AN ANALYSIS OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTAL INFLUENCES O N THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY-NAVY AND THEIR IMPLICATION FOR THE FUTURE

A t h e s i s presented t o t h e Faculty o f t h e U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f College i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e requirement f o r t h e degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

B.A.

JOHN R. O'DONNELL, LCDR, USN U n i v e r s i t y o f I l l 1 nois-Chicago, Chicago, I 1linoi s , 1982

F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas 1995

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Master's The .s, 2 Aug 94

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An Analysis of Major Developmental Influences on the People's Liberation Army Navy and Their Implications for the Future

Lieutenant Commander John R. O'Donnell, U.S. Navy

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This study examines the development of the navy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the various influences that have shaped Chinese maritime capabilities. Since 1949, the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) has grown from a small collection of surface vessels to a major regional navy with significant air. surface, and subsurface capabilities. - ~hroughout its history, rhe PLAN was subjected to developmental influences chat can be categorized as strategic, polltical, economic, and institutional. The effects previous influences had on the PLAN can be used as a guide to determine how current influences will affect the In the past 15 years, these developmental influences PLAN in the next 25 years. on the PLAN have changed dramatically. Currently the PLAN is changing in response to a lack of a superpower threat, China's continuing quest to recover ulostu territories in the South and East China Seas, the reduction of political interference in military affairs, the PRC's growing economy, the growth of the PRC's coastal regions, expanding international trade, and the PRC's offshore resource.development. Also the PLAN has minimized its historical subordination to the army. Together, these influences forecast a modern, capable, and independent navy that will become a dominant presence in the waters surrounding China's island claims.
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121 Chinese Navy, PLAN, People's Liberation Army-Navy

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MASTER O F MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name o f Candidate:

LCDR John R. O'Donnell

Thesis T i t l e : An Analysis o f Major Developmental Influences on t h e People's Liberation Army -Navy and Their Implication f o r t h e Future.

Approved by:

Thesis Committee Chai rman

, Member

'?Ar++u d.?v%p
CDR Donald D. H i l l , B.S.

Member

Accepted t h i s 2d day o f June 1995 by:

, Director,' Graduate Degree

P h i l i p J . Brookes, Ph..D.

Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those o f t h e student author and do not necessarily represent t h e views o f t h e U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f College or any other governmental agency. (References t o t h i s study should include t h e foregoing statement.
ii

ABSTRACT A N ANALYSIS O F MAJOR DEVELOPMENTAL INFLUENCES ON THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY-NAVY AND THEIR IMPLICATION FOR THE FUTURE b . ~ LCDR John R. 0' Donne11 , USN. 112 pages. This study examines t h e development o f t h e navy o f t h e People's Republic o f China (PRC) and t h e various influences t h a t have shaped Chinese maritime c a p a b i l i t i e s . Since 1949, t h e People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) has grown from a small c o l l e c t i o n o f surface vessels t o a major regional navy w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t air, surface, and subsurface c a p a b i l i t i e s . Throughout i t s h i s t o r y , t h e PLAN was subjected t o developmental influences t h a t can categorized a$ s t r a t e g i c , p o l i t i c a l , economic, and i n s t i t u t i o n a l . The e f f e c t s these previous influences had on t h e PLAN can be used as a guide t o determine how current influences w i l l a f f e c t t h e PLAN i n t h e next t w e n t y - f i v e years. I n t h e past f i f t e e n years, these developmental influences on t h e PLAN have changed dramatically. Currently t h e PLAN i s changing i n response t o a lack o f a superpower t h r e a t , China's continuing quest t o recover " l o s t " t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h e South and East China Seas, t h e reduction o f p o l i t i c a l interference i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s , t h e PRC's growing economy, t h e growth o f t h e PRC's coastal regions, expanding i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade, and t h e PRC's offshore resource development. Also t h e PLAN has minimized i t s h i s t o r i c a l subordination t o t h e army. Together, these influences forecast a modern, capable, and independent navy t h a t wi 11 become a dominant presence i n t h e waters surrounding China's i s l a n d claims.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are several people who have given t h e i r valuable time and assistance w i t h t h i s project.

I wish t o thank my wife. Hare, f o r

t r a n s l a t i o n services and providing t h e support needed t o complete t h i s thesis.

I also wish t o thank my thesis committee, Dr. Gary Bjorge, Mr.

Joseph G.D. Babb, and CDR Donald H i l l f o r t h e i r t i m e l y , c r i t i c a l and instrumental feedback on t h e e a r l y d r a f t s o f t h i s thesis.
I would also l i k e t o thank t h e s t a f f a t t h e Combined Arms Research

Library (CARL) f o r t h e wide v a r i e t y o f services t h a t make CARL a superb research f a c i l i t y . Ms. Mary Nelson. P a r t i c u l a r l y helpful were Mr. Russel 1 Rafferty and Mr. Rafferty's acumen h i t h electronic databases was

instrumental i n locating numerous c r i t i c a l documents needed t o complete t h i s research. Ms. Nelsen provided c r u c i a l assistance i n tracking down

several hard t o f i n d books through t h e i n t e r - l i b r a r y loan system.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

P a e
APPROVAL PAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ABSTRACT
ii

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iii iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

L I S T OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L I S T OF TABLES

vi
vii

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

L I S T OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i i i CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 . DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN THROUGH 1959

. . . . . . . . . . . .

15
34 46 63 79 94

3 . L I N BIAO AND THE PLAN (1960-1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 . PLAN I N TRANSITION: 1972-1982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 . A MODERN NAVY: THE PLAN 1983-1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6 . REVIEW. ANALYSIS. AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ENDNOTES APPENDIX A . ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE CHINESE MILITARY

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .

104 105 106 107 108 112

B . ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE PLA NAVY . . . . . . . . . . . . C . LEADERSHIP OF THE PLAN (1950-1995)

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

D . PLAN FLEET DISPOSITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BIBLIOGRAPHY

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I N I T I A L DISTRIBUTION L I S T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST O F FIGURES Figure

1. The P a c i f i c Basin

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 . The PRC's Offshore Claims

3 . Surface Combatant Vessels

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 . China's Maritime Border

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 . F i e l d Army Relationship t o PLAN Headquarters . . . . . . .

6 . M i l i t a r y Regions o f t h e PRC (1949) . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 . Naval Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8 . U.S. Encirclement o f t h e PRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 . China's Offshore O i 1 Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 . South China Sea Islands

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1. Soviet Encirclement o f t h e PRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 . PLAN'S South P a c i f i c Deployment 13 . China's Offshore Defense Strategy 14 . PLAN'S Long Range Deployments

. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES Tables 1. Asian Surface Combatant Ships 2 . PRC's Gross National Product Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .

10 13 27 35 47 64 80 83 85 86 88

3 . PLAN'S Composition by Ship Type

4 . Soviet Ship Transfers t o t h e PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 . PLAN'S Composition by Ship Type (1960) . . . . . . . . . . 6 . PLAN'S Composition by Ship Type (1972) . . . . . . . . . . 7 . PLAN'S Composition by Ship Type (1983) 8 . S t r a t e g i c Influences 9 . P o l i t i c a l Influences 10 . Economic Influences
1 1.

. . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I n s t i t u t i o n a l Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I m ~ o r t a n tInfluences on t h e Future PLAN . . . . . . . . .

12 .

LIST O F ABBREVIATIONS Anti - a i r warfare

". ..
. I

ARL
ASW

Repair ship-landing c r a f t Anti -submarine warfare Anti -surface warfare Chinese Communist Party Central Military Commission Destroyer Guided m i s s i l e destroyer Defense I n t e l 1igence Agency (U .S. E l ectromagnetic Counter Measure Exclusive Economic Zone F i e l d Army Foreign Broadcast Information Service Guided m i s s i l e f r i g a t e Gross National Product Japanese Maritime S e l f Defense Force Medium landing ship Tank landing ship
M i 1itary Region

; .5

..

I ; '

Asuw
CCP
CMC
DD

DDG OIA E C M
EEZ

FA FBIS FFG GNP JMSDF LSM LST

MR

PLA PLAAF

People's Liberation Army (can r e f e r t o t h e e n t i r e m i l i t a r y o r simply t h e ground forces) People's Liberation Army A i r Force viii

PLAN PLANAF PRC

ROC
ROK

People's Liberation Army-Navy People's Liberation Army-Naval A i r Force People's Republic o f China Republic o f China Republic o f Korea Speci a1 Economic Zone Sea Line o f Communication Attack submarine B a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e submarine (diesel - e l e c t r i c ) B a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e submarine (nuclear powered) Guided missi l e attack submarine Attack submarine (nuclear powered) Surface t o surface m i s s i l e United Nations Conference on t h e Law o f t h e Sea United States Navy

SEZ SLOC
SS

SSB SSBN SSG

SSN

SSM

UNCLOS USN

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION study exami nc t h e development o f t h e nava1 forces o f t h e

People's Republic o f China (PRC) and t h e various influences t h a t have shaped t h e formation o f a maritime c a p a b i l i t y . The purpose i s t o

i d e n t i f y t h e major developmental influences and determine how they may influence t h e f u t u r e o f t h e Chinese naval forces. These forces, a

branch o f t h e Chinese army, are known as t h e People's Liberation Army (Navy) o r PLAN. During i t s f i r s t 45 years o f existence, t h e PLAN has

grown from a c o l l e c t i o n o f obsolescent ships t o a modern and reasonably capable coastal navy. This development has been spasmodic. Only since

t h e 1980s has t h e PLAN been able t o maintain a period o f continuous growth. The primary research question i s , how have c e r t a i n influences affected t h e development o f t h e PLAN and what do they mean f o r t h e PLAN'S future? Although t h e PRC i s a major regional power, i t s navy has been p r i m a r i l y a coastal defense force. This coastal navy developed i n

response t o a v a r i e t y o f influences t h a t f o r ease o f analysis have been categorized i n t o s t r a t e g i c , p o l i t i c a l , economic, and i n s t i t u t i o n a l . The f u t u r e o f t h e PLAN w i l l be determined by t h e impact o f these influences.

., ., ' .
:.

. ,

.
'

1:

; ; $.
::

1.'

I.':
i.!

S t r a t e a i c I n f l uenceS Events, p o l i c i e s , and s t r a t e g i e s occurring a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l t h a t have a f f e c t e d t h e PLAN are defined as s t r a t e g i c influences. Among these s t r a t e g i c influences are superpower t h r e a t s i n

c: ,.,. ,..
: .:
>,!

i,.

..!

,.

..

t h e region, Asian g e o p o l i t i c s , and Asian naval modernization programs. For t h e f i r s t 40 years o f t h e PLAN's h i s t o r y , t h e t h r e a t o f superpower a c t i o n was t h e dominant s t r a t e g i c i n f l u e n c e on t h e PLAN. Since t h e f a l l

o f t h e Soviet Union t h e i n f l u e n c e o f Asian g e o p o l i t i c s and Asian naval modernization programs has increased. Superpower Threat The two superpowers, t h e Soviet Union and t h e United States, were key s t r a t e g i c influences on t h e PLAN. The f e a r o f one o r both o f

these two superpowers was a s i g n i f i c a n t reason f o r t h e PLAN's defensive o r i e n t a t i o n f o r t h e f i r s t t h i r t y years o f i t s existence. This As t h i s

superpower t h r e a t consisted o f attempts t o e n c i r c l e t h e PRC.

encirclement i n v o l v e d superpower naval forces, t h e PLAN was a f f e c t e d . I n t h e 1950s and 1960s, t h e United States was t h e main t h r e a t t o t h e PRC. The U.S. was seen as attempting t o e n c i r c l e t h e PRC through

t h e i r support o f c o u n t r i e s such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, P h i l i p p i n e s , South Vietnam, and Thailand. Because o f t h i s n a t i o n a l

enmity, t h e United States Navy (USN) was viewed as t h e PLAN's most 1ik e l y enemy. I n t h e 1970s and e a r l y 1980s t h i s view was reversed as an expansionist Soviet Union became t h e PRC's main t h r e a t . Additionally,

t h e Soviet P a c i f i c F l e e t expanded d u r i n g t h e 1970s and 1980s, and became t h e new perceived enci r c l i ng f o r c e . Soviet naval deployments and t h e

establishment o f a Soviet naval base i n Vietnam were viewed by t h e Chinese w i t h concern.

F i g u r e 1. The P a c i f i c Basin. Reprinted, by permission, from Dora Alves, Coooerative S e c u r i t v i n t h e P a c i f i c Basin: The 1988 P a c i f i c S m ~ o s i u m(Washington DC: National Defense U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1990). X I V .

The withdrawal o f t h e superpowers from t h e region a l s o a f f e c t e d t h e PLAN. The Russian P a c i f i c F l e e t d r a m a t i c a l l y c u t i t s operating The United States

tempo, and i s no longer a f o r c e i n t h e region.

P a c i f i c F l e e t l o s t i t s major regional base, Subic Bay, and has reduced i t s presence i n t h e Western P a c i f i c . This reduced t h r e a t should be That these expenditures are

r e f l e c t e d i n reduced naval expenditures.

now r i s i n g i n d i c a t e s t h a t i n f l u e n c e s other than s t r a t e g i c ones a r e a t

work.

The weakened superpower naval presence i n Asia has allowed t h e

PLAN t o shed i t s defensive o r i e n t a t i o n and focus on operations against o t h e r r e g i o n a l navies. Asian G e o p o l i t i c s Throughout i t s h i s t o r y , t h e PLAN has been i n f l u e n c e d by two g e o p o l i t i c a l considerations. These i n f l u e n c e s are t h e PRC's quest f o r

secure borders and t h e PRC's c l a i m on what are seen as h i s t o r i c Chinese lands ( i n c l u d i n g o f f s h o r e i s l a n d s ) . F i g u r e 1 shows t h e PRC's

geographical p o s i t i o n i n t h e P a c i f i c area. The i s s u e o f permanent, secure borders i s important t o any nation, and t h e PRC i s no exception. maritime one. The PRC's eastern border i s a

Running from Korea Bay t o t h e G u l f o f Tonkin, t h i s To secure t h i s eastern border, The PRC has used

c o a s t l i n e i s almost 3,000 m i l e s long:

t h e PLAN was designed t o be t h e "Great Wall a t Sea."

i t s naval forces (mostly i n t h e 1950s) t o secure t h i s eastern border. The PRC's c l a i m t o t h e h i s t o r i c Chinese lands dates t o t h e Chinese Empire i n t h e mid t o l a t e 1 9 t h Century. This " h i s t o r i c China"

c o n s i s t s o f t h e PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong. Macao, various i s l a n d s around Taiwan, and numerous i s l a n d s and i s l e t s i n t h e South China Sea. The

PLAN has been i n v o l v e d i n t h r e e combat a c t i o n s s i n c e 1949 i n e f f o r t s t o recover these t e r r i t o r i e s (Senkaku Islands i n t h e e a r l y 1970s, Paracel Islands i n 1974. and t h e S p r a t l y Islands i n 1988). The i s s u e o f t h e V o f f s h o r e claims" i n t h e East and South China Seas i s drawing more a t t e n t i o n , as these areas a r e b e l i e v e d t o c o n t a i n l a r g e o i l reserves. These o f f s h o r e claims i n c l u d e t h e S p r a t l y and

Paracel Islands i n t h e South China Sea, and Taiwan and t h e Senkaku

..,
. ,
,..
,

(Diaoyu) Islands i n t h e East China Sea (Figure 2 ) .

Parts o f t h e S p r a t l y

and Paracel i s l a n d s a r e a l s o claimed by Taiwan, Vietnam. Malaysia, t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , and Brunei. The PRC's o f f s h o r e claims were formalized on

':',
.

..!

25 February 1992, when t h e National People's Congress passed t h e Law of

t h e T e r r i t o r i a l Sea and Contiguous Zone.

Figure 2.

The PRC's Offshore Claims.

Naval Competition i n Asia The t h i r d s t r a t e g i c influence on t h e PLAN has been t h e naval development programs o f China's neighbors. I n t h e post-Cold War w o r l d Japan.

regional navies have become more o f an i n t e r e s t t o t h e PLAN.

.
.

South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, I n d i a , and Singapore are upgrading t h e i r naval f o r c e s .

Surface Combatant Ships ( F r i g a t e Size o r Larger)

THAILAND MALAYSIA

Figure 3. Surface Combatants o f t h e Major Asian Navies. Data from The M i l i t a r y Balance (London: I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c Studies, 1990 through 1994). F i g u r e 3 shows t h e s t a t u s o f a selected segment o f t h e major navies i n post-Cold War Asia. As shown i n t h e f i g u r e , o n l y t h e Republic

o f Korea (ROK) has s i g n i f i c a n t l y increased i t s number o f major surface

combatants s i n c e 1990.

The t r e n d s evident i n Figure 3 a r e a l s o However. F i g u r e 3 does n o t show

a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e i r navies as a whole.

t h e advance i n c a p a b i l i t i e s as newer platforms replace o l d e r ones. Taiwan has leased s i x Knox c l a s s f r i g a t e s from t h e U.S., r e p l a c i n g aging Korean W a r era destroyers. The Japanese Maritime S e l f Defense Force

(JMSDF) i s b u i l d i n g some o f t h e w o r l d ' s most t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y advanced ships such as t h e KONGO c l a s s guided m i s s i l e destroyer.

Table 1.--Asian Surface Combatant Ships ( F r i g a t e Size o r Larger) COUNTRY AVERAGE AGE 1990 (YEARS) 110.50 RANKING AVERAGE AGE (1990) 1994 (YEARS) RANKING (1994) 1 3 2 4 5
1

I MALAYSIA I JAPAN I INDIA

ROK PRC INDONESIA

11.74 13.18 14.68 23.00

1 1
1

1 2

15.50 14.69 16.15 11.69 21.08

1
1

113.10

3 4 5 6

115.67

1 1 1

I THAILAND I TAIWAN

1 1

31.83 43.86

1 1

7
8

1 1

19.70 44.45

1 1

6
8

1 1

Data from The M i l i t a r y Balance (London: I n t e r n a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e f o r S t r a t e g i c Studies, 1990 through 1994).

Using age o f a s h i p alone as an i n d i c a t i o n o f i t s combat c a p a b i l i t y , t h e PLAN has made s i g n i f i c a n t progress i n t h e 1990s towards developing a modern combat capable navy. Table 1 shows t h e average age

and age ranking (newest t o o l d e s t ) o f surface combatant ships f o r t h e major Asian navies. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e PLAN advanced from t h e ranking

o f f i f t h among major Asian navies t o f i r s t i n a span o f f i v e years. Every one o f these Asian navies was able t o minimize t h e ageing o f t h e i r surface combatant force through acquisitions and construction. A d d i t i o n a l l y , Thai land and Indonesia showed a decreasing age trend. advanced age o f t h e Taiwanese surface combatant force wi 11 decline s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e next few years as Taiwan r e t i r e s some o f t h e 28 World War I1 era destroyers s t i l l i n t h e inventory. P o l i t i c a l Influences P o l i t i c a l influences are as those r e s u l t i n g from t h e m i l i t a r y ' s and s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e PLAN'S r o l e i n domestic Chinese p o l i t i c s . Key t o The

t h i s influence i s understanding t h e military - Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) r e l a t i o n s h i p .

The CCP has always wanted t o ensure i t s control

over t h e m i l i t a r y w h i l e minimizing t h e PLA's influence i n p o l i t i c s and governmental a f f a i r s . The PLA, on t h e other hand, has wanted t o

minimize p o l i t i c a l influence i n military a f f a i r s . The CCP's influence over t h e m i l i t a r y and t h e m i l i t a r y ' s intervention i n domestic p o l i t i c s both peaked during t h e Cultural Revolution. Since then, t h e p o l i t i c a l influence on t h e m i l i t a r y and t h e

r o l e o f t h e m i l i t a r y i n l o c a l and national p o l i t i c s have both declined. The declining r o l e o f t h e m i l i t a r y i n p o l i t i c s i s evidenced by t h e steady decline o f m i 1it a r y representation i n t h e CCP Central Committee Politburo since t h e Cultural Revolution. one military member, L i u Huaqing. t h e PLAN (1982-1987). Today t h e Politburo has only

L i u was also a former commander o f

Conversely, t h e CCP's p o l i t i c i z a t i o n o f t h e

military has declined from a peak achieved during t h e Cultural

Revolution.

This i s evidenced by t h e reduced m i l i t a r y involvement i n 8

mass movements / p o l i t i c a l work and t h e p o l i t i c a l leaders' current emphasis on m i l i t a r y professionalism. The second p o l i t i c a l issue was ideological and revolved around t h e strategy and doctrine o f t h e m i l i t a r y . The m i l i t a r y , especially t h e

t e c h n i c a l l y oriented branches (PLAN and t h e People's Liberation Army Air Force o r PLAAF), wanted t o develop a professional m i l i t a r y as a r e s u l t o f lessons learned i n t h e Korean War. The CCP and Mao Zedong wanted t o

continue t h e doctrine o f t h e "People's War" and placed great f a i t h i n massed forces motivated by p o l i t i c a l education and indoctrination. Only

a f t e r Mao died. d i d t h e PRC s t a r t t o move away from t h e "People's War" doctrine. This f i r s t modification was c a l l e d "People's W a r under Modern

Conditions . " The struggle between professionalism and p o l i t i c a l l y radicalized mass armies continues today, a l b e i t on a smaller scale. Economic Influences The e f f e c t t h a t t h e nature and scope o f t h e PRC's national economy had on t h e PLAN's development are defined as economic influences . Throughout most o f i t s h i story, PLAN development was constrained by a weak national economy. Recent PRC economic l i b e r a l i z a t i o n has resulted i n a growing, dynamic economy t h a t no longer acts as a hinderance t o t h e PLAN's development. Table 2 show t h e growth

r a t e o f China's Gross National Product (GNP) during selected h i s t o r i c a l periods. This t a b l e shows t h e dramatic difference i n growth r e s u l t i n g This growing economy wi 11 be b e t t e r able
A

from economic 1iberal iz a t i on.

t o support t h e large c a p i t a l cost required of a modern naval force.

healthy economy can develop the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and technology required by a navy and investment i n t h e navy w i l l a i d economic development.

