes dismsmd msi. valid.

there. In the course of supervising his sector advisors, he makee-frequen~ contact with the province chiefs ci vilian advisors. He has no formal, di rect authority over these personnel, but he should have a sincere interest in their progrema and theif relation ships with the sector and subsector advisors. Indeed, it is normal for ths provincial civilian advisors to leek to the division eenier advieor for geid ., Mllit8ry RowL .. .. . . . . . .. .. .. .....+.*. A

ADVISORS

ante and to solicit hk advice in the blending of various advisory pro grams. . The division senior advisor must be alert to indication of conflicting in terests among the different US repre sentatives in the provinces. He must insure that thdir operations are ceer dinated and compatible. Differences arise occasionally, but the division senior advisor can resolve most of them if he recognizes and discharges his over-all responsibilities. In this role,he mnet appreciate all aspects of the counterinsurgency struggle. His obligations in the process of develop ing a stable, effective, and popular governmental ayetem must not be overlookedin pursuit of his military responsibilities. Inescapably, the division senior ad visor is a ds facto ambassador of the United States. This is a role played by all US officials serving in a foreign land,However, the role bas added em phasis in Vietnam, particularly at the Vietnamese division level. Here, the senior advisor is cloee enough to the peopleto be exposed literally to tens of thousands of indigenous personnel in the most remote areas. At the same time, he has the closest contact with high-rankingVietnamese on both offi cial and personal bases. The senior advisor represents the UnitedStates at countless ceremonies

and social functions and ie often the host. Frequently, he ie required to accommodate and entertain officials from allied natione, other than South Vietnam, as they visit the DTA in a variety of. capacities. His obligations regarding the official entertainment of foreign nationals is recognized by the fact that he is allowed to draw rep resentation funds for that purpose. In addition, the division seqior ad visor is designated a subarea coordi nator. As such, he ie reqnired to ac count for US civilian nationals wbo live, work, etudy, and travel in tbe DTA. He is required to maintain roe ters of these personnel, to know their location, and to plan for their safety and evacuation under various emer gency conditions. Added to his officially assigned re sponsibilities, the division senior ad visor, along with all of hie team, is a goodwill ambassador. Tide is a t~ ical role played for years by US serv icemen the world over, and always with particular vigor where suffering is the greatest. They sponsor orphan ages and sanitariums; they contribute to local charities; and they visit hos pitals. They make toys and teach chil dren new games. They do these things, and more, in their individual methods of ehowing the nature of their demo cratic way of life in stark contract to that of the insurgent terrorists.

Becernber 1s67

33

..

#@# ml; .

v~l!%om

JourndoftheRU$f

(Great Britain)

#
Colonel H. B. C. WatkinsjBritish Armu I

ECAUSE all strategic thought in the world is dominated by the existence of powerful deterrent forces, the greateat single factar in any @it ico-military situation today is the credibility of the threats or policies of the governments involved. Quite simply, the maintenance of peace and tbe prosecution of successful policies are dependent upon a nations ability to parsuade its opponente and ite al. lies that it maans what it says. There is nothing new about this. However, because the consaquencas of making

a warlike gesture can now lead to dis aster for all mankind, the establish. ment of a policys credibility has be come a dWicult and complex business., The great power of annihilation which both East and West now possess makes it difficult for either side to persuade other nations that they will , press a point of conflict to the bitter end. It is, therefore, of the first im portance that both soldiers and pufiti ciane should be able to analyae the factors which affect crdbility. At the risk of causing grave offenss . !Wtary Rmbe ,&

94

IS IT CREDIBLE? to mathematicians, the formula shown

in the chart is offered as a means of csrrjbw out such an analysis. T3ds short study is mainly concerned with the military aspects of the problem. However, eince economice, politice, and military power are the eseential ingredients of. strategy, and because their relative importance in any given strategic situation is dependent upon the circumstances of the moment, somepolitical comment ie unavoidable. I

political situation, its national char acteristics and way of life, and its record as a fightilngrace, all these and many other facets of the image seen by the world affect a nations prestige. It is important to realize that no two nations will see a country through the same eyes. For each, the various elements of a national image will carry different weighte. Britains ex tensive interests in tbe Pereian Gulf area will be of far more significance Strength + Presence Reaction time

Credibility = Prestige X

I
Before demonstrating the applica tion of the formula, it is important that the meaning of each of the phrases or words which have been used to construct it should be defined and understood. The meaning of credibility hae al ready been established. The first and most important element in its makeup is prestige. National prestige may spring from a variety of factors. It is something which is very finely balanced. A few careless words or an ill-considered act can undo the work of many months, or even years. A nations military and economic strengthe,its current and historic ree ordsof political integrity, ite domestic Thk article wae digeeted f70m the orrgind, publtslwd in the JOUSNAL OF THE ROYALUNITEP s~vrcE lN@TITUTIoN (Gveat Brituin) May 1967. Cop@ghted @) 1967 by the JOUSNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SESVICE INSTITU TION. Colonel Watkine b in the Mil& ?AN11 Operations Directorate of the Mini&-g of Defenee. DUr4sb6r 1937
1

I I

to the Sheikhs of the Trucial States than the size or efficiency of her con tribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To the West Germans, the exact opposite would apply. In spite of the machinations of those who oppose Britain, she still enjoys considerable prestige in many of the less-developed areae of the world where she has acquired a repu tation for just and responsible stew ardship and for fair dealing. Prestige is a constantly varying factor. Its value must be carefully weighed in direct relation to a patilcular problem or eet of circumstance. Prestige is not enduring. The stead fastness and courage of the people in two World Ware have given a certain quality te Britahs national image. By demonstrating that Britons were prepared to risk their entire national future and to forfeit much of their economic prosperity in the cause of freedom, and by showing that they would etsnd fast in the face of seem ingly impossible odds, they acquired great prestige ae champions of the right., 35

IS IT CREDIBLE?

TIds reputation was shared by the nations of the Commonw~althand the Empire. Such countries as Australia and New Zealand, in spite of their tiny populations, achieved such prodi gies of valor and steadfastness that their stature grew out of all propor. tion to their economic significance. Their name still stands high in the councils of the world. In spite of recent difficulties, Brit ain continues to enjoy a rather special position in international affairs, to which neither her present economic, military, or political strengths would of themselves entitle her.
1 Economic Strength I Turning from prestige to the next

an important ingredient of military power. Prosperity givee a nation the ability to sustain military measures. In any strategic situation, the degree of strength required falle logically into two halves-that which is needed to produce immediate results in tbe area of conflict; and the reserves avail able to reinforce success or to counter a reverse. Thus, it might well be that a very small force, readily available, is sufficient to produce success in the short term. However, for that success to be maintained will often involve police action by a substantially larger force over a long period.
thiestion of Presence

factor, strength, there are a number of strengths which can affect a etrategic problem. Reverting to the comparison made earlier between Brit ains relationships with the Trucial States and with one of her NATO partners, in the first instancet eco nomic strength is a far greater factor - than either conventional or nuclear power. In the latter, the two will be much more closely baianced in im portance. Granted that a state of nuclear parity or near-parity exists, the coun try which is best able to support its policies worldwide is the one which possesses the most mobile and effec tive conventional forces. The word ef feotive is used advisedly and should not be confused with powerful or larg est. Thus, in the formula, the word strength presupposes a state of nu clear parity and could be taken to mean etfeetive conventional capabil ity where military strength is in tended. Economic strength is not only a lo cal factor of great significance, but 36

Let Us now consider the question of presence. This again can be pre dominantly economic or military either may be desirable, according to the circumstances. Because of the risk of escalation, the deterrent value of even a small military force can be out of all propotilon to its actual military capacity. The mere act of placing ones troops in such a position that an intending aggreesor must come into physical conflict with them, if he pursues his aggressive intentions, is one of the best safeguards against war. On the other side of the coin, it is often the commercial presence which is the key to the maintenance of good relations in certain areas. In such circumstances, pressure can best be brought to bear by the threat of a withdrawal of that presence or of eco nomic aid upon which the other na tion is relying for much of its pros perity. Oneof the most potent factors in the equation ie the reaction time. A natione ability to take decisive and immediate conventional action is a *
Militery Rwiml

IS IT CREDIBLE?

critical element in the credibility of its deterrent policy. The military problems associated with such a situation are largely those of movement. The political ones ,are prodigious. When considering such operations as the supp&sion of an insurrection

iness in the United Kingdom and over seas, have all helped Britain to pro duce a faster military response. The political obstacles remain un changed. All the material advantages gained by military improvements in Britains readiness can be thrown to

or the movement of troops to deter aggressive action, the military prob lemie either one of immediately rein forcing an existing military preeence or of quickly establishing a new one. Emphasis upon the air transportabil ity of equipment and the establish ment of a large air traneport fleet, snd the maintenance of forces at read D8comhw19S7

the winds if the political response is too slow. That she is able to achieve a quick political response has been proved by evente. Probably the most remarkable of all strategic snccesses in recent years was the US victory in the Cuban cri sis. Takhrg advantage of the serious lose of face suffered by the United 37

thrent to the US mainland and to the countries of Central and South America. Widle it is not to be considered that the Soviets ever eeriously con templated using these weapons and troops against the United Statae, their very presence formed a lever by which pressure could be exerted in international negotiations and in the rough and tumble of the cold war. 30

able. Soviet satellites had won the ad miration of the world while US space efforts seemed modest in comparison. To the man in tbe etreet, it looked as if the same could be said about re search in outer space. In Europe, the Soviet forces bad been steadily improving their equip ment and all-round capability. In the political sphere, the memory of the U-2 incident wae still fresh. . MlliiIyRoviw d

IS IT CREDIBLE?

Turning to the question of strength, a rather different picture is presented. The strength involved in thk issue was purely military. There were few, if any, important economic issues at stake. Because Cuba is an island many thousan~s of miles from the Soviet Union, and because the em ployment of Soviet troops based in Cuba could only be in the internal security or anti-invasion roles, their conventional contribution to the sit uation was limited. At best, it could be said that their presence was a de terrent to insurrection. In the formula, strength was de fined as effeetive conventional capa bility. And to be deemed effective, forces must also be mobile. Thus, while it could be argued successfully that the Soviet truops in Cuba were effectively suppressing Fidel Castros domestic.enemies, they were power less to influence any moves which might be made by the United States, short of actual invasion. Mdl Is Called President John F. Kennedy reacted extremely fast once it had become clear that words would achieve noth ing. By establishing the blockade on Cuba and by etanding fast when the Soviets endeavored to force the ring, hedrove them into a position in which there were only two rational courees opento themto abandon Cuba or to declare war. In the tense situation which already existed, the risk of nu clearwarfare developing from the lat tsr course was clearly unacceptable to the soviets. Their bluff had been called. By estz$lishing a conventional mil itary presence in the area of dispute with minimum delay, President Ken nedyhad vi~ually won his battle beDersmber 1967

fore the Kremlin had time to realize what had happened. The sequel, of course, involved a substantial loss of face for the Soviet Union. It is in the terms of the effect upon their prestige at home and abroad that the victory must be measured. To recapitulate on this situation, and bearing the formula in mind, the Soviet prestige value at the outset was high, but their conventional power and their presence were limited in their application. Because of this, their reaction time was very slow.
Conventional Strength

On the US side, a solid, if slightly tarnished, prestige was powerfully boosted by considerable conventional strength which was able to operate effectively. The fact that this strength was airborne and seaborne and oP erating on external lines gave the United States a substantial presence in the area. This was helped by the at the United States was op fact erating from secure home bases. The critical factor, the US reaction time, was very fast, thus greatly adding to the value of the product of the rest. Great Britain is now acquiring the mobility needed to enable her to re act effectively in almost any brush fire type of situation with which she is likely to be faced. But strength and the ability to create or reinforce a military presence are inextricably iy volved with the question of prestige. Britain must concentrate upon build ing up her national prestige world wide. In every country, the problem will be different, depending upon the past relationship. Today, prestige must be won and maintained by positive action. Much of this will take place in the political and economic fields. Although it may

IS IT CREDIBLE? be admirable to avert

major war by

means of a lightning mifitary re sponse on a limited scale, the growth of Britains prestige is dependent upon a constant improvement in the general image she presents to the world. Military action is, after all, but an extension of government policy. It is interesting to consider the pol icy of the United States toward those less fortunately piaced. One has only to cast ones mind back to the major natural disasters of the last 15 years or so to realize how the United States. hee seldom missed an opportunity to be firet on the scene, bringing substan. tial phyeical eupport to the stricken area. In spite of vaet defenee budgets and the burden of the Vietnam war, the United States has continued to produce large eums of money and large quantities of good equipment at very competitive prices for newly de veloping countries. Thus, in spite of the war in Vietnam, the aepeet of the US image which is still most com monly eeen is that of a great and gen eroue economic power rather than a military colossus. One eometimes wonders whether even now the extent of the US military might ia fully ap preciated except, fortunately, in the fastness of the Kremlin and in Peking, although doubtleee the point is well taken in Hanoi. Valuable as the provision of ecQ nomic aid may he in the establishment of prestige, with human nature being what it ie, nations are seldom really grateful for aid, are always suspi cious, and their jealousy is easily aroused. Is it not often aaid that the quickest way to lose a friend is to lend him money?

Probably the one form of aid which is normally free from such taints is that which ie given spontaneously to meet a sudden need such as eupport for a disaster area. Britains mobile forces are well equipped to give such aid and to give it quickly. A few hundreds of thousands spent in this way, without thought of repayment, not only can build up an extremely vsl uable fund of goodwill, which no amount of straight economic aid will bring, but can also help to demon strate to tbe world that Britain is still reedy to give tlret priority to her responsildlities se a member of the eociety of nations. The value of this in the.maintenance of Great Britaius prestige ie obvioue. Thie point brings us to the ques. tion of pcditical integrity and stabil ity. Unlees other nations have faith in Great Britehs pledges and unless, as a nation united, Britain can per. euade them that she knowe in which dir+tion and to what end she is striv. ing, nearly all other measures to pr~ vide strength and to make policies credible will be wasted. Polities!- in tegrity and stability are, thereforq direetly related to defense.. It is in possible to think of a defensive P&Y in terms of military capacity alone. Because military success is now so dspendent upon speed, it ie obvious that there can be no true ceonomy in cheeseparing over the question of. equipment. It is the job of the armed for.we to present as convincing a pie- tnre of professional efficiency as ~. hnmanly possible. This picture not only lends credibility to Great Bnt aina military capability, but also ra fleets a state of well-being in the ns tion.

.
49 . ..md

Militmy R9VW

Shwzgth ifi lf?et,i)-eme~t

Lieutenant Colons]IrvinM.Kent,United States ,hm~

T WAS not many years ago that official policy decreed it to be anath ema to consider the Army and civil defense (CD) as having any common interesta. However, 1965 saw the pub lication of two clearly stated guide lines for the use of military resources in support of civil defense. The Fed eral Civil Defense Guide, published in April, and the new version of Army Regulation 500-70, Civil Defense Emergency Employment of ArmLJ Re sources, published in July, both clearly indicate the importance of this tack. The latter publication states: The eitcuttion may demand that m~litary sctppart of civil defense be afforded a Womtft of eflort second only to that of neutralizing thoee enemg forces capable of inflicting im- , mediate and direct damage orr the United States. It is now, however, official policy that, in the event of a major emer gency, the military departments will be prepared to employ all reeources~ not directly required in offensive, de fensive, or eelf-survival operations, in .

41

RETIREMENT

support of the civil power. In the light of current events, no man can safely predict that type of emergency will never come to paes. - Indeed, the

However, just at the time that a CD emergency would be most critical, th needs of the military servicee woul be greatest for manpower and unit to carry out other aesigned rolee and missions. The problem, then, is oneof insuring that we have prepared to use all resource.
Manpower Pool

Civilian eupply activities must be per formedif the Nationis to survive weaker our home front preparatiorre the more H%elythey are to present a tempting target. Lieutenant Colonel Irvin M. Kent ia with the Judge Advocate Section, Headquurter8, US Arnog Air Defense Cemnumd, Ent Air Force Baue, Cof orado Springu, Coforado. Hia aaeign ment8 include dut~ with the Oflfoe of the Staff Judge Advocate, US Army Commtmicationa Zone, Europe, and with the US Army Combat De velopment Command, Ciml Affa@e Agenc#, Fort Gora%n, Georgia. He hofdu a B.A. degree from Syracuse Vnitreraity in Ners York and an LL.B. fvom Harvard Law School, Camb ridge, Maasaehuaetts. A freguent contributor to the MILITARY REWEW, his meet vecent article, A National Securitg COrpe: appeared in the July 1967 iaewe. 42

There is a large trained manpowe pool which has been scarcely tapps which could be made available for this mission. There are now about half a million men and women in the Unite States drawing retirement pay of on type or another as a result of militory eervite. In addition, there are a nuto ber of other retired military per sonnel not drawing any kind of retirement pay, such ae membere of the Retired Reeerve who have ml reached age 60. A handful of thre people I are now engaged in fuU or part-time CD activities, but what of tbe rest? Even if only 25 to 35 pw cent could be recrnited and properl organized for military support of ciiil defense in an emergency, the ability of the military services to respezd properly to the needs of the Nation would take a giant step forward, Retired Regular officers have trsdi tionalty been available for recall to active duty in an emergency. The sit uation of other retired personnelis less eimple. The US Code contaitd numeroue and divergent rules w thing to retired pereonnel. Thereb no doubt that, if a uerious effort wes to be made to draw upon this tW mendous and growing reservoir d akllled manpower, certain changr would be required in thie Iegielati@ Once the idee was accepted, draftbt appropriate remedial legislation end changes in departmental reguleti@
Militaty R#

RETIREMENT

wouldpresent no great problem. The important decision which must be made,is to coneider this manpower pool as a resource of the military de partmentswhich can and will be ap plied to this task.
Methods of Utilization

Retired military pers6nnel can be utilized in three primary ways: In existing civilian CD etaffs and units. Detailed to reinforce active or Reserve military headquarters and unitsaesigned CD support missione. As members of units made up entireiy of Retired and, poseibly, Standby Reserve personnel whose only mission would be military sup. Portof CD. The first method is the one now used in one form or another for the relatively few retired military per sonnelinvolved in CD activities. This form of employment for their talents is a good one and could and should be eapanded. The second method would allow more realistic use of active and ReServeunita for CD missions. It would enablecommanders of such units to engagein better contingency planning and give them iruxeaeed capabilities. Foreaample, if an infantry National Guard compiny in southwestern Virginia were earmarked for employ ment in the Richmond-Petersburg metrope]ikn area in a CD support role,it could uee the services of chap lains, medical men, engineers, judge 0dVOC8tes, and other apacialiste despitethe fact that no infantry eom panytable of organization and equip ment providae for them. Yet within CSSyeonmmting dis~nee of the home base of &at company, there are, un doubtedly, Retired and Reserve R~er 1*

Stendby personnel with each of these military specialties. The planning for this units CD support commitment would be en hanced if such personnel were ee signed to the unit and subjeet to emergency call to active duty by the unit commander or other appropri@e authority. Basically, that authority

A NationalGusrd unit earmsrksdfor a civil defenserole emdduse manyretired specialists muet be delegated to the lowest pos sible level to meet the needs of true emergency situations. A system must be provided to have these additional personnel perform come planning and training on a reg ular basis with their aseigned unit. Thie need not be as time consuming ae an all-purpose assignment to the unit. Most of them are engaged in day-to-day work using their basic skills, although they would be able to perform better with speeitlc training which involved the application of thoee skills in a CD emergency sc membere of the unit.

