T5 B24 Copies of Doc Requests File 2 FDR - DOJ Tab - Entire Contents - DOJ Doc Requests and Responses 187

Thomas H.
Kean
CHAIR
FBI DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 13
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ("the
Richard Ben-Venistc
Commission") requests that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or the
Max Cleland "respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following documents
no later than September 26, 2003 (the "production date"):
Fred F. Fielding
Jamie S. Gorelick 1. Memoranda to and from the FBI Director. For the period from February
26, 1993 through Sept. 20, 2001, policy memoranda, including memoranda
Slade Gorton
concerning the issues of student tracking and watchlisting, regarding the role of
John Lehman immigration law enforcement in counterterrorism investigations and
prosecutions:
Timothy J. Roemer a. to the Director of the FBI from the Office of the Attorney General, the
Office of the Deputy Attorney General, or the Commissioner of the
James R. Thompson
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), or persons acting in
these capacities; and
b. from the Director of the FBI to the Office of the Attorney General, the
Philip D. Zelikow Office of the Deputy Attorney General, or the Commissioner of the
E X E C U T I V E DIRECTOR INS, or persons acting in these capacities.
2. Documentation on previous terrorist entry to the United States. The Alien

file ("A-File") collected by the FBI in connection with its investigation or
prosecution of the following individuals:
a. Nidal Ayyad
b. Mahmud Abouhalima
c. Mohammed Abouhalima
d. Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj
e. Mohammed Salameh
f. Eyad Ismoil
g. Ramzi Yousef
h. Mustapha Shalabi
i. Bilall Alkaisi
j. Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman
k. El Sayyid Nosair
1. Ibrahim el Gabrowny
m. Mohammed Saleh
n. Amir Abdelghani
o. Fadil Abdelghani
p. Tarig Elhassan
q. Fares Khallafalla
r. Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali
s. Matarawy Mohammed Said Saleh
t. Abdo Mohammed Haggag
u. Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer
v. Lafi Khalil
TEL (202) 331-4060
FAX (202) 296-5545
http://www.9-llcommission.gov
FBI Document Request No. 13
Page 2
w. Abdul Hakim Murad

x. Ali Mohammed
y. Khalid Abu Al Dahab
z. Wadih el Hage
aa. Essam al Ridi
bb. Ahmed Ressam
cc. Abdelghani Meskini
dd. Abdel Hakim Tizegha
3. FBI immediate response on immigration and border security. Documents setting forth the
FBI's role in governmental actions taken with regard to immigration and border security from
September 11, 2001 through December 31, 2001, including the dates of and names of attendees at
White House meetings attended by FBI officials to address border security issues; policy papers
prepared by the FBI for the above meetings; and memoranda to the Office of the Attorney General
and Deputy Attorney General from the Director of the FBI sufficient to establish the FBI's current
role in border security.
4. Liaison by border authorities with the FBI. Documents sufficient to show the process by which
the FBI was notified by US border authorities of the entry into the United States of potential foreign
terrorists, and coordinated response to such entries, including: Interagency agreements between the
FBI and other U.S. Government agencies on this topic in force from January 1, 1998 through
September 11, 2001; interagency agreements between the FBI and other U.S. Government agencies
on this topic currently in force; and documents, including interagency agreements, reflecting
policies, practices, and assignments with respect to INS, U.S. Customs Service, and U.S.
Diplomatic Security Service detailees assigned to FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)
from January 1, 1998 through September 11, 2001.
5. Watchlisting of terrorists before September 11,2001. From January 1, 1998 through September
11, 2001, documents sufficient to show the FBI's criteria for placing individuals into the TIPOFF
watchlist and the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF); the number of
individuals FBI submitted to each list and the number of individuals in VGTOF for terrorism
concerns on September 11, 2001; and interagency agreements in force between the FBI and other
federal, state and local agencies on watchlist data sharing.
6. Watchlisting of terrorists after Sept. 11,2001. FBI policy directives currently in effect regarding
terrorist watchlists, including the criteria for placing individuals into TIPOFF and VGTOF for
terrorism concerns; interagency agreements in force between the FBI and other federal, state, and
local agencies regarding the sharing of data on watchlists; the most recent policy statement and
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning expansion of watchlists and state and local
authorities' access to them; and a list of current FBI employees on detail to the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center assigned to work on terrorist Watchlisting.
7. FBI terrorist identity lookback project. Documents setting forth or summarizing the description
and results of the project undertaken by the FBI prior to the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt
Lake City, Utah, under which the FBI tasked its field offices to cull terrorism investigation files for
the names of potential terrorists for addition of their names to the Violent Gang and Terrorist
Organization File (VGTOF) and NCIC databases for watchlist and related purposes.
Page3
8. Visa Identification Terrorist Automated Lookout (VITAL). Documents sufficient to describe

the origin, mission, and results of the VITAL project, including the number of potential foreign
terrorists identified who have attempted to enter or have entered the United States.
9. Visas Condor. Documentation and information discussed in the briefing for the Commission on
July 31, 2001 describing the Condor namecheck program, including:
a. Mission - the directive establishing the Condor program and the criteria for countries and
individuals subject to it;
b. Personnel - the names of the lead personnel and those responsible for preparing the Condor
Security Advisory Opinions (SAO's) sent to the State Department;
c. Statistics — the number of visas Condor SAO's performed by the FBI from its inception in
2001 to the present, by month; a chart graphing the number of Condor SAO's on one axis
and the number of days it took to complete the clearance on the other axis;
d. Counterrorism results — the categories of reasons cited by the FBI for proposing to the
State Department that visas be denied, and the numbers of denials proposed by category;
the number of aliens to whom a visa was denied based on FBI's SAO; the number of aliens
to whom a visa was granted over the objection of the FBI; the number of SAO's performed
by the FBI where the FBI was unable to locate its files pertaining to the individual (where
the individual was either a subject or a cross-reference in an FBI investigation) with a
breakdown stating whether the missing files were counterterrorism or other files; and
e. Current status — the most recent memorandum to the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney
General summarizing the status and accomplishments of the Condor program, including
any revised criteria; and documents sufficient to describe efforts currently underway to
establish a candidate scoring system for visa applicants.
10. Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF). Documentation shown or discussed in the
briefing for the Commission on August 21, 2001, including: the powerpoint presentation showing
FTTTF's mission, methodology, and list of databases; FTTTF's role supporting the Condor, Tiger,
Absconder and other counterterrorism initiatives; the number of individuals identified as potential
foreign terrorists on existing watchlists whom FTTTF located in the United States; and the most
recent memorandum to the FBI Director or his designee reporting on the status of FTTTF, its
current staffing, and relation to the national watchlist center.
11. Security Directive List. Documents sufficient to establish the origin, mission, and results of the
Security Directive List created and disseminated by the FBI in the immediate aftermath of
September 11,2001.
12. Immigration-related detainee program. All electronic communications, investigative inserts,

letterhead memoranda, affidavits, and FD 302s, related to those individuals among the illegal
immigrants detained and held after September 11, 2001 on immigration-related charges who were
determined to be affiliated with or associates of the 19 hijackers, al Qaeda, or related groups; and
the total number of aliens detained as a counterterrorism measure.
13. Voluntary interviews. Documents sufficient to establish the origin, mission and criteria,
organization and results (prosecutorial and preventive) of the voluntary interview program
involving interviews of Muslims, Arabs, and others by the FBI or Joint Terrorism Task Forces in
response to the attacks on September 11, 2001, including criteria on when and how to detain
interview subjects.
Page 4
14. "S" visas. Documents sufficient to describe the FBI's role in the "S" visas program for individuals
who have supplied terrorist-related information to U.S. law enforcement, including the number of
individuals to whom "S" visas were issued since September 11, 2001, and whether such persons
were associated with immigration-related detainees program, the voluntary interview program, the
Absconder Initiative, or another FBI activity.
15. Referrals for prosecution on immigration charges. Documents setting forth the number of
individuals who were either the subject of or a cross-reference in an FBI counterterrorism
investigation who were referred by the FBI for prosecution on at least one immigration charge
during the period (a) from January 1, 1998 through September 11, 2001; and (b) from September
12, 2001, through the present.
16. Alien smuggling along the Southwest border. Documents from January 1, 1998 through the
present discussing the issue of smuggling of aliens from the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan
into the United States across the Southwest border.
17. Links between illegal entry into the US and organized crime. Documents from 1998 to the
present discussing in summary form FBI information about linkages between illegal entry by
terrorists into the United States and organized crime, weapons traffickers, traffickers in persons,
terrorist financiers, or narcotics traffickers.
The Commission further requests that documents requested above be provided as soon as they are
available, even though all requested documents may not be provided at the same time, thorough
means of a "rolling" production.
If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on an alleged
claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon as
possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and describe each such document
or class of documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to
allow a meaningful challenge to any such withholding.
If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requested documents but has
information about where such documents may be located, the Commission requests that the
respondent provide such information as soon as possible and in no event later than the production
date.
If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of these document
requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or concerns be raised with the
Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior to the
production date.
September 12, 2003 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
panne Accolla
sdunne@9-11commission.gov
nt: Friday, September 12, 2003 3:12 PM
j: pobrien3@leo.gov
Cc: dan.levin@usdoj.gov; dmarcus@9-11commission.gov; team5@9-11commission.gov;
dcampagna@9-11commission.gov
Subject: FBI document request no. 13
FBI document
request no 13.doc...
Pat: Attached as a Word document is FBI document request no. 13. Please call
Tom Eldridge at 202-401-1686 with any questions about this request and to
arrange for production. Feel free to call Dan or me as well if any issues
arise. Thanks. Steve
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of the General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20535
September 3, 2003
Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
RE: Commission's Request for Documents
Dear Mr. Marcus:
In response to the Commissions Request for Documents, please find the

following:
Documents responsive to Document Request l-8e: 2001 AFOR Phoenix Field

Office;
• Documents responsive to Document Request l-8e: 2000 AFOR Phoenix Field
Office;
Documents responsive to Document Request l-8e: 1999 AFOR Phoenix Field
Office;
• Documents responsive to Document Request l-8e: 1998 AFOR Phoenix Field
Office;
• Documents responsive to Document Request 1-11: 1998 Inspection Report for
Berlin Legat;
Bonn Legat; >
• Documents responsive to Oral Request from Thomas Eldridge.
This is part of the FBI's rolling production and thus may be supplemented in the
future. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 202-324-9613.
Sincerely,
Assistant General Counsel

Document
Date Date of Request / Agency ID
Logged Item Type Item* Doc* From To Subject Number Location
09/04/03 09/03/03 RFBI 1 03005659 Sinton, Robert Marcus, Daniel Response to FBI Document Request No. 1
2001 Annual Field Office Report [Phoenix Field Office] [packet #22] 00000446-
09/04/03 undated RFBI 1,8e 03005660 Classified Material attached 00004777 GSA
09/04/03 undated RFBI 1, Be 03005661 Classified Material attached 000005022 GSA
000000001-
09/04/03 undated RFBI 1, 11 03005664 Inspector's Report Berlin Legat 2001 Classified Material attached 000000254 GSA
000000255-
09/04/03 undated RFBI 1,11 03005665 Inspector's Report Bonn Legat 1998 Classified Material attached 000000541 GSA
000000193-
09/04/03 undated RFBI 03005666 H I IF Technology Demonstration [oral request from Tom Eldridge] 000000216 GSA
Updated September 3, 2003

Joanne Accolla
m: Susan Ginsburg [sginsburg@9-11commission.gov]
t: Friday, September 26, 2003 4:02 PM
, u: team5@9-11commission.gov
Subject: FW: FBI #13 -- SG comments on Levin notes
Original Message
From: sdunne@9-llcommission.gov [mailto:sdunne@9-llcommission.gov]
Sent: Friday, September 26, 2003 3:46 PM
To: Susan Ginsburg
Cc: dmarcus@9-llcommission.gov
Subject: RE: FBI #13 - - SG comments on Levin notes
I conveyed the gist of these comments to Dan Levin, who was agreeable to the
clarifications, so I think we are all on the same page. If we are unhappy with
what we get, we can always go back to the well or ask at interviews, and Levin
is happy to gives us names of people we should interview on these issues.
Quoting Susan Ginsburg <sginsburg@9-llcommission.gov>:
> Dan and Steve,
> Below are my comments on Dan Levin's notes about our FBI document
> request "and the upcoming DOJ one." Tom will be over there to meet
> with Scott
Allen
•"""""'at 1. I will make sure he gets this to review then, in case you can
vait.
i
> put * by two of them which are the most important.
> Thanks.
> Susan
> Original Message

> From: dmarcus@9-llcommission.gov [mailto:dmarcus@9-llcommission.gov]
> Sent: Thursday, September 25, 2003 9:16 AM
> To: team5@9-llcommission.gov
> Subject: Fwd: FBI #13
> susan and Tom: this looks OK to Steve and me. Let me know
> immediately if you see any problem (as opposed to minor quibbles!).
> DM
> Forwarded message from "Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov"
> <Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov>
> Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2003 08:06:13 -0400 (EDT)

> From: "Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov" <Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov>
> Reply-To: "Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov" <Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov>
> Subject: FBI #13
> To: "'dmarcus@9-llcommission.gov'" <dmarcus@9-
> llcommission.gov>, "'sdunne@9-llcommission.gov'"
<sdunne@9-llcommission.gov>
;i AM RESENDING THIS BECAUSE OUR SYSTEM WAS DOWN AND I'M NOT SURE IT
- WENT
> THROUGH - IF YOU ALREADY GOT IT, SORRY. THANKS.]
just wanted to make sure my notes were right from our meeting on FBI
? #13 (and the upcoming DOJ one). Please let me know if you have any
'disagreement
rith the following:
> 1. In general, at least as an initial matter, searching can be limited

> to
> the central records systems (for the DOJ one I may also try to search an
> individual's files if I think there is someone who is likely to have
> responsive
> material that can be easily retrieved). Also, we can shift requests
between
> FBI and DOJ (or DHS) if it makes it easier to respond (we'll obviously
> let you know if we do so).
> YES
> 2. Item #2 has been shifted to DHS
> YES
> 3. Item #3 - the post 9/20 period is not being considered part of
> the "immediate response" but rather policy changes; you are looking
> for
> substantive documents (which we will likely shift to DOJ) reflecting the
> policies as opposed to identifying every meeting or participant.
> WAS FBI LEADERSHIP A POTTED PLANT? IF "IMMEDIATE RESPONSE1" DID NOT
> INCLUDE ADDRESSING WHAT TO DO AT THE BORDER AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT
> POSSIBLE ASSOCIATES IN THE US, THAT WOULD BE SURPRISING. THAT BEING
ya-^SAID. WE ARE LOOKING FOR KEY SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENTS, WITH DATES,
^ \SSOCIATED WITH THE INDIVIDUALS WHO DEVELOPED THE PROPOSALS,
SANCTIONED, AND IMPLEMENTED THEM.
> WE WOULD LIKE THE KEY PEOPLE FROM FBI -- THOSE WHO PROPOSED,
> DECIDED, AND IMPLEMENTED --TO BE IDENTIFIED SO WE CAN INTERVIEW THEM. IF
WE
> DID NOT STATE THIS ADEQUATELY WE CAN ADD IT TO THE DOJ REQUEST.
> 4. On #7, the focus is not the Olympics or Olympic security but the
> particular project and you are looking for summary documents
> evaluating
the
> project and its results.
> WE ARE LOOKING FOR THE ACTUAL RESULTS. HOW MANY ADDITIONAL ISLAMIC
> FUNDAMENTALIST TERRORISTS WERE IDENTIFIED THROUGH THIS PROCESS THAT
> WERE ADDED TO VGTOF? THUS -- "DOCUMENTS SUMMARIZING THE PROJECT AND
> ITS RESULTS."
> 5. For #11 again you are looking for significant policy documents
> describing the purpose and/or results of the list.
> RESULTS.
> 6. For #12 in the first instance at least you are looking for names of
> people affiliated with the hijackers, AQ, or groups related to AQ (and
> you will then check to see if you already have additional information
> on any such people).
>
•^^ *WE REQUEST THE TOTAL NUMBER OF IMMIGRATION RELATED DETAINEES (AS
STATED IN THE FINAL CLAUSE), AND THE ABOVE INFORMATION.
> 7. On #13, you are looking for summary documents evaluating the project
>
2
and its results.
>
> THE SUMMARY NEEDS TO INCLUDE CRITERIA FOR THE INTERVIEWS, NUMBER OF
INTERVIEW'S, AND THE RESULTS.
J. On #14, we will check to see if the FBI has any easy way to provide
> such summary information but will not go through each individual file
> or field office/USAO to try to determine it. Similarly on #15, we
> will see if the FBI
> (or DOJ) has any easy way from computerized systems to determine these
> numbers
> but will not go through individual files or field of f ices/USAOs to try to
> determine this.
>
> *#14 ALLOWS US TO SHOW SOMETHING POSITIVE, AND EVALUATE THIS
> POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT TOOL. WE WOULD LIKE TO BE AS CREATIVE AS
> POSSIBLE ABOUT HOW TO GET IT. FOR INSTANCE WE MIGHT ACTUALLY WANT TO
> GO TO ONE OR TWO KEY FIELD OFFICES FOR A CHECK. WE WOULD LIKE DHS TO
> BE CONSULTED
ABOUT
> WHETHER THEY CAN OBTAIN THIS INFORMATION. WHO WAS THE INDIVIDUAL WHO
> HAD THE FINAL SAY ON PROVIDING THIS BENEFIT AT FBI /DOJ?
>
> 9. On #16 and #17 you are looking for significant or summary reports or
>
> analyses on these subjects.
>
> WE WANT TO KNOW IF FBI HAS ANY EVIDENCE THAT TERRORISTS HAVE ENTERED
> THROUGH THE SW BORDER, THROUGH ALIEN SMUGGLING AND/OR NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING
> OR OTHER FORMS OF ORGANIZED CRIME. FOR THIS QUESTION, AN INTERVIEW
> WITH
-AH
\PPROPRIATE PERSON MIGHT BE AN ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE.
> (Again, in a number of these areas there may be no such summary
> documents
or
>
> evaluations, but we will look for them.)
>
> Do I have it right?
>
> Thanks .
>
>
> ----- End forwarded message -----
Office of the General Counsel Washington, D. C. 20535
October 6, 2003
Daniel Marcus, General Counsel yj J J^

