April 6, 2003

Information Paper

Subject: Payne Stewart Lear Jet

Issue: A family spokesperson asked that we construct a timeline comparing the NORAD
response to the Payne Stewart Lear Jet tragedy with the response to the hijacked airliners
on September 11,2001.

Facts:
1. According to National Transportation Safety Board Aircraft Accident Brief
No. DCAOOMA005:
• Learjet N47BA departed Orlando FL for Dallas Texas aboutX)919 EDTr
October 25,1999;
• At 0926:48 EDT, N47BA was issued instructions to change radio
frequency. N47BA acknowledged the change;
• At 0927:16 EDT, N47BA acknowledged an instruction to climb and
maintain FL 390. That was the last known radio transmission from the
Learjet;
• At 0933:38 EDT (6 minutes and 20 seconds later) N47BA was instructed
to change radio frequency. There was no response;
• For the next 4 Vi minutes the Jacksonville controller called the flight five
more times with no response.
2. According to the same report:
• About 0952 CDT [1052 EDT] a USAF F-16 test pilot from the 40th Flight
Test Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base was vectored to withhin 8 nm of
N47BA;
• About 1012 CDT [1112 EDT] the pilot concluded his inspection of
N47BA and proceeded to Scott AFB, Illinois;
• About 1113 CDT [1213 EDT] two Oklahoma ANG F-16s "TULS A 13
flight" were vectored to intercept the flight by the Minneapolis ARTCC;
TULS A 13 flight departed for tanker refueling at 1139 CDT [1239 EDT];
• About 1150 CDT [1250 EDT] two North Dakota ANG f-16s "NODAK 32
flight" were vectored to intercept the Learjet
3. Florida is in two time zones. Jacksonville is in the Eastern time zone and
Eglin Air Force Base is in the Central time zone.
4. According to the Northwest Florida Daily News of October 26, 1999:
• The test pilot was Eglin-based Air Force Captain Chris Hamilton;
 • He was wrapping up an exercise "around 8:30am" [CDT] when he got a
call from Staff Sgt. James Hicks: "a Learjet was in distress and had lost
contact with the Federal Aviation Administration;"
• "A panicked call from Jacksonville air traffic controllers, a rapid-fire fill-
up and the broad directions to inspect a Learjet 'in distress,' brought the
[pilot] to the skies over Memphis Tennessee;"
• "close to an hour later, the fighter caught up with the Lear."
5. According to the Associated Press, October 27, 1999:
• The Air Force pilot was flying his F-16 on a training mission over the Gulf
of Mexico when he was diverted to try to find out what was wrong with
the Learjet;
Staff Sgt. James Hicks was on duty as an air traffic controller at Eglin
when he received a call from the Federal Aviation Administration control
center in Jacksonville that the Learjet might be in trouble;
Hicks directed Hamilton, engaged in air-to-air combat training, to a tanker
operating over Eglin to top off his fi|!g)and give chase to the Learjet.
It took Hamilton, whose plane was unarmed, about 50 minutes to close the
100-mile lead the Learjet had..

To Be Determined.
• What was the NORAD and SEAD (Southeast Air Defense Sector) role, if any?
• Were the Oklahoma and North Dakota aircraft NORAD assets?
• Who vectored those aircraft to the Learjet?
• What were the procedures in place to respond to distressed aircraft and were they
followed?
• On 9/11 were US fighters aloft on training missions [in addition to the Langley jets
over North Carolina] and were tankers aloft that morning to support scheduled
activities?
 DoD Reaction Times
Payne Stewart Incident and American Air 11
Event Stewart AA11
Time Cumulative Time Cumulative
Last Communication 13:27 0 12:14 0
First Controller Attempt to Contact 13:33 6 12:15 1
Supervisor notified 13:38 11 12:20 6
Air Defense Sector Notified 13:55 28 12:38 24
Fighters Enroute 14:12 45 12:52 38
Fighters on Station 14:52 85 13:23 69
Key Points:
A one-hour time zone difference, if not accounted for, gives the impression that DoD
reacted faster than it actually did to the Payne Stewart incident
Therefore, all times on this chart are Coordinated Universal Time (ZULU)
FAA had a choice of vectoring a fighter on a training mission or a three-fighter air
defense scramble. It selected the single fighter to track down the Stewart aircraft.
 Payne Stewart Incident and American Air 11
Event Stewart AA11
Time Cumulative Time Cumulative
Last Communication 13:27 0 12:14 0
First Controller Attempt to
Contact 13:33 6 12:15 1
Supervisor notified 13:38 11 12:20 6
Air Defense Sector Notified 13:55 28 12:38 24
Fighters Enroute 14:12 45 12:52 38
Fighters on Station 14:52 85 13:23 69
Key Points:
A one-hour time zone difference, if not accounted for, gives the impression that DoD
reacted faster than it actually did to the Payne Stewart incident
Therefore, all times on this chart are Coordinated Universal Time (ZULU)
FAA had a choice of vectoring a fighter on a training mission or a three-fighter air
defense scramble. It selected the single fighter to track down the Stewart aircraft.

9-11 Incident Aircraft

Impact Notification
NTSB Other Rounded Flight Time Warning
8:46:40 8:46:34 8:47 AA11 8:38 9 minutes

9:02:40 9:03:08 9:03 UA175 9:03 0 minutes

9:37:45 9:37:57 9:38 AA77 9:34 4 minutes

10:03:11 10:03:10 10:03 UA93 10:06 0 minutes

NEAPS Reaction (nearest minute)

Time Activity
8:38 Boston ARTCC Watch Desk call received AA11
8:38 Cape TRACON call received AA11
8:38 Mission Crew Commander summoned to ops floor
8:39 Loudspeaker recall for Alpha Flight
8:39 ID Section initiated separate call to Boston ARTCC
8:39 Major Deskins continued call from Boston ARTCC
8:40 Lat/Long obtained from Boston ARTCC
8:40 Trackers began looking for AA11
8:41 Otis ordered to Battle Stations
 8:41 Ground Control Position for Otis established
8:45 Scramble decision made
8:45 ID Section initiated call to New York ARTCC
8:46 Scramble order issued
8:46 AA11 picked up 8 nm from impact
8:48 Updated Lat/Long obtained from New York ARTCC
9:03 Second hijack notification from FAA
9:04 UA175 is reported as the second aircraft

Terrorist Pilot Manipulation of Aircraft Transponders

Aircraft Time Action Effect Result
AA11 1220 Off Known Target Unknown Altitude (FAA) FAA tracked, not effectively communicated to NEADS
Unknown Target Unknown Location
(NEADS) NEADS picked up target, no track, just before impact

