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Los Angeles Times June 20, 2004 Sunday

Copyright 2004 The Times Mirror Company; Los Angeles Times

All Rights Reserved
Los Angeles Times

June 20, 2004 Sunday

Home Edition

SECTION: MAIN NEWS; Foreign Desk; Part A; Pg. 1

LENGTH: 1900 words

HEADLINE: The World;

2 Allies Aided Bin Laden, Say Panel Members;
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan let terrorists flourish before 9/11, apparently in return for
protection from attacks by Al Qaeda.

BYLINE: Josh Meyer, Times Staff Writer

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helped set the stage for the Sept. 11 attacks by cutting deals
with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden that allowed his Al Qaeda terrorist network to flourish,
according to several senior members of the Sept. 11 commission and U.S. counter-terrorism
officials.

The financial aid to the Taliban and other assistance by two of the most important allies of
the United States in its war on terrorism date at least to 1996, and appear to have shielded
them from Al Qaeda attacks within their own borders until long after the 2001 strikes, those
commission members and officials said in interviews.

"That does appear to have been the arrangement," said one senior member of the
commission staff involved in investigating those relationships.

The officials said that by not cracking down on Bin Laden, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
significantly undermined efforts to combat terrorism worldwide, giving the Saudi exile the
haven he needed to train tens of thousands of soldiers. They believe that the governments'
funding of his Taliban protectors enabled Bin Laden to withstand international pressure and
expand his operation into a global network that could carry out the Sept. 11 attacks.

Saudi Arabia provided funds and equipment to the Taliban and probably directly to Bin
Laden, and didn't interfere with Al Qaeda's efforts to raise money, recruit and train
operatives, and establish cells throughout the kingdom, commission and U.S. officials said.
Pakistan provided even more direct assistance, its military and intelligence agencies often
coordinating efforts with the Taliban antTATQIecia they said.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * U tfiJT

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=8aOa7adl52el577406d92558aelf52b8&docn... 6/25/2004
UNITED
NATIONS

Security Council ^ "

Distr .
GENERAL

S/RES/1054 (1996)
26 April 1996

RESOLUTION 1054 (1996)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3660th meeting,

on 26 April 1996

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 11 March 1996

(S/1996/179) submitted pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1044 (1996) and the
conclusions contained therein,

Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of the

President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on
26 June 1995, and convinced that those responsible for that act must be brought
to justice,

Taking note that the statements of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of
11 September 1995, and of 19 December 1995 (S/1996/10, annexes I and II)
considered the attempt on the life of President Mubarak as aimed, not only at
the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and not only at the sovereignty,
integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also at Africa as a whole,

Regretting the fact that the Government of Sudan has not yet complied with
the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU set out in those statements,

Taking note of the continued effort of the OAU Secretary-General to ensure

Sudan's compliance with the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU,

Taking note also, with regret, that the Government of Sudan has not
responded adequately to the efforts of the OAU,

Deeply alarmed that the Government of Sudan has failed to comply with the
requests set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1044 (1996),

96-10786 (E) 260496

 Intelligence Failure? Let's Go Back to Sudan Page 1 of 3
This item is available on the Benador Associates website, at
/ kttp://www. benadorassociates.coo]/article/43

intelligence Failure? Let's Go Back to Sudan

by Mansoor Ijaz and Timothy Carney
Washington Post
June 30, 2002

In early 1996, CIA director John Deutch convinced Secretary of-St3le Warren Clinslophel to pull U.S.
diplomats out of Sudan out of fear for their safety. His anxiety was based on intelligence that
implicated the Sudanese government. Although the embassy wasn't formally shut down, it was
vacated, and relations with Khartoum became severely strained.

Soon afterward, the CIA figured out that its analysis was wrong. A key source had either embellished
or wholly fabricated information, and in early 1996 the agency scrapped more than 100 of its reports
on Sudan.

Did the State Department then send its diplomats back? No. The bad intelligence had taken on a life
of its own. A sense of mistrust lingered. Moreover, the embassyhad become a political and diplomatic
football for policymakers and activists who wanted to isolate Khartoum until it halted its bloodyj:ivil
war with the largely Christian south. To this 9ay, the embassy is mostly unstaffed.

This episode is worth recounting now. Whether hunting terrorists in Afghanistan, judging the integrity
of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, mediating a dispute between India and Pakistan, or
Contemplating the virtue of an attack on Iraq, the Bush administration has given great weight to the
ontent of U.S. (and sometimes foreign) intelligence reports. As the United States wages war on
terrorism and Congress re- organizes and bolsters U.S. intelligence agencies, the influence of
intelligence on foreign and military policy will only grow.

But American policymakers have to be intelligent about using intelligence. The story of U.S. policy in
Sudan shows how bad intelligence - or good intelligence badly used -- can damage U.S. interests. In
Sudan, it confused us about political Islam, hurt our ability to intervene in the 47-year-old Sudanese
civil war, and in 1996 undermined our best chance ever to capture Osama bin Laden and strangle his
organization, before he was expelled from Sudan and found his way to Afghanistan.

We write from experience. One of us, Carney, a retired career diplomat, was the last U.S.
ambassador to Khartoum. The other, Ijaz, an American hedge-fund manager, played an informal role
by carrying messages between Khartoum and Washington after the embassy was emptied.

Perhaps the most important intelligence failure in Sudan wasn't about protecting the safety of U.S.
diplomats but about understanding the political environment throughout the Muslim world. This is one
aspect of Sudan's cautionary tale: the danger of losing sight of politics while focusing on terror.

During the 1990s, some committed Muslims around the worldtried to forge a political movement to
bridge the gap between the modern world and medieval scripture. But instead of engaging this
movement, the United States lumped Islamic political groups together and viewed them all as
dangerous. It clung to relationships with authoritarian regimes that felt threatened by Islamic groups
nd thus let well-organizedradicals dominate the Muslim world's reformist movement.

Khartoum was an important center of Islamic political activity. Sudan's National Islamic Front, led by
the fiery, Sorbonne-educated Hassan Turabi, seized power in a 1989 coup. Turabi held annual
conferences that attracted thousands of Muslim radicals to Khartoum to craft their vision for an
http://www.benadorassociates.com/pf.php?id=43 8/27/03
UNITED
NATIONS

Security Council
Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/1070 (1996)*
16 August 1996

RESOLUTION 1070 (1996)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3690th meeting,

on 16 August 1996

The Security Council.

Recalling its resolutions 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996 and 1054 (1996) of
26 April 1996,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 10 July 1996

(S/1996/541 and Add.l, 2 and 3),

Taking note of the letters of 31 May 1996 (S/1996/402), 24 June 1996

(S/1996/464) and 2 July 1996 (S/1996/513) from the Permanent Representative of
the Sudan,

Taking note also of the letter of 10 July 1996 (S/1996/538) from the
Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,

Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of the

President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on
26 June 1995, and convinced that those responsible for that act must be brought
to justice,

Taking note that the statements of the Central Organ of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
of 11 September 1995, and of 19 December 1995 (S/1996/10, annexes I and II)
considered the attempt on the life of President Mubarak as aimed, not only at
the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and not only at the sovereignty,
integrity and stability of Ethiopia, but also at Africa as a whole,

Regretting the fact that the Government of Sudan has not yet complied with
the requests of the Central Organ of the OAU set out in those statements,

Reissued for technical reasons.