43

RETIREMENT

Similarly, other retired personnel could be aesigned to Active Army units and to headquarters staffs for CD support missions, In each case, the gaining unit should have added to its normal table of allowances the equipment which such specialists and other additional personnel would need. The use of retired military person

.-

,. /s -d

Units could be set up to perform rescue and emergency rehabilitation missions in stricken areas, traffic con. trol and refugee assistance along lines of evacuation, and refugee re. ception and ehelter center cadres. They could provide teams for medical care, engineer services, civilian sop. ply activities, and other functions which must be performed if the Na. tion is to survive and to continue to fight. The units could also provide administration, either as temporary replacements for nonfuntiloning gov ernmental bodies or as reinforcement for governmental institutions unsble to cope with the load. Objections Objections will certainly be raised The first is that these retired people are not as young, ae healthy, or se vigorous as might be deeired for such tasks. But both German and British CD efforts in World War H made effective use of men and women in these age gronps. Indeed, it would be safe ,to say that in neither nation would the CD effort have succeeded without them. For thbr service there can and must be no artificial age limitation, Realistic rather thss idealitilc physical standards must be devised and applied electively. Thue, the physical standards must be geared to the specific unit or CD staff assignment. A second objection is. that some of the retired persnns may be neededfor recall to active military service. These will be in a minority; a decision muet be made as to where their eervicee are most needed at such a time. As signment to a CD support unit ned not mean that any given retiree woold spend the duration of a war therein, OnceAhe worst of a given crisis hss

Militsry police retirees csn plan and supervisetratllccontrnl nel in military CD support units com posed entirely of Retired and Standby Reserve personnel might well prove to be the most useful method of em ployment. While assignment of re tired personnel should be primarily on a voluntary basis, required addi tional skills could be drawn from the Standby Reserve on either a volun tary or a compulsory basis. The fact that great numbers of retired person nel live in fairly concentrated areas is the key here. Fortunately, meet of these favorite retirement areas are not in high-priority target complexes and sbordd have a better than average first strike survival probability. 44

~ MilffsrY RoW

RETIREMENT

passed, he would, like all other mili tary personnel on active duty, be sub ject to reassignment in accordance with the needs of the service. A third objection is that the crea tion of such a, system would divert, in peacetime, active military re sources to locate, classify, assign, train, and equip such personnel. This is true but not valid as an objection. The question is, can the military services, without such a system, com ply with the CD support mission which they have been given ? Or if they can comply, can they divert an adequatenumber of men to this job while performing their remaining missions? The peacetime diversion of a small administrative capability to this task would be an inexpensive in surance premium to pay for the added emergency strength which could thus be made immediately available. Even this divereion could be reduced by the voluntary recall of certain retired personnel specifically to run this program. This program should be for retired knilitarypersonnel without regard to service. While it may be that most of these individuals will be assigned to units and headquarters under the control of the Department of the ArmY, the only basic for assignment should be particular sklus, rather than former membership in one or another of the armed services. With proper incentives-such as ac-

tive duty pay and allowances for actual training seeeione, in addition to retired pay, and provision for reretirement after a given number of years of CD service with a recompu tation of retired pay based upon ac tive duty pay at that time-it should not be difficult to recruit vohrntarily most of those who would be needed. A first step would be a detailed census of all retired personnel to ascertain their location, present skille, and preferences as to the type of CD duty. A second step would be examination and classification. The third, of course, would be CD assignment of one type or another. Concurrently with the firet two steps, military planning and organi zational structure for the use of re tired persons would be required. Based upon the reeults of the census and the organizational decisions, as signments should then be made. At this time, gaps would become ap parent and decisions would be needed as to the use of Standby Reserve per sonnel to fill euch gaps. The system would require testing in drills and updating as required. While more static than in the active services, per sonnel would still require replacement and reassignment. Properly handled, however, this system would provide the military services strength from retirement to meet the needs of the Nation for military eupport of civil defense.

Becemher1967

45

Brian Bond

N THE period since the French Revolution, warfare has become eteadily less decisive in the sense of realizing the aims of those who have resorted to it deliberately. In the sphere of military operations, it has become generally more difficult to clinch victory by the decisive battle. Also, in the sphere of grand etrategy, it has become more impossible for the aggressor, or any of the belligerents, to secure peace terms that bring more than short-time gains. Thus, the apeeial problems created by nuclear weapons may provide no more than a climax to a long historical develop ment. Harl von Clausewitz died prema

turely in 1831 leaving his philosophi cal treatise On Wm largely unrevissd and not fully arranged in its 3SSI sequence. The influence of thk post humously published work on militaw thinking, partkularly between 1370 and 1914, wze unrivaled. 3iscs Clausewitz is still widely regarded 88 the champion of war as an inst~ ment of policy and often quoted, it seems appropriate to establish whst he really believed.in this crucial mak ter. Clausewitz celebrated dictum wbi~ occurs with variations throughd two of his books really did repreeeot the essence of hle thought. In ons familiar version, it reeds: We m@

4S k--.,

.... ... ..

---:.:.?3

MOOERN WAR

tain . . . that War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means.

By the time of the Firet World War. Cwrnanys opponents had come to identify Claueewitz with German , militarism,and I_&dcetrine, taken Out of context and frequently abbreviated, was taken to imply ruthless approval of war as just another means of at tiIning the national end. What, in fact, he had stated was that war is riotan independentactivity which can be considered in isolation from the circumetences which gave rise to it and tbe object for which it is con ducted.A continuation of the passage just quoted exemplifies this: , We eag mized with other means in waler thereby to maintain at the same time that this politictd intercmwse doee wet cease bg the Wa7 itself, is not cluwtged into something quite dif ferent, but that, in $t8 eesenee, it con tinnee to 8xk?t, whatever ?nau bs the $ form of the mearw which it use8, and that the chief lineg on which theg are attached, are only the geaeras featnres of policu which run alt threngh the War until ~eee8 takes pfac8. In thue insisting, ae the funda mentalprinciple, that the military ele ment must always be subject to po litical control, Clausewitz espoused theview which is still generally incul catedas the golden rule in civi]-mili tary relations in democracies. Brim Bond is lectureT in WaT Studies at the ?Jnive78ity of London King8 college, L.odm, Eugkzud. He served with the Ra@ ArtiUe~ during 195b-56, I.& h~t~ at Wo7ce8ter Coflcgs, Oxford, for three year8, and is the author of the book Victorian MlfitaryCampaigns. war 1967

This same principle also played a vital part in Clausewitz chain of rea soning beginning with the definition of war as an act of violence under taken to bring about changes in the opponents poficy. The purely logical argument ran as follows: Ae the uee of phtisical vower to the utmo8t extent by no means excludee the co-operation oj the inteUigence, it followe that he who weee force unspa7 iugly, without ref8?wnot? to the blood shed involved, muet obtain a aupe riomty t~ hie adver8ar& uses less vigor in its application. The former then dictates the law to the tatter, and both proceed to extremities to which the onl~ limitatiowa a78 those impoe8d bg the amount of oounterai?ting force on each side. Thue, by reciprocal action: one would have expected to see war rapidly accelerate until it reached the absc lute of unlimited violence, but Clauee witz eaw that in reality thie was un likely to happen. This he attributed, in part, to tbe notion of friction which accounted in war for the wide gap between aim and achievement. PoliticalAnalysis On a purely political analyeie, excluding technical considerations, Clausewitz argued cautiously from the experience of the Napoleonic era that war had approached close to its reel nature of nnreetrained violence, . and he believed that barriera once torn down were not easily raised again. He concluded that, %vhenever great in terests are in diepute, mutual hoe tility will discharge itself in the same manner ae it hae done in our times. Claueewitz neither approved nor dis approved of what he regarded as an inevitai$e aepeet of the struggle for power in a world composed of fiercely 47

1!

II

_ ...
I
MOOERN WAR competing nation-states, but he did affirm that, aa a matter of moral ob ligationnot eimply of logicwar must be controlled by nationef policy. by the US Civil War and Pruesias wars of the 1860s, provided abundant opportunity for the introduction of new weapons and new techniques in land and eea warfare. The leesons of these wars, and later 19th-century contlicts, were only fully grasped in retrospect from the ex. . . . ,t@

The term indecisive should be relative when applied to war. Warfare has always been overdestructive, and there have been protracted ware of .. . ... ..,,

The Civil War saw the first important military use of railwaye attrition in every era. Modern war presents a special problem only be cauae of mans enormously increased powers of worldwide destruction. The impact of the industrial revo lution upon war had ecarcely been felt in the Napoleonic era, and Clause witz gave little consideration to tech nological innovation. The advent of truly modern war, beginning in the Crimea in 1864 and quickly followed 48 perience of 191418. Even at the time, however, a handful of observers and commentators realized that techniesl innovation was tending to give over whelming advantage to the defensive Firepow& and entrenchments begsz to dominate the battlefield, knd the spade outvalued the sword and bayv net. Improvements in transport, m~ notably the military use of railway% enabl~dvastly larger and fitter arnti~

~
MOOERN WAR

to be epeedily assembled strategically, but there wae no equivalent improve ment in tactical mobility. Tactical etalemate, more%er, wae symptomaticof. increasing indecisive. ness in warfare as a whole. Technical changes provid~ only part of the explanation, although an important part, of why the materially stronger power found increasing difficulty in i bringing conflict to a speedy conclu i i eion. Thus, the Confederacy was abIe 1! to employ its railwaye to delay the { effects of the Unions numerical su ~ perjority, while the French Govern ment of national defens6 raised and 1 ~~equippednew armies after the Ger 1 manehad apparently won the war at Sedanand Metz. Only when political willpower was exceptionally brittle could military victoriee stiIl occasionally lead to a speedytermination of hostilities. The Hapsburg Emperor Francie Joseph I chose to accept defeat at Sadowa as : decisiverather than risk internal dis turbances by a fighting retreat on Vienna. In 1905, actual revolution in 1 { Russiaimpelledthe czar to make peace with Japan.
Industrial Revolution

population were trained to ar-meand prepared for increasingly rapid mo bilization as a prelude to the decisive battle. The principle of the nation in arms allied to nationalism, and assieted by nonmilitary factors such as the spread of good communication and literacy, provided fertile ground for militarist propagandists. Some of theee talked of a struggle for survival: between nations. By comparison, the move ments for international solidarity, such as the Socialiet International, proved completely ineffective when the test came in 1914.
20th-Cantury Warfare

The impact of the induetial revo htion upon warfare would have besn
far lees cataclysmic but for the rein ; production of more widespread and
~ systematic mass conscription fOllow ~ ing the Pruseian example in the
i 1860s.From the 1860s, the European
~~rulers decided in their own dynastic
] intereststo harness the revolutionary
! fo;ce of nationalism to the state and
i to redirect its aggreeeive drives
againstexternal enemies. Thue, in the
last qnarter of the century, Clause-
I Witz conditions for abeolute war
were brought near to reality. Entire
1

The ominoue possibilities of theee developments were only to be fully realized in the total warfare of the 20th century. In the first place, gov ernment at war and dependenton the emotional mass support of their populations found it extremely difficult to control the war hysteria which they had encouraged or to pureue limited peace aims. Only by superb political dexterity and great strength of character did Prince Otto von Bis marck, for example, defeat popular and militery preseure to impose a humiliating peace settlement on France in 1871. In the First World War, none of the major belligerents were able to adhere to its original war aime. $ Britain, for example, went to war in 1914 on the decision of a far from militaristic government with the avowed aim of restoring Belgiums frontiers. By the middle of the war, the object was to deetroy German militarism. By 191S, there wee in tense electoral pressure for a vindic tive peqce settlement and to smash Germany forever as a great power. 49

knibw

lab7

MOOERN WAR

The need for a democratic and antimilitarist country, such as Britah, deliberately to whip up war hysteria in ordsr that a costly and politically sterile struggle might continue to receive public backing goes far to ex-

sands of citizens, women as well es men, beeame involved in munitions mititary transport, and the production of raw materialsmade it ever more
diflicult to distinguish between the

military and nonmilitary element. The I

plain the indecisiveness of tbe peace settlement. The seeond major problem inherent in total warfare is closely related to the first. Mass armies cannot fight for more than a few weeke without a complementary mobilisation of na tional resources and noncombatanta hence, the general assumption before 1914, unsupported by recent military experience, that the great war when it same must be short. The expansion of the civilian base for waq-as thouSa

temptation grew to bypass the armia and strike directly at their unpro tected families and homes. Tbiz gave

rise to the term borne front. The new trend toward indiscrimi. nate use of violence against noncom batants in modern warfare may tS dated from the devastations carrid out by Major Generals William 1 Sherman and Philip H. Sheridan in the Civil War which were deliberatdl intended to shorten the war by under mining Confederate morale. ~ .
Mllitaty *

Frmrco-Prussian War witnessed the indiscriminatebombardment of cities, includingParis, and not merely of tbe forts defending them. TotalWar Trand The final blurring of the distinc tions between soldiers and civilians, warfront and homefrent, occurred in ~ the course of tbe two World Wars. q Three points are worth noting about ] tide trend toward total war: Civilians had always suffered in ~ warfare, but the modern plunge to ward barbarism was rightly re [ gardedas a regression at a time when both the meane and the incentive for international cooperation were par ticularly promising. There was novelty in the deliber ate direction of hostility toward non combatants. These methods stemmsd from the fact that it was becoming gen uinely more difficult for the military forces to terminate campaigna with. out conquering the enemys people. 8 With the tendency of warfare to becomemore destructive and progres sively harder to conclude with mean ingfuland lasting gaine, there are two \ pointswhich link up with Clausewitz ~ basic doctrines. The first ia the tendency of military i men to insiet more and more ve i hementlythat, in an era of general ~ warwhen the fate of the entire Na tion could depend on speedier and .] moreefficientmobilization in prepara 1~ tion for a single deeieive battle-they ~ musttake precedence over the political ] leaders. The growing complexity of ~ thecraft of war which few politicians couldevenpretend to grasp made their claims harder to resist. However, it may be of some consolation that, in ao many countriee today, miIitary 1

MODERN WAR

leaders have vokmtariiy undertaken political responsibility and are, there fore, ideally placed to appreciate the ricks of military plana divorced from politics. The eecond matter for comment is the remarkable contrast between the service chiefs ambitious claims for supremacy over civilian minieters be fore 1914 and the eterility of strategic thought. Clausewitz found no, com parable succeseor before 1920, and hie own strategic ideae were simplified and distorted almost beyond recogni tion. In B. H. Liddell Harta words: The 8oidiers of aU countmes were quick to swaUow the new gospel; few were capable of digestiag it. The Po litical world, which had lost touch wit h the 8tudv of war as warfare became more professiti:ized, was content to follow the sokfiere interpre tation of Ciacwew2tzian doctrine with devastating results.
Operational Manual On W(w was rashly treated ae an operational manual. Ita author was variously hailed or condemned as the advocate of sheer numerical superi ority as the key to victory, of the guerre d outrmtce as the only respect

able etrategy, and of the superiority of the attack over the defense. So iittle thought did the military Ieadere be fore 1914 devote to what we ehould now call grand or political strategy, that they invite the charge of regard ing victory on the field as an end in itself. General Erich F. von Luden dorff did indeed eventually reverse Clausewitz position. He declared that politice were subservient to war, not only during hostilities, but aleo in time of peace which he regarded as little more than the preparatory stage to combat. 51

kmlim 196,

MOOENN

WAN

of the strategic barrenness of World It may be objected that Clausewitz worked in a period of comparative War I that the victorsparticularly France, Britain, and the United States intellectual freedom compared with accepted too unreservedly the inde late 19th-century strategiete who were cisiveness and futility of war in gen ~constricted by that same monarchical eral, and tended to forget that the influence which they found politically state which defends itself against in. so ueeful. European monarche were vaeion is ueing war as an instrument too frightened of internal revolution to permit their staff officere to elabo- of policy no less than the invader. rate more subtle technique of apply Peace at Any Price ing violence. The determination of war-weary na Nevertheleee, this yawning gulf be tions to have peace at any price found tween overwhelming military might expression in reliance on a weak and the almost total absence of etrate League of Nationa to keep the peace, giee for employing it short of general and in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which war remains hard to understand or tfied to combat the euppoeedlyevil in explain. Even in. Britain, with her fluence. of Clausewitz by denouncing tradition of indirect naval etrategy, war as an instrument of policy. It wee there was a cons~icuous failure to SZSY in the 1920s to underestimatethe bring se~ice thinking into a bar. strength of political grievance latent monious relationship with Cabinet in Germany, Italy, and Japan, and policy. Consequently, ae late as 1911, aleo the potential force of irrationa~ it was discovered that the army and aggressive drives which could bS navy were pursuing completely dif mobilized as a political force through ferent strategies, whiie the Cabinet new techniques of propaganda and had been largely ignorant about both. maes suggestion. The indecisiveness of World War I, World War I Stalemate The consequences of this lack of a at the levels of both operational and flexible analytical approach to stra grand etrategy, did at least stimulati tegic problems were made manifest the formulation of new strategic when a stalemate occurred in World theories to replace the discredited Clausewitzian deeieion by a clash of War I. The fundamental problem from the end of 1914 wae to gain control mass armiez. The strategy on whose behalf tbe most extravagant claims of the strategic centers of gravity. were made was that of airpower, and The Germans only eerious attempt to break the deadlock on the Weetern ita most eloquent prophet wae the, Front was the eelf-defeeting policy of Italian, sGeneral Giulio Douhet.* restricted submarine warfare. Sur Prior to World War II, the doctrine iebgly, in only two instances during that airpower would be speedily de t t e entire war did the Allies make any cieive remained no more than an idea. hove whatever toward taking control Although it etill hae its defenders who f the pattern of the war: the abortive argue that it was never given a fair $ ardenellsz campaign and the ulti ZeeLieaten.nt Colonel William H. TOIIAIIISQII, mately rewarding imposition of a ~:l~ne?pks ArmY, %. F.kher of Aim Militnw Retiew, Ser,k.ber MZt maritime blockade. ml zwi. Da Wnllmln. Frskll. -nmw ~;~ia~ Milit.aru lhuiaw. November 1SS?. It was one unfortunate consequence . . . 52
Revrq Mllrtery &

MOOERN WAR

trial, there was general agreement by 1946. that far too much had been claimedfor airpower ae an independ ent arm. However, tbe point is that, whatever its merits and defecte, it was a strategy of very limited appli cation in relation to tbe great variety of international conflicts in which

This etrategy rested on commonsense principles which had been touched on by most military thinkere from Sun tzu onward, but had never before been so systematically and clearly formu lated. Direct preseave alwa~s temfs to harden amf coneolirfute the e-eeietance

