InterpretativeSociologyandthePhilosophyofPraxis:ComparingMax WeberandAntonioGramsci

InterpretativeSociologyandthePhilosophyofPraxis:ComparingMaxWeberand AntonioGramsci

byGershonShafir

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INTERPRETATIVE SOCIOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAXIS: COMPARING MAX WEBER AND ANTONIO GRAMSCI
Gershon Shafir It has been customary to measure the contribution of Max Weber to sociology and the social sciences by comparing his work with the theses of Karl Marx, who died approximately thirty-five years before him.1 In my opinion, it would be more enlightening to conduct a comparative analysis between the positions taken by Weber and Antonio Gramsci, one of his illustrious contemporaries. By comparing thinkers of the same generational background, even adherents of different or opposing theoretical traditions, we find unexpected similarities, against which it is easier to assess the relative influence of their respective intellectual traditions vis--vis their historical contingencies. In addition, taking Gramsci as the other pole of the comparison provides an opportunity to consider the changes that took place within Marxism in the same historical context. The generation of European thinkers active between 1890 and 1930 occasioned, in H. Stuart Hughes words, a reorientation of the dominant culture by its sustained and systematic criticism of Enlightenment rationalism and the positivist model of the natural sciences. The liberal systems waning self-confidence and its gradual decline, which was more pronounced in countries such as Germany and Italy, found its echo in the culture of the age. As industrial societies were surging ahead, the more imaginative thinkers of the eraBergson, Pareto, Croce, Freud, Weber, Durkheim, Jung, etc. became aware of the pull of counterforces. While unwilling to part with certain promises of liberalism, they could not help but see it as shallow and misleading. As a consequence, these thinkers, psychologists, philosophers and sociologists wished to reform liberalism through the incorporation of hitherto neglected or overlooked dimensions of human behaviour, and willy-nilly tipped the balance of individual life and the social order towards the field of inner life. For the student of society:
. . . the activity of human consciousness for the first time became of paramount importance. For consciousness seemed to offer the only link between man and the world of society and history.2

Although Weber and Gramsci approach the problem of consciousness from different angles they are united in their appreciation of its significance, and indeed, in the task of theorizing it as the unsolved question of their time. In the following pages I shall examine four aspects of their respective theories: 1) the social psychology of human consciousness; 2) the cultural motive force of

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its evolution, and the social processes which give these their significance; 3) the stratification of culture, and 4) the role of intellectuals as the agents of cultural change. Finally I shall explore the opposite versions of society that each derives from theories that are similar in many ways. I. Socio-Psychological Foundations Theories of human consciousness may feature different combinations of psychological and cultural elements. Various forms of psychological theories were elaborated by the anti-positivist generation, but Weber and Gramsci were among the most consistent in examining psychological processes, needs and motivations in the context of their determination by and significance for the general culture of their societies, and through that culture for the prevailing social structure. Weber describes human behaviour as action, which becomes the legitimate topic of sociological inquiry when the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behaviour.3 The term meaning does not refer in Webers writings only to a necessary intentionality that characterizes human action as such. It resembles the emphasis placed by existentialist philosophers, such as Nietzsche, on meaningful choices that alone give direction to human life. Weber expresses great admiration for Nietzsche,4 but while the latter sees the painful striving to generate worthy values and live by them as the characteristic of post-religious modernity, Weber views it as the universal lot of humankind, and therefore, projects the existential quest onto the dawn of human consciousness. In his view the great world religions are variant attempts to provide such systematic tracks to human action. The pursuit of selected cultural values that represent a stand in the face of the world is an inner needin Webers terminology an ideal interest. Together with the material interest, they directly govern mens conduct.5 The ideal interest is neither a faint reflection of nor an apology for the material interest, but is a socio-psychological legitimizing factor in its own right. Nevertheless, Weber recognizes that there is an elective affinity between the economic interests of various strata and the already formed ideas they are attracted to, and by which they are restrained or prompted. So Weber, while serving the tight link positioned by Marx between the world of existence and consciousness, does not deny their mutual influence, and in essence creates a multi-dimensional theory of society. But, as we are not limited in this study to the traditional comparison of Weber with Marx, but are examining Webers place in the gallery of the most sensitive minds of his generation, we cannot fail to notice that his main purpose is not the critique of Marxian social theory but of positivism. The philosophical debate for Marx was with the Hegelian problematic of ideals as goals aspired for by a dialectic of their own. But Weberthe product of the first generation to address psychology seriouslyis not interested in ideas in this sense but in ideal interests as a source of self-legitimating motivation, in direct rebuttal of the restriction of positivist social sciences focus of study to observable, that is, external behaviour. Webers focus on culture as a