The second economic influence i s t h e geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n o f economic development. I n t h e 1980s, t h e PRC began designating

c e r t a i n coastal regions as Speci a1 Economic Zones (SEZs) . An SEZ i s a region where foreign investment and development i s encouraged. The

increasing dependence upon these coastal economic zones has i n p a r t forced a s h i f t i n t h e PRC's m i l i t a r y strategy towards a more forward oriented defense. As these SEZs have grown i n importance, so has t h e

importance o f t h e PLAN.

Table 2 PRC's Gross National Product (GNP)

PERIOD

G R O W T H RATE (PERCENT)

Source: Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton & ComDany, 19901, 670; W i l l i a m Overholt. he' Rise o f China (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994) , 30 ; Economist I n t e l 1igence U n i t , Countrv Re~ot-t : China and Mona01ia (London: Economist I n t e l 1igence U n i t Ltd. , 1994), 23.

Another economic influence i s t h e growing competition f o r ocean resources. Competition f o r ocean resources, such as o i 1. minerals, and

marine l i f e w i l l force countries t o s t r i c t l y enforce t h e i r maritime

claims.

I f t h e PRC wishes t o enforce a 200 n a u t i c a l m i l e Exclusive

Economic Zone (EEZ), t h e PLAN would have t o expand t h e number o f ships and p a t r o l a i r c r a f t . Possible o i 1 deposits have exacerbated t h e

t e r r i t o r i a l disputes i n t h e South China Sea region.

I n s t i t u t i o n a l Influences The term i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e s i s used t o describe t h e i n f l u e n c e t h a t t h e PRC's m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e has had on t h e PLAN. As a subordinate o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e PLAN has been s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by t h e People's L i b e r a t i o n Army (PLA). man t h e f l e d g l i n g navy. PLA o f f i c e r s and s o l d i e r s were used t o

This meant t h a t t h e PLA's i n f l u e n c e had been

f e l t i n a l l areas o f t h e PLAN, b u t e s p e c i a l l y t h e areas o f naval s t r a t e g y and d o c t r i n e . As these army personnel were t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e PLAN, t h e y brought w i t h them i n t r a - a r m y r i v a l r i e s . I n t h e formation o f t h e PLAN, This was a r a t h e r new

most personnel came from t h e T h i r d F i e l d Army.

army which d i d n o t have t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e o l d e r Eighth Route Army o r t h e New Fourth Army. The PLAN lacked t h e p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e because This

i t s key leaders were n o t from t h e same u n i t s as t h e PLA's leaders.

intra-army problem diminishes, as t h e C i v i l War leaders pass from t h e scene. As these C i v i 1 War allegiances disappear, new s e r v i c e connected

f a c t i o n s have emerged. The second i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e has been t h e r o l e o f t h e M i n i s t e r o f Defense, a key p o s i t i o n i n t h e Chinese m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e . Both Peng Dehuai (1954-1959) and L i n Biao (1959-1971) had an enormous

i n f l u e n c e on t h e PLAN.

Between L i n Biao and t h e e a r l y 1990s. t h e r e i s In

l i t t l e evidence o f t h e M i n i s t e r o f Defense's i n f l u e n c e on t h e PLAN. 1992, a former commander o f t h e PLAN was appointed as M i n i s t e r o f Defense. This man, L i u Huaqing, brought n e a r l y f o r t y years o f naval

experience t o t h e Defense M i n i s t e r p o s t . Scooe and L i m i t a t i o n s This study begins w i t h a discussion o f t h e formation o f t h e PLAN and goes on t o e x p l a i n how t h e s t r a t e g i c , economic, p o l i t i c a l , and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e s j u s t described have a f f e c t e d t h e PLAN. The f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , missions, c a p a b i l i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e surface, naval a v i a t i o n , subsurface, and amphibious forces wi 11 be included i n t h i s research. Amphibious forces w i l l be viewed from t h e naval

perspective and wi 11 n o t i n v o l v e an i n depth review o f t h e Chinese Naval I n f a n t r y ' s l a n d war f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s . This research must necessarily be l i m i t e d i n order t o focus on t h e key issues t h a t have and continue t o i n f l u e n c e t h e PLAN. Although,

China has had a l o n g maritime t r a d i t i o n p r i o r t o 1949, t h i s study w i l l be l i m i t e d t o t h e Chinese Communist Navy. The discussion o f t h e PLAN

w i l l be l i m i t e d t o conventional forces o n l y as t h e i s s u e o f PLAN s t r a t e g i c ' nuclear capabi 1i t i e s and deterrence i s t o o lengthy t o i n c l u d e i n t h i s research. S i ani f i c a n c e The study o f t h e PLAN i s e s p e c i a l l y r e l e v a n t today. The PRC i s

important t o w o r l d and regional s e c u r i t y , and i t s navy w i l l p l a y a v i t a l r o l e i n t h e PRC's emergence as a major power. There a r e f o u r basic

reasons why t h i s study i s important. w o r l d ' s t h i r d l a r g e s t navy.

F i r s t , t h e PLAN i s numerically t h e

Table 3 shows t h e major vessels o f t h e

PLAN. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e a i r component o f t h e PLAN c o n s i s t s o f over 840 aircraft. Although n o t as t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y advanced as o t h e r Asian I n manpower terms, t h e PLAN i s

navies, t h e PLAN i s a major naval force.

l a r g e r than t h e maritime forces (navy and marine) o f Taiwan, South Korea. Japan, Vietnam, t h e Phi 1i p p i n e s , and Malaysia combi ned."

Table 3.--PLAN'S Composition by Ship Type

I
I I I I I I I

SHIP TYPE BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE (NUCLEAR POWERED) ATTACK SUBMARINE DESTROYER FRIGATE FAST ATTACK CRAFT AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
MINE WARFARE SHIPS

QUANTITY

I
I
96 17 34 799 -35 63 2 (NOTE 1)

I
I I I I I

REPLENISHMENT OILER

I I I I I I I

Note:

50 "R" c l a s s submarines are b e l i e v e d t o be non-operational

Source: Bernard P r e z e l i n ed.. Combat F l e e t s o f t h e World 1993: T h e i r S h i m . A i r c r a f t . and Armament (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval I n s t i t u t e Press. 1993). 87-105.

Secondly, t h e PLAN operates i n o r near some o f t h e w o r l d ' s most v i t a l sea l i n e s o f communications (SLOCs). The PRC's disputes w i t h i t s

neighbors over o f f s h o r e i s l a n d s d i r e c t l y impact t h e v i t a l SLOCs through t h e S t r a i t s o f Malacca and Lombok S t r a i t s . Through these s t r a i t s pass

o i l f l o w i n g t o t h e United S t a t e s ' major regional a l l y , Japan. While t h e U.S. Navy's presence i n Asia has declined. t h e United States s t i l l has many i n t e r e s t s i n t h e area. The U.S. has major defense

t r e a t i e s and re1a t i onshi ps w i t h Japan, South Korea, Phi 1i p p i nes , and several o t h e r Southeast Asian c o u n t r i e s . I n a d d i t i o n t o defense

comnitments, t h e United States has an important economic i n t e r e s t i n t h e region. Thirty-seven percent o f U.S. t r a d e i s w i t h Asia. This t r a d e i s

n e a r l y t h r e e times U.S. t r a d e w i t h L a t i n America and double t h e t r a d e w i t h t h e European Union.' To ensure adequate p r o t e c t i o n o f these

i n t e r e s t s w i t h l i m i t e d resources, t h e U.S. must understand t h e PLAN. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h i s study i s important simply because o f t h e r e l a t i v e l a c k o f i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e PLAN. Much i s known about t h e Most s t u d i e s on

various f l e e t s o f t h e w o r l d b u t l i t t l e about t h e PLAN.

t h e PLAN were completed d u r i n g t h e Cold War and r e f l e c t b i - p o l a r strategic thinking. This study endeavors t o expand and update t h e f i e l d

o f knowledge on t h e PLAN. Qraaniz a t i on This analysis o f t h e PLAN i s d i v i d e d by h i s t o r i c a l periods i n i t s development. Chapter Two covers t h e PLAN's h i s t o r y up through t h e Chapter Three encompasses t h e era when L i n Chapter Four covers t h e t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d

break w i t h t h e Soviet Union. Biao was M i n i s t e r o f Defense.

from L i n ' s death u n t i l t h e ascendancy o f L i u Huaqing t o t h e leadership o f t h e PLAN.

1982.

Chapter F i v e describes developments i n t h e PLAN s i n c e

Chapter S i x wi 11 summarize t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e i n f l u e n c e s on t h e

PLAN and discuss how c u r r e n t i n f l u e n c e s wi 11 a f f e c t t h e PLAN's f u t u r e .

1 4

CHAPTER T W O THE GREAT WALL AT SEA: DEVELOPMENT O F THE PLAN THROUGH 1959 This chapter examines t h e i n i t i a l period o f t h e PLAN'S development through t h e Great Leap Forward. This era was marked by I n addition t o

rapid naval expansion sponsored by t h e Soviet Union.

t h i s growth, t h e PLAN was occupied w i t h t h e development o f command structure, i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , strategy, and doctrine. Operationally t h e

PLAN was employed frequently against t h e N a t i o n a l i s t naval forces based on Taiwan. Events Leadino t o t he Formation o f t h e PLAN The evolution o f t h e PLAN began a t t h e end o f World War 11. The

Soviet Union provided t h e i n i t i a l impetus f o r a Communist Chinese navy, when they transferred several ex-Japanese gunboats t o t h e PLA. In late

1946 t h e Soviets established t h e Democratic Naval Academy a t Dalian, p a r t o f Soviet occupied L i andong peninsula (Figure 4). This academy provided Soviet l e d i n s t r u c t i o n f o r f u t u r e naval o f f i c e r s .
A similar

school f o r e n l i s t e d personnel was also established a t Jiamusi , close t o t h e Soviet-Manchurian border .= E f f o r t s t o construct a Chinese Communi s t navy began i n northeast China p a r t i a l l y as a r e s u l t o f a i d provided by t h e Soviets who were then occupying Manchuria and t h e L i aodong Peninsula. The f i r s t Communist

naval o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e Northeast Navy, was established i n November

1948.

This command was n o t an operational headquarters, b u t r a t h e r an

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c e n t e r f o r t h e naval t r a i n i n g a c t i v i t i e s i n Manchuria and t h e L i aodong peninsula.

SH*"b"Al

6
Figure 4.

CHINA
SEA

rP

China's Maritime Border

I n February 1949, N a t i o n a l i s t ships began defecting t o t h e Communists. The most symbolic o f t h e defections occurred i n t h e north when t h e flagship and p r i d e o f t h e Nationalist navy defected a t Huludao i n March o f 1949. This ship, t h e l i g h t cruiser Chonaainq (ex-HMS

Aurora), was l a t e r sunk a t anchor by Nationalist air planes.' The most important defection t o t h e f u t u r e o f t h e PLAN occurred along t h e east-central coast o f China. On' 23 A p r i l 1949, v i r t u a l l y t h e

e n t i r e N a t i o n a l i s t Second Coastal Defense Fleet defected t o t h e Communist side a t Nanjing (Figure 4) ."his f l e e t o f 25 vessels

ranging i n s i z e from landing c r a f t t o destroyers, represented about 25% o f Nationalist naval strength a t t h e time.'
A t t h e time o f i t s

defection, t h e Second Coastal Defense Fleet was on t h e Yangtze River. On t h e same day t h e f i r s t operationally oriented naval u n i t , t h e East China M i l i t a r y Region Navy, established i t s headquarters i n Taizhou, Jiangsu province (Figure 4 ) . i s uncertain. The relationship between these two events

However, Taizhou and Nanjing are only about 45 miles

It

apart and both c i t i e s are on o r connected by water t o t h e Yangtze.

i s easy t o surmise t h a t t h e establishment o f t h e naval headquarters was

a quick response by t h e PLA t o manage i t s newly acquired naval force.

Regardless o f t h e relationship, 23 A p r i l 1949 i s considered t h e b i r t h o f t h e PLAN. The f i r s t commander and p o l i t i c a l commissar o f t h e East China
Military Region Navy was an army general, Zhang Aiping.
" 8

Prior t o

, ,.

assuming these posts, Zhang was a deputy corps commander i n t h e Third F i e l d Army.' The Third F i e l d Army was f i g h t i n g t h e Nationalists i n t h e To man t h i s

area a t t h e time t h a t t h e headquarters was established.

17

naval force, Third F i e l d Army personnel were assigned t o t h e East China

Military Region Navy.'

Figure 5 shows t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e f i v e F i e l d

a r and t h e current naval Armies a t t h e conclusion o f t h e C i v i l W

organization.

The East China M i 1itary Region Navy headquarters was

l a t e r relocated t o Shanghai and eventually renamed t h e East Sea Fleet.8 The re1a t i onshi p between these F i e l d Armies i s key t o understanding PLAN-PLA p o l i t i c s especially i n t h e f i r s t decades o f t h e PRC's h i s t o r y .

Figure 5. Generalized F i e l d Army Locations i n January 1950 i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e PLAN'S present geographical d i v i s i o n s . Map reproduced, by permission, from The International I n s t i t u t e f o r Strategic Studies, The M i l i t a r v Balance: 1992-1993 (London: Brassey's, 1992). 149.

With t h e bulk o f t h e operational naval forces, t h e East China M i l i t a r y Region Navy took t h e lead i n developing a naval strategy.

18

Zhang A i p i n g convened a naval planning conference on 9 J u l y 1949. conference s e t f o u r t a s k s . t h e f l e d g l i n g naval f o r c e .

This

The f i r s t t a s k was t o organize and r e g u l a t e The second t a s k was t o conduct p o l i t i c a l The t h i r d The

reeducation o f t h e many former N a t i o n a l i s t naval personnel.

was t h e r e p a i r o f damaged o r d e t e r i o r a t i n g ships and f a c i l i t i e s .

l a s t t a s k was t o e s t a b l i s h naval school^.^ The goals o f t h i s new navy as defined by Zhang, were: t o b u i l d up a skeleton naval arm t o be used as a basis f o r t h e c r e a t i o n o f a powerful People's Navy o f t h e f u t u r e , i n order t o destroy t h e sea blockade o f l i b e r a t e d China, t o support t h e l a n d and a i r forces o f t h e PLA i n defense o f Chinese s o i 1 , and t o wipe o u t a1 1 remnants o f t h e r e a c t i o n a r y forces . l o Organization o f t h e Communist navy i n southern China took longer.
It was n o t u n t i l 15 December 1949, t h a t t h e Guangdong M i l i t a r y

D i s t r i c t Ri v e r i ne Defense Command was established.

The deputy commander

o f t h e Guangdong M i 1it a r y Region, Hong Xueshi , became t h e R i v e r i ne Defense Command's f i r s t commander. Personnel f o r t h i s f o r c e were drawn

from minor naval commands and f l o t i l l a s i n t h e region and t h e Fourth F i e l d Army. l1 The Beai nni na (1950) I n 1950, t h e Chinese began t o transform t h e regional naval forces and f a c i l i t i e s i n t o a n a t i o n a l f o r c e . The East China M i l i t a r y

Region Navy, t h e Guangdong M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t R i v e r i n e Defense Command, and t h e various organizations i n northeast China formed t h e b a s i s o f t h e PLAN'S o p e r a t i n g f l e e t headquarters. A n a t i o n a l naval headquarters was

e s t a b l i s h e d i n Bei j i n g on A p r i l 14, 1950 w i t h Xiao Jinguang as t h e f i r s t PLAN commander.

A long-time f r i e n d and p o l i t i c a l a l l y o f Mao Zedong, Xiao

Jinguang, was an army o f f i c e r w i t h no naval experience p r i o r t o assuming the position. Like Mao a n a t i v e o f Hunan province, Xiao had been Mao's He had studied i n Moscow f o r four

f r i e n d since t h e age o f seventeen.

years, was a veteran o f t h e Long March o f 1934.1935, and was deputy commander o f L i n Bi ao's Fourth F i e l d Army p r i o r t o assuming t h e navy position.12 Xiao was a strong Maoist who believed i n a strong coastal defense strategy. Soviet assistance was very important t o t h e PLAN and Thus, Xiao had

Xiao was selected i n p a r t f o r h i s fluency i n Russian.

t h e r i g h t p o l i t i c a l and ideological q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r t h e assignment ." Post C i v i l War army troop d i s t r i b u t i o n affected t h e composition o f t h e PLAN. Naval forces drew army personnel from collocated f i e l d Appointees t o t h e East China Military Region Navy

armies (Figure 5 ) .

came from t h e Third F i e l d Army.14 Fourth F i e l d Army provided most o f t h e personnel t o t h e Northeast Fleet and t h e Guangdong M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t
R i v e r i ne Defense Command headquarters.

Elements o f t h e Fourth F i e l d

Army also provided t h e o r i g i n a l composition o f t h e PLAN'S headquarters i n Beijing.15 The PLAN began w i t h a c o l l e c t i o n o f N a t i o n a l i s t ships t h a t were e i t h e r captured by t h e PLA or were turned over t o t h e Communists by t h e i r defecting crews. o r Japanese o r i g i n . small. These ships and c r a f t were o f American, English,

Ships o f t h e newly created PLAN were a l l r e l a t i v e l y

The largest operational ship was a destroyer escort displacing

1.020 tons.16 I n 1950, t h e PLAN consisted o f a l i g h t c r u i s e r (nonoperational 1, four destroyer escorts, seventeen gunboats, one 20

minesweeper, three motor gunboats, twelve p a t r o l vessels, and several transports, a u x i l i a r i e s , and landing c r a f t . " The PLAN'S manpower began w i t h a mixture o f former Nationalist s a i l o r s and PLA soldiers. Because o f t h e technological ski 11s required

t o maintain and operate a navy, t h e PLAN was forced t o r e t a i n some former N a t i o n a l i s t s a i l o r s . they could be trusted. P o l i t i c a l reeducation was required before

One o f Zhang Aiping's o r i g i n a l goals was t h e As discussed e a r l i e r , t h e Third and These

reeducation o f these s a i l o r s .

Fourth F i e l d Armies provided personnel f o r t h e early PLAN.

personnel required substantial t r a i n i n g before they could become competent mariners . I n 1950 several major naval schools were opened t o t r a i n these people. On August 24th, t h e Naval Fast Attack C r a f t School and t h e The a r t i l l e r y school was
.

Naval A r t i l l e r y School opened i n Qingdao.

founded i n p a r t by members o f an a r t i l l e r y d i v i s i o n o f t h e Fourth F i e l d Army. On 31 October 1950, t h e F i r s t Naval Aviation School was formed i n
It i s l a t e r combined w i t h a second aviation school t o become

Qingdao.

t h e Naval Aviation School . l a The PLAN pursued an aggressive p o l i c y o f recovering and restoring i t s naval c a p a b i l i t i e s w i t h l i m i t e d resources. With Soviet

a i d t h e Dalian-Port Arthur complex was enlarged w i t h more capable p i e r s , new warehouses. expanded anchorage areas, increased storage f a c i 1iti es , and refurbished machine shops and dry dock f a c i l i t i e s . I n Qingdao, t h e

f a c i l i t i e s l e f t by t h e U.S. Navy were augmented by new construction. Repair f a c i l i t i e s i n Jiangnan as we1 1 as a torpedo factory and naval arsenal were made o ~ e r a t i o n a.l9 l

The PLAN attempted t h e r e p a i r o r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f vessels w i t h v a r y i n g degrees o f success. The c r u i s e r Chonaainq was r e f l o a t e d i n

1951, b u t was never f u l l y restored and was scrapped i n t h e m i d - 1 9 5 0 ~ . ~ ~ An ex-Canadian and two e x - B r i t i s h corvettes p r e v i o u s l y converted t o merchant vessels were rearmed and refurbished as combatants by t h e PLAN." The r e p a i r s h i p T a b S h a (ex-USS A c h i l l e s (ARL-41)) which had

burned and grounded i n 1949 was restored t o operational s t a t u s . Soviet naval assistance expanded i n 1950. Advisory Mission was established e a r l y i n 1950. The Soviet Naval I n i t i a l l y t h e group o f

Soviet naval advisors numbered around 500 w i t h 100 remaining a t t h e PLAN'S headquarters and t h e r e s t being d i s t r i b u t e d among t h e f l e e t u n i t s . 2 2 I n J u l y , t h e f i r s t Soviet shipments o f replacement p a r t s f o r ships i n h e r i t e d from t h e Guomindang a r r i v e d . The Soviets a l s o provided

Three ~ years assistance i n t h e e f f o r t t o r e s t o r e t h e C h ~ n a o i n q . ~

1a t e r , t h e Soviet Naval Advisory Mission numbered between 1,500 and

2,000 and had a presence i n v i r t u a l l y every s h i p and t a c t i c a l u n i t i n t h e PLAN.24 Despite t h e urgent need t o consolidate, organize, and t r a i n , t h e PLAN was thrown i n t o i n i t i a l e f f o r t s t o secure t h e PRC's eastern maritime border. E a r l y amphibious operations t o consolidate t h e coastal I n March

i s l a n d s under Communi s t c o n t r o l revealed serious d e f i c i e n c i e s .

o f 1950, t h e PLA conducted an amphibious assault on t h e i s l a n d o f Hainan. Hainan i s o n l y 15 m i l e s from t h e mainland a t i t s c l o s e s t p o i n t .

Over 500 s o l d i e r s drowned when r a f t s being towed by motorized junks capsized d u r i n g t r a n s i t ." The e a r l y amphibious operations were

conducted more l i k e r i v e r crossings and c l e a r l y demonstrated t h e need

100 m i l e wide Taiwan Strait. Preparations f o r such an invasion were well advanced by June 1950. The Third F i e l d Army had b u i l t up supply and transportation assets t o sustain a crossing o f t h e Taiwan Strait.26 Army u n i t s were being t r a i n e d i n amphibious warfare by naval o f f i c e r s . " The 25 June

invasion o f South Korea and t h e subsequent positioning o f t h e United States' Seventh Fleet i n t h e Taiwan S t r a i t s ended these invasion plans. Earlv Strateav The PRC's predominant s t r a t e g i c concern early i n i t s h i s t o r y was t o defend t h e nation and i t s Communist revolution from attack. The PLAN

was important f o r i t was t o secure China's maritime border and extend Communist control t o t h e off-shore islands. I n a September 21, 1949

speech t o t h e Chinese People's P o l i t i c a l Consultative Conference, Mao Zedong had declared:

.,.,
i
, ,
i

..