The British

in Malaya showed that inarrrgetrcies could be permanentlydefeated of an opprmentiike snow which ie squeezed into a snowball, the more compact it becomee, the slower it is, to melt. Alike in polic~ and strategg or to put it amthec- way, in the strat. e9Y of both the diplomatic and the milita~ epheree-the indirect ap proach is the most effective WaZIto up set the opprment8 bakwe, psychology. cal ad phgsical, the?v?by making poesible his overthrow. The tc-w purpoee of etrategy is to dimirzish the possibility of reeistawe. 53

some uee or threat of coercion was required. The meet eubtle attempt between the World Wars to formulate a gen eral theory of strategy, which took intoaccountboth the indeciaiveneesof orthodoxnaval and military thinking es translated into action in 1914-18, andthe likelihood that wars of vary ing degrees of intensity, would con tinue to be fought, wae Captain B. H. LiddeS Harts gradual evolution of the coacept of indireet approach.
1*7 D8clmhw

MOOERN WAR

And from this fobws anether axiom thut to etwure attaining an objec tivt? one ehou-?d have alternative ob jectives. An attack that conve%ges on one point ehould threaten, and be abla to diverge against another. OnlU by thie jZexibilitu of aim can etrategy be attuned to the nncertaintg of urar. The meet eucceeeful practical dem onstration of the strateric indirect au -. .

which may be used to operate aga{aet the enemge wiU. But like Napoleon he had an inadequate greap of the higher level of grand etrateggtlmt of cond~ting war with a far-eighted regard to the etate of the peaoe that will follow. By relying increasingly on cheer in and military force, particularly after the invasion of the USSR in

preach in recent European history was given by Adolf Hitler betieen 1936 and 1940. Initially, he waged war by suggestion, by words instead of weapons, and by propaganda replacing the projectile. In Llddell Harts worda: Hitler gave the art of offensive etrategg a new development. He &o mastered, better than ang of hie op _t8, the #ret stage of grand etrat egv, that of developing and coor dinating all forma of war-like ec tivitg, a@ d the P088ib& instruments 54

June 1941, Hitler strikingly demon strated the futility of war in the tra ditional eenee to eecure permanentp+ litical benefits. Hitlers early strategic euccesma provide the outstanding illustration of the double disadvantage under which the Weetern democracies have labored especially eince the Bolehevik Revoh tion in 1917. The8e are: Generally regarding conventional war as untldrrkeble except as a lad resort to resiet outright military ar greasion. . Wlitarf R ..ati

MODERN WAR
Being inhibited by their political andcultural traditions from adopting more subtle strategies for imposing their will on opponents. As a consequence, the less scrupu lous rulers, or revolutionary move ments, have, for the most part, held the strategic initiative. The outstand ing exponent of the theory and prac tice of what has aptly been called total strategy since 1945 has, of course,been Mao Tse-tung, and it is now a commonplace that in Maos thinking the priorities of traditional warfare are practically reversed. The Marxist-Leninist system of thoughthas never drawn a distinction betwaenthe political field and that of total strategy. Undoubtedly, m prac tice, the principles of subversive warfarewere also strongly influenced by tbe fact that the revolutionaries have usually been hopelessly outmatched initially in conventional military power. However, since such postwar successes as the Vietminh in Indo china, and the National Liberation Front in Algeria, there is no reason to doubt that revolutionaries realize that a total strategy stands a good chance of prevailing over a stronger 1 OPponent who relies primarily on tra-, , ditionalmethods.

This gives risa to the contemporary problem of whether subversive war fare has not created a completely new type of indecisiveness, namely that either the struggle drags on indefi nitely or the insurgents succeed in gaining power. The insurgents feel that the imperiatiet or government forces cannot win. This seems valid onlywhere the government refuses to makepolitical concessions or to try to remedyreal social and economic griev ances. British experience in Malaya
December1987

tbe defeat of th.d Huke in the Philippines euggest that insurgents can be permanently defeated. If, as has been argued, the scope for direct military action such se tbe Suez operation of 1956 is likely to be very small in the foreseeable future, there is urgent need for countries of the non-Communist West to develop a more sophisticated and subtle ap proach to positive strategy wbicb could be practiced from the stable base of nuclear deterrence. It is rather a matter of evolving methods of analysis and C.oordhatedpolitico-military plan ning than of discerning blueprint for action in particular areas. Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie has touched on the problem in showing that we still lack a generally valid theory of etrategy, since the conti nental, naval, air, and even Maoist guerrilla strategies are all of restrict ed application. This lack of a common pattern of strategic thought must in evitably result in failures of under standing between armed services and governments, aud also between the services themselves. These unresolved dMficultiesresult chietly from the gen eral recognition that traditional strat egies for the application of military pciwer are now largely ~obsolete. The virtual disappearance, from the contemporary world, of war as Clause witz knew it has in no way eclipsed the lasting significance of his central dot-4 trine. Not only tbe potential power of nuclear weapons to destroy the world, but also the blurring of the distinction between war and peace, make it more crucial than ever before that all na tions should accept Clausewitz essen tial teaching that an apolitical war is not so much impossible as stupid and wrong.
and 55

THE

JORDAN
Colonel

WATERS

Sidney Gritz, United States Arnw

HE seemingly endless se ries of clashes between the Arab States and Israel erupted into major, open warfare in June 1967. The outsome is history, but were there any solutione to the age-old problems ? Israel did not even eucceed in furthering her right to exist claim in Arab eyes. Existing problems were aggravated, and new ones probably generated. One of the most exacerbating single issues, over which war may again be waged, in volvee use of the Jordan IUver waters, an ieeue as vital ae use of the Gulf of Aqaba or the Suez Canal. It is dMicult for the western mind

to contemplate fully the importance of water. In the United States, water is generally plentiful. It ie not considered an element over which wars could be fought. In the arid desertland of the Middle Eaet, however, water means irrigation, cultivation, and life. The Jordan flows in a great rift that extends from northern Syria acrosa the Red Sea into Egypt. it riaea on the slopes of Mount Hermon in Syria; flows separately in tbe Hasbani, Banyas, and Dan Rivers; and converges about 22 miles above Lake Tiberias to form the Upper Jordan I (Figure 1). Here, it is enlarged by # I numerous springa, and flows in a nar 1

JOROAN WATERS

row channel to Lake Tiberias in Israel. It emerges from the southern end of the lake where it is joined by ita main tributary, the Yarmuk River, and ,then twists a course
through the Jordan Valley into the Dead Sea shout away. to empty 90 miles

The Jordan River is a major ob stacle to peace in the Middle East be cause it involvee four riparian states: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel, all of which lack sufficient and regular rainfaR. Harnessing the Jordan to conserve winter tloodwatera for the summer months is the major pre requisite fo; industrial and agricul tural growth. ,
Physical Characteristics

The physical characteristics of the river make it particularly well suited for power production which ia ao es sential to industrialization. In its course from Mount Hermon to the Dead Sea, it. drops approximately 2,100 feet. While it is doubtful that the Jordan itself can provide ade quatelyfor both irrigation and power development,the Hasbani and Yar muk Rivers are particularly suitebIe sources of hydroelectric power. The international character of tbe Jordan is inherent in its origin. Its three main sources rise in Lebanon, Cokmel Sidnsy Gmtz is the Adju tant General, Hsadqaartere, US Arrng C%nttnentat Army Comrmzrzd, Fort Moaroe, Virginia. A graduats of the US Arwvp War College, Carlisle Bar racks, Pwwglvanti, he received his B.A. from Dickiwon College, Carlisle, Pcnneylvanti, ad an MS. degres from George Washington University, Wmhington, D. C. He ie preeentlff at tending the Harvard Advanced Mam agsrmmt Program at Haeward Vni vee%ity, Cambridge, Maaeochusetts. Beeweber 1887

Syria, and Israel. The Jordan flows through northern Israel, then forms the border between Israel and Jordan below Lake Tiberias before flowing entirely within Jordan. The Yarmuk River forms part of the border be tween Jordan and Syria. At its south ern portions, it also forms the border between Jordan and Israel. Thus, each of the Jordans tributaries, except tbe Dan River, is an international water way. While Israel is Jordans- upper riparian on the Jordan River, Leba non, Syria, and Jordan are Israels upper riparians on the Hashani, tbe Banyas, and the Yarmuk. The significance of the Jordan River is intensified by the rapid popu lation growth in each of its riparian states. To a large degree, each is de pendent upon the Jordan system to provide increased irrigation and power for development.
Syria and Lebanon Syrias population is approximately five million, about two-thirds of which is engaged in farming. However, of

the one-third of tbe country that is potentially arable, only 8.3 percent is presently irrigated. Expansion of thi?, arable land is essential to provide far the increasing population, eince agri culture is almost certain to contipue as Syrias main source of income.~t is true that Syria lies along the Euphrates River and much of her irrigable land is serviced by it. How: ever, water from the Jordan system is needed to irrigate the lands along the Banyaa and above Lake Tiberias as well as along the north bank of the Yarnmk. Lebanon is a country measuring less than 4,000 square miles, or about half the size of Israel, and hae about 1.8 rrtillion people. Her rainfall is 57

E$s

JORDAN WATERS

+---..
, ..,..-

fairly abundant, and she has the only purely national river in the area, the Lltani, which provides to the country a valuab!e source of needed power. The population ia growing rapidly, however, and expanaion of cukivated land is essential to support the growth. The Hasbani flows through Lebanon for about 16 miles before crossing a corner of Syria to enter Israel. Part of its now can be used for irrigation in Lebanon, but would previde only limited help in satisfying Lebanons total water needs.
Jordan and Syria

lumns

THEJORDANRIYERSYSTEM
Figure

1.

Jordan has an area of 34,750 sqnare miles, exceeded in size among the ri parians.only by Syria. Her population is over two miilion and growing at a rapid pace. In addition to the prob lems that are typical of the region, Jordans situation is complicated by the fact that unemployed refugees from the 194S war account for about 30 percent of the population. Lack of natural resources and low per capita income accentuate the need for rapid economic improvement. Only about five percent of the land is arable, and this depends on utilization of the water from the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. No other alternative exists for irrigating thk land. Thus, the situation is most critical for Jor dan. Development projects for irri gating this land have already begun. Although the major resources of Israel are in the northern part of the country, large areas of arid but arable land lie in the southern tip, the Negev Desert, Her population of 2.5 million is expeeted to increase to three million by 1970. Israels avowed policy of un limited immigration, in accordance with her Law of Return: makee development of the Negev a critical .
Mllitmy Rovim

JORDAN WATERS

necessity. It is primarily in this area that. Israel can resettle new immi grants. The policy of unlimited im migration poses a further threat tp the Arabs and, makes them more de termined to prevent diversion of the Jordan River for use in cultivating the Negev. c To provide space and sustenance for a larger population, Israel muet ex pandagriculture and industry; there fore, she must transfer water from north to south. Although springs, wells, and several small rivers are available to fulfill some irrigation needs, hydroelectric projects and ex teneive irrigation in the Negev re quire utilization of the system.
Four Aiparians Compared

Israel actually began to divert the Jordan waters when she started to drain the Hula Marehes in her north ern regione in 1951. Thie marked the beginning of the All-Israel plan to flow water into the Negev Desert via a 100-mile national conduit which was completed in 1963. The project iniJordan Itivar Development Plans

It is apparent that Syria, Lebanon, Jordan,and Israel have eimilar prob lems: Resources are inadequate for fast-growing populations, each has large deeert or mountain areae where cultivation ie difficult, and there is a desperate need for water in all of theeecountriee. Of tbe four riparian states, Jordan and Israel are meet heavily dependent upon the Jordan River system for their economic de velopment. Lebanon and Syria have other sources, but need ~ portion of the Jordan waters to irrigate certain land within their boundaries. While Lebanonand Jordan need the waters primarilyfor irrigation, an important consideration in Syria and Ierael ie hydroeketric energy for industry. Many plans have been drawn in an effort to provide equitable distribu tion of the Jordan watera. Theee have rangedfrom the Ionidee plan in 1939, before Ierael achieved statehood, to theArab headwatere diversion plan in 1964 (Figure 2). Not a]] have in volvedthe United Etates. lbcelrmr lea7

Ionides eurvey _. . . . ..-. _-~l939 Imwdermilk propoeal ------ _1944 Haye plan -__. -____ -_------l948 MacDonald plan ._.. -.--.. _-l95l A1l-Ierael plan -__-_ ---_ --_-l95l Bunger plan -______________ 1952 Israel seven-year plan _--- _195353 Main plan ------_ -_--___ --.l953 Cotton plan ___________ -____1954 Arab plan -----_ ---1954 .-..l954 Baker-Harza plan -____ -----l955 Unified plan --_----_ -------l955 Ierael 10-year plan _-_-. -_1956956 National water plan __------ _l956 Eaet Ghor Canal project ----_1958 Arab headwatere divereion plan -__---- _.-.l964 Figure 2. tially called for drainage of the mamhee into the Jordan headwatere north of Lake Tiberiae, pumping from that point into the conduit, then southward toward the Negev. The flow of water began in 1964, but little, hae reached the Negev. Israel$e pumps, as originally envi sioned, were to be located in a demili tarized zone within Ieraele borders. Syria immediately complained to the United Nations on the grounds that such action in the demilitarized zone violated the Syria-Israel General Armistice Agreement of 1949. When tensiori along the Ierael-Syriz border 59

~
~ z JOROAN WATERS

increased and armed violence broke out, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for stoppage of work in the demilitarized zone until a satisfactory agreement could be ne gotiated. When an agreement could not be reached, Israel resumed work on the project in 1953. Again, Syria complained to the United Nations on the same grounds. The r+l issue at stake, although not debated in the UN Security Council, was the Israeli plan, to build a village in the demilitarized zone at the site of the proposed pumps. Tbe UN Security Council warned Israel against diversion of any water from within the zone. Israel, however, maintained that she was legally en titled to tbe water since the zone was within her sovereign territory.
Work Suspended

Israeli objections to unilateral devel opment of the Yarmuk led to with drawal of proposed financing.
Main Plan

Nevertheless, under pressure from the United States, who threatened to withdraw financial asdietance, and to avoid sanction by the United Nations, Israel complied with the ruling and suspended work. Accordingly, she moved the site of the pumps to the northern end of Lake Tiberias. Thie change proved costly to Israel beeauae the water of Lake Tiberias is so saline that it must be mixed with sweeter water in order to be usable for the cultivation of citrus crops. The critical need to cultivate more land in Jordan to feed the thousands of Arab refugeea prompted the United Nations Relief and Works Palestine Refugees Agency for (UNRWA) to involve itself in Jordan water projects. The UNRWA had co operated with the Bunger plan and the Jordanian Government in 1952 in formulating plans for utilization of the Yarmuk River waters. However, so

In an effort to seek further meaus to aid refugee resettlement, UNRWA conceived the idea of a unified re gional plan in the hope that it would eliminate conflicte that had arisen from divergent plans. Accordingly, UNRWA requested the Tennessee Val. Iey Authority (TVA) to develop such a plan. TVA employed the Charles T, Main Company, Incorporated, from which the plan derives its name. Iri essence, tbe Main plan was baaed on data collected from previous develop. ment p~op~sals. It attempted te corn. bine those plans into one joint project that would make the most efficient use of available resources. In his letter of transmittal b, UNRWA, Mr. Gordon R. Clapp, then Cbairmafi of the Board of Directors of TVA, stated: The Main plan doee not ccneidw political factere or attempt to sst this 8Uetem into the mztiond bcuudanw now prevailing. The preeent location of national boundaries euggeete that the optimum development of the watw reecuvces of the Jerdan-Yarmuk wa tershed can CUZVbe achieved by ee operation among the etatee concerned. It ia for this reason that the Main plan wae unacceptable to the Arabs, and the Israelis. It is impossible to consider the Jordan River system out side the relevant political factors. The question of water allocation can only be approached in conjunction with other factors of the Arab-Israeli dis pute. The Main plan waa moat important, however, becauae it represented the first effort at unified joint development .
Militats Raw .d

envoyof president Dwight D. Eisen hower,When he firet went to the Mid dle Eaet, Ambassador Johnston epeci fied that suggeetione would receive careful consideraflon as long as they did not interfere with the funda mentalidea of a comprehensive and unified approach to the valleys de velopment. Before the Arab States wouldIieten to his proposals, he had heamber 1967

the other hand, Israel refused a neuJ tral or international water authority because of her etrong desire to force Arab recognition by direct negotia tion. The Arabs and Israelis had other objections to the Main plan. Lebanons national river, the LMani, wae not in eludedin the eurvey. Israel argued that, if a regional plan wae to be
61

1
JORDAN WATERS

undertaken, it should include all the water resources of the region. In ad dition, Ierael felt strongly that her allocation of water was insufficient to provide for her neede. The Arabs, however, objected vehemently that the allocation of 33 percent of the water to Israel was exceesive. More over, the Arabs were unwil!ing to sub-

since, for the first time, they were regional plans rather than unilateral projects. They b@h recognized ri. parian rights which indicated a reeli. sation that regional cooperation of. fered the best means for efficient utili. zation of the water resources. Nevertheless, there wae still %on. eiderable disagreement between the

had Ofimof I.forlnawln Phati In the arid desertland,wster meansirrigation,cultivation,and life

mit to any plan that provided for ~=s~in%%~h ;~g~u%% give Israel control over water aW cated to the Arab Statee. After considering the Main plan, and expressing their objections to k, Ierael and the Arab States offered counterproposals. Iaraals plan, called the Cotton plan, was prepared by Joseph Cotton, an American engineer serving as consultant to the Israeli Government. The Arab plan of 1954, a counterproposal, was drab hy the Arab League Technical Committee. Theee two plans represented a major advance in the thinking of both eides 6f

conflicting pa&les. Neither side ~uld agree on the allocation of water, and the Arabs clung to their policy thst Jordan waters should not be used oub side the Jordan River bazin. Israel could not agree to the latter since it meant no water to the Negev. To the Arabs, water in the Negev encourages immigration which, in turn, means an increase in Israels arened forces, in dustry, and agriculture. These factors were viewed as a threat by the Arab States. Moreover, the Arabs feared . that increased population pressure on Israels resouries might become 8 stimulns to aggressive military 8X. pansion. .