UA175 1247 Change Known Target Unknown Location (FAA) FAA lost UA175, never communicated to NEADS
FAA picked up intruder, never communicated to
1248 Change Unknown Target Known Location (FAA) NEADS

AA77 1256 Off Unknown Target Unknown Location (FAA) FAA lost AA77 and reported as possibly crashed
Unknown Target Unknown Location
(NEADS) FAA and NEADS picked up intruder in last minutes

FAA maintained continuity, Pittsburgh Tower

UA93 1341 Off Known Target Known Location (FAA) evacuated
NEADS tracked DAL1989, followed it to west and
Wrong Target Known Location (NEADS) back
Lufthansa Flight 592, Frankfurt to Cairo, hijacked to New York
May Testimony: No domestic hijacking in last decade
Lufthansa: First hijacking since 1985
First trans-Atlantic hijacking since September 1976
Multi-agency conference 2 hours and 20 minutes after FAA first notified; FBI lead, on the ground
Otis AFB Air Defense fighters are scrambled, take handoff from Canadian jets and escort plane to
JFK

Lufthansa 592 American 11

Date February 12, 1993 September 11, 2001
Goal Politcal Asylum Unknown
Type Trans-Atlantic Domestic
Hijackers 1 5
Nationality Ethiopian Saudi, Egyptian
Weapon Starter Pistol Knives, Spray
Method Pilot Hostage Crew Neutralized
Initial Reaction LE Issue Presumed LE Issue
Air Defense Otis AFB Otis AFB
Lead Pilot Duffy Duffy
Battle Cab Marr (BC) Marr (FO)
Weapons Fox (WD) Fox (SD)
ID/MCC McCain (IT) McCain (MCC/T)

Gofer 06, a Minnesota ANG C130, takes off

routinely for home, sights primary only traffic,
is vectored to follow by Washington
Approach, and is two minutes behind when it
observes the aircraft impact the Pentagon.

\n
8:33

Gofer 06, C130

:33
'Andrews AFB

Mixing Bowl 8:36

American 77, B757

Langley Scramble, a series of individual actions that don't cohere in the aggregate.

1. NEADS scrambles Langley fighters for a heading and altitude (010, FL 290) but does
not provide target data—a bearing and range. No mission, "words," is given.
2. NEADS adds a third fighter to the scramble, after battle stations has been authorized.
3. Langley Base Operations asks for "words" from NEADS and is told it has to do with
the situation in New York.
4. Langley Tower enters a standard flight plan (090 for 60) so that it can get the fighters
off the ground and at altitude as quickly as possible.
5. Langley Tower turns control over to Norfolk Approach while the fighters are taking
off and understands that someone else will head the fighters where they need to go.
6. Norfolk Approach believes the flight plan to be later information that supercedes the
scramble order.
7. The fighters take off to the east, standard air defense procedure and proceed on
runway heading (080) to 4000 altitude.
7. The lead pilot concurs that the flight plan is his second heading.
8. Norfolk Approach asks the lead pilot which direction he would like to go? The pilot
does not hear that question at the time.
9. Norfolk Approach hands off ATC to Giant Killer which is not expecting to receive the
fighters; it heard the scramble order.
10. NEADS controller recognizes his fighters are "headed for Whiskey 386.. .1 have no
idea why."
11. He is told, "call Giant Killer, no rush. There is no rush because NEADS is waiting
for the third pilot to catch up.

Net result is that no one took action or initiative to change the flight plan and the Langley
fighters proceeded into military controlled airspace over water.

AFIO (Authority for Intercept Operations)

Controllers "paired" the fighters to a "Z" point south of BWI

NEADS became aware of a target six miles from the White House and established a track
B032 on what would ultimately be identified as American Air 77.
Controllers desperately tried to gain control of the Langley fighters and took the only step
they could
NEADS declared AFIO and got the fighters headed toward Baltimore.
Controllers then paired the fighters to the new track B032 and vectored them to
Washington DC
Through either a transposition of numbers or a faulty pointer in the cockpit of the lead
pilot the fighters temporarily headed for a CAP south of Washington
 Classification//Unclassified

NORAD Summary of Payne Stewart Aircraft Incident (approximate times)

. 1400Z FAA notified SEADS of incident and requested assistance

. 1452Z Two unarmed F-15s from Eglin AFB diverted from a training mission to
intercept the Payne Stewart aircraft
. 1500Z Eglin F-15 pilots inspect Payne Stewart aircraft and report findings
. 1510Z Eglin F15s concluded inspection and proceeded to Scott AFB, Illinois
. 1600Z Tulsa Oklahoma F 16s proceed to escort Payne Stewart aircraft
. 1700Z SEADS manually plotted the Payne Stewart aircraft direction, altitude, speed,
and fuel exhaustion to be Aberdeen,SD
. 1700Z Two NODAK F-16's enroute from Fargo proceeding to join escort Payne
Stewart aircraft
. 1719Z Payne Stewart aircraft crashed
- The fighter aircraft circled the area until they were told the crash scene had been
located and their assistance was no longer needed
. 1746Z Fighter aircraft told their assistance was no longer needed, return to base

Classification/TUnclassified
NCT0070330
 WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions

SERIES: 9/11 Commission - Team 8
NND PROJECT NUMBER: 51248 FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30441

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 08/05/2008

BOX: 00006 FOLDER: 0001 TAB: 1 DOC ID: 31185883

COPIES: 1 PAGES: 13

J^^ESSRESTOCTEDJ
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

FOLDER TITLE: Miles Kara Work Files: Domestic Cases WF

DOCUMENT DATE: 10/25/1999 DOCUMENT TYPE: Chronologies

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT: Emergency Response to Off Course Aircraft

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s):

9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE
 CLASSIFICATION/UNCLASSIFIED