96-21420 (E) /.
UNITED
NATIONS

Security Council
Distr .
GENERAL

S/RES/1044 (1996)
31 January 1996

RESOLUTION 1044 (1996)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3627th meeting,

on 31 January 1996

The Security Council,

Deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of international

terrorism in all its forms which endanger or take innocent lives, have a
deleterious effect on international relations and jeopardize the security of
States,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on

31 January 1992 (S/23500) when the Council met at the level of Heads of State
and Government in which the members of the Council expressed their deep concern
over acts of international terrorism and emphasized the need for the
international community to deal effectively with all such acts,

Recalling also the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes

against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, opened
for signature at New York on 14 December 1973,

Stressing the imperative need to strengthen international cooperation

between States in order to make and adopt practical and effective measures to
prevent, combat and eliminate all forms of terrorism that affect the
international community as a whole,

Convinced that the suppression of acts of international terrorism,

including those in which States are involved, is an essential element for the
maintenance of international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed at the terrorist assassination attempt on the life of the

President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on
26 June 1995, and convinced that those responsible for that act must be brought
to justice,

96-02172 (E)
 sudan Page 4 of 13
(SFC,4/15/96,A-8)

1973 Mar 2, Arab commandos, "Black September" terrorists, led by Abu Jihad executed 3 hostages in
^•Chartoum, Sudan, after Pres. Nixon refused their demands. US ambassador Cleo A. Noel, deputy George Curtis
Moore and Belgian charge d'affaires Guy Bid. The operation was later reported to have been organized by
Yasser Arafat.
(WSJ, 1/10/02, p.A12)(SC, 3/2/02)

1976 The deadly Ebola virus was 1st identified in western Sudan and the nearby region of Congo.
(SFC, 1/8/02, p.A6)

1978 Chevron Corp. sank oil wells north of Bentiu.

(SFC, 6/13/01, p.D3)

1983 Civil War began again in the Sudan when the People's Liberation Army renewed the battle for greater
autonomy from the Muslim north. The discovery of oil in the middle of the country and the imposition of sharia
by the government reignited violence.
(SFC, 5/29/96, p.A8)(SFC, 1/31/98, p.A9)(SSFC, 3/25/01, p.C8)

1983-1998 The civil war killed some 1.5 million people over this period.
(SFC, 11/3/98, p.A10)

1984 Chevron Corp. pulled out of Sudan after rebels killed 3 employees.
(SFC, 6/13/01, p.D3)

1984 War rekindled in the Sudan. A government official stated that: "The southerners were being used by the
rxist Ethiopians and by Col. Qaddafi of Libya to cause trouble for Sudan." Pres. Nimeiri set an edict to make
Islamic law the code of the land. The Sudanese People's Liberation Army was led by a former Sudanese army
colonel and Ph.D. in economics from Iowa St. Univ. named John Garang.
(NG, May 1985, R. Caputo, p.609)

1985 Apr 4, A coup in Sudan ousted pro US President Gaafar Nimeiry and replaced him with Gen. Dahab.
(HN, 4/4/99)(WSJ, 12/8/99, p.A19)

1985 Christian Col. John Garang and Muslim leader Sadiq el-Mahdi helped to restore democracy, but soon
grew at odds.
(WSJ, 3/4/97, p.Al4)

1985 The people of the Nuba Mountains allied themselves with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army
(SPLA) after government backed Arab militias attacked their villages.
(SSFC, 1/7/01, p.Dl)

1986 May 15, Francis Bok was kidnapped when Arabs from a government-armed militia swept into his village
shooting the men and cutting off their heads with swords.
(WSJ, 5/23/02, p.Al)

1988-1989 The war induced famine killed some 250,000 people.

(SFC, 11/3/98, p.AlO)

989 Jun 30, The elected coalition government was overthrown. The Umma Party and the Democratic Union
party established bases in Cairo and Eritrea and later allied with rebel groups that included the Southern
People's Liberation Party.
(SFC, 12/29/98, p.A6)

http://timelines.ws/countries/SUDAN.HTML 9/4/03
BBC NEWS I Middle East I Timeline: Sudan Page 1 of 4

faiiiBofmiMiMflniinriiniinlfi
NEWS SPORT WEATHER WORLD SERVICE A-Z INDEX SEARCH

Low Graphics version | Change edition

News Front Page Last Updated: Monday, 3 March, 2003, 17:24 GMT
Q Email this to a friend @ Printable version
Timeline: Sudan COUNTRY PROFILES
A GUIDE TO THE MIE

A chronology of key events: loose a country

Africa Compiled by BBC Mo
Americas 1881 - Revolt against the Turco-Egyptian administration.
Asia-Pacific
Europe 1956 - Sudan becomes independent.
Middle East
South Asia
1958 - General Abbud leads military coup against the civilian
UK government elected earlier in the year
Business
Health 1962 - Civil war begins in the south,
Science/Nature lead by the Anya Nya movement.
Technology
Entertainment 1964 - The "October Revolution"
overthrows Abbud and a national
Have Your Say government is established
Country Profiles
1969 - Ja'far Numayri leads the "May
In Depth
Revolution" military coup.
Programmes
1971 - Sudanese Communist Party
leaders executed after short-lived coup Khartoum skyline
RELATED SITES
against Numayri
OKOB WEflTHER
South gets autonomy
1972 - Under the Addis Ababa peace agreement between the
government and the Anya Nya the south becomes a self-
governing region.

1978 - Oil discovered in Bentiu in

southern Sudan.

1983 - Civil war breaks out again in

the south involving government forces
and the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM), lead by John
Garang.

Islamic law imposed

Rebel John Garang
1983 - President Numayri declares the
introduction of shari'ah (Islamic law).

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/827425.stm 5/28/03
Sudan (History) - Crossroads linking Black southern Africa, Mediterranean areas, souther... Page 1 of 2

Ar^jsie German Consulting

HI Sudan - History
Historically, sparsely-populated Sudan has served as the crossroads linking
Black southern Africa with the Mediterranean areas and the southern Sahara
with the Red Sea.
In about 2000 B.C., Egypt colonized Nubia (now northeastern Sudan), from
which it took slaves and soldiers, gold, ivory, and precious stones.
Nubia controlled Egypt briefly around 750 B.C., and continued to dominate the
middle Nile until A.D. 350, when it was colonized by the Ethiopia-based empire
of Aksum.

Ethiopia and Nubia accepted Christianity in the 6th century and remained Christian until colonized
by Moslems in the 15th century.

The Sudan (as the country was known before 1975) was ruled as an Anglo-Egyptian condominium
from 1899 until achieving independence as a parliamentary republic on 1 January 1956. After a
military coup in November 1958,
a Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was established and ruled until October 1964, when it was
overthrown in a civilian revolution.

Subsequent governments failed to improve the economic situation or to deal with the problem of the
insurgent southern provinces, and in May 1969 power was seized by a group of officers, led by Col
Gaafar Mohammed Numeri, who assumed the rank of major-general.

All existing political institutions and organizations were abolished, and the "Democratic Republic of
the Sudan" was proclaimed, with supreme authority in the bands of the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC).

In October 1971 a referendum confirmed Gen. Numeri's nomination as President. A new

Government was formed, the RCC was dissolved, and the Sudanese Socialist Union was
recognized as the only political party.

An early problem facing the Numeri Government concerned the disputed status of the three
southern provinces (Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile), whose inhabitants are racially and
culturally distinct from most of the country's population.

Rebellion against rule from the north had first broken out in 1955, and fighting continued until March
1972, when an agreement to give the three provinces a degree of autonomy was concluded in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between members of the Sudan Government and representatives of the
South Sudan Liberation Movement.

A High Executive Council (HEC) for the Southern Region was established in April 1972, and
Sudan's permanent Constitution was endorsed in April 1973. Elections to the Regional People's
Assembly for southern Sudan took place in November 1973, followed by elections to the National
People's Assembly in April 1974.

Following an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1976, Sudan severed diplomatic relations with Libya and
established a mutual defence pact with Egypt. Diplomatic links between Sudan and Libya were
restored in 1978, but relations became strained in 1981, during Libya's occupation of Chad, and
President Numeri frequently accused Libya of supporting plots against him.

In 1990, after Lt-Gen. al-Bashir had visited Col Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, in Tripoli, Sudan and

http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/sudanhis.htm 5/28/03
Prendsrgast: Us Intent Is Not To Demonize Islam, But Terrorism Page 1 of 2

PRENDERGAST: US INTENT IS NOT TO DEMONIZE

ISLAM, BUT TERRORISM
Runs Pirn \ Official speaks at Institute of Peace Sudan parley)

By Emile S. Siman
USIA Staff Writer

September 18, 1997

Washington — "The United States' intent is not to

demonize Islam, Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism,"
said a National Security Council official September 17,
but "terrorism, regional destabilization and human rights
abuses."