MiliteIy Rew .Jw

JOROAN WA7ERS

Ambassador Johnston made four trips to the Middle East in pursuit of ra settlement of the Jordan waters is . ..... . -.. . sue. me nnal proposal, me u rnned plan of 1955, embodied the best ele mentsand the most commonly agreed areas of the Main plan, the Cotton plan, the Arab counterproposal, and severalothera. It allocated the Jordan watersas follows: Jordan, 625 million cubic yards per year; Syria, 170 mil lion cubic yards per year; Lebanon, 45 million cubic yards per year; and Israel, the residue, estimated at 600 million cubic yards per year, a com promisebetween Israels claim and the Arab proposal. This plan, therefore, took cog nizanceof Arab desires to insure ade quate water for the Jordan River watershed, and made provieion for ,. Israelto use her share as ehe desired. I
Major Objections Both sides again objected to the

plan.Major objections were water al location and the question of interna tional supervision. Israel continued her insistence upon direct supervision by the states concerned. Although the Arabs had previously indicated a pref erence for international authority, they now indicated a fear that even acceptanceof euch a plan might imply recognitionof Ierael. Ambassador Johnston had made great strides in achieving a wide area Of compromise. His mission was con siderablyenhancedby the fact that he csrried with him an offer of US funds to cover two-thirde of the cost of the project which was estimated at 200 million dollare. Despite the financial inducementand the fact that Israel hadmeanwhile coneented to a neutral supervisingauthority, it is noted that the Arabs would not give formal ac Member 1967

ceptance to any plan that would also help Israels development. ~ When the Arab States shelved the Johnston Unified plan, it marked the end of the closest approach to an agreement. It became clear that the Jordan waters issue was linked di rectly to political considerations, pri marily the matter of Arab recognition of Ierael. In addition, the Arabs har bored deep suspicion of US intentions in urging acceptance of the plan, and the US offer to finance a large portion of the project wasexploited by them. They depicted the plan as a scheme to help Israel increase her immigration and as a bribe to make the Arabs ac cept a strengthened Israel. Moreover, the political and economic boycott of Israel bas been a major weapon of the Arab States. Denial of the Jordan headwaters is an aspect of this boycott since it considerably limits Israels long-term plan to carry northern water to tbe Negev.
Return to Unilateral Projects

The breakdown in negotiations for a unified regional settlement caused botb Israel and the Arabs to return to their unilateral plans for diversion of the Jordan watere. Israel is pumping water from Lake Tiberias through the national conduit. Despite salinity of the water, a third pumping station is expected to carry water to the Negev, thus enabling in . creased immigration. To counter Israeli moves, the Arab League formulated plans to divert the Jordan headwaters in Syria and Lebanon before they flow into Israel. One proposal involves diversion of the Hasbani into the Lltani in Lebanon; another diverts the Banyas and the Hasbani tbrougb Syria into the Yar muk to be used for irrigation in Syria 03

-.,
JORDAN WATERS

Such d]version would re duce Israels flow from the Jordan to approximately 390 million Cubic yards per year, a quantity Israel claims ie far below her neede of 720 million cubic yards per year, The Arabs have not yet initiated any large-scale diversions primarily for fear of military confrontation with Israel. At the Arab summit meet ing in Cairo in January 1964 and again at Alexandria in September 1964, Syria and Lebanon indicated they did not desire to initiate any divereion schemes that might provoke Israeli attrcka, unless the United Arab Com mand could provide defensive forces to cope with such an eventuality. With the defeat of the Arabic forces in June of this year, Arab leaders must agree that Israel presently has su perior military capability and that any proposal involving the use of military forces would be doomed to failure. An analysis appears to offer little hope for a peaceful solution of the Jordan watere problem. However, there may be such a hope-in tech nology, not in armed forces, arms racea, and impractical schemes thatdo not address themselves to the iseues involved. Thie hope reets on a major Israeli project of desalination of wa ters of the Mediterranean Sea. The problem of salinity and desali nation is most significant since it can have a marked effect on US policy insofar as relations with Israel and the Arab States are concerned. The United States has become the chief financial supporter of both Jordan and Israel. A large portion of thie support has been used to import fond which is in short supPlY becanse of a lack of cukivated land. It is in the US eco nomic interest, therefore, to encourage
and Jordan.

tbe Arab States and Israel to become more viable and self-sufficient by means of water development. It is of interest t~othe United States to con. tain the explosive political situation which would involve her. Thns far, US funds for waterworks in Israel have been applied to generrd irrigation projects. More recently, however, there has evolved a growing common concern between the United States and Ierael for the improvement of desalting techniques. This has lsd to agreement between President Lyn don B. Johnson and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol of Israel to cooperate in fnture studies. As a result, a joint United. States-Israel technical team has been conducting studies to define the scope of the program in Israel. In 1964, Israel announced her fu ture water projects wonld be based on technology rather than geography. It is Israels hope. that joint etudies will result in the construction of a nuclear plant for distillation of sea water in Israel. Technologists say euch a plant would supply 150 to 200 mega watts of power and 80 to 165 million gallons of freeh water daily. Israel ie enthusiastic about the de salination project. She feels that she can ultimately create an ati]ficial Jordan River in Israel. She is confi dent that such a water source would enable her to cultivate the Negev, without infringing on neighboring states. This hopeful technological step, therefore, could conceivably relieve some of the pressures on the Jerdan River system and open a new phase in Middle East economic development., Most important, such a project may reduce some of the political and mili tary tensions and mark a first step toward peace in the Middle East.

.
S4 ii%.. Mllitwy Row
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A&

(Switzerland)

Swiss Concept of Defense

The following article is a digest of selected Federal Council Reuort to the Federal Assembly Concerning the Con~eption of the Na onal Military Defense (6 June 1966). .Edito~. ? < Darts of . . Switzerlands Y ITS presence and etate of preparedness, the Swiss Army must demonstrate that an attack on Switzerland would not be profitable. The armye mieeion during peacetime is to inter vene against violations of Switzerlands neutrality to the limit expected of a neutral atate. In war, the armye miesion ie to maintain the nations independ ,

oecamber1*7

,-
SWISS DEFENSE

ence

by obstinate

and

continuous

re

si@ance, thereby inflicting maximum losses upon an aggressor. If the stra tegic eituation permits, the army must protect the greatest poseible part of the country or at least hold on to a limited zone. If Switzerland ie drawn into a con flict in the near future, it will prob ably be a general war where weapona of mass destruction are used or there will he a threat that they will be used. An aggressor with a richly equipped arsenal will choose the means which offer the beat preapecte of reaching the objective in the fasteat and most economical manner. Aggression against Switzerland could take a num ber of forms. PoliticalCapitufstion By threatening to use nuclear weapone, an aggressor could try to obtain political capitulation without actually becoming engaged on Swies territory. This attempt at, nuclear blackmail could be supported with well-prepared paychrdogical and sub versive warfare. If Switzerland can not counteract such blackmail with military means, the army; nevertbe leea, will play an active part by main taining the populatings will to resiet. An aggressor witfi large-yield mlclear weapons would be capable of practically eliminating the Swiss Army and the substance of the pso ple. However, by such action, he would This article waa tran8k7ted from the two-part mginal, pmb lished in the REVUEMILITAICE SrIleaE (Switzerland) September and October 1966. C-ghted @ 1966 bv the RavuE MILXTAIRE Suleem Trarwlation by Mm. An drzfe Johnson, Fort George G. Meade, Mar@arrd. so s..

destroy that which wae hie very rea. son for initiating the action. Even though such a&lon ia poaaible, it in improbable. An aggreesor would have to occupy at least a part of Switzerland to profit from tbe labor and the induatriel installations, or to undertake .mili. tary operations from Swiss territory againet other powera. Since an ag. greaser would be interested in seizing objectives in the best possible conrli tion, he will uae mass destruction weapona OUIY to maintain the momen. turn of the attack.
Courses of Action

Weighing the taska of the Swisn Army and the possible courses of ZZ. tion of an aggressor, the army must be prepared for tbe following: Protection of neutrality. Protection and defenee in the event of attacke which seek to aprcad terror. ,. Defensive combat againat an sr gressor who etarts a limited war, uses weapons of mass deatructilon,or threatens the use of these weapons A modern adversarys doctrine is predicated on nuclear weapons, chwrr ical agents, and the rapid movement of mechanized and airmobSe forces. From the initial phaae, the aggressor will carry the attack into the depthe of a country in order to obstruct the coordkiated employment of the d~ fenders forces. The aggressor will employ nuclear and chemical wezpona to atrike artil. lery weapons, command installation% and reserves. Meehani@d ground forces will lead the attack on a wide , front, exploiting the effects of raSSE : destruction weapona, and will PCOO trate into the depths of the defeneA #lggreeeor airm~bile forcee will be Military S9dSe ,.. .,,

..1

SWISS DEFENSE .

employeddeep in the territory to open routes of advance and to fix the reserves,thereby contributing fo main taining the attacks momentum. This doctrine cannot be applied to Swiss territory without come re9tric tiorrs.Switzerland does not have areas where such massive operations could be conducted. The terrain would not facilitate an unlimited use of nuclear

use airborne troops trained in moun tain warfare to maintah the momen tum of the attack through the moun taina. Swiss forces will be engaged in de fensive combat on their own soil. Knowing the terrain, theee forcee can plan and prepare for defense. At least initially, Switzerland can choose the areas where ehe wante to fight. These

weapons without limiting the free dom of maneuver of the aggressors attzckhrgforces. The aggressor would use nuclear and chemical weapons in those arees whichwould not restrict hie freedom of maneuver in order b destroy or neutralizethe main centers of resist ance and fjwitzer]and~s mechanized forces. In the mountaina, the aggres sor could use nuclear weapone to pre vent movement and resupply. If the sgg?ezsor intends to seize epezific ob jccthwain the Alps, he will attack with m&banized forces through the big valleys. He will simul~neous]y Oetmter 1ss7

areas can be eelected and prepared in advance of hostilities. In comparison with the size of the population and the size of the coun try, Switzerlanda army is relatively large. This allowa the army to bf engaged in combat echeloned in greet depth. Switzerland hez no nuclear, biolog ical, or chemical weapons. In addition, the majority of the potential aggres sors conventional weapona surpass Swise weapons in range, mobility, and effectiveness. The number of combat aircraft and mechanized combat meani in Switzerland are modest. In 67

SWISS DEFENSE

addition, the lack of appropriate training areas and firing ranges is a handicap to the armed forces. For these reasone and the militia character of the army whose periode of training are brief, Switzerland is compelled to eelect combat methods adapted to her conditions, and to en gage in combat in those areas where the enemy will not be able to use the full power of hia superior means.
Necessity Of SuNiVd

echelons by air action and hy grouo[ forces condu~lng counterattacks ao[ eurprise attacks to prevent reinforce ment and.supply. Destroy aggressor forces whicl have made deep penetrations by coun terattacking with mechanized fores supported by aircraft.

Since mass destruction weapone de termine the eharactm of the battle, it is important for troops te survive the effects: Troopa not engaged in the fighting will remain ae long as pos sible in permanent shelters, field for tifieatione, or in underground rein forced quarters. Dispersion and the choice of formations are also neees sary to reduce troop imlnerabllity. Wherever poaeible, close contact with the aggressor should be sought eo that he will not be able 10. use lds weapons without endangering his own forces. The emplonent of the army must insure that an optimum relation is established between space, time, and the available forces so that Switzer land neither exposes herself to an un bearable risk nor jeopardises the suc cess of defensive combat with conven tional weapons. Swiss forces must be organized ac cording to the threat prior to the ad vent of hostilities to prevent concen trations and to insure that forces in the defensive combat zones are mu tualIy suppo#]ng. Defensive opera tions will be designed to: Canalize the aggressor and to wear him down by defensive zones echeloned in depth. Cut, off the aggressors advanced 88

lacks rd large Formations The tield army corps will conduc defensive operations in the Jura, a the Plateau, and in the Lower Al~ The frontier brigades have the re sponsibility of setthg up roadbledr and impeding the aggressors move ment; thla will make it more difficsl for enemy forces to link up with air mobile troops landed in the interio] The frontier divisione constitute tb mobile reserves of the frontier zonf The tie@ divisions will conduct de , fensive operations in the Plates . areas which are operationally imps tant. They will be employed primaril on terrain not favorable for the UE of nuclear weapons and which block canalizes, or diverts mechanized fore attacks. Their light tanks and tari destroyers will allow them to figh , aggressor armor or provide fire M port for infantry counterattacks. Armored units of the mecbanirc divisions will counterattack aggresso forces which uenetrate or have bee air lifted into the defensive zones ,: These counterattacks will have Qe most success when dkweted against aggrmor forces pefilally held by the frontier troops or field divisions. The situation, especially in the air, wiu determine the size of the armored force to be used. The mountain army corps has the mission of fighting an attack through the Alpa. Ite combat brigades @ block the axee leading to the centeI

,Militarg Rer@

SWISS DEFESSE

or crossing Switzerland, and will cre ate conditions favorable for the em ployment of mountain divisions. The mountain divisions are the mo bile fighting forces of the mountain armYcorps. Because of the wide sepa ration of the Alpine zone and the sep aration of its combat sectors, these unitejmust largely operate independ ently. Aviation snd Air Defense The air defenee miesion ie to sound the alert in case of danger and to engage enemy aircraft, thereby mak ing it difficult for the aggressor to gain air superiority and interfere with the operations of ground forces. Both aircraft and surface air defense weaponswill be used for thle miesion. Up to 9,800 feet above the surface, the air defense units equipped with cannon have the task of protecting groundforcee; aircraft will intervene only when these weapons cannot ac complishthe mission. The attack of eurface targets ia the main tack of air,craft. In general, these attacks will require that the amszeore air defenaee be neutral ised in the objective area. At the tactical echelon, the taeke will be to cut the aggreeeors axee of advance and to take advantage of every opportunity to uee strong re serveeagainet weak pointe in his for nretione.The aims of these maneu vera are to break the momentum of the attack and to deetroy already weakenedforrnatione. From the beginning of hostilities, vaet portions of Swiss territory will feel the effects of war. Combat will ~ve a fluid character. Defe dere \ muet expect to be attacked fro%all sidee.An aggressors rapid and deep tbruete, and the contamination of I
~ hcamhor t867 .

parts of the ground by chemical or nuclear weapons, may reduce Swiss Army units to fragments of varying importance. These fragments will have to fight separated from adjacent unite. However, unity of action will be as eured as long as comnmnicatiloneare maintained. It ie likely that the aggressor will not be alone in ueing nuclear and chemical weapone on Swise territory. Other powers may use these weapons against the aggressor. Then, it is con ceivable that combat would become a fight between isolated formation with rriodest meane at their dieposal reeorting to elementary methode of combat. But to base Switzerlands con. cept of defense on this eingle poeei bi[ity would be wrong.
Planning Methods

Rapid advances in military tech nology and the attendant increase in military epending show that an effec tive national defense muet be based on a planning schedule covering at leaet a 10-yeer period. The starting point for planning de fense during the 1970s consiets of an analyeis of the potential enemy and the threate he ie capable of ueing againet Switzerland. It will then be poaeible to determine those which Switzerland can ward off militarily. From a forecaet of the threat, coupled with an estimate of Switzerlands general condition, one can study tfie repercussion on the conduct of com bat. In the 1970s, if Switzerland is in volved in military operations, it will meet likely be in the framework of a general war. Nuclear armaments will continue to be the primary means of mase destruction in the foreseeable future and will be characterized by a 69

SWISS OEFEWSE

growing diversity in their rrse.Chem ical and biological weapons will, per haps, assume gr.mter importance. In the air war, there will be a tend ency toward a euitzble distribution of tasks between manned aircraft, guided missiles, and space veldcles.

obsolete war equipment would pose greater difficulties and hardsbipe to the Swiss Army than it would to other armies, Improvement and moderniza. tion are also limited by tbe armed forces fragmented periods of inetruc. tion. Instru&lon in the use of weap

%vitzerlsndhas ordered57 Jfirope 111-Ssircraft The latter will bring an increased ca pability in reconnaissance and liai son. On the ground, one can expeet to eee more effective reconnaissance; greater mobility, especially air mobil ity; and greater emphaeis on longrange weapons and electronic warfare. Another basis for planning the de fense of the 1970s ie the considera tion of the limite of Switzerlands ca pabilities. The future organization of the army is strongly limited by what ie currently in existen~uipment, inatallationg reserves of ammunition, and all types of materiel. Diacardmg
70 *.

ons and new devices ie spread out over several years. In addition, estisfying additional requirements is also restricted by the number of persons available for serv- ice. Stzrthg new unita or increasing the strength of existing units cannot be accomplished without dissolving other organizations or reducing their strength. Taking into account the picture of the enemy of the 1970s, the tasks of the Swiss Army, and the limiting fec tors, the grride7ineeof Switzerlands planni~g are: Military R* ,&

SWISS DEFENSE
Increase the possibility of eur vival. Increaae combat power by im provementsin the effectiveness of fire and mybility. Improve the means of command. Develop the capability to inter vene in tbe event of emergencies. Estimating the proper condltiona for Switzerland is of decisive impor tance. Technical military development in other countries and changes in ar mament and organization of foreign armies must he studied. The organization of the army must be adapted to exieting circumstances and new requiremente. These must be within the limits of personnel, equip ment, and finance. Training must atress the complete utilization of the soldiers aptitudes and the characteristic of the equip. ment. Training should he as close ae peasibleto actual war conditions. In the future, Switzerland will need to take measurea of total defenee. The armys zonea of action will be more and more inhabited. It, therefore, be comesnecessary to take into consider ation the needs of civilians during military operations. However, a re duction of military forces to, create specialunits to protest civilians would mrve neither the beet interesta of na tionaldefense nor the particular needs of the civilian population. Switzerlandhas proceeded from the ideathat her forcee will not have nu clear weapons or their equivalent at herdisposal. She has signed the treaty banning testing of nuclear weapone in the atmosphere, in space, and nnder water. However, as long as these weapons exietand ean be used againet Switzer land,she hae the right to examine the

advantages and disadvantages occur ring from the possession of nuclear arrne. Such an examination includes more than a study of protection and dissuasion and how nuclear weapons could reinforce Switzerlands combat power. It aleo includes the study of the baees upon which a possible deei sion to equip Swiss forces with nuclear weapons could be founded. In the plan of development of the infantry, priority requirements are the aequiaition of a new generation of antitank weapons, the reinforcement of low-angle fire weapons, equipment for night combat, and the improvement of materiel for mountain warfare. For mechanized units, for the most part, the effort will go toward the improvement of present equipment. Air defense protection will have to be reinforced. Antitank ! weapona will have to be replaced about the middle of the next deeade by more modern weapons. Before 1970, a decision will have tO be reached 01, modernizing the ar tillery to guarantee appropriate sup port to mechanized forces. Studies aimed at a more rational use and dis tribution of vehicles are being con ducted. Priority is given to replace ment of technically obsolete vehicles and to improving the quality of trans portation. At the beginning of tbe 1970s, Switzerland must foresee the acquisi- , tion of a new series of aircraft, re sponsive to the nations needs and corresponding to her financial capabil ities. When the introduction of cur rently sought surface-to-air missiles and air defense cannon ia achieved, Switzerland will have to think shout replacjng other obsolete pieces with more effective weapons.