.,

.
,

Our national defense w i l l be consolidated, and no i m p e r i a l i s t w i l l be allowed t o invade our t e r r i t o r y again. Our people's armed forces must be preserved and developed w i t h t h e heroic and tested People's Liberation Army as i t foundation. W e w i l l not only have a powerful army but also a powerful air force and a powerful navy.'" I n January o f 1950, Mao also described h i s view on t h e importance o f t h e PLAN: "We must b u i l d a navy. This navy must be able t o secure our

coastal defense and e f f e c t i v e l y protect us against possible aggression by. t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s . "" Constraining t h i s desire f o r a strong navy was t h e devastation o f t h e Chinese economy. The modernization o f t h e PLA and t h e PLAN was not a high p r i o r i t y o f t h e Chinese leadership immediately a f t e r taking power i n 1949. The PRC leadership's main concerns were establishing a

... .:;i. . .
!

... .

workable administrative organization, curbing i n f l a t i o n , and rebuilding domestic industry . 3 0 Even before t h e o f f i c i a1 declaration establishing

t h e PRC, i t s leaders were looking t o demobilize t h e PLA t o concentrate on rebui l d i ng t h e nation. I n addition t o t h e e f f o r t s t o gain control o f t h e coastal islands and Taiwan, t h e PRC began an early campaign t o recover islands f u r t h e r out i n t h e East and South China Seas. Only two years a f t e r t h e founding o f t h e i r country, t h e PRC started t o lay claim t o t h e various i s l e t s and .reefs o f t h e Spratly Islands. I n t h e 1951 peace t r e a t y

between Japan and t h e United States, Japan renounced a l l claims t o t h e islands o f t h e South China Sea. The peace t r e a t y d i d not mention who i n

f a c t owned these islands and on 15 August 1951, t h e PRC claimed t h e Spratly Islands, t h e Paracel Islands. and other reefs and i s l e t s o f t h e South China Sea as an h i s t o r i c p a r t o f China . 3 a Without t h e means t o

enforce these claims, t h e PRC nonetheless had established an important legal foothold i n these islands. continued t o influence t h e PLAN. Since then, these i s l a n d claims have

a r Develo~mentsDurins t h e Korean W
The PLAN d i d not s i g n i f i c a n t l y p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e Korean W a r but was busy developing i t s organization. On 13 October 1951, t h e Central

Military Comission c l a r i f i e d t h e relationship between each of t h e

regional navies, t h e Military Regions w i t h naval forces, and t h e Navy Headquarters. The M i l i t a r y Region was given combat command o f t h e regional navies, w h i l e t h e Navy Headquarters i n Bei j i n g had p r i m a r i l y an "organizational leadership relationship. "" r o l e as a supporting force t o t h e army. 24 This cemented t h e PLAN'S

I n December 1951, Xiao Jinguang outlined h i s "Three P i l l a r s " on which t o develop t h e PLAN. These p i l l a r s were, " t o b u i l d p o l i t i c a l l y

and i d e o l o g i c a l l y , t o b u i l d organizationally, t o b u i l d technologically.

"34

It i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t Xiao placed p o l i t i c a l and Xiao was a

ideological growth ahead o f technological advancement.

strong be1iever i n p o l i t i c a l orthodoxy over technical competence, which probably explained why he survived as t h e PLAN'S commander f o r t h i r t y years. Also during t h e Korean War, t h e People's Liberation Army-Naval
A i r Force (PLANAF) was formed i n A p r i l o f 1952 w i t h Dun Xingyun as i t s

f i r s t commander.

The 1 s t Division o f t h e PLANAF was activated i n The u n i t was formed w i t h personnel from t h e

Shanghai on 27 June 1952.

f i r s t classes from t h e Naval Aviation School along w i t h a regiment from t h e army and one from t h e People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).35
Early planes were a l l propeller driven and i t was not u n t i l 1955 t h a t

t h e PLANAF received i t s f i r s t j e t a i r c r a f t . Influence o f t h e Korean War Although not a major p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e Korean War, t h e PLAN was s i g n i f i c a n t l y influenced by i t . By causing t h e delay and eventually t h e cancellation o f t h e planned invasion o f Taiwan, t h e Korean W a r allowed t h e N a t i o n a l i s t forces on Taiwan t o recover from t h e i r recent defeat on t h e mainland. Taiwan received massive U.S. a i d and r e b u i l t i t s navy, In

thereby becoming a s i g n i f i c a n t t h r e a t t o China's eastern border.

1953, Mao stated, " I n t h e past, when i m p e r i a l i s t s invaded our country, i n most cases they came from t h e sea. Even now, t h e P a c i f i c Ocean i s

not a t a l l P a c i f i c . W e ought t o have a strong navy."3"ao

also

c a l l e d f o r t u r n i n g t h e coastline i n t o a "Great W a l l on the Sea."37 The Korean W a r also reduced t h e resources available f o r expanding and modernizing t h e PLAN. On 14 February 1952, Mao and Xiao Jinguang agreed t o s h i f t funds from ship construction t o t h e PLAAF t o help b u i l d more a i r c r a f t f o r use i n Korea.3s Only w i t h Soviet assistance was t h e PLAN able t o grow during t h i s period (Table 4 ) .
It

was not u n t i l a f t e r t h e war t h a t t h e PRC could restore naval development programs. The Korean war also demonstrated t o t h e PRC leadership t h e value o f sea power. Merchant shipping, escorted by naval forces, provided t h e Aircraft

l o g i s t i c support t o t h e United Nations land and air forces.

c a r r i e r s o f f t h e Korean coast launched air s t r i k e s a t w i l l against t h e Communist forces. Also, U.S. amphibious capabi l i t y , as demonstrated a t

Inchon showed t h e Chinese t h e u t i l i t y o f a modern, t r a i n e d amphibious force. A statement a t t r i b u t e d t o Mao surfaced i n 1954: "Our f a i l u r e t o win a decisive v i c t o r y i n Korea i s a t t r i b u t e d t o our poor naval force. "39 Era o f Professionalism and Soviet Influence (1953-1959)
a r was t h e peak o f Sino-Soviet The period following t h e Korean W

naval cooperation.

This cooperation consisted p r i m a r i l y o f material, These transfers were

technological , and ideological transfers.

a r instrumental i n t h e early development o f t h e PLAN. The post-Korean W

leader o f t h e PLA, Peng Dehuai , envisioned a Chinese m i l i t a r y based upon t h e Soviet model .

The Soviets provided t h e PLAN a v a r i e t y o f surface combatants and submarines. The m a j o r i t y o f these vessels were t r a n s f e r r e d between

1953 and 1959. Table 4 l i s t s t h e major Soviet naval t r a n s f e r s t o t h e PLAN. A f t e r 1955, Soviet assistance was aimed a t developing t h e PRC's

ship construction capabilities

--MAJOR SOVIET NAVAL TRANSFERS T O THE PLAN TABLE 4. DATE RECEIVED

MAY, 1954 JUNE, 1955

MIKE SUBMARINE MIKE V SUBMARINE

GORDY DESTROYER

11

JULY, 1953 OCTOBER, 1954 JUNE, 1955 OCTOBER, 1954 JUNE. 1955 OCTOBER, 1954

I: I:
1 50
12

P-4 MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT

T 43 MINESWEEPER

Source: David G. M u l l e r , China as a Maritime Power, 28-32. With Soviet a i d , t h e PRC developed a s h i p b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y . The

shipbui l d i ng program emphasized construction o f small and medium u n i t s as w e l l as submarines." The Soviets a l s o assisted i n t h e development In

o f s h i p r e p a i r f a c i l i t i e s and submarine construction technology. 1956, Chinese yards began assembling "W" c l a s s diesel - e l e c t r i c submari nes from Soviet made p a r t s .
..

With Soviet assistance, t h e Chinese

began construction i n t h e l a t e 1950s o f one "G" class d i e s e l - e l e c t r i c

..
,

b a l l i s t i c missile s ~ b m a r i n e . ~ ~

The t r a n s f e r o f Soviet naval thought t o t h e PLAN was j u s t as

%* ,., <.?~? .. ,.:.
, : ; *.:
I

important as material and technology transfers t o t h e PLAN'S development. During t h e mid t o l a t e 1950s t h e Soviet Navy s h i f t e d t h e i r

rf:

,bi m, . ...
.*. , "9

&;

emphasis away from a b i g ship S t a l i n i s t navy t o one t h a t emphasized f a s t attack c r a f t , submarines, guided missiles, and a i r c r a f t t o deter blockade o f t h e homeland. "Young School." This doctrine o f thought was c a l l e d t h e

The "Young School" naval doctrine had also been popular

I f he was

i n t h e 1920s and 1930s when Xiao Jinguang studied i n Moscow.

exposed t o any naval doctrine during h i s t r a i n i n g i t was most probably t h i s "Young School . " Also t h e PLAN's l i m i t e d naval expertise and t h e presence o f Soviet naval advisors a t a l l levels o f t h e PLAN, it i s no surprise t h a t t h e PLAN adopted t h i s "Young School" type o f naval doctrine. I n 1958. t h e CCP Central Military Commission approved "A

Resolution on Building the Navy. " This resolution stated t h a t : The Navy takes t h e development o f submarines as i t s focal point, w i t h a corresponding development o f necessary surface ships. No matter whether t h e development i s f o r submarines o r surface ships, i t should especially emphasize t h e use o f new technologies, such as guided missiles and atomic p r o p ~ l s i o n . ~ ~ This emphasis on submarine development para1l e l s t h e "Young school" doctrine and would be a primary pattern i n t h e PLAN's development f o r t h e next two decades. Defense Reorganization and Peng Dehuai
, -., , ,. ,. :, ,.

.
<

As leader o f t h e PLA, Peng Dehuai had a l a r g e r influence on t h e professionalism o f t h e PLAN than Xiao Jinguang. I n 1954 Peng became t h e

F i r s t Vice-Chai rman o f t h e CCP Central Committee's M i 1i t a r y Commission. This p o s i t i o n i s i n p r a c t i c e t h e head o f t h e PLA. Previously, Peng had

l e d t h e Chinese troops i n Korea and was convinced o f t h e need f o r 28

modernization.

Peng s t r o v e f o r a professional n o t a r e v o l u t i o n a r y army He s t a r t e d reforms which were l a t t e r These systems were: t h e Compulsory

and used t h e Soviets as a model. known as t h e "Four Great Systems."

M i l i t a r y System, t h e System o f M i l i t a r y Ranks, t h e Salary System, and t h e Order o f M e r i t System." Peng's reform e f f o r t s were implemented i n 1955. law was enacted i n February o f t h a t year. A conscription

This ensured a steady f l o w o f

new s a i l o r s and allowed t h e PLAN t o keep them f o r f i v e years (opposed t o t h r e e and f o u r years f o r t h e PLA and PLAAF r e s p e c t i v e l y ) i s five

year commitment helped t h e PLAN maintain a professional t r a i n e d f o r c e . That same month, a rank system as w e l l as a s a l a r y system was a d ~ p t e d . ' ~By October o f 1955 t h e l a s t o f t h e "Four Great Systems," t h e Order o f M e r i t System, had been enacted. Peng had a keen i n t e r e s t i n naval a f f a i r s . I n 1955. he l e d t h e This

m i l i t a r y ' s f i r s t successful combined arms amphibious a s s a u l t .

amphibious operation was d i r e c t e d against N a t i o n a l i s t troops i n t h e i s l a n d s o f f t h e coast o f Zhejiang province." Peng wanted t h e PLAN t o I n a statement

develop methodically and w i t h i n Chinese c a p a b i l i t i e s .

t h a t r e f l e c t e d Chinese c a p a b i l i t i e s and t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e Soviet Young School he s a i d , "The process o f b u i l d i n g t h e Navy should be ' F i r s t boats, then ships. e t cetera. F i r s t F i v e Year Plan The p e r i o d o f 1953-1957, o f f i c i a1 l y designated " t r a n s i t i o n t o s o c i a l i s m , " corresponded t o t h e PRC's F i r s t F i v e Year Plan. t h e F i r s t F i v e Year Plan emphasized t h e development o f heavy 29 The goal o f
'

F i r s t , we should develop torpedo boats, submarines,

industry . 4 g This emphasis on heavy industry helped t h e PLAN especially i n t h e development o f ship repair and construction f a c i l i t i e s . Although

a t t h e end o f t h e f i r s t Five Year Plan, t h e leadership was generally

s a t i s f i e d w i t h what had been achieved, Mao and l e f t i s t radicals thought more could be accomplished i f t h e population was i d e o l o g i c a l l y aroused and i f domestic resources were used t o simultaneously develop a g r i c u l t u r e and industry.50 Mao c a r r i e d t h e day and pulled China i n t o t h e Great Leap Forward which had d i r e e f f e c t s on t h e PLAN'S modernization programs. The f a i l u r e o f t h e Great Leap forward combined

w i t h the withdrawal o f Soviet assistance l e d t o a two year shipbuilding

Figure 6. Military Regions o f t h e PRC, 1949. Reprinted, by permission', Jonathan D. Spence. The Search f o r Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990), 523. 30

P o l i t i c a l Struggles Throughout t h e early 1950s. t h e PLA had been organized i n t o s i x separate m i l i t a r y regions (Figure 6 ) . Each o f these regions had four

main posts: a government chai man, a .party secretary, a m i l i t a r y commander, and a PLA p o l i t i c a l commissar. Some men, such as Gao Gang

and Rao Shushi, held more than one post and were developing strong regional power bases.= I n 1954 these two strong regional leaders were

purged and t h e m i l i t a r y and administrative organizations were centralized. The PLAN d i d not escape t h i s c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f power i n Bei j i n g . I n 1955. t h e PLAN began t h e formation o f a three f l e e t system. China M i l i t a r y Region Navy became t h e East Sea Fleet w i t h i t s headquarters i n Shanghai (Figure 4 ) . The Navy o f t h e South Central China M i l i t a r y Region was renamed t h e South Sea Fleet and established i t s headquarters i n Zhangjiang. The naval a c t i v i t i e s i n north China were The East

not organized i n t o a f l e e t structure a t t h i s time. Previously, t h e PLAN had avoided t h e heavy p o l i t i c a l influence t h a t t h e ground forces had experienced.

It was only i n 1957, t h a t t h e

PLAN established t h e o f f i c e o f F i r s t P o l i t i c a l Commissar, w i t h Su Zhenhua as i t s f i r s t leader. P r i o r t o 1957, t h e navy's senior P o l i t i c a l

Commissar and head o f t h e navy's P o l i t i c a l Department was e n t i t l e d , Deputy P o l i t i c a l Commissar. Su Zhenhua held t h i s post a t t h e time o f h i s promotion t o F i r s t P o l i t i c a l Commissar, a move which merely formalized h i s control o f t h e navy's p o l i t i c a l structure. The minimal

p o l i t i c a l influence i n naval a f f a i r s was evident i n Su's 1957 address t o t h e Congress o f Naval A c t i v i s t s i n which standard p o l i t i c a l r h e t o r i c was

decidedly absent.

I n t h i s speech he charged t h e navy t o practice

economy, r a i s e t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e armed forces, develop t a c t i c a l expertise, continue t o strengthen China's defense o f t e r r i t o r i a l waters, escort merchant convoys, and protect t h e f i s h i n g f l e e t . 5 z Taiwan S t r a i t s C r i s i s I n 1958. t h e PRC threatened t o complete t h e task t h a t t h e Korean

W a r had stopped.

The most extensive series o f naval actions between t h e

PLAN and ROC occurred during t h e blockade o f t h e islands o f Jinmen and Mazu i n 1958. I n attempts t o intercept resupply convoys t o Jinmen, t h e Only U.S. intervention w i t h four c a r r i e r

PLAN l o s t four torpedo boats.

task forces prevented Jinmen from f a l l i n g t o t h e C o m m ~ n i s t s . ~ This ~ c r i s i s again showed t h e a b i l i t y o f sea p w e r t o influence events and also prompted t h e PRC t o extend i t s t e r r i t o r i a l seas from 3 t o 12 nautical miles. S p l i t w i t h t h e Soviet Union The Si no-Soviet r i f t t h a t emerged i n t h e l a t e 1950s dramatically affected t h e PLAN. This r i f t was b a s i c a l l y a divergence i n paths between t h e two s o c i a l i s t states coupled w i t h underlying d i s t r u s t between Mao and t h e Soviet leader Khrushchev .s"ir s t , t h e s p l i t delayed t h e PLAN's modernization plans. t o reevaluate i t s strategy. Union t o t h e north. The ideological and p o l i t i c a l s p l i t between t h e Soviet Union and t h e PRC delayed t h e PLAN's growth. I n 1959 Soviet naval assistance was This break also caused t h e PLAN

No longer d i d i t have a benevolent Soviet

dramatically reduced and by August 1960 t h e Soviet Union had removed t h e

l a s t 150 naval advisors (down from a peak o f 2,000).

The effect on t h e

PLAN was dramatic, v i r t u a l l y a l l ship construction was halted, h a l f completed ships and submari nes sat i d l e w h i l e naval leaders determined priorities. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e supply o f spare parts f o r t h e Soviet made This

equipment stopped, causing more u n i t s t o remain i n p o r t . 5 5

dramatic c u t o f f drove t h e PLAN t o s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , a trait t h a t remains ingrained i n Chinese m i l i t a r y t h i n k i n g . This i n i t i a l period o f t h e PLAN'S h i s t o r y ended i n 1959. In

t h a t year a1 1 o f t h e influences previously described were dramatically changed. PLAN.

.
. .
,

S t r a t e g i c a l l y , 1959 marked t h e end o f Soviet assistance t o t h e

Economically, t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e f a i l e d Great Leap Forward were P o l i t i c a l l y and i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , t h e replacement

beginning t o be f e l t .

o f Peng Dehuai as Minister o f National Defense w i t h L i n Biao had a s i g n i f i c a n t influence on t h e PLAN.

. .

CHAPTER THREE LIN BIAO AND THE PLAN (1960-1971) The new leader o f t h e Chinese military, L i n Biao, r a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n t h e development o f t h e PLAN. This second era o f t h e PLAN's h i s t o r y was a period o f growth and modernization t h a t occurred despite national economic disasters and p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y . Most o f t h i s expansion can be a t t r i b u t e d t o one man, L i n Bi ao. During

t h i s period, L i n had a l a r g e r influence on naval force structure and strategy than t h e PLAN's commander. L i n Biao's vehement anti -

Americanism l e d t o t h e expansion o f t h e PLAN as a counter t o t h e U.S. Navy. The PLAN i n 1960 was s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from t h e force created only a decade before. The number, variety, and c a p a b i l i t y o f The ships o f t h e PLAN now had more

i t s ships had increased (Table 5).

o f a Soviet appearance as a r e s u l t o f Soviet naval assistance i n t h e 1950s. As shown i n Table 5, t h e PLAN now had t h e nucleus o f a coastal

defense force w i t h i t s large numbers o f f a s t attack c r a f t , submarines, and p a t r o l vessels. The personnel composition o f t h e PLAN had also changed. Although t h e o f f i c e r corps was s t i l l composed almost e n t i r e l y o f former PLA o f f i c e r s , t h e PLAN had begun developing i t s own o f f i c e r corps. Instead o f volunteers, t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e PLAN's s a i l o r s were now conscripts serving a f i v e year term o f service.

34

Table 5. --PLAN'S ~ o m ~ o s i t i ' o by n Ship TYPE (1960) SHIP CLASS ATTACK SUBMARINE QUANTITY 26 4 NOTES ALL EX-SOVIET. THE MOST CAPABLE ARE THE 12 "W" CLASS

I
I I

DESTROYER FRIGATE FLEET MINESWEEPER PATROL VESSEL TORPEDO BOAT AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS REPAIR SHIP

I
I
I

16 10 27 APPROX. 150 25 1

ALL EX-SOVIET GORDY CLASS INCLUDES 4 RIGA CLASS BUILT I N SHANGHAI ALL SOVIET 1-13 CLASS EX-SOVIET AND BRITISH CRAFT 50 SOVIET P-6 CLASS AND SEVERAL SOVIET P-4 CLASS MOSTLY EX-U.S. SHIPS

1
1

EX-USS ACHILLES(ARL-41)

Source: Raymond V. B. Blackman, ed., Jane's F i a h t i n a Ships 1960-1961 (New York: McGraw-Hi 11 Book Company I n c . . 1960). 117-121.

As a r e s u l t o f changes i n t h e 1950s, t h e PLAN was developing along t h e l i n e s o f a professional naval f o r c e modeled on t h e Soviet navy. Not o n l y were t h e PLAN's ships o f Soviet design, so were i t s I n t h e previous decade t h e PLAN

s t r a t e g y , rank s t r u c t u r e , and uniforms.

had adopted t h e Soviet "Young School" o f naval thought t h a t advocated an i n s h o r e defense w i t h l i g h t surface c r a f t over a h i g h seas f l e e t w i t h l a r g e r ships.' This s t r a t e g y was t o continue throughout t h e decade

w i t h some p o l i t i c a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s .
B y 1960, t h e PLAN's o r g a n i z a t i o n had evolved t o resemble i t s

c u r r e n t s t r u c t u r e (Figure 7 ) . The naval a c t i v i t i e s i n northeast China were now consolidated under t h e North Sea F l e e t headquartered i n 35

Qingdao.

The PLAN'S t o p leadership, Xiao Jinguang and Su Zhenhua, However, Zhang Aiping, t h e founder o f t h e East China

remained t h e same.

M i l i t a r y Region Navy i n 1949 had previously reverted back t o t h e PLA.

Figure 7. Naval Organization. Reprinted from Godwi n The Chinese Communist Armed Forces (Maxwell A i r Force Base, AL: A i r University Press, l988), 123.

36

.
,

6.
f

. .' .?