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deposit of socio-psychological forces offers a unique perspective for the interpretation of human behaviour in terms of the need for legitimacy, an interpretative sociology. Within the theoretical realm of Marxism proper, the theory of consciousness, in addition to being a phase in the development of Marxism proper in its own right, is at the same time part of the anti-positivist current. A first wave of internal criticismBernsteins revisionismwas connected with objections to Marxs economic prognosis concerning the inevitability of a final economic crisis and the polarization of classes in advanced capitalist society. A new brand of criticism, levelled after the failure of the socialist revolutions in Western and Central Europe, questions the taken-for-granted or spontaneous link connecting economic crisis and the social revolution. Gramscis own stancea Western or Neo-Marxist one which he terms the philosophy of praxisis elaborated in his polemic against, among others, the Belgian socialist Hendrik De Man. De Man, assuming a Freudian position, argued that Marx neglected the basic facts of mass psychology. According to De Man, the emotional mainsprings of action are crucial in determining the receptivity of the working class to theoretical aims posed by intellectuals, and the slighting of this fact introduces a rationalist superstition into Marxism.6 Gramscis relation to De Mans Freudian posture is as ambivalent as Webers position is to Nietzsches existentialism. On the one hand, Gramsci supports De Mans attack on economismthe Marxist version of positivism which believes in the law-like character of social life, and therefore readily agrees with De Mans argument that masses of people do not spontaneously develop a theoretical understanding of their class interest as a consequence of their social situation. On the other hand, Gramsci objects to De Mans attempt to explain the gap between material interest and political action in terms of affects and psychological processes. Between the spheres of economic and political life lies, in his view, the repertoire of culturally prescribed preferences which is predominant in influencing people in choosing courses of action. In a fashion similar to Webers conflation of subjectivity with an existential quest, Gramsci proceeds to erase the distinction between consciousness in general and philosophy. Consciousness is always a particular consciousness and its foundation is the taken-for-granted quality of mass culture. In Gramscis view every person is a philosopher, since he or she has a spontaneous philosophy, that is, an entire system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, ways of seeing things and acting, that consists of given cultural elements, such as language, which is a totality of determined notions and concepts and not just words grammatically devoid of content, popular religion and folklore. Taken together Gramsci refers to these elements as common sense.7 Although Gramsci does not clearly demarcate the borders of this common sense, he considers it to be a permanent feature of the social order and a major way of making sense of the world. Above all it serves as the basis of the customary unreflected response of the popular masses to historical contingencies. The Gramscian emphasis on the philosophical character of popular culture

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as the basis of practical activity is a direct attack on the positivist view, which wishes to restrict philosophy or even make it superfluous through the use of empirical methods. By enlarging the scope of philosophy from a detached and quasi-technical or logical field of analysis to a general interpretation of the world, Gramsci establishes popular beliefs as a new starting point for the understanding of history and rejects the view that social sciencewhether Marxist or othercan establish the rule-like character of reality.8 II. Cultural Evolution