MMIITY
On the Battlefield
Lieutenant ColonelRobertB. Tu1lY, .?/mfed Sfafe8 Army The views expreeeed in this article are the author8 and are not twcee?arilg those of the Department of the Arnw, Department of Defense, or the US Army Command and General Staff CoUsge.Editor. 72 NE of the earliest military writ ere, Sun-tsu, in hie book, Ths Art of War, commented rapidity-is the eseence of war. Tacticians before and after him have also emphasized that npneuver and rapid movement Mili@yRwbn ., .J

,.
BATTLEFIELD MOBILITY

are the keye to victory on the battle field. Todays tacticians refer to this as tactical mobility. The history of tactical mobility has reached an apex in the airmobile division. Alexander the Great recognized the mobility potential when he conquered thecivilized world by his use of lightly armoredmaneuver nnits on the flanks of hk heavy phalanxes. WhHe Alex anderutilized cavalry, it remained for Genghis Khan to demonstrate fully the importance of this new form of mobilewarfare when he nnleashed his mounted hordee.
Powerful New Element

The battlefield use of animals with their mobility advantage over the foot soldier wee a decisive factor for decades after the Genghis Khan era until the application of gunpowder. This powerful new element held sway tbrougbout most of the years to the 20th century. In the US Civil War, the rifled musket highlighted the dominanceof firepower and accounted for high casualty rates. The ultimate in firepower without mobility occurrad during World War I when the tremendous firepower of both antagonist rqmrlted in a trench Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Tullg is with the US Avmy Test and EvaZ vation Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Marp.kwtd. A 1967 gradnate of the US Army War CoUege, Carlisle Barracke, Pennsylvania, he hm eerved with the Milita~ Aeeistance Cem nand and let Cavalry Divieiors (Air mobile) in Vietnam. Other as8ign W-nts inclnde duty with the O&e of pervemsel Operation, Department of the Army, Wmhingtm, D. C.; with the 187th Airborne, Regimental Com bat Team, and 8th US Army, Korea; @ with Headquarter, US ArnsII, Europe, and VII Corps in Gecvnany.
hcember 13S7

stalemate with overwhelming casual ties again prevalent. In World War 11, the value of increased mobility wae briefly demonstrated in the bold thrusts of German panzer units in Europe, the tank battlee in Africa, and General George S. Pattone daeh through France. However, in the main, the bulk of the fighting during thie period was geared to the mobility of the infantry. It has been qnly in the last few years with the improve ments in aerial platforms that mo bility hae regained ite proper place. Mobility includes freedom of action whereby centralized control of subor. dinate units is normally minimal. It creates initiative in leadere and devel ops better information of enemy and friendly capabilities alike. Stonewall Jackson ably demonstrated this tac tical principle in his ShenandoahVal ley campaign when he held 70,000 men at bay with only 17,000, defeated them in four battles, and nearly de etroyed them at Winchester.
Search far Balance

Throughout the yeare, Wletory re veals the search for balance in the employment of troops on the battle field. The primary thrust of the US Armys efforte in the recent yeare has been devoted to restoring balance be tween firepower and mobility and be tween the forces to be engaged. The United States has restored the tecti-, cal balance in Europe by turning to mechanized and armored unite to counter a similar USSR force poeture. In the meantime, in the developing areas of the world, the threat now ap pears in the form of wars of national liberationlow-intensity warfare on terrain and under conditions where our highly sophisticated units cannot operate effectively nor can those of 73

BAITIEFIELB

MOBILITY

meet other countries. Once more, then, the United States faced the problem of foot soldler encountering feet sol dier with progress measured in yards per hour. The Army turned to the light air craft, and in early 1962, conducted a study to develop new tactical mobil ity concepts. While primary emphaais was devoted to increased mobility, other functionsincluding firepower, command, and controlwere also ex amined in order to restore balance in the land battle. The study group, known as the Howze Board, issued its final report in August 1962. In this report, the board noted that the Army lacked proper air mobility posture be cause of a shortage of aircraft. Since aircraft of the right type were in the inventory, the group recommended that sufficient numbers should be pro cured and tactical units formed whzch would have the deeired mobility. After further testing and evalua tion, the 1st Cavalry Divisioti (Air mobile) entered the force structure and was soon employed. High tributes have been paid to the division through out its period of combat duty in South Vietnam.

along the route, Other critical points included bridges, winding portions of the road, and a few isolated wooded areas. The plan devised by the battalion commander to protect the convoy was eimple and flexible. The task force was spread out in many strongpoints along the initial portion of the route, and the convoy was started through in close order. When the end of the vehicular column passed the proteeb ing unit, that unit was airlifted to the head of the battalion formation where it eeeured a previously unpro tected critical piece of terrain. Fire support Tube artillery units were in the hattal~on formation and were placed so as to be able to support by fire the many small strongpoints. When it be. came necessary to move artillery units, aerial rocket artillery support was utilized until the new positions were manned. Controlling the opera. tion. from his aerial command P@ the battalion commander thus was able to move the convoy rapidly by leapfrogging units ahead of the col umn until the destination was reached safely. A typical search and destroy mis. sion assigned by the division corn. mander to a brigade wae to search for Viet Cong main force units in a piece of terrain approximately 30 miles long and 10 miles wide. The ter: rain was mostly dense tropical growth without roads and only allowed snail like foot movement. The brigade was composed of three infantry battalions supported by an a~lllery battalion, a lift battalion, 8 cavalry troop, an aerial rocket batkd ion, and other suppofilng units. Dividing the area into six-mile

Esamples
Tactical mobility of the airmobile division can best be illustrated by reviewing typical missions actually performed by the 1st Cavalry Divi eion in Vietnam. One such mission was the protection of a vehicular sup ply column. This mission, assigned to an airmobile battalion tack force, was to protect a convoy of several hundred vebiclea which was passing through approximately 46 miles of Vlet Cong territory. The terrain was generally open and rolling with the exception of a rugged mountain range midway 14 LA... .. . .

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Milmy Revim

. .Aaf

BATTLEFIELD MOBILITY

squares, the brigade advanced east to west with the air cavalry screening the front and flanks and the infan try battalions leapfrogging each other into new eearch and destroy areae. Shortly after commencing the opera tion and, when unite were widely dis persed in their search missions, the air cavalrv noted enemv activity some

battalions were assembled and air lifted to positions from which they could influence the action. Strong ground units in the decisive area sup ported by massed atilllery fires were in complete control 24 hours later. Over 6,000 artillery rounds and 2,000 aerial rockets had been fired in supuort of the infantry. A Vlet Cong

US Amw

Horsesandgunpowder combinefor mobilityandfirepower distance to the weet. In order to take advantage of the observation, one widely scattered battalion wae promptlyassembled and lifted into the area. Soon, it became evident that the enemy force engaged was of regi mentalsize or larger. Immediately,all air cavalry was di rected to screen in the area of con. tact. Concurrently, reinforcements from an unengaged unit were airlifted into the fight and all artillery units suppofilng the brigade were reposi tioned in order to concentrate their fires in the decieive area. Shortly thereafter, the remaining infantry
December1967

regiment had been destroyed: Within 48 hours, after a period of mopping UP, units were again assembled, moved, and placed in another search area 10 miles to the northwest. The advantages of an airmobile unit in rapid response time and in~ difference to obstacles are apparent. Without being freed from the friction of ground movement, these operations probably would have taken much longer or would have required much larger forcee. The rice paddies, jun gles, and rivers are little hindrance to rapid movement. By avoiding such obstacles, the individual soldier he 75

BATTLEFIELD MOBILITY

comes less fatigued and is better able to perform his job. Equally important is the ability to search for an elueive enemy on an extremely broad front in difficult ter rain while being logistically supported by aerial vehicles. When enemy con centrations are located, troops, fire power, and tbe necessary support can

available, the designation of a rs serve unit merely entails a radio trans in a similar manner in order to provide maximum effort. Just prior to the engagement already described, air cavalry reconnaissance unite were spread out over 30 miles or more in
mission Other to that effect. resources can be switched

be massed rapidly at the decisive points to defeat the enemy. This ability to mass at the critical point applies to all elements of the division. Becauee the brigades oper ate consistently over large areas, units from squad to battalion must do like wise. when a unit encounters strong resistance, additional support is brought in immediately. Another advanhgei of the airmobile unit is its ability to change task force structure on short notice. Any unit not heavily engaged may be utilised as a reserve regardless of its relative location. Provided a pickup zone is

support of all the battalions. Minutw thereafter, these reconnaissance re sources were concentrated in support of the engaged unit. Similarly, infsn try units from dietant locations changed hands rapidly, artillery units were positioned, and lift units di verted their resources as necessary. Such ability to reconfigure task or ganization promptly complements the ability to mass nnite at the critical point. Another key factor is the un matched capacity for personal com munication in the airmobile unit bs twaan the man who gives the orders .
Miiitery IWU

16
iaswk .... .--.... ...->. . ..

.# ..@

BATTLEFIELD MOBILITY

and those who must comply. When time is available, a written order may be sufficient. However, when ,the en emy presence is fleeting and time is short, written orders are impractical and radio transmissions are, at best, impersonal and insecure. Throughout the actions de?cribed previously, the commsnderwas able to talk to subor dinates face-to-face: Orders were is sued, coordination was made, and many doubts were clarified on t%e spot. When task organizations are be ing changed and units massed, there is m substitute for personal contact. Other missions can be added to the list which amplify the versatility and flexibility of the airmobile concept. Search and clear, road clearance, and security of base areas over extended distanceare but a few. The airmobile concepthas proved to be sound. Critics will hasten to point out cer tain areas where the airmobile force is at a disadvantage and has yet to prove itself. The most commonly voiced disadvantages are: vulnerabil ity of aircraft, sustainability, and a limited combat environment. Experienceto date does not support these reservations. From January 1962to July 1966, helicopters through out Sontb Vietnam flew over 2.5 mil lion sotiles carrying assault troops, evacuatingwounded, and lifting cargo. Duringthis period, only one helicopter was lost per 16,000 sorties. Fighting against main force units primarily, the Ist Cavalry Division established a similar record. In regard to sustainability, the 1st Cavalry Division has attained very high atandarde. In the Pleiku campaign,the division maintained relent 1sss pressure on three enemy regi ments for a period of 35 days and
kemher 1967

practically destroyed the force. Dur ing Operation Masher-White Wing, the division shattered the better part of three other enemy regiments in a 41-day campaign. Similar Iengtby op erations are still being conducted. In deed, it appears that the sustainability of airmobile forces in combat is lim ited only to the endurance of the in dividual soldier. The impact of this particular problem was eased by tbe rapid replacement of tired troops by those engaged in base security. While tbe question of the limited combat environment for an airmobile force still appeare unanswered, the evidence gathered from over three years of exteneive field teste and com bat indicates that the airmnbile divi sion can perform virtually every mis eion expected of a division. In order to counter the apparent threats to US security, it appears that more airmobile forces are required in the Armys force structure in order to react to various levels of violence. The airmobile concept has proved it , self to be sound ae shown by the record of the 1st Cavalry Division. I
, But it is neceeeary to do more than i add airmobile divisions to the struc ture. There muet be corresponding I improvements in strategic mobility in order to maximize the efftilveness of tactical mobility. There must be total I mobility. While strides have been made in) this direction, our strategic mobility I
posture must be examined in detail in order to develop fast deployment vehicles, to improve strategic Logis tical concepts and practices, and to find better methods of delivering sup pliee to the combat forces. Once th% has been done, the total mobility con cept will be a reality. 77

French Armor: 1940

John A. Lynn

RENCH armored doctrine rather than an inferiority in numbers of tanks bears the responsibility for the defeat of French armor in 1940, The Germans had no real numerical advantage. General Heins Guderirm has stated that the Germans had a total of 2,800 tanks, of which only 2,200 were used. B. H. Liddell Hart estimates that the 10 panser divisions employed in France numbered 2,574 tanks. On the French side, the report of the French Commission of Inquiry re vealed that 2,909 modem tanke were produced and delivered to the French Army between 1935 and 1939. More, of couree, were available by May of 1940. Liddell Hart sets the number of modern French tanks by that date at

.
78
Military Revim

FRENCH ARMOR

3,5oO.Considering that British tanks were also in service on the Continent, sheer weight of numbers was on the Allied side. Neither were French tanks inferior, tank for tank. The French had 95, H35, H39, and FCM light tanks, Somwamediums, and heavy B tanks. The attacking Germans had, in their 10 armored divisions, light KwI and KWIItanks, Czech light-mediums, and mediumKwIZZ and KwIV tanks. Char acteristics of these several designs of armoredcombat vehicles reveal French superiorityin thickness of armor plate and in caliber of armament as shown in the accompanying table.
German Guns Ineffective

man tanks. They generally had poor radio equipment or none at all; and all French tanks had one-man turrets. Therefore, one man had to load and aim the gun while be commanded the vehicle. On balance, however, the ad vantage in equipment lay with the French.
Ooctrkre and Organization To explain the defeat of French ar

The thick armor plate of the French tanksmeant that probably no German mainarmament, not even the 75-milli meter gun, could penetrate a French tank, at least at its point of greatest armor thickness. French light tanke could, on the other hand, pierce Ger man light tanke, while French me diums and heavies could pierce any German tank. Concerning the 1940 campaign, General Erwin Rommel complained,Our guns eeemed to be completely ineffective against the heavyarmor of the French tanks. In fact, in terme of gun caliber and thick ness of armor plate, a French Iight tank was more equivalent to a KwIII, a medium, than to the two types of Germanlight tanks. French tanks did suffer from other shortcomings. Except for the Somua medium,they were slower than GerJohn A. Lgnn attended the Univer sity of Illinois at Urbana where he received his A.B. degree. He received hie M.A. in Milita~ History from the Vnivereitg of Caltfol.rzia at Davia, and ie new working toward hia Ph. D. Oemaher 1967

mor in May and June 1940, we,should look at French doctrine and organiza tion. The first and most important statement of armored doctrine, en titled Provisio?ml Indrrwtione Con cerning the Tactical Utilization of Larger Units, wae produced in 1921 by a military panel under the direc tion of Marshal Henri P. P6tain. It etated that firepower wae the primary concern, and attack waa justified only after considerable preparation. An offensive was to be a heavy con centration of mass piled up behind the lines and sent tumbling toward the enemy as an avalanche in which the infantry would play the greatest part. Light and heavy tanke were seen as offensive weapone, but offensive weap ons in a slow-motion war of nearly etatic f rents. Light tanks were to ac company the infantry while heavy tanks, by their mass and firepower, were to clear tbe way for infantry and light tanks. An Instruction on the Employment of Combat Tanks appeared in 1930, but it merely reinforced the earlier statements of the 1921 Zrwtruetien. I,Tanks are only to be supplementary>
put temporarily at the disposition of
the infantry; they considerably rein force its action, but they do not re

place it. In 1934, when the first large mechanized unit, the 1st L]ght Mech anized Divieion, was constituted un ,,

TANK CHARACTERISTICS

8foximurn Armor
Tgpe Weight Ton8 Armoment Caliber
French R95 12 One machinegun

sgse4

Miles per Bow or Minimum-Maximum Where Known

40-millimeter

13

One .37-millimeter cannon BS5 12 One machinegun One 37-millimeter cannon

One machlnegun

40-miWmeLr

above

13

FZ89

12

40-millimeter

above

13

One S7-millimeter cannon

SOmua
B (3 types)

20

.One

machinegun

40-millimeter

28

One 47-millimeter

ermnon 30-33 Two machineguns

One 47-millimeter cannon One 76-millimeter -. 40-70-millimeter

cannon (ehort barrel)

German
KtoZ KwII 6 9 Two machineguns
One maehinegun

3-13-millimeter 12-14-millimeter

25 30

One 20-millimeter cannon

KurlII

16

Two rnachhegune 20-25-millimeter One 37-millimeter cannon ~

One machinegun

24

KwIV

20

25-millimeter

26

One 47-millimeter cannon One 75-millimeter cannon (short barrel)

80
k. r&L.

Military Rovim .

FRENCH ARMOR

der cavalry command, it was consid ered as a mechanized version of horse cavalry, not as a true armored divi
sion.

In 1936, under the guidance of Gen eral Maurice G. Gamelin, a new In strwctton on the Tactical Utilization of Larger Unitk was issued. More lati tude was given to tanks, but they were still pictured as a breakthrough weapon in a warfare of continuous fronts. No detailed method for the employmentof large, heavy armored formations was included since none exieted in France at that time. Between 1936 and 1939, two addi tionallight mechanized divisione were created, and after the German Sep tember1940 euccesses in Poland, four armoreddivisions were hastily impro vised. They were fitted into existing organization and doctrine. Stertof Blitzkrieg Blitzkrieg commenced in Western Europe on 10 May 1940 as the Ger mans invaded the Netherlands, Be]. gium,and Luxembourg. On 13-14 May, panzerdivisions crossed the Meuae at Sedan and Dinant after advancing throughthe Ardennee. Following their successful penetration at Sedan, the panzers swept on to the Channel, reachingit near Abbeville on 20 May. German armor had cut the French Army in tWO,isolating the northern half. The best chance for France to defeat this armored thrust was with her own armored units. Her failure to do so was due, in large measure, to faulty employment doctrine. b 10 May 1940, French armored forces were divided into three cate goriesinfantry tanks, light mecha- 1 nizeddivisione, and arrnor~ddivisions. I The first category included 34 battal ions of about 45 tanks each. The batDecember1967

talion were distributed among nine field armies. When these scattered bat talion came into contact with massed German armor, they were brushed aside. This fragmentary deployment caused nearly one-half of all French tanks to be unavailable to the cru cial large French armored formations. The three light mechanized divi sions were committed to battle with

ti.tewtichische

Militnriach. Zeit..hrift

The GermanKIoIIlighttank the Allied forces north of the German penetration. These divisions, composed of light and medium armor, armored cars, motorcyclists, and motorized in fantry, were at a disadvantage at leaet when compared to the lst, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, or 10th Panzer Divisions which were stronger than the remain ing four German armored dihaions. The Germans, in fact, had abandoned their light (mechanized) divisiorrk as ineffective after the Polish cam paign. All the French light mechanized di visions fought north of a line through Arras and Dinant. The 1st Light Mechanized Divieion wae originally employed in Belgium. It began to move into Holland with the French 7th ArmY but was forced

m=,. . ..