John Prendergast, who is director of African Affairs at

the National Security Council, spoke about the
implications of the situation in the Sudan to U.S. foreign
policy on the second day of a two-day conference on
"Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan," which was
sponsored by the Washington-based United States
Institute of Peace.

The NSC official outlined initiatives taken by the United

States government on three levels to counter the
Khartoum regime in Sudan, which is controlled by the
National Islamic Front.

On the international level, Prendergast noted that the

U.S. government, in focusing on "eradicating terrorism,"
placed Sudan on the State Department's list of states that
sponsor terrorism, which includes four other Mideast
states — Iran, Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Moreover, "we are
trying to expel Sudan from the IMF, on purely economic
grounds," mainly because it is not adhering to economic
reforms. We have "intensified pressure to contain" the
NIF-dominated government in Khartoum, which he
labeled an "odious regime."

On the regional level, the NSC official declared, the

United States "tries to focus on supporting neighboring
states in the Horn of Africa" which are threatened by
Sudan. He noted that through what he called the "Front-
Line States Initiative," both Uganda and Ethiopia have
received non-lethal weapons to defend themselves and
Washington closely coordinates with the governments of
the region. The U.S. also supports the IGAD (Inter
Governmental Authority on Development) Declaration
which calls for peace talks to settle the civil war in
Sudan. Another initiative is the Greater Horn of Africa
Initiative which involves a "forum on policy" on how to

http://www.usembassy-israel.org.i1/publish/peace/archives/l 997/me0918a.htm 5/28/03

Raid on Afghanistan, Sudan: Aug. 20, 1998: Clinton's Washington Speech Page 1 of 3

DOWNLOAD
FREE

TARGET: TERRORISTS
Statement by President Clinton [an error occurred
The President spoke from the White House on his while processing
decision to strike 'terrorist-related facilities' this directive]

Good afternoon. Today I ordered our armed forces to strike at

terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan because of the
imminent threat they presented to our national security.

I want to speak with you about the objective of this action and why it
was necessary.

Our target was terror. Our mission was clear -- to strike at the
network of radical groups affiliated with and funded by Osama bin
Laden, perhaps the preeminent organizer and financier of
international terrorism in the world today.

The groups associated with him come from diverse places, but share
a hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence, and a
horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents.

They have made the United States their adversary precisely because
of what we stand for and what we stand against.

A few months ago, and again this week, bin Laden publicly vowed to
wage a terrorist war against America, saying -- and I quote -- "We do
not differentiate between those dressed in military uniforms and
civilians. They are all targets."

Their mission is murder. And their history is bloody.

In recent years, they killed American, Belgian and Pakistani

peacekeepers in Somalia. They plotted to assassinate the president
of Egypt and the Pope. They planned to bomb six United States 747s
over the Pacific.

They bombed the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan. They gunned down

German tourists in Egypt. The most recent terrorist events are fresh
in our memory. Two weeks ago, 12 Americans and nearly 300
Kenyans and Tanzanians lost their lives. And another 5,000 were
wounded when our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were
bombed.

There is convincing information from our intelligence community that

the bin Laden terrorist network was responsible for these bombings.
Based on this information, we have high confidence that these
bombings were planned, financed and carried out by the organization
bin Laden leads.

America has battled terrorism for many years. Where possible, we've
used law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight. The
long arm of American law has reached out around the world and

http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/asbombing/clintonwash.html 5/28/03
War on Terrorism Page 1 of 4

TUCSON WEATHER

www. a z st a rn e t. com
THE ONLINE SERVICE OF THE ARIZONA DAILY S T A R
VIEW FORECAST

WAR ON TERRORISM
Background
main | anthrax | archive | human flag | in-depth | interactive map | links |
message board | slide shows and interactives | smallpox | videos | Contact us Information
A collection of
explanatory stories
December 3, 2001
printed in the Arizona
Daily Star.
In war on terrorism, Sudan struck a blow by
fleecing bin Laden
By ROBERT BLOCK
The Wall Street Journal

KHARTOUM, Sudan — With American bombs dropping on

Afghanistan, Ibrahim al Rufai Abu el Hassan is pleased to
announce that Khartoum Tannery Co. is under new management.
"The previous owner is long gone," he says with a wry smile. • Muslims speak in
many voices
Curiously, Dr. Hassan, a chemical engineer, says he doesn't know Plus: Origins, growth
who that owner was, except that he was a Saudi businessman who of Islam
had to leave Sudan abruptly.
• Who are the
The man he is referring to, in all but name, is Osama bin Laden, Afghans? A look at
who took up residence here in 1991 and ran the tannery as part of ethnic groups
a business empire that Washington says funded his terrorist
network. In 1996, Sudan, under United States pressure, expelled
• How the Taliban
the then-relatively-little-known Mr. bin Laden.
rose to power
Five years later, many in Sudan are loath to talk about their
dealings with a man whose name many in the West have come to • The roots of
regard as a synonym for evil. In 1998, the United States launched a Islamic extremism
missile attack on a Sudanese Pharmaceuticals factory on the still-
unproven theory that Mr. bin Laden was using his investments here • Combat in
to make chemical weapons. Now, the Taliban are in retreat and Afghanistan's caves
Washington is promising to expand its war against terrorism
beyond Afghanistan. But there may be yet another reason for
Sudan's reluctance to discuss Mr. bin Laden: Its government ripped • Afghanistan on
him off for millions of dollars. the world stage

In the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the • Jihad in
Afghanistan

http://www.azstarnet.com/attack/indepth/wsi-sudanbinladen.html 5/28/03
 Order Code IB98043

Issue Brief for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks,

Terrorism, and U.S. Policy

Updated April 23, 2003

Ted Dagne
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service »> The Library of Congress


