Assignment Cover Sheet

UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
Undergraduate Division School of Government & Society (College of Social Sciences) STUDENT ID No. (srn): YEAR OF STUDY: MODULE TITLE: 2 Modern Social Theory 1117509 PROGRAMME OF STUDY: Sociology

MODULE BANNER CODE: CLASS TEACHERS NAME: Justin Cruickshank SUBMISSION DATE: ASSIGNMENT TITLE: 13/1/2012 Are Durkheims proposals for intergrating individuals and groups potentially authoritarian?

(Please Note -Module information required above can be found in your Module Handbook )

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University policy requires that a penalty be imposed of 5 marks to be deducted from the actual mark achieved for each working day the assignment is late until 0 is reached. There is a strict deadline of 11:59pm on day of submission. A further 5 marks will be deducted for every 11:59pm deadline that is missed. Any written assessment that exceeds the stated word limit by more than 10% will receive a 5 mark deduction.

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Are Durkheims proposals for integrating individuals and groups potentially authoritarian? This paper will outline how whilst there are a number of ways to explain how Durkheims attempts to links individuals and groups were potentially authoritarian, his whole perspective was fundamentally flawed by a normative assumption which not only undermines his methods, but imposes a pernicious view of society which carries with it authoritarian even totalitarian connotations. This paper will initially outline the ways in which Durkheim conceptualised democracy, the state and how he saw to integrate individuals to groups. It will briefly detail Durkheims argument for why this would be necessary, then move onto a number of criticisms, explaining some flaws in his thinking and demonstrating how according to influential twentieth century thinking explains the sort of liberty or freedom which Durkheim was advocating was in fact positive liberty, which as we shall see, is potentially tyrannical. Finally it will expose a fundamental flaw of his method, namely his positivist approach was critically flawed, and utilising the Berlinian notion of positive liberty to categorically answer the question posed that yes, Durkheims attempts to link individuals to groups are indeed potentially authoritarian. The key manner in which Durkheim sought to integrate individuals and groups was essentially a neo-corporatist endeavour; in order to solve the distributional problems of wealth in a more orderly and equitable manner, Durkheim saw the development of secondary groups, or as he often referred to them, occupational associations (Fenton 1984, Giddens, 1972, Giddens, 1978, Poggi, 2000). While we will see how Durkheims offerings in practice, could have an authoritarian flavour, it is important to stress that he appeared committed to creating a more equitable social order, and felt not only was economic regulation necessary, but moral regulation was essential (Fenton, 1984, Poggi, 2000). For Durkheim the state must 2

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play a moral as well as an economic role, and the alleviation of the malaise of the modern world must be sought in measures which are general moral rather than economic (Giddens, 1972:99). The emphasis on the moral is key to understanding how Durkheims intentions for integration and as we shall see, carried with them authoritarian undercurrents. Additionally, economic regulation by the state would be undertaken to safeguard, control and complement the market whilst simultaneously reducing its damaging effects in order to protect the interests of all employers, employees and consumers (Poggi, 2000). This regulation would be achieved by empowering expressly constituted public bodies (Poggi, 2000), which Durkheim expressed the secondary groups or corporation would be called upon to become the basis or one of the essential bases of political organisation (Durkheim quoted in Poggi, 2000:137). Before outlining how the secondary groups would serve to integrate indivuals, it is necessary to touch on Durkheims conception of democracy. Durkheim saw democracy not in the traditional sense (see Poggi,2000:128 ) but rather as a system by which society can achieve a consciousness of itself in its purest form (Durkheim, 1957:89); he felt that the higher the levels of critical spirit interplay with public affairs, the more democratic the nation - in contrast to the unquestioning and traditional customs of less democratic societies (Durkheim, 1957, Durkheim, 1986). For Durkheim then, what determines a states democratic credentials is a two way process of communication and deliberation between state and public sphere (Poggi,2000:129). Secondary groupings would help this process of communication by elucidating the common interest of all its members and provide a more cogent dialogue between state and society (Giddens, 1971, Poggi, 2000). In better understanding why Durkheim saw the necessity for these groups or corporations, we must quickly touch on a trend he saw occurring as society develops, and how this view envisaged new ways to associate individuals to form greater solidarity in society. 3