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States \l_^r\^/r>^*^'
Suite 300
2100 K Street, N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
In response to the Commissions Request for Documents, please find the following:
Documents responsive to Document Request 5-4c;

Documents responsive to Document Request 5-9a -8 Packets;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-lc;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-Id;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-If;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-lg;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-lh;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-Ik;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-11;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-Is;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-lu; ;
Documents responsive to Document Request 13-4.^
Additionally, enclosed is an electronic copy of the time line and, as a" separate
document, a set of instructions for searching the time line. Adherence to these instructions will
prevent possible reconfiguration of the chart.
J
Roberts. Sinton
Washington, D. C. 20535-0001
October 8, 2003

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-Supplemental #lb;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-Supplemental #lc;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-Supplemental #li;
Documents responsive to Document Request 5-9a - 3 Packets;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-lb;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-1m;
Documents responsive to Document Request lO-lo;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-lr;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-lw;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-lx;
Documents responsive to Document Request 14-3.
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
October 21,2003

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
In response to the Commission's Request for Documents, please find the
following:
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-Supplemental #lg - 13 Packets;
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-lz - 3 Packets;
Documents responsive to Document Request 13-6. ^
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sirton
WATCHLISTING OF TERRORISTS
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11,2001
RESPONSIVE
to
REQUEST #13-6
[PACKET #2]
COMMISSION COPY
To: 9-11 Commission Task Force
From: Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)
Subject: Request for a list of current FBI employees detailed to TTIC, assigned to work on terrorist
watchlisting.
Date: October 10, 2003
Details: The Terrorist Identities Group (TIG), within TTIC, is the organizational component tasked with
developing and maintaining an all-source terrorist identities database. It is from this database, that
watchlist nominations will be provided to the newly created Terrorist Screening Center.
Currently, only one FBI employee is assigned to the TIG, that being the Group Chief, SSA
Michael D. Resnick. It is anticipated that five FBI analysts will be assigned to the TIG by year-end.
An additional 10 FBI analysts have been requested to report to the TIG by May, 2004. These analysts
will be responsible for maintaining the portion of the database dealing with the relevant information on
the FBI's international terrorism subjects. These 15 FBI analysts are critical to the TIG fulfilling its
mission.
The POC in this matter is SSA Michael D. Resnick, telephone (703) 482-9783.
October 24, 2003

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
In response to the Commissions Request for Documents, please find the ~ "/L , • ,
following: OUUW^-
• Documents responsive to Document Request for ACS Material

[10/21/03]-5 Packets;
London Legat;
Documents responsive to Document Request 1-11: 2001 Inspection Report for
London Legat;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-le;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-lj;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-lq;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-lr;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-Is;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-lv;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-lx;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-ly;
Documents responsive to Document Request 5-4 - 4 Packets;
Documents responsive to Document Request 5-4d - 3 Packets;
Documents responsive to Document Request 5-8a;
Documents responsive to Document Request 13-11; ^
Documents responsive to Document Request 14-lr.
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
November 18,2003

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:

following:
• Documents responsive to Document Request 3-If;

• Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #3-e -4 Packets;
• Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #3-h -2 Packets;
• Documents responsive to Document Request 13-11.
Sincerely,
S. Siri
SECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST
DOCUMENTS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE
ORIGIN , MISSION AND RESULTS OF THE
SECURITY DIRECTIVE LIST CREATED AND
DISSEMINATED BY THE FBI IN THE IMMEDIATE
AFTERMATH OF SEPTEMBER 11,2001.
RESPONSIVE
to
REQUEST #13-11
(PACKET #2)
COMMISSION COPY
9/11 COMMISSION TASK FORCE
DOCUMENT DELETION CODES
[As of August 11,2003]
"A" - SOURCE/INFORMANT INFORMATION - Information, the disclosure of which

would tend to reveal the identity of an informant or source where confidentiality is
expressed or implied.
"B" - FBI TECHNIQUES AND/OR METHODS - Information on sensitive FBI

techniques and/or methods which would impede or impair the effectiveness of that
technique and/or method.
"C" - NON-RELEVANT FBI CASE INFORMATION - Information neither relevant nor

responsive to the Commission's requests.
"D" - FBI PENDING CASE INFORMATION - Information which would impede or

jeopardize a pending investigation of the FBI.
"E" - STATUTORY - Information legally prohibited from release by statute.
"F" - PRIVACY/SECURITY - Information, the disclosure of which would be an

unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy or jeopardize the safety of law
enforcement personnel and/or their family members
Material redacted under this code includes (1) social security numbers;
(2) date and place of birth; (3) home address and telephone numbers;
(4) personnel cell phone and pager numbers
"G" - FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION - The identity of a foreign

government and/or foreign service to include the names of foreign law enforcement
employees/officials.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Aviation Security Directive
Subject: Threat to U.S. Airports - No Fly and Selectee Lists

Number: SD 1542-01-1 OB Date: April 22, 2003
EXPIRATION: Indefinite
This Security Directive (SD) supercedes and cancels SD 1542-01-10A and must be
implemented not later than April 29, 2003. Revised procedures are indicated by bold
text.
INFORMATION: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has received

information indicating that the individuals on the No Fly and Selectee Lists associated
with this SD could pose a threat to civil aviation and national security.
This SD provides procedures that airport operators are to follow to compare individuals
whose names appear on the No Fly and Selectee Lists with direct employees and those
employees to which the airport has issued Security Identification Display Area (SIDA)
identification media, or is considering issuing SIDA identification media.
REVISION SUMMARY:
• Revises procedures for comparing names of direct employees and those employees
to which the airport has issued SIDA identification media or is considering issuing
SIDA identification media against the No Fly and Selectee Lists
• Provides guidance and direction to restrict or prohibit access to the SIDA and other
sterile areas of the airport
ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRPORT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER 49 CFR 1542:

The requirements of this SD are applicable to Category X through IV airports that are
required to maintain SIDAs and sterile areas.
I. TSA will provide No Fly and Selectee Lists to the security coordinator of each airport
to which this SD applies. The No Fly and Selectee Lists will be provided via
password protected email or may be obtained from TSA's secure webpage. All future
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY
RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR US. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.
REQ 13-11 000000004

• SECURITY DIRECTIVE 1542-01-10B
Page 2 of 3
updates (removal or addition of names) to the No Fly and Selectee Lists will be
provided in the same manner. Airport operators must conduct a comparison
between the names on the most recently issued No Fly and Selectee Lists and
its direct employees and any other individual to whom the airport has issued,
or is processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification
media that is evidence of employment at the airport.
WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
REQ 13-11 000000005

SECURITY DIRECTIVE 1542-01-1 OB
Page 3 of 2
II. Many non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name order. The names
that
appear on the No Fly and Selectee Lists may be in varying order and spelling. Data
such as date of birth, social security number, and passport number and country of
issue, will be provided by TSA when available. This data must be used when making
a comparison between names on the No Fly and Selectee Lists and those individuals
to whom the airport has issued, or is processing an application for, SIDA, sterile
area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport.
ill NO FLY LIST ACTIONS

A. If during the course of the name comparison, the airport operator determines it
has issued, or is processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other
identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport, to an individual
named on the No Fly List, the airport operator must immediately contact:
1. The nearest FBI Office.

2. The Transportation Security Intelligence (TSI) Watch at 202-267-3099.
B. If processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media

that is evidence of employment at the airport, the airport operator must not issue
the media. For those individuals already issued SIDA, sterile area, or other
identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport, the airport
operator must suspend the media and prohibit the individual's access, whether
escorted or unescorted, to the SIDA and sterile areas until the status of the
individual is determined by the FBI.
IV. SELECTEE LIST ACTIONS

A. If during the course of the name comparison, the airport operator determines it
has issued, or is processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other
identification media that is evidence of employment at the airport to a direct
employee and that employee is named on the Selectee List, the airport operator
must immediately contact:
1. The nearest FBI Office.