Incident Log Criteria: Incident 99106607

S

250CT19991400Z BURGERLE
FM JAX ARTCC (Rallon??) N47BA (LR35) departed Orlando Intl at 1309Z enroute to Dallas Love cleared to
FL390 but climbed through altitude to FL430+ no radio contact. Position presently 50 E Tallahassee. Requested
intercept by Oakgrove (SEADS) F-15'S. Mode "c" was reported to vary. ARTCC was advised to call direct.
250CT19991430Z BURGERLE
AS per Landings.com Aircraft registered to McMillen Aircraft Dover, DL
250CT19991608Z BURGERLE
TO AIRCRAFT SERVICES INTERNATIONAL (Steve Smart) 407 851-3304—Sanford, FL is home base.
Aircraft departed Sanford to Orlando International picked up two passengers: Bruce Borland and Payne Stewart.
Flight plan to go to Dallas then Houston. Total of three passengers and two Crew. Others names unknown.
250CT19991609Z BURGERLE
Aircraft Services International cont. Aircraft belongs to Sun Jet Charter Sanford, FL 407 328-8440
250CT19991612Z BURGERLE
FM SEADS (COL CORBETT) DSN 523-5781 2345. Aircraft is at FL 470, departed with four hours fuel,
presently over S. Dakota.
250CT19991612Z BURGERLE
FM SEADS (COL CORBETT DSN 523 -5781 2345) aircraft is over S. Dakota-departed with 4 hours of fuel, FL
470
250CT19991631Z BURGERLE
TO MSP ARTCC (CX) N47BA is 60-70 SE of Sioux City heading NW at FL 48.3 with two F-16's (Tulsa 12
and Tulsa 13 following).
25OCT19991632Z EVANSJL
TO ACC PA(SMSgt SIMS) BRF HER ON THE SITUATION. STATED THAT WE SHOULD BE GETTING
INCREASED MEDIA INTEREST DUE TO THE FACT THAT PAYNE STEWART IS ON BOARD. THE
LAST COORDS THAT WE HAVE PUT THE ACFT JUST EAST OF MEMPHIS, TN AT FLT LEVEL 430.
WILL KEEP HER POSTED.

25OCT19991638Z EVANSJL
TO ACC/XO(LTC WEIGAND) BRF THE SITUATION AT HAND. STATED THAT THE LATEST INFO HAS
THE ACFT 60-70 SE OF SOUIX CITY, IA AT FLT LVL 483 WITH TWO F-16s MONITORING THE
SITUATION. PASSED THAT WE ARE MOST LIKELY LOOKING AT A SEARCH FOR A DOWNED ACFT
DUE TO THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO MOVEMENT ON BOARD THAT ACFT.

250CT19991640Z BURGERLE

21OCT2003 1657Z Page 1 of 3

CLASSIFICATIONS/UNCLASSIFIED
 CLASSIFICATION//UNCL ASSIFIED

Incident Log Criteria: Incident 99106607

FM Western ADS McChord AFB (Sgt King) DSN 984-4311 Two NODAK F-16's enroute from Fargo
proceeding to join up. Estimated location of fuel exhaustion 43 45 00/1000000 or Aberdeen VOR 208/124.
25OCT19991652Z BURGERLE
TO SD DEM 605 773-3231 (John Burheim) SD is already aware of the situation. Passed estimated location of fuel
exhaustion.
250CT19991708Z BURGERLE
TO Western ADS ( Sgt King) Question concerning point of fuel exhaustion computation. All wx, fuel, alt, etc
were computed by FAA and AF pesonnel. The Aircraft operator was determined to be Sun Jet and a Mr. Bob
Wilcox was contacted at Ph # 407 328-8440 and was already aware.
25OCT19991714Z FULLINLD
FM TRENTON RCC (CAPT HOEY) WANTED TO KNOW IF WE HAVE AN ANTICIPATED TOUCH DOWN
AREA FOR THE ACFT AND OFFERED THEIR ASSISTANCE IF WE NEED IT. I TOLD HIM WE WOULD
GIVE HIM WHEN THE ACFT GOES DOWN.
250CT19991715Z LARTZRH
FM: WADS(MSGT KING)BRIEFED THEY ARE SHOWING THE ACFT IN A SPIRAL COMING THRU THE
CLOUDS. THIS PUTS THE ACFT 12 MI SE OF ABERDEEN SD. COOR: 45-20.26N 098-53.56W. WILL
KEEP US UPDATED.
k, ••• - • —

25OCT19991717Z FULLINLD
TO TRENTON RCC (CAPT HOEY) LET HIM KNOW THE ACFT IS SPIRALING DOWN THROUGH THE
CLOUDS AND SHOULDN'T MAKE IT INTO THEIR AIRSPACE.
25OCT19991719Z LARTZRH
FM: WADS(MSGT KING)BRIEFED THEY HAVE LOST RADAR WITH THE ACFT AND THE F-16'S ARE
CHECKING FOR A POSSIBLE CRASH. COOR'S NOW ARE: 45-20N 098-51W.

TO: MSP CTR...THEY HAVE THE SAME INFO AND ARE NOT IN CONTACT WITH THE F-16'S BUT THE
WADS IS.

25OCT19991727Z KHANRH
FROM: WADS (SGT KING) SAID HE BELIEVES ACFT HAS IMPACTED THE GROUND, HE SAID TWO
FARMERS AND SOME HELICOPTERS WERE ON SCENE HAS NO OTHER INFO.
25OCT19991729Z LARTZRH
TO: WADS(MSGT KING)BRIEFED NO CONTACT WITH THE ACFT AND THIS IS THE LKP THEY HAVE
AFTER RADAR LOST ACFT. COOR: 44-54N 098-26W ....NOTHING FURTHER AT THIS TIME.
25OCT19991732Z FULLINLD

21OCT2003 1657Z Page 2 of 3

CLASSIFICATION/UNCLASSIFIED
vr/-im n n *7 r\ *> o
v CLASSIFICATION/UNCLASSIFIED
Incident Log Criteria: Incident 99106607
V
TO SD DEM(RICHARD SMITH) BRF THAT THE ACFT HAS CRASHED NEAR ABERDEEN, SD. THEY
ARE AWARE OF IT AND THE HIGHWAY PATROL IS ON THE WAY. THEY WILL KEEP US AWARE
AND WE WILL.

25OCT19991733Z KHANRH
FROM: TRENTON RCC (CAPT HOEY) SAID HE HAD SAR ASSETS AVAILABLE IF WE NEEDED THEM,
TOLD HIM IT WAS NOT NECESSARY AS THE ACFT IS ALREADY DOWN, THANKED HIM FOR HIS
HELP.

25OCT19991739Z LARTZRH
FM: WADS(SSGT AIKEN)BRIEFED THEY GOT A POSSIBLE CRASH SITE FROM THE F-16'S THE
POSSIBLE SITE WAS LOCATED ATI 714Z. COOR: 45-24N 098-44W.
25OCT19991746Z KHANRH
TO: SD DEM (??) SAID NAME OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS NAME IS RICHARD SMITH CAN BE
REACHED AT SAME NUMBER.
250CT19991750Z LARTZRH
FM: WADS(MSGT KING)BRIEFED THERE ARE MULTIPLE CARS AND A HELO ON SCENE. ALSO THE
16'S ARE RETURNING TO BASE.
S25OCT19991820Z FULLINLD
FM SD DEM (RICHARD SMITH 605-773-3231) WANTED TO LET US KNOW THAT THERE WERE NO
SURVIVORS FM THE ACFT BUT IT DOESN'T APPEAR THAT ANYONE ELSE WAS INJURED WHEN
THE ACFT WENT DOWN. ACFT IMPACTED ABOUT 1720Z IN A FIELD BETWEEN MINA AND
WETONKA, SD (ABOUT 16 W ABERDEEN). THE HWY PATROL AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IS
ON SCENE WITH THE GOVERNOR AND A REPRESENTATIVE FM SD DEM EN ROUTE AND HE
WANTED TO LET US KNOW THAT INQUIRIES HAVE BEEN COMING DOWN FM THE WHITE HOUSE.
THANKED HIM FOR HIS HELP.