!~'.,

i :" ,

-.
t

... , i'

Strateaic Outlook Throughout t h e 1960s, t h e Chinese continued t o view t h e U.S. Navy as t h e primary maritime t h r e a t . The U.S. Navy was seen as p a r t o f

:.. ,

. , .;

an e f f o r t t o e n c i r c l e China, as depicted i n Figure 8.

Figure 8. U.S. Encirclement o f t h e PRC. Drawing from Pekina Review, reprinted i n Washinaton Post, 27 February 1966, E3.

The PLAN d i d not view t h e Soviet navy as a major t h r e a t .

The

p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e o f t h e day had many references about t h e U.S. Navy, but none about t h e Soviet Navy. S t r a t e g i c a l l y , t h e Soviet P a c i f i c Fleet
It lagged behind t h e other three

was not much o f a t h r e a t i n t h e 1960s.

Soviet f l e e t s i n t h e number and q u a l i t y o f i t s ships.

Throughout t h e

1960s, Soviet operations i n t h e P a c i f i c were consistently l a s t among t h e

1 ' .( ., ,

L'

:... i:.:
. . , , : , * : ; .. ., ..

four major operating areas ('~editerranean.A t l a n t i c , Indian Ocean, and P a c i f i c Ocean) i n terms o f annual ship d a y s . V t was not u n t i l l a t e i n t h e decade t h a t China began t o perceive a Soviet naval t h r e a t i n t h e Pacific.

<:,

. 0'. ,'

'.., . ,..,

. .

Naval Strateqy
The PRC's naval strategy changed very l i t t l e i n t h e 1960s. strategy t h a t came t o t h e f o r e during t h i s period was an offshoot o f Mao's "Great W a l l a t Sea." "People's W a r a t Sea." This strategy came t o be known as t h e The

The "People's War a t Sea" was a combination o f

Mao's coastal defense strategy and t h e Soviet "Young School" doctrine. I n t h e world struggle, L i n Biao saw t h a t North America and Western Europe constituted t h e " c i t i e s o f the world" and t h e r e s t o f t h e continents made up t h e " r u r a l areas o f t h e world. "' He saw p r o l e t a r i a n uprisings beginning I n these " r u r a l " areas. Using t h i s same analogy, The "People's War a t

t h e oceans could also be p a r t o f t h e r u r a l area.

Sea" was simply an extension o f " r u r a l " g u e r i l l a war onto t h e oceans. I n f a c t , t o win a t sea one must embrace Mao's thought, r e l y on t h e masses o f people, make use o f cover and concealment, and "bring i n t o f u l l play t h e strategy and t a c t i c s o f t h e people's war."" Period o f Retrenchment (1960-1961) The end o f Soviet assistance and t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e Great Leap Forward had great impacts upon t h e PLAN'S growth. These two factors

combined t o e f f e c t i v e l y h a l t any new ship development o r construction f o r t h e PLAN u n t i l 196Z.5

O f these two factors, t h e end o f Soviet

assistance affected t h e PLAN t o a greater degree.

The end o f Soviet

assistance affected t h e PLAN so deeply t h a t t h e issue o f outside technical dependence affects t h e PLAN t o t h i s day. The withdrawal of Soviet assistance stopped t h e PLAN'S growth

by removing Soviet technicians, h a l t i n g t h e supply o f spare p a r t s , and

restricting the availability o f fuel. I n 1960. four "W" class A f t e r t h e Sino-

submarines were i n various stages o f construction.

Soviet s p l i t , work ceased on these submarines f o r over a year.6 A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e PLAN had not stockpiled quantities o f spare parts f o r i t s Soviet designed ships and submarines. By e a r l y 1961 and through

1962 many ships and submarines were unable t o operate due t o lack o f replacement parts and technical assistance.' By 1960, t h e PRC was After the

importing one-half of i t s o i l requirements from t h e Soviets. s p l i t these imports were reduced by 40 percent.

The r e s u l t i n g o i l

shortage caused t h e PLAN t o reduce usage by r e s t r i c t i n g underway training.s Along w i t h t h e end o f Soviet aid, t h e economic r e s t r u c t u r i n g a f t e r t h e Great Leap Forward caused a reduction i n ship construction. To repair a severe a g r i c u l t u r a l production slump, t h e Central Committee i n 1961 s h i f t e d emphasis away from heavy industry and towards a g r i c u l t u r e and l i g h t industry . 9 This was reaffirmed i n 1962. when Zhou Enlai c a l l e d f o r t h e nation t o put i t s f i r s t p r i o r i t y i n agriculture, l i g h t industry over heavy industry, and t h e reduction o f s t a t e investment i n t h e construction o f industri a1 enterprises .'"hi change i n emphasis resulted i n dramatic reductions o f naval related industries. For example, t h e production o f merchant ships dropped from s

54,300 metric tons displacement i n 1959 t o 13,500 metric tons i n 1962 ( a

75 percent reduction).

Finished steel production declined from 11,300

tons i n 1960 t o 6,000tons i n 1962 (a 47 percent drop) .ll This reduction o f i n d u s t r i a1 production combined w i t h t h e absence o f s k i 1l e d Soviet technicians c r i p p l e d t h e PLAN'S development plans f o r two years. Expansion and P o l i t i c s (1962-1966) During t h i s period t h e PLAN expanded dramatically. Between

1962 and 1966, expenditures on naval construction rose about 600

percent. The naval budget not only increased i n absolute terms but also In as a percentage o f t h e growing non-strategic m i l i t a r y forces budget.

1958, t h e PLAN expenditures constituted 25 percent o f t h e non-strategic

forces budget; by 1966 t h i s had increased t o 29 percent .12 During t h i s period t h e PLAN used t h e increased budget appropriations t o upgrade t h e force. I n 1962. they resumed work on t h e

four "W" class submarines and started work on i t s successor, t h e "R" submarine. The PLAN began construction o f a b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e capable

submarine, t h e "G" class i n mid 1962. They also r e f i t t e d t h e "W" class w i t h new sonars while a t t h e same time decommissioned older submarines. The PLAN also took t h e f i r s t steps towards a modern coastal defense navy w i t h t h e b u i l d i n g o f t h e Komar class m i s s i l e attack boats i n 1963 and t h e Osa class m i s s i l e attack boats i n 1964. These were equipped w i t h Styx missiles which f o r t h e f i r s t time gave t h e PLAN a capable a n t i surface c a p a b i l i t y .
;.;. :>+
. ,

The PLAN was also developing large numbers o f gun I n 1963, work began on

equipped coastal p a t r o l boats and torpedo boats.

.: i ; : j i ?x ' 4%~:; _j/. I.. I:x '..

t h e Jiagnan class f r i g a t e , t h e f i r s t surface combatant designed and b u i l t i n China. The f i r s t a n t i submarine type vessel, t h e Hainan class

submarine chaser, was launched i n 1964.l'

40

I n addition t o t h i s s i g n i f i c a n t expansion o f t h e number o f vessels and a i r c r a f t , several personnel issues were addressed i n t h i s period. L i Zuopeng, a f e l l o w Fourth F i e l d Army alumni, was appointed L i was a close associate o f L i n Biao having

Xiao's deputy i n 1962.

previously served as a corps commander i n h i s

arw.

Manning and

t r a i n i n g a t e c h n i c a l l y based force l i k e t h e PLAN became easier i n 1965, when t h e term o f service f o r ship based s a i l o r conscripts was increased from 5 t o 6 years. I n 1965, p o l i t i c s reversed t h e PLA's t u r n toward t h e Soviet professional military model t h a t began a t t h e end o f t h e Korean W a r . On May 24 o f t h a t year, a l l o f Peng Dehuai's 1955 reforms were repealed. Two days l a t e r , t h e military uniform was standardized. This eliminated

t h e most v i s i b l e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e services and between o f f i c e r s and conscripts. t h e army. The PLAN would i n t h e f u t u r e wear t h e same uniform as

I n June, t h e M i n i s t r y o f National Defense p r o h i b i t e d the use Henceforth, o f f i c e r s were t o be c a l l e d by t h e i r

o f military t i t l e s .

f u l l name or simply " ~ o m r a d e . " ~These ~ measures were intended t o reverse t h e trend towards t h e Sovietization o f t h e military model and t o force a return t o equality t h a t t h e rank s t r u c t u r e had eliminated. Proof o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e "People's War a t Sea" doctrine and small naval combatant employment came i n August 1965. In a brief battle

eleven torpedo boats, four f a s t attack c r a f t , and one gunboat engaged a N a t i o n a l i s t l a r g e subchaser and a small subchaser. i n a PLAN v i c t o r y . The b a t t l e resulted

Zhou Enlai commended t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g u n i t s by

saying "This naval b a t t l e e n t a i l e d close combat, n i g h t combat, and mass combat.

It was a b a t t l e i n which small c r a f t fought large vessels. " 1 5

41

C u l t u r a l Revolution (1966-1969) The C u l t u r a l Revolution had t h r e e main i n f l u e n c e s on t h e PLAN. F i r s t . i t removed some senior naval o f f i c e r s . Second, i t forced t h e Third, t h e Cultural

navy t o continue w i t h a coastal defense s t r a t e g y .

Rev01u t i on p r e c i p i t a t e d a s t r u g g l e among t h e PLAN's t o p 1eadership. Although these i n f l u e n c e s are s i g n i f i c a n t , t h e y were minimal compared t o t h e changes t h e C u l t u r a l Revolution brought t o t h e PLA. Many senior naval o f f i c e r s were purged d u r i n g t h e C u l t u r a l Revolution. h o n g those purged were t h e PLAN's P o l i t i c a l Commissar, t h e

navy's c h i e f operations o f f i c e r , t h e East Sea F l e e t commander, two deputy commanders, and two F l e e t P o l i t i c a l Commi ssars . A1 together 120 s e n i o r naval o f f i c e r s and thousands o f -lower ranking personnel were purged.16 The C u l t u r a l Revolution forced t h e PLAN t o continue w i t h i t s coastal defense naval s t r a t e g y . over weapons became d o c t r i n e . The p o l i t i c a l r h e t o r i c espousing men A s k i r m i s h w i t h t h e N a t i o n a l i s t navy was

described as "a sea b a t t l e t h a t r e f u t e d t h e bourgeois and r e v i s i o n i s t t h e o r y t h a t weapons, r u l e s , and r e g u l a t i o n s and 'experts' are omnipotent. "17 The f e a r o f p o l i t i c a l r e p r i s a l made c h a l l e n g i n g t h e c u r r e n t s t r a t e g y very hazardous. The C u l t u r a l Revolution a l s o p r e c i p i t a t e d a s t r u g g l e between t h e PLAN's commander, X i ao Jinguang, and h i s deputy, L i Zuopeng. L i had

been i n h i s p o s i t i o n s i n c e 18 June 1962.18 On 9 June 1967, he replaced Su Zhenhua, as F i r s t P o l i t i c a l Commissar o f t h e PLAN." As a r e s u l t o f

h i s t i e s w i t h L i n Biao, L i Zuopeng e f f e c t i v e l y became t h e PLAN's c h i e f . Xiao Jinguang became a mere figurehead and was r e l a t i v e l y s i l e n t

throughout t h e Cultural Revolution. The proof o f L i ' s power was demonstrated i n 1969, when he, rather than Xiao, was appointed t o t h e
pol it bur^.^^

Even w i t h t h e continuing p o l i t i c a l struggle, both c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y shipbuilding increased during t h i s period.

t:? . , 8

Despite t h e

. , . ,' .. ,.. .',

i!

r e j e c t i o n o f t h e Soviet model, t h e PLAN followed t h e same ship p r i o r i t i e s developed by Peng Dehuai i n t h e 1950s. restated these ship b u i l d i n g p r i o r i t i e s : Submarines, f a s t attack c r a f t , development o f t h i s kind o f vessels ( s i c ) i s what we should accelerate. W e are hopeful t h a t a nuclear powered submarine can enter t h e water i n 1970. . . . The Navy should enhance i t s airborne and surface defense systems.= Shipbuilding s k i l l s had increased by t h e l a t e 1960s. I n 1968, I n 1969, Zhou Enlai

2.1. 'i,
'l,,

y i . 6 . .,

'
,

,., ., :
:I

I.

>: ; . : .

China designed and b u i l t i t s f i r s t 10,000 ton class merchant ship.22

.,.:
.
,

The PLAN received t h e f i r s t "R" diesel - e l e c t r i c class submarine b u i l t e n t i r e l y w i t h domestic materials i n 1969.23 Soviet Border Incident (1969) Relations w i t h Soviets continued t o deteriorate during t h e 1960s. Beginning i n 1966 and continuing through 1968, t h e Chinese grew I n March 1969,

wary o f increased Soviet troop levels along t h e border.

Chinese and Soviet troops clashed i n t h e disputed Wusuli Jiang (Ussun River) border area ." A f t e r t h i s incident, t h e Soviet P a c i f i c Fleet The Soviets were viewed as

began t o be perceived as a t h r e a t .

" f r a n t i c a l l y expanding i t s navy and b u i l d i n g up a f l e e t w i t h combat a b i l i t y i n far oceans"25t h a t would be used i n conjunction w i t h t h e U.S. t o blockade t h e PRC.

The t h r e a t t o t h e PLAN was s t a r t i n g t o change i n t h e early 1970s. Instead o f one major t h r e a t , there were now two. The Chinese

argued t h a t i n t h e face o f two "maritime t y r a n t s " t h a t they should b u i l d a powerful navy and a strong merchant marine. They also suggested t h a t China should b u i l d "railroads on t h e sea" t h a t would f a c i l i t a t e national defense. t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f Taiwan, and t h e providing o f support t o world rev01u t i on. 26 The regional navies were not viewed as major threats. However,

t h e r e b i r t h and growth o f Japan's naval forces was noted w i t h some concern. The Japanese government and t h e Japanese Maritime Self-Defense

Force (JMSDF) was c r i t i c i z e d heavily i n 1970 and 1971 j u s t p r i o r t o t h e r e t u r n o f t h e Ryukyu Islands (including t h e PRC claimed Senkakus) t o Japan by t h e U.S. Also, t h e raids from Taiwan had diminished i n t h e

1960s as t h e PLAN and PLA s o l i d i f i e d i t s coastal defenses i n t h e Taiwan Strait." The F a l l o f L i n Biao (1971) A f t e r an abortive coup, L i n Biao was k i l l e d i n an airplane crash on 13 September 1971. Afterwards, a l l o f L i n ' s supporters were removed from o f f i c e i n what has been c a l l e d t h e "most extensive purge o f t h e PLA high command since t h e Chinese Communists came t o power. " 2 B Although, t h e PLAN i n general was not associated w i t h t h e coup attempt, t h e PLAN's p o l i t i c a l commissar, L i Zuopeng, was deeply involved. L i was

a key associate o f L i n Biao and t h e o f f i c e r who allegedly allowed L i n ' s

escape plane t o take o f f despite e x p l i c i t orders t o t h e contrary from Zhou Enlai . 2 9 L i was removed as t h e PLAN's p o l i t i c a l commissar and a l l

other posts on 24 September 1971.'"

44

L i n d i d not l i v e t o see t h e type o f navy he helped develop.

In

December o f 1971, t h e f i r s t guided m i s s i l e destroyer designed and b u i l t i n t h e PRC was turned over t o t h e PLAN by Dalian Shipyard." L i n ' s tenure as Minister o f Defense t h e PLAN fared w e l l . During

L i n was.

c r u c i a l t o t h e construction o f 7 Luda class destroyers, 2 guided m i s s i l e f r i g a t e s , 7 f r i g a t e s , 95 Surface t o Surface M i s s i l e (SSM) equipped p a t r o l c r a f t . 430 p a t r o l c r a f t (gun), and over 430 torpedo equipped p a t r o l c r a f t .'"

CHAPTER FOUR PLAN I N TRANSITION: 1972 T O 1982

By 1972, t h e PLAN had become a capable coastal defense force. I t s substantial submarine force and large numbers o f small f a s t attack c r a f t , some equipped w i t h surface t o surface missi l e s (SSM). were a potent t h r e a t t o adversaries (Table 6). The PLANAF had also grown i n

t h e previous decade and was now estimated t o have 100 IL-28 l i g h t bombers and around 350 f i g h t e r s (mostly MiG-15,17, and 19 types). PLAN also constructed a series o f coastal surveillance s i t e s t h a t provided coverage o f t h e e n t i r e coastline out t o 50 miles.' t h e coastal defense force i n i t i a t e d by L i n Biao. The CCP's reaction t o L i n ' s coup attempt was t o reduce t h e p o l i t i c a l role o f the military. PLA representation i n t h e 25 man This was The

P o l i t b u r o dropped from a high o f 52 percent i n 1969 t o 28 percent i n 1973 and i n t h e same time frame PLA membership i n t h e Central Committee dropped from 45.6 percent t o 31.3 percent.' The PLAN l o s t i t s f i r s t

ever Politburo representative, L i Zuopeng. because o f h i s association w i t h L i n Biao and h i s involvement i n L i n ' s coup attempt. L i n Biao's death temporarily halted naval expansion. I n 1972

m i l i t a r y spending dropped 20 percent and rose only 1 percent per year f o r t h e r e s t o f t h e decade. These budget constraints c u t and slowed

procurement o f t h e Luda destroyer and t h e Han nuclear submarine construction programs. However, construction o f Young School type ships 46

continued, w i t h production o f several "R" class submarines, f a s t attack c r a f t , and t h e development o f t h e Ming class submarine.'

Table 6.SHIP CLASS BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE ATTACK SUBMARINE

I

PLAN'S Composition by Ship TYPE (1972) OUANTITY

1 "G" CLASS

NOTES

35
I

ALL SOVIET DESIGN 4 GORDY DESTROYERS 1 LUDA GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER 5 JIANGNAN CLASS 4 RIGA CLASS

DESTROYER FRIGATE MISSILE BOAT FLEET MINESWEEPER FAST GUNBOATS PATROL VESSEL
TORPEDO BOAT

5 18 17

I
I
- .

20 315 20 220
.

1
1

OSA AND KOMAR CLASS SOVIET 7-43 CLASS 37MM GUNS EX-SOVIET AND BRITISH CRAFT

AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS REPAIR SHIP

25
1

1
I

SOVIET P-4 AND P-6 CLASS MOSTLY EX-U.S. SHIPS EX-USS ACHILLES(ARL-41)

Sources: Raymond V. B. Blackman ed.. Jane's F i a h t i n a S h i m 1972-1973 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company I n c . , 1960). 64-68, and David G. M u l l e r , China as a Maritime Power (Boulder Co: Westview Press, 1983), 89-110.

Economic Influences i n t h e Earlv 19705 The PLAN b e n e f i t t e d from China's increased i n t e r e s t i n maritime economic a f f a i r s i n t h e 1970s. The primary economic i n f l u e n c e was t h e

growing importance o f offshore o i l f i e l d s .

The second economic factor

was expansion o f foreign trade and t h e f o l l o w on development o f a large merchant f l e e t , expanded ship bui l d i n g capacity, and growth i n m a r i time infrastructure.
O i l became a major concern f o r China as w e l l as t h e r e s t o f t h e

world i n t h e e a r l y 1970s.

I n t h e early 1970s, surveying e f f o r t s

determined t h a t large o i l deposits were possibly located under t h e East China and Yellow Seas. I n 1974 South Korea and Japan established a

j o i n t development zone f o r f i n d i n g o i l under t h e East China Sea continental s h e l f (Figure 9 ) . This was seen i n Bei j i n g as a f l a g r a n t infringement o f China's sovereignty . The o f f i c i a1 Chinese p o s i t i o n as stated by t h e M i n i s t r y o f Foreign A f f a i r s was: "The East China Sea continental s h e l f i s t h e natural extension o f t h e Chinese continental territory. The People's Republic o f China has i n v i o l a b l e sovereignty

over t h e East China Sea continental shelf."+

Early i n t h e 1970s t h e PLAN was involved i n protecting China's

continental s h e l f from o i 1 exploration by foreign nations and companies. Previously, two PLAN Komar class m i s s i l e boats shadowed a Gulf o i 1 company exploration ship t h a t was conducting surveys north o f Taiwan approximately 40 t o 50 miles from t h e Chinese mainland. Due t o t h i s

naval presence, t h e U.S. pressured t h e company t o withdraw i t s ship.' Between February and June 1973, PLAN Komar class m i s s i l e boats appeared i n t e r m i t t e n t l y w i t h i n a m i l e o f Gulf o i l d r i l l i n g r i g , Glomar I V , i n a Korean concession area o f the East China Sea. This presence combined

w i t h American reluctance t o press t h e concession claim. forced Gulf O i l t o abandon e f f o r t s t o d r i l l i n t h e area.6 These two events aqain

demonstrated t o t h e Chinese t h e b e n e f i t s o f even a minimal naval presence.

F i g u r e 9. China's Offshore O i l Regions. Reprinted, by permission, from Kim Woodard, "China and Offshore Energy" i n Problems o f Communism Vol . XXX, Nov-Dec 1981, 39.

I n addition protecting China's offshore petroleum resources, t h e PLAN was used t o assist s t a t e o i l enterprises. This assistance

included providing t h e o i 1 r i g s w i t h meteorological data, coordinating t h e preparation o f exploratory work, and safeguarding personnel working on t h e r i g s . The PLANAF also flew sorties t o ascertain concentrations of oil reso~rces.~ Thus t h e navy played a key r o l e i n t h e development o f China's offshore o i 1 resources. The growing size o f t h e Chinese merchant marine and shipbuilding industries focused government a t t e n t i on on maritime affairs. To help s t a r t an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y competitive merchant marine, The PRC purchased 250

t h e Chinese began w i t h foreign ship purchases.

freighters, tankers, and bulk c a r r i e r s t o t a l i n g 2.5 m i l l i o n gross tons between 1970 and 1976. There was also a dramatic increase i n shipbuilding output. Between 1970 and 1976, t h e PRC constructed 94

f r e i g h t e r , tankers, and bulk c a r r i e r s amounting t o over 1 m i 11i o n gross tons ."hip production was accelerated. For example, Ji angnan

shipyard i n Shanghai b u i l t 5 ships i n 1974, whereas i n t h e 1960s t h e shipyard took f i v e years t o b u i l d a single ship.9 The PRC also began upgrading i t s maritime i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . Besides ships, t h e most important item a maritime nation required was f a c i l i t i e s t o tranship products e f f i c i e n t l y . Such f a c i l i t i e s included

deep d r a f t berths, wide and deep channels, and modern f r e i g h t handling equipment. This improvement i n maritime i n f r a s t r u c t u r e had t h e

advantage t h a t i t could also be used by t h e PLAN.