Just as Weber and Gramsci view psychology from its social angle, so they share a similar view of society as the embodiment of certain historical forces at given levels of development. In this sense, their theories offer a clearly recognizable evolutionary pattern of human affairs, though neither share in the rigid certainty of the evolutionists and historical materialists. Weber believes that it is possible to arrange the various historically significant religious interpretations given to the meaning of life on a continuum, on the basis of their increasing rationality. Subsequent religions provide increasingly complex explanations for human distress, and offer solutions through ever more controlled ways of lifeethical systems. The methodology of religious rationalization in Webers scheme is in the growing remoteness of the explanation from the common sense nature of everday life.9 The Calvinist doctrine of predestination, totally excluding the possibility of human control and comprehension, signals a magnificent consistency10 and the apex of religious rationalization. Weber has declared the ideal interest to be an independent source of motivation that stands behind some of the major achievements of culture, but he also demonstrates that it has an autonomous logic of evolution. In his words:
. . . rationality, in the sense of logical or teleological consistency of an intellectual-theoretical or practical-ethical attitude has and always had power over man, however limited and unstable this power is and always has been in the face of other forces of historical life.11

Analyzing the cultural dimension separately from these other forces accords Weber a clue towards identifying a universal principle of evolution in the highly complex realm of culture and values. As a result he can disassociate himself from the positivist way of thinking, not only by emphasizing the subjective dimension of society, but also by pointing to the autonomy of the entire realm of cultural life and its method of evolution and direction, which alone make it possible to understand the activity of the historical subject. Each historical era, according to Gramscis Hegelian historicist perspective, represents another step in the liberation of humankind, culminating in the passage from the reign of necessity to the reign of freedom.12 While each stage contains arbitrary elements, the bedrock of history is its rational component: that which is useful to men in that it enlarges their concept of life, and raises to a higher level life itself .13 New stages preserve the rational

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elements of the earlier ones and Marxism is the crowning achievement that presupposes all this cultural past: Renaissance and Reformation, German Philosophy and the French revolution, Calvinism and English classical economics, secular liberalism and . . . historicism.14 Gramsci, in an approach typical of his generation, examines the movement of history from the vantage point of the transformation of human consciousness, and describes it as a movement of intellectual and moral reformation. He pays far less attention to the direct impact of the material basis on social change than Marxists of the previous generation. The real significance of the development of the productive forces for Gramsci is in the intervention of the state, not as a repressive instrument, but in order to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level that corresponds to the new economic structure.15 Therefore, he refers frequently to reformation, a term of radical cultural change, never to revolution, a concept of radical political transformation. The cultural reformation creates not just new values but a new collective person whose civilization and morality correspond to the needs of the new social order.16 In Gramscis usage, a new common sense is created for a new era. For himin contradistinction from the English view of common sense as normal practical understandingit is an ever-changing type of mass culture which emerges and wanes in accordance with the prevailing scientific and philosophical opinions of the period. The Catholic Church was content to leave the masses in their medieval spirit. The bourgeoisie promised to absorb the entire society by raising it to its own cultural and economic level,17 though in practice it never did so. Gramsci places his hope in Marxism, which he is confident can make this promise come true. This argument, however, already brings us to the next point: the internal divisions of cultural life. III. The Stratification of Culture The relatively minor differences between the respective Weberian and Gramscian emphases on socio-psychological and cultural motives take on far-reaching significance when they are conjoined with the issue of social stratification and its impact on the cultural sphere, and it is at this point that Weber and Gramsci part ways. Weber professes his belief that a fundamental and unbridgeable gap separates the superior culture of the intellectuals and the mass culture of the non-intellectuals (that is, high and mass culture). Its origin lies in the different reasons for the pursuit of meaningful choices of life styles. The masses experience various forms of distress in their everyday life: hunger, drought, sickness and ultimately, suffering and death.18 For the intellectuals the predicament of the masses is seen in their own inner mirror, as a proof that the world does not display an inner order. The task that the intellectuals set for themselves is to find that order which would lend meaning and rationality to the world.19 The intellectual seeks in various ways . . . to endow his life with a pervasive meaning, and thus find unity with himself, with his fellow men, and with the cosmos.20 The masses, however, do not share the intellectuals