FRENCH ARMOR

to turn back on 11 May. The division was $hen moved south and dlepereed into support battalions along the front of the 1st North African Division on the northern iiank of the German penetration. On 18 May at 0700, General Henri H. tXraud ordered the division to counterattack. General Giraud be-

cavalry corps commanded by General Ren6 Prioux. This corps moved intc Belgium on 10 May in accordance with the Dyle Plan of the French staff. Stationed before Gembloux, the 2d and 3d formed an advance guard an armored defense corps told tc ecreen the lat Army and to fight a delaying action while that army dug

Iieved that if the counterattack had been delivered immediately, it could have bad considerable .reaults. But since the division was dispersed in stead of being held as a ready maes, it was not assembled until 1830 and its attack met with no aucceae. Later, on 24 May, the infantry section of the divieion was spiit off and used in an attack during the evening of the 25th. The 2d Light Mechanised Division, along with the Sd, was part of the 82

in on the Dyle River. The 16th Panaer Corps inflicted heavy losses on both the 2d and 3d, forcing them back to 1st Army lines on 14 May. When the corp reached safety, they were split up into suppbrt units and dispersed along the line of the 1st ArrnY. By 24 May, both divisions had bees regrouped and committed separately. All three mechanised divisions began evacuation at Dunklrk on 31 May. , Four armored divisions constituted the thi~d type of French armored for ~ilitmy Rotim . .J

FRENCH ARMOR

mation in MaY and June 1940. On 10 May 1940, the first three armored ditisionswere held in reeerve on the plains of Champagne close to Reime. But in less than a week these large, heavyarmored unita had suffered from confusedemployment and unneeesaary dispersion.The only armored division that maintained ita integrity through out May and June waa the 4th which was not formed until 14 May.
Spring Campaign With the opening

of the spring cam paign on 10 May, the 1st Armored Division was sent north from Reims Mechanical Troubles to supportthe lat ArmY along the Dyle The 3d Armored Division had been River. It wae unloaded from trana. ordered to move up to reinforce the port trains on 12 May, and on 14 May 2d Army on 12 May. While moving on was ordered to take up positions for Sedan, this new armored division en an attack on the Dinant area. How countered mechanical troubles. What ever, after moving into position, the was not dispersed by mechanical fail tanks were very short of gas. Due to ures was diepersed by command on confusion and delays, the tanks could 14 May as the division wae ordered not refuel until the morning of the to organize armored strongpoints all 15th. That morning while refueling along tbe 2d Army front. Thus; this was in progresethe let Armored Di armored division was virtually re vision was attacked by the 7th and moved from the board as an active 5th Panzer Divisions, wedged between player. By 4 June, only 60 tanks of them, and annihilated. On 16 May, this formation were left. GeneralBruneau of the 1st Armored At least the lately formed 4th Ar Divisioncould aesemble only 17tanks. mored Division waa not diapersed, but The 2d also suffered heavy losses. it was employed as an isolated unit. This division was originally ordered The 4th did not exist until 14 May, on 13 May to join the 1st Army. Ar and by then the 2d and 3d Armored riving at the railroad station, the di Divisions could hardly be called divi vision w~s delayed because of a scar- . sions, while the lat had been elimi city of fit cars. For the next three nated. Its first assignment was a d& days, the 2d was in the process of fensive one; on 14 May, it was ordered movement. The commander of the to cover the formation of the 6th northeast front then recalled the dL Army by operating in the Laon dis vision and ordered its tracked vehicles trict. The concept of thla mission waa to unload from the trains; however, basically one of defensive support by the spreadout division was directly in a large unit, the path of the victorious panzere. On 28 May, the division launched Wheeled vehicles fled south; tanks a counterattack against the German moved north. Severed as it was, the bridgehead at Abbeville with some
Maember 1337

2d Armored Division was no longer a coherent unit. It was broken up into small units which were assigned to holding bridges. The division was again re grouped on 26 May with 196 tanks. Before it could go back into action as an entire division on 31 May, it lost 50 of these tanks due to mechanical failurea incurred during a series of marchea and countermarches. The dk viaion suffered heavily in the next few daya of fighting and by 4 June had only 86 tanks.

8s

FRENCH ARMOR

success. On 30 May, the 4th Armored Division pulled back to regroup and await further action. The method of employment of ar mored forcee must be considered a major cause of French defeat. Tanks were regarded as infantry support weapone; armored divisions were die persed as support battalions; and di

visione were employed separately stead of uniting them into arm corps for large-scale counteroffensi The interwar French determine to subordhate armor to infantry tually ruled out an effective con tration of armor. Thie faulty emp ment was not a matter of chance, a matter of policy.

COMMENTS INVITED

The Military Review welcomes your comments on any mate rial publiehed. An opposite viewpoint or a new line of thought of your ideas. If you will assist us and may lead to publication

are an anthority on a certain subject, why not write an article for our consideration? If you have only an idea, query us; per haps we can assist you in developing an acceptable article.

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34
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MilitaIY Ilevim
.
.d

A%C fi\:D~From

Krasnaua Zuezda (USSR)

SOVIET
GROUIIID FORCES
/

Marshal

Ivan 1. Yakubovsky,

Soviet Armg

This article ie one of Marehal yakubovekgs fi?et .pronounceqnerlte en military doctrine after being ap. pointed a Soviet First Dem@ Mi* ister of Defense and the .mnwnander in chief of the Way8aw pact forcee. Editor. OVIET military doctrine is based on the fact that the nations .ae curity in peace and war ie insured by theefforts of all the armed forces and their combat msene. Nevertheless,
LWombw lsb7

man will etill play the primary role in any armed conflict. The ground forces have undergone, great change. They have been equipped with missiles and nuclear weapons. Their firepower has grown along with their capability to deliver deep fires and conduct rapid opera tions. This qualitative leap forward has had a tremendous influence on the nature and ecope of contemporary combhed arme combat and on the meane by which it ie waged. 85

SOVIET GROUND FORCES

At the same time, the Soviet Union has qot been able to make the role and capabilities of nuclear weapons absolute, especially in the achievement of ground forces missions. In a whole series of situations, these

conventional, cleesieel organic, weaponryartillery, tanks, and small arms. Consequently, along with the devel. opment of. missiles and nuclear weap ens, the Soviet Union attaches great

forces must, be prepared to wage comL bat withont employing nuclear weap ons. They must be prepared to use Thie article was transkzted and digested from the original, pub ltihed in KEASNAYA ZVESDA (USSR) 21 July 1967. Marshal Yabubovehw ia the aw thor of The Commandere Re epotwibility which appeared in the December 1965 issue of the MILITAZY REVIEW. t

:r

significance to developing and per fecting conventional combat means. Conventional means have not lost their significance. This further in creasee the greund forces firepower and etriklng power, and their capa bility for combat with or without nu clear weapons. There hae been a eharp increase in the firepower of the ground forces as a result of equipping regiments and other formations with the meet . Military iterke ..:&&4

SOVIET GROUND FORCES

modern automatic small arms and more powerful models of other weap ons.These forces have their own mod ern air defense weapons. The missile systemsare able to destroy enemy air craft with a high kill probability in sny type of weether. Antiaircraft guns and other means of combating low-levelaircraft have been improved. Today, a volley of tire from a Soviet motorized rifle division is several times greater than the volley of a World War II mechanized corps. Strikbg power is insured primar ily by the large number of tanks. In the current motorized rifle division, there are more tanks than there were in the World War II mechanized corps. Thesetanks are superior to the latest tanks of the United Statea and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries in a number of the more importantcharacteristics. Soviet tanks are better protected against both con ventional and nuclear weepons, and havepowerful weapons and a high de gree of mobility. Tanka are one of the primary means for rapid exploitation of deep strikes made by Soviet mis sile forces, aircraft, and atilllery. Equipping Soviet motorized units with armored vehicles increased the ground forces striking power. No longer is there any need to feer that the infantry will lag behind the tanks and be unable to reinforce their euc

cesses. Operating in a~ored person nel carriers, a Soviet motorized rifle division can advance rapidly and is able to exceed the rate of advance made by tank unite during the Iaet operations of World War II. Today, when powerful, deep tires wiU precede the operations on the battlefield, Soviet ground forces will have the capability to conduct rapid marches and displacements, and of maneuvering on a broad scale in order to ztrike the enemy in the flank and rear. The offense will be carried to greater depths with deci&e aims and at high ratea of advance. Due to the presence of amphibious materiel in the units, and to the capabilities of the tanks to ford rivers and lakes, attacking units will be able to make hastf crossings of water barriers un aided. One other important characteristic will lend an exceptionally mobile and active character to combat operations of the ground forces. This is the pres ence of airborne forces in which are concentrated the most varied and powerful weapons and materiel. In brief, this is the status and ca pability of the Soviet ground forces. Aithough they possess formidable weaponry, their main etrength is the personnel who are capable of ueing the entire range of available destruc tive power. *

kembor 1967

81

,,
The vieuw expreeeed in this article are the authors and are not neces. earilg thoee of the Department of the Army, Department of the Navg, De partment of Defmwe, or the US Army Command and General Staff CoUege. Editor. EVER before in our eociety has decieion making been so criti ital. The amount and complexity of }fiformation that
muet be assimilated a.~ anal~zed is sniggering, while the time avadable for planning and cx~

cuting deeieions ie diminishing. This is especially true in the military reabn. Military commanders are seeking rapid reeponse means for gainin~ ex perience in military operations and contingencies. War gaming has be come a valuable means of gaining this necessary experience and also of de- . Military ftwbe &

80

.
WAR GAMING,

veloping automatic and correct re sponses to various situations. This is necessitated by the high capacity of modern communication systems col lection of information and the need for speed in the evaluation of this in-, focmation in todays environment. War games are not new. They were the map problems of the 19th century and are still played today by military unite and as parlor games. The Ger man General StatTused war games as a meansfor training officers in tactks and decision making and to test the officere abilities in solving tactical problems. War gaming in the US Army evolved from simple map prob lemsto a very scientific study.

and bandies the apparatus of play, to gamee, where completely mechanized

strategies are initially specified and computere carry out all details of play. A useful discussion of war gaming as a meane of teaching tactics and gaining experience in decision mak ing requires a common understanding of the principal terms ueed.
Operations Research Operations research is a relatively new concept and ia the result of ef forts begun during World War II. It

L#nchester Model
The current trend is to develop the processas an operations research tech nique. The earliest attempt to apply a mathematical relationship to war gaming was in 1916 by F. W. Lan cbester, and much of the published workon war gaming uses hk concepts as a stsrthg point. The essential step in development from claesical war gamesto a scientific tool was the sub stitutionof scientific planning factors and roles for arbitrary adjudication. The vehicle for war gaming varies from the map exercises, where teams playopposing sides and a control team calculates the results of interaction Major Edwin S. Tankhw, US Army Reaewe, ie a mobilization designee to the Electromice Command Laboratory at Fort Afommouth, New Jersey. He holds a B.S. from. the University of Wiecondn at Madieon, and an M.S. from the lJniversity of Psmwylvania at Philadelphia. He is a Reeeareh Ph~eicel Jfet~uvgiet with the Naval Air lingine~ng Cmter, Department of the Navg, PhUadelphin, Pemw@
vania. hmrnbnr 1967

is an attempt to introduce mathemat ics and the capabilities of computers to decieion making. It deals with max imizing certain wanted consequences and minimizing certain unwantedcon sequence. operations research is a way of thinking and not a single method. The central idea behind the method involvee the use of models, usually mathematical modele, to solve tbe problem. The computer is pro gramed to carry out the calculations. Operations research reached ita high point in the Britieh Royal Air Force during World War II in con nection with air-sea rescue techniques in the English Channel. The probabil ity of the rescue was maximized as a function of time, area search, and the degree of localization of the search. Simulation and decision making are two areas where the operations re search concept finale its greatest ap plication. The steps in the thought, processes used in makhg an estimate of the situation or in analysing the variou~ courses of action can be con sidered a phase of operations research. In operation research, models are used to make decisions. There is some ultimate objective that the deeieion maker wants to maximize or mini mize. The model is then used for find 89

WAR 6AMINS

The high capacity of modern comnmnication systems provides massive amounts of . information to the commander whether he he war gaming or on the hattietleid

tion. A model can be a representation of a structure, or it might describe a functional relationship. Models in the scientific field are usually represented by algebraic notations. The construe. tion of the model usually involves identification of the significant vari ables an,d apeeifying the relationship 90

ulated experimental fashion. The de cision-makfng part of the problem is simulated by having psople make de. cisions in the same manner that would be required in tbe real-life situstion. The opposing tsama of players make the command decisions to attack or retreat, open fire, or call for air aup

.
Militafy ffwin

WAR 6AMING

port. A team of referees monitors the game, and eometimes a computer cal culates the reetdts. The decision to tire is made by tbe apprOWiateteam, but the decision ae to whether or not the firing res~lts in a kill is reached by the referees or computer by applying certain rules and comparing them with the known kill probability of the weapon. War gaming is a means of experimenting withalternative tactics and strategies. War games are played according to rules and decided by skill, strength, or luck. The primary objective is to learn to win; hence, decieion-making skills must dominate.
Matheraafical Equations

esses. Command post exercises and field maneuvers are examples of man ual simulations when they are preplanned. Computer programs are typ ical machine simulations.
Information Theory Information theory is an important concept that arises in analysis, opera

Tbe Manchester model mentioned earlier is a seriee of mathematical equationswhich describe certain typee of military engagements. The mathe matical equations consider the initial strengths of the odd and even sides, and the average effectiveness of the odd and even men in killing their op ponents.The model assumes that the men put out of action are dead, and allmen in action are firing. The equa tions were established for the follow ing combat situations: When each side is visible to the other and each man on each side is able to fire at opposing individuals, the rate loss is proportional to the numberof opponents firing. When each side ie invieible to the othsr, and each fires into the adea he believes the other to OCCUPY, the 10SS rate on one side is proportional to the number of men on the other and to the number of men occupying the area under fire. Games, models, and simulations are distinguisbed by the degree to which they imitate decision-making procOecemher 19e7

tions research, and many other areas. Some generalizations are applicable without understanding the mat~emat ical concepts behind them. Messages, for example, play a considerable role in our daily activities. It is important to differentiate between the amount of information conveyed by a message and the value of tbe message to the person receiving it. The amount of information conveyed is the key fac tor in information theory. Suppose there are a number of like boxes, and one contains a 20-dollar bill. The person selecting the correct box is allowed to keep tbe money. A message says that tbe 20-dollar bill is in the fourth box. The information conveyed by that message is a quanti tative measure of information and is the basis of information theory. The amount of information needed to se lect the box containing the 20-dollar bill is the same whether the box con tains $20 or $100. The value of the information is greater in the latter event. If there are 25 boxee, then the meesage specifying wbicb box con- tained the 20-dollar bill would be of greater value than if there were only two boxes.}If there were but one box, the amount of information imparted would be zero since the message does not tell anything not ahmdy known. Information theory is a study in probability. The amount of informa tion increases as the number of pos
91

WAR GAMING

sible messages increase. However, the larger the number of messages which might be seketed, the greater the un certainty ae to which message will be received. There is no uncertainty when there is but one possible mes sage. The mock battle is a war-game tech nique frequently used by military forces and illustrates some of the ad-

cut rules. This is where experience is an important factor. Another important factor in sire. ulated battles is that commanders never have sufficient information, sqch as the essential elements of infortna tion, to make the decisione they would like to make. Some of the types of. major deeisione that come up in si@ ulated battles include whether to com-

Armm

The current trend is to

evelop war gaming as an operations rescereh technique

vantages and limitations of combat simulation. Umpires with everJ ;nit decide onthe-spot winners of a local engage ment, what actions are, feasible, and how many casualties there are. These maneuvers are never like the reel bat tle for they are carried out primarily for the purpose of instruction and training. Care must be exercised in the interpretation of the data. The types of decisions made by the com manders of the opposing sides are gen erally the same. There are certakr com binations that the experta all play the eemq even though there are no ckwm92 L.>,... . _.

mit a reserve division, whether to use a nuclear device, or whether tn change a plan of attack because an enemy nuclear weapon has been used. An important factor in any simu lated battle is communications. Mes sages are logged in for record aad , play a major role during the battle as well as in the analyeb of the re suits of the battle. A systems analyst or operations analyst classifies the messages and scores them on the bear ing they have on a decision. For ex. ample, in making a decision to use s nuclear device, the commander has b, be certain it will not hurt his own .
Militwy Rariw ..- &

WAR GAMING troops. In such an instance, he sel interval between degrees must be de fined, and this maybe difficult to do. The numerical scale must be changed to suit the structure of each new sit uation. It is virtually impossible to choose values for the constants or to estab lish casualty rates beforehand to pre dict the outcome of a battle. The equa tione worked out do not always ac count for all the vagaries of a real battle. The validity of the equatione is based on historical data for specific situations. Theee are then applied to the assumption used in the war-game simulation.

dom has accurate information on the location of his own troops; he only knowstheir location several hours pre viously. He also requires information concerningthe location of the enemy, and complete information concerning logistics. , The amount of information consid eredavailableis increased by the num ber of messages received-a very rough measure of information. Mee sagesthat deal with etrong enemy re sistanceor a nuclear logistic shortage are vital. These messages are dlffieult to evalua@; consequently, the analyst usually assumes that each message has identical informational content. Delay in Repertbag The usefulness of informa~on is af fasted by the delay in repofilng. Frontlineinfom-ation that is one-half hour old is more valuable than that wlich is three or four hours old. This distribution is usually present, prob ably related to human action and to the random addition of a large num ber of small delays along the line. Studies chow that the communica tionssystems serving the Army would have much greater value in decision makingif the delay times could be re duced. This ie one area where war gamingcan be valuable. Tactical model simulation involves problems of quantification, a term which appears frequently in the lit eratureon simulation. Quantification includesformulating a scale or index corresponding to degrees of differ ences among various qualitiee. Ter rain, for example, can he described qualitatively in terms of cover and concealment,man-made objects, traf ficability,tieldeof fire, dispersion, and terrain objective. Some measurable Mamherlg37

GeneralPrinciples
Despite the limitations of the Lan chester equations, they do represent a simple description of certain types of military exchange. Even though they cannot ordinarily be used to pre dict quantitatively the course of a military engagement,they have proved useful in explaining some of the gen eral principles. The Manchesterequations are being appEed to guerrilla and counterguer rilla warfare in war-gaming studies. Of greatest interest in thie situation ie the force ratio between the attack ing guerrilla and the defending reg ular forcee. The nature of guerrilla warfare ie such that the defending regular army mnst fragment itself to defend many points vulnerable to guerrilla attack ~ and to search for many guerrilla bands. Thus, the numerically inferior guerrilla can win if they are carefnl to maintain local superiority in any encounter with the regulars. I # particularly important factor in guerrilla and counterguerrilla opera tion is the effect of the attitude and support, of the kwal population for 93

WAR 6AMIM6 whtch the two sides must contend by political, economic, and psychological, as well as military meane. Such fac tors can often be reflected in values assigned to the fighting effectiveness of the eize of the group. They might be expressed in probabilistic terms. The attacking-guerrilla can, by the use of taetice that con&ensate for hla weaknesses, defeat a force of de fending regulars that hae over-all superiority in numbers and weapons. The defending forces can wiri by appropriate selection of weapons, countertactics, and group size for in dividual engagements in general. How ever, the high over-all ratios of de fending regulars to attacking guerril las that have characterized recent warfare of this Kind in which the defense has been successful are ex tremely difficult to deduce. This makes the problem of using a model very dif ficult. In a local engagement, if the ambusher ie approximately equal in size to the defender and both have comparable weapone and fighting ef fectiveness, the defender probably cannot win.

for perceiving the broadest possible range of alternatives, the streee of a major crisis tende to narrow a de. cieion makers view to a few familiar alternatives. Most decision makers can identify major available alternatives in a given crieia within a few hours. Wbst they cannot do withh a ehort time frame is to examine thoroughly tbt possible consequences of each alte~ tive which grow like branches on i tree. :3 The use of a computer in the simw Iation of various modele makes pozsk ble in a few hours the application of analytical techniques that might oth~ wise take month# to examine. The @ cision maker can identify othe ) unanticipated alternatives and resu 3 ~ $ Probabilistic Elements

An analyst partitions the field $ decision making according to an t& dividual, a group, and according W whether it is affected under the * ,. ditions of:

Availabla Alternatives
In deeieion making during war games, the problem meet commander are faced with at the bigher echelon is how to make a rational choice among alternatives. Thie ie where a decision maker neede to perceive a broad range of available alternatives. He must have an understanding of the nature of these alternatives and be able to estimate the consequences of choosing any alternative. The global ecope of consideration in thie era has enormously increaeed the quantity of information that a de cision maker must assimilate. In mo menta of crisis, when there is a need e4

. Certakity. If each action leadsM a specific outcome. Risk. If each action leads to a setof pessible specific outcomes, prob. ability is used. Uncertainty. When the probabili. ties of these outcomes are completely unknown or not even meaningful. A game played betieen a atrons forca and a week force gives little information because we can predict tie, outcome. This ia a certahty. The greater the numbsr of possible ouk comes, the richer the information that sin be utilised in studying various outcomes and their difference. Skili and strenirth of resources *

There are unknown factors that must be represented by a probabilistic elk . [ Militeq *

WAR GAMING ment. These unknown factors are per

sonalIeadereKlp,morale, and eeprit de corp$. To simulate this unknown ef feet, a probability weighing factor must be introduced. Thus, the out come of a battle is not completely de termined by the relative strength of

shows the positiou of actual units in the field. Thie type of game is well known to virtually all Army officere, In a man-machine game, the player obtains hie information from data dis played by a machine. The player then considers the variables represented by

Amw

New.