21OCT2003 1657Z Page 3 of 3

CLASSIFICATION/UNCLASSIFIED
T/irnn n i r\ t a
Aircraft Accident Brief [PDF version]
Presentations from Boardmeeting

Accident No.: DCAOOMA005

Operator or Flight Number: Sunjet Aviation
Aircraft and Registration: Learjet Model 35, N47BA
Location: Aberdeen, South Dakota
Date: October 25, 1999

SUMMARY

On October 25, 1999, about 1213 central daylight time (CDT), a Learjet Model 35, N47BA, operated by
Sunjet
Aviation, Inc., of Sanford, Florida, crashed near Aberdeen, South Dakota. The airplane departed Orlando,
Florida, for
Dallas, Texas, about 0920 eastern daylight time (EOT). Radio contact with the flight was lost north of
Gainesville, Florida,
after air traffic control (ATC) cleared the airplane to flight level (FL) 390. The airplane was intercepted by
several U.S.
Air Force (USAF) and Air National Guard (ANG) aircraft as it proceeded north westbound. The military
pilots in a
position to observe the accident airplane at close range stated (in interviews or via radio transmissions) that
the forward
windshields of the Learjet seemed to be frosted or covered with condensation. The military pilots could not
see into the
cabin. They did not observe any structural anomaly or other unusual condition. The military pilots observed
the airplane
depart controlled flight and spiral to the ground, impacting an open field. All occupants on board the
airplane (the captain,
first officer, and four passengers) were killed, and the airplane was destroyed.

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On October 25, 1999, the flight crew was scheduled to begin a 2-day trip sequence consisting of five
flights. The flights on
the first day were to be from Orlando Sanford International Airport (SFB), Sanford, Florida, to Orlando
International
Airport (MCO), Orlando, Florida; from MCO to Dallas-Love Field Airport (DAL), Dallas, Texas; and from
DAL to
William P. Hobby Airport, Houston, Texas.

The first flight of the day, a visual flight rules positioning flight operating under 14 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR)
Part 91, was scheduled to depart SFB about 0800 EDT bound for MCO, which is approximately 15 nautical
miles (nm)
away. According to the Sunjet Aviation customer service representative on duty at SFB on the day of the
accident, the
captain reported for duty at SFB about 0630 EDT, and the first officer arrived about 0645 EDT. She stated
that both
pilots were in a good mood and appeared to be in good health.

A Sunjet Aviation line service technician stated that the captain asked him to pull the airplane out of the
hangar, fuel it to
5,300 pounds fuel weight, connect a ground power unit to the airplane, and put a snack basket and coolerl
on the
airplane. The first officer arrived at the airplane just before the fueling process started and stayed in the
cockpit while the
airplane was being fueled. The first officer then went inside the terminal building while the captain
performed the preflight
inspection of the airplane.

About 0725 EDT, an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed with the St. Petersburg Automated Flight
Service Station
for the second flight of the day, MCO to DAL, which would operate under 14 CFR Part 135. The flight
plan indicated
that N47BA was scheduled to depart MCO about 0900 EDT; follow a route over Cross City, Florida, to 32
degrees, 51
minutes north and 96 degrees, 51 minutes west; and proceed directly to DAL. The requested altitude was
39,000 feet.2
The flight plan also indicated that there would be five persons on board (two pilots and three passengers)
and 4 hours and
45 minutes of fuel.

According to a witness, the accident airplane departed SFB about 0754 EDT. The flight arrived at MCO
about 0810
EDT. An Aircraft Service International Group employee at MCO stated that after the airplane arrived, the
captain told him
that they were picking up passengers and did not require additional fuel. According to this witness, the
passengers arrived
about 30 minutes later and boarded the airplane. The Sunjet Aviation director of operations indicated that
an additional
passenger who was not on the original charter flight request boarded the accident airplane at MCO. Several
bags were
placed on board the airplane, including what the Aircraft Service International Group employee described
as a big golf bag
weighing about 30 pounds.

According to ATC radio transmissions, the flight departed MCO about 0919 EDT bound for DAL. At
0921:46 EDT, the
flight contacted the Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and reported climbing through
an altitude of
9,500 feet to 14,000 feet.3

At 0921:51 EDT, the controller instructed N47BA to climb and maintain FL 260. N47BA acknowledged
the clearance
by stating, "two six zero bravo alpha." At 0923:16 EDT, the controller cleared N47BA direct to Cross City
and then
direct to DAL. N47BA acknowledged the clearance. At 0926:48 EDT, N47BA was issued instructions to
change radio
frequency and contact another Jacksonville ARTCC controller. N47BA acknowledged the frequency
change.

At 0927:10 EDT, N47BA called the Jacksonville ARTCC controller and stated that the flight was climbing
through an
altitude of FL 230. At 0927:13 EDT, the controller instructed N47BA to climb and maintain FL 390. At
0927:18 EDT,
N47BA acknowledged the clearance by stating, "three nine zero bravo alpha." This was the last known
radio transmission
from the airplane.4 The sound of the cabin altitude aural warnings was not heard on the ATC recording of
this
transmission.6
At 0933:38 EOT (6 minutes and 20 seconds after N47BA acknowledged the previous clearance), the
controller
instructed N47BA to change radio frequencies and contact another Jacksonville ARTCC controller. The
controller
received no response from N47BA. The controller called the flight five more times over the next 4 1/2
minutes but
received no response.

"^bouTo952 CIJK? a USAF F-16 test pilot from the 40th Flight Test Squadron at Eglin Air Force Base
'^
was vectored to within 8 nm of N47BA.8 About 0954 CDT, at a range of 2,000 feet from the accident
airplane and an
altitude of about 46,400 feet,9 the test pilot made two radio calls to N47B A but did not receive a response.
About 1000
CDT, the test pilot began a visual inspection of N47B A. There was no visible damage to the airplane, and
he did not see
ice accumulation on the exterior of the airplane. Both engines were running, and the rotating beacon was
on. He stated that
he could not see inside the passenger section of the airplane because the windows seemed to be dark.
Further, he stated
that the entire right cockpit windshield was opaque, as if condensation or ice covered the inside. He also
indicated that the
left cockpit windshield was opaque, although several sections of the center of the windshield seemed to be
only thinly
covered by condensation or ice; a small rectangular section of the windshield was clear, with only a small
section of the
glare shield visible through this area. He did not see any flight control movement. About 1012 CDT, he
concluded his
inspection of N47BA and proceeded to Scott AFB, Illinois.