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satisfaction derived from a consistent symbolic solution. They, as Weber repeats again and again, hold a calculating attitude and demand compensation for their suffering.21 The modern-day proletariat, for example, wishes to receive a revolutionary compensation in this world.22 The incompatibility of the ideal interests of the intellectuals and the masses destines them to live in separate cultural realms. Occasionally, the masses initiate a social movement on their own, usually with the intention of demanding justice in a particular case, but when this happens it is not born out of a desire to make the totality of the world rational but out of irrational sentiments. In the modern world, Weber adds, public opinion is not an independent phenomenon, but is the result of manipulation by party leaders and the press.23 Not surprisingly, when Weber formulates his general theory of stratifcation, the ideal motivation occupies a place of honor. The expression of ideal, material and political interests are systematic principles of social cleavage, the basis of a three-dimensional stratification. Just as material interests organize society into different classes with varying resources of income and wealth, and political interests form the basis of parties with various amounts of power, so ideal interests motivate the creation of status groups with a succession of status honor.24 When social groups form their ideal interest into a typical life style, be it religious, ethnic, occupational, etc., they claim recognition in the form of prestige and status honor. Status, in Webers analytic scheme, is the principle of hierarchical organization of competing life styles which preserves the distance between the claimants by monopolizing ideal and material resources. Gramsci rejects the division that exists between the intellectuals and the popular masses as a starting point in the analysis of cultural stratification. The concrete division of labour between mental and manual workers which exists in traditional and modern societies obscures, according to him, the reality of a significant bond between these categories. Gramsci therefore offers an alternative premise: all men are intellectuals . . . but not all men have in society the function of the intellectuals.25 In other places Gramsci adds that everyone is a philosopher and a legislator.26 This has to be the case since each person is a man of taste, participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it.27 Values and world views are being produced and reproduced continuously and by actively participating in this process people tend to establish norms even if only in a limited zone of living and with limited awareness.28 Gramsci particularly stresses the cultural implications of work experience. The working person possesses a spontaneous consciousness based on his or her practical experience in changing the material environment in cooperation with others. As members of a class, the workers also express a shared identity beyond their individual participation in the reproduction of the cultural order. This solidarity, however, exists only in embryonic form and therefore appears in historical action only occasionally and in flashes.29 The maturation of the cultural autonomy of the working class is inhibited

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not by its lack of intellectualism but by the cultural domination of the ruling class, by forced stratification. The ruling class is able to attain the submission and passivity of the popular masses through its hegemonic control. Gramsci, with his usual sociological acumen, emphasizes the institutional underpinning of this hegemony. Perry Anderson sums up his view succinctly:
this hegemonic system of power was defined by the degree of consent it obtained from the popular masses it dominated . . . Its mechanism of control for securing this consent lay in a ramified network of cultural institutionsschools, churches, newspapers, parties, associations . . . 30

The hegemony of the dominant class is not an epiphenomenal result of its leading role in the world of production, though that might have been the case in the past, but the end result of the consistent efforts of groups of intellectuals auxiliary to the ruling class. According to Gramsci, power undergoes transformation after a ruling class is established in its position and subtle and subterranean manipulation takes the place of overtly exerted control. Cultural hegemony changes the common sense of the masses, which was an initially justified cultural reaction, into a mummified state of mind. In consequence, not only is opposition repressed, but the very thought of change is made unlikely.31 Hegemony, in Gramscis view, is the most pervasive method of cooptation which reaches into all ranks of the popular masses. In Gramscis view the fact that the culture of intellectuals occupies a rung higher than the culture of the masses is not the result of different initial impulses motivating these strata, but is the consequence of the cultural struggle. In the coming phase of this struggle, Gramsci vehemently argues, the common sense of popular culture needs to be raised to the level of the most advanced state of humanist philosophyMarxism. He admits that common sense lacks coherence while philosophy is an intellectual order based on internal consistency and critical evaluation. Nevertheless, Gramsci bridges the two realms by pointing out that common sense is not a realm unto itself but a less evolved form of philosophy, and concludes therefore that a passage from the one to the other and vice versa, must be possible.32
Such critical understanding takes place through a struggle of political hegemonies and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper in order to arrive at the working out at a higher level of ones own conception of reality.33