B. In relation to identification media:
1. If the employee has applied for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media
that is evidence of employment at the airport, the airport operator must not
issue the media until the FBI clears the employee. An airport operator may
issue other than SIDA identification media if that employee will be subject to
screening in accordance with the SD 1542-02-03 series prior to entrance into
any sterile area of the airport.
2. Do not permit the employee access to the SIDA if the employee has already
been issued a SIDA identification media unless that employee is accompanied
REQ 13-11 000000006

~~~~ « SECURITY DIRECTIVE 1542-01-10B
Page 4 of 3
by an escort who has been issued a SIDA media, or the employee is cleared by
the FBI.
AIRPORT OPERATOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The Airport Operator must immediately provide

written confirmation to the Federal Security Director (FSD) indicating receipt of this SD.
AIRPORT dissemination: The FSD will disseminate this SD to the Airport Security
Coordinator (ASC) and any law enforcement element having 49 CFR 1542
responsibilities at that airport. No other dissemination may be made without prior
approval of the FSD.
Airport Law Enforcement Agency Network (ALEAN) affected members who currently have a
memorandum of agreement with the TSA will also receive this SD from the TSA. No other
dissemination may be made without prior approval of the Administrator. Unauthorized
dissemination of this document or information contained herein is prohibited by 49 CFR 1520.
APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, an

airport operator may submit in writing to the FSD, proposed alternative measures and the
basis for submitting the alternative measures, for approval by the Assistant Administrator
for Aviation Operations.
FOR TSA ACTION ONLY: The TSA shall issue this SD immediately to 49 CFR 1542 airports
Category X through IV and to the corporate security element of all affected U.S. aircraft
operators.
Isl
J. M. Loy, ADM
Administrator
WARNING- THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520. NO PART OF THIS
RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR US. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. S52.
REQ 13-11 000000007

V.T

SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Subject: Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators - Selectee List
Number: SD 1544-01-21C Date: April 22, 2003
This Security Directive (SD) supercedes and cancels SD 1544-01-21B and must be
text.

information indicating that individuals on the Selectee List associated with this SD may
warrant additional scrutiny prior to boarding to ensure they do not pose a threat to civil
aviation and national security.
This SD provides procedures that aircraft operators are to follow to verify the identity of
individuals whose names appear on the Selectee List. The procedures outlined herein
apply to passengers carried by the aircraft operator and the aircraft operator's direct
employees.
REVISION SUMMARY:
• Revises procedures for verifying the identity of individuals whose names appear on
the Selectee List
• Revises procedures to restrict or prohibit access to restricted areas of an airport by
aircraft operator employees whose names appear on the Selectee List
ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRCRAFT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER TITLE 49. CODE

OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR). PART 1544: If you are an aircraft operator covered
by
49 CFR 1544, you must implement all the measures set forth in this SD.
I. TSA will provide a Selectee List to the security director or designee of each
aircraft operator required to implement this SD. The Selectee List will be
provided via password protected email or may be obtained from TSA's secure
webpage. All future updates (removal or addition of names) to the Selectee List
will be provided in the same manner. Aircraft operators must conduct a
comparison between the names on the most recently issued Selectee List and
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552.
REQ 13-11 000000008

.-U01 IJ.UUO
- - - - ----
| ' Security Directive 1544-01 -21 C
] Page 2 of 4
those passengers checking in for flights. Additionally, aircraft operators must

also conduct a comparison between names on each updated Selectee List and all
direct aircraft operator employees and those individuals to which the aircraft
operator has issued Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) identification
media, or is considering issuing SIDA identification media.
II. Many non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name order. The
names that appear on the Selectee List may be in varying order and spelling.
Data such as date of birth, social security number, and passport number and
country of issue, will be provided by ISA when available. This data must be used
during the flight check-in process to assist in the determination of an individual's
status as outlined in Section III of this SD.
m. PASSENGERS
Should an individual whose name appears on the Selectee List present himself or
herself to the aircraft operator for transport, the aircraft operator must complete
the following procedures prior to allowing the passenger and bags on board the
aircraft:
A. Compare all available passenger data (date of birth, social security number,
and passport number and country of issue) to information on the Selectee List
to determine if there is a match.
B. If the passenger matches both name and one piece of identifying data or there
is an exact name match and no additional identifying data is provided to you
on the Selectee List, the aircraft operator must:
1. Designate the person as a selectee for enhanced screening procedures.
2. Clear all checked baggage belonging to the passenger, if any, in
accordance with the measures in AOSSP Section VIII.E.
3. Ensure the passenger and all their accessible property are subjected to
secondary screening either at the security screening check point or at the
gate in accordance with SD 1544-01-10 series.
4. Immediately contact the following:
a. The nearest FBI Office if within the United States or the United
States legal attache at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate if
outside the United States.
b. The local Federal Security Director, if within the United States or its
territories, who will alert other air carriers of that airport of the
situation.
c. The appropriate law enforcement officials at the airport if outside
the United States, advising them of the situation
C. Each aircraft operator must develop a system to document passengers
processed in accordance with Section III.B. above, and the system must be
approved by the aircraft operator's Principal Security Inspector.(PSI). The
REQ 13-11 000000009

Mage 3
1 x Security Directive 1544-01 -21C
, Page 3 of 4
system must include a record of verification check of the information

provided on the Selectee List. A record must be maintained at each station
of all flights operated with passengers who are designated as selectees in
accordance with this SD, listing the name of each passenger and the
names of the two aircraft operator representatives who completed the
verification. These records must be maintained at the station for a
minimum of seven (7) days if in the United States or 180 days if outside the
United States.
REQ 13-11 000000010

: V V CHOI I
I , .... •..;...,.
Security Directive 1544-01-21C

Page 4 of 4
D. The procedures in Section III.C. do not apply to a passenger designated as a

selectee based on the application of the Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS) or manual prescreening criteria.
IV. AIRCRAFT OPERATOR EMPLOYEES

A. Aircraft operators must conduct a comparison against the most current
Selectee List for all direct aircraft operator employees. If during the course
of the name comparison the aircraft operator determines that an employee
has been issued, or is processing an application for a SIDA, sterile area, or
other identification media that is evidence of employment with the aircraft
operator, and that employee is named on the Selectee List, the aircraft
operator must immediately contact:
1. The nearest FBI Field Office if within the United States, or the United
States legal attache at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate, if
outside the United States:
3. The appropriate law enforcement officials at the airport, advising them
of the situation.
B. Upon completion of the steps in IV.A., aircraft operators must take the
following action in relation to ID media:
1. If the employee has applied to the local airport operator for SIDA
identification media, the aircraft operator must advise the airport
operator not to issue the media until the FBI clears the employee. An
aircraft operator may issue sterile area or other identification media
that is evidence of employment with the aircraft operator if that
employee will be subject to screening in accordance with the SD 1544-
01-10 series prior to entrance into any sterile area of the airport and
equivalent restricted areas at airports outside of the United States, or
2. If the employee has already been issued a SIDA identification media,
the aircraft operator must not permit the employee access to the SIDA
or other airport sterile areas unless that employee is accompanied by
an escort who has been issued and is displaying a valid SIDA media or
is cleared by the FBI.
AIRCRAFT OPERATOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The aircraft operator shall provide

immediate written confirmation to its assigned PSI indicating that it has received this SD.
AIRCRAFT OPERATOR dissemination required: The aircraft operator shall immediately pass
•the information and directives set forth in this SD to all stations affected, and provide written
confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledged
REQ 13-11 000000011

Page 5 of 4
receipt of the information and directives set forth in this SD.
WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1520 NO PART OF THIS
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW. AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1S20, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. SSL
REQ 13-11 000000012

;Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01-21C%2Q4ated%204-22-03[1].doc , , • Page 6
Page 6 of 4
The aircraft operator shall disseminate this information to senior management personnel,
GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at locations within the United States and its
territories. Aircraft operator security personnel at each location should coordinate the
distribution of information in this SD with local airport management and law enforcement
personnel on a strict need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their
respective organizations to personnel with an operational need-to-know. All aircraft operator
personnel implementing this SD must be briefed by the aircraft operator on its content and the
restrictions governing dissemination.
APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, the
aircraft operator may submit in writing to its Principal Security Inspector (PSI) proposed
alternative measures and the basis for submitting the alternative measures, for approval by
the Assistant Administrator for Aviation Operations. The aircraft operator shall
immediately notify its PSI whenever any procedure in this SD cannot be carried out by the
aircraft operator or its agents, or is not being carried out by a government authority charged
with performing security procedures.
FOR TSA ACTION ONLY: The TSA shall issue this SD immediately to the cornorafp
element of all affected U.S. aircraft operators and to local airport management and
associated law enforcement officials.
/s/
J. M. Loy, ADM
Administrator
REQ 13-11 000000013

ii"w(3tch%20List%20SD-l544-01-20B%2ft^ted%204-22-03[1].doc ,- I . ,.Pa9e1

SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Subject: Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators - No Fly List
Number: SD 1544-01-20B Date: April 22, 2003
This Security Directive (SD) supercedes and cancels SD 1544-01-20A and must be
text.

information indicating that individuals on the No Fly List associated with this SD could
pose a threat to civil aviation and national security.
There have been many instances where the name of a passenger is identical or similar to
an individual on the No Fly List. This SD provides revised guidance and direction
concerning use of the No Fly List and procedures aircraft operators are to follow to
resolve name conflicts. Affirming the incorrect identity of the individual can cause
unnecessary embarrassment and inability to board a flight. Additionally, this SD revises
procedures currently in place which prohibit aircraft operator employees whose names
appear on the No Fly List, access to restricted areas of airports.
REVISION SUMMARY:
• Revises procedures for verifying the identity of individuals whose names appear on
or are similar to names on the No Fly List
• Provides guidance and direction for the use of the No Fly List and procedures aircraft
operators are to follow to quickly resolve conflicts
• Revises procedures to restrict or prohibit access to restricted areas of an airport by
aircraft operator employees whose names appear on the No Fly List
ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRCRAFT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER TITLE 49. CODE

OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR). PART 1544: If you are an aircraft operator covered
by
49 CFR 1544, you must implement all the measures set forth in this SD.
I. TSA will provide a No Fly List to the security director or designee of each aircraft
operator required to implement this SD. The No Fly List will be provided via
password protected email or may be obtained from TSA's secure webpage. All
REQ 13-11 000000014

i Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01 -2QB%'2pdated%204-22-Q3[1]'.dbc""" -' , ....•....- • p a ge2
< i Security Directive 1544-01-20B I
Page 2 of 1
future updates (removal or addition of names) to the No Fly List will be provided in
^ the same manner. Aircraft operators must conduct a comparison between the
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER S U.S.C. 552.
REQ 13-11 000000015

Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01-20B%20.'J3ted%204-22-03|:i].doc ,' > Page 3
'f Security Directive 1544-01-208 |
' Page 3 of 1
names on the most recently issued No Fly List and those passengers checking in
for flights. Additionally, aircraft operators must also conduct a comparison
between names on each updated No Fly List and all direct aircraft operator
employees and those individuals to which the aircraft operator has issued SIDA
identification media, or is processing an application for SIDA identification media.
Many non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name order. The names
that appear on the No Fly List may be in varying order and spelling. Data such as
date of birth, social security number, and passport number and country of issue,
will be provided by TSA when available. This data must be used during the flight
check-in process to assist in the determination of an individual's status as
outlined in Section III of this SD.
PASSENGERS
A. Check Prior to Arrival: When passenger reservation data is available in
advance of the arrival of a passenger for check-in, the aircraft operator must
conduct a comparison of its flight reservation system to the most current No
Fly List. During this process, if an aircraft operator matches a name and at
least one additional piece of identifying data on its flight reservation system
with the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifying data that appears in the
Remarks Section of the No Fly List, the aircraft operator must immediately
contact the following:
1. The nearest FBI Field Office, if the departing flight is within the
United States, or the United States legal attache at the nearest U.S.
Embassy or Consulate, if the departing flight is outside the United States.
3. The local Federal Security Director, if the departing flight is within the
United States, who will alert other aircraft operators at that airport of the
situation.
B. Clearance at Check-In (Within the United States): Upon arrival of a

passenger for check-in at an airport in the United States, the aircraft
operator must conduct a comparison between the names on the most
recently issued No Fly List and their flight reservation system. During this
process, if an aircraft operator matches a name and, if provided, at least one
additional piece of identifying data on its flight reservation system with a
name on the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifying data that appears
in the Remarks Section (if the passenger matches data in the Remarks
Section, see III. B. 4.), the aircraft operator must deny transportation to that
individual, their accessible property, checked baggage, and any other
individual(s) accompanying the passenger and their baggage unless cleared
by the following process:
1. Contact the appropriate local law enforcement officials and ensure the
responding Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) compares all available data
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER t U.S.C. 552.
REQ 13-11 000000016

iWatch%20List%2QSD-1 544-01 -20B%î3ted%204-22-Q3[1].doc 717T..7.
l'"~NF Security Directive 1544-01 -20B
' Page 4 of 1
(date of birth, social security number, passport number and country of

issue, etc.) to determine if the individual is a match.
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW. AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL
REQ 13-11 000000017

Watch %20List%20SD-1544-01 -20B%2Q^|ted%204-22-03[1 J.doc « »_ Page .5
^"'i Security Directive 1544-01-20B T
Page 5 of 1
2. If the LEO determines there is no matching data from the No Fly List
other than the individual's name, the aircraft operator may accept the
individual as a passenger for transport.
3. If the LEO determines that an individual matches the name and at least
one additional piece of identifying data (requirement to match additional
data does not apply where only a name is listed) from the No Fly List, the
aircraft operator must immediately contact the following:
a. The nearest FBI Field Office.
b. The Transportation Security Intelligence Watch at 202-267-3099,
c. The local Federal Security Director who will alert other aircraft
operators at that airport of the situation.
4. Match of identifying data that appears in the Remarks Section of the No
Fly List. TSA may provide identifying data in the Remarks Section of the
No Fly List for an individual who bears a name that is the same as, or
similar to, a name on the No Fly List, but who is permitted to fly. This
identifying data will be used to confirm that the individual is not the
person identified as a threat on the No Fly List.
a. TSA will accept, from individuals only, written requests for relief from the No Fly
List clearance procedures of III. B. 1., 2., and 3.
b. If TSA establishes that an individual requesting relief is not on the
No Fly List, TSA will include in the Remarks Section of the No Fly
List the identifying data that distinguishes the cleared passenger
from the individual who is prohibited from flying.
c. An aircraft operator must implement a system approved by its
Principal Security Inspector (PSI) that:
(1) Utilizes the data provided in the Remarks Section of the No
Fly List to clear an individual for flights at check-in without
the procedures, listed in III. B. 1., 2., and 3.
(2) Provides a procedure to verify that an authorized aircraft
operator representative responsible for verification of the No
Fly List applies these clearance procedures.
(3) Maintains at each station a record of every flight that operated
with an individual who was cleared to fly with these clearance
procedures, including listing the name of each individual and
the names of two representatives of the aircraft operator who
completed the verification. These records must be maintained
at the station for a minimum of seven (7) days.
C. Clearance at Check-In (Outside of the United States): Upon arrival of a
passenger for check-in at an airport outside of the United States, the aircraft
operator must conduct a comparison between the names on the most
recently issued No Fly List and their flight reservation system. When an
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW. AS DERNED IN 49 CFR 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC 20590. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE HAY RESULT IN CIVIL
REQ 13-11 000000018

II
....",., _
-« Security Directive 1544-01-20B

| Page 6 of 1 j
individual matches information on the No Fly List, excluding a match of identifying

data that appears in the Remarks Section (if the passenger matches data in the
Remarks Section, see III.C.4.), an aircraft operator must deny transportation

to that individual, their accessible property, checked baggage, and any other
individual(s) accompanying the passenger and their baggage unless cleared
by:
1. The United States legal attache at the nearest U. S. Embassy or
Consulate.
3. Additionally, the appropriate law enforcement officials at the airport
should be notified.
4. Match of identifying data that appears in the Remarks Section of the No
Fly List. TSA may provide identifying data in the Remarks Section of the
No Fly List for an individual who bears a name that is the same as, or
similar to, a name on the No Fly List, but who is permitted to fly. This
identifying data must be used to confirm that the individual is not the
person identified as a threat on the No Fly List.
a. TSA will accept, from individuals only, written requests for relief
from the No Fly List clearance procedures of this SD.
b. If TSA establishes that an individual requesting relief is not on the
No Fly List, TSA will include in the Remarks Section of the No Fly
List the identifying data that distinguishes the cleared passenger
from the individual who is prohibited from flying.
c. An aircraft operator must implement a system approved by its
Principal Security Inspector (PSI) that:
(1) Utilizes the data provided in the Remarks Section of the No
Fly List to clear an individual for flights at check-in,
alleviating the requirement to process the passenger through
the procedures of III.C.1., 2., and 3.
(2) Provides a procedure to verify that an authorized aircraft
operator representative responsible for verification of the No
Fly List applies these clearance procedures.
(3) Maintains at each station a record of every flight that
operated with an individual who was cleared to fly with these
clearance procedures, including listing the name of each
individual and the names of two representatives of the
aircraft operator who completed the verification. These
records must be maintained at the station for a minimum of
one hundred and eighty (180) days.
IV. AIRCRAFT OPERATOR EMPLOYEES

DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW, AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1 520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER S U.S.C. 552.
REQ 13-11 000000019

Security Directive 1544-01-208
Page 7 of 1
A. Aircraft operators must conduct a comparison between names on each

updated No Fly List and its direct aircraft operator employees and those
individuals to which the aircraft operator has issued, or is processing an
application for SI DA, sterile area, or other identification media that is
evidence of employment with the aircraft operator.
REQ 13-11 000000020

Page 8 of 1
B. If during the course of the name comparison an aircraft operator

determines it has issued, or is processing an application for a SIDA, sterile
area, or other identification media that is evidence of employment with the
aircraft operator, for an individual named on the No Fly List, the aircraft
operator must immediately contact the following:
1. The nearest FBI Field Office, if within the United States, or the United
States legal attache at the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate, if outside
the United States.
2. The Transportation Security Intelligence Watch at 202-267-3099.
3. The local Federal Security Director who will alert other aircraft operators
at that airport of the situation.
C. If processing an application for a SIDA, sterile area, or other ID media that is

evidence of employment with the aircraft operator, the aircraft operator must
not issue the media. For those individuals already issued SIDA. sterile area,
or other identification media that is evidence of employment with the aircraft
operator, the aircraft operator must suspend the media and prohibit the
individual's access, whether escorted or unescorted, to the SIDA and sterile
areas until the status of the individual is determined by the FBI.
AIRCRAFT OPERATOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Upon receipt of this SD, the aircraft operator
shall provide immediate written confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that they have
received this SD.
AIRCRAFT OPERATOR dissemination required: The aircraft operator shall immediately pass
the information and directives set forth in this SD to all stations affected, and provide written
confirmation to its assigned PSI, indicating that all stations affected have acknowledged
receipt of the information and directives set forth in this SD.
The aircraft operators shall disseminate this information to senior management personnel,
GSC's, and supervisory security personnel at locations within the United States and its
territories. Aircraft operator security personnel at each location should coordinate the
information in this SD with local airport management and law enforcement personnel on a strict
need-to-know basis. All recipients must limit dissemination within their respective organizations
to personnel with an operational need-to-know. All aircraft operator personnel implementing
this SD must be briefed by the aircraft operator on its content and the restrictions governing
dissemination.
APPROVAL OF ALTERNATIVE MEASURES: With respect to the provisions of this SD, as

stated in 49 CFR 1544, aircraft operators may submit in writing to their PSI, proposed
alternative measures and the basis for submitting the requests, for approval by the Assistant
Administrator for Aviation Operations. The aircraft operator shall immediately notify its PSI
whenever the aircraft operator or its agents cannot carry out any procedure in this SD, or is
not being carried out by a government authority charged with performing security procedures.
WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PART 1S20. NO PART OF THIS
REQ 13-11 000000021

rWatch%20List%20SD:1544-01-20B%2Q^ted%204-22-03[1].doc!; "" ' ^\. "Page 9
t j Security Directive 1544-01-20B T. ?
Page 9 of 1
DOCUMENT MAY BE RELEASED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW. AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR 1520. EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION
REQ 13-11 000000022

Watch%20List%20SD-1544-01-20B%^H,ated%204-22-03[1].doc ; \e 10
Page 10 of 1
FOR ISA ACTION ONLY: The TSA shall issue this SD immediately to the corporate security
element of all affected U.S. aircraft operators and to local airport management and associated
law enforcement officials.
FOR STATE DEPARTMENT: Retransmittal to appropriate foreign posts is authorized. Post

must refer to STATE 162917, 201826Z Sep 01, Subject: FAA Security Directives and
Information Circulars: Definitions and Handling, for specific guidance and dissemination.
Isl
J. M. Loy, ADM
Administrator
REQ 13-11 000000023

(Rev. 01-31-2003)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 06/09/2003
To: All Field Offices Attn: ADIC/SAC

ASAC Counterterrorism
JTTF Supervisors
Airport Liaison Agents
FBIHQ, Manuals Desk
All Legats
Counterterrorism Attn: Section Chief, ITOS I
Section Chief, ITOS II
Section Chief, DTOS
Unit Chiefs
From: Counterterrorism
Special Events Management Unit/
Civil Aviation Security Program
Contact: SSA Alexis Louise Smollok, (202) 324-0242
Approved By: Mefford Larry A
Pistole John S
Harrington T J
Drafted By: Smollok Alexis Louise:als
Lightfoot John
Case ID #: 3OOB-HQ-C1184203-K (Pending)
66F-HQ-C1384970
Title: TSA NO FLY AND TSA SELECTEE LIST;
PROCEDURES TO ADD OR REMOVE NAMES
Reference: 265A-NY-280350-WLC Serial 98
265A-NY-280350-WLC Serial 89
265A-NY-280350 Serial 1586
66F-HQ-C1392852 Serial 8
Enclosure: The following three TSA Aviation Security Directives,
dated April 22, 2003, are enclosed:
(1) SD-1544-01-21C, "Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators-Selectee
List" ;
(2) SD-1542-01-10B, "Threat to U.S. Airports-No Fly and Selectee
Lists"; and,
(3) SD-1544-01-20B, "Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators-No Fly
List. "
REQ 13-11
000000024
To: All Field Of? Jes From: Counterterrori:
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184^d3-K, 06/09/2003
Synopsis: To advise of procedures established to provide consistent

application of names submitted by the FBI to the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) No Fly and Selectee Lists.
Details: Background:
On October 15, 2001, the FAA issued Security Directives

(SB's) after receiving lists of individuals associated with Al-Qaeda
from both the CIA and the FBI. The SB's contained a list of persons
who were believed to pose a threat to civil aviation security. This
process was refined to a coordinated policy and protocol between the
FBI, CIA, and FAA (now the TSA) to identify persons who may pose a
threat to civil aviation security. Since late 2001, there have been
refinements -to the protocol in which persons are either placed on or
removed from either list. The TSA maintains the two lists and names
are submitted mostly by the CIA and the FBI, but also from the
Department of Homeland Security/Bureau of Immigration and Customs
.Enforcement, TSA, and on occasion, other agencies.
The TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee List are not to be
confused with other watch lists, such as:
a. Terrorist Watch List (TWL),

b. National Crime Information Center Violent Gang and
Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF),
c. Department of State (TIPOFF System),
d. Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS),
e. Bepartment of Homeland Security (formerly Treasury
Department) Treasury Enforcement Computer System (TECS),
f. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (formerly
United States Customs Service and Immigration and
Naturalization Service) Interagency Border Inspection
System (IBIS), and
g. National Automated Lookout System (NALS).
Definitions of each list
The persons on the TSA No Fly List are to be prevented from

using U.S. commercial aviation, since they have been deemed by the
TSA to be a threat to civil aviation security, based upon information
received from various sources. These individuals may not use
commercial aviation as long as their name appears on the TSA No Fly
List.
When a person on this list arrives at an airport and

attempts to fly, the airline is required to alert local law
enforcement. Local law enforcement authorities will be the primary
response to determine if the person at the airport matches the person
on the list. If there is a positive match, then the local law
REQ 13-11 000000025

To: All Field Of., j:es From: Counterterrori. I
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184203-K, 06/09/2003
enforcement authorities will contact the local FBI Field Office's

Airport Liaison Agent or Joint Terrorism Task Force. The FBI shall
then respond to the airport to conduct further investigation,
including identity checks, consensual interview, and notification to
FBIHQ. Such responses should be documented at the field division
level.
A detention is generally warranted for individuals with an
outstanding arrest warrant, or if investigation reveals the person is
on an operational terrorist mission.
The persons on the TSA Selectee List are not known to be a
threat to aviation, but an agency has said . they may have a possible
connection to terrorism or a terrorist organization. Passengers
determined to match the name on this list are subject to enhanced
pre-boarding security screening measures, and ultimately, are
permitted to travel on commercial aviation. The .airlines are also
required to notify both local and airport law enforcement and the
local FBI office. However, as long as individuals are subject to
enhanced screening, additional law enforcement review is not
required.
The backbone to the regulatory process for the civil
aviation industry is Security Directives, issued by the TSA (formerly
Federal Aviation Administration). Over the past twenty months, the
TSA has issued updated SD's that outline actions for airport
operators and airlines in regard to names appearing on either the TSA
No Fly List or TSA Selectee List.
In essence, the SB's advise airport operators to (1) check
applicants for airport ID card (e.g., SIDA badge) applicants names
against the TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee List, and (2) outline
procedures for airlines to check passengers names and employees for
name matches from either list. Responses to positive name
identification may require FBI involvement for further identification
and interview after screening by local or airport law enforcement in
questionable cases of identity.
To control all names placed on and removed from both the TSA
No Fly List and TSA Selectee Lists by the FBI, a separate control
file (300B-HQ-C1184203-K), has been established for accountability
purposes in the Counterterrorism Division. This file number shall be
appropriately referenced in all documentation.
Procedures to add or remove a person for both lists:
' The Counterterrorism Division has developed the following
procedures to add a person to either the TSA No Fly List or TSA
/\e List. TSA has concurred with the following procedures:
REQ 13-11 000000026

To: All Field Of?! ies From: Counterterrori*,
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184'^03-K, 06/09/2003
1. A substantive terrorism case, such as a 265 and 199 or a

266, must be open on the subject. (Neither a Headquarters
nor Field Office's control file may be used for this
purpose.)
2. Submissions to either the TSA No-Fly List or the TSA
Selectee List must be done via an EC that is uploaded with
unrestricted text. The person's name and identifying
information must also be indexed in UNI. Submissions to
add or remove a person via an e-mail message or telephone
call will be denied.
3. The EC must include all of the following:
a. The substantive file number(s) and the control file number
(300B-HQ-C1184203-K);
b. Addressed to the following three units in t-h^

Counterterrorism Division at Headquarters:
(1) the appropriate FBIHQ operational unit;

(2) Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit, Room 11303; and
(3) Special Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation Security
Program, Room 11795.
c. The Synopsis section of the EC should state: "Request to

add [or remove] [Name] [DOB], a U.S. citizen [or US PER or
non-USPER] , to [or from] the TSA No Fly List [or TSA
Selectee List]." Example: Request to add John Q. Citizen,
DOB 03/15/1971, a U.S. citizen, to the TSA No Fly List.
d. The Details section of the EC must specify: (1) which of
the two lists (TSA No-Fly or TSA Selectee) the person
should be added or removed, (2) whether the person is an
USPER (citizen), USPER (non-citizen, such as a Permanent
Resident Alien or lawful non-immigrant visa status), or a
non-USPER, and (3) complete identifying information.
e. For all persons -- including non-citizen USPERs and non-
USPERs -- the EC must include a (1) full name, (2) gender,
and (3) a complete date of birth. Year of birth or
approximate age will not be sufficient. TSA will not add
a person to either list without these three pieces of
information.
•f. For USPERs, and non-USPERs when the information is

attainable, the identifying information shall include all
REQ 13-11 000000027

To: All Field Off les From: Counterterrorit
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184203-K, 06/09/2003
other known identifiers, such as: known aliases, country of

origin, passport number, alien registration number,
address, Social Security Number, driver's license number,
physical description.
g. The Details section of the EC must describe: (1) the
person's known or suspected connections to terrorism or a
terrorist organization, and (2) the reasons to believe the
person poses a threat to civil aviation security.
h. The Details section of the EC must include a point-of-
contact who is thoroughly familiar with the case, such as
the case agent, co-case agent, and/or supervisor. The POC
should be available at all hours (24/7) in case questions
arise about the person placed on the list. Include direct-
dial work numbers, pager number, and cellular number for'
each POC.
i. The Leads section of the EC must include at least four
leads to the Counterterrorism Division:
(1) the operational unit's Unit Chief to review and
approve;
(2) the operational unit's SSA;
(3) Terrorism Watch and Warning Unit ("Read and clear"),
and ;
(4) Special Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation Security
Unit ("Read and clear").
Approval of request
4. Note that only a Unit Chief or higher in the Counterterrorism
Division at HQ may approve the inclusion (or deletion) of a
person onto either list. No one in any field office or Legal
Attache has approval authority.
a. Approval to add to the TSA No Fly List: If the Unit Chief
(or higher) approves the request to add a person, then
he/she will add the following statement: "The FBI considers
this person to be a threat to civil aviation security."
b. Approval to delete from the TSA No Fly List: If the Unit
Chief (or higher) approves the request to delete a person,
then he/she will add the following statement: "The FBI no
longer believes this person is a threat to civil aviation
security."
REQ 13-11 000000028

I f ;)
To: All Field Off" es From: Counterterroris/"N,
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184^.3-K, 06/09/2003 v. /
c. Approval to add to the TSA Selectee List: If the Unit

Chief (or higher) approves the request to add a person,
then he/she will add the following statement: "The FBI
believes this person may have a possible link to terrorism
and may be a threat to civil aviation security."
d. Approval to delete from the TSA Selectee List: If the Unit
Chief (or higher) approves the request to delete a person,
then he/she will add the following statement: "The FBI no
longer believes this person to be a threat to civil
aviation security."
5. If the Unit Chief or higher in the operational unit in the
Counterterrorism Division approves the addition to or removal
from either list, then it is the responsibility of the
operational unit to coordinate with the TSA's detailees on the-
FBI's National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) for inclusion
or deletion.
The TSA's detailees to the NJTTF are currently Stuart O'Neil and
Jorge Dominguez. They will forward the approved request to TSA
from for placement (or removal) on the appropriate list.
Mandatory review of USPERs
6. If an USPER is added to either list, then the submittor of the
USPER is required to review whether the person should remain on
the list. This mandatory review will occur when the case is
closed and every 12 0 days after the date of the EC that
requested submission of that person to the list. Note that an
USPER can remain on the list even if the Field Office has closed
their investigative or intelligence case, as long as there is
justification to do so. The justification would have to be
articulated in an EC uploaded to the substantive and control
files, and it must include articulable facts that the person
continues to pose a threat to civil aviation security. Even if
the Field Office has closed the case, it is still required to
conduct a review and document the results every 120 days.
The results of the review -- that is, the reasons to maintain
the person on the list or the reasons to remove the person from
the list -- will be documented in an EC that is uploaded with
unrestricted text. The EC will be sent, as above, to the same
units in the Counterterrorism Division with the same leads,
described above.
If the Field Office, Legat, or operational unit in the
Counterterrorism Division concludes prior to the closure of the
1 ooonnnnoo
/"—^. " £*
To: All Field Off- fes From: Counterterrorisx

Re: 300B-HQ-C1184203-K, 06/09/2003
case, or prior to the mandatory 120 day review, that the person
no longer poses a threat to civil aviation security, then an EC
should be submitted immediately to request deletion from the
list.
Distribution of the lists
The most current TSA No Fly List and TSA Selectee List are e-
mailed to all Airport Liaison Agents, Legats, and Joint Terrorism
Task Force members as soon as they are received from the TSA by the
Counterrorism Division, Special Events Management Unit/Civil Aviation
Security Program. Dissemination of these lists may occur as much as
twice daily. The points-of-contact in that unit are SSA Alexis
Smollok, (202) 324-0242, and IOS Brenda Jones: (202) 324-8693.
The lists are also posted on the FBI's Intranet, SIOC Operations,
TSA/FBI Support Page, which is located at: . '
http://30.5.100.249/opsupport/faasupport/
FBI response to an airport
If an FBI response is warranted, then full database checks and
other appropriate investigation should be conducted and documented.
The Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit is available 24/7 at (202) 324-
1220 as a resource to check ACS and NCIC on possible matches.
If FBI searches are negative, but it is determined the person is
a match, then the field agent should contact the TSA's 24-hour
command center at (202) 267-3099 for background information. TSA'-s
command center maintains documentation on all persons on both lists
provided to them by the FBI and all other agencies who contribute to
the lists. For these instances, it is recommended that responses to
positive name matches on the lists be maintained in the appropriate
airport liaison or civil aviation security file in the field
division.
For Legat response purposes, individuals appearing on the TSA No
Fly list may not utilize U.S. commercial aviation. Interview and
identification of the individual will rest within the appropriate
local law enforcement jurisdiction, at the request of the FBI. If the
individual uses a foreign-flag air carrier to attempt to enter the
U.S. and cannot be prevented from traveling, the FBI office at the
arriving city must be contacted for appropriate action as soon as
possible. For reference, it is the responsibility of the TSA to
include names appearing on the TSA No Fly List to also be entered in
TIPOFF and TECS.
In instances in which individuals are prevented from flying and

wish to voice their objection, the TSA, Office of the Ombudsman has
REQ 13-11 000000030

To: All Field Ofl Jes From: Counterterrori^.
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184203-K, 06/09/2003
been organized to handle such matters. They can be contacted, in

writing, at: Office of the Ombudsman, Transportation Security
Administration, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 22202.
REQ 13-11 000000031

/-S. . "V
To: All Field Off J*s From: Counterterrori4 ,)
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184V203-K, 06/09/2003 V'"
ISA Security Directive 1544-01-20A

[Note that this SD was replaced on April 22, 2003 by TSA SD-1544-01-
20B, but is included here for background]:
US Department of Transportation
Transportation Security Administration
Civil Aviation Security

Security Directive
Information of Concern to Aviation Security Personnel:
Current Security Procedures Should be Reviewed
Subject: Threat to U.S. Aircraft Operators — No Fly List

Number: SD 1544-01 -20 A
Date: April 5, 2002
This Security Directive (SD) 1544-01-20A supercedes and cancels the SD 108-01-20 and must be implemented immediately upon
receipt by corporate offices.
INFORMATION: The TSA has received information indicating the individuals on the list associated with this Security Directive
are dangerous and could pose a threat to civil
aviation.
REVISION SUMMARY:
-Updates regulatory citations.
--Provides an additional option for clearing passengers listed on the No Fly list.
ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIR CARRIERS REGULATED UNDER TITLE 49. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR). PART
1544: If you are an aircraft operator covered by 49 CFR Part 1544, you must implement all the measures set forth in this SD.
I. TSA will provide a No Fly List to you. All future updates to the list will be forwarded by the TSA to your corporate security
office under separate cover. It is anticipated that .names may be added or removed from this list. When you receive an updated
No Fly List, you must immediately conduct a comparison of passengers boarding all flights, as well as screeners and direct air
carrier employees.
II. Many non-Western cultures do not follow strict patterns in name order. The names that appear on the No Fly List may be in
varying order and spelling. Data such as Date of Birth, Citizenship, Passport Number, etc. will be provided when available.
III. PASSENGERS
A. Should you find in your flight reservation system an individual whose name appears on the No Fly List, you must immediately
notify:
The nearest field office of the FBI, and at overseas locations the nearest United States Embassy.
B. Should an individual whose name appears on the No Fly List present himself or herself for transport, you must deny
transportation for that individual, their accessible property, checked baggage and any person(s) accompanying that individual
and their baggage until cleared by one of the following processes:
KEQ 13~1:L 000000032

..
To: All Field Off jes From: Counterterrori
Re: 300B-HQ-C1184^G3-K, 06/09/2003
LEAD(s) :
Set Lead 1: (Info)
ALL RECEIVING OFFICES
Disseminate as appropriate.-
12
13-11 000000035
November 26, 2003

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #2-q;

Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #3-e - 4 Packets;
Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #12-
(Listing of Victims -Flight 93, Pentagon & New York) - 3 Packets;
Digitized Copies of Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #12 above.
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
"S"VISA
DOCUMENTS SUFFICIENT TO DESCRIBE THE FBI'S ROLE
IN THE "S" VISAS PROGRAM FOR INDIVIDUALS WHO
HAVE SUPPLIED TERRORIST-RELATED INFORMATION
TO U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT, INCLUDING THE NUMBER
OF INDIVIDUALS TO WHOM "S" VISAS WERE ISSUED
SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AND WHETHER SUCH
PERSONS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH IMMIGRATION-
RELATED DETAINEES PROGRAM, THE VOLUNTARY
INTERVIEW PROGRAM, THE ABSCONDERINIATIATIVE,
OR ANOTHER FBI ACTIVITY.
RESPONSIVE
to
REQUEST #13-14
COMMISSION COPY
9/11 COMMISSION TASK FORCE
DOCUMENT DELETION CODES
[As of August 11, 2003]
"A" - SOURCE/INFORMANT INFORMATION - Information, the disclosure of which

would tend to reveal the identity of an informant or source where confidentiality is
expressed or implied.
"B" - FBI TECHNIQUES AND/OR METHODS - Information on sensitive FBI

techniques and/or methods which would impede or impair the effectiveness of that
technique and/or method.
11C" - NON-RELEVANT FBI CASE INFORMATION - Information neither relevant nor

responsive to the Commission's requests.
"D" - FBI PENDING CASE INFORMATION - Information which would impede or

jeopardize a pending investigation of the FBI.
"E" - STATUTORY - Information legally prohibited from release by statute.
"F" - PRIVACY/SECURITY - Information, the disclosure of which would be an

unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy or jeopardize the safety of law
enforcement personnel and/or their family members
Material redacted under this code includes (1) social security numbers;
(2) date and place of birth; (3) home address and telephone numbers;
(4) personnel cell phone and pager numbers
"G" - FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION - The identity of a foreign

government and/or foreign service to include the names of foreign law enforcement
employees/officials.
Service Law Books
Sec. 214.2(t) Alien witnesses and informants—
(1) Alien witness or informant in criminal matter. An alien may be classified as an S-5
alien witness or informant under the provisions of section 101(a)(15)(S)(i) of the Act if, in
the exercise of discretion pursuant to an application on Form I-854 by an interested
federal or state law enforcement authority ("LEA"), it is determined by the Commissioner
that the alien: (Paragraph (t) added 8/25/95; 60 FR 44260)
(i) Possesses critical reliable information concerning a

criminal organization or enterprise;
(ii) Is willing to supply, or has supplied, such information to

federal or state LEA; and
(iii) Is essential to the success of an authorized criminal

investigation or the successful prosecution of an individual
involved in the criminal organization or enterprise.
(2) Alien witness or informant in counterterrorism matter. An alien may be classified as

an S-6 alien counterterrorism witness or informant under the provisions of section
101(a)(15)(S)(ii) of the Act if it is determined by the Secretary of State and the
Commissioner acting jointly, in the exercise of their discretion, pursuant to an application
on Form I-854 by an interested federal LEA, that the alien:
(i) Possesses critical reliable information concerning a

terrorist organization, enterprise, or operation;
(ii) Is willing to supply or has supplied such information to a

federal LEA;
(iii) Is in danger or has been placed in danger as a result of

providing such information; and
(iv) Is eligible to receive a reward under section 36(a) of

the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, 22
U.S.C. 2708(a).
(3) Spouse, married and unmarried sons and daughters, and parents of alien witness or
informant in criminal or counterterrorism matter. An alien spouse, married or unmarried
son or daughter, or parent of an alien witness or informant may be granted derivative S
classification (S-7) when accompanying, or following to join, the alien witness or
informant if, in the exercise of discretion by, with respect to paragraph (t)(1) of this
section, the Commissioner, or, with respect to paragraph (t)(2) of this section, the
Secretary of State and the Commissioner acting jointly, consider it to be appropriate. A
nonimmigrant in such derivative S-7 classification shall be subject to the same period of
admission, limitations, and restrictions as the alien witness or informant and must be
identified by the requesting LEA on the application Form I-854 in order to qualify for S
INSERTS
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Service Law Books
nonimmigrant classification. Family members not identified on the Form 1-854
application will not be eligible for S nonimmigrant classification.
(4) Request for S nonimmigrant classification. An application on Form 1-854, requesting

S nonimmigrant classification for a witness or informant, may only be filed by a federal
or state LEA (which shall include a federal or state court or a United States Attorney's
Office) directly in need of the information to be provided by the alien witness or
informant. The completed application is filed with the Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice, who will forward only properly certified
applications that fall within the numerical .limitation to the Commissioner, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, for approval, pursuant to the following process.
(i) Filing request. For an alien to qualify for status as an S

nonimmigrant, S nonimmigrant classification must be
requested by an LEA. The LEA shall recommend an alien
for S nonimmigrant classification by: Completing Form
1-854, with all necessary endorsements and attachments,
in accordance with the instructions on, or attached to, that
form, and agreeing, as a condition of status, that no
promises may be, have been, or will be made by the LEA
that the alien will or may remain in the United States in S
or any other nonimmigrant classification or parole, adjust
status to that of lawful permanent resident, or otherwise
attempt to remain beyond a 3-year period other than by the
means authorized by section 101(a)(15)(S) of the Act. The
alien, including any derivative beneficiary who is 18 years
or older, shall sign a statement, that is part of or affixed to
Form I-854, acknowledging awareness that he or she is
restricted by the terms of S nonimmigrant classification to
the specific terms of section 101(a)(15)(S) of the Act as the
exclusive means by which he or she may remain
permanently in the United States.
(A) District director referral. Any district director or

Service officer who receives a request by an alien,
an eligible LEA, or other entity seeking S
nonimmigrant classification shall advise the
requestor of the process and the requirements for
applying for S nonimmigrant classification. Eligible
LEAs seeking S nonimmigrant classification shall
be referred to the Commissioner.
(B) United States Attorney certification. The United

States Attorney with jurisdiction over a prosecution
or investigation that forms the basis for a request
for S nonimmigrant classification must certify and
endorse the application on Form l-854"and agree
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Service Law Books
that no promises may be, have been, or will be
made that the alien will or may remain in the United
States in S or any other nonimmigrant classification
or parole, adjust status to lawful permanent
resident, or attempt to remain beyond the
authorized period of ajdmission.
(C) LEA certification. LEA certifications on Form

1-854 must be made at the seat-of-government
level, if federal, or the highest level of the state LEA
involved in the matter. With respect to the alien for
whom S nonimmigrant classification is sought, the
LEA shall provide evidence in the form of
attachments establishing the nature of the alien's
cooperation with the government, the need for the
alien's presence in the United States, all conduct or
conditions which may constitute a ground or
grounds of excludability, and all factors and
considerations warranting a favorable exercise of
discretionary waiver authority by the Attorney
General on the alien's behalf. The attachments
submitted with a request for S nonimmigrant
classification may be in the form of affidavits,
statements, memoranda, or similar documentation.
The LEA shall review Form 1-854 for accuracy and
ensure the alien understands the certifications
made on Form 1-854. (Corrected 10/5/95; 60 FR
52248)
(D) Filing procedure. Upon completion of Form

I-854, the LEA shall forward the form and all
required attachments to the Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, United States
Department of Justice, at the address listed on the
form.
(ii) Assistant Attorney General. Criminal Division review.-
(A) Review of information. Upon receipt of a

complete application for S nonimmigrant
classification on Form I-854, with all required
attachments, the Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, shall ensure that all information
relating to the basis of the application, the need for
the witness or informant, and grounds of
excludability under section 212 of the Act has been
provided to the Service on Form I-854, and shall
INSERTS
REQ 13-14 000000003

1"^
Service Law Books

consider the negative and favorable factors
warranting an exercise of discretion on the alien's
behalf. No application may be acted on by the
Assistant Attorney General unless the eligible LEA
making the request has proceeded in accordance
with the instructions on, or attached to, Form 1-854
and agreed to all provisions therein.
(B) Advisory panel. Where necessary according to

procedures established by the Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, an advisory panel,
composed of representatives of the Service,
Marshals Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Drug Enforcement Administration, Criminal
Division, and the Department of State, and those
representatives of other LEAs, including state and
federal courts designated by the Attorney General,
will review the completed application and submit a
recommendation to the Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, regarding requests for S
nonimmigrant classification. The function of this
advisory panel is to prioritize cases in light of the
numerical limitation in order to determine which
cases will be forwarded to the Commissioner.
(C) Assistant Attorney General certification. The

certification of the Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, to the Commissioner
recommending approval of the application for S
nonimmigrant classification shall contain the
following:
(1) All information and attachments that may

constitute, or relate to, a ground or grounds of
excludability under section 212(a) of the Act;
(2) Each section of law under which the alien

appears to be inadmissible;
(3) The reasons that waiver(s) of inadmissibility

are considered to be justifiable and in the
national interest;
(4) A detailed statement that the alien is eligible

for S nonimmigrant classification, explaining the
nature of the alien's cooperation with the
government and the government's need for the
INSERTS
REQ 13-14 000000004

Service Law Books
alien's presence in the United States;
(5) The intended date of arrival;
(6) The length of the proposed stay in the

United States;
(7) The purpose of the proposed stay; and
(8) A statement that the application falls within

the statutorily specified numerical limitation.
(D) Submission of certified requests for S

nonimmigrant classification to Service.
(1) The Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, shall forward to the Commissioner
only qualified applications for S-5 nonimmigrant
classification that have been certified in
accordance with the provisions of this
paragraph and that fall within the annual
numerical limitation.
(2) The Assistant Attorney General Criminal

Division, shall forward to the Commissioner
applications for S-6 nonimmigrant classification
that have been certified in accordance with the
provisions of this paragraph, certified by the
Secretary of State or eligibility for S-6
classification, and that fall within the annual
numerical limitation.
(5) Decision on application.
(i) The Attorney General's authority to waive grounds of

excludability pursuant to section 212 of the Act is
delegated to the Commissioner and shall be exercised with
regard to S nonimmigrant classification only upon the
certification of the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division. Such certification is nonreviewable as to the
matter's significance, importance, and/or worthwhileness to
law enforcement. The Commissioner shall make the final
decision to approve or deny a request for S nonimmigrant
classification certified by the Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division.
(ii) Decision to approve application. Upon approval of the
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REQ 13-14 000000005

Service Law Books
application on Form 1-854, the Commissioner shall notify
the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, the
Secretary of State, and Service officers as appropriate.
Admission shall be authorized for a period not to exceed 3
years.
(iii) Decision to deny application. In the event the

Commissioner decides to deny an application for S
nonimmigrant classification on Form 1-854, the Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, and the relevant LEA
shall be notified in writing to that effect. The Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, shall concur in or
object to that decision. Unless the Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, objects within 7 days, he or she
shall be deemed to have concurred in the decision. In the
event of an objection by the Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, the matter will be expeditiously referred
to the Deputy Attorney General for a final resolution. In no
circumstances shall the alien or the relevant LEA have a
right of appeal from any decision to deny.
(6) Submission of requests for S nonimmigrant visa classification

to Secretary of State. No request for S nonimmigrant visa
classification may be presented to the Secretary of State unless it
is approved and forwarded by the Commissioner.
(7) Conditions of status. An alien witness or informant is

responsible for certifying and fulfilling the terms and conditions
specified on Form 1-854 as a condition of status. The LEA that
assumes responsibility for the S nonimmigrant must:
(i) Ensure that the alien:
(A) Reports quarterly to the LEA on his or her

whereabouts and activities, and as otherwise
specified on Form 1-854 or pursuant to the terms of
his or her S nonimmigrant classification;
(B) Notifies the LEA of any change of home or work

address and phone numbers or any travel plans;
(C) Abides by the law and all specified terms,

limitations, or restrictions on the visa, Form 1-854,
or any waivers pursuant to classification; and
(D) Cooperates with the responsible LEA in

accordance with the terms of his or her
INSERTS
REQ 13-14 000000006

o
Service Law Books
classification and any restrictions on Form 1-854;
(ii) Provide the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal

Division, with the name of the control agent on an ongoing
basis and provide a quarterly report indicating the
whereabouts, activities, and any other control information
required on Form 1-854 or by the Assistant Attorney
General;
(iii) Report immediately to the Service any failure on the

alien's part to:
(A) Report quarterly;
(B) Cooperate with the LEA;
(C) Comply with the terms and conditions of the

specific S nonimmigrant classification; or
(D) Refrain from criminal activity that may render

the alien deportable, which information shall also
be forwarded to the Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division; and
(iv) Report annually to the Assistant Attorney General,

Criminal Division, on whether the alien's S nonimmigrant
classification and cooperation resulted in either
(A) A successful criminal prosecution or

investigation or the failure to produce a successful
resolution of the matter; or
(B) The prevention or frustration of terrorist acts or

the failure to prevent such acts.
(v) Assist the alien in his or her application to the Service

for employment authorization.
(8) Annual report. The Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, in consultation
with the Commissioner, shall compile the statutorily mandated annual report to the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate.
(9) Admission. The responsible LEA will coordinate the admission of an alien in S
nonimmigrant classification with the Commissioner as to the date, time, place, and
manner of the alien's arrival.
INSERTS
REQ 13-14 - 000000007

( I o
Service Law Books
(10V Employment. An alien classified under section 101(a)(15)(S) of the Act may apply
for employment authorization by filing Form I-765, Application for Employment
Authorization, with fee, in accordance with the instructions on, or attached to, that form
pursuant to § 274a.12(c)(21) of this chapter.
(11) Failure to maintain status. An ali^n classified under section 101(a)(15)(S) of the
Act shall abide by all the terms and conditions of his or her S nonimmigrant classification
imposed by the Attorney General. If the terms and conditions of S nonimmigrant
classification will not be or have not been met, or have been violated, the alien is
convicted of any criminal offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of 1 year or
more, is otherwise rendered deportable, or it is otherwise appropriate or in the public
interest to do so, the Commissioner shall proceed to deport an alien pursuant to the
terms of 8 CFR 242.26. In the event the Commissioner decides to deport an alien
witness or informant in S nonimmigrant classification, the Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, and the relevant LEA shall be notified in writing to that effect. The
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, shall concur in or object to that decision.
Unless the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, objects within 7 days, he or
she shall be deemed to have concurred in the decision. In the event of an objection by
the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, the matter will be expeditiously
referred to the Deputy Attorney General for a final resolution. In no circumstances shall
the alien or the relevant LEA have a right of appeal from any decision to deport.
(12) Change of classification.
(i) An alien in S nonimmigrant classification is prohibited

from changing to any other nonimmigrant classification.
(ii) An LEA may request that any alien lawfully admitted to

the United States and maintaining status in accordance
with the provisions of § 248.1 of this chapter, except for
those aliens enumerated in 8 CFR 248.2, have his or her
nonimmigrant classification changed to that of an alien
classified pursuant to section 101(a)(15)(S) of the Act as
set forth in 8 CFR 248.3(h).
INSERTS
REQ 13-14
000000008
. t O
Immigration and Naturalization Service
HQOPS 50/18-P
Office of the Executive Associate Commissioner 4251 Street NW

Washington, DC 20536
Q£u 2 3 2002
MEMORANDUM FOR REGIONAL DIRECTORS
CHIEF,
U.S. BORDER PATROL
ACTING DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
FROM; jhnny N. WUwsms

ixeqimjvÂssociate Commissioner
rof Field Operations
SUBJECT: Guidance Governing the S Nonimmigrant Visa
The purpose^trf-thts'mernorandum is to provide guidance on the processing and handling of

aliens who have applied for the S nonimmigrant visa via the sponsorship of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) or other law enforcement agency.
Provisions and Conditions of the S Nonimmigrant Visa
As part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Crime Bill, Public
Law No. 103-322), Congress established a standard procedure for allowing aliens into the
United States' who are needed to provide testimony or information to law enforcement agencies2
' In practice, the provision is commonly used to provide a lawful status to eligible aliens who are already in the United
States.
" The term law enforcement agencies (LEAs) include U.S. Attorney's Offices and Federal and State courts, as well as
