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1. FRANCISCO LECAROZ & LENLIE LECAROZ vs. SANDIGANBAYAN & PP G.R. No.

130872 March 25, 1999 FACTS: In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the SB of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Francisco Lecaroz (Mayor) informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie Lecaroz (Lenlie - former KB Chairman) continued to receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. ISSUE: Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen or has qualified. HELD: YES. To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of KB youth sectoral representatives to the SB and of the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the KB Constitution respectively provide - Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980. In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataang barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with their tenure is president of their respective association and federation . In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 22, Rule III is valid. HELD: NO. The provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules implementing RA 2260 cannot be accorded validity. It is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. The statute itself (RA 2260) contained no provision prohibiting the appointment or reinstatement in the government service of any person who was already 57 y/o. The provision at issue is an unauthorized act on the part of CSC a supererogation since it has no relation or connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried in effect. The power vested on the CSC was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions on it. Apart from this, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published. 3. ESTRADA vs DESIERTO [G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001] ESTRADA vs ARROYO [G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001] (Thanks to Coffeeholic for this digest. I did some truncations.) FACTS: In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Arroyo was elected VP. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senatorjudges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the VP shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President (2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President Held: The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the

2. TOLEDO vs. CSC and COMELEC G.R. No. 92646-47 FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by the COMELEC Chairman as Manager of the Education and Information Department of the COMELEC when he was more than 57 years old. This was his first time to join government service. No prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) was secured. Said provision prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into the government service without prior approval by the CSC. Atty. Toledo officially reported for work and assumed the functions of his office. COMELEC, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under the CSRPAP issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared Toledos appointment as void ab initio. Toledo appealed the foregoing Resolution to the CSC. CSC Resolution No. 89-468 disposed of the appeal by declaring the appointment of Toledo as merely voidable and not void ab initio and declaring Toledo as a de facto officer from the time he assumed office to the time of the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2066. October 4, 1991

presidency, and hence is a President on leave. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

5. ROMULO vs YNIGUEZ G.R. No. 71908 February 4, 1986

FACTS: Respondents Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa contend that that the petition should be dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are political in nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even supposing without admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere with the Batasans power of impeachment HELD: NO. 1. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and complaint for impeachment makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had acted. 2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment without revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which of course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply with any order from the Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself. 3. The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, then it does not have the authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, there will be the spectacle presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing. 4. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it.

6. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez vs. The House Of Representatives Committee On Justice, et.al. G.R. No. 193459 FACTS: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner. On August 3, 2010, private respondents Reyes group filed another impeachment complaint. On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II instructed the Deputy Secretary General for Operations to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day. On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., the HRep simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent. Public respondent found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010. On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent. After hearing, public respondent found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. ISSUE: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present impeachment complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the Constitution?) Held: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Petitioner reckons the start of the 1-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within 1 year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings. Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the singular tense of the word complaint to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense. The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick February 15, 2011

alone, however, cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral. As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that [a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding[ of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondentintervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding.

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