The aim of counterposing Marxist philosophy to the hegemony of the ruling class is the development of a critical understanding of the social order by the popular masses. This understanding will give them a sense of separate identity and will serve as the basis of their autonomous political activity. Moral and intellectual reformation, that is, consciousness of being part of a particular hegemonic force and independent political action must be two equally developed facets of an ongoing praxis.34 Class struggle is not a political conflict spilling over into the cultural realm; in Gramscis view the gradual evolution of the consciousness of the popular masses was the key to the intensity of the class struggle itself.

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IV.

The Role of the Intellectuals

The focus of Webers theory of consciousness is the existential quest for meaning, and it is the intellectual who conceives of the world as a problem of meaning.35 The prototypical intellectual is the charismatic prophet and he appears when the routine workings of society are interrupted and the conventional justifications of meaningful life styles and senseless suffering have lost their hold. The compelling nature of mass distress demands then a radical breakthrough in the realm of intellectual interpretations; nothing less than a wholly new and more consistent interpretation of human life and its afflictions will suffice. The apex of the evolution of human consciousness is the moment of charisma, because it declares the supremacy of a powerful intellect and cultural commitment over all other social forces, such as organization and material considerations. Society is changed through the transformation of human consciousness which radiates out to other spheres and reorganizes them accordingly. Weber is very critical of intellectuals who do not follow the inner course of cultural development which occasionally influences the masses, but actually follow the masses or cooperate with them in a social movement. His ire is amply expressed during the revolutionary years after the First World War in Germany. Sterile excitation, he claims, plays so great a part with our intellectuals in this carnival we decorate with the proud name of revolution. Instead, he demands objective responsibility,36 meaning the fulfilment of the intellectuals own role of cultural innovation. More significantly, from Webers theoretical position, the very involvement of the masses in the process of changing the world according to the charismatic revelation is the beginning of its corruption. The unavoidable fate of charisma is the loss of its initial purity through its exploitation for the benefit of the following. It is important to point out in this context that scientific work, according to Webers strongly held opinion, cannot be the modern source of charismatic knowledge, since it cannot offer ethical doctrines in the way in which religion did. Research addresses itself only to the improvement of the means towards the attainment of certain ends, but the meaning of these ends is something that is only assumed by scientists: No science is absolutely free from presuppositions, and no science can prove its fundamental value to the man who rejects these presuppositions.37 Therefore, charismatic leadership, which is not limited to the religious sphere but can appear in politics as well, may remain in the Weberian scheme of things the only source of new and more meaningful life styles and value commitments. Gramsci, in contrast to Weber, unequivocally rejects the possibility of charismatic pronouncement as the source of cultural innovation in the modern era. In the complex order of modern society an internally conceived charismatic destiny can only be of short term use for the speedy solution of a crisis. The active intervention of the popular masses is required to establish a new social orderone that is universal and total.38 To organize that transformation, Gramsci argues, a complex social unit which expresses a