About 1113 CDT, two Oklahoma ANG F-16s with the identification "TULSA 13 flight" were vectored to
intercept the
accident airplane by the Minneapolis ARTCC. The TULSA 1 3 lead pilot reported to the Minneapolis
ARTCC controller
that he could not see any movement in the cockpit. About 1 125 CDT, the TULSA 13 lead pilot reported
that the
windshield was dark and that he could not tell if the windshield was iced.

About 1 133 CDT, a TULSA 13 airplane maneuvered in front of the accident airplane, and the pilot
reported, "we're not
seeing anything inside, could be just a dark cockpit though. ..he is not reacting, moving or anything like that
he should be
able to have seen us by now."

About 1 138 CDT, the TULSA 13 lead pilot stated, "my wingman is going to make a final pass and then we
are going to
head back to the [midair refueling] tanker." The TULSA 13 wingman reported, "we did not get close
enough to see any
icing on the window due to our configuration... we did get up behind him but did not see anything." About
11 39 CDT,
TULSA 13 flight departed for the tanker.

About 1 150 CDT, two North Dakota ANG F-16s with the identification "NODAK 32 flight" were vectored
to intercept
 Facility Position Time
St. Petersburg AFSS PG06 1117-1131 UTC
Sanford ATCT GC 1142-1158 UTC
LC 1148-1202 UTC
Orlando ATCT STN 1151-1210 UTC
LCI 1156-1219 UTC
DRW 1146-1218 UTC
GC1 1202-1217 UTC
Orlando ATCT CD 1211-1322 UTC
LCI 1304-1326 UTC
GC1 1305-1320 UTC
Orlando ATCT DRW 1304-1343 UTC
Jacksonville ARTCC R53 1210-1224 UTC
R68 1213-1234 UTC
R66 1224-1247 UTC
Jacksonville ARTCC R15 1316-1332 UTC
R16 1322-1345 UTC
Jacksonville ARTCC R34 1336-1405 UTC
R17 FPY 1332-1403 UTC
Jacksonville ARTCC Rll 1355-1429 UTC
Atlanta ARTCC R28 (1A-51) 1236-1251 UTC
R15 (4A-51) 1250-1309 UTC
R15 (4A-51) 2139-2201 UTC
R28 (4A-51) 2139-2201 UTC
R28 (1A-51) 2200-2220 UTC
Atlanta ARTCC R08 (3B-19) 1352-1435 UTC
DOS (3B-17) 1409-1439 UTC
Atlanta ARTCC R02(5A-17) 1409-1449 UTC
D02 (5A-15) 1427-1449 UTC
Memphis ARTCC D30 1430-1458 UTC
R23 1451-1514 UTC
Memphis ARTCC R31 1431-1458 UTC
R30 1427-1501 UTC
Memphis ARTCC R24 1503-1525 UTC
D24 1501-1523 UTC
R25 1508-1525 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC R29 1501-1545 UTC
D29 1501-1545 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC OZ Supervisor 1505-1540 UTC
TR Supervisor 1533-1540 UTC
TR Supervisor 1541-1603 UTC
TMU 1509-1529 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC ORD TMU 1507-1522 UTC
 ORDTMU 1552-1556 UTC
TMC 1446-1520 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC TMC 1514-1556 UTC
TMC 1557-1619 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC R67 1519-1601 UTC
R67 1602-1626 UTC
D67 1550-1607 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC R48 1522-1550 UTC
R48 1551-1619 UTC

Kansas City ARTCC R72 1529-1548 UTC

R26 1532-1540 UTC
R26 1541-1622 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC TMU 1530-1613 UTC
TMU 1614-1630 UTC
TMU 1518-1544 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC D26 1532-1615 UTC
R42 1547-1604 UTC
D42 1549-1605 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC R92 1534-1617 UTC
D92 1534-1617 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC R30 1541-1606 UTC
D30 1541-1606 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC TMU 1545-1626 UTC
TMU Meter 1446-1502 UTC
TMU Meter 1514-1525 UTC
Kansas City ARTCC R41 1557-1620 UTC
TIMELINE Lear Jet N47BA from Sanford (SFB) to Orlando (MCO) 10-25-1999 UTC.

N47BA
CALLS
SANFORD
GROUND SANFORD
CONTROL TOWER
FOR IFR SANFORD INSTRUCTS
CLEARANCE GROUND SANFORD N47BA TO
FROM CONTROL TOWER CONTACT
SANFORD (SFB) ISSUES CLEARS ORLANDO
TO TAXI N47BAFOR APPROACH
ORLANDO (MCO) INSTRUCTIONS TAKEOFF CONTROL
I | | I
11:47:347 11:48:23Z 11:53:44Z 11:56:10Z
 Memorandum
U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

subject: INFORMATION: St. Petersburg Timeline with N47BA (Payne Stewarts AircraffjDate: 2/10 704

Reply to
From: Acting Air Traffic Manager, PIE AFSS Ann of: G. Blair

TO: John W. Stewart, Jr, Manager ASO-505

This document was prepared using all the available information we have on the accident
involving N47BA on October 25, 1999.

(All Times Universal Coordinated Time)

1122 - The pilot of N47BA called St. Petersburg AFSS P r e f l i g h t position #6 by telephone
and requested a weather briefing from Orlando, FL to Dallas. TX and filed two flight plans,
one from Sanford, FL (SFB) to Orlando, r'L (MCO) and another one from Orlando. FL
(MCO) to Dallas. TX (DAL). The weather briefing was given and flight plans filed.

1555 - St. Petersburg AFSS received an ALNOT (Alert Notice) from ZJX (Jacksonville
Center), regarding N47BA and responded accordingly.

1740 - St Petersburg AFSS received a cancelation of the ALNOT (Alert Notice).

Shane Goldman
 MCO ATCT
N47BA Accident Timeline

Time (UTC) Event

J

1238 N47BA is issued a clearance to Love Fieid, TX

1312 N47BA requests taxi instructions and is cleared to taxi
to Runway 36 Left
1318 N47BA is cleared for takeoff
1319 N478A'is climbed to 14,000 feet of altitude
1321 N47BA is switched to Jacksonville ARTCC
1430 Received a call from NOxAD indicating ZJX hac lost
communications with N47BA
1718 Received a call from ZJX indicatinq N476A had crashed
 Virginia Anthony To: Jeffery Myers/AWA/FAA@FAA
cc: Irving EWashington/ASO/FAA@FAA, Charles Oxibrd/ASO/FAA@FAA,
02/17/2004 12:00 I M U n d a j V Vhite/AGL/FAA@FAA, Melonic T Gacta/ASO/FAA@FAA, Paula
Bordignon/ASO/FAA@FAA
Subject: ZTL Timeline / N47BA

The following information pertaining to the accident to N47BA on October 25, 1999, is provided as a "timeline"
from Atlanta ARTCC (ZTL), as requested by ASO505 on February 17, 2004.