Law o f t h e Sea Debate The PRC's admission i n t o t h e United Nations i n 1971 began a decade long involvement i n international maritime discussions rev01v i ng around t h e development o f t h e Law o f t h e Sea Treaty. The PRC's

p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e United Nations Conference on t h e Law o f t h e Sea (UNCLOS) highlighted maritime a f f a i r s and t h e need f o r a strong navy t o protect China's offshore resources. The UNCLOS meetings were important t o t h e Chinese. The

conferences provided a forum t o denounce t h e two superpowers as "maritime hegemonists", and t o c u r r y p o l i t i c a l favor among Third World coastal states who wanted a 200 nautical m i l e Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ).

For t h e Chinese t h e issue was both economic and s t r a t e g i c .

The

Chinese press accused t h e U.S. and t h e Soviet Union o f plundering t h e resources o f smaller countries, using t e r r i t o r i a l waters t o c o l l e c t m i l i t a r y information, and as a base t o launch invasions.1 After nine years t h e Law o f t h e Sea Treaty was signed on 10 December 1982. Although not pleased w i t h the provisions on deep sea mining and t r a n s i t o f foreign warships through t e r r i t o r i a l waters, t h e Chinese signed t h e t r e a t y . The vice chairman o f t h e Chinese delegation

t o t h e UNCLOS said a f t e r t h e signing, t h a t countries should make e f f o r t s t o defend t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e convention and t h e i r legal r i g h t s and interests." This debate over t h e Law o f t h e Sea highlighted t h e need

f o r a comprehensive maritime strategy t h a t would protect Chinese r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s i n t h e waters o f East Asia.

Paracel I s 1ands During t h e same p e r i o d t h a t t h e Law o f t h e Sea was being debated, t h e Chinese quest t o recapture " l o s t t e r r i t o r i e s " manifested i t s e l f i n t h e South China Sea.
A d i s p u t e began over t h e S p r a t l y Islands

(Figure 10) i n l a t e 1973, as a r e s u l t o f South Vietnam's l e a s i n g o f o i l concessions and i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f a p o r t i o n o f t h e S p r a t l y (Nansha) Islands i n t o t h e i r Phuoc Tuy province.'"

F i g u r e 10.

South China Sea Islands

52

A1though the dispute between China and South Vietnam rev01ved around t h e Spratly Islands, c o n f l i c t between t h e two m i l i t a r i e s began i n t h e Paracel (Xisha) Islands. P r i o r t o the c o n f l i c t both sides had

forces i n t h e Paracels. The PRC occupied t h e northeast portion o f t h e islands known as t h e Amphitrite Group, and t h e South Vietnamese occupied t h e Crescent Group i n t h e southwest (Figure 10). On 19-20 January 1974,

t h e PLAN captured t h e Crescent Group o f t h e Paracel Islands w i t h a task force o f f a s t attack c r a f t and about 500 troops. The action i n t h e Paracels was t h e PLAN'S f i r s t amphibious operation since 1955. Although i t appeared t o be a modern combined arms amphibious assault, there was l i t t l e coordination between t h e PLA branches. International condemnation along w i t h an i n a b i l i t y t o p r o j e c t

power f u r t h e r south prevented the PLAN from securing t h e Spratly Island~.~~ m Soviet Hegemoni s m Replaces U.S. Imperi a1is Another important s t r a t e g i c f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g t h e PLAN i n t h i s period was t h e s h i f t i n China's primary t h r e a t from t h e United States t o t h e Soviet Union. I n t h i s period S i no-American r e l a t i o n s improved, The Soviet

w h i l e t h e Sino-Soviet dispute expanded t o t h e oceans.

P a c i f i c Fleet became t h e primary adversary o f t h e PLAN because o f i t s expansion, t h e pattern o f operations i n Asia, and t h e h o s t i l e p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s between China and t h e U.S.S.R. Second, t h e Soviet a c t i v i t i e s Having a new

i n Asia were seen as an attempt t o e n c i r c l e t h e PRC.

adversary t o replace t h e U.S. meant t h a t t h e PLAN could continue t o request increased expenditures on naval forces.

GROWING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE EAST

Figure 11. Soviet Encirclement o f t h e PRC. Reprinted, by permission, B e i . i i n ~ Review, March 23, 1981, 21.

S o v i e t naval expansion i n t h e P a c i f i c was watched c l o s e l y by t h e PRC. By t h e e a r l y 1980s, t h e Soviet P a c i f i c - F l e e t had almost

doubled t h e number o f p r i n c i p a l surface combatants t o 90, increased i t s naval a v i a t i o n by 50 percent t o 440 a i r c r a f t , and added many newer 54

classes o f nuclear powered submarines.

I n a d d i t i o n , t h e Soviet navy had

s t a t i o n e d i t s l a r g e s t contingent o f naval i n f a n t r y (8.000 men) i n

V l adi vostock ."

The w o r l d wide Soviet naval exercise. "Okean 75, " The Chinese a l s o had

demonstrated t h e Soviet t h r e a t t o t h e Chinese.

noted t h e increased Soviet naval a c t i v i t y near t h e PRC's c o a s t l i n e . At t h i s t i m e t h e Chinese came t o view t h e Soviets as "hegemonists" who wanted t o dominate Asia (Figure 11) and e n c i r c l e t h e PRC. The Soviets use o f Vietnamese p o r t f a c i l i t i e s beginning i n 1979 The Chinese saw t h e goals o f t h i s

was major p r o o f o f t h i s i n t e n t i o n . Soviet expansion as f o u r f o l d :

t h e removal o f t h e U.S. from t h e Western

P a c i f i c , t h e enci rclement and i s o l a t i o n o f China, t h e n e u t r a l i z a t i o n o f Japan, and t h e gradual c o n t r o l of Southeast Asian c o u n t r i e s .15 Return o f Professionalism and Modernization By t h e mid-1970s, professionalism and modernization had begun i t s return t o the m i l i t a r y . I n May 1974 t h e PLAN r e i n s t i t u t e d a uniform

t h a t was s i m i l a r t o t h e ones o f t h e professional era o f t h e l a t e 1950s. The PLAN'S f i r s t nuclear power submarine,

H a , was launched i n 1974.

Also i n 1974, Jianahu, t h e l e a d s h i p o f a new c l a s s o f f r i g a t e s was l a i d down. I n January 1975, Zhou Enlai f o r m a l l y announced t h e PRC's d e c i s i o n

t o begin t h e "comprehensive modernization o f n a t i o n a l defense. "16 M i l i t a r y school c u r r i c u l u m once again concentrated on m i l i t a r y v i c e ~ o l i t i c a lstudies. The Decline o f t h e P o l i t i c a l I n f l u e n c e from t h e L e f t
A major p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g t h e PLAN was t h e reduction

o f t h e p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e of t h e l e f t i s t s .

Symbolic o f t h e p o l i t i c a l

decline o f t h e l e f t i s t s was t h e f a l l o f t h e "Gang o f Four."

This group,

which included Mao's wife, opposed naval professionalism and had i n 1975 sidetracked a PLAN modernization proposal t h a t envisioned an ocean going navy as w e l l as a strong coastal defense.17 A member o f t h i s group, Zhang Chunqiao, stated t h a t a navy was i r r e l e v a n t i n the age o f shorebased guided missiles .="After t h e f a l l o f t h e "Gang o f Four," t h e

naval modernizers responded with: The introduction o f guided missiles cannot replace a navy or diminish i t s r o l e . The navy has a multi-faceted r o l e t o play: t o destroy enemy naval power, t o blockade v i t a l sea areas, t o protect sea communications and transport, t o coordinate w i t h t h e army i n naval actions, and t o protect f i s h i n g and shipping i n peacetime." This rebuttal defines many o f t h e missions o f a modern navy, such as sea control, sea denial , and power projection.
It appears t h a t t h e PLAN was

already focusing on new roles and missions a t t h i s stage i n 1977.

Once

t h e "Gang o f Four" was removed from power t h e PLAN began t o distance i t s e l f from o l d strategy and doctrine. Develooment o f a New Naval Doctrine A f t e r Mao's death. t h e PRC leadership sought out a new military doctrine t h a t would encompass t h e new s t r a t e g i c and technological realities. To avoid repudiating Maoist doctrine, t h i s new m i l i t a r y

doctrine was l i n k e d t o t h e past and was labeled "People's War Under Modern Conditions. The military strategy t h a t accompanied t h i s new Later labeled "Active

doctrine was again a modification o f Mao's ideas.

Defense Under New H i s t o r i c a l Conditions, " t h i s strategy placed more emphasi s on forward defense and modernization. The new m i 1i t a r y

doctrine and strategy were t h e essential ingredients f o r the development

of a new naval strategy.

This naval strategy was f i n a l i z e d i n t h e 1980s

and wi 11 be addressed i n t h e next chapter. The s h i f t away from a "Young School" coastal defense strategy was evidenced by t h e construction i n 1977 o f an underway replenishment ship. This type o f ship, t h e Fuqing class, was t h e first underway The f i r s t one became operational i n

replenishment ship i n t h e PLAN.

1979 and t h e PLAN c u r r e n t l y has two o f these ships.21 The c a p a b i l i t y t o refuel a t sea gave t h e PLAN added range, f l e x i b i l i t y , and t h e a b i l i t y t o remain on s t a t i o n longer. During t h e l a t e 1970s t h e PLAN began t o concentrate on combined arms naval warfare.
A t t h e Third Plenum o f t h e 11th CCP Central

Committee (18 t o 22 December 1978), Deng Xiaoping directed t h e m i l i t a r y t o "Pay special a t t e n t i o n t o combined combat t r a i n i n g . " 2 2 This

combined combat t r a i n i n g meant t h a t surface, subsurface, and air elements o f t h e navy were t o coordinate t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s t o mass combat power on t h e enemy. It was during t h i s period t h a t t h e PLAN developed

t h e Reclulations on t h e Coordinated Trai nincl o f S h i m and A i r c r a f t which i n s t i t u t e d b e t t e r planning and a broadening o f coordinated ship-ai r c r a f t training.23 To accomodate these changes t o doctrine and strategy, t h e PLAN upgraded i t s t r a i n i n g program. The t r a i n i n g concentrated on improving These combat

t h e standards o f t h e "Five Combat Capabilities." capabi 1iti es were:

1. Coordinated combat capabi 1it y

2.
3.

Quick reaction c a p a b i l i t y Electromagnetic Counter Measure (ECM) c a p a b i l i t y

4. 5.

Guaranteed l o g i s t i c a l capabi 1i t y F i e l d survival capabi l i t y 2 .

These combat capabi 1it i e s provide an i n s i g h t i n t o t h e PLAN'S emphasis f o r development. They wanted t o develop a c a p a b i l i t y t o

conduct coordinated surface, air, and subsurface attacks on t h e enemy. The PLAN was t o be f l e x i b l e and a g i l e i n order t o quickly respond t o any t h r e a t and would use ECM t o negate t h e electronic advantage o f a more advanced navy. Additionally, t h e PLAN would ensure s u f f i c i e n t l o g i s t i c support and upgrade t h e i r ships' damage control capabi 1i t i e s . Economic Influences (1976-1982) Along w i t h t h e decline o f l e f t i s t p o l i t i c a l extremism came an economic program known as t h e "Four Modernizations." This program

c a l l e d f o r modernization o f industry, agriculture, science/technology, and national defense i n t h a t order o f p r i o r i t y . The PRC leadership believed t h a t a strong economy was a basis f o r a strong national defense. The PRC's press echoed t h i s theme by s t a t i n g : "Only w i t h t h e

faster growth o f economic construction can there be greater progress i n defence{sic) c o n s t r ~ c t i o n . " ~ I~ n a 1981 address t o t h e PLA, Deng Xiaoping c a l l e d f o r the military t o b u i l d a powerful armed force, t o improve t h e army's weaponr-y, and t o accelerate t h e modernization of national defense on t h e basis o f a continually expanding economy.26 Thus, economic modernization can be seen as a precursor o f military modernization. With increased foreign trade came t h e growth o f a large merchant marine f l e e t and ship b u i l d i n g c a p a b i l i t y . Between 1970 and

1980, t h e PRC's merchant f l e e t expanded from 70 ships w i t h a t o t a l

58

displacement (empty) o f 750,000 tons t o 431 ships w i t h a t o t a l displacement (empty o f 7,920,000 tons ." This expansion was

accomplished by purchasing ships abroad and through n a t i o n a l s h i p construction. By t h e end o f t h e 1970s. t h e PRC was b u i l d i n g merchant

ships f o r export. T e s t i na t h e New Modernizations Towards t h e end o f t h e 1970s t h e PLAN began a s e r i e s o f o u t o f area operations t o t e s t new ships, technologies, and techniques. In

1977, a PLAN submarine conducted a f i r s t ever t r a i n i n g c r u i s e i n t h e Western Paci f i c .28 The PLAN exercised naval combi ned arms i n l979, when 4 submarines, 22 surface ships, 4 reconnaissance and 8 f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t combined t o i n t e r c e p t a simulated enemy t a s k f o r c e i n t h e Ye1 low Sea and East China Sea.29 The most d i s t a n t o f these o u t o f area operations occurred i n May o f 1980. I n t h i s operation, an eighteen s h i p PLAN t a s k f o r c e

deployed 4,000 m i l e s t o t h e South P a c i f i c i n support o f a Dong Feng V i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l b a l l i s t i c missi l e t e s t conducted on 18 May (Figure 12). I n t h i s t a s k f o r c e were t h e two r e c e n t l y completed Fuqing c l a s s underway replenishment ships which .were v i t a l i n supporting t h e 35 day operation. This f o r c e demonstrated t h e PLAN'S a b i l i t y t o s u s t a i n a naval f o r c e i n d i s t a n t waters . l o The PLAN continued w i t h these experiments and t r i a l s . In a

t e s t o f l o n g range maritime s u r v e i l l a n c e , two PLANAF B-6 bombers conducted t h e f i r s t p a t r o l o f t h e S p r a t l y Islands on 8 November 1980.31 I n t h e s p r i n g o f 1981, a PLAN naval f o r c e conducted a naval presence operation i n which they operated o f f southern Japan, i n t h e Phi l i p p i n e 59

Sea, t h e South China Sea. and Gulf of T ~ n k i n . ~ I =n October 1982, t h e PLAN conducted i t s f i r s t successful submerged launch o f a b a l l i s t i c missile.
33

Even w i t h these improvements i n various t a c t i c s ,

techniques, and procedures, t h e PLAN s t i l l lacked a leader who could envision t h e navy as more than j u s t an adjunct o f t h e army.

Figure 12. PLAN's South P a c i f i c Deployment. Reprinted, by permission, from Bei.iina Review, 23, No. 21, 26 May 1980, 5.

New PLAN Leadership As t h e modernization progressed i n t h e l a t e W O s , i t became c l e a r than t h e PLAN's older leadership would have t o be replaced. Xiao

J i nguang, who had headed t h e navy since 1950, was incapable o f changing t h e organization and bureaucracy t h a t he had i n s t i t u t e d . I n 1978, he

was promoted and t h e PLAN was e f f e c t i v e l y under t h e control o f Xiao's deputy and an experienced naval o f f i c e r , L i u Da~sheng.'~The command

s i t u a t i o n was c l a r i f i e d two years l a t e r when on 1 1 January 1980. Ye Fei was appointed Commander o f t h e PLAN bypassing L i u D a o ~ h e n g . ~ ~ Ye Fei was another r e l a t i v e l y o l d army o f f i c e r w i t h l i m i t e d naval experience. He was born i n F u j i an province i n 1914. L i k e most He was a member o f t h e He had served

o f f i c e r s , Ye Fei was not educated outside China.

Fourth F i e l d Army during t h e l a s t p a r t o f t h e C i v i l War.

tours as commander o f t h e Fujian M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t and commander o f t h e Fuzhou Military Region. Only i n t h e year p r i o r t o h i s appointment d i d

Ye Fei have any connection w i t h t h e PLAN (he was made 1 s t P o l i t i c a l Commissar i n 1979) .36 Ye Fei proved unsuitable f o r t h e assignment, due p r i m a r i l y t o poor health. office. He reportedly had two heart attacks i n h i s f i r s t year o f

I n December o f 1980, L i u Daosheng headed a delegation t o

Pakistan where he was i d e n t ~ f i e d as "Acting Commander" o f t h e navy." Even a f t e r he recovered, Ye was unable t o provide strong d i r e c t i o n t o t h e PLAN i n these c r i t i c a l years o f development. On 28 August 1982, t h e Central M i 1i t a r y Commission (CMC) r e t i red Ye Fei . Again L i u Daosheng was bypassed, t h i s time i n favor o f Liu H ~ a q i n g . ~ L i~u was t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t naval experience t o head t h e PLAN. The nomination o f a career naval o f f i c e r t o t h e PLAN'S t o p leadership p o s i t i o n was a s i g n i f i c a n t t u r n i n g p o i n t i n i t s h i story. L i u was born i n Hubei province i n 1916. During t h e l a t t e r p a r t

o f t h e Chinese revolution he was deputy p o l i t i c a l commissar o f t h e 10th Army o f t h e Second F i e l d Army, where he became friends w i t h Deng Xiaoping. A f t e r t h e founding o f the PRC, L i u transferred t o t h e navy.

L i u Huaqing's in i t i a1 assignment i n t h e forming PLAN was as deputy p o l i t i c a l commissar o f t h e Number 1 Navy College i n Dalian. From 1954 t o 1958 L i u s t u d i e d a t t h e Soviet Union's Voroshilov Naval War College and t h e Frunze Naval Academy i n L e r ~ i n g r a d . ' ~During L i u ' s s t u d i e s , t h e Soviet Navy was s t r u g g l i n g t o j u s t i f y i t s existence i n t h e face o f c r i t i c i s m from t h e dominant Soviet ground forces. Liu

was a l s o i n t h e Soviet Union when t h e S o v i e t ' s l e a d i n g proponent o f a b l u e water f o r c e , Admiral Gorshkov, assumed t h e command o f t h e Soviet Navy. This was an e x c i t i n g p e r i o d i n t h e development o f Soviet naval It i s p o s s i b l e t h a t L i u Huaqing was i n f l u e n c e d by these naval

strategy.

p o l i c y s t r u g g l e s and Soviet b l u e water expansion plans. Upon h i s r e t u r n i n 1958, L i u was assigned as t h e a s s i s t a n t comander o f t h e North Sea F l e e t and commander o f t h e Lushun naval base. L i u moved s t e a d i l y upward through various assignments. years i n v o l v e d w i t h research and development." He spent several

It would be L i u

Huaqing who would l e a d t h e PLAN through i t s next developmental phase.

CHAPTER FIVE
A MODERN NAVY:

THE PLAN 1983-1995

By 1983 t h e PLAN was a f i r s t class coastal defense navy t h a t was j u s t beginning t o operate f u r t h e r from shore.
,,

This navy was t h e

apex o f a "Young School" type force, w i t h large numbers o f submarines and f a s t attack c r a f t (Table 7 ) . The navy was increasing i t s technical c a p a b i l i t i e s and was beginning t o develop a naval strategy and doctrine t h a t were not t i e d d i r e c t l y t o t h e ground forces. The PLAN's surface

combatant forces were we1 1 equipped w i t h surface t o surface missi les, but lacked surface t o air missiles f o r s e l f o r area defense. Due t o

t h e i r large numbers, t h e coastal f a s t attack c r a f t provided a formidable coastal defense force. Construction o f new ships had added t o t h e

PLAN's amphibious l i f t c a p a b i l i t y and t h e recent expansion o f t h e PLAN marine corps had completed t h e requirements necessary f o r a 1i m i ted amphibious assault. Fleet l o g i s t i c s continued t o be backward, although

t h e PLAN now had t h e two Fuqing class replenishment ships. I n 1983, t h e PLANAF consisted o f some 200 bomber and a n t i -ship s t r i k e a i r c r a f t , 550 f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t (mostly MiG-19 Farmers), and about

a dozen French made Super Frelon helicopters. The Super Frelon i s

p r i m a r i l y a shore based helicopter. The PLANAF's ASW c a p a b i l i t y was s i g n i f i c a n t l y l i m i t e d f o r i t was e n t i r e l y shore based.'
It would not

be u n t i l t h e e a r l y 1990s t h a t t h e PLAN began deploying helicopters on surface combatant ships. 63

Table 7. --PLAN'S Composition by Ship Type (1983)

SHIP CLASS
I

QUANTITY
I

NOTES
1 XIA CLASS 1 "G" CLASS

BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE ATTACK SUBMARINE

109

6 2 85 16

HAN CLASS SSN MING CLASS "R" CLASS "W" CLASS

DESTROYER FRIGATE

18 40

4 GORDY CLASS 14 LUDA CLASS DDG 14 3 5 4 JIANGHU CLASS JIANGDONG CLASS JIANGNAN CLASS RIGA CLASS

MISSILE BOAT FLEET MINESWEEPER FAST GUNBOATS PATROL VESSEL TORPEDO BOAT AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS REPLENISHMENT SHIPS REPAIR SHIP

215 23 402 20 260

37

I
I

1
I

MOSTLY OSA AND KOMAR VARIANTS SOVIET 7 4 3 CLASS MOSTLY SHANGHAI CLASS EX-SOVIET AND BRITISH CRAFT MOSTLY HUCHUAN CLASS 5 YUKAN CLASS LST 2 YULING CLASS I S M 3 FUQING CLASS A O R
-

I
I

I
I

1
1

EX-USS ACHILLES(ARL-41)

Source: John Moore ed. , Jane's Fiahtina Ships 1983.1994 (New York: Jane's Publishing Company Ltd. , 1983), 91-107.

As t h e PLAN had grown, so had t h e Soviet P a c i f i c F l e e t .

By

1983, t h e Soviet P a c i f i c Fleet had become a major t h r e a t t o t h e PLAN. This f l e e t consisted o f 110 submarines (including 28 nuclear powered

b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e submarines), 1 a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r .