Federal and State investigative agencies.
REQ 13-14 000000009

Memorandum for Regional Directors, et al. Page 2
Subject: Guidelines Governing the S Nonimmigrant Visa
(LEAs). The Crime Bill established section 101(a)(15)(S) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), which authorizes the admission of a limited number of alien witnesses and informants under
specified conditions. The provisions also authorize adjustment of status to permanent residence after
the satisfaction of certain conditions.
Under the regulations (8 CFR § 214.2(t) -copy of regulation attached) an alien may be
classified as an S-5 alien witness or informant under the provisions of INA § 101(a)(15)(S)(i), in the
exercise of discretion pursuant to an application on Form 1-854 Inter-Agency Alien Witness and
Informant Record (copy attached)"by an interested LEA, if it is determined by the Commissioner that
the alien: (i) possesses critical reliable information concerning a criminal organization; (ii) is willing to
supply or has supplied such information to a Federal or State LEA; and (iii) is essential to the success
of an authorized criminal investigation or the successful prosecution of an individual involved in the
criminal organization or enterprise. An alien may be classified as an S-6 alien counterterrorism
witness or informant under the provisions of INA § 101(a) (15)(S)(ii) if it is determined by the
Secretary of State and the Commissioner acting jointly, in the exercise of their discretion, pursuant to
an application on Form 1-854 by an interested Federal or State LEA, that the alien: (i) possesses critical
reliable information concerning a terrorist organization, enterprise, or operation; (ii) is willing to
supply or has supplied such information to a Federal LEA; (iii) is in danger or has been placed in
danger as a result of providing such information; and (iv) is eligible to receive a reward under section
36(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, 22 U.S.C. § 2708(a).
An alien spouse, married or unmarried son or daughter, or parent of an alien witness or

informant may be granted derivative S classification when accompanying, or following to join, the
alien witness or informant if, in the exercise of discretion by the Commissioner or the Secretary of
State and the Commissioner acting jointly, consider it to be appropriate.
The Crime Bill gives the Attorney General the discretion to waive most exclusion grounds3 for
an alien eligible for S status if the Attorney General determines that it is in the national interest to do
so.
According to INA § 214(k)(l) the number of aliens who may be provided a visa as
nonimmigrant under INA §101(a)(15)(S)(i) in any fiscal year may not exceed 200. The number of
aliens who may be provided a visa as nonimmigrants under INA § 101(a)(15)(S)(ii) in any fiscal year
may not exceed 50. The period of admission of an alien as such a nonimmigrant may not exceed 3
years. Such period may not be extended by the Attorney General. According to INA § 214(k)(4), as a
condition for the admission, and continued stay in lawful status, of such a nonimmigrant, the
nonimmigrant - (A) shall report not less often then quarterly to the Attorney General such information
concerning the alien's whereabouts and activities as the Attorney General may require; (B) may not be
convicted of any criminal offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of 1 year or more after date of
such admission; (C) must have executed a form that waives the nonimmigrant's right to contest, other
' The Nazi and genocide exclusion grounds may not be waived.
REQ 13-14 000000010

than on the basis of an application for withholding of deportation, any action for removal of the alien
instituted before the alien obtains lawful permanent resident status; and (D) shall abide by any other
condition, limitation, or restriction imposed by the Attorney General.
Application Process for the S Nonimmigrant Visa
An application for an S nonimmigrant visa may only be submitted by an LEA directly in need
of the information to be provided by the alien witness or informant. The Form 1-854 must be filed
directly with the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
when the LEA is not the INS. When the INS is the sponsoring agency, the Form 1-854, with all
attachments and alien A-file, is to be forwarded directly from the district/sector office to the
Headquarters Office of Investigations (HQINV), via Federal Express. The package must contain a
memorandum addressed to the Assistant Commissioner for Investigations from the District Director or
Chief Patrol Agent that explains why the alien should be granted S nonimmigrant status. The Form
1-854 and its attachments will be reviewed by HQINV, and HQINV will determine if the alien meets
the requirements of the S nonimmigrant provision. Once that process is complete, HQINV will
forward the application to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division with its
recommendation. The Criminal Division then forwards properly certified applications that fall within
the numerical limitation to the INS Commissioner for approval.
The requesting LEA must certify its needs for the alien witness or informant by providing
evidence establishing the nature of the alien's cooperation with the government, the need for the
alien's presence in the United States, any conduct or condition that may constitute a ground of
excludability, and any factors warranting a favorable exercise of discretionary waiver authority by the
Attorney General. (The Criminal Division has created a worksheet that is to be completed by the
sponsoring agency. This worksheet addresses each of the above elements. This worksheet is attached
and an electronic version can be requested from HQINV).
The Form 1-854 must be signed by the United States Attorney with jurisdiction over a
prosecution or investigation that forms the basis for a request for S nonimmigrant classification. The
United States Attorney must agree that no promise may be, has been, or will be made that the alien will
or may remain in the United States in S or any other nonimmigrant classification or parole, adjust
status to lawful permanent resident, or attempt to remain beyond the authorized period of admission.
Under the regulations, the Criminal Division reviews each application for completeness and
considers the negative and favorable factors warranting an exercise of discretion on the alien's behalf.
No request for S nonimmigrant classification may go to the INS without the Criminal Division's
certification. The INS Commissioner will make the final decision to approve or deny a request for S
nonimmigrant classification. If the INS approves the application, admission as a nonimmigrant will be
authorized for a period not to exceed three years. The regulation specifies that S nonimmigrants may
work in the United States.
REQ 13-14 ' 000000011

o
Upon approval of the S nonimmigrant visa, it will be the responsibility of the controlling INS
agent, who submitted the application, to provide quarterly reports to HQINV. The HQINV will then
forward the reports to the Attorney General.
The S status itself does not authorize the alien to travel abroad. If a situation arises that
requires the alien to travel abroad, a request for advance parole must be made directly to HQINV, who
will then forward the request to the Headquarters Parole Office.
Requests for Employment Authorization
Several LEAs have called HQINV regarding problems obtaining employment authorization
documents (EADs) for their informants at the local INS offices because: 1) HQINV has possession of
the alien's A-file; and 2) there is no provision under 8 CFR § 274a. 12 to grant employment
authorization to an alien who has a pending S nonimmigrant visa. Pursuant to 8 CFR § 274a.l2(c)(21)
an BAD card can be issued to a principal alien and qualified dependent family members once the S
nonimmigrant visa has been approved.
Due to the length of time it is taking to process an S nonimmigrant visa application from its
arrival at the Criminal Division through the final approval of the INS Commissioner, and since an alien
with a pending S nonimmigrant visa cannot be physically removed from the United States, the
Assistant Commissioner for Investigations at HQINV will place these aliens in deferred action until a
decision is made regarding the pending S nonimmigrant visa (Action will be deferred by the
Assistant Commissioner for Investigations only on nondetained aliens). Aliens under deferred
action are eligible for an BAD card pursuant to 8 CFR § 274a. 12(c)(14).
PROCEDURE: District offices will continue processing BAD requests under current
procedures except for aliens who have an S nonimmigrant visa application pending at the
Criminal Division or at HQINV. For those cases, the sponsoring LEA will forward the Form 1-765,
Application for Employment Authorization, with fee and photographs, to his/her respective
Headquarters Point-of-Contact (POC). The LEA POC will forward the Form 1-765, with fee and
photographs, directly to HQINV. Once HQINV approves the Form 1-765, the BAD card will be
messenger mailed to the LEA's POC.
Requests by LEAs for Parole
Based on the authorities provided under 8 CFR § 212.14(a), parole can be granted under INA
§ 212(d)(5) for aliens whom LEAs seek to bring to the United States as witnesses or informants who
are applying for S classification. All such requests are to be submitted by the headquarters office of
the LEA directly to HQINV, who will then forward the request to the INS Headquarters Parole Office
after review and concurrence.
REQ 13-14 000000012

o • o
All requests for advance parole for aliens who have an S nonimmigrant visa application
pending at the Criminal Division or at HQINV are to be submitted by the headquarters office of the
LEA directly to HQINV with a letter detailing the purpose for the advance parole request. Approval of
these requests are limited to "urgent humanitarian reasons or for operational purposes identified by the
LEA (significant public interest)." The HQINV will then forward the request to the INS headquarters
Parole office after review and concurrence.
Detained Aliens
If the alien is in custody and is being processed for removal, all attempts to obtain a final order
of removal should be made. However, the removal is deferred until such time as a decision is rendered
on the application. It is critical that contact with HQINV be maintained during this process. No alien
will be removed from the United States while an S nonimmigrant visa is pending at the Criminal
Division or at HQINV.
Adjustment of Status to Lawful Permanent Resident
If the Attorney General determines that an S nonimmigrant alien supplied the required
information and that the information contributed to the success of an investigation or prosecution of a
criminal enterprise, the alien may adjust status to permanent residence (INA § 245(j); 8 U.S.C. § 1255;
8 CFR § 245.11). The application for adjustment of status process is similar to the initial S
nonimmigrant visa application process. The LEA that made the original request must initiate the
request by filing another Form 1-854 with the Criminal Division (INS cases are to be forwarded
directly to HQINV). The Criminal Division reviews the information to determine whether to certify
the request to the INS Commissioner. The INS Commissioner makes the final decision whether to
allow the alien to apply for adjustment of status. If the Commissioner decides to permit the alien to
apply for adjustment of status, the alien then submits the Form 1-485 Application to Register
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, with the appropriate fee and supporting documentation. Due to
the sensitive nature of these applications and because this program is controlled by HQINV, the
I-485s will be filed at HQINV. District Adjudication Officers, from INS district offices, will be
detailed to HQINV in order to adjudicate these cases or these cases can be adjudicated at the
Washington or Baltimore District Offices. NOTE: These applications must be received at HQINV
prior to expiration of the applicant's S nonimmigrant status. If the S nonimmigrant status expires
before the 1-854 and 1-485 have been received, the sponsoring agency must reapply for a new S
nonimmigrant visa in order to place the applicant back in S nonimmigrant status. It is recommended
that requests for adjustment of status be submitted two years after the alien has been granted S
nonimmigrant status.
After the alien adjusts status to lawful permanent resident, the INS may start removal
proceedings if the alien engages in removable conduct after adjusting status, or if the INS discovers
that the alien failed to disclose an excludable offense committed before adjusting status to that of a
permanent resident [INA § 212(d)(l); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(l); 8 CFR § 212.4(i)(2)]..
REQ 13-14 000000013

Please direct any questions regarding these guidelines to Senior Special Agent
Michael Greenfield (202) 353-0786 or Supervisory Special Agent Lydia St. John-Mellado, Director,
Fraud Unit (202) 514-5097. The INS S nonimmigrant visa applications are to be Federal Expressed to:
425 I St., NW, Room 1000, Washington, D.C. 20536 ATTENTION: Senior Special Agent Michael
Greenfield.
Attachments (3)
REQ 13-14 000000014

V c
Asset/Informant Unit (AIU)
Training - S Visa Program
1/8/03 - Overview of the S-Visa and Parole Programs

"S" Visas
4 What is an S Visa ?
The "S" non-immigrant classification was created by the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. It is available to a limited number of aliens who supply
critical reliable information necessary to the successful investigation and/or prosecution of a
criminal organization or critical reliable information concerning a terrorist organization. For
those selected, existing grounds for exclusion, including those arising from criminal convictions
or certain problems with immigration status, will be waived. For aliens who comply with the
terms of their S non-immigrant status, the sponsoring law enforcement agency may make
application for them to be permitted to apply for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status.
+ Who is eligible ?
Criminal Informants and family members (spouse, parents, sons, daughters)
Cooperative Witnesses and family members (spouse, parents, sons, daughters)
Assets and family members (spouse, parents, sons, daughters)
4 Process
Field Office prepares package
AIU reviews application and obtains concurrence from substantive desk
DOT reviews application
INS reviews application
AIU advises Field Office of INS approval for applicant to enter S-visa program
and furnishes an application for employment authorization.
Field Office advises applicant of approval
Once alien is in the S-Visa program for two years, AIU advises Field Office to
apply for permission to adjust S-Nonimmigrant status to LPR
AIU reviews petition to adjust to LPR status
DOT reviews petition
INS review petition
AIU advises Field Office of INS approval for applicant to adjust to LPR status
AIU instructs Field Office to submit material for adjustment
AIU reviews documentation for adjustment
INS reviews documentation for adjustment
AIU advises Field Office of INS approval for applicant to receive LPR status
REQ 13-14 000000015

I
*
Asset/Informant Unit (AIU)

Training - S Visa Program
FBI's responsibility
Quarterly Reports until applicant receives LPR status
Annual Reports until applicant receives LPR status
Resolve application discrepancies until LPR status received
Employment Authorization
4 What is an Employment Authorization card?

Aliens admitted legally to the United States may qualify for work authorization.
INS issues a laminated card once employment authorization is approved. The authorization is
for one year.
+ Who is eligible ?
AIU process employment authorization for S-visa recipients only.
4 Process
Field Office prepares application
AIU reviews and forwards application to INS
INS reviews application and sends AIU an employment authorization card
AIU provides Field Office employment authorization card
Advance Paroles
+ What is an advance parole ?

Aliens in the United States may obtain documentation to re-enter the United
Statues in advance of their overseas travel.
+ Who is eligible ?
AIU process advance paroles for S-visa recipients only
+ Process
Field Office submits request via EC
AIU prepares letter to INS and fax same
INS notifies AIU via fax of approval
AIU advises Field Office
REQ 13-14 000000016

Thomas H. Kean
CHAIR
Lee H. Hamilton
V I C E CHAIR
Richard Ben-Veniste
Fred F. Fielding "respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following documents
no later than January 9, 2004 (the "production date"):
Jamie S. Gorelick
Slade Gorton 1. Color copies of all travel documents (passports, visas, and travel stamps or cachets)
of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers that are in the possession of the FBI. These include, but
Bob Kerrey
are not limited to:
John Lehman a. Saudi Arabian passport of Saeed Al-Ghamdi #C573895 recovered from the
Flight 93 crash site;
Timothy J. Roemer
b. Photocopies of Mohammed Atta's Egyptian passport (#1617066), and Egyptian
James R. Thompson Identity document (#M387555);
c. Lebanese passport of Ziad Jarrah recovered from the Flight 93 crash site;
d. Saudi Arabian passport of Satam M.A. Al Suqami (#8559583) recovered from
Philip D. Zelikow the World Trade Center; and
DIRECTOR e. Saudi Arabian passport of Abdulaziz Al-Omari (#C165015) recovered from the
World Trade Center.
2. Color copies of all travel documents related to individuals closely associated with
the 9/11 plot that are in the possession of the FBI, including:
a. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad's visa application, passport, and visa issued to him
under an alias in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on July 23, 2001;
b. Mohammad Al Kahtani's visa application, passport, and visa issued in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, on July 14, 2001;
c. Saeed "Jihad" Al Ghamdi's visa application and passport sought by him in
Jeddah Saudi Arabia on November 8, 2000;
d. Moshabib Al Hamlan's visa application, passport, and visa issued on October
28, 2000;
e. All visa applications submitted by Ramzi Binalshibh, and all passports believed
to have been used by Binalshibh;
f. All visa applications submitted by Zakaria Essabar, and all passports believed to
have been used by Essabar;
g. Ali Abdul Aziz Ali's visa application and passport used in connection with his
application for the visa denied to him in Dubai, UAE on August 27, 2001; and
h. All visa applications or copies of passports for the following individuals: Saud
Al Rashid (DOB: 1-30-81), Qutaybah Al Najdi (DOB: Cir. 1975), Saad Al
Baluchi (DOB: Cir. 1972), Zuhair Al Thubaiti (DOB: 4-24-76), and Julaybib Al
Ghamdi(DOB: 11-18-80).
TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
Page 2
3. Documents describing efforts by Ramzi Binalshibh to have his travel documents altered in
order to further his terrorist activities.
4. Color copies (and any translations made thereof) of all documents recovered by the FBI that are
believed to have been in the possession of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, or other 9/11 plotters, relating to
travel or identification documents, including:
a. Notes recovered from luggage and cars that describe preparation for the 9/11 attack,
including the use of identification documents such as passports;
b. The letter written in Arabic recovered from luggage not loaded onto American Airlines
Flight number 11; and
c. A notebook recovered from the Flight 93 crash site, discussing, among other things, how to
interact with an immigration inspector.
5. Documents sufficient to establish how the above items came into the FBI's possession.
The Commission further requests that documents requested above be provided as soon as they are
available, even though all requested documents may not be provided at the same time, through
means of a "rolling" production.
If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on an alleged
claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon as
possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and describe each such document
or class of documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to
If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requested documents but has
information about where such documents may be located, the Commission requests that the
respondent provide such information as soon as possible and in no event later than the production
date.
If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of these document
requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or concerns be raised with the
Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved prior to the
production date.
December 23, 2003 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
Page 1 of 1
Joanne Accolla
Steve Dunne
S,_ . Tuesday, December 23, 2003 3:36 PM
To: 'pobrien3@leo.gov'; 'rmkelly@fbi.gov'
Cc: Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov; Dan Marcus; Team 5; Dianna Campagna
Pat and Rick: Attached as a Word document is FBI document request no. 20. Please call Tom Eldridge at 202-401-
1686 with any questions about this request and to arrange for production. Feel free to call Dan or me as well if any
issues arise. Thanks. Steve
12/29/2003
Washington, D. C. 20535-0001 T\f\ h J JJAS
April 28, 2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.

Dear Mr. Marcus:

following:
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #3-k;

Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #7-b;
Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #43 - Supplemental Packet
[Documents In Response to Request from Commission Staffer Thomas Eldridge
-Documents Related to How the FBI Determined the 19 Hijackers ' Identities;
Miscellaneous Documents for the Commission #6 ["Shared Responsibility
Letter" to Senators Collins & Levin]
Sincerely,

Thomas H. Kean
CHAIR
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
Richard Ben-Veniste
States ("the Commission") requests that the Federal Bureau of
