1117509 Do critical realists adequately link structure and agency?

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This paper will discern whether critical realism adequately links social structures and human agents, illustrating the position that on its own, it cannot adequately combine these two features of society. It will go on to propose a dialectical approach, influenced by the work of Akram (2008, 2010) in proposing a synergy of concepts borrowed from Archer, Giddens and to a lesser degree, Bourdieu, before questioning the problematic itself of whether it is even necessary or indeed possible to seek a unification theory of the social sciences. The issue of structure and agency, and the apparent disconnect between the two has troubled numerous scholars throughout the history of sociological theory (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004). The early work of classical sociologists in Durkheim, Marx and Weber all identified in some form or other, structures which constrained the scope human agents actions (Ibid.) Archer (1995) illustrates this polarisation between people and parts, has existed in numerous guises such as macro versus micro, and collectivism versus individualism throughout sociologys history (Archer, 1995). Before proceeding, it is useful to have some working definition of key terms. Whilst each of the three theorists this paper hold as its foci differ somewhat in the vernacular of their theories and indeed, even the key terms such as social structure for instance Giddens use of social system is more in keeping with orthodox views of social structure (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004) nonetheless some definition seems appropriate in order to generate a general notion of what structure, agent and agency refer to. For the purposes of this paper I shall define agent, agency and structure in the following way; agent refers to the individual or people as Archer (1995) succinctly puts it. Agency shall be defined as a synonym for human action (Scott and Marshall, 2005:9). Finally, perhaps the most elusive to define, structure denotes the parts of society that shape and constrain agents, creating a framework within which agency operates (Archer, 1995). However this appears rather vague, so referring to the Oxford

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dictionary of sociology we find the term signifies social behaviour seen as designating the arrangement of individuals and groups into larger entities (Scott and Marshall, 2004:644), such as the social facts which Durkheim studied (Ibid.) So social structures are the patterned and ordered practices which agency functions within, which guide agents and of which many argue constrain them (Archer 1995, Ritzer and Goodman, 2004). Critical realism (henceforth, CR) is not the first attempt at unifying the polarised concepts of structure and agency. Whilst providing a history of this area of social science is not possible within the constraints of this paper, CR will be considered within the European literature of the late twentieth century, juxtaposed alongside the work of two prominent theorists in Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu. In their respective ways both Giddens and Bourdieu have sought to overcome the dichotomy of the structure-agency problem (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004), and at least in that sense, share an affinity with CR. CRs origins stem from the work of Roy Bhaskar, who looked to formulate a new ontological approach to engaging with reality which he hoped, would lead to epistemic improvements in both the social and natural sciences (Bhaskar, 1978). At the centre of this ontological position was the notion of a reality beyond our knowledge, situated in what he dubbed the intransitive domain (ibid). Whilst certainly grounds to critique the work of Bhaskar and CR more generally on an ontological level exist, this appears unnecessary in answering whether CR adequately links structure and agency. Moreover, the highly technical nature of such a critique is better handled by for example, Cruickshank (2004) or King (1999). Because of the limitations imposed upon this paper, CRs corner will be represented by Margaret Archers morphogenetic theory, and be considered in contrast to Giddenss structuration theory and Bourdieus notion of Habitus. We will begin by addressing Giddenss structuration theory, before moving onto Archers theory, which in part sought to address issues she took with his perspective,

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before moving briefly onto Bourdieus work in an attempt to identify why CR should be considered to inadequately link the problematic of structure and agency. We start with Giddens, who according to Ritzer and Goodman (2004:509) formulated one of the best known and most articulated efforts to integrate agency and structure. Giddenss rather eclectic approach Craib identified no less than nine main influences on his writing (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004:509) sought to develop a non-positivist conceptual framework and methodology for the social sciences (Baert, 1998:93). [It] should be considered a general theory seeking to survey the interaction between social structure and human agency, thus synergising the concepts within one conceptual framework intended to adequately elucidate both features and the respective problematic which arose from these notions of society (Ibid.:94). In short, Giddens saw the positivist doctrine which dominated sociology in the post-war period ... [and] its adherence to functionalist theory and positivist epistemology (Ibid.:94) as insufficient in resolving the dualisms he observed between structure and agency amongst others (Ibid:94). Structuration theory can therefore be seen as an attempt to rectify his misgivings in sociology on the subject. Giddens proposed a dialectical approach to structure and agency, stressing the interplay between the two, on the one hand, shrugging off the determinism of structural accounts, and the other, of rejecting the emancipated notion of the individual as espoused by agency-based accounts such as symbolic interactionism or rational choice theory (Ritzer and Goodman, 2004, Akram, 2010). Instead he placed emphasis on the conscious agent, capable of enacting free will in the interplay between the constraining, nature of social structures. Archer whilst sharing the intent to unify, took issue with Giddens approach. Her early work was heavily oriented toward critiquing Giddens (Ritzer and Goodman, (2004):514) and her later work is arguably a reaction to articulate a systems-theory alternative *to structuration theory+ (Ibid.) One tenet of her work is the notion of culture not being represented in the literary dialectic of the

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structure agency problem (Archer, 1995, Ritzer and Goodman, 2004). She criticises Giddens, amongst others, of a form of conflation in his case central conflation and posits instead of a dualism between structure and agency whereby both concepts can only be analysed separately (Archer, 1995) she sees a duality, emphasising how the two can only be understood in terms of their relationship and interplay to each other. In articulating this interplay she invokes the imagery of the coin; that society can be viewed as a coin, with structure and agency referring to