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UNCLASSIFIED

Intelligence Enhancements
for
Force Protection
This brief is classified:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

70171001
23 Jan 01
UNCLASSIFIED
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Agenda

Problem
Proposal
Specifics
Benefits
Way ahead

70171002
23 Jan 01
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Overview
II

Challenge:
Enhancing Force Protection in light of a multi-
faceted, diffuse, and continuously evolving
terrorist threat manifested by interconnected
groups with global reach and transregional
infrastructures.

70171003
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
23 Jan 01
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Overview

Focus:
The Defense Intelligence component of the Force
Protection problem with particular emphasis on
threat analysis and warning.

"Unity of effort among the offices and agencies in DoD


providing resources, policy, oversight and direction is
critical to truly gain the initiative over a very adaptive,
persistent, patient and tenacious terrorist."
DoD USS Cole Commission Report

70171004
23 Jan 01 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Overview
I
Characteristics of the Problem
Worldwide continuum of activity
- Defies attempts at regionally focused analysis
Difficult warning problem becoming even harder
- Loosely affiliated groups collaborating for specific
operation
- OPSEC/COMSEC obsessed target
Appearance of ambiguous, uncorroborated information
Characteristics of organized international criminal activity
Similar to Computer Network Defense challenges

70171005
23 Jan 01 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Overview
I

Proposal
•Two components:
-Strengthen and more precisely direct terrorism
analysis firepower
-Expand breadth of information available for
analysis

70171006
23 Jan 01 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Strengthening and Directing Analysis

Clarifying organizational responsibilities and accountability


Issue:
- Commander receives threat assessments from DIA, Commands
and State
- Warning products from variety of echelons
- Results in little value-added and potential confusion
- No single entity responsible and accountable
Proposal:
- Assign Director, DIA unambiguous accountability for
terrorism warning
- Assign Director, DIA sole responsibility for establishing Threat
Levels
- Revise Threat Level product to incorporate divergent analysis
- Incorporate existing service assessment efforts into DIA's
70171007 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
23 Jan 01
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Intelligence/Operations
Force Protection Relationship
Country
THREAT LEVEL/CLIMATE ASSESSMENT

DIA

CINC

<^THREATCON/FORCE PROTECTION AUTHORITY


^xl

Facility City Operation Force

70171017
1 Feb 01 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Strengthening and Directing Analysis (Cont.)

Consolidate analytic energy and output


Issue:
- DoD speaks with many voices
- CIA's CTC is focused on collections and operations
- DIA analysts are junior and have little access to decision-makers
Proposal:
- Direct DIA to establish a consolidated terrorism
analysis organization
- Direct NIMA and NSA to imbed elements
- Ensure organizational empowerment, fenced funding
- Form close partnership with CIA's CTC
- Provide authoritative leadership (FO/GO, former FO/GO,
senior SES)
70171008
23 Jan 01 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Strengthening and Directing Analysis (Cont.)

Incorporate state-of-the-art technologies


• Issue:
- Daunting information environment
- Fragments of relevant data embedded in vast "noise"
- Late '80's investment did not keep pace
- Modern commercial technology has high potential payoff
• Proposal:
- Convert data to state-of-the-art commercial standards
- Partner with advanced technology efforts
- Fund for technology examination and exploitation

70171009
23 Jan 01 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Expanding Available Information


III

Assumptions:
• Significant collections breakthroughs are not likely
• Successes will involve combination of:
- Intelligence
- Good police and investigative work
- Vigilant security
- Foreign government involvement
- Plain luck
• Improvements are possible

70171010
23 Jan 01 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Expanding Available Information (Cont.)


I
Integrate compartmented intelligence
• Issue:
- Restricted CIA and NSA reporting
- Preclude inclusion in large electronic databases
- May not reach relevant analysts
• Proposal:
- Designate DIA effort as recipient of all terrorism reporting
- Configure limited access database as repository for all
compartmented reporting

70171011
23 Jan 01 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Expanding Available Information (Cont.)

Improve access to law enforcement/security information


Issue:
- Different concepts of information sharing and need-to-know
- Includes investigative and security components of
military services
- Some data deemed of little interest beyond local level or
criminal case
Proposal:
- Broaden DoD access to law enforcement/security
information
- Forge interagency information sharing and handling
agreements
- Develop appropriate guidelines
70171012
23 Jan 01 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

What's Different?
II
Today Proposed

• Diffused accountability • Clear accountability


• Multiple threat levels • One DoD threat level
• Access to some threat • Access to all threat data
information
• Integrate LE/S data with
• Intel - LE/S disconnect intelligence
• 1980's technology • State-of-the-Art technology

Changes are within Defense Intelligence only


NO changes to CINC authorities/prerogatives
70171019
1 Feb 01
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Warning and Threat Data Flow Comparison


I
TODAY PROPOSED

Threat Assessment & Warning


Threat-Assessment & Warning
ARFI

Some data
RFI
Product
Threat Assessment
& Warning FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED

Intelligence Support to
Force Protection
Strengthening Terrorism Analysis

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Background

USS Cole attack


Tasking
- Examine intelligence contribution
- Propose DoD improvements
Parallel to USS Cole Commission

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UNCLASSIFIED

The Terrorism Target

Characteristics
- Transregional
- Adaptive
- Security obsessed
- Permanent
Increasingly complex
Fragmentary & ambiguous data

UNCLASSIFIED
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How We are Doing

•Two decades of improvement


- DCI Counter Terrorist Center
- Collection - dedicated effort
- Analysis - DIA strong suit
•Target continues to change
It is nearly impossible to quantify success...but
we view every terrorist success as an
intelligence failure

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

How We are Doing (cont.)

Limited collection breakthroughs


Diffused analytic capabilities
- Little additional value
Some data highly restricted
Insufficient information technology
Unclear responsibility and
accountability

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

The Proposal - Specifics

Establish consolidated DoD-wide effort


- Assign DIA responsibility
- Strengthen analytic capability
- Ensure organizational empowerment
- Provide authoritative leadership
Incorporate state-of-the-art technology
- Convert to commercial standards
- Apply advanced analytic tools

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

The Proposal - Specifics

Integrate compartmented intelligence


- Designate DIA recipient of all
terrorism related data
- Tailor information technology support
Access more law enforcement data
- Work with Justice & Treasury
Improve flow/analysis of security data
- Incorporate investigative reporting
The proposal is supported in concept by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCs, and the DCI
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Short Term (3 to 6 months)

Establish responsibility/accountability
Consolidate analytic energy & output
- Embed imagery and SIGINT
Increase flow of compartmented data
Update all existing data
Protect and direct fiscal resources

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Mid Term (6 to 18 months)

Apply state-of-the-art technologies


- Partner with technology owners
Integrate compartmented data
- Exploit all source data base
Expand analytic base
Better target, drive collection
- Partner with Counter Terrorist Center
Project and program resources in POM

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

Long Term (in excess of 18 months)

• Achieve true analytic depth


- Sustain advanced technology
applications
•Organize and resource to task
•Achieve deep penetration of the target
The ultimate objective is to get deep inside the
terrorists' pre-attack planning cycle

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

The End Result

An all-source analysis effort that:


- Sharpens focus onwarning
-Accesses all relevant information
- Ignores boundaries of space & time
- Is manned and equipped to succeed
Places clear accountability and
responsibility with Director, DIA

UNCLASSIFIED

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