October 25, 1999

ALL TIMES BELOW ARE COORDINATED UNIVERSAL TIME (UTC)

1357 Jacksonville ARTCC (ZJX) called ZTL R08 to forward information pertaining to the status of N47BA (no
radio contact, continued climbing, had remained on present heading;) ZJX advised that he put an entry into the
machine for flight tracking purposes because the flight plan route did not enter ZTL airspace.

1401 ZJX advised R08 that F-16's using the call sign BULITl had been launched to intercept N47BA.

1407 R08 transmitted in the blind attempting to reach N47BA; no response was received.

1415 R08 issued traffic to N3PC and moved him out of the projected flight path of N47BA. R08 then asked
N3PC to report traffic in sight.

1418 N3PC reported traffic in sight and stated that the aircraft was above FL390.

1421 ZJX forwarded flight plan information on BULITl to DOS.

1425 BULITl reported on ZTL Sector 08 frequency. R08 issued a heading and altitude for intercept to BULITL

1428 ROS transferred communications with BULITl to ZTL Secor 02 frequency.

1432 D02 forwarded information pertaining to N47BA and flight plan of BULITl to ZME Caledonia Sector. ZME
advised D02 to put BULITl on ZME Muscle Shoals Sector frequency.

1433 BULITl reported on ZTL Sector 02 frequency. R02 issued position, ground speed and altitude information
pertaining to N47BA.

1436 D02 forwarded flight plan information pertaining to BULITl to ZME Muscle Shoals Sector.

1438 R02 issued position information to BULITl pertaining to N47BA.

1443 R02 transferred communications with BULITl to ZME frequency, 387.1.

ZMP-ARTCC-232
N47BA

1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT NO.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ZMP-ARTCC-232
November 16, 1999
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
3. NAME OF REPORTING FACILITY
REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
Memphis (ZME) ARTCC
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT

October 25, 1999

ALL TIMES BELOW ARE COORDINATED UNIVERSAL TIME

UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED

1432 - Memphis Center's Caledonia High Altitude Radar Sector (R30) accepted a radar handoff on N47BA from Atlanta
ARTC Center.

1439 - R30 accepted a radar handoff on BULIT1, from Atlanta ARTC Center.

1452 - BULIT1 reports visual with N47BA.

1501 - BULIT1 reports cockpit windows frosted or condensed over and couldn't see inside.

1505 - BULIT1 is descended to Flight Level 350.

1513 - BULIT1 is cleared direct to Scott Air Force Base. Memphis ARTC Center's Blytheville High Altitude Radar
Sector (R25) transmits on guard frequencies for N47BA to go to one hundred percent oxygen.

1516 - Kansas City ARTC Center accepts a radar handoff on N47BA.

NO MORE FOLLOWS

FAA Form 8020-6-1 PAGE 1 of 1 PAGES

 ZMP-ARTCC-232
N47BA

Synopsis of situation involving N47BA over flying MEMPHIS ARTCC on October 25, 1999.

R30

1439:23 r30 called and advised atlanta center to put bulitl on

Caledonia's freqqency

1439:50 r30 called bulitl, no reply.

1439:52 r30 called atlanta center and advised he was not talking with bulitl

1442:55 ztl advised they still had the bulit

1443:52 bulitl bulitl checked on r30:s frequency at 11440

1443:58 r30 asked bulitl if he had n47ba on radar

1444:00 bulitl advised r30 he had a radar contact 28 miles off his nose heading
330

1444:05 r30 confirmed that was n47ba and advised bulitl the beacon code was
3245

*~^ 1444:11 bulitl advised he was not I-f-f equipped

1444:21 r30 advised bulitl an his present speed he would overtake n47ba in 5
minutes and the aircraft's mode c indicated fort}- five thousand
three hundred

1446:50 r30 asked bulitl if he needed any thing from memphis center

1446:53 bulitl replied negative

1451:08 r30 asked bulitl if ne had visual

1451:11 bulitl replied not yet, he was 1 0 miles in trail and needed the last
assigned frequency and call sign

1451:17 r30 advised bulitl the call sign was n47ba and standby for frequency

1452:06 r30 advised bulitl the frequency was. 126.82

1452:12 bulitl acknowledged and reported he had visual

1452:17 r30 advised the aircraft's altitude indicated forty five thousand two
hundred
/*"v
ZMP-A.RTCC-232
N47BA

1455:03 r30 asked bulitl if he had any contact

1455:05 bulitl replied negative

1455:09 r3 0 switched bulit 1 to r23

1455:17 bulitl replied standby

1455:48 bulitl asked r23 to say the frequency again

1455:50 r30 replied frequency 317.65 v-h-f 118.62

R23

1456:23 bulitl checked on r23's frequency in block altitude 330-450

1456:28 bulitl advised he had negative contact with n47ba

1456:34 r23 acknowledged

1456:39 bulitl requested block altitude 400-450

1456:42 r23 approved the altitude block

1457:49-1459:04 relief briefing

1501:26 bulitl advised r23 n47ba's cockpit windows were frosted over or
condensed over and he could not see in the aircraft

1501:36 r23 acknowledged

1503:10 bulitl advised r23 there was no response from n47ba and both sides of
the cockpit was frosted over

1503:33 r23 acknowledged

Ii03:35 bulitl asked memphis center to say his request

1503:39 r23 advised bulitl he had to talk with the supervisor.

1503:55 r23 advised bulitl to stay with him

1504:36 r23 asked bulitl if all the windows were frosted or condensed over, no
reply
 ZMP-A^TCC-232
N47BA

1504:58 r23 asked bulitl if he was able to check all the windows

1505:01 bulitl advised that both sides of the cockpit was frosted or condensed
over but the passenger windows were clear

1505:08 r23 asked if he could see inside the passenger windows

1505:10 bulitl replied negative

1507:08 r23 advised r24' of the situation with n47ba and b u l i t l

1507:12 r24 advised r23 he was aware of the situation

1507:33 r23 advised bulitl another chase aircraft was being coordinated and
asked how much fuel he had on board