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Durkheim saw that as society developed from the mechanical solidarity of the past, to the organically solidary advanced industrial societies, the primary tendency in increasingly complex society is towards the progressive emancipation of the individual from the subordination to the conscience collective (Giddens, 1971:101). What he meant here is that as society develops, the uniformity of individuals caused by shared religious practice and the similarity of occupational tasks in the mechanical division of labour would erode as they became increasingly divided occupationally with the emergence of organic solidarity (for a good explanation of Durkheimian division of labour and social solidarity, see Morrison, 2006). This was problematic for Durkheim, the shared collective conscience, consolidated through religious practice and inspired moral feelings of charity towards ones neighbour (Fish, 2005:96) of mechanical solidarity were desirable and were lost with organic solidarity emerging. As democratic, organically solidary society develops, the erosion of the collective conscience occurs. This was linked to the emerging secular morality emphasising the rights and dignity of the individual typical of the liberal and humanist thinkers as well as political economists such as Adam Smith (Giddens, 1972). However, these new ideas of moral individualism lack[ed] the binding power exerted by the more encompassing type of traditional moral order over social conduct (Giddens, 1978:61), leading him to conclude that because moral individualism could not directly moralize the myriad of occupational tasks. New bodies which contained specialised codes of practice would need to be formed. These would be specific to the forms of activity involved and would not only pursue economic or work-related interests, but would promote professional ethics which specified the rights and responsibilities of its members (Poggi, :136, Giddens, 1978:61). In addition to the moral functions of these groups, they would interpose themselves between state and individual, preserving the states distance from society enabling greater consciousness, but also to help remedy the tendency of modern conditions to 4

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atomise individuals and/or sharpen their egoism, providing society with a visibly configured structure (Poggi, 2000:134). Lastly, he foresaw these groups acting as electoral colleges taking the place of the direct franchise, acting as an component of the mediation between individual and state, allowing the state greater realisation of the needs of society (Giddens, 1978). Before continuing onto the place of morality in the Durkheimian society, it is important to illustrate some issues with the corporatist alternative he offered. Firstly, these electoral colleges could be seen to act as an impediment to freedom, and therefore carries shades of the authoritarian. If groups based on occupation were to act as voting agents in the interests of all its members, it does not follow that it would represent the entirety of its membership, and therefore would have a constraining influence on at least some individuals lives. Moreover, while he makes clear that a channel of communication would exist between state and societies members, there is a more worrying element to this, as can be seen in this excerpt: When the State takes thought and makes a decision, we must not say that it is the society that thinks and decides for it. It is not simply an instrument for canalizing and concentrating. It is, in a certain sense, the organising centre of the secondary groups themselves. (Durkheim, 1957:49) This suggests the state would in fact shape and influence public opinion rather than simply listen to it. Whilst this in itself is not necessarily a limitation upon freedom, there is a clear sense since the state will go beyond reflecting and concentrating societies wills, it could involve coercing the interests of individuals away from private interests to a public interest which could be argued, carries shades of Rousseaus general will, which will be discussed further below. Secondly, by formalising groupings that individuals would affiliate themselves based upon occupation limits their ability to determination his failure to cater for the modern individuals multiple associations, that these are not static but will 5