88 p r i n c i p a l surface

combatants, 225 minor combatants, 20 amphibious ships (and t h e bulk o f Soviet marines), and 330 combat a i r c r a f t . = Although smaller i n sheer numbers than t h e PLAN, t h e Soviet P a c i f i c Fleet enjoyed an advantage i n combat power and capabi 1iti es . By t h e e a r l y 1980s t h e Chinese m i l i t a r y doctrine was evolving

a r Under Modern Conditions" and t h e military i n t o t h e "People's W

strategy was s h i f t i n g towards "Active Defense Under New H i s t o r i c a l Conditions." Both the doctrine and strategy were predicated on China To support t h e national strategy

remaining on t h e s t r a t e g i c defense.

and doctrine, t h e PLAN's overall defensive strategy now included an a c t i v e war o f a t t r i t i o n a t sea. principles. This strategy rested on three

F i r s t , t h e PLAN was t o avoid e a r l y decisive engagement w i t h

t h e Soviet P a c i f i c Fleet and conserve strength f o r a protracted war. Second, t h e PLAN would d i v i d e i n t o small groups o f h i g h l y maneuverable f a s t attack c r a f t t o destroy t h e Soviets piecemeal. Third, t h e PLAN

would r e l y on coastal minelaying, land based missiles and a r t i l l e r y , and t h e PLANAF t o i n t e r d i c t Soviet sea l i n e s o f communications and prevent a Soviet amphibious assault . l Economic I n f 1uences Throughout t h e period 1983 - 1994 t h e "Four Modernizations" economic reform program continued t o influence t h e PLAN. M i lit a r y modernization was subordinated t o economic moderni z a t i on. leadership concurred w i t h placing economics f i r s t . The PLAN

The PLAN's deputy

commander, Zhang Xusan, stated i n 1992 t h a t , "Economic development

serves as t h e country's primary task, and t h e navy w i l l spare no e f f o r t i n supporting and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e process. "" These economic reforms brought advanced technology t o t h e PLAN. As one o f t h e more t e c h n i c a l l y oriented branches o f t h e m i l i t a r y , t h e PLAN g r e a t l y benefited from China's e f f o r t s t o modernize her science and technology. I n t h e previous decade t h e PLAN and t h e shipbuilding Now they faced a more

industry had learned how t o b u i l d ships.

d i f f i c u l t challenge o f b u i l d i n g t h e advanced weapons systems, t h e command and control systems, and t h e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e which are required o f a modern naval power. F i r s t t h e PLAN had t o establish t h e organization t h a t would determine technological requi rements, procure them, t e s t them, and then incorporate t h e new technology i n t h e f l e e t . The t e s t i n g p o r t i o n came

f i r s t . w i t h t h e establishment o f t h e Naval Testing & Evaluation Center on 9 March 1983. Later t h a t year, t h e navy established three new

committees, t h e M i l i t a r y Studies Research Committee, t h e Science and Techno1ogy Committee, and t h e S c i e n t i f i c Cultural Education Research C~mmittee.~ Together these new committee coordinated t h e other functions o f technological development i n t h e PLAN. New technology provided t h e PLAN w i t h advanced systems. I n i t i a l emphasis was on purchasing advanced technology from t h e West. However, t h e fear o f dependence on outside powers learned as a r e s u l t o f t h e Soviet p u l l out i n t h e l a t e 1950s forced t h e PLAN t o be s e l e c t i v e on which technologies t o purchase. As a r e s u l t , t h e massive Chinese

purchases o f Western technology expected by t h e West never materialized. The PLAN only bought selected m i l i t a r y items, usually i n small numbers.

>, , , , .

: i
,

. ,

:., :<

This emphasis on research and development d i r e c t l y affected PLAN performance.

..

,
1

The r e l i a b i l i t y o f shipboard equipment was improved.

i;i.:

>.r.

During t h e Seventh Five Year Plan, t h e navy developed "1,500 kinds o f s c i e n t i f i c and technological achievements i n i t s r e l i a b i lit y research. "" Through t h e use o f science and technology, t h e time and cost o f r e p a i r i n g a destroyer dropped 30 percent. The PLAN also developed a f a s t attack c r a f t main engine t h a t lasted twice as long. In

..
, ..

1983, a small p o r t i o n o f these s c i e n t i f i c and technological achievements were estimated t o save t h e PLAN 150 m i l l i o n yuan (approximately 18 m i l l i o n U.S.
dollar^).^

Coastal Devel opme~ntStrategy Coastal economic development was p a r t o f economic moderni z a t i on and also had an overall p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on t h e PLAN. The economic needs

o f t h e coastal Special Economic Zones (SEZs) l e d t o increased development o f China's maritime i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . The s i x t h Five Year

Plan (1981-19851 included plans t o b u i l d 132 deep water berths f o r 15 coastal ports t h a t would increase cargo handling capacity by 46 percent t o 317 m i l l i o n tons by 1985.8 Coastal development also had adverse side e f f e c t s on t h e PLAN. F i r s t , economic development sometimes forced PLAN u n i t s t o relocate. An

angsu Province, where 1arger example o f t h i s occurred i n L i anyungang, Ji berths were required t o increase l o c a l coal export^.^ This also occurred i n Q i nghuangdao, J i u j i ang , X i amen. Guangzhou. Zhoushan. and Tanggu . Secondly, t h e use o f PLAN u n i t s t o support coastal economic development h u r t navy t r a i n i n g . The PLAN was used t o r e h a b i l i t a t e older

67

I. ,' . :

ships f o r coastal transport, assist i n t h e construction o f f a c i l i t i e s , conduct navigational surveys o f t h e coast, repai r merchant vessels, and help i n anti -smuggling e f f o r t s .I0 These a c t i v i t i e s detracted from t r a i n i n g a professional naval force.
A t h i r d problem arose out o f t h e PLAN being collocated w i t h t h e

booming SEZs and l i v i n g i n these areas o f growing affluence.

The

r e l a t i v e prosperity of t h e coastal people compared t o t h e PLAN's a u s t e r i t y caused many navy personnel t o concentrate on t h e i r own rnateri a1 wealth vice t h e i r assignment. The s a i l o r s saw an ever-widening As a

gap between t h e m i l i t a r y and l o c a l people and morale suffered.

B e i j i n g radio commentator noted i n 1988, "Some cadres and f i g h t e r s are eager t o take o f f t h e i r uniforms and want t o be transferred t o do c i v i l i a n work i n various l o c a l i t i e s so as t o carve out a new career as soon as possible."ll The PLAN sought t o counter these economic

influences through education o f t h e s t r a t e g i c importance o f t h e i r rnission.12 Ocean Resources The quest t o e x p l o i t ocean resources continued t o influence t h e PLAN's strategy. The navy's deputy commander i n c h i e f , General Zhang

Xusan, stated t h a t t h e PRC ought t o increase i t s e f f o r t s a t e x p l o i t i n g marine resources t o employ more labor and f a c i 1it a t e t h e country's growth i n t h e next century.13 I n 1983, an East China Sea exploratory well yielded t h e f i r s t commercially s i g n i f i c a n t amounts o f o i l .14 Protection o f these maritime resources, such as o i l , was one o f t h e reasons t h e CMC c i t e d i n a 1986 c a l l f o r a modern navy.lS

Conscripts The growing Chinese economy made it more d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e m i l i t a r y t o a t t r a c t personnel. r e g i s t r a t i o n had been voluntary. Although t h e PRC had a conscript system, This voluntary system had s u f f i c e d t o

t h i s p o i n t because t h e m i l i t a r y offered Chinese youth an opportunity f o r upward m o b i l i t y . The m i l i t a r y was especially appealing t o r u r a l youth. For them, t h e PLA provided an

who made up t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e m i l i t a r y .

opportunity t o learn a s k i l l , so t h a t upon completion o f obligated service they could l i v e i n t h e c i t i e s . Previously, there had always

been more registrants than open b i l l e t s and t h e l o c a l selection committees could weed out t h e undesi rable. Slowly but surely, improving

economic conditions were changing t h i s s i t u a t i o n . The a g r i c u l t u r a l reforms o f t h e "Four Modernizations" made

military service less a t t r a c t i v e .

More young people were simply not

r e g i s t e r i n g f o r conscripti on.

The Chinese press began a media campaign

i n t h e mid-1980s t o encourage thesepeople t o register., Also, t h e Chinese government enacted t h e Conscriot Work Requl a t i on^ on 24 October 1985. This act authorized l o c a l governments t o force people t o f u l f i l l

t h e i r military obligations according t o law.16 I n one example, t h e Bei ji ng Municipal People's Congress requi red mandatory r e g i s t r a t i o n , and i n s t i t u t e d a system o f fines and punishment f o r those who d i d not. The

p u l l o f t h e f r e e market economy was so great, t h a t one o f t h e possible fines was loss o f a l l business licenses f o r one year." The second economic influence was t h e problem o f operating increasing technology w i t h r e l a t i v e l y backward conscripts. adopted three approaches t o solve t h i s problem. The PLAN

F i r s t , specialists and

sent t o research i n s t i t u t e s and manufacturing plants t o study. key technicians were sent abroad f o r advanced training.'" Merchant Marine

Third,

The rapid growth o f t h e Chinese merchant f l e e t was important t o t h e PLAN. The merchant f l e e t allowed ex-PLAN s a i l o r s t o keep t h e i r ski 11s current and reduced unemployment among ex-servicemen. I n 1992,

nearly 50 percent o f t h e merchant f l e e t crew members were ex-PLAN sailors. This merchant f l e e t could become a p a r t o f t h e PLAN i n t h e

event o f emergency." Merchant ship construction was important t o t h e PLAN as i t sustained naval shipyards, improved ship b u i l d i n g techniques through practice, and provided hard currency as a r e s u l t o f merchant ship sales abroad. I n t h i s period, sales o f Chinese b u i l t merchant ships expanded.

According t o one survey. "the f l e e t has reaped more than 50 m i l l i o n yuan o f p r o f i t s { s i c ) , and t h i s has made up f o r t h e i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e m i l i t a r y expenses t o a c e r t a i n degree. "'o
It i s unclear from t h e above

statement whether foreign ship sale receipts go d i r e c t l y t o t h e PLAN o r t o t h e PRC's treasury. Regardless, shipbuilding has been a p o s i t i v e

influence f o r t h e PLAN and t h e country as a whole. New M i l i t a r y and Naval Strateay The previously described post-Mao evolution i n m i l i t a r y strategy and doctrine had, by the mid-1980s. resulted i n an almost complete reversal o f Mao's "People's War" doctrine. According t o Zhang

Zhen, then commandant o f t h e National Defense University, t h e Central

M i l i t a r y Commission (CMC) o f t h e Central Committee o f t h e Chinese Communist P a r t y d i r e c t e d a b o l d course change i n t h e s p r i n g o f 1985. The CMC b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e two superpowers had achieved p a r i t y and t h a t a major war was u n l i k e l y f o r t h e remainder o f t h e t w e n t i e t h century. Accordingly, t h e CMC d i r e c t e d t h e PLA t o s h i f t t h e i r s t r a t e g y and t r a i n i n g t o what t h e they f e l t was t h e most l i k e l y form o f c o n f l i c t i n t h e near f u t u r e , l o c a l l i m i t e d war (jubuzhangzheng) on t h e PRC's borders .21 This change i n m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e and s t r a t e g y coincided w i t h and i n f l u e n c e d t h e development o f a new naval s t r a t e g y . The naval However,

s t r a t e g y ' s name remained t h e same, "Offshore A c t i v e Defense." t h i s s t r a t e g y was q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h e previous one.

The primary

changes were i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f o f f s h o r e and i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f new m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e and s t r a t e g y t o naval warfare. Although t h e PRC o r

t h e PLAN had n o t p r e c i s e l y defined t h e term "offshore", several o f f i c i a l have given t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . L i u Huaqing i s reported t o have s a i d

t h a t t h e PLAN must maintain e f f e c t i v e sea c o n t r o l w i t h i n t h e f i r s t i s l a n d chain and t h a t t h e term o f f s h o r e r e l a t e s t o t h e h i g h seas and means t h e waters w i t h i n t h e second i s l a n d chain (Figure 13).22 I n Apri 1 1987, L i u Huaqi ng c o n f i rmed t h a t a c t i v e o f f s h o r e defense remained t h e fundamental s t r a t e g y o f Chinese naval f 0 r c e s . ~ 3 The PLAN acquired an enhanced r o l e i n t h e new m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e and s t r a t e g y . A c t i v e defense under new h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s c a l l e d f o r To do

a defense o f key areas such as t h e prospering coastal regions.

t h i s , t h e s t r a t e g y intended t o extended China's s t r a t e g i c depth seaward which would transform t h e coast from a defensive f r o n t l i n e t o a

s t r a t e g i c r e a r area.

Also, t h e s h i f t i n focus t o l o c a l wars meant t h a t

naval warfare would become a more important area i n China's m i l i t a r y strategy.

Figure 13. The PLAN'S Offshore Defense. Reprinted, by permission from Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang. "The Chinese Navy's Offshore A c t i v e Defense Strategy, " Naval War Col leae Review, V o l XLVII, No.3 (Summer 1994) : 21.

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Force Restructuring I n l i n e w i t h t h e new doctrine and strategy and t h e primacy o f

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economic growth, China reduced i t s m i l i t a r y manpower.

I n 1985, Deng

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Xiaoping formulated a plan t o shrink t h e PLA by 1 m i l l i o n men i n two years." On 1 August 1985, t h e CCP's journal stated "the strength o f

an army i s not determined by t h e number o f troops, but by t h e q u a l i t y of ..,

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i t s commanders and f i g h t e r s , t h e q u a l i t y o f i t s arms, and t h e degree o f r a t i o n a l i t y o f i t s systems and foundations. t h i s reduction i n force.
"15

. .

The PLAN d i d not escape

Between 1983 and 1993, t h e PLAN'S manning

l e v e l was reduced from 360,000 t o 260.000.26 This 28 percent decrease was roughly t h e same as t h e reduction i n t h e ground forces. I n addition

t h e m i l i t a r y ' s share o f t h e national budget f e l l from 13.7 percent i n 1983 t o 9.4 percent i n 1986." Following t h e completion o f these

reduction i n 1986, t h e m i l i t a r y planned t o focus on weapons improvements and o f f i c e r training.l"his was a bold reversal from Mao's doctrine

o f a "People's War" and again t h e emphasis was on professionalism vice p o l i t i c a l correctness.

Zhana L i anzhonq I n August 1987, L i u Huaqing was promoted t o Vice Chairman o f t h e CMC and Zhang Lianzhong replaced him as commander o f t h e PLAN. L i u , Zhang was also an experienced naval o f f i c e r . He was r e l a t i v e l y During t h e Like

young. having been born i n 1931 i n t h e Liaodong Peninsula.

C i v i l War, he was member o f t h e Third F i e l d Army and hence i s believed

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t o owe some allegiance t o Zhang Aiping, t h e founder o f t h e PLAN.29 He remained an i n f a n t r y o f f i c e r u n t i l t h e mid 1960s when he transferred t o

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t h e PLAN. A submariner, he held various submarine and shore commands p r i o r t o h i s assignment as deputy navy commander i n 1985.
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The choice o f

Zhang surprised many Western m i l i t a r y analysts who expected other more

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notable PLAN leaders t o get t h e a ~ s i g n m e n t . ~ He ~ lacked t h e p o l i t i c a l influence o f L i u Huaqing as he i s only an a l t e r n a t e member o f t h e Central' Commi t t e e . P o l i t i c a l Influences The biggest p o l i t i c a l influence on t h e PLAN during t h i s period was t h e continued r i s e i n power o f L i u Huaqing. member o f t h e CCP's Central Committee. I n 1985, he became a

While t h e PLAN'S p o l i t i c a l

influence i n t h e person o f L i u Huaqing was growing, t h e p o l i t i c a l representation o f t h e m i l i t a r y as a whole was declining. I n 1985, only

13 percent o f t h e CCP's Central Committee were military (as opposed t o 45 percent i n 1969 a t t h e height o f t h e Cultural Revolution). The

downward t r e n d o f m i 1i t a r y representation i n t h e Politburo continued. I n 1986, t h e military made up only 13.6 percent o f t h e Politburo. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e m i l i t a r y was no longer a s i g n i f i c a n t force i n l o c a l civilian politics."

S p r a t l v Islands (1988) The Spratly Islands dispute heated up again i n 1988 between t h e two most a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the struggle: t h e PRC and Vietnam. In

January o f 1988, t h e PLAN landed troops on two o f t h e i s l e t s and then occupied four additional ones. Navy clashed over t h e islands. I n March, t h e PLAN and t h e Vietnamese This b a t t l e resulted i n damage t o a t

l e a s t two Vietnamese boats and t h e PRC maintained control o f t h e islands

74

they had occupied.

This a c t i v i t y i n t h e S p r a t l y Islands has forced t h e

PLAN t o rnaintai n p a t r o l s o f these regions. Professional Trends

B y 1989, t h e PLAN had become a p r o f e s s i o n a l , s k i l l e d f o r c e

capable o f conducting extended o u t o f area operations.

To t e s t i t s

s u s t a i nabi 1it y and readiness i n d i s t a n t waters, t h e PLAN conducted numerous p o r t v i s i t s and conducted r o u t i n e exercises away from t h e PRC. As shown i n F i g u r e 14, t h e PLAN had operated as f a r away as Hawaii and Karachi, Pakistan. The events o f T i ananmen Square t e m p o r a r i l y brought

these p o r t v i s i t s t o an end.

F i g u r e 14. The PLAN'S Long Range Deployments. Reprinted, by permission Tai Ming Cheung, Growth o f Chinese Naval Power: P r i o r i t i e s . Goals. Missions. and Reaional I m p l i c a t i o n s Singapore: I n s t i t u t e o f Southeast Asian Studies , 1990, 13.
75

Post Soviet Union The f a l l o f t h e Soviet Union meant t h a t t h e land threat from t h e north was diminished. This caused a reevaluation o f defense This was s i g n i f i e d by t h e greater

p r i o r i t i e s away from a land bias.

i n t e r e s t i n coastal defense, "land and coastal defenses are o f equal importance. There i s no problem o f which should be given greater

emphasis than t h e other. . .

There i s no reason f o r us t o again f o l l o w

t h e past guideline o f 1ayi ng one-sided emphasis on border defense construction. "32 PLAN. The PLAN also benefitted from t h e f a l l o f t h e Soviet Union through t h e purchase o f Soviet arms t o upgrade i t s equipment. Most This new emphasis on coastal defense benefitted t h e

s i g n i f i c a n t f o r t h e PLAN was t h e 1995 delivery o f t h e f i r s t o f four "K" ( K i l o ) class diesel - e l e c t r i c submarines from t h e Soviet Union. modern submarines wi 11 give t h e PLAN added ASW c a p a b i l i t y , as a submari ne i s considered t h e best weapon against other submarines . The
"K" i s quieter and has a b e t t e r ant-ship torpedo than t h e "R" submarine

These

i t i s replacing.

Under Modern Conditions In t h e early 1990s, t h e concept o f t h e "People's War" i n naval warfare was f i n a l l y eliminated. I n t h e post-Desert Storm era much

Chinese m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e discussed modern and combined arms warfare. The purpose o f a 10-ship naval exercise i n t h e East China Sea was " t o study and explore ways f o r coordinating various forces and r a i s i n g t h e comprehensive naval d e f e n s i b i l i t y under conditions o f modern

76

warfare."33 I n March o f 1993. t h e North Sea Fleet conducted i t s f i r s t ever Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) exercise using PLAN ships and
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submarines. exercises :

The press a r t i c l e declared t h e importance o f such

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The counterattack between m i s s i l e destroyers and submarines w i t h high speed underwater maneuverability i s an important mode of f u t u r e naval b a t t l e s . I f China does not venture i n t o t h i s exclusion area {area o f PLAN neglect} i t w i l l come t o g r i e f i n a f u t u r e war.-" Emphasis on T e r r i t o r i a l Claims I n t h e 1990s, t h e PRC has continued i t s insistence on i t s offshore t e r r i t o r i a l claims, especially i n t h e South China Sea. On 25

February 1992, t h e PRC's National People's Congress passed t h e Law of t h e T e r r i t o r i a l Sea and Contiguous Zone. This law formalized t h e PRC's

claims t o Taiwan, Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha) , t h e Senkaku (Diaoyu) , Pescadores (Penghu). Pratas (Dongsha), Paracel (Xisha), (Nansha) archipelagos (Figure 2 ) . and Spratly

About three months l a t e r , t h e PRC

announced t h a t it had licensed a U.'S. firm t o explore f o r o i l and gas i n t h e disputed areas. There has been recent evidence o f a PRC military buildup i n t h e South China Sea.
A book publishedby t h e China Public Security M i n i s t r y

revealed t h a t t h e PRC i s constructing a m i l i t a r y air base i n the Paracel Islands. This air base i n t h e Paracels places Chinese m i l i t a r y a i r c r a f t

190 miles closer t o t h e Spratly Islands and allows Chinese a i r c r a f t t h e abi 1it y t o provide increased coverage o f t h e Spratly Is1ands region than a i r c r a f t based i n t h e previous bases i n Hainan."
I f t h i s base i s

capable o f providing air support f o r possible actions i n t h e Spratlys, The Chinese requirement f o r an a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r would be reduced.

77

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Asian Naval Moderni z a t i ons

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Naval modernization Southeast Asian navies began i n t h e l a t e 1980s. Responding t o varying i n t e r n a l and external influences, Taiwan, South Korea, Ma1aysi a. Singapore, Thai 1and, and Indonesia each began programs t o upgrade t h e i r naval forces. Although there was l i t t l e

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d i r e c t Chinese reaction t o these modernizations programs, t h e Chinese d i d attempt t o portray t h e i r own naval expenditures as non-threatening and o f a defensive nature.
I f t h e PRC showed l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n Southeast Asian navies,

t h e reverse was t r u e ' o f t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e Indian navy.