1507:41 bulitl advised he had an hour's fuel before he had to divert

1507:45 r23 asked if he wanted to go to little rock or scott to get fuel

1507:55 bulitl asked how long before next aircraft would be on station

^ 1508:00 r23 advised he did not know and switched bulitl to r24

R24

1508:36 bulitl called r24 in block altitude 350-450

1508:42 r24 acknowledged

1513:10 r24 advised bulit 1 he was to land at scott to refuel

1513:19 bulitl acknowledged

1513:20 r24 cleared bulitl direct to scott at f!350

1513:26 bulitl acknowledged the clearance

1514:33 r24 descended bulitl to f!310

1514:36 bulitl acknowledged the clearance

1514:49 r24 switched bulitl to r25

/*•v
•ZMP-ARTCC-232
N473A

R25

1514:52 r25 made a transmission on guard for n47ba to go to one hundred

per cent oxygen, no reply

1515:33 bulitl called r25 at f!310 direct to scott. r25 acknowledged

1517:06 r24 transmitted to n47ba if he heard memphis center to acknowledge

with ident, no reply

1517:30 r25 asked bulitl if every thing was intact or did look like the aircraft
was damaged

1517:39 bulitl advised there was no damage that he could see

1517:45 r25 acknowledged the transmission

1518:00 r24 transmitted to n47ba if he heard memphis to contact kansas city

center on 132.65 acknowledge with ident. no reply

1519:02 r24 called n47ba, no reply

1519:03 r25 switched bulitl to kansas city center

1519:15 bulitl acknowledged

 REPORT DATE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REPORT NO.
December 2, 1999 ZMP-ARTCC-232
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
NAME OF REPORTING FACILITY
REPORT OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT Kansas City (ZKC) ARTCC
(Continuation Sheet)
14. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF FLIGHT (Including control or other services provided by A TS facilities, and emergency action taken.)

October 25, 1999

ALL TIMES BELOW ARE COORDINATED UNIVERSAL TIME

UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED

1451 - Kansas City ARTCC (ZKC) was notified via a national telecon, that Air Traffic Control (ATC) had
lost radio communications with N47BA on a flight from MCO to DAL. ZKC was informed that the
aircraft had been flying on an approximate heading of 330 degrees and was in a gradual climb.

1523 - N47BA entered ZKC airspace on an approximate heading of 330 degrees. N47BA's altitude
readout was fluctuating between FL462 and FL469.

ZKC utilized several chase aircraft and coordinated with numerous facilities during the course of
N47BA's flight though ZKC airspace. These chase aircraft were refueled by several available tanker
aircraft that were on maneuvers within the ZKC airspace. TULSA13, an F16, was able to join up with
N47BA, but not prior to leaving the ZKC airspace.

1607 - N47BA departed ZKC airspace on an approximate heading of 330 degrees. N47BA's altitude
readout was fluctuating between FL475 and FL479.

No More Follows

FAA Fomi 8020-6-1 (7-70) Fornierty FAA Fom 2452.1 PAGE 1 of 1 PAGES
 Aircraft Accident
N47BA 10/25/99
Mina, SD
(Payne Stewart)

SUBJECT: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States

BACKGROUND: Information Requested February 9, 2004, by AAT-200

NARRATIVE: Timeline of Events

CURRENT STATUS: Open Investigation Surrounding the Events of September 11, 2001

,. PREPARED BY: Richard Sweeney, Quality Assurance Specialist

Kansas City Center. Quality Assurance Staff
913-254-8430, February 13, 2004

|EVENT]
Notified by Memphis Center that N47BA, LJ35/I, MCO..DAL, was
proceeding on a northwesterly heading and unable to communicate with
aircraft. Pilot appears to be unconscious.

1524 N47BA entered Kansas City Centers airspace proceeding on a northwesterly

heading. There has been no contact with the flight crew. There are 5
individuals on board with one notable person. Kansas City Center Air Traffic
Manager and Assistant Air Traffic Manager were notified.

1525 United States Air Force and ADC were briefed on the situation concerning
N47BA. Kansas City Center was seeking assistance from the United States
Air Force for intercept aircraft and tanker support. The probably route of
flight, was plotted and passed.

1540 ADC advised Kansas City Center intercept aircraft for N47BA are launching
from Whiteman Air Force Base, Lincoln, "Nebraska, Omaha. Nebraska and
Fargo, North Dakota.

1608 N47BA exited Kansas City Center delegated airspace 20 nautical miles
north/northeast of St. Joseph, Missouri (STJ030020). Altitude of N47BA is
indicating 47.800 feet. There was no contact with the flight crew. Datablock
on N47BA was transferred to Minneapolis Center. Kansas City Center Air
Traffic Manager and Assistant Air Traffic Manager were notified.
 BRIEFING SHEET

Subject: Aircraft Accident N47BA - ZMP ARTCC-232

Background: Information requested by National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Narrative: Master timeline of events (This information was obtained from the data that I am supplying to
you.)

Prepared by: Robert R. Ethier, ZMP ARTCC Resource Management Manager, at 651-463-5996.

Date: February 13, 2004

Time (TJTC1 Event

1600 Approximate time that N47BA entered Minneapolis ARTCC airspace at FL475,
approximately 10 miles southeast of LMN. 2 - F16 military aircraft ( Tulsa Air
National Guard) shadowed the aircraft. The aircraft progressed through 5
sectors in Minneapolis ARTCC airspace and climbed to FL488 on an
approximate 327 heading and at a ground speed of 330 knots.

1613 Approximate time that communications began between ZMP R28 and
TULSA13/14. The military aircraft advised no movement in the cockpit.

1706 Approximate time that communications began between ZMP R20 and
TULSA13/14.

1707 Approximate time North Dakota Air National Guard joined in the escort.

1711 N47BA entered a descent 15 NW of Aberdeen.

1712 Radar contact was lost with N47BA

1714 Approximate time communications ended between ZMP R28 and TULSA
13/14.

1717 N47BA impacts ground approximately 452304N 098483W

1723 Military aircraft (NODAK) confirms N47BA down at 4525N 9845W

1821 Temporary Flight Restriction issued Aberdeen 260 radial 018-mile fix at or
below 10,000 UFA.
 Pa9eN°- 1of2
U.S. Department of Transportation Daily Record of Facility Operation Date
10/25/1999
Federal Aviation Administration
^•Kocation Identification Type Facility lOperating Position Checked By