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collective will is necessary, and history has already provided this organism, and it is the political party.39 The role assigned by Gramsci to the radical party significantly includes, in addition to ordinary political tasks, the accomplishment of the desired moral and intellectual reformation. To be able to elaborate and diffuse a new conception of the world40 the party cannot be the seat of bureaucrats who usually handle routine tasks of limited significance, but has to be the cultural center for the intellectuals of the working classthe organic intellectuals. Gramsci distinguishes between the traditional intellectuals, auxiliary to the ruling class, that develop and sustain the hegemonic apparatus, and the organic intellectuals of the popular masses that are involved in the formation of a counterhegemony. The party fulfils the same formative role for the organic intellectuals that higher schools of learning and academies do for all other types. If it seems strange to argue that a political party may be a center of cultural life, we should remember that the goal of the radical party is not the defense of the narrowly conceived interests of the class it represents, but the transformation of society in its totality and in line with the most ambitious philosophical thinking. For a class to conceive of its interests in the broadest possible fashion, it needs those social elementsthe intellectualsthat have been trained to hold a general perspective on society. According to Gramsci, a party motivated by such considerations rises above the economic contingencies which gave rise to it in the first place, and tries to encompass in its own hegemonic struggle all subaltern social forces, not just the working class. Conclusion By treating human consciousness as a constitutive element of social reality in its own right, the outstanding intellectual figures of the generation of 1890-1930 changed our way of thinking about society. Some, like Pareto, Freud, Jung, Bergson, Nietzsche, and to an extent Durkheim and Sorel, were more concerned with the psychological, or even irrational aspects of human beings and society; Weber and Gramsci were among the most sociologically conscious, and probably the most dedicated in their attempts to uncover the rational aspects of human culture in the existential quest and common sense. Historical contingencies, the decline of the liberal order and positivist culture shaped the problem posed to their generation. They responded to it by reorienting European culture in a manner strikingly similar in its basic layer: the comprehension of the constitutive elements of human consciousness and its motive forces, and its integration into their image of men and women. The divergence between Weber and Gramscis theories is found not at the basis of their perspectives but in their ideological commitments and theoretical traditions, which remained unaffected by historical change. Questions relating to the tenacity of cultural stratification and the extent of possible social change were more sensitive to their political and ideological commitments. These constituted another theoretical level, one which pulled them apart. Weber is convinced beyond doubt that the different motivation of

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higher and lower strata is a permanent feature of the social and moral order.41 In his opinion, only high culture can be the source of a new ethics, and its development is the consequence of the inner development of high culture in the pursuit of a more consistent ethical system. Gramsci, on the other hand, views the development of high and mass culture as parallel and contingent. Philosophy, he points out, must find its material through contact with mass culture. The task of high culture is not to influence popular consciousness but to raise its concerns to a more critical and consistent level. The clearest expression of the creative and pivotal role of high culture in Webers scheme is the great weight he places on the appearance of the charismatic prophet, even though charisma is a quality Weber cannot account for analytically. The appearance of charisma is as unexpected as it is necessary. This deep-seated ambiguity has far-reaching consquences. For example, Weber never develops a theory of revolution: since he perceives major social change to be contingent on non-sociological factors, he cannot clothe it in theoretical terms. It is important to note that Gramsci does not possess a theory of revolution either: he offers a view of cultural reformation, and its relationship to the form and method of radical political transformation is left uncharted. Nevertheless, the intellectual and moral reformation is painted by Gramsci with rich theoretical colouring, as a process of the elaboration of a stratum of organic intellectuals out of the fertilization of high culture by popular philosophy. Webers view of the evolution of high culture as an inner-directed process also accounts for the fact that once the charismatic pronouncement makes contact with existing social forces it inevitably becomes routinized, losing a great deal not only of its initial zeal, but also of its cultural significance. In this way, the Calvinist doctrine of predestination was transformed into the spirit of methodical capitalist accumulation. In Webers theory, the separation between the ideal interest of the intellectuals and the material interest of the masses finds its counterpart in the gap between theory and practice, and indicates that theory will always produce unintended consequences. Ironically, Weber cannot predict the presence of charisma but does foresee its distortion. Webers emphasis on the autonomy of the existential quest as a motive force of cultural development leads him at this point out of sociology and into a theoretical dead end. A similar gap between theory and practice was discovered by Gramsci during the red years following the First World Warthe gap between the theory of the intellectuals that predicted a socialist revolution and its absence in practice. In his opinion, the lack of synchronization between the culture of the intellectuals and the popular masses that were under the hegemonic cooptation of the Italian ruling classes made it impossible for history to move forward, and for a new humanity to be born. He concludes, therefore, that the task for his generation should be the democratization of culture, which alone could make significant social change possible. Gramscis aim is to establish the same unity between the intellectuals and the simple as there should be between theory and practice.42 This view makes Gramsci unique among the anti-posivitist thinkers: in his opinion it is both possible and necessary to