Feature.

Umpirss with every unit determine winnere in mock battle war games resources.Thie uncertainly is referred to as ignorance, and an attempt muet be madeto model its uncertain effecte. War-gameplayers run the rick of act ing without perfect knowledge of their own sw and strength or with outperfeet knowledge of the skill and strength of their opponents. In a msnua]ly eimulated war game suchas a command post exercise prob lem, the data input from a player is representedon a situation map which December 1967 these data and makes a decision. A typical decision might involve the Pos eible redeployment of tbe forces. , The decieion by the player is pro gramed into a computer. The corn- , puter then integrate the inpute, com pares them with the decieion-making criteria, and modltiee the model ac cording to the outcome of the com parison. The player obtains model-world feedbapk from his decisions and their ,, 95

~,.. .
WAR 6AMIN6

...

simulated consequences. Previously stored elements in the com,puter and the model restrict his deciston making to a previously determined logic. This limits the information received from the computer and the information he may put intd the computer which sire. ulates the sluggish responses of the real world. The advantage of combining men and the computer in deeision making is that the consequences of human players decisions can be developed rapidly and in greet detail by the com puter and be promptly fed back to the human. In game logic, outcomes are com puted from numerical values assigned to the capabilities of oppossd forces. DiSiculty arises since sheer numbers are not enough. The forces may be wfihted by factors such as weather, morale, or terrain. Not all of the per turbing factors are included in a model, so the probable effects are sim ulated by random numbers weighted by the force factor. Combat results are based on quanti ties and qualities of engaged forces. Their relative combat effectiveness de pends upen terrain, friendliness of the local population, quality of reconnais sance and intelligence, availability of air support, superiority in conven tional or nuclear weapons, and other factors. The results are also adjusted to aecoimt for factors which are be low the level of operating detail of the model. The validity of war games and their output ie always contingent upon the validity of game or model logic, in put data and assumptions, and evacu ation techniques. Even if all these factors are validhaving the desired

correspondence with reality, being re. producible, and representing the CX. periment the computer was intended to do-the validity of the game is still uncertain. Although there are trutbe revealed by the game, one can not be certain that these are the truths one intended to find or thst they repreeent all of the truths tbst eon be found. War games should not be assumed to be predictive. Simple games give simplified results, although these may be highly enlightening and sugges tive. Very complex games ean provide good qualitative representation of con sequences of alternative assumptio~ but not with any quantitative validi~ concerning relative probabilities of W ternative outcomes in the reaP world. The designer, struggling with tbq problems of developing a valid game model and logic, gains greater insig~ into correspondence with reality t~ the players who must simply make valid input assumptions during the play. There is also the possibility that no matter how realistic the game may be, the d~ision makbig involved in it may be more recktess than in an er tual situation where the stakes meY be destruction and annihilation. At the end, there is always ths matter of judgment. However, gamee, models, and simulations are not in tended to be substitutes for judgmsn$ but rather to be a means of exercising, extending, and improving judgment. If the final outcome of war gaming in the man-machine relationship is the improvement of the otlIcers judgment and rapid deeision making, then the expense involved is more than justi fied.

,
Military ReY@

Shroud for Communications Satellite

An all-metal payload shroud which 9eparateS in three sections will be used when an Air Force Titan 111 velicle

the

possibility of damaging thq pay load during separation, according to the manufacturer. Previous shrouds consisted of clamshell halves. Clamshell shrouds have operated successfully on three Titarz III launch es to date.US Air Force release. Computer Automatic Dictionary A computerized automatic diction ary that is capable of lookhg up Viet namese words and providing their English translations instantaneously has been developed by a US manu facturer. The computer performs a word-for word, and, in some cases, phraee-for phrase, lookup in a stored VletnameseEnglish dictionary and provides an output of the English equivalent for each word or phrase of the input sentences. ,The dictionary matching procedure makea use of a longest match tech nique so that, in some cases, whole phrases may he translated. Because Vietnamese is reeeonahly responsive, as a language to word-for-word trans lation, the new technique should pro vide useful raw intelligence to a mili tary unit on the contente of captured documents.News release.
The MILITARY REVIEW mid the U. & Army command .nd General Stiff Colleg. s# mme no resDOnBibititr for aeenmm of l. fOr ra.tim contained in the MILITASfY NOTES scetim of thh r.ubllutlon. Items are Wfnted = a serviee to the resdem. No official en domement of ~he view.. m.inf.nh or f.etnaf ststemenfs is mtended.-The Editor. I I

US Air Fur..

Titan 111 shroud

Iauncbes a communications satellite into space in the fall of 1968.

Theshroud is made up of three fair

ings which protect the sensitive in strumentation of scientific payloads

during passage through the earths atmosphere.Once free of the atmos phere,the protective fairings are jet tisoned. The three.section separation aya tem enables the shroud to clear the spacecraft more rapidly and reduces
December 1967

97

MILITARY N07ES XM172 firenadti launcher

AWIV News Fdwu

A model of the new automatic grenade launcher, the XM17.?, ie demonstrated by two members of the US Army Combat Developments Command Experimen tation Command (USACDCEC). The belt-fed weapon weighs 27 pounds and can fire 250 grenades a minute at targets up to about 380 yards away. The grenade launcher is currently being teeted for combat use by the USACDCEC at Fort Oral, California.Army News Features. Automatic Food Analyzer Scientists at the Naval Oceanographic Odice are teeting an automatic food analyzer which can determine nutrient values of sea water while a ship is underway, all~wing scientists to forecaet the presence of large schools of fish. The oceanographic office commander zaye the food analyzer hae military value because large echoole of fieh can block eonar equipment or scatter sound waves.-DOD relesec. as Snow Area Miztrrre A new mixture for application to equipment and facilities which will blend into a snow-covered landscape has been developed by the US Army Mobility Equipment Commands Engineer Reeearch and Development Laboratories at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Designed to replace whitewash applications, the material in certain dries within a half-hour and is resistant to abraeion, moisture, and moder ate heat.DOD release. * Military Itevim ..A

MILITAltY NOTES Hospitalsfor Vietnamese Sivilians Three hoepitale will be built for Vietnameseciviliane who are injured ae a reeult of the war. Tbe hoepitale will be at Da Nang, CFUS Lai, and in the Mekong Delta, poesihlyat Cantho. Initial etaffing at the hospitals will include nearly 1,100 US military medical personnel. The Da Nang and Chu Lai hospi tals, with 700 bede, are expected to .heopen this year. The 400-bed delta hospital is expected to be ready by April 196S. Three hundred beds in existing US military facilities at TUY Hoa and Vung Tau will also be turned over to tbe Vietnamese. They are eurplue to military neede and will be used by the Vietnamese until there ie a mili tary requirement. Presently, Vietnamese with war in juriee are treated on a space available basic in US military hospitale or at aid stations.DOD releaee. FlatAircraft Tires Test results on aircraft tiree devel-: oped to land eafely when completely flat have b~n reported by the man ufacturer. The tires ability to run uninflated withouttire or wheel rim damage has heenproved in dynamic teeting by the Air Force and in the companye high speed eimulated landlng. If the tires lose air preseure bacauee of punctur ing or damage, their sidewalls fold in, and tbe tread contracts to form a tight, flexible band around the wheel rim. The aircraft tires will opsrate safely wldle flat until it ie convenient to replace them. Tests have ehown that the tiree, fully inflated, are more durable and cooler running than conventiona~_,air Ossmber 19S7 \ craft tires. The tiree can also be used with either a higher total plane weight to eupport or at a lower inflation pree sure than their conventional counter parts. The aircraft tiree, called expand able by the manufacturer, are spe cially cured in a folded form by- a molding process which the manufac turer describes ae one of tbe most complex ever attempted in Hire mass production. The tires, when folded, take up to 65 percent lees space in plane wheel welle. The only additional equipment the tiree require in an aircraft is an auto matic inflation and deflation system to fill the tiree for landings and ~ke offe and to release air pressure as ,the tires fold up to return to the wfteel well after takeoff.-Newe release. Altitude Effects Study The Army ie conducting a etudy of high-altitude effecte on the human body using safe, emall amountc of radioactive material in 10 volunteer subjects. Radioactively labeled cortkol and aldosterone will be used to measure endocrine gland function at see level and high elevations. The sea level phase is at Fort Lewie, Washington, and the high-altitude tests at Pikee Peak, Colorado. The etudy follows reporte that the Indian Army had experienced inca pacitating personnel problems restdt ing from altitude eicknees when a mil itary force attempted to function at elevation above 10,000 feet. The study is expected to provide detailed information on the endocrine function in man at high altitudes and the changes that eccur during the strees of an oxygen deficit.-Army News Features. as

,.
MILITARY NOTE$ Longllonge lance Missile ,The Army has announced it will continue to develop an E~terzde& Range .%rwe (XRL) miseile. Thie decieion, in effect, extends the application of the Lance concept which combines the reliability and low cost of a free rocket with the range and accuracy of a guided miseile. Capable of carrying either,a nuclear or conventional warheed, Ltiice ie the Armys answer to the battlefield re quirement for a weapon that is highly mobile, rugged, accurate, reliable, and simple to operate. It gete ite accuracy from a new simplified inetilal guid ance and control system developed by the Army. The deeieion to go ahead with the XRL miseile followed a test that ahowed minimum modification of the existing Lurwe conld greatly extend its range. The XRL missile can be launched from present Lance ground support equipment.Arrny Newe Featuree. Miliiry AirIii Command Contracts The MSitary Airlift Command (MAC) hae announced that it paid 23 US commercial airlines a record 684.9 million dollare to fly military passen gers and cargo under contract during Fkal Year 1967. The figure repres~nts a 74percent increaee over the 39 .2 million dollars paid in Fiecal Year r 1966. MAC negotiates airlift contracta
with the commercial airlines for the Department of Defense and managea the military-civilian airlift system.

Army ROTC Scholarship Program Over 1.600 ArmY Reserve Otlice] Training Corps (ROTC) scholarships
will be awarded for the 1963-69 school year. Theee awards, added to the

scholarships presently in force, will bring the total to 4,000 in effect next year. A total of 800 new four-year scholarships will be awarded on a com petitive baeis to outstanding high school graduatee, and approximately 845 twu-yeer awarde will be made to seleeted follege students who havs completed two yeare of ROTC train ing.D0b re]eaee. Nrrclsar Decoupling Projsct Results from firing an underground nuclear device have been sufficientto warrent further research in the de. coupling theory, according to the De fenee Departments Advanced Re search Projects Agency (ARPA). The test ahot, conducted under Project Sterling, was fired for the ARPA by the Atomic ~gy Com mission: . . . to develop a better wzderstaruL i~g of the problems of seiam$c detec tion ,and to verifyr a theecy~ecow pling+hich was firet advanced in 1959 by a group of eciemtiete at Rand Corporation. Decoupling is the absorption of nu clear bIast waves in air, and the Sterling testa showed it would be pos sible to mutlle significantly an under. ground nuclear explosion by firing it in a cavity. Because of test reeulte, ARPA hee requested the Atomic Energy Corn. miseion to conduct a feasibility studY of mining or leaching of a large, deep cavity in salt under a new program titled,Projeet Payette.DOD release. WtarS RcrW

The 634.9 million dollars includes initial contract awards of 341 million dollara and the expansion of those awards as military airlift require. menta increaeed during the year.US Air Force releaee. llm

.
The US Army in Vietnam has added six Commandoarmored cars to its ar senal of mechanized weapons to pro videgreater protection for aupPlycon voys. This is the first time the Army
has used armored wheel vehicles in

Arnw New. Features

ton vehicle
hour, and,

can t~avel at 60 miles an with batchee buttoned up,

combatoperations eince World War II. The vehiclesarmed with twin, turret-mounted, caliber .30 machineguns-have augmented armed jeeps of the 18th Militiry Police Brigade to escortconvoys through dangerous ter ritory. Under ideal conditions, the sevenOecemhor 1N7

the Commando can navigate calm bodies of water at walking speeds. The four-wheeled armored car fed tures a hull design with no vetilcal surfaces and all-around armor that prote%ts-crews from emall arms fire and hand grenades, and helps to de flect larger projectiles and shrapnel. The users will evaluate the maneu verable Commandosto determine their acceptability for this mission.Army News, Features.
101

w-r-m., .

MILITARY NOTE3 Vieinamesa Civia Aation Program Army soldiere in Vietnam are help ing the Vietnamese people through a continuing civic action program. Statistics on US civic action activ ities during the first half of 1967 chow the extent of American help in the eocial and economic development of Vietnam: Medical treatrnente, 4,843,396; im munization, 1,381,968.; food distri bution, .12,044 tone; voluntary con

coordinate civic activities in Vietnam. Civil affairs staff elements are es. signed to all divieions, brigades, and infantry battalions deployed to ViSt- nam. In addition, 23 US military eur gical teame in provincial hoepitale and four engineer construction advisory detachments aeeist in the fields of public health, construction projects, and general rural improvement. US tactical units support and, in many casee, perform civic action W tivities. The main thrust of the civic action program, however, hae been to encourage the Vietnamese military forces to participate actively in the program.Army Newe Features. Rocket Launch Teahnique
A new technique for launching large, eolid rocket vehiclee from tuben will be investigated for the Air Form It is known as= the self-ejeet con= cept. The feasibility of the concept was demonstrated year in a series of launches self-eject late last

tribuw, $849,000; redistribution of captured rice, 2,953 tons; and 24,819 schoole, roads, bridgee, public build ings, and wells repaired or con structed. Civic action, one aspect of the Revolutionary Development Program of the Republic of Vietnam, also in cludee resettlement of refugees and tribal groupe, interpreter support, English-language training, establishment: of laundries, and provieion of a potable water supply. Three US Army civil affairs units

in which each solid rocket ejected itself from a launch tube ueing low-pressure gee flowing from its own rocket motor. Once out of the tube, the rocket motor came to full tbruet automatically and operated normally. A rocket ueing the self-eject con cept is different from a typical rocket which comee to full thruet inune diately upen ignition. Current rockets launched from open pade, launchem and eiloe get off to jackrabbit starts which do not ahvaye uee the first few eeeonds of propellant in,the most economical rnanner. The new technique offers a poten tial performance increase in terms of payIoad or range, or both.News releeee. . MiliiIYEsvW . .s

102

The number of surface-tu-air mis sile (SAM) sites in North Vietnam has quadrupled in the last two years, aeeerdingto the Department of De fense. The figures show that in mid-1965 there were approximately 50 SAM sites, and information available con cerning mid.1967 shows more than

200.
Many of these sites are unoccu pied? a spokesman explained, and manyare occupied with dummy mis siles. There are usually four to six launchers at each site, estimated to be abattery-sizeunit. There are probably
Dewmber

three batteries to a battalion. Many SAMs aresemimobile andsbift leca tion frequently. The Department of Defense stated that any SAM site anywhere in North Vietnam, posing a threat to a strike force, may be attacked if necessary to * protect the force. Beeause of the movement of SAMs, the ,Refense Department says that the number listed should not be taken as an accurate index of SAM strength. The North Vietnamese have fired more than 3,600 SAMs and have heen the cause of only 76 US-confirmed and probable aircraft losses.DOD re lease., 103

1337

MILITARY NOTE3

CANADA
The CL-84S Ordered Three CL-84 ~ln-engine, tilt-wing VSTOL (vertical and ehort takeoff and landing) aircraft will be pur chased for the Canadian armed forces. The tirst delivery will be in late 1968, with delivery of the remaining two in 1969. A prototype CL-84 has been under going flight testing eince December 1964. It hae successfully demonstrated verthxd and short takeoffs and land without equipment. The airplanes will also have the car)ability for mound --attack and armed escort. For vertical takeoff, the CL-84 wing -complete with engines and propel. lersis tilted upward. Using prop& ler thrust and aided by a coaxial tail rotor, the aircraft lifts itself straight off the ground. . Once airborne, the wing ia tilted to conventional position for forward flight. For vertical land. ing, the sequence ie reversed. No hel. icopter training ie neeeesary for CL-84 Sight crews. When vetilcal flight is not essen. tial, the tilt wing makes the CL-84 an exceptional STOL aircraft. With the wing tilted at about 45 degr% it can clear a 50-foot obstacle in under 500 feet with a ground run of I@ than 200 feet. Payload ie approxi mately 100 percent more than in the VTOL configuration.-News release.

,.

, ,,.

-4&

BELGIUM

Camad.zir Ltd.

CL-84 tilt-wing VSTOL

Leoperd Tanks
Belgium will receive 334 .Leesswd tanks from German manufacturers in the next two years. The tanks will he

inge, hover, transitions ta and from conventional flight, and a cruising speed of approximately 260 knots. Sev eral live demonstrations of simulated land and water rescues have also been made. Capable of taking off and landing like a helicopter, yet flying like a conventional aircraft, the CL-84 will be evaluated by the Canadian armed forces invarioue roles, including res cue and evacuation; ground attack and awed escort; visual, electronic, and photographic reconnaissance; and tactical transportation in all forms. Payload .will be up to 17 personnel

m41llQ Leopard tsnks

equipped with Belgian FN machineguns. The Lsopar& will replace US M47 tanke.-News item. . MilitaryReviee - ,,, d

PAKISTAN of Saudi Arabian Forces Training

Pakistan will render trgining, as sistance, and technical advice to the Saudi Arabian armed forces. A new agreement was signed between the two countries in August in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. The agreement was signed by the Saudi Arabjan Defense Minieter, princesu]~n Bin Abdal.Aziz, and the Defense Minister of Pakktan, Vke AdndralA. K. Khan.-Newe item. Offlmber 1s07

Ussrl
Miaaile.ArmedDasfroyer A new Soviet missile-armed de stroyer has been seen in the Baltid Sea. It ia estimated that the new ves sel hae a displacement of about 6,000 tons. The ahip is equipped with mis silee and a large number of antiair craft automatic weapons. Although it ie not known if this vessel is the only one of ita kind, it has been designated the Kresta class. News item. 105

MILITARY NOTSS

GREAT BRITAIN

,.

CEYLON
Patrol Boat Delivered The iirst of nine patrol boats or dered by the Ceyloneae Navy from a shipbuilder in Singapore has hem delivered.News item.