462
X ^
accessed atvvww.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/
transcripts/sudanmernotext_100301.html.
19. Since September 11, one much-repeated allegation has been that the Clinton
administration missed a key opportunity in the mid-1990s to improve rela-
tions with Sudan and learn more about the terrorists, including bin Laden,
who had been sheltered there. Had the United States done that, critics con-
tend, it could have prevented the attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon.
The chief proponents of this argument are Mansoor Ijaz, a New
York-based investment banker, and Timothy Carney, the former U.S. ambas-
sador to Sudan. Carney has sharply criticized the Clinton administration for
what he says are critical mistakes in its policy toward Sudan. In the 1990s,
Ijaz made sizable contributions to the Democratic Party and met once with
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger at the request of White House politi-
cal personnel. Berger heard out Ijaz's argument that the United States should
engage more with the Sudanese. Despite repeated requests, Berger declined
to meet Ijaz again. (The White House had been harshly criticized for meet-
ings between officials and businessman Roger Tamraz, who wanted assis-
tance in getting a pipeline built to carry Caspian basin oil, and Ijaz presented
a comparable case since he has investments and ties to firms in the energy
sector, some of which may have been interested in oil development in
Sudan.) Ijaz, a Pakistani-American who has advertised his close ties with
governments in South Asia and his ability to make progress on the Kashmir
conflict, was viewed by other NSC officials as an unreliable freelancer, some-
one who was pursuing his own interests and fancied himself a grand strate-
gist. Jointly and separately (and Ijaz much more frequently), Carney and Ijaz
have made their case in the Los Angeles Times, Vanity Fair, and The Wash-
ington Post and through numerous television appearances.
They adduce several pieces of evidence to support it. Ijaz, in particular,
often cites correspondence from Sudanese leaders professing a desire to
cooperate on counterterrorism that he personally delivered to U.S. officials.
They refer to an offer to hand bin Laden over to U.S. authorities, as they
wrote in The Washington Post on June 30,2002. (See Timothy Carney and
Mansoor Ijaz, "Intelligence Failure? Let's Go Back to Sudan," Washington
Post, 30 June 2002, B4.) And they claim that Ijaz was shown sensitive intelli-
gence on terrorists tracked through Khartoum by the Sudanese intelligence
chief. They argue that the administration was blinded by its preconceptions
aj' \n and refused to engage with the Khartoum regime.
rhe notion that the United States missed a great chance is belied by the
facts. There was no break in diplomatic relations even though the U.S. em-
NOTES 463
bassy in Khartoum was closed. U.S. and Sudanese officials met numerous
times, including, as Carney and Ijaz note, in Virginia in early 1996. The
Sudanese were not shunted off to low-level officials but met with Undersecre-
tary of State Thomas Pickering. They had ample opportunity to provide
genuine intelligence cooperation, and they did not do so. The U.S. govern-
ment declined Ijaz's services because there was nothing he could achieve that
America's diplomats could not. In fact, Ijaz's involvement could add nothing
to relations except provide Khartoum with an opportunity to manipulate
him. And that is exactly what has happened, whether he is wittingly com-
plicit or not.
An example is Ijaz's claim to have seen sensitive intelligence: How could
Ijaz possibly know what constitutes sensitive intelligence? What expertise
does he have in terrorism? How could he know anything about the value of
the paper in front of him beyond what the Sudanese told him? What kind of
perspective did he have on years of Sudanese dissembling about its support
for terror and its dealings with the United States?
A further example of the thinness of this story is the claim that Khartoum
offered to hand bin Laden over. Setting aside the issue of whether the United
States could take custody of bin Laden, against whom it had no indictment at
the time, no senior government official from the Clinton administration is
aware of any such offer, nor has any record of one surfaced. It is hard to find
anyone who has made this claim other than Mansoor Ijaz. In fact, in an inter-
view on May 2,2002, in Washington with one of the authors, Timothy Car-
ney said that he "was not aware of any option to send [bin Laden] to us." One
has to wonder what suddenly convinced him that there was such an option.
At the heart of the argument that Washington botched its dealings with
the Sudanese government is the implicit contention that in 1996 and after,
the Khartoum leadership was well-meaning but misunderstood. Again, this is
belied by the facts. Sudan continued to harbor and support terrorists long
after bin Laden left. As the embassy-bombing trial transcripts show, Khar-
toum kept close watch over the terrorists within its borders, knew them
well, and cooperated closely with them, not with the United States. Senior
bin Laden operatives continued to visit Khartoum, undoubtedly with the
acquiescence of the regime, months after the bombing of the East Africa
embassies in 1998. The Sudanese knew precisely what they needed to do to
improve relations with the United States. They refused because they shared
many of the goals and ideology of the terrorists and, at a minimum, wanted to
keep their involvement with these groups safe from scruti'-- Sudan never
provided any serious cooperation with the United States /use to do so
would have revealed its complicity in numerous acts of terror.
Mail:: INBOX: Fwd: MEI Policy Brief: Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil on "The Prospects for Democrac... Page 1 of 3

ffi^^Qai^lfli^Mlii®1^! *& INBOX

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6.18MB / 476.84MB (1.30%)

iNBOX: Fwd: MEI Policy Brief: Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil wove i copy |TNS message to jr
on "T... (6 of 536) C
Delete I Reply I Reply to All I Forward I Redirect I Blacklist I Message Source I Resume I Save as I Print Back to INBOX ^^
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2003 15:32:55 -0400
From: Warren Bass <warrenbass@hotmail.com>#
To: "" <sallan@9-11commission.gov>4P
Subject: Fwd: MEI Policy Brief: Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil on "The Prospects for Democracy & Unity in Sudan" Summary by Hesham
Sallam ,,

fyi, for your sudan obsession... :)

>From: "Middle East Institute" <mideasti@mideasti.org>

>Reply-To: <mideasti@mideasti.org>
>To: mideasti@mideasti.org
>Subject: MEI Policy Brief: Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil on "The Prospects for
>Democracy & Unity in Sudan" Summary by Hesham Sallam
>Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2003 14:50:25 -0400
>
>Middle East Institute
>POLICY BRIEF
>
>The Prospects for Democracy & Unity in Sudan
>Dr. Mohamed I. Khalil
'MEI Scholar-in-Residence
^*
>
>Summary:
>
>June 25, 2003 (Washington, DC) - The Sudan peace process has recently made
>signifleant progress and an end to a long devastating war seems to be near.
>Yet the Machakos Protocol of July 2002, if pursued and implemented to its
>tenor, would not result in the restoration of democracy, human rights and
>the rule of law to the people of the Sudan.
>
>
>Brief:
>
>Attributing the unprecedented progress in peace talks between the
>government
>of Sudan and the Southern Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) to the
>active
>U.S. involvement and the increasing concern of friendly countries, Dr.
>Khalil points out that despite broad agreement between the two parties,
>details of wealth and power sharing, the structure of the interim
>government
>and the substance of the interim constitution are yet to be worked out.
>
>The government's agreement to the SPLA's demand for self-determination
>rules
>out the possibility of Southern unilateral secession, which would not augur
ll for relations between two neighbors who share vital natural resources.
-Moreover, according to international law, people of Southern Sudan are not
>entitled to external-self determination, which may lead to secession. This
>right to self-determination is only legally recognized in international law
>within the colonial context. To that extent Machakos should be regarded as

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?actionID=101&index=532&start=5 6/26/03
Background Notes Archive - Africa Page 1 of 10
U.S. Department of State
Background Notes: Sudan, June 1995
Bureau of African Affairs

and released by the Bureau of African Affairs,

^rfice of East African Affairs

June 1995
Official Name: Republic of the Sudan

PROFILE

Geography

Area: 2.5 million sq. km. (967,500 sq. mi.); almost one-third size of
continental U.S.
Cities: Capital-Khartoum. Other cities-Port Sudan, Kassala, Kosti, Juba
(capital of southern region). No current accurate population statistics
available.
Terrain: Generally flat with mountains in east and west.
Climate: Desert in north to tropical in south.

People

Nationality: Noun and adjective--Sudanese (sing, and pi.).

Population (1994 est.): 28 million; 25 percent urban.
Annual growth rate (1993 est.): 3 percent.
Ethnic groups: Arab-African, black African.
Religions: Islam (official), indigenous beliefs (southern Sudan),
Christianity.
Languages: Arabic (official), English, tribal languages,
^lucation: Years compulsory—9. Attendance-50 percent. Literacy-27
^ jrcent.
Health: Infant mortality rate—099/1,000. Life expectancy—52 yrs .
Work force (6 million, 1982): Agriculture--78 percent. Industry and
commerce--10 percent. Government--6 percent.

Government

Type: Military dictatorship.

Independence: January 1, 1956.
Constitution: 1985 provisional constitution amended, now suspended.
Branches: Executive authority is shared by the 12-member
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the cabinet. The
chairman of the RCC is concurrently chief of state (president) and
prime minister. Judicial-Supreme Court, attorney general, civil, shari'a
(Islamic), special revolutionary courts, and tribal courts;
investigative
commissions.
Administrative subdivisions: 5 northern regions, 3 southern regions;
each region, 2 or more provinces.
Political parties: All political parties banned following June 30, 1989,
military coup.
Central government budget (1990 est.): $1.5 billion.
Defense (1990 est.): 30 percent of GNP.
Flag: Horizontal red, white, and black stripes with green triangle on
staff side.

GDP (1988 e s t . ) : $9 billion.

GDP annual growth rate (1994 e s t . ) : - 6 . 0 percent.