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change over ones lifetime and represent a plurality of identity he makes absolutely no concessions for (Poggi, 2000). This could in practice be incredibly constraining on ones ability to self determine. Lastly, he did not clearly articulate how these secondary groupings would alter the or usurp political parties and crucially how the political parties of democratic states express social cleavages and contrasting interests and how his prescription would potentially alter the balance with the development of these associations (Poggi, 2000). It is important now to look closer at Durkheims concern about moral degeneration brought about by this move from religious homogeneity to a secular individualism, and the need to revive this in some way. Some form of collective conscience as seen in mechanical solidarity was necessary in modern societies, in order to reduce the pathologies and high levels of anomie Durkheim (1952) saw in society developing (Fenton, 1984). This was so, because the move to forced, individualised labour tasks in societies expressing organic solidarity were more atomised, and when linked to the secular rise of moral individualism, left individuals with far weaker social ties and commonalities with each other and society itself (Fenton, 1984, Fish, 2005, Giddens, 1971, Morrison, 2004). This led Durkheim to reason that a revival of elements of religion would be necessary in a new form of collective conscience, which he termed the cult of the individual (Fish, 2005). The cult of the individual, with its emphasis on the value of dignity and rights of individuals would replace the traditional, religious beliefs; which could not adjust themselves in the face of growing individual autonomy and increasing occupational specialisation and differentiation in modern societies (Fish,2005:70). His emphasis that both political economy and socialist programmes for social order were flawed, because of a lack of moral regulation (Giddens, 1972, 1978) is telling, and is indicative of a belief that in the milieu of society, some form moral conscience was necessary to emerge from the decaying religious morality of mechanically solidary societies. For Durkheim, it was essential that in order for 6

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moral regulation to be successful, it was necessary the the cult of the individual retained an implicit irrational religious element, or as Fish (2005:96) articulates: the idea of individuality could only become a basis for social cohesion if rational and self interested understandings of it were subordinated to those non-rational sympathies that lay at its core. The reason that this was necessary was bound up in the virtues of charity developed through theological practice and belief in mechanical solidary societies. This charity for ones neighbor, could not be retrieved within the secular cult, however, an emotionally upheld moral principle of justice could replace it and would be necessary to sustain the moral order (Fish, 2005). Indeed, as Fenton asserts Durkheims quest was for a civic religion; founded upon the principle that all social structures were in some sense, moral structures (1984:83), that all forms of regulation were essentially moral in some way, and that contained in any moral action was an elemental and irrational religious sentiment. There is a concerning element in his thinking here; it could be argued that he overestimates the necessary degree for consensus in modern society, and concluding civic religion is the means to greater consensus, according to Fenton (1984) he can be seen as conservative in his thinking. Indeed, by emphasising so greatly on a collective consensus in society, Durkheim could be seen to place primacy on order, rather than freedom. Fenton goes yet further arguing there to be a precarious ideological quality about the belief that consensus about social and political principles emerges in modern democracies, and is responsible for a necessary minimum of political stability (Fenton, 1984). From here there is a clear path to authoritarianism, as if consensus is more important than individual freedom, coercion could be utilised to achieve this end. As Mannheim put it the problem . . . of a planned society mainly consists in avoiding bureaucratic absolutism (quoted in Mazower, 1999:207).

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While Durkheim arrived at his collective moral conscience from society as a separate entity to the individual, Rousseau saw his general will as a composite of all individuals particular wills (Morrison, 2006:159). So while both explanations for their collective imperative came from opposite ends of the scale (Durkheim structural, Rousseau agential) both arguably contained in practice, essentially the same end that is to subordinate or coerce the individual free will to a higher common interest or will that of societies, or groupings in society. Therefore it is argued here, that the tyrannical criticism of Rousseau that Talmon postulates, that this subordination of free will to collective will would constitute the imposition of an inflexible pattern of behaviour (Boucher, 2009:267) in order to, in Durkheims case, eradicate the social pathologies he believed afflicted the advanced industrial societies of his time. Consequently, it is posited here then, that Durkheims attempts to integrate individuals into groups in this way could fall guilty to the same potential for authoritarianism even tyranny that Rousseau was accused of. This conflation of Rousseau and Durkheims thinking leads us toward the notion positive liberty, which is evident in Rousseaus general will (Boucher, 2009), and therefore arguably, that of Durkheims attempts to link individuals and groups. The recurring theme of potentials for coercion, that have been alluded to during the analysis, are key to explaining why this paper asserts Durkheims attempts to integrate individuals and groups are potentially authoritarian even tyrannical. In order to justify this position, Berlins conceptual dichotomy of liberty will be employed and Hayeks embrace of negative liberty, to demonstrate a contemporary western paradigm which determines Durkheims attempts potentially tyrannical. Berlins negative liberty the notion that individuals are free only if they are unconstrained by the external interference of others (2002) which is advocated in this paper, offers a more realistic and less dangerous way to order society. Berlin was concerned about the danger of coercion; to coerce man is to deprive him of his freedom (Berlin, 2002:168). He saw it as a perilous route to travel, as from 8