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narrow and bridge the gaping cultural abyss between the higher and lower strata. Gramsci sees the political party as a cultural and political centre which will provide the means for uniting the intellectuals and the popular masses by inducing the intellectuals to work out and make coherent the principles and problems raised by the masses in their practical activity. This would result in a cultural and social block between them.43 The role of the party is to bring together theory and practice to create social praxis, and the key to correct praxis lies in breaking down social stratification in the cultural realm. Gramscis persistent use of the term philosophy of praxis indicates that he is not willing to relinquish the possibility of relating theory and practice, as Weber seems to be doing. He offers instead a methodology of praxis, which will connect the two at a higher synthesisa revolutionary one. Webers deep pessimism arises from his tendency to examine modern society while looking back nostalgically at an era of religious evolution and charismatic leaders. In contrast, Gramscis guarded optimism springs from his readiness to accept the modern age, while attempting to direct it towards a democratic culture.
NOTES
1 See for example: Norman Birbaum, Conflicting Interpretations of the Rise of Capitalism: Marx and Weber, British Journal of Sociology 4 (1953); Irwing M. Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Sociological Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1958); Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1971). Stuart H. Hughes, Consciousness and Society: the Reorientation of European Social Thought: 1890-1930 (New York: Vintage, 1958), p. 428. Max Weber, Economy and Society, 3 Volumes (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 4. Reinhard Bendix and Gunther Roth, Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 22. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed. and trans., From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 280. Hendrik De Man, The Psychology of Socialism, rev. ed., (New York: Henry Holt, 1927), pp. 25-30. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 323. Richard Kilminster, Praxis and Method (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 110-113; Mihailo Markovi, Gramsci on the Unity of Philosophy and Politics, Praxis 3 (1967), p. 338. Wolfgang Schluchter, The Paradox of Rationalization; on the Relation of Ethics and the World, in Gunther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter, Max Webers Vision of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Ann Swidler, The Concept of Rationality in the Work of Max Weber, Sociological Inquiry 43, No. 1 (1973). Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1958), p. 104. Gerth & Mills, From Max Weber, p. 324. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, p. 404. Ibid., p. 245. Ibid., p. 395. Ibid., pp. 395, 258. Ibid., pp. 208-9, 242. Ibid., p. 260.

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Gerth & Mills, From Max Weber, p. 280. Ibid., p. 281. Weber, Economy and Society, p. 506. Ibid., p. 492. Gerth & Mills, From Max Weber, pp. 225-6. Ibid., p. 221. Ibid., pp. 180-195. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, p. 9. Ibid., pp. 265, 347. Ibid., p. 9. Ibid., pp. 265-6. Ibid., p. 329. Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London: NLB, 1976), pp. 79-80. Joseph Femia, Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci, Political Studies 23, No. 1 (March 1975), pp. 31-35. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, p. 199. Ibid., p. 333. Ibid., p. 333. Weber, Economy and Society, p. 506. Gerth & Mills, From Max Weber, pp. 115, 127. Ibid., p. 153. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, pp. 210-211. Ibid., p. 129. Ibid., p. 335. Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 490-492. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 330. Ibid., p. 330.

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