Fred F. Fielding Investigation (FBI or the "respondent") provide the Commission
with copies of the following documents no later than January 26,
Jamie S. Gorelick
2004 (the "production date"):
Slade Gorton
Bob Kerrey
1. Documents sufficient to show Mohammed Atta's
presence at the Orlando International Airport on August
John Lehman 4, 2001, including rental vehicle, parking, and calling
Timothy J. Roemer
card records.
James R. Thompson 2. Airline reservation records for Mohammad Al Qahtani

for travel to the United States arriving on August 4,
2001.
Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 3. U.S. school records for the following hijackers: Hani
Hanjour, Mohammed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Ziad
Jarrah, Nawaf al-Hazmi, and Khalid Mihdhar,
indicating registration and dates of enrollment.
4. Documents sufficient to establish how the above items

came into the FBI's possession.
The Commission further requests that documents requested

above be provided as soon as they are available, even though
all requested documents may not be provided at the same time,
through means of a "rolling" production.
If any requested documents are withheld from production, even

temporarily, based on an alleged claim of privilege or for any other
reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon as
possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and
describe each such document or class of documents, as well as the
alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to
Page 2
If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requested
documents but has information about where such documents may be located, the
Commission requests that the respondent provide such information as soon as
possible and in no event later than the production date.
If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope
of these document requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or
concerns be raised with the Commission as soon as possible so that any such
issues can be addressed and resolved prior to the production date.
January 12, 2004 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
Page 1 of 1
Accolla
n: Steve Dunne
it: Monday, January 12, 2004 5:12 PM
To: 'pobrien3@leo.gov1
Cc: 'dan.levin@usdoj.gov'; Dan Marcus; Team 5; Dianna Campagna
Pat: Attached as a Word document is FBI document request no. 22. Please call Janice Kephart-Roberts at 202-401-
1705 with any questions about this request and to arrange for production. Feel free to call Dan or me as well if any
issues arise. Thanks. Steve
1/14/2004
Thomas H. Kean
CHAIR
FBI DOCUMENT REQUEST No. 29
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR
Richard Ben-Venistc
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the
"Commission") requests that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or the
Fred F. Fielding "respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following documents
Jamie S. Gorelick
no later than February 26, 2004 (the "production date"):
Slade Gorton 1. All records relating to the investigation of individuals, other than the
Bob Kerrey hijackers, who had booked and/or been ticketed for AA Flight No. 11,
AA Flight No. 77, UA Flight No. 175, and UA Flight No. 93 on
John F. Lehman
September 11, 2001, including individuals who had canceled or were no
Timothy J. Roemer shows for the flight. This request includes records relating to
individuals who were booked under Passenger Name Record "Noris"
James R. Thompson
and "Cooper," whose flights were arranged by Intervia Travel Agency in
Karachi, Pakistan.
Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
2. All records related to the Intervia Travel Agency located in Karachi,
Pakistan from January 1, 1998 through September 11, 2001.
3. All formal reports produced by the FBI from 1990 through September
11, 2001, regarding the FBI's assessment of current and potential threats
to domestic air transportation, including any reports produced pursuant
to the requirements of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990.
The Commission requests that the items described above be provided as soon as
they are available, even though all requested items may not be provided at the
same time, through means of a "rolling" production.
If any requested items are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on
an alleged claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests
that the respondent, as soon as possible and in no event later than the production
date, identify and describe each such document or class of documents, as well as
the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to allow a
meaningful challenge to any such withholding.
If the respondent does not have possession, custody, or control of any

documents requested above but has information about where such documents
may be located, the Commission requests that the respondent provide such
information as soon as possible and in no event later than the production date.
TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
www.9-llcommission.gov
February 12, 2004 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
Page 1 ofl
•v yanne Accolla
*K
om: Steve Dunne
Sent: Thursday, February 12, 2004 5:12 PM
To: 'pobrien3@leo.gov'
Cc: 'Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov'; Dan Marcus; Team 5; Dianna Campagna
Pat: Attached as a Word document is FBI document request no. 29. Please call Tom Eldridge at 202-401-1686 with
any questions about this request and to arrange for production. Feel free to call Dan or me as well if any issues arise.
Thanks. Steve
2/13/2004
Thomas H. Kean
CHAIR
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
Richard Ben-Veniste
States ("the Commission") requests that the Federal Bureau of
Fred F. Fielding Investigation (FBI or the "respondent") provide the Commission
with copies of the following documents no later than March 3, 2004
Jamie S. Gorelick
(the "production date"):
Slade Gorton
Bob Kerrey
1. All flight manifests for the following aircraft that
departed the United States in September 2001 with
John Lehman Saudi nationals (as indicated in the FBI's response to
Timothy J. Roemer
FBI Document Request No. 14, item 4):
James R. Thompson a. Ryan International Flight 441;

b. Jetlease USA charter which departed Lexington,
Kentucky on or about September 16, 2001;
Philip D. Zelikow c. Republic of Gabon-flagged charter DC-8-73,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR tail number TR-LTZ, which departed Las
Vegas, Nevada on or about September 19, 2001;
d. Chartered flight B 727-21, tail number N727PX,
which departed Las Vegas, Nevada on or about
September 20, 2001;
e. American Trans Air flight ATA L-1011, tail
number N189AT, which departed Las Vegas,
Nevada on or about September 24, 2001; and
f. Northstar Aviation flight which departed from
Providence, Rhode Island on or about
September 14, 2001.
2. All interview reports for any passengers on the above

flights.
3. All documents describing the clearance process for

these flights, including any restrictions placed on the
departures of these flights (such as "prevent departure"
orders), and the protocols utilized in screening the
passengers on these flights prior to their departure.
Page 2
The Commission requests that the documents requested above be provided as

soon as they are available, even though all requested documents may not be
provided at the same time, through means of a "rolling" production.
If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on
an alleged claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that
the respondent, as soon as possible and in no event later than the production date,
identify and describe each such document or class of documents, as well as the
alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to allow a meaningful
challenge to any such withholding.
documents but has information about where such documents may be located, the
Commission requests that the respondent provide such information as soon as possible
and in no event later than the production date.
If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of these
document requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or concerns be
raised with the Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed
and resolved prior to the production date.
February 18, 2004 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
Page 1 of 1
.ne Accolla
jm: Steve Dunne
Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2004 10:55 AM
Cc: 'Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov1; Dan Marcus; Team 5; Dianna Campagna
Thanks. Steve
2/18/2004
Thomas H. Kean
CHAIR
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR
"respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following documents
Richard Ben-Veniste
no later than March 23, 2004 (the "production date"):
Fred F. Fielding
1. All Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) reports, or
Jamie S. Gorelick
predecessor computer exploitation reports, regarding hard drives
Slade Gorton seized from al Qaeda associated subjects from 1995 through
September 11,2001.
Bob Kerrey
John Lehman 2. All investigative materials (images or verbal) concerning travel or

Timothy J. Roemer
travel documents derived from those hard drives.
James R. Thompson 3. Sections on terrorist travel and travel documents from training
manuals obtained prior to September 11, 2001, from al Qaeda or
related organizations.
Philip D. Zelikow
XECUTIVE DIRECTOR The Commission requests that documents requested above be provided as soon
as they are available, even though all requested documents may not be provided
at the same time, thorough means of a "rolling" production.
If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily,

based on an alleged claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission
requests that the respondent, as soon as possible and in no event later than the
production date, identify and describe each such document or class of
documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient
specificity to allow a meaningful challenge to any such withholding.
documents but has information about where such documents may be located,
the Commission requests that the respondent provide such information as soon
as possible and in no event later than the production date.
March 9, 2004 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
Page 1 of 1
/anne Accolla
: Steve Dunne
;~~~it: Tuesday, March 09, 2004 10:52 AM
Thanks. Steve
3/9/2004
x Federal Bureau of Investigation
March 12, 2004

Suite 300
2100 K Street, N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:
• Documents responsive to Document Request 10-lv - 2 Packets;

• Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #36 [-Documents Requested by
Commission Staffer Dieter Snel\~Follow-up Documents - Roger Cook Interview]
• Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #37 [Documents Requested by
Commission -Follow-up Documents-Roger Morrisson Interview (NJTTF
Presentation}
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
Thomas H. Kean
CHAIR
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the
Lee H. Hamilton
VICE CHAIR
"Commission") requests that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or the
"respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following documents
Richard Ben-Veniste
no later than April 13, 2004 (the "production date"):
Fred F. Fielding
1. All passports obtained by the FBI of individuals on the following
Jamie S. Gorelick
flights of Saudi Arabian nationals who departed the United States
Slade Gorton after September 11, 2001: Northstar Aviation flight from
Providence, Rhode Island (departing on or about September 14,
Bob Kerrey
2001); Chartered Boeing 727 flight from Lexington, Kentucky
John Lehman (departing on or about September 16, 2001); Ryan International
Timothy J. Roemer
Flight 441 (departing on or about September 20, 2001); DC-8-73,
Tail No. TR-LTZ (departing on or about September 20, 2001);
James R. Thompson Flight B 727-21, Tail No. N727PX (departing on or about
September 20, 2001); and Flight L-1011 (departing on or about
September 20, 2001).
Philip D. Zelikow
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR The Commission requests that documents requested above be provided as soon
as they are available, even though all requested documents may not be provided
at the same time, thorough means of a "rolling" production.
If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily,

based on an alleged claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission
requests that the respondent, as soon as possible and in no event later than the
production date, identify and describe each such document or class of
documents, as well as the alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient
specificity to allow a meaningful challenge to any such withholding.
documents but has information about where such documents may be located,
the Commission requests that the respondent provide such information as soon
as possible and in no event later than the production date.
March 30, 2004 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
http: / /www.9-11 commission.gov
Page 1 of 1
Joanne Accolla
From: Steve Dunne

^*nt: Tuesday, March 30, 2004 3:27 PM
i o: 'pobrien3@leo.gov1
Thanks. Steve
3/30/2004
it.
March 26, 2004
Daniel Marcus. General Counsel

Suite 300
2100 K Street, N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:
• Documents responsive to Document Request 10-Is;

• Documents responsive to Document Request 20-4b;
• Documents responsive to Document Request 20-4c;
• Documents responsive to Document Request 27-1 - 4 Packets;
• Documents in response to Supplemental to Miscellaneous Request #39
[Documents In Response to Request from Sarah Linden-Documentation on CIR
316/02827-04].
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
March 25, 2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
RE: Commission's Request for Etocuments
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:
• Documents responsive to Document Request 20-1 (in 4 Parts).
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
March 31,2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:

Documents responsive to Document Request 20-4a;
Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #33-Supplemental Packet #2
[Documents In Response to Request from Commission Staffer Doug Greenberg •
Material Related to Commission Interview with Adam Drucker];
Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #38-Supplemental Packet
[-Documents Requested by Commission Staffer Barbara Grewe-Fo//ow-w/?
Documents- ThomasAinora Interview].
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
March 25, 2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:
• Documents responsive to Document Request 20-1 (in 4 Parts).
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
March 15, 2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:

Documents responsive to Document Request 30-1 a thru f;
Documents responsive to Document Request 30-ld;
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
March 12, 2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:
Documents responsive to Document Request 10-lv - 2 Packets;

Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #36 [-Documents Requested by
Commission Staffer Dieter Sn&ll-Follow-up Documents - Roger Cook Interview}
Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #37 [Documents Requested by
^Commission -Follow-up Documents-Roger Morrisson Interview (NJTTF
C_ presentation}
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
MISCELLANEOUS REQUEST for
DOCUMENTS
-DOCUMENTS REQUESTED BY
COMMISSION
-FOLLOW-UP DOCUMENTS
ROGER MORRISSON (NJTTF PRESENTATION)
RESPONSIVE
to
MI: !ELLANEOUS REQUEST
from COMMISSION
COMMISSION COPY
MISC. REQ. #37 000003595
MISC. REQ. #37 000003596
MISC. REQ. #37 000003597
MISC. REQ. #37 000003598
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Lead Resolution Resolution
Assignment Investigations
Leads Leads
Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Health and Human Services U.S. Customs Service
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Department of Interior U.S. Capitol Police
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection Environmental Protection Agency U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Department of I Bureau of Immigration and Customs Federal Bureau of Prisons U.S. Department of Agriculture
Enforcement
Federal Protective Service U.S. Food and Drug Administration
Homeland Security NJTTF
Central Intelligence Agency
Internal Revenue Service U.S. Marshals Service Agencies
Defense Intelligence Agency
Naval Criminal Investigative Service U.S. Postal Inspection Service Members
Department of State Diplomatic Security
Nuclear regulatory Commission U.S. Secret'Service
Other Government
Defense Criminal Investigative Service
Agencies Transportation Security Administration U.S. Special Operations Command
(Non-NJTTF) Department of Commerce (SOCOM)
U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations
Department of Homeland Security U.S. Treasury IG for Tax Administration I
U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division
Defense Threat Reduction Agency U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOMJ
U.S. Army Military Intelligence
Denotes Membership
Department of Energy U.S. Southern Command (SOCOM) Pending
National Railroad Police
NY City PD
Washington Metropolitan PD
56JTTF's in the United States

28 Annexes 45 Legal Attaches
General Public FBI Field Ofces (Legats) Vttrldwide
Law Enforcement OQA'
FISA Cuts Sources
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MISC. REQ. #37 000003600
MISC. REQ. #37 000003601
MISC. REQ. #37 000003602
MISC. REQ. #37 000003603
MISC. REQ. #37 000003604
MISC. REQ. #37 000003605
MISC. REQ. #37 000003606
MISC. REQ. #37 000003607
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Staffing/Admin/Scheduling NJTTF
SSA Wiley V.Taylor (FBI) SSA Kenneth Love (FBI) SSA Donald Lee Taylor (FBI) SSA David Beall (FBI) VACANT-SSA VACANT-SSA
Information-Sharing Initiatives Operations Coordinator Operations Coordinator Special Projects Coordinator Administrative Coordinator Outreach and Training
JTTF Liaison-SC JTTF Liaison - NC JTTF Liaison-NE JTTF Liaison - SE JTTF, Liajson-SW' JTTF Liaison - NW
OL.HO.JN.LR.KX.LS.ME.MO.OC CG.DT.IP.KC.MW.MP.OM.SL.Sl AL.BA.BS.BF.NK.NH.NY.PH.PG.WF.CV.CI AT.aH.CE.CO.JK.MM.MO.NF.RH.SJ.TP AQ EP HN LV,LAPX,SA SO r ,ANON,PDSCSU BpSE J
CROSS PROJECT TEAM IOS Carla Matherson (FBI) IOS Michael J. Reilly IOS Ricardo Page (FBI)
IOS Jeffrey Murray (FBI)
SSA Wiley V.Taylor NJTTF Operations NJTTF Operations [ Special Projects JTTF Budget/Logistics
IOS Manuel Castillo NC JTTF Liaison NE JTTF Liaison SW JTTF Liaison SW JTTF Liaison
IOS Alexandria Chambers
IOS Paula Ryerson (FBI)

VACANT IOS (2) > JTTF Budget/Logistics
NW JTTF Liaison
IOS Manuel Castillo (FBI) IOS Richard Giannascoli

Information Sharing Initiatives (FBI)
NW JTTF Liaison Policy/MIOG/Special Projects
SE JTTF Liaison
NJTTF Intranet Development IOS Leslie Rogers (FBI)

Project State/Local OT. Budget
IOS Chambers SC JTTF Liaison
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MISC. REQ. #37 000003609
MISC. REQ. #37 000003610
MISC. REQ. #37 000003611
MISC. REQ. #37 000003612
MISC. REQ. #37 000003613
MISC. REQ. #37 000003614
MISC. REQ. #37 000003615
THE NATIONAL JTTF
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the JTTFs became the primary
operational and investigative arms of the United States government in the war on terrorism, expanding
from 35 JTTFs to the present 56 JTTFs and 28 annexes. This rapid growth created new challenges of
organization and assimilation between multiple federal, state, and local government agencies and the
JTTF Program. In July 2002, Director Mueller authorized the formation of the National Joint Terrorism
Task Force (NJTTF) to address the complex information-sharing, coordination, and logistical issues
between the many intelligence, law enforcement, defense, diplomatic, public safety, and homeland
security agencies and the JTTF Program. The NJTTF is presently comprised of 38 OGAs collocated
in the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) at FBEHQ.
The mission of the NJTTF is to enhance communication, coordination, and cooperation

between federal, state, and local government agencies representing the intelligence, law enforcement,
defense/diplomatic, public safety, and homeland security community by providing a point of fusion for
terrorism intelligence and by acting as the "hub" of support for the JTTFs throughout the United States.
The NJTTF accomplishes its mission by attaining the following goals:
Operating a multi agency task force at FBJUQ consisting of personnel from the intelligence, law
enforcement, defense, diplomatic, public safety, and homeland security community which serves
as a "point of fusion" for multi agency collaboration and effective sharing of terrorism intelligence
between the participating agencies nationwide.
Coordinating topical terrorism projects involving all JTTFs by collecting, correlating, and fusing
terrorism information at FBEHQ for dissemination to CT substantive units, JTTFs, and other
government agencies.
• Providing administrative, logistical, financial, and training support and guidance to all JTTFs.
Establishing and maintaining a "one-stop shopping" location for the intelligence, law
enforcement, defense, diplomatic, public service, and homeland security community at the
FBI's SIOC, which is readily available to SIOC commanders during crisis situations.
Presently, there are a total of 57 individuals assigned to the NJTTF which include 14 FBI
employees and 43 representatives from OGAs. The participating agencies in the NJTTF include:
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection-DHS
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement-DHS
Central Intelligence Agency
Defense HUMINT Services
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Criminal Investigative Service
MISC. REQ. #37 000003616

Department of Commerce
ft Department of Homeland Security
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of the Interior
Department of State
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Federal Protective Service-DHS