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even the most paternalistic and noble of intentions, its consequences are disastrous. The alternative form of freedom or liberty Berlin used the terms interchangeably positive liberty, was seen as dangerous by Berlin because it had an idealistic quality which would lead to coercion and oppression. This could be seen in the Jacobin revolution in France, and the communist revolution in Russia, which were born of ideals rooted in positive liberty and despite their appeals for freedom from oppression, through unintended consequences had led to oppression, violence and tyranny (Curtis, 2007) Now, adopting a more extreme disciple of the qualities of negative liberty, we shall see how Von Hayeks hugely influential neo-liberal perspective, utilising it in order to further disseminate authoritarian dangers of Durkheims approach. Durkheim argues that [the] agencies making up the state are ill equipped to ascertain and evaluate (Poggi, 2000:133) the myriad of unpredictable developments and market circumstances. Durkheims rather convenient conviction that secondary groups would be better equipped to make these evaluations is hard to justify, he at least acknowledges that the volatility of markets made regulation difficult, yet it does not follow that other bodies would be more suitable for regulatory responsibility. As Hayek argued, negative liberty and the free market would create a spontaneous socio-economic equilibrium most favourable to social order and stability (Ellison, 2008). In building upon the invisible hand notion of self regulating free markets put forth by Smith two centuries pervious (El-Ojeili, and Hayden, 2006), Hayek forcefully argued that the infinite complexity of markets meant informational market failure would inevitably arise through regulatory intervention and would only lead to coercion (Ellison, 2008), which as we have seen with Berlins (2003) belief and echoed in von Hayeks, would inevitably lead away from freedom towards tyranny (Curtis, 2007). Finally, we see how flaws in Durkheims methodology, betrays an implicit value judgement about how society ought to be. His uncovering of social facts were not 9

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of any particular value as objective phenomenon and only serve to reassert more forcefully the notion that Durkheim, in a rather understated way, prescribed a normative view on society based upon his own moral assumptions Dubeski (2001). The emphasis on moral control is of particular interest to us here, as this conception of morality was a foundation stone of Durkheims entire understanding of society; it was not a product of his unearthing of objective social facts, but was rather a fallacious assumption which he attempted to justify through pseudo-scientific rationalisations, undertaken to provide a convincing basis for his moral assumptions (Dubeski, 2001). This position, based upon a set of normative value judgements can be seen with Fentons convenient elucidation of this Durkheimian presupposition: Individual men and women never have lived free of moral regulation; it is inconceivable that they ever will, or that social life can ever be understood as if they were; their freedom from regulation would indeed be no freedom at all. To imagine such a condition is to imagine anarchy in society, empty despair of the individual. 1984:86