Battlefield Surveillance Radar A man-portable radar will soon be in use with British Army field regi ments for battlefield surveillance. one man will be able to keep watch over a large sector in substantially any conditions of weether and visibility, locating and identifying the movement of men and vehicles. The radar, the GS 14 MI(I, can be carried by two men and placed in operation in two minutes. It is ex tremely easy to handle and operate, and the use of solid-state technology will enabIe it to etand up to military uee under battle condition. The baeic production order for the radarincluding associated test equipment, training aide, and epare parta-amounta te near 14 million dollars.News release. EASTGERMANY Underground Headquarters The Eset German Defense Ministry hae directed the army to releeat.athe most important headquarters under ground. This order has produced fe verish construction activity in a num ber of miiitary inatdations. Approximately 350 prisoners under army supervision are work]ng in three shifts on the construction of an ex tensive underground command center. The construction site is located east of Berlin and bas been posted off limits. Presumebly, the center is being built for the operations staff of the East German Air Force. In Strausberg, construction is in progress on the facilities for the head quarter of the East German ArrnY. In the past monthe, army engineers have built several new underground tunnels and command bunkers.Newa item.

AUSTRALIA
More Airmen for Vietnam The Royal Australian Ah Force is sending forward air controllers to Vietnam to eerve with the US Air Force. The main task of the controllers, who fly light aircraft, is to direct ground attack aircraft to their targets and observe results. The first three Australian con troller were posted to Vietnam in October. After four weeke trainiug, they joined a US tactical air control group supporthrg Australian Task Force operations in Phuec Tuy Province.News releaee. Armed Services Strength The combined strength of Aus tralias armed cervices is expected to reach 81,000 by June 1968. This will make it the highest figure in the na tione peacetime history. The expected total will represent an increase of more than 3,500 over a 12-month period. The 1967 defeme report said that, of Australias 81,000 servicemen, about 65,000 wil be volunteers. Tbe remaining 16,000 will be nationat servicemen.-News release. Sheridan Tank Tests The Australian Army will teat two air-transportable Sheri&n tanh After eix monthe of testing, the Au* tralian Government will decide whether a regiment should be armed with the Shev&fan.-News release. . MlmeryReeke

NO END OF A LESSON. The Inside Story of the Suez Crisis. By Anthony Nutting. 205 Pages.Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., New York, 1967.$5.00. BY LTC CHARLES L. MCNEILL,USA Anthony Nutting was Minister of State for Foreign Affaira in the Brit ish Governmentof Anthony Eden. He resigned this important post as a result of the British involvement in what he terms the debacle of Suez in 1956. This hook is fascinating and pow erful reading. Prior to its publication, Mr. Nutting had not revealed the rea sons for his sudden resignation from the British Government. As he states in his preface: I was w adamant in orr.oesingtheir (Btiti8h, French, and Israeli) policies at the time aa I am now in reaAert ing that wAat they did was trwrrdly wrong artd politically insane. Mr. Eden bears the brunt of the bookswrath and ire. From his origi nal role aa a successful international negotiatorand stateamanr he emerges as a political echemer who wae ob sessedwith the desire to destroy Ga mal Abdel Nasser and to perpetuate thedominanceof Great Britiln in the WlddIeEast. The book traces the origin and de velopmentof what the author chooses to call an international conspiracy: andthen concludes with a summary of the present-day consequences brought Onby that conspiracy.
hemher

CHINA: 7fra Peoples Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A. Sy Jehn K. Fairbank.145 Pagas. 7he Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.,1967. $S.95. BY MAJ DONALD S. MAHLBEUG, USA This is a compilation of 11 essays written by Professor Fairbank for varioue puhlicatilonsbetween 1960 and 1966. The majority appeared in 1966. A noted echolar of Eeet Asian his tory, the author traces the develop ment of the current policies of Na tionalist China and Communist China through a discussion of political and cultural history. Using this as a back ground, he explains Mao Tse-tungs attempt to revolutionize thinking and purge China of the old ways in the face of the tenacious hold of her an cient traditions. The exploitation of China in the 19th and early 20th centuries is dis cussed to chow how the imperialistic West has evolved as tbe dominant ~target of Chinese hostility. The author statee that, through an understanding of Chinese tradition, the United States should be able to develop policies which will aid in un dermining Chinae militancy and force her to engage in international affaire. This is the key. While a policy of conkdnment is, perhaps, militarily sound on a shortterm basis, it fosters Chinese strength internally. Pa#lcipation in interna tional relationa would force China to grow, politically and reduce her revo lutionary fervor. 107

1967

Mlf.fTARYBOOKS ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE VIETNAM WAR. SS Pages, Ths Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown Unfveraity, Washington, O. C,, 1S07. $2.S3 papsrbound. BY LTC FRANK E. VARLJEN,USA This study traces the expansion of the US defense effort in South Viet nam, analyzes the impact on the US economy, and exsminee the resultantquestions of domestic economic policy. NATO AND TNE RANGE OF AMERICAN CHOICE. Cy William T. R. lox and Annette Baker Fox. 352 Pages.ColumbiaUniversity Press, New York, 19B7. $7.95. BY MAJ FRANCISA. IANNI, USA President Charles de Gaulles an nouncement of March 1966 that France would withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization raised anew the question of the role of NATO in US foreign affairs. In this timely volume, the authors pre sent a case study of the impact of partkipation in NATO. This book is not about NATO; rather, it is about the US Govern ment in NATO. Like a number of other Institute of War and Peace Studies publications, it ie much more a study of the policy process than an evaluation of past policies or a pre scription for future US atilon. Through a study of US activities in NATO since its inception, the au thors examine not only how NATO has been used to serve US policies, but how pafilcipation in NATO has influenced the US policy formation process. For those who ask whether NATO has outlived ita usefulness, se welt as those who ask how the United States can operate more effectively in form ulating policies for and in the orgeni aation, this book has much to offer. THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND RECON. STRUCTION, 1B6%1877,By J~oe E. Sefton, 264 Pages.LouisianaState UnfveraityPress, Baton Rouge, La., 1M7, $0.00. BY .COL ALSESTS. Barrr, JR., USA,. Ret. An unueual view of the bitter re construction period is provided in this schblarly study. Well researched and documented, this history bringe out clearly the complex problems which confronted the Army in the unglam orous, and generally unwanted, role of reconstructing the South. Serious legal problems arose to con front senior commanders for which they were almost totally unprepared by training or tradition. The conflict between the President and the Con grees during the Andrew Johnson ad ministration created, for tbe Army, many additional probleme by defauk. NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BY Otto Bsrzins. 140 Pages. Mart PuhliahingCo., Inc., Nsw Yorlrj 19B7. $3.00. BY LTC THOMASP. Srzrmmt,USA

Thie book discueses nuclear effects in an eaey-to-read manner. However, two reasons make the Army reader heeitate to use the book ae reference material. The date of the latest bock in the bibliography is 1962. Aa a w suit, obsolete nuclear weepen syateme are described in general terms as Ire ing cnrrent aysteme. The book leana toward civil defens~ aepecta. Consequently, decay rataa are not considered when computing doeea in fallout areas. For the Army reader who would not mind these minor short comings, thk book is recommendedse, a faat, general refresher on nuclear weapon effects. It is not recommended reading on nuclear weapons tberrr selves. . Military Rwkc :&

MILITARY BOOKS A 6UIOE TO MARXISM.And Its Effect on So vietDevelopment.BY P. ft.Wgor. 253 Pages. Humanities Press, Inc., New York, 1960. $3.00. BY LTC ROBERT R. DUNLAP,USA , Mr. Vigor; long a student of Marx ism and now senior lecturer at SandInwst, isolatas 10 beliefs of Marx theory. With these precepts, coupled with their inferences and a few Com munist predictions, the author pre sentsan unusually clear picture of the salient concepte of Marxist theory. The books title is eomewhat mis leading, for after a eummary of Marxiem, the author aleo diecuseee the contributions and changee in the theorymade by Nikolai Lenin, Joseph Stalin,and Nikita Khrushchev. He fol lowethie with a brief consideration of the Yugoslavian and Chineee versione of Marxiem-Leninism. THE OAY THEY LOST TNE if-BOMB. BY Christopher Morris. 192 Pages. Coward McCann, Inc., New York, 1966.$5.00, BY LTC WILLIAMR. C. LITTLE; Canadian ArmII Onthe morning of 17 January 1966, the villagers of Palomaree, Spain, were preparing to celebrate the feast of their patron eaint when a B-52 bombercarrying hydrogen bombs and a KC-1.95 jet tanker collided overhead. The collieion brought about a mas sive recovery operation involving thousands of military and civilian per sonnel.Thie culminated in a deep-eea searchand recovery mission in which the last bomb wae recovered. This ie a readable account of the operation.The reader must decide for himeelf whether Mr. Morrie sharp Criticiem of t~ policy relative to the releaseof information is fair in light of the prol.dcms which he describee.
OWmher 19S7

NO PLACE TO OIE: The Agony ef Wet Nam. By Hugh A. Mulligan. 362 Pages. Wiiiiam Morrow & Cc., inc., New York, 196B and 1967.$5.95. BY MAJ JACK GOLDSTEIN, USA Mr. Muliigan refers to the war in Vietnam as a etrange war to fight and a stranger war to cover. Never theless, No PZace to Die{ accurately deecribee what it is like to live, fight, and die in the jungles of Vietnam. This ie a story of two Vietnam warsthe old war, principally a Viet namese war with American advieore, and the new war, principally an American war. However, the value of this book is not in its history of the war, but in ite penetrating analy sia of the American eoldier ae he fighte these distinctly different wars. Of particular intereet is the laet chapter which ie a diecueeion of the feelings of the American soldier as he fighte a complex war. ROBERT E. LEE: Tho Cemplete Man, 1661 1870. By Margaret Sanborn. 430 Pages. B Lippincott Co., Philaitelplda,Pa., and ~ewYerk, 19B7. $8.95. BY LTC GEORGE M. RODGERS, USA Mrs. Sanborn continuee where ehe left off in her last bookf?obert E. Les, A Portrait: 1807-1861and tells the personal story of tbe laet 10 yeare of Leee life. It was during thie period that General Lee led the Confederate Forces and, subsequently, setied as Preeident of Washington College. This book reveals many facets of Lees personal life to ineludb his moode, thoughts, and reactiona during this trying period. In addition, the author gives a fresh account of hk Iaet daye, death, and funeraL There are many excellent photo graphs of Lee in the beek including the last one taken prior to hia death.

106

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MILITARY BOOKS AMERICAS RACE TO DECAOENCE. A Study of Politioal, Economic, Social and Othw Oaaay. By Raymond Locke. 192 Pages. Es pesition Press, inc., New Yerk, 1966.$4.50. BY LTC MARCO J. CASACCIA, USA This work isan analysis of alleged decay in seven vital areas of Ameri can life-biological, environmental, political, economic, social, military, and educational. It ie a study of gloom and doom without benefit of suggested or recommended remediesthese, the author states, areself>vident. Americas Race to Decadence is intended to arouse the readers anger and move him to action. THEY CAME FROM TNE SKY. By E. N. Ceek. ridge. With aFerewerdby Colonel Mau~ice J. Brrckmaster. 2$7 Pages. Tleemas Y. Creweli Cc., New Yerk, 19S7. $6.95. BY LTC NIVEN J. BAISD, USA The hours of darkness which cov ered the period from 1940 to 1943 in France brought forth the bravest who had the hope and courage to resist. It was for those with this courage that the organization known as Spe cial Operations Exezutive (SOE) wee created to provide training, leaderchip, and contact with the help avail able from outAde occupied France. Mr. Cookridge has attempted to show the problems which such an or ganiaztion mnst overcome, from its creation through the period of opera tion during the occupation. The ex ploits of three out of approximately 480 men and women who worked in Franoa for the French eeetion of SOE are highlighted. Their work with the n/ugaie, French Forcee of the Inte rior, and, ultimately, with the Ameri can Office of Strategic Servicee ie a ebmy of unparalleled human reeource fulnezs. 110 b... ... . MILITARY STRA~: A General ThEEW oi
Pewer Centrei. By Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie,
United Stetes Navy. 111 Pages. Rutgers
University Press, New Brunswick, N. J.
1967.$4.60.
BY LTC JOHNR. VILAS, USA This thought-pro& eking book pro. videe the reader with an overview of the concepts of warfare. Following a lengthy introduction to the problem, the author diecnsses strategy within the framework of four theories: con tinental, maritime, air, and that of Mao Tsa-tung. Admiral Wylie laments that: There hoa been little or no reoognb tion that the etcdg of warfare merits a pkzce in the intellectual world ae a matter worthg of more tiwn technical atudv. Mititaty Strate~y does not provide a panacea to the conduct of war in its totality; this is not the authors intent. It does, however, preeent challenging and interesting concepts on the subjezt with emphaeis on Ad miral Wylies theory of power con. trol. This book will be of interest, and provide food for thought to both the professional and the armchair etrat egiat. ARMY OF THE HEARTLAWO. The Army et Tennessee,1661.1662.By Themas Lawrense Cenneliy. 205 Pages. Lesisiatta State Uni. versity Press, Baton Reuge,lit., 1BB7.$&Ml This volume, one of a planned set of two, describes the inefftilve lsed ership which plagued the Army of Tennessee in 1861-62. It brings to, light the personality conflicts between senior commanders and the kwk ef etfeztive communication with head quarters. , MllitwyWdee . ...>. +&4&

MILITARY BOOKS INCREDIBLE VICTORY. By Walter Lerd. 331 Pages.Harper & Row, Inc.,New Yerk, Evans ton; and Lenden, 19S7. $5.95. Exhaustive research has provided an absorbing, story of the naval ac tion which defies logicthe defeat of the Japanese Imperial Navy combined} fleetat Midway. Mr. Lord has faithfully reproduced an account of this battle, and has broughtan understanding of the com manders, both American and Japa nese,and the men who served them. RURAL PACIFICATION IN VIETNAM. BY wit. Iiam A. Nighswenger.320 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, Waahing ten,D. C., London,Eng., 1966.$12.50. BYLTC ANTHONY P. DE LUCA,USA As stated in the introduction, this beok is an examination of the ways and means for building the peace in rural Vietnam. The author, who servedas the senior US civilian rep resentativeof the Agency for Inter national Development in Vietnams Quang Nam Province from 1962 to 1964, focuses on the pacification ac tivities within that province. Mr. Nighswongers approach ie to explainfirst, the strategies of pacifica tion and their cultural context, and, then,the content of specific programs andstructures. Next, he evahsatis the pacificationprocess and identifies the failores in the provincial apparatus and in the US advisory effort. FiZZlly, a pacification theory and a model for program implementation areoffered for consideration. With the documentation and sup portingappendixes provided, the book serves as an excellent primer for those engaged in pacification-particularly in tbe programing of rural develop mentactivities.
Usetiw 1907

PHILIPPINE COLLABORATION IN WORLO WAR IL By David Joel Steinberg.235 Pagea.The University of Michigan Prees, Ann Arbor, Mich.,1967.$7.50. BY COL JOSEPH M. CORVINO, USA

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When a country is occupied by en emy forces during wartime, its leadera are faced with the choices of continuing to fight, submitting to martial rule by enemy forces, or coop erating in an enemy-sponsored,home rule government. Each citizen must determine when the exigencies of oc cupation present such riske that re sistance is not in the national interest. Such was the situation and the de cision confronting members of the Philippine society ,during the Japa nese occupation in World War II. Some Filipinos chose to continue re sistance through guerrilla warfare; others took the view that they must assnme administration under Japanese supervision for the good of the people and the country. Using the Philippine occupation as a case study, the author investigates thie hazy area of social values. The Philippines have not held an investi gation into collaboration since the war because it would require a reappraisal of the wartime behavior of the elite, and a complete examination of Phil ippine eocial organization. Mr. Steinberg concludes that the ~ failure to examine collaboration com pletely has been justified on tim grounds that no human being would be capable of assessing correctly all of the factore involved in such a corn- plex social situation. Filipinos have transferred the burden of justice from their imperfect human aoeiety to the final judgment of a Higher Power. Mr. Steinberg has prepared a welldocumented, scholarly work. 111
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MILITARY BOOKS TOJO: The Last Bansai.By CorrftnayBrowoe, 260 ,Pagas.He~ Rinehart & Winston, inc., Hew York, Chicage. and San Francisce. 1%7, $s,95. BY LTC KENNETH STROMGSUSN, USA This volume is far more than a biography. The author uses Hidekl
, Tojo, a professional soldier who be came the Japanese Prime Minister, to
ahow the development of militarism
in moderrrJapan and to trace the miSi tary and political events leading to war and the holocaust that signaled ita end in 1945. With the exception of the war years and the laet few chaptere trac ing the War (Mimes Tribunal and Tojoe death, tbe book reveals little of Tojo the man. Perhape this ie proper, for Mr. Brownes theeie is obviouely that Hideki Tojo was a product-more the epitom~f the military tradi tion and environment in which he grew up and lived. The author uses events from Tojos life to present an interesting treatise on militarism in Japan and to trace the political factors leading to World War II and Japans eurrender. THEY FOUGHT BACK. The Story of Jewish Raciatanca in Nasi Eurepe.Edited and TrarrsIatad by Yuri Subl. 318 Pagas. Crown Pub iishars, Inc., New York, 1SS7. $5.25. BY LTC! BASTONM. HAYWARD, USA This book tells about the worst crime ever perpetrated on mankind: the genocide of European Jews. It also telSe of Jewish resistance to the Nazis. The authors, many of whom were perticipanta in the eventa, recount an inspiring stmy of bow the Jewa in ghettoe from Warsaw to Minsk re volted to face uncertain death rather than submit to deportation and cer.
112

tain death. Others tell of thy uprisin~ in tbe infamous tfobibor and Tre blinks death campe, These and other I reportc of botb individual and group actions describe a heroic atory of a people reeisting tyranny with little more than raw courage. Although most of the book deals with events in Pcdand and East Eu. rope, there are also a~lcles on Jewish resistance in Paris, Italy. and Bel. gium. Most of the a~lcles included have not previously appeared in Eng. lisb. Mr. Suhl, as editor and author of some of the articles, eucceeda in de stroying the myth that the Jews did not resist, STAUFFEN32R6. The Architact of tire F* meus July 20tb Conspiracy te Assassinate Hitler. By JeachimKramars.TranslatedFrem fha German by R. H. Barry. Irrtroduatien by Professor H. R. Trever.Roper. 255 Pagas ltsa Macmiiian Co., New Yerk, 1SS7. $5.95. BY LTC CARLF. BASWELL, USA This is the first full-length biogra phy of Claus von Stauffenberg, the 37-year.old colonel of the German General Staff who was the motivating force behind the attempt on Adolf Hitlers life on 20 July 1944. Staif. fenberg was haatily executed the same day by bis commanding officer in an attempt to cover up his OWTI guilt. Von Stauffenberg was an intellec- tual of unusual ability, inspiration, and character. He turned from tbe Nazi movement because he was rs volted by tbe fundamental immorality of nezism which was demonstratedby the German policy in the Soviet Union during 1941-42. The book ie readable, intriguing, and recommended for both the gea eral reader and the military historian, *
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Military Reviw 4?/