Joint Forces Command (NORTHCOM)
Internal Revenue Service
National Railroad Police
Naval Criminal Investigative Service
New York City Police
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Transportation Security Administration-DHS
Treasury IG for Tax Administration
U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations
U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division
U.S. Army Military Intelligence
U.S. Capitol Police
U.S. Coast Guard-DHS
U.S. Department of Agriculture
U.S. Food and Drug Administration
U.S. Marshals Service
U.S. Postal Inspection Service
U.S. Secret Service-DHS
U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Department
Like all JTTFs, the NJTTF derives strength from the combination of experience, diversity of
mission, and access to the databases each participating agency brings to the table. The NJTTF,
however, provides an unprecedented collaborative effort combining the resources from these agencies,
into one task force. All NJTTF members are provided FBI Intranet and database access for CT
investigations and related case files and, in turn, bring with them access to their respective databases,
which facilitates an accelerated information-sharing capability to all NJTTF members. NJTTF
members interact, on a daily basis, with the CT Operational Units at FBIHQ, JTTF members in the
field, as well as with their own agencies. Many of the NJTTF member agencies also have
representatives on local JTTFs and serve as a conduit for sharing of terrorism information between the
NJTTF and their counterparts at the JTTFs.
MISC. REQ. #37 000003617

The NJTTF has coordinated with the Office of the FBI Executive Assistant Director for Law
Enforcement Coordination to create fellowships for state and local law enforcement personnel. These
fellowships allow officers to join the NJTTF for a temporary appointment. These officers obtain first
hand knowledge of the day-to-day operations of the NJTTF, CT Watch, and operational International
and Domestic Terrorism Units at FBI Headquarters. These officers assist the FBI and the NJTTF in
identifying methods to enhance information sharing between all levels of law enforcement. The Kansas
City, Mo Police Department as well as San Jose,Ca Police Department have assigned officers to the
NJTTF.
The NJTTF maintains critical liaison with the national headquarters of its participating agencies
as well as with the Department of Justice Anti-Terrorism Advisory Committee (ATAC) Program.
MISC. REQ. #37 000003618

THE JTTF PROGRAM
The task force concept was initially utilized by the FBI in New York City in 1979 to address a
significant and overwhelming bank robbery crime problem which was victimizing the New York
financial community. The implementation of the task force concept proved to be a valuable
investigative tool, and w'as subsequently applied to the FBI's Counterterrorism (CT) Program. In May
1980, the first JTTF was established in the New York Field Office in response to an increased number
of terrorist bombings. In the beginning of 1996, a total of 11 JTTFs existed in the FBI CT Program.
By this time, it was clear to the FBI that the establishment of JTTFs enhanced interagency cooperation,
coordination, and communication and created cohesive units capable of addressing a wide variety of
terrorism matters.
The establishment of the JTTF Program has enhanced the FBI's ability to promote a
coordinated counterterrorism effort among FBI field offices and their respective counterparts in federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies. From 1996 to 2000 the JTTF Program grew from 11 to 29.
In fiscal year 2001, Congress provided a $2 million enhancement to strengthen and further expand the
JTTF program. With a base of $5.2 million, 6 new task forces were established, for a total of 35 task
forces at the end of fiscal year 2001. In fiscal year 2002, $15.7 million of the Congressional
Supplemental facilitated providing JTTF coverage in all 56 FBI field offices. In fiscal year 2003, with a
new base of $5.9 million, Congress provided an additional $20 million. These funds have been used to
strengthen and expand operations in the existing JTTFs.
The following depicts the growth of the JTTF Program from September 11, 2001, to the present:
JTTFs added by fiscal year since October 1998:
FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001

San Antonio San Diego Albuquerque
Pittsburgh Salt Lake City Cleveland
Detroit Minneapolis Las Vegas
Indianapolis Charlotte New Haven
El Paso Seattle Cincinnati
New Orleans Anchorage
FY2002
Albany Louisville
Baltimore Memphis
Birmingham Milwaukee
Buffalo Mobile
Columbia Norfolk
Honolulu Omaha
Jackson Richmond
Jacksonville San Juan
MISC. REQ. #37 000003619

Kansas City Springfield
Knoxville St. Louis
Little Rock
JTTF RESIDENT AGENCY ANNEXES
The terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, the anthrax, attacks, and the directives issued by the
Attorney General of the United States (AG) regarding Anti Terrorism TaskForces (ATTFs) have inspired
unprecedented interest by federal, state and local agencies to become full-time members in the 56 JTTFs,
as well as in outlying FBI resident agency (RA) locations. The RA locations are known as Annexes, which
are branches of the established field office JTTFs. During FY 2002,10 JTTF Annexes were approved,
bringing the total number of JTTFs, including Annexes, to 66.
On June 30,2003, the FBI approved the establishment of an additional 18 Annexes, bringing the
total numberof Field Office JTTFs and Annexes to 84. For command and control purposes, theFBIRA
Annex locations are supervised locally by FBI Supervisory Senior Resident Agents (SSR As), who are
subordinate to the Special Agents in Charge or Assistant Directors in Charge of their respective field
offices. Listed below are the locations of the current 28 resident agency Annexes:
(* denotes field office Annexes approved on 06/30/2003)
• Birmingham Field Office JTTF

Huntsville RA*
Charlotte Field Office JTTF

Fayetteville RA*
Cleveland Field Office JTTF

Toledo Resident Agency
Columbia Field Office JTTF

Greenville RA*
Houston Field Office JTTF

Beaumont RA*
Bryan/Conroe RA*
Corpus Christi RA*
Texas City RA*
• Jacksonville Field Office JTTF

Pensacola RA*
Kansas City Field Office JTTF

Wichita City RA*
MISC. REQ. #37 000003620

Louisville Field Office JTTF
Lexington
'to -
1
RA*
Los Angeles Field Office JTTF

Long Beach RA
Riverside RA
Santa Ana RA
Memphis Field Office JTTF

Nashville RA
Milwaukee Field Office JTTF

Madison RA
Oklahoma City Field Office JTTF

Tulsa RA*
Omaha Field Office JTTF

Des Moines RA
Pittsburgh Field Office JTTF

Charleston,WV RA*
Clarksburg.WV RA*
Richmond Field Office JTTF

Charlottesville RA*
San Antonio Field Office JTTF

Austin RA*
Brownsville RA*
Laredo RA*
McAllen RA*
Seattle/Salt Lake City JTTF

Intermountain Northwest RA
Tampa Field Office JTTF

Orlando RA
San Juan Field Office JTTF

Virgin Islands RA
MISC. REQ. #37 000003621

• The FBI anticipates that the level of federal, state and local participation in the JTTF Program
will continue to grow during fiscal year 2004, which will result in the need for increases in the allocation
of resources to reimburse state and local agencies for overtime costs and to fund rent and renovation
costs required in connection with the establishment or expansion of new off-site facilities. Task force
costs are categorized in two ways, overt and covert. Covert funding supports the operations of task
forces while overt funding is used for the necessary administrative support.
All requests for expanded JTTFs and the establishment of annexes within the respective division
are reviewed and coordinated by FBI Headquarters. Coordination requires extensive efforts to ensure
each JTTF has the tools and training adequate for it to complete its mission. This coordination and
review ensure that only the most critical expenses and start-up costs are incurred. While the creation
and maintenance of JTTFs involve a costly investment of non personnel resources, this initiative realizes
qualitative and quantitative benefits in the form of improvements to interagency coordination and
cooperation and the sharing of information in CT investigations.
There are approximately 3,350 full-time JTTF members nationwide which include 1,793 FBI
Special Agents, 811 state and local officers, and 746 members of other government agencies (OGAs).
Federal participants in the JTTF Program include the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(BICE); U.S. Secret Service; U.S. Department of Commerce; U.S. Department of Energy; U.S.
Transportation Security Administration; Central Intelligence Agency; U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency; Naval Criminal Investigative Service; U.S. Marshals Service; U.S. Customs Service (BCBP);
U.S. Coast Guard; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; U.S. Border Patrol; U.S.
Department of State/Diplomatic Security Service; Postal Inspection Service; Internal Revenue Service;
Federal Protective Service; Department of Interior's Bureau of Land Management; U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; U.S. Capitol Police; Federal Bureau of Prisons; Air Force Office of Special
Investigations; U.S. Park Police; Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration; and the Defense
Criminal Investigative Service.
The JTTFs have played a critical role in many significant terrorism investigations. Examples of
JTTF accomplishments include the conviction of Ramzi Yousef and Eyad Mahmoud Ismail for
conspiracy in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the prevention of several acts of
terrorism by members of the True Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Wise County, Texas, in April, 1997;
the July 2000 arrest of 17 individuals in Charlotte, Concord, and Lexington, North Carolina, which
resulted in the dismantling of a Hizballah cell. Additional examples include the Buffalo JTTFs '
September 2002 arrest of six U.S. citizens for attending an Al-Qaeda/Usama Bin Laden (UBL) -
sponsored training camp in Afghanistan during Spring-Summer 2001. In October 2002, the Portland,
Oregon JTTF arrested six individuals who have been charged with conspiracy to wage war with the
United States and providing material support to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In December 2002, the
North Texas JTTF from the Dallas FBI Field Office indicted five brothers, officers of INFOCOM, a
computer company closely linked to the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD).
The HLFRD was shut down in December 2001 as a specially designated terrorist for its links with
HAMAS. These investigations would not have been successful without the interagency formation of
MISC. REQ. #37 000003622

JTTFs in the field.
JTTFs are routinely utilized to coordinate the FBI's security preparations for virtually all major
special events in the United States. Examples include the 2000 Presidential Nominating Conventions in
Los Angeles, California, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City,
Utah; and, recently, the 2003 NCAA Division I Basketball and Hockey Tournaments.
Recently, the JTTFs played a critical role by assisting in the interview of over 10,000 Iraqis
during the FBI's Iraqi Phase n project.
MISC. REQ. #37 000003623

April 16, 2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:

following:

Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
April 21,2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:

Documents responsive to Document Request 3-It;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3-lv;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #l-a;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #l-b;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #l-f;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #2-e - 2 Packets;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #2-q;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #3-o;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #4-d;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #6-a;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #7-a;
Documents responsive to Document Request 3 Supplemental #7-b;
2 VHS VideoTapes responsive to Document Request 23-4;
Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #43
-How the FBI Determined the 19 Hijackers' Identities;
• Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #44

[PENTTBOM Summary of Investigation dated February 29, 2004 -Law
Enforcement Sensitive Version]
• Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #45
[PENTTBOM Summary of Investigation dated February 29, 2004 -Secret
Version];
Documents responsive to Document Request for ACS Material
[04/16/04 for Hyun Kim]-1 Packets.
Sincerely,
n o*
DOCUMENTS REQUESTED BY
COMMISSION STAFFER
THOMAS ELDRIDGE
HOW FBI DETERMINED THE 19

HIJACKERS'S IDENTITIES
RESPONSIVE
to
ML !ELLANEOUS REQUEST
from COMMISSION
COMMISSION COPY
PENTTBOM
Travel Documents
Travel documents provided by U.S. Immigration, U.S. Customs and Department of State identifying
the hijackers requesting entry to.the United States and entering the United States. A copy of all
available travel documents such as visa applications, photocopies of available passports, I-94's and
Customs forms were previously provided to the "Commission." The travel documents of the hijackers
have also been scanned into the "Concordance" system.
Hijacked Flights
Identified names of all individuals onboard the four hijacked flights using flight manifests. (Flight
manifests for hijacked flights scanned into "Concordance" and information related to manifests can be
located on ACS, 315N-NY-280350-302, Serial 7134. Note: information concerning Saeed Alghamdi
in Serial 7134 is incorrect.)
American Airlines Flight 11, Flight Attendants Betty Ong and Madeline (Amy) Sweeney contacted
American Airlines via phone and identified the seat numbers assigned to the hijackers:
Betty Ong identified hijackers in seats 2A, 2B and 10B;
Seat 2A was assigned to Wail Al-Shehri

Seat 2B was assigned to Waleed Al-Shehri
Seat 10B was assigned to Satam Al-Suqami
Madeline (Amy) Sweeney identified hijackers as being in seats 10B, 9C or 9D and 9G;
Seat 9C unoccupied (note that Mohamed Atta was assigned seat 8D)
Seat 9D unoccupied (note that Abdul Aziz Alomari was in seat 8G)
Seat 10B was assigned to Satam Al-Suqami
(ACS 315-NY-280350-CE 1021 and 302-57614)
Obtained identifying information from the airline passenger name records and flight booking information.
(Passenger name records scanned into Concordance.)
PENTTBOM compared the names and identifying information of the hijackers to information from
Customs and INS when these individuals entered the United States. The information matched. (Travel
documentation scanned into Concordance.)
PENTTBOM compared the recovered identity documents (passport, etc) from the crime scenes.
These documents matched the flight manifest records and the INS/Customs records. (Recovered
MISC REQ #4£ 000003842

identity documents can be located on the PENTTBOM Photo Database by Laboratory numbers: K75,
K77, K78, K80, K84, Kl 17, Kl 18, K139, K400, K752, K791, K792, K1037, K2396, K2446,
K2447, K2514, K2574, K2579, K2887, K2888, K2893, K2894, K2895, K2904, K2905, K2907,
K2913, K2944, K3128, K3774, K3782, Ql, Q2, Q3, Q7, Q19, Q165, Q166, Q169, Q409, Q568,
Q1109andQ1110.)
Requested the governments of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Lebanon and Egypt to contact the
hijackers families, show photographs of the hijackers to family members and interview family members.
(Search following subfiles and serials in the File 315N-NY-280350:
CZ - 385; RY - 69; RY - 149; RY - 160; RY - 210; RY - 408; RY - 809; MAIN - 5327; MAIN
(Secret) - 27774.)
DNA
United Airlines Flight 93 had a crew of seven (7) and thirty seven (37) passengers. The seven (7) crew
members and thirty three (33) passengers have been identified by DNA. Four (4) sets of unknown
human remains have not been identified. Next of kin for Ziad Jarrah, Saeed Al-Ghamdi, Ahmed Al-
Nami and Ahmed Al-Haznawi have not provided DNA samples for comparison.
The Bundeskriminalamt (BKA - German Federal Police) provided DNA profiles obtained from search
warrants conducted on Ziad Jarrah's girlfriend (Aysel Sengun) residence. The FBI Laboratory
compared the DNA profiles provided by the BKA, with DNA profiles from the four sets of unknown
human remains recovered at the crash site of UAL Flight 93.
The DNA profiles provided by the BKA matched the sample of one of the sets of unknown human
remains. (ACS 315N-NY-280350-OUT, Serial 4417.)
American Airlines Flight 77 had a crew of six (6) and fifty eight passengers (58), including the five (5)
hijackers. Remains of all six (6) crew members and fifty two (52) passengers were recovered from the
Pentagon crash site and positively identified (the 53rd passenger was a child and no remains were
recovered.) Five sets of recovered human remains have not been identified and do not match reference
DNA profiles of any of the victims. Two (2) sets of these unidentified human remains were determined
to be biologically related. Next of kin for Hani Hanjour, Khalid Al-Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf Al-
Hazmi and Salem Al-Hazmi have not provided DNA samples for comparison.
The total number of victims at the World Trade Center stands at 2749. This number is comprised of:
1538 victims identified based upon physical remains, 1208 on the basis of a death certificate issued
after sufficient evidence was submitted to a state court that the person was at the World Trade Center
or on one of the airplanes, and three people who died outside New York City from injuries received in
the attack. To date the next of kin for Mohamed Atta, Satam Al-Suqami, Waleed Al-Shehri, Wail Al-
Shehri, Abdulaziz Al-Omari, Marwan Al-Shehhi, Fayez Banihammad, Ahmed Al-Ghamdi, Hamza Al-
Ghamdi and Mohand Al-Shehri have not provided DNA samples for comparison.
MISC REQ #43 000003843

May 11,2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:
Documents responsive to Document Request 26-1; ~ . ,i »

Documents responsive to Document Request 43-1 & 43-2; r^" /î^«ô
Documents responsive to Document Request for ACS Material
[05/06/04 for Raj De].
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
June 15,2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
following:
• Documents responsive to Document Request 2-5;
• Documents responsive to Document Request 10-la;
• Documents responsive to Document Request 38-1 - 2 Packets;
• Documents responsive to Document Request 46-1;
• Documents responsive to Document Request 46-8.
Sincerely,
Roberts. Sinton'
June 17,2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
In response to the Commissions Request for Documents, please find
folio whig:
Documents responsive to Document Request 35-13 -9 Packets;
Documents responsive to Document Request 38-1 - 2 Packets.
Sincerely,
Robert S. Sinton
July 1,2004

Suite 300
2100KStreet,N.W.
Dear Mr. Marcus:
In response to the Commissions Request for Documents, please find the following:
Documents in response to Miscellaneous Request #59:
-Documents Related to Saudi Arabian Airlines Flight from Newark Airport
This is part of the FBI's rolling production and thus may be supplemented in the future.
Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 202-324-9613.
Sincerel
Robert S. Sinton
' Assistant General Counsel

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Thomas H.

2. Documentation on previous terrorist entry to the United States. The Alien

w. Abdul Hakim Murad

8. Visa Identification Terrorist Automated Lookout (VITAL). Documents sufficient to describe

12. Immigration-related detainee program. All electronic communications, investigative inserts,

September 12, 2003 Daniel Marcus

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20535

Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

RE: Commission's Request for Documents

Dear Mr. Marcus:

In response to the Commissions Request for Documents, please find the

Documents responsive to Document Request l-8e: 2001 AFOR Phoenix Field

Assistant General Counsel

Updated September 3, 2003

Quoting Susan Ginsburg <sginsburg@9-llcommission.gov>:

> Dan and Steve,

> Original Message

> Date: Thu, 25 Sep 2003 08:06:13 -0400 (EDT)

rith the following:

> 1. In general, at least as an initial matter, searching can be limited

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the General Counsel Washington, D. C. 20535

Daniel Marcus, General Counsel yj J J^

RE: Commission's Request for Documents

Dear Mr. Marcus:

Documents responsive to Document Request 5-4c;

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

From: Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)

Date: October 10, 2003

Federal Bureau of Investigation

October 24, 2003

Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

• Documents responsive to Document Request for ACS Material

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

RE: Commission's Request for Documents

Dear Mr. Marcus:

In response to the Commissions Request for Documents, please find the

• Documents responsive to Document Request 3-If;

"A" - SOURCE/INFORMANT INFORMATION - Information, the disclosure of which

"B" - FBI TECHNIQUES AND/OR METHODS - Information on sensitive FBI

"C" - NON-RELEVANT FBI CASE INFORMATION - Information neither relevant nor

"D" - FBI PENDING CASE INFORMATION - Information which would impede or

"E" - STATUTORY - Information legally prohibited from release by statute.

"F" - PRIVACY/SECURITY - Information, the disclosure of which would be an

"G" - FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION - The identity of a foreign

Aviation Security Directive

Subject: Threat to U.S. Airports - No Fly and Selectee Lists

INFORMATION: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has received

ACTIONS REQUIRED BY AIRPORT OPERATORS REGULATED UNDER 49 CFR 1542:

REQ 13-11 000000004

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

REQ 13-11 000000005

ill NO FLY LIST ACTIONS

1. The nearest FBI Office.

B. If processing an application for SIDA, sterile area, or other identification media

IV. SELECTEE LIST ACTIONS

1. The nearest FBI Office.