Milliard, FL ZJX ARTCC WMIC Air Traffic Manager

Miles R. Miller jjfy

Time care; REMARKS

0400 WILLIAM J ENGLISH (YY) ON CFPL GNV VORTAC OTS. SAV TACAN AZIMUTH OTS. MOBIL ATIS , .
BLEEDOVER ON 124.77. MLB LRR PRI/WXO/S. . /MY<
0401 TRAFFIC COUNT FOR 10/24/99 TOTAL 5693, VFR 311. <**
0424 WCLC. --~T_
E 0430 ZJX DARC/DARC FOR BASELINE TESTING.
0510 SECURITY CHECK COMPLETE.
E 0805 BEGIN NAS ONLINE CERTIFICATION.
E 0844 CERTIFICATION COMPLETE, NAS OPERATIONAL.
1015 MARVIN J. LEININGER (ML) ON
1033 WCLC
E 1055 R73 132.5 MAIN/TX.RVR OTS.
E 1323 MLB LRR RTN TO SVC
1338 ADVISED BY COSIC MOTIN, OF ALTITUDE DEVIATION BY N47BA, LR35 MCO - DAL. A/C
ASSIGNED FL390, OBSERVED ON MODE C , AT FL412 IN A CONTINUOUS SLOW RATE OF C
A/C IS ALSO NORDO
1340 NOTIFIED ASO CCC (LOWERY) AND ASO 505 (ALEXANDER), RCC LANGLEY (SGT. BERGER)
REGARDING N47BA.
1343 ATC DECLARES EMERG. N47BA BASED ON ERRATIC FLIGHT PROFILE AND NO COMM WITH A/C.
1355 CONTACTED SEAD (OAKGROVE) TO EXPLORE POSS. OF AIRBORNE F15 OR F16 A/C IN W470 OR
W151 DIVERTING TO INTERCEPT N47BA AND MAKE VISUAL OBSERVATION OF A/C. OAKGROVE
WILL DIVERT BULIT1, 2F16'S FROM W151.
1409 ISSUED ALNOT N47BA
1410 CONTACTED N47BA OPERATOR, SUN JET AVIATION, SANFORD, FLA.. DETERMINED THAT
THERE IS NO FLIGHT PHONE ABOARD N47B. SUN JET PROVIDED ZJX WITH CELL PHONE
NUMBERS OF PILOT AND 2ND OFFICER. ZJX ATTEMPTED CONTACT ON ALL CELL PHONE
NUMBERS TO NO AVAIL.
1412 N47BA TRAVERSED INTO ZTL AIRSPACE. ALL COORD. WITH ZTL COMPLETE.
1415 ZJX CONTINING TO PARTICIPATE IN TELECON WITH ARTCC'S ALONG ROUTE OF FLIGHT, GATES
LEAR CORP., NTSB, PUBLIC AFFAIRS. _„ ,,„,„,,.,« ,.,« «—
1428 ZTL ADVISED BULIT1 INTERCEPTED N47BA. ZTL/ZME/ASOCCC HANDLING INCIDENT.
E 1445 327.1 JAX SITE OTS.
E 1500 327.1 JAX SITE RTS.
1515 AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY - KONG13/F15/EFD-VPS DAMAGE TO VERTICAL STABILIZER. LANDED
VPS SAFELY AT 1529Z. ASOCCC NOTIFIED. 8020-30 TO 505.
E 1525 132.5 MAIN TX/RCVR RTS.
1712 TELCON PARTICIPANTS ADVISED THAT N47BA DOWN 12 NW ABR.
1740
1800 CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, N47BA, AND ASSOCIATED NOTES FORWARDED TO
ZJX-505.
1830 GENE WYGAL (IV) ON DUTY
E 1849 QRJ LRR RTS.

/ CER ihat entries above are correct; that all scheduled operations have been accomplished, except as noted, and that
all abn occurrences and conditions have been recorded.
Watcbfsiiert i*br/s) Signature Watch Supervisor(s) Signature Watch Supervisor(s) Signature

FAA Form 7230-4 (1-94) Supersedes Previous Edition Produced by ATX-400, MSDT, Washington D.C. - Dash 4.EXE
 Page No.
Daily Record of Facility Operation (Continued) 2 of 2
REMARKS

R78 VDM FAILED. NOM ADVISED.

2039 R78 VDM RTS.
E 2050 VSCS DB-ALT PERFORMED ZJX CDB056 ON-LINE...DSR WORK
2053 WCLC
0230 CHUBBY T. MOTIN (JT) ON.
0359 COB.

FAA Form 7230-4 (1-94) Produced by ATX-400, MSDT, Washington D.C. - Dash 4.EXE
 Page No.
Of1
o. Department of Transportation Daily Record of Facility Operation Date
r'ederal Aviation Administration 10/25/1999
'Cation Identification Type Facility Operating Position Checked By

r-iilliard, FL ZJX ARTCC COSIC Air Traffic Manager

Miles R. Miller

Time (UTC) REMARKS

0400 COMBINED ON WMIC.

1000 CHUBBY T. MOTIN (JT) ON.
1025 SCHEDULE REQUESTS REVIEWED AND ACTED UPON.
1035 WCLC.
1407 SHARON V. HYZER (OP) ON
1532 CHUBBY T. MOTIN (JT) ON.
1620 SHARON V. HYZER (OP) ON
1710 CHUBBY T. MOTIN (JT) ON
1755 SHARON V. HYZER (OP) ON
1830 FREDERICK SCOTT (FE)ONCIC
1840 SHARON V. HYZER (OP) ON
2040 MARIO BOSQUE (MA) ON.
0134 WCLC.
0134 SCHEDULE REQUESTS REVIEWED AND ACTED UPON.
0230 COMBINED ON WMIC

/ CERTIFY that entries above are correct; that all scheduled operations have been accomplished, except as noted, and that
all abnormal occurrences and conditions have been recorded.
Watch Supervisor(s) Signature Watch Supervisor(s) Signature Watch Supervisor(s) Signature

FAA Form 7230-4 (1-94) Supersedes Previous Edition Produced by ATX-4QO, MSDT, Washington D.C. - Dash 4.EXE
 Page No.
1 Of 1

j.S. Department of Transportation Daily Record of Facility Operation Date

Federal Aviation Administration 10/25/1999
Location Identification Type Facility Operating Position Checked By

Hilliard, FL ZJX ARTCC WOSIC Air Traffic Manager

Miles R. Miller

Time (UTC) REMARKS

0400 COMBINED ON WMIC, WCLC. CFPL: MOBILE ATTIS INTERFER W/124.77.

1030 HERMAN HUDSON (UO) ON.
1057 WCLC.
1309 ACTED ON AL/SHIFT SWAP REQUESTS.
1550 HOWARD BEDEE (HO-CIC) ON.
1615 HERMAN HUDSON (UO) ON.
1930 PAUL R. KNIGHT [PK] ON.
2032 REQ FOR SHIFT CHANGES/AL ACTED ON.
2118 WCLC
0300 COMBINED AT WMIC.

/ CERTIFY that entries above are correct; that all scheduled operations have been accomplished, except as noted, and that
all abnormal occurrences and conditions have been recorded.
Watch Supervisor(s) Signature Watch Supervisor(s) Signature Watch Supervisor(s) Signature

FAA Form 7230-4 (1-94) Supersedes Previous Edition Produced byiATX-400, MSDT, Washirtgton D.C. - Dash 4.EXE