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bgnotes/af/sudan9506.html 7/8/03

r

CHAPTER 4
The Koran and the Kalashnikov:
Bin Ladens Years in Sudan
"They began issuing statements amongst themselves in the
Sudan, calling the Americans infidels. . . . But, ladies and
gentlemen, it was not just words. You will hear that bin
Laden and his group began taking actions to prepare to do
battle with his enemies, particularly the United States."
—Opening statement of federal prosecutor in the
Manhattan trial of four bin Laden associates,
Februarys, 2001
c
iome upstairs, I have something to show you," said a Middle
' Eastern dissident I was visiting in London in 1997. In his study
he pulled out a videotape and popped it into his VCR. The footage,
shot through the windows of a slowly moving car, showed some of the
tens of thousands of Americans living in Saudi Arabia.1 The camera
panned to a sign announcing a housing complex for employees of
Aramco, the oil company. Then the cameraman drove into the com-
plex and zoomed in on an American woman pushing her child on a
swing. In the next sequence, the cameraman overtook a U.S. army
truck driven by a female soldier, who glanced nervously at the camera
when she realized she was being videotaped. The tape was poorly shot,
but fascinating in a voyeuristic way It had no narration, but its mes-
sage was plain: "Look at these infidels trespassing on our holy land."
76
Opposition to the longtime presence of Americans on the Arabian
peninsula intensified dramatically after August 7, K, ni Bthe day the
first U.S. troops were dispatched to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation
Desert Shield. The dying edict of the Prophet Muhammad had been
"Let there be no two religions in Arabia"; now "infidels" of both sexes
were trespassing on the holy land of the Arabian Peninsula.2 For bin
Laden, this was as transforming an event as the Russian invasion of
Afghanistan had been a decade earlier. It is no coincidence that exactly
eight years later, on August 7, 1998, his men blew up two U.S. em-
bassies in Africa, the bombs going off almost simultaneously in two
different countries—no mean feat of coordination.
Of course, bin Laden had been denouncing Americans well before
he was forced to put up with them in the flesh. On his return from the
Afghan war in 1989, he was quickly in demand as a speaker in
mosques and homes, and one of his principal themes was a call for a
boycott of American goods because of that countiy s support for Is-
irael.3 Hundreds of thousands of recordings of his speeches circulated
in the Saudi kingdom.4
Ironically, bin Laden was in sympathy with the reason for the U.S.
presence in Saudi Arabia: the war against Saddam Hussein. He had
embarrassed the Saudi regime much earlier by warning of the Iraqi
leaders intentions.5 "A year before Hussein entered Kuwait," bin
Laden recalled, "I said many times in my speeches at the mosques,
warning that Saddam will enter the Gulf. No one believed me. I dis-
tributed many tapes in Saudi Arabia. It was after it happened that they
started believing me and believed my analysis of the situation."6
After Hussein's forces did invade the small, oil-rich state on August
1, 1990, and threaten the security of Saudi Arabia, bin Laden immedi-
ately volunteered his services and those of his holy warriors. The Saudi
army and his own men would be enough to defend the Kingdom, he
reasoned; after all, hadn't his own troops been instrumental in driving
the Russians from Afghanistan?
The Saudis did not take this offer seriously. Despite the tens of bil-
lions of dollars they had spent on their own army, they turned instead
for help to the U.S. government and then-President Bush, who" had
made his fortune in the oil trade and so understood exactly what was at
stake in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (whatever rhetoric was employed on
The Koran and the Kalashnikov: Bin Laden's Years in Sudan / 77
 9-11 COMMISSION DAILY PRESS CLIPS
for September 23, 2003

***HEADLINES***

1. Clinton NSC attacks Miniter (WT)

2. Miniter responds (WT)
3. Moroccan Calls 9-11 Conviction 'Unjust' (AP)
4. Pakistan Detains 17 in Sweep At Islamic Schools in Karachi (AP)
5. Musharraf Criticizes Terror War (WP)
6. Probe of 2 Groups That Train Muslim Chaplains Sought (WP)
7. Fifth Column II (WT)
8. Antiterrorism creed (BG)
9. Don't deny government useful anti-terror tools (USA Today)
10. Patriot Act overreaches (USA Today)
11. Patriot Act Used In 16-Year-Old Deportation Case (WP)

"*FULL TEXT***

1. Clinton NSC attacks Miniter

By Roger Cressey and Gayle Smith
Washington Times

As counterterrorism and foreign policy professionals and veterans of the NSC staff in the years
proceeding September 11, we have heard our share of misstatements and conspiracy theories
about terrorism. But nothing quite compares to Richard Miniter's book "Losing Bin Laden," which
includes a number of erroneous allegations about the Clinton administration's counterterrorism
record, many of which were then published in this newspaper. Let us address a few:

First, Mr. Miniter recycles old, false Sudanese claims that the Clinton White House declined
access to Sudan's intelligence files on al Qaeda and that an unnamed CIA official declined an
offer from Sudan in 1996 to turn Osama bin Laden over to the United States.

No one should believe these allegations by Mr. Miniter's source, Fateh Erwa — a Sudanese
intelligence officer known for his penchant to deceive — that there was an offer to hand bin Laden
over to the United States. Certainly, no offer was ever conveyed to any senior official in
Washington. Had the Sudanese been serious about offering bin Laden to the United States, they
could have communicated such an offer to any number of senior Clinton administration officials. It
did not happen.

Mr. Miniter also claims that Sudan repeatedly tried to provide voluminous intelligence files on bin
Laden to the CIA, the FBI, and senior Clinton administration officials and would be "repeatedly
rebuffed through both formal and informal channels." Absurd. In fact, it was precisely the other
way around.

On multiple occasions, and in venues ranging from Addis Ababa to Virginia, Washington, New
York and Khartoum, the United States aggressively pressed the Sudanese to prove their alleged
commitment to cooperating on terrorism, by severing their close ties with known terrorists,
arresting specific individuals and providing specific intelligence information to us. Yet, despite

PRESS CLIPS FOR SEPTEMBER 23, 2003 1

 Search - 1 Result - "us diplomats return to sudan" Page 1 of 2
Source: News & Business > News > By Individual Publication > W > The Washington Post J.:
Terms: "us diplomats return to sudan" (Edit Search)

The Washington Post, September 24, 1997

—**.

Copyright 1997 The Washington Post

- The Washington Post

September 24, 1997, Wednesday, Final Edition

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A27

LENGTH: 400 words

HEADLINE: U.S. Diplomats Return to Sudan

BYLINE: Thomas W. Lippman, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:
The United States is sending diplomats back to Sudan, 19 months after pulling all American
employees out of the U.S. Embassy there for security reasons, the State Department announced
yesterday.

The move does not reflect an improvement in relations with the vast African country, officials
but instead signals the start of an upgraded diplomatic campaign to increase pressure on the
militant Islamic regime.

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright ordered the return of eight mid-level diplomats to the
Khartoum embassy as "part of an intensified diplomatic effort to change the behavior of the
Sudanese government," a State Department official said. "We want to ratchet up the pressure on
~" Sudan to respond to the demands of the international community on terrorism, human rights and
the civil war [in southern Sudan.] This shouldn't be misinterpreted by anybody, especially the
Sudanese."

Sudan is on the State Department's list of countries that sponsor international terrorism.
Washington has long viewed the Khartoum government as an ally of Iran in promoting regional
unrest, encouraging terrorism and opposing peace between Israel and the Arabs. In Washington's
view, Khartoum is the source of trouble across east and Central Africa, most notably along its
southern frontier where non-Muslim neighboring countries are supporting a long-running
insurrection against the Islamic regime.

In February 1996, the State Department announced it was withdrawing all U.S. personnel from
Khartoum because the Sudanese government could not guarantee their security. Diplomatic
relations were not formally severed, however, and the embassy has remained open, staffed by
Sudanese employees. Ambassador Timothy M. Carney has been living in Nairobi, Kenya, and flying
into Khartoum monthly to conduct official business.

Carney will remain in Nairobi, but the security situation in Khartoum has improved sufficiently to
allow the posting there of the eight mid-level diplomats, a State Department official said.

At the same time, he said, Washington is planning to increase the amount of its "non-lethal" aid to
Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea, states backing the rebels in southern Sudan. The governments in all
three countries are in high favor with the Clinton administration, which regards them as relatively
progressive and as useful in the effort to curb Sudanese influence.