I n a 1993

report by t h e PLA's General L o g i s t i c Department, General Zhao Nanqi declared t h a t India's development o f a large navy was not acceptable t o t h e Chinese and t h a t t h e PRC was not going t o l e t India dominate t h e Indian Ocean. He then proposed t o increase t h e PLAN'S presence i n t h e

Indian Ocean by conducting increased p o r t c a l l s i n t h e region.36 General Zhao i s considered a possible successor as t h e PLA's second most senior o f f i c e r , and i n t h a t p o s i t i o n could w i e l d great i n f l ~ e n c e . ~ '

CHAPTER SIX DEVELOPMENTAL INFLUENCES: REVIEW, ANALYSIS. AND CONCLUSIONS The previous chapters have d e t a i l e d t h e development o f t h e PLAN as a f u n c t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c , p o l i t i c a l , economic, and i n s t i t u t i o n a l influences. These i n f l u e n c e s a f f e c t e d t h e PLAN's s t r a t e g y , d o c t r i n e . This chapter wi 11 summarize past developmental

and f o r c e s t r u c t u r e .

i n f l u e n c e s , analyze t h e c u r r e n t influences, and determine how c u r r e n t i n f l u e n c e s w i l l p o s s i b l y a f f e c t t h e PLAN i n t h e next twenty f i v e years.

A t w e n t y - f i v e year t i m e p e r i o d was chosen as t h i s roughly corresponds t o

t h e u s e f u l l i f e span o f a f r o n t l i n e naval combat s h i p .

This review and

a n a l y s i s begins w i t h t h e most overarching o f t h e f o u r i n f l u e n c e s . Stratesi c Influences

O f t h e f o u r developmental i n f l u e n c e s on t h e PLAN, t h e

s t r a t e g i c i n f l u e n c e s have been t h e most c o n s i s t e n t throughout i t s history. Table 8. These s t r a t e g i c i n f l u e n c e s a r e l i s t e d by h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d i n Two s t r a t e g i c i n f l u e n c e s have remained r e l a t i v e l y constant
It i s these two enduring i n f l u e n c e s t h a t

throughout t h e PLAN's h i s t o r y .

have had t h e g r e a t e s t s t r a t e g i c e f f e c t on t h e PLAN The f i r s t o f these key s t r a t e g i c influences i s t h e PRC's f e a r o f superpower enci r c l ement and t h e associated superpower naval t h r e a t . For t h e m a j o r i t y o f i t s h i s t o r y , t h e PLAN has been faced w i t h an

79

e n c i r c l i n g superpower t h r e a t , e i t h e r U.S. o r S o v i e t .

For t h e f i r s t two I n t h e 1970s,

and a h a l f decades t h e U.S. was China's primary t h r e a t .

t h e Soviet Union supplanted t h e U.S. as China's major perceived t h r e a t . The Soviet t h r e a t r e t a i n e d i t s primacy u n t i l t h e mid t o l a t e 1980s and t h e t h r e a t was about e l i m i n a t e d w i t h t h e f a l l o f t h e Soviet Union. presence o f these superpower t h r e a t s helped b u i l d consensus f o r increased naval spending. Around 1986, t h e PRC s h i f t e d i t s m i l i t a r y The

focus from defense against superpower aggression t o t h e conduct o f l o c a l l i m i t e d wars around t h e PRC's borders.

Table 8 . - - S t r a t e g i c Influences on t h e PLAN SPECIFIC COMPONENT TO 1959

- U.S. NAVY I S PRIMARY THREAT - FEAR OF U.S. ENCIRCLEMENT - SOVIET ASSISTANCE - CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS - U. S. NAVY I S PRIMARY THREAT - FEAR OF U.S. ENCIRCLEMENT - NO SOVIET ASSISTANCE - CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

1960-1971

1972-1982 1983- 1995

SOVIET NAVY BECOMES PRIMARY THREAT - CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

-

- SOVIET NAVY I S PRIMARY THREAT (TO 1986) - FEAR OF SOVIET ENCIRCLEMENT (TO 1986) - CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

Since 1992 t h e PLAN has been w i t h o u t a major superpower adversary. The Soviet P a c i f i c F l e e t has atrophied i n V l adi vostock whi 1e

t h e U.S. P a c i f i c F l e e t has reduced i t s Western P a c i f i c presence. Previously, t h e PLAN b e n e f i t t e d from t h e existence o f an external 80

superpower naval t h r e a t .

A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e PLAN needed a t h r e a t t o This t r a d i t i o n a l PRC

overcome a c o n t i n e n t a l b i a s among t h e leadership.

l a n d focus has now changed, as many CCP and n a t i o n a l leaders now see t h e importance o f maritime a f f a i r s . The second constant s t r a t e g i c i n f l u e n c e has been t h e PRC's t e r r i t o r i a l claims i n t h e waters o f Asia. Beginning w i t h t h e 1950s

capture o f several near shore i s l a n d s i n t h e East China Sea and t h e Taiwan S t r a i t t h e Chinese have s t r i v e n t o regain h i s t o r i c Chinese maritime t e r r i t o r i e s . I n t h e 1960s, t h e PRC continued t o s t r e s s i t s

claims t o t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h e East China Sea. South China Sea, and t h e Taiwan S t r a i t b u t was t o o absorbed i n i n t e r n a l upheaval t o do anything about them. I n 1974, t h e PRC took advantage o f a weakened South Vietnam

and a d i s i n t e r e s t e d U.S. by o u s t i n g t h e South Vietnamese from t h e Paracel I s l a n d s . Fourteen years l a t e r i n 1988, PLAN ships sank t h r e e

Vietnamese ships w h i l e occupying s i x p o s i t i o n s i n t h e S p r a t l y Islands. I n January, 1995, t h e PLAN occupied M i s c h i e f Reef i n t h e S p r a t l y I s l a n d s which was a l s o claimed by t h e Republic o f t h e Phi1ippines.l This 45 year t r e n d towards t e r r i t o r i a l a c q u i s i t i o n along China's eastern maritime border has been an o p p o r t u n i s t i c campaign aimed against weak o r i s o l a t e d o p p o s i t i o n . A l l t h e m i l i t a r y moves t o occupy

i s l a n d s have been taken against c o u n t r i e s w i t h weak o r non-existent naval f o r c e s . The Chinese claims over Taiwan, Pescadores I s 1ands , and

Senkaku I s 1ands have n o t been strenuously exercised as t h e y would b r i n g t h e PRC i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h c o u n t r i e s w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t naval power (Taiwan and Japan).

Although n o t a continuous s t r a t e g i c i n f l u e n c e , t h e e f f e c t o f t h e 1950s Soviet assistance on t h e PLAN i s s i g n i f i c a n t enough t o warrant discussion. This naval a i d s i g n i f i c a n t l y helped t h e PLAN become a

respectable coastal defense navy through Soviet s h i p , i n f o r m a t i o n , and technology t r a n s f e r s . The primary s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s Soviet naval

assistance was n o t hardware, b u t r a t h e r t h e export o f t h e Soviet "Young School " naval d o c t r i n e t h a t w i t h m o d i f i c a t i o n s became t h e PLAN'S d o c t r i n e and drove PLAN f o r c e s t r u c t u r e f o r almost t h i r t y years. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e abrupt end o f Soviet assistance t a u g h t t h e PLAN t h e value o f s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y . A f t e r t h e end o f Soviet m i l i t a r y assistance, The

t h e PRC was determined t o develop i t s e l f w i t h domestic resources.

PLAN r e t a i n s t h i s t r a i t , 36 years a f t e r t h e s p l i t w i t h t h e Soviet Union. The Chinese w i l l buy selected m i l i t a r y hardware t o h e l p develop ideas b u t w i l l n o t make mass m i l i t a r y purchases as t h a t would i n d i c a t e f o r e i g n dependence. P o l i t i c a l Influences P o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e s on t h e PLAN have had t h e most recent impact on t h e development o f t h e navy. shown, by p e r i o d i n Table 9. These p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e s are

Throughout i t s h i s t o r y t h e PLAN as an

i n s t i t u t i o n has been subjected t o l e s s o f t h e CCP's p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e and manipulation than China's ground forces. The PLAN has been a b l e t o

s t r e s s professionalism over p o l i t i c s t o a g r e a t e r degree than t h e army.

O f a l l t h e branches o f t h e PLA, t h e navy s u f f e r e d t h e l e a s t

i n t e r f e r e n c e from t h e CCP.

The reasons f o r t h i s are n o t c l e a r .

However, t h e CCP seemed content t o keep t h e PLAN o u t o f p o l i t i c s and t h e PLAN was content t o b u i l d a facade o f p o l i t i c a l orthodoxy t o s a t i s f y t h e
82

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'

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CCP.

H i s t o r i c a l l y , t h e PLAN lagged behind t h e army i n t h e development The P o l i t i c a l Commissar system

o f p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .
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was i n h e r i t e d from t h e PLA and i n s t i t u t e d immediately by naval shore based commands, b u t i t was n o t u n t i l t h e e a r l y 1960s t h a t most ships began r e c e i v i n g p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r s . The C u l t u r a l Revolution's emphasis

on s t r i c t obedience t o Maoism and Ma0 m i l i t a r y thought, f o r e s t a l l e d t h e navy's attempts t o develop a separate naval s t r a t e g y and d o c t r i n e . Throughout t h e C u l t u r a l Revolution, t h e PLAN continued t o b u i l d submarines, f a s t a t t a c k c r a f t and a i r c r a f t . These were t h e l i g h t forces

o f t h e "Young School" and conformed w i t h Mao's s t r a t e g y o f n a t i o n a l defense and t h e navy's r o l e as a coastal defense f o r c e .

Table 9. - - P o l i t i c a l Influences on t h e PLAN

I
1

PERIOD TO 1959 1960-1971 1972-1982

SPECIFIC COMPONENT

I
I

PLAN HAS NO POLITBURO REPRESENTATIVE EMPHASIS O N PROFESSIONALISM

CULTURAL REVOLUTION - NATIONAL EMPHASIS O N POLITICS

- DEATH OF MA0 ZEDONG - REMOVAL OF GANG OF FOUR - RETURN OF DENG XIAOPING - MILITARY'S REDUCED POLITICAL ROLE

1983-1995

- MILITARY'S REDUCED POLITICAL ROLE - EMPHASIS ON PROFESSIONALISM

The PLAN's p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e i n t h e CCP has been extremely limited. With t h e n o t a b l e exception o f L i Zuopeng's involvement i n L i n

Biao's coup attempt, t h e PLAN distanced i t s e l f from domestic p o l i t i c a l struggles. L i was t h e PLAN's f i r s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n t h e CCP Central 83

Committee Politburo (1969-1971).

The PLAN d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n Since t h e r i s e o f

A

succession p o l i t i c s following Mao's death i n 1976.

t h e modernists, p o l i t i c s i n t h e PLAN has become even less important. PLAN o f f i c e r was not admitted t o t h e Politburo again u n t i l 1992, when L i u Huaqi ng was appoi nted . For t h e past 15 years, t h e CCP f a c t i o n favoring modernization o f t h e m i l i t a r y l e d by Deng Xiaoping has dominated over t h e p o l i t i c a l purists.

By consent, t h e m i l i t a r y ' s p o l i t i c a l r o l e has been reduced and The r i s e

t h e military has been allowed t o concentrate on modernization.

o f t h e modernists over t h e Maoists allowed t h e m i l i t a r y and t h e PLAN t o modify Maoist military doctrine. The m i l i t a r y has been able t o again

emphasize professionalism through t h e restoration o f a rank structure. separate uniforms f o r t h e services, and increased emphasis on s k i l l and
military proficiency.

The PLAN's naval strategy evolved from an army

support r o l e i n t h e "Active Defense" strategy t o a primary r o l e i n extending China's defensive perimeter seaward under t h e "Offshore Active Defense" strategy. The s h i f t away from Mao's "People's War" doctrine

has helped t h e t e c h n i c a l l y oriented PLAN by encouraging t h e employment o f advanced technologies i n modern warfare. Economic Influences Economic influences have played a major r o l e i n t h e development o f t h e PLAN. These influences are l i s t e d , by period i n Table 10. The predominant economic influence i n t h e early period o f t h e PLAN's h i s t o r y was t h e backward Chinese economy. This economy placed constraints t h a t i n h i b i t e d t h e i n i ti a1 development o f t h e PLAN. These constraints were

t h e lack o f funds t o b u i l d and maintain a navy, and t h e emphasis on a g r i c u l t u r e and l i g h t industry over heavy industry. With t h e r i s e o f t h e Four Modernizations, came additional economic influences . Thi s incl uded an expandi ng economy, development o f offshore resources, coastal development, and expansion o f foreign trade.
A l l o f these influences had a p o s i t i v e impact on t h e PLAN.
A growing

economy could support an expanding navy.

I n 1984, Deng X i aoping stated,

"Quadrupling China's gross i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l product means t h a t by t h e end o f t h i s century, improving our m i l i t a r y equipment w i l l be an easy job."' The influences o f coastal development and expanding

foreign trade also benefitted t h e navy i n d i r e c t l y by focusing t h e Chinese leadership on maritime issues rather than i n t e r i o r development.

Table 10. --Economic Influences on t h e PLAN

PERIOD

SPECIFIC COMPONENT
-

T O 1959 1960-1971 1972-1982

DEVASTATED ECONOMY

- ECONOMIC SCARCITY - EARLY FOCUS ON MARITIME RESOURCES

- FOUR MODERNIZATIONS - MARITIME RESOURCES - COASTAL DEVELOPMENT

1983-1995

- EXPANDING ECONOMY - MARITIME RESOURCES - COASTAL DEVELOPMENT

I n s t i t u t i o n a l Influences The i n s t i t u t i o n a l influences remained r e l a t i v e l y constant f o r t h e f i r s t 30 years o f t h e PLAN but have changed s i g n i f i c a n t l y since

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1983.
.+$.,

These i n s t i t u t i o n a l influences are l i s t e d i n Table 11. Dominant

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among these influences was t h e army's control over t h e PLAN. This army dominance was reduced i n t h e 1980s.

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Table 11. - - I n s t i t u t i o n a l Influences on t h e PLAN PERIOD T O 1959

-

SPECIFIC COMPONENT
ARMY CONTROL O F PLAN - ROLE O F PENG DEHUAI - RISE O F PROFESSIONALISM (1953-1959)

1960-1971

- ARMY CONTROL O F PLAN - ROLE O F LIN BIAO - "PEOPLE'S WAR DOCTRINE"

I
1983-1995

ARMY CONTROL O F PLAN "PEOPLE'S WAR UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS" DOCTRINE

- ROLE OF LIU HUAQING - PLAN DIVERGES FROM ARMY - BEGINNING O F A SEPARATE NAVAL DOCTRINE

Army domination o f t h e PLAN began a t t h e formation o f t h e navy.

Transferred army o f f i c e r s formed t h e core o f t h e PLAN'S i n i t i a l leadership. Xiao Jinguang, a former army o f f i c e r , commanded t h e PLAN The army was also dominant among t h e PLA's It was

f o r i t s f i r s t 31 years.

service branches because i t was t h e oldest and most respected.

t h e army t h a t was victorious i n t h e C i v i l War, not t h e navy o r t h e air force. Third, army dominance forced t h e other branches i n t o a The navy's e a r l y strategy and doctrine were t i e d t o

supporting r o l e .

t h e land based "People's War" doctrine. I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , army dominance o f t h e navy began t o wane i n t h e l a t e 1970s as military leaders saw serious weaknesses i n t h e

W a r Under Modern Conditions."

The army dominance o f the PLAN was

severely weakened by t h e appointment o f L i u Huaqing as t h e PLAN's comander i n 1982. L i u Huaqing and h i s successor Zhang L i anzhong were t h e f i r s t naval o f f i c e r s t o head t h e PLAN. During t h e i r tenure t h e navy

accelerated t h e trend toward becoming an independent force. The second major i n s t i t u t i o n a l influence on t h e PLAN was r o l e o f t h e M i n i s t e r o f Defense. This influence was p a r t i c u l a r l y strong i n t h e f i r s t two Ministers o f Defense. The f i r s t , Peng Dehuai, emphasized The second, L i n These two m i l i t a r y

a professional force developed along Soviet l i n e s .

Biao, stressed t h e p o l i t i c a l r o l e o f t h e military.

leaders, acting i n opposite directions. had a b i g impact on t h e PLAN's strategy, doctrine, and force structure. Since L i n ' s f a l l from power,

no M i n i s t e r o f Defense has accumulated enough power t o provide t h e k i n d o f impact t h a t Peng and L i n had on t h e military.

Conclusions Using previous and current influences t o determine t h e PLAN's f u t u r e can be r i s k y . Unpredictable events have and w i l l occur t h a t An

could eliminate, a l t e r , o r replace o l d influences almost overnight. example o f t h i s was L i n Biao's death and h i s subsequent repudiation. This section w i l l assume away any dramatic unforeseen events and w i l l

review t h e developmental influences t o determine how they may a f f e c t t h e PLAN i n t o t h e year 2020. Important developmental influences t o t h e PLAN

o f t h e f u t u r e are summarized i n Table 12.

S t r a t e g i c a l l y , t h e PLAN i s a d j u s t i n g t o a w o r l d i n which t h e r e i s no superpower t h r e a t t o China. I n t h e mid t o l a t e 1980s, t h e Chinese

military began t o change i t s focus from a defense o f China from superpower i n v a s i o n t o t h e conduct o f regional , 1i m i t e d wars along t h e e x t e r i o r o f China's border. This emphasis on external v i c e i n t e r n a l

war, means t h a t t h e PLAN wi 11 become a more important p a r t o f t h e Chinese m i l i t a r y . Thus, t h e absence o f a superpower t h r e a t w i l l n o t On t h e

cause a dramatic c u r t a i l m e n t o f t h e PLAN'S modernization.

c o n t r a r y , t h e l a c k o f a seaborne i n v a s i o n t h r e a t w i l l a l l o w t h e f u t u r e PLAN t o shed i t s defensive o r i e n t a t i o n .

Table 1 2 :

Important Influences on t h e Future PLAN

CATEGORY STRATEGIC POLITICAL

SPECIFIC COMPONENT
- N O SUPERPOWER NAVAL THREAT - CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

MILITARY'S ROLE I N CHOOSING DENG'S SUCCESSOR - EMPHASIS O N PROFESSIONALISM

-

ECONOMIC

INSTITUTIONAL

- EXPANDING ECONOMY - MARITIME RESOURCES - COASTAL DEVELOPMENT - INTERNATIONAL TRADE - LIU HUAQING - INCREASED SPECIALIZATION

The second s t r a t e g i c i n f l u e n c e on t h e f u t u r e PLAN i s t h e PRC's c o n t i n u i n g quest t o recover l o s t t e r r i t o r i e s and reverse t h e "Unequal T r e a t i e s " forced on China l a t e i n t h e European c o l o n i a l era. S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e PRC w i l l s o l i d i f y i t s c o n t r o l o f t h e S p r a t l y and

Paracel Islands as t h e countries d i r e c t l y i n opposition t o t h e PRC's d r i v e t o acquire i s l a n d t e r r i t o r i e s are divided on how t o counter Chinese diplomatic and military moves i n t h e South China Sea. Malaysia has recently distanced i t s e l f from a m u l t i - l a t e r a l approach t o solving t h e Spratly Island dispute. The PRC w i l l consolidate i t s positions i n

t h e Spratly Islands by e x p l o i t i n g t h e weakness o f t h e other claimants. This consolidation may also be accomplished by p o l i t i c a l agreement, because as Mao once said, " P o l i t i c a l power grows out t h e end o f a gun b a r r e l . " The PLAN wi 11 have become t h a t gun b a r r e l . T e r r i t o r i a l claims on Taiwan and t h e Senkaku Islands w i l l not be pressed, as i t would b r i n g t h e PRC i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h two o f Asia's strongest m i l i t a r y and economic powers. The PRC - Taiwan issue w i l l be

a1 lowed t o slowly evolve towards interdependence. Also, t h e PRC leadership w i l l be s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e status quo over t h e Senkaku Islands. t h e PLAN. How wi 11 these current and long running s t r a t e g i c influences a f f e c t t h e PLAN i n t h e future? This force w i l l be capable o f p r o j e c t i n g and maintaining power w i t h i n t h e area bounded by i t s i s l a n d claims. However, there i s no s t r a t e g i c imperative f o r t h e PLAN t o acquire an aircraft carrier. The PLANAF w i l l have s u f f i c i e n t ground based air The recent purchases o f Soviet Therefore, PRC claims i n these two areas w i l l not influence

cover t o defend i t s i s l a n d claims.

a i r c r a f t i s t h e f i r s t step i n developing a i r c r a f t w i t h s u f f i c i e n t range t o accomplish t h i s mission. Additionally, a Chinese a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r would have many p o l i t i c a l drawbacks as many Asian countries and t h e United States would become alarmed by t h i s prospect. Recently, t h e

I . :

,...,. ....~

PRC's Foreign Minister c i t e d t h e PLAN's lack o f an a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r as an example o f China's peaceful intentions . The f u t u r e p o l i t i c a l influences on t h e PLAN wi 11 be determined by t h e scope o f t h e PLAN's involvement i n succession p o l i t i c s a f t e r Deng
X i aoping.