This normative assumption, which Durkheim makes is the core underpinning of his method; his moral principle led him to see sociology as a projection of what must or should be (Fenton, 1984) and this idealism led him in a direction Berlin (2002) would recognise as positive liberty. Further, Dubeski (2001) argues convincingly, that Durkheim was the advocate of altruism even more than he was an originator of social science, postulating that, altruism is the most core foundation for totalitarianism, state terror, and rigid social conformity, and that Durkheims methods based on this fallacious outlook would have quite dangerous potential tendencies in practice. In drawing on popular fiction, one could see how such a society might look: in Orwells (1954) 1984; and how, were one to act like Winston Smith, whose only act of rebellion in an authoritarian society (which, according to 10

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Dubeskis notions on altruism, contained Durkheimian echoes), is to live for himself, we see how one might be treated. We have seen that Durkheims methodology, which ostensibly is positivist in its quest for value neutrality betrays an inability of Durkheim, despite his appeals in Suicides preface, to eschew personal bias to unearth objective facts independent of the individual (1952), ironically created a value-loaded subjective explanation which is easy to reject. In effect, his own failure to obey his own appeals for value neutrality, led him into a methodologically fallacious black hole. Finally before concluding, a minor footnote of criticism can be labelled at Durkheims use of metaphor as Berlin (2002:179) asserted in a manner which seems almost directed at Durkheim himself, the perils of using organic metaphors to justify coercion of some men by others in order to raise them to a higher freedom have often been pointed out (Berlin,2002:179). In any case Dubeski (2001) adds to this pointing out: this paper suggests that a closer examination be made of the relations between normative and methodological assumptions before one resorts to biological analogies and organic metaphors as means to persuade others of the worth of ones paradigm. In those cases where the theorist errs on the side of organicism and over ascribes organic qualities to society, it is likely that the theorist confused normative and existence-related considerations, and has allowed value-judgments to creep into the concept formation and to affect the perceived validity of the linkages in the chain of reasoning. Dubeski, 2001 In conclusion, this paper has shown how Durhkeims attempt to integrate individuals by secondary groupings or corporations, which would mediate and alter the conscience of respective members, would be potentially authoritarian when perceived from a viewpoint advocating negative liberty. In addition, It has been 11

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shown how because of implicit normative assumptions, Durkheim is led down a methodological dead end which undermines the validity of his social facts and provides further evidence for at the very least, a kernel of positive liberty in his prescriptive doctrine, leaving a treacherous path toward authoritarianism and tyranny.

Bibliography Berlin, I. (2002) Two Concepts of Liberty in Hardy, H. (ed) Liberty Oxford University Press: Oxford Boucher, D. (2009) Rousseau in Boucher, D. And Kelly, P. Political Thinkers (2nd edition) Oxford University Press: Oxford 12

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Durkheim, E. (1952) Suicide. Routledge: London. Durkheim, E. (1957) Professional Ethics and Civic Morals Routledge: London Dubeski, N. (2001) Durkheims altruism as the source of his social holism: A discussion of the viability of a social basis for moral principles Electronic Journal of Sociology available [from http://www.sociology.org/content/vol005.003/dubeski.html] (accessed 18/1/2012) Giddens, A. (1971) Capitalism and Modern Social Theory Cambridge University Press: Cambridge Giddens, A. (1978) Durhkeim Fontana Press: London El-Ojeili, C and Hayden, P. (2006) Critical theories of globalization Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke Ellison, N. (2008) Neo-Liberalism in Alcock, P. et al The Students Companion to Social Policy (3rd edition) Blackwell: Oxford Fenton, S. (1984) Durkheim and Modern Sociology Cambridge University Press: Cambridge Fish, J. (2005) Defending the Durkheimian Tradition Ashgate: Aldershot Mazower, M. (1999) Dark Continent: Europes Twentieth Century Penguin: London Morrison, K. (2006) Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Formations of Modern Social Thought (2nd edition) Sage: London Orwell, G. (1954) 1984 Penguin: London Poggi, G. (2000) Durkheim Oxford University Press: Oxford The Trap, part three. (2007) We will Force you to be Free. Directed by Adam Curtis. London. BBC. [live broadcast] available online from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nH8w-MBGZ9o

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