— LOAD-DATE: September 24, 1997

Source: News & Business > News > By Individual Publication > W > The Washington Post UJ

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=c92866c30b6b3f5942af3e933dab015a&csvc=bl&cform... 10/7/03
SUDAN Pa«?e 1 of 6

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To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url: http://www.googie.com/search?
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SUDAN
U.S. Department of the Treasury
Office of Foreign Assets Control

What You Need To Know About U.S. Sanctions

An overview of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations —
Title 31 Part 538 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
• INTRODUCTION - On November 3,1997, afterfindingthat the
policies and actions of the Government of Sudan, including continued
support for international terrorism, ongoing efforts to destabilize neigh
boring governments, and the prevalence of human rights violations,
including slavery and the denial of religious freedom, constituted an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign
No U.S. bank, including its foreign branches, may finance, or arrange
offshore financing for, third-country trade transactions where Sudan is
known to be the ultimate destination of, or the Government of Sudan is the
purchaser of, the goods. Arranging transactions which ultimately benefit
Sudan (for example, brokering third-country sales to Sudan) constitutes an

http://216.239.37.104/search?q=cache:JjCGJJrdtQ8J:www.ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sanctions/tllsudan.pdf+OFAC+Sudan... 10/24/03
TCS: Tech Central Station - Where Free Markets Meet Technology Page 1 of 2

TECH CENTRAL STATION

Signs of the Times Font Size: * *H

By Ken Adelman Published 01/10/2002

Two important Times stories - one in the New York Times, the other in the London Sunday
Times - tell us a lot about the news media and help set the record straight about the
Clinton administration's failed efforts to combat terrorists.

The first story contains a rebuke of Fox News broadcasters for patriotism. The second
shows how President Clinton passed up three chances to nab Osama bin Laden before his
massive terrorist attacks against us.

First up, Fox.

You'd think that in our post-9/11 world, wearing a flag pin signifies nothing worse than
national unity in our fight against terrorism.

But essayist Caryn James thinks otherwise. In her December 30, 2001 New York Times
essay on "The Year in Television," Ms. James pointed out that right after September 11th
came "a round of flag-waving and flag-wearing patriotism, in which even some network
correspondents wore flag pins."

Before long, however, all the networks but one realized the grave error of this move. "That
was rightly seen as crossing a line into politics," James lectures, "and was banned by
every network and cable channel except Fox News." Then came her punch-line - "so much
for its ludicrous claim to political balance."

Granted, I'm biased towards Fox News, not only for giving me the opportunity to write a
weekly column on their website, but also for frequent appearances on the air. But even if
Ms. James wrote that about another network, I'd consider her claim rather "ludicrous."

Why would wearing an American flag pin sacrifice "political balance"? Is that more
Republican than Democratic? Surely the Democrats wouldn't admit that. Is it pro-American
as opposed to pro-Taliban? Surely so, but Ms. James can't mean that by "political
balance." American patriotism, symbolized by a flag pin, doesn't compromise "political
balance," but instead proclaims a determination to preserve our values of freedom and
tolerance.

Clinton's Failure

"U.S. Missed Three Chances to Seize Bin Laden" headlined England's most prestigious
and best-selling newspaper, the Sunday Times, on January 6th in the first of a three-part
series.

The much-discussed piece began: "President Bill Clinton turned down at least three offers
involving foreign governments to help to seize Osama Bin Laden after he was identified as
a terrorist who was threatening America, according to sources in Washington and the
Middle East."

The first offer came in the summer of 1996 when Sudanese officials were willing to hand
over the terrorist, then living in their country. They had done something similar when giving
Carlos "The Jackal" to French authorities two years earlier.

Yet in our case, unlike the hardheaded French, the Clinton White House let pass the
Sudanese offer. The very next month bin Laden struck, when "a 5,000lb truck bomb ripped
apart the front of Khobar Towers, a U.S. military housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi
Arabia. The explosion killed 19 American servicemen. Bin Laden was immediately
suspected."

The other two offers came in the summer of 2000. The Clinton team handled neither
seriously. Within 14 months, bin Laden struck again, this time more spectacularly with the

http://www2.techcentralstation.com/1051/printer.jsp?CID=1051-011002B 11/3/2003
DradgeReportArchives.com 2003 Page 1 of 4

Drudge's Special Reports DrudaeRePOrtArch8ves.com Today's DrudgeReport.com

Time Line I Recent Links and Pictures I NEW Popular Links

Important:

If the link is
XXXXX DRUDGE REPORT XXXXX FRI NOV 30 2001 10:30:08 ET XXXXX flashing
*"\Q: SUDAN TRIED TO GIVE CLINTON ADMIN FILES ON BIN LADEN YOU
have been
NEW YORK —VANITY FAIR HAS OBTAINED LETTERS and memorandums that
document approaches made by Sudanese intelligence officials and other selected
emissaries to members of the Clinton administration to share information asa
about many of the 22 terrorists on the government's most-wanted list,
including: Osama bin Laden. WINNER!

VANITY FAIR is set to unleash the story in January 2002 editions,

publishing sources tell the DRUDGE REPORT. Claim Here
MORE

THE MUKHABARAT, A SUDANESE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, spent the early to mid-

1990s amassing copious amounts of information on bin Laden and his
cohorts at a time when they were relatively unknown and their activities
limited, author David Rose reports. From the fall of 1996 until weeks
before the September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, the
Mukhabarat made repeated efforts to share its files on terrorists with
the U.S. On more than one occasion senior F.B.I, officials wanted to
accept the offers, but were apparently overruled by the State
Department.

FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE ALBRIGHT and her assistant secretary

for Africa, Susan Rice, declined to comment for this story.

^^WORDING TO TIM CARNEY, THE LAST U.S. AMBASSADOR to Sudan, whose

posting-ended in 1997, "The fact is, they were opening the doors, and we
weren't taking them up on it. The U.S. failed to reeiproeatf^ ?u.flnTi'9 —
willingness to engage us on some~~s~erious questions of terrorism. We can

http://www.drudgereportarchives.eom/data/2001/l 1/30/20011130_154810_matt91h.htm 7/8/03

NewsMax.com: Inside Cover Story Page 1 of 4

NewsMax.com America's News Page CUC

.une 30, 2003 FREE OFFER:: Ann Coulter's Treason

* Home • Late-Night Jokes • Archives • Cartoons • News Alerts • U.S. News Links • PriorityGrams
> Int'l News Links • MoneyNews • Contact Us • NewsMax Store • Classifieds • Get Your Site List*

With Carl Limbacher and NewsMax.com Staff

For the story behind the story...

Tuesday, JUly 2, 2002 11:12 p.m. EDT

U.S. Ambassador to Sudan

Confirms Clinton Snubbed Bin
Laden Deal
Protect Your SIGN
Loved Ones! Former Ambassador to the Sudan Tim
Carney confirmed Tuesday night that
THE
You could PETTO®
the Clinton administration refused an
save up to offer from the Sudanese government to Click Here
60%! hand over terrorist mastermind Osama
Click Here bin Laden in the late 1990s -
directly contradicting former Clinton
administration officials who have
attacked the story as baseless.

"In fact, what was offered [by the

Sudanese] was to expel bin Laden to Click Here
Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis, because
Click Here he was such a hot potato, simply
refused to handle him," Carney told
Fox News Channel's Alan Colmes.

"Then, as I understand it, there was

an offer to send him to us," Carney
recalled. The Clinton administration
rebuffed the overture because, Carney
said, "we did not have an indictment
[against bin Laden] at the time."