The m i l i t a r y as a u n i f y i n g force i n China wi 11 have a large The m i l i t a r y ' s

voice i n t h e selection o f t h e PRC's next leader.

objection t o Deng's f i r s t h e i r apparent, Hu Yaobang, was among t h e causes f o r h i s dismissal as t h e CCP's secretary-general i n January
1987:

The PLAN, as an emerging force, w i l l have d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l The p o l i t i c a l divergence between t h e army

goals from t h e ground forces.

and t h e navy w i l l force t h e navy t o assume an expanded p o l i t i c a l role. This w i l l be unfamiliar ground f o r a m i l i t a r y branch t h a t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y escaped t h e r e a l i t i e s o f Chinese p o l i t i c s under t h e protection o f t h e army. The second p o l i t i c a l influence on t h e f u t u r e o f t h e PLAN i s a continued emphasis on military professionalism. The perpetual struggle

between p o l i t i c a l orthodoxy and m i l i t a r y professionalism appears t o have ended; w i t h professionalism t h e clear winner. No f u t u r e leader o f t h e

PRC w i l l attempt t o draw back from t h e substantial gains made by t h e

navy i n favor o f reestablishing p o l i t i c a l primacy. Dominating both strategic and p o l i t i c a l influences, economic influences w i l l have t h e greatest impact on t h e f u t u r e o f t h e PLAN. A healthy, vibrant economy i s v i t a l t o t h e continued expansion o f t h e Chinese navy. Economic growth i s t h e CCP's prime concern and h i s t o r y

has demonstrated t h a t i n t h e event o f an economic c r i s i s , military expenditures wi 11 be frozen or even reduced. Ensuring t h e continued

90

expansion o f t h e Chinese economy i s becomi ng an increasingly d i f f i c u l t task. China i s j u s t beginning t o confront t h e problem o f simultaneously

encouraging and managing economic growth, control 1ing i n f l a t i o n , and reducing unempl oyment . Another 1arge problem f o r t h e Chinese economy i s improving e f f i c i e n c y and ending government subsidies . An estimated 50 percent o f China's 108,000 s t a t e enterprises are l o s i n g money. As these s t a t e enterprises account f o r about 55 percent o f China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
,

t h i s problem must be resolved t o f a c i l i t a t e continued

economic expansion . 5 The second economic influence on t h e f u t u r e o f t h e PLAN i s t h e quest f o r maritime resources such as o i l and f i s h . The PLAN has

committed i t s e l f t o assisting i n t h e development o f t h e national economy. H i s t o r i c a l l y , t h e PLAN has done t h i s by aiding fishermen i n distress and i n t h e construction o f o i l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . State owned

shipyards have also b u i l t offshore o i 1 platforms i n support o f o i l exploration and extraction e f f o r t s . The PLAN wi 11 continue t h i s

assistance i n t h e quest f o r maritime resources. The PRC has become a more maritime oriented nation p a r t i a l l y as a r e s u l t o f i t s increased overseas commerce. Coastal economic development i s related t o t h i s international trade and both are important t o China's continued economic expansion. As t h e f i r s t l i n e o f

defense o f these important coastal regions, t h e PLAN w i l l emerge as a more powerful branch o f t h e m i l i t a r y . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , t h e trend towards m i l i t a r y specialization w i l l continue.
I f current trends continue, t h e PLAN w i l l become a separate

force i n a l l but name. The navy w i l l continue t o develop and r e f i n e i t s

own maritime strategy and doctrine.

The navy wi 11 most l i k e l y remain a

. ;.

p a r t o f t h e PLA structure, but i t w i l l no longer be influenced by a overpowering ground force component. Possible Imp1ic a t i ons The net r e s u l t o f a l l these influences, i s t h a t t h e PLAN i n t h e year 2020 wi 11 have slowly evolved i n t o a navy second t o none i n Asia. The PRC's goal, I believe, i s t o develop a strong naval force without antagonizing o r a l i e n a t i n g i t s neighbors. The PLAN wi 11 have not

.. .. .
s

'

acquired an a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r unless Japan o r a u n i f i e d Korea has one. The reason f o r t h i s i s twofold, a PLAN a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r would unduly cause concern among Asia countries and t h e Chinese wish t o avoid t h e Soviet mistake o f placing military growth over economic growth. no coincidence t h a t t h e Soviet Union' f i r s t conventional a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r was i n construction a t t h e time o f t h e country's collapse. By 2020, t h e PLAN wi 11 have achieved a rough technological p a r i t y w i t h other modern navies. I t s submarine force w i l l be a mixture
It i s

o f nuclear powered submarines based on t h e navy's experience w i t h t h e Han and Xia class submarines and diesel - e l e c t r i c powered submarines developed from t h e Soviet "K" class submarines f i r s t delivered i n 1995. Entering service i n t h e early 1980s and possessing improved endurance, weapons, and reduced s e l f noise, t h e "K" i s a s i g n i f i c a n t upgrade f o r t h e PLAN submarine force consisting l a r g e l y o f obsolete "R" submarines. China's growing technological sophistication along w i t h reverse engineering o f Soviet a i r c r a f t , wi 11 have made t h e PLANAF a modern a i r f o r c e capable o f defending any o f t h e PRC's offshore claims. The

PLAN surface ships by 2020, w i l l have modern surface t o a i r missiles f o r 92

s e l f and area defense and w i l l have land s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y s i m i l a r t o t h e U.S. Navy's c u r r e n t Tomahawk M i s s i l e . The PLAN w i l l have a modern c m a n d and c o n t r o l system capable o f supporting long range operations. O p e r a t i o n a l l y , t h e PLAN i n 2020 wi 11 have d r a m a t i c a l l y increased i t s v i s i b i l i t y i n Asia.
It wi 11 conduct more p o r t v i s i t s and

e s t a b l i s h more m i l i t a r y t o m i l i t a r y contacts. more out o f area operations.

The PLAN wi 11 conduct

By 2020, t h e sea area w i t h i n China's

i s l a n d claims and e s p e c i a l l y around t h e S p r a t l y and Paracel Islands w i l l be considered a l o c a l operating area and wi 11 be t h e s i t e o f increased and near continuous PLAN presence. The PLAN wi 11 become a fami l i a r , b u t

n o t an overshadowing presence i n t h e waters o f t h e Western P a c i f i c . East China Sea, Ye1 low Sea, and South China Sea.

ENDNOTES CHAPTER ONE 'David G. Mu11e r , C bna as a Maritime Power Westview Press. 1983) , 44. (Boulde r , CO:

'International I n s t i t u t e f o r Strategic Studies, Jhe M i l i t a r v Balance 1994-1995 (London: Brassey's, 1994), 164-193. 3Charles R. Larson, Commander i n Chief, United States P a c i f i c Command's testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, Posture Hearinas, 103rd Congress 2nd Session, 2 March 1994. CHAPTER TWO 'Muller, 12.

3Bruce Swanson, Eiahth Vovaae o f t h e D r a ~ o n :A Historv o f China's Ouest for Seapower (Annapolis. MD: U.S. Naval I n s t i t u t e Press, 1982). 181-182.

'Gene Z . Hanrahan, "Report on Red China's New Navy," U.S. Naval I n s t i t u t e Proceedi nas 79 (August 1953) : 847. Tlichael D. Swaine. The M i l i t a r v & P o l i t i c a l Succession i n China (Santa Monica. CA: RAND Corporation. 1992). 39.
'Wi 1l i a m W. Whi tson. Oraanizational PersDectives and DecisionMakina i n t h e Chinese Communist Hiah Command (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporati on, 1971) , 42.

==China Today Edi t o r i a1 Board. Danadai Zhonaauo Hai jun (The Peoole's Navv Todav) (Bei j i n g : China Social Sciences Press, l987), 683-

684 and Whitson, 42. 12Muller, 15. =5wanson, 194.

.. ,. , .. : *.:I .,..

14Whitson, 42. "China Today, 684. l"aymond V. 6. Blackman ed., Jane's Fiahtino Ships 1950-1951 (New York: McGraw-Hi 11 Book Company, 19501, 150-158. 17B1ackman, 150-158. ="hi na Today, 684-686. 19Swanson, 194-195. mMuller, 29. 21Raymond V. 6. Blackman, ed. , Jane's F i a h t i na Ships 1955-1956 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19551, 152. 2~uller. 18. "Ibid, 28-29.

; ; :i . ., ..

26Jiefang Ribao (Liberation D a i l y ) , 13 Feb 1950 i n Jon W. Huebner, "The Abortive Liberation o f Taiwan. " The China Ouarterlv 110: 265. "Jiefang Ribao, 4 Feb 1950 i n Huebner: 265. '"Michael Y. M. Kau, ed.. The Writinas o f Mao Zedona: 1949-1976. Volume 1 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 19861. 6.

'"Jonathan D. Spence, The Search For Modern China (New York: W. W . Norton & Company, 19901, 525. "Harlan W. Jencks, F r m Muskets t o Missiles: P o l i t i c s and Professionalism i n t h e Chinese Armv. 1945-1981 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 19821, 46. "Mul l e r , 78

"China Today, 686

"Ibid, 580 'China Today, 687.

World December 1969 trans. U. S. Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency ( D I A ) .

t r a n s l a t i o n LN 809-70. 2: i n Muller, 20. mMuller, 29. "Sena, 3 i n Mu1l e r 50.

"Takahiko Sena, "Submarines o f Communist China." Ships o f t h e

"Paul H. 8. Godwin. The Chinese Communist Armed Forces (Maxwell A i r Force Base, AL: A i r University Press. 1988), 115.

china Today, 694.

"Jurgen Domes, Pena Te-Huai: The Man and t h e Imaa? (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985). 66-67. 45Conscription Law o f t h e People's Republic o f China, 7 February 1955, i n Theodore H . E . Chen, The Chinese Communist Reaime: Documents and Commentary (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967). 311-319.

4 7 D ~ e s66. , 'China Today, 689. "Robert L. Worden, Andrea Matles Savada, and Ronald E. Dolan ed., China: A Countrv Study (Washington, DC: Library o f Congress Federal Research Division, 1988). 41. '"bid. 43.

51Spence, 522-524.

CHAPTER THREE lMuller, 111. 'Michael MccGwi r e , Ken Booth, and John McDonnel 1 , ed. , Soviet Naval Pol i c v : 0b.iecti ves and Constraints (New York: Praeger Pub1ishers , 1975), 377-379. 'Lin Biao, "Long L i v e t h e Victory o f t h e People's War," i n Irrmanuel C. Y. Hsu Readi nas i n Modern Chinese Historv (New York: Oxford University Press, 19711, 629. 4Chang Y i -Mi n, "Building t h e World's Strongest People's Navy" 1 No. 1: 42. Bei.iina Review 1 'Muller, 89-90. "bid, 'Ibid. 81bid. 'Peter S. H. Tang and Joan M. Maloney, Communist China: The Dwnestic Scene 1949-1967 (South Orange NJ: Seton Hall University Press, 1967). 400. I b i d , 405. 11Harold C. Hinton, ed., The People's Republic o f China: A Handbook (Boulder. CO: Westview Press, 1979), 423-424. 90.

14Tang and Maloney, 433-434. "China Today, 701. W u l l e r . 134-135.

laChina Today, 697. I 9 I b i d , 703. '"uller, 136.

p?.;,;!
,-,,

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t, ,.v: >v,.,: &%;;;;

y>.. ,d..' $ p
, . 5.. > , : . . .:

&.!, 5
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"China Today, 704. 22YenWei -hui , "China Builds i t s F i r s t Ocean-Going Freighter i n t h e 10,000-Ton Class," P e k i n ~ Review 1 1 No.3: 15. "China Today, 704 "Worden, Savada, and Dolan, 49. 25Muller, 114. 26Menno T. Kamminga, "Building 'Rai 1roads on t h e Sea' : China's A t t i t u d e Towards Maritime Law" China Ouarterlv 59 (July-September 1974) : 547. "Mul l e r , 113-114
28El l i s J o f f e , "The Chinese Army A f t e r t h e C u l t u r a l Revolution: The E f f e c t s o f I n t e r v e n t i o n " China Ouarterlv 55 (July-September 1973): 469.

H i
1

*< J., ; . . ..:.

,.. . h, . .

"Muller 105-106. 'China Today. 704.

)'Bruce Swanson, "The Navy o f t h e People's Republic o f China," i n Guide t o Far Eastern Navies, ed. Barry M. Blechman and Robert P. Berman. (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval I n s t i t u t e Press. 1978), 92-94. CHAPTER FOUR =Mullet-, 108 'Parris Chang, "China's M i l i t a r y 1974): 105. 'Mu1 l e r , 151-152 4PRC M i n i s t r y o f Foreign A f f a i r s statement. Bei.iina Review 20, No. 25 (17 June 1977): 17. 'Selig S. Harrison, China. O i l . and Asia: C o n f l i c t Ahead? (New York: Columbia U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1977). 1-7. "bid, 130.
"

Current H i s t o r v 67 (September

'China Today, 628. "wanson, "The Navy o f t h e People's Republic o f China." 145. 98

gBei.iincl Review 18, No. 24 (13 June 1975): 30. l%ei.iina Review 17, No. 25 (21 June 1974): 5. "Xinhua, 2 May 1982 i n FBIS-CHI, 3 May 1982, A - 1 "Gerald Segal Press, 19851, 198.

. Defendi na China (London:

Oxford U n i v e r s i t y

laKenneth G. Weiss. The Sea i s Red: The Si no-Soviet Rival r v and i t s Naval Dimension (Alexandria, VA: Center f o r Naval Analyses, 1984). 17. 15Jiang Yuanchun. "Soviet Strategy f o r East Asia. Review 24. No. 12 (23 March 1981): 20.
"

Beiiinq

1 7 E l l i s J o f f e . "People's War Under Modern Conditions: A Doctrine f o r Modern War" China Ouarterlv 112 (December 1987): 569. l W u l l e r , 173. l9Jiefanaun Bao (20 A p r i l 1977): 3. i n Muller, 173. %obert S. Wang, "China's Evolving S t r a t e g i c Doctrine, " Survey X X I V , No. 10 (October 1984): 1048. "John Moore, ed., Jane's Ficlhtincl Ships 1992-1993 (New York: McGraw-Hi 11 Book Company. 1992). 131. "China Today, 472

2v'Speed Up t h e Modernization o f National Defence ( s i c ) " Bei,ii nq Review 20, No. 32 ( 5 August 1977): 17. '"eng Xiaoping, The Selected Works o f Dena XiaoDina Volume 2 ( B e i j i n g : Foreign Language Press, 1984). 373. "Renmin R i b a ~ ,20 J u l y 1981, 7. 'China Today. 707.

"China Today, 710

successful Launching o f Carrier Rocket" Bei j i n a Review 25, No. 43 (25 October 1982) : 5.
"Mu1 1e r , 206. 'Xhina Today, 709. 3hPeopl e ' s Liberation Army. Zhunaauo Renmi n Jiefana,iun J i ana X i IJ Mina L i u (Chinese P e o ~ l e ' sLiberation Armv - L i s t o f Flaa Officers, Volume 1 2nd ed. (Bei j i n g : PLA Press. 1987). 58. "Mu1 1e r , 206.

'Thins Today, 712.

""Brief Biography o f L i u Huaqing," Bei.iina Review 32. No. 47 (20 November 1989). 22. 'OPeople's Liberation Army, Zhunaauo Renmin Jiefana.iun Jiana Xiu Mina L i u (Chinese P e o ~ l e ' sLiberation Armv - L i s t o f Flaa Officers, Volume 2 2nd ed. ( B e i j i n g : PLA Press. 1987). 58. CHAPTER FIVE =Muller, 166-167. 2International I n s t i t u t e f o r Strategic Studies. The M i l i t a r v Balance 1983-1984 (London: International I n s t i t u t e f o r Strategic Studies. 1983). 18. 'Alexander Chi eh-cheng Huang, "The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications" Naval War Colleae Review XLVII , No. 3 (Summer 1994) : 17. 'Gao Anming, "Navy t o P a r t i c i p a t e i n Economic Reform Drive" China D a i l v 6 A p r i l 1992 i n FBIS-CHI-92-072, 14 A p r i l 1992, 43. Xhina Today, 712-713. 5 h i Changxue and Wang Helin, "Navy Has Made Marked Improvements i n I t s A b i l i t y t o Maintain, Repair Equipment by Means o f Technology" Renmin Ribao 6 J u l y 1991 i n FBIS-CH-91-135, 15 J u l y 1991. 56. 'Ibid. %ei.iina Review 26, No. 5 (31 January 1983): 19.

g"More Seaports, Airports Opened" B e i i i n a Review 27, No. 48 (26 November 1984) : 9.
b i'

..; ~.... <,

si.
:

.,

".

!d.

..,.

l"Huang Caihong, "Navy Supports Coastal Development With Resources" Xinhua Domestic Service 7 July 1992 i n FBIS-CHI-92-132, 9 July 1992, 29. ==BeisinsDomestic Service 2 June 1988 i n FBIS-CHI-88-108. 6 June 1988, 29.

13Gao Anmi ng , 44. 14Bei.iina Review 26, No. 28(6 J u l y 1983): 7 "Honaai (Red Flaa) 16 January 1986, 17-21. 16"Conscription Work Regulations" Xinhua Domestic Service 29 October 1985 i n FBIS-PRC, 30 October 1985, K18-K-27. 17"Beijing Men Get Set t o Join t h e PLA" China Dailv 23 October 1993 i n FBIS-CHI-93-024, 25 October 1993, 39. 18Liu Shendong and Si Yanwen, "High, New Technology Applied i n Navy Construction" Jiefanq.iun Baa 30 September 1991 i n FBIS-CHI-91-211, 43. 19Hu Chunhua , "Navy's E f f o r t t o Develop Maritime Shipping Service Has Broad Prospects" Jiefanqjun Bao 2 June 1992 i n FBIS-CHI-92121. 38.

21Paul H. B. Godwin, "Force and Diplomacy: Chinese Security Policy i n t h e Post-Cold war Era" China and t h e World: Chinese Foreiqn Relations i n t h e Post-Cold war Era 3rd ed., Samuel S. K i m ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, l994), 172. 2"lexander Chi eh-cheng Huang, 19.

"China Dailv 1 1 A p r i l 1987 i n FBIS-PRC, 16 Apri 1 1987, K-23 24ChongK. Yoon, "Problems o f Modernizing t h e PLA: Domestic Constraints" China's M i l i t a r v Modernization: International Implications Larry M. Wortzel ed. (New York: Greenwood Press. 1988). 2-3. 25Honaai (Red Flaa) 1 August 1985 i n FBIS-CHI-153, 8 August 1985. K-4. 261nternational I n s t i t u t e f o r Strategic Studies, The M i l i t a r y Balance 1983.1984 (London: International I n s t i t u t e f o r Strategic 101

..., .,
1 ' 9 .

... .,,,
. ..

Studies, 1983). 84; International I n s t i t u t e f o r Strategic Studies, M i l i t a r v Balance 1993-1994 (London: International I n s t i t u t e f o r Strategic Studies, 1993), 152.

l3.e

z8Bei.iinclReview 29, No. 16 (14 A p r i l 86): 5-6. 29Michael D. Swaine. The M i l i t a r v & P o l i t i c a l Succession i n China: leaders hi^. I s t i t u t i o n s . B e l i e f s (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992). 74. ' o T ~Kuncr Pao 3 February 1988, 1 i n FBIS-CHI-88-022. 3 February 1988, 9.
"Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform A f t e r Mao (Washington, DC: The Brooking I n s t i t u t i o n , 1987), 217.

"Mao Zhenfa, "Form t h e Concept o f Defense That Lays an Equal Emphasis On Both Coastal and Land Defenses" Jiefancl.iun B ~ Q 9 February 1990 i n FBIS-CHI-90-042-S, 2 March 1990. 23. " W u Senhui and Zhang Hanting, "East Sea Fleet Combined Forces Maneuvers Ends" Xinhua Domestic Service 3 June 1992 i n FBIS-CHI-92-109, 5 June 1992. 29. 34HuangCaihong "Army-People Projects Benefit Coastal Areas" Xinhua Domestic Service 9 A p r i l 1993 i n FBIS-CHI-93-074, 20 A p r i l 1993, 22. 35"China Builds Air Base Near Spratlys and Taiwan i s Following S u i t " Asian Defence Journal 23, No. 8 (August 1993): 98. '"'Bei j i n g Said t o B u i l d Three Large Naval Bases" January 1993 i n FBIS-CHI-93-006, 1 1 January 1993, 22-23. 28-29.
CHAPTER S I X

1<Ynda 11

37Eastern Exoress 4 May 1994, 8 i n FBIS-CHI-94-086, 4 May 1994,

'Nayan Chanda , R i goberto Ti g l ao. and John McBeth, "Terri t o r i a1 Imperative" Far Eastern Economic Review 158, No. 8 (23 February 1995): 15. ~Chong-PinL i n , "Red F i s t : China's Army i n Transition" International Defense Review 28 (February 19951, 31. 'Joris Janssen Lok and Robert Karniol , "Spain Offers Carrier Designs t o Chinese" Jane's Defense Weeklv 23 (18 February 1995): 8.

Chong-Pin L i n , 31. sNayan Chanda, "The End i s Near" Far Eastern Economic Review 158, No. 8 (23 February 1995): 48-50.

APPENDIX A

Organisational Chart of the Chinese People's Liberation Army

Source: Jaws's Information Group Ltd. china i n C r i s i s : The Role o f t h e M i l i t a r y (London: Jane's Defense D a t a , 19891,91.

104

APPENDIX B

Organisational Chart of the PLA Navy

I
lonh China Scr Fleet

I
Earl China
Sea Flrct

I
Military lnftilvler k Schaolr. smliatcd lo ,he Nary

I
Units vndcr dirrc conlrol or ,he Nsr

Boat Unit

s v n e y Uni

Q Ship
Boat Uni,

Source: Janes's Information Group L t d . China i n C r i s i s : The Role o f t h e M i l i t a r y (London: Jane's Defense Data, 19891, 90.

105

APPENDIX C LEADERSHIP OF THE PLAN

PLAN COMMANDERS XIAO J INGUANG

YE F E I

JAN 1950 JAN 1980

JAN 1980 AUG 1 9 8 2

L I U HUAQING ZHANG LIANZHONG

AUG 1 9 8 2 - NOV 1 9 8 7 NOV 1987 - PRESENT

1ST POLITICAL COEblISSAR SU ZHENHUA

L I ZUOPENG

FEB 1957 - JUN 1 9 6 7 JUN 1 9 6 7 - SEP 1 9 7 1 MAY 1 9 7 2 - FEB 1 9 7 9 FEB 1 9 7 9 - JAN 1980 JAN 1 9 8 1 - OCT 1 9 9 3 OCT 1 9 9 3 - PRESENT

SU ZHENHUA YE F E I
L I YAOWEN

WE1 JINSHAN

APPENDIX D

PLAN'S MAJOR NAVAL BASES AND OPERATING AREAS

Source: Tai Ming Cheung. Growth o f Chinese Naval Power: P r i o r i t i e s . Goals. Missions. and Reaional I m ~ l i c a t i o n(Singapore: I n s t i t u t e o f Southeast Asian Studies. 1990), 33.

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