Carney's account corroborates the

claims of Pakistani-American
freelance diplomat Mansour Ijaz, who
has maintained for months that the

http://www.newsmax.com/showinsidecover.shtml?a=2002/7/2/221350 6/30/03
 The Brookings Institution Page 1 of 1

Sc J 1 0 I . A H S
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Publications

Articles:

The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States," Policy

Brief #116 (February 2003)

"The New National Security Strategy and Preemption," Policy Brief

#113, with James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon (January 2003)

"Managing Allies and Adversaries: A Critique of U.S. National Security

Policy," University of Delaware International Speakers Series (11 /19/02)

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9/11 Personal Privacy

http://www.brookings.edu/scholars/srice.htm 6/5/03
 Page 1 of4

Scott Allan
From: The Crescent Partnerships [crescent@crescentgroup.com]
Sent: Sunday, March 28, 2004 7:14 AM
Subject: IJAZ on the Clinton Intelligence Record in NRO (4)

LONDON Sunday, March 28, 2004

Dear Friends & Colleagues,

In light of the past week's events surrounding the release of Richard Clarke's new
book, the controversy it generated on intelligence failures and the 9-11
Commission's hearings on the subject, I thought it might be of interest for you to
see once again an article I wrote about a year ago in which the very same topics
were discussed at length.

Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor Ijaz
NRO Contributor

April 28, 2003, 8:45 a.m.

The Clinton Intel Record

Deeper failures revealed.
By Mansoor Ijaz

The unearthing of documents directly linking Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization to Saddam
Hussein this weekend may have hermetically sealed the Bush administration's case that dismantling
Iraq's Baathist enterprise was in part necessary to undo terrorism's dynamic duo. But closing that case
may reopen a Pandora's box for ex-Clinton administration officials who still believe their policy
prescriptions protected U.S. national interests against the growing threat of terrorism during the past
decade.

The London Telegraph^ weekend revelations raise deeply disturbing questions about the extent and
magnitude to which President Clinton, his national-security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, and
senior terrorism and State Department officials — including Assistant Secretary of State for East Africa,
Susan Rice — politicized intelligence data, relied on and even circulated fabricated evidence in making
critical national-security decisions, and presided over a string of intelligence failures during the months
leading up to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

4/2/2004
 Page 1 of4

Scott Allan

From: The Crescent Partnerships [crescent@crescentgroup.com]

Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2004 9:34 AM
Subject: IJAZ on the 9-11 Commission Inquiry in NRO (4)

LONDON Wednesday, March 24, 2004

Dear Friends & Colleagues,

I've offered some areas of inquiry the 9-11 Commissioners might want to consider
for the witnesses appearing today in front of the Committee. These seven areas of
questioning appeared in an op-ed for National Review Online yesterday.

Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor Ijaz
HRO Contributor '" , ..

March 23, 2004, 8:55 a.m.

A Dick Clarke Top Seven

Questions for commissioners.
Richard Clarke, the former White House counterterrorism czar in four successive administrations,
testifies in front of the 9/11 CommissiononWednesday. But what should have been a serious inquiry
into how a loosely knit gang of Islamic fanatics could rise to become one of history's most lethal and
effective global terrorist organizations now promises to become a political spectacle.

At the height of the presidential campaign season, Clarke has made irresponsible and untrue allegations
that the Bush White House was indifferent to the threat posed by al Qaeda in the months leading up to
the 9/11 attacks. Whether his charges are the result of a momentary lapse in judgment in an otherwise
distinguished civil-service career, or the hallmark of personal ego and greed in trying to sell a book
while settling scores with a Bush White House that demoted him, the 9/11 commissioners cannot be
deterred in their task to find out the truth about what happened on his watch to America's
counterterrorism efforts.

The 9/11 commissioners have a thankless job of asking tough questions that nobody wants to ask. There
will be a broad set of questions asked Tuesday and Wednesday of the various witnesses who appear. But
when Clarke goes under oath, there will be a need to get down to specifics because the devil of

4/2/2004
 Page 1 of3

Scott Allan

From: The Crescent Partnerships [crescent@crescentgroup.com]

Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 11:35 AM
Subject: IJAZ on Richard Clarke in The Washington Times (4)

NEW YORK Tuesday, March 23, 2004

Dear Friends & Colleagues,

Mr. Ijaz asked that I send his op-ed piece on the recent controversy generated by
Richard Clarke's new book and hopes you will find it of interest. He asked that I
send his best regards to each of you.

Sincerely, M. Wassil

Tuesday, March 23, 2004

washingtontimes.com

POLITICIZED INTELLIGENCE TO WHAT END?

by Mansoor Ijaz

Richard Clarke, former White House counterterrorism czar for Presidents Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush, testifies tomorrow before the commission investigating the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. He is well-qualified to do so because few
individuals over the last decade, inside or outside government, better understood the Islamic
extremism threat in all its dimensions.

But rather than deliver a factual recounting and analysis of the intelligence failures and
politically charged antiterrorism policies that plagued his years as coordinator for
counterterrorism operations, he has chosen to characterize the Bush White House as
indifferent to the threat posed by Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network prior to the September
11 attacks without consideration for the failures on his watch during the Clinton years. This is
inaccurate and adds nothing to our understanding of how distant terrorists could plan and carry
out such daring and effective attacks.

Mr. Clarke's premise that Bush national security officials neither understood nor cared to know
anything about al Qaeda is simply untrue. I know because on multiple occasions from June

4/2/2004
 Scott Allan
The Crescent Partnerships [crescent@crescentgroup.com]
Monday, March 22, 2004 1:48 PM
Gov (NSC) Hadley, Stephen J.
Gov (NSC) Lineberry, Laura; Gov (NSC) McCormack, Sean
IJAZ manuscript on RICHARD CLARKE

Importance: High

LONDON Monday, March 22, 2004

Dear Steve,

I thought you should have an advance copy of this piece on Richard

Clarke's statements which will appear in a prominent Washington
newspaper tomorrow morning. This storm too shall pass...

All best, Mansoor

LONDON
Richard Clarke, former White House counterterrorism czar for Presidents Bill Clinton
and George W. Bush, testifies today before the commission investigating the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. He is well-qualified to do so because
few individuals over the last decade, inside or outside government, better understood the
Islamic extremism threat in all its dimensions.
But rather than deliver a factual recounting and analysis of the intelligence
^—failures and politically charged antiterrorism policies that plagued his years as
oordinator for counterterrorism operations, he has chosen to characterize the Bush White
House as indifferent to the threat posed by Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network prior to
the September 11 attacks without consideration for the failures on his watch during the
Clinton years. This is inaccurate and adds nothing to our understanding of how distant
terrorists could plan and carry out such daring and effective attacks.
Mr. Clarke's premise that Bush national security officials neither understood nor
cared to know anything about al Qaeda is simply untrue. I know because on multiple
occasions from June until late August 2001, I personally briefed Stephen J. Hadley, deputy
national security adviser to President Bush, and members of his South Asia, Near East and
East Africa staff at the National Security Council on precisely what had gone wrong during
the Clinton years to unearth the extent of the dangers posed by al Qaeda. Some of the
briefings were in the presence of former members of the Clinton administration's national
security team to ensure complete transparency.
Far from being disinterested, the Bush White House was eager to avoid making the same
mistakes of the previous administration and wanted creative new inputs for how to combat
al Qaeda's growing threat. Mr. Clarke's role figured in two key areas of the debriefings -
Sudan's offer to share terrorism data on al Qaeda and bin Laden in 1997, and a serious
effort by senior members of the Abu Dhabi royal family to gain bin Laden's extradition
from Afghanistan in early 2000.
* Fall 1997: Sudan's offer is accepted by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
then rejected by Mr. Clarke and Clinton National Security Adviser Samuel "Sandy" Berger.
Sudan's president, Omar Hasan El Bashir, made an unconditional offer of
counterterrorism assistance to the vice chairman of the September 11 Commission, then Rep.
Lee Hamilton, Indiana Democrat, through my hands on April 19, 1997. Five months later on
Sept. 28, 1997, after an exhaustive interagency review at the entrenched bureaucracy level
of the U.S. government, Mrs. Albright announced the U.S. would send a high-level
diplomatic team back to Khartoum to pressure its Islamic government to stop harboring Arab
terrorists and to review Sudan data on terrorist groups operating from there.
^^ As the re-engagement policy took shape, Susan E. Rice, incoming assistant secretary
E state for East Africa, went to Mr. Clarke, made her anti-Sudan case and asked him to
jointly approach Mr. Berger about the wisdom of Mrs. Albright's decision. Together, they
recommended its reversal. The decision was overturned on Oct. 1, 1997. Without Mr.
Clarke's consent, Mr. Berger is unlikely to have gone along with such an early
confrontation with the first woman to hold the highest post at Foggy Bottom.
Renaissance Connection Page 1 of 10

www.rcnetwork.ne
BY DAVID ROSE

© VANITY FAIR
Repinted from Vanity Fair (New York) January 2002, No. 497, pp.50-56

THE OSAMA FILES

BY DAVID ROSE
In a squat, red-brick building next to Khartoum's presidential
palace, the agents who serve the Mukhabarat, Sudan's
intelligence division, keep their secrets in pale manila files.
"Those guys know what they're doing," says a retired long-
time C.I.A. Africa specialist. "They tend to be thorough. Their
stuff is pretty reliable." And sometimes very important.
Sudan's Mukhabarat spent the early to mid-1990s amassing
copious intelligence on Osama bin Laden and his leading
An updated picture of Osama bin Laden cohorts at the heart of the al-Qaeda terrorist network-when
with fellow terrorists Ayman al-Zawahiri left,
and Muhammad Atef. they were still little known, and their activities were relatively
limited. Some of the files at Mukhabarat headquarters identify
individuals who played central roles in the suicide bombings
of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August
> 1998; others chart the backgrounds and movements of al-
Qaeda operatives who are said to be linked directly to the
atrocities of September 11.
In the wake of those attacks, President Bush and the F.B.I, issued a list of the world's 22 most
wanted terrorists. Sudan has kept files on many of them for years.

From the autumn of 1996 until just weeks before the 2001 attacks, the Sudanese government
made numerous efforts to share this information with the United States all of which were
rebuffed. On several occasions, senior agents at the F.B.I, wished to accept these offers, but
were apparently overruled by President Clinton's secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, and hi
assistant secretary fc«^Ajrjc^,_Sjj§gn_R[ce, both of whom would not comment for this story afte
repeated requests for interviews. Vanity Fair has obtained letters and secret memorandums th
document these approaches. They were made directly to the State Department and the F.B.I.,
and also via a series of well-connected U.S. citizens who tried to warn America that the
Sudanese offers were serious and significant.

By definition, September 11 was an intelligence failure. As the C.I.A. man puts It, We didn't kn
it was going to happen." Some of the reasons for that failure were structural, systemic: the
shortage of Arabic-speaking agents, the inability of C.I.A. officers to go underground in
Afghanistan.

This one was more specific. CE Had U.S. agencies examined the AF Mukhabarat files when tl

http://www.rcnetwork.net/include/_tellafriend.php?iscript=yes&preview=760&criteria=id,bo... 5/28/03
 Page 1 of4

Scott Allan

From: The Crescent Partnerships [crescent@crescentgroup.com]

Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 8:58 AM
Subject: IJAZ on the 9-11 Commission Hearings in NRO (4)

LONDON Thursday, April 15, 2004

Dear Friends & Colleagues,

Please find below some thoughts on the 9-11 Commission's hearings over the past
month, and a key area of inquiry I believe the commissioners have not yet looked
at.

Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor Ijaz
NRO Contributor

April 15. 2004, 8:32 a.m.

Politicized Intelligence
The 9-11 Commission's Achilles Heel.
By Mansoor Ijaz

The independent 9/11 Commission investigating the intelligence failures that preceded the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States has not done enough to shed light in its hearings during
the past month on the most critical problems facing America's system of predicting and protecting
against external threats. The commission's blue-ribbon panel seems unable — perhaps even unwilling —
to ask tough questions about how good intelligence was politicized, how bad intelligence was used to
make worse policy, and how policymakers' egos and personal career agendas interfered with the
development of prudent national-security strategies to deal with the growing threat of militant Islam's
terrorist front.

Analyzing these areas can reveal more about how the 9/11 attacks became possible than any assessment
of which committee or working group met when, and who did or did not attend, or how high a "wall"
was built to make sure the American judicial system functioned properly. The Clinton administration's
stormy relations with Sudan illustrate the gaping holes in the commission's important work with
distressing clarity.

5/7/2004
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Page 1 of 5
Khartoum and terrorism: the view
from inside the NSC New Diversionary
Scheme to shift blame on US gov. and
legitimize Sudan gov.
Gayle Smith was special assistant to the president for African affairs at the
National Security Council under President Clinton. Los Angeles Times
"Terrorism? Sudan Gave Us No Help"
By GAYLE SMITH
December 7 2001
One of the mistakes all too frequently made by the outside world is to assume that
because the regime in Sudan is bad it is incapable of fooling the good guys.
The regime, however, has been anything but ineffective. Quite the contrary, it is
frequently brilliant, always clever and too often successfully manipulative. Its most
successful ploy has been to turn on its head the adage "actions speak louder than
words."
"We stand for peace," the government says. According to Khartoum, the
government wants nothing more than to end the civil war that has killed more than
2 million civilians and turned southern Sudan into a permanent, destitute relief
center. What Sudanese officials fail to mention is that they overthrew an elected
government in 1989 just hours before it was to sign a peace agreement. "We are
not terrorists," they say. What they fail to mention is that they invited Osama bin
Laden not only to live in Sudan but to establish a financial architecture there. What
they fail to mention is that they created terrorist training camps and deployed
soldiers against their neighbors and Western targets. What they fail to mention is
that they harbored terrorists involved in an assassination attempt against Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak, the bombing of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya
in 1998 and a thwarted plot to bomb the United Nations.
The only definitive step Khartoum ever took against terrorism—asking Bin Laden
to leave the country in 1996—came about not out of a desire to thwart Bin Laden's
intentions but because Sudan wanted tu uvolU fmtliu 1 sanctions. • .
The Sudanese government appears to still hope that words speak louder than
actions. Now the story is that the Sudanese government had massive intelligence
files on the Al Qaeda network that it wanted to give to the U.S. over the four years
beginning in 1996 and that the State Department refused to take them, thus
denying the U.S. important information. This is as inaccurate as it is illogical.
The facts are these: On countless occasions, the Sudanese government—eager to
5/28/03
 Page 1 of4

Scott Allan

From: The Crescent Partnerships [crescent@crescentgroup.com]

Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 8:58 AM
Subject: IJAZ on the 9-11 Commission Hearings in NRO (4)

LONDON Thursday, April 15, 2004

Dear Friends & Colleagues,

Please find below some thoughts on the 9-11 Commission's hearings over the past
month, and a key area of inquiry I believe the commissioners have not yet looked
at.

Best Regards, Mansoor

Mansoor Ijaz
NRQ Contributor

April 15. 2004, 8:32 a.m. ~7l< /* ,4*<r,^ >

<JS A
Politicized Intelligence '
The 9-11 Commission's Achilles Heel.
By Mansoor Ijaz

The independent 9/11 Commission investigating the intelligence failures that preceded the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States has not done enough to shed light in its hearings during
the past month on the most critical problems facing America's system of predicting and protecting
against external threats. The commission's blue-ribbon panel seems unable — perhaps even unwilling —
to ask tough questions about how good intelligence was politicized, how bad intelligence was used to
make worse policy, and how policymakers' egos and personal career agendas interfered with the
development of prudent national-security strategies to deal with the growing threat of militant Islam's
terrorist front.

Analyzing these areas can reveal more about how the 9/1 1 attacks became possible than any assessment
of which committee or working group met when, and who did or did not attend, or how high a "wall"
was built to make sure the American judicial system functioned properly. The Clinton administration's
stormy relations with Sudan illustrate the gaping holes in the commission's important work with
distressing clarity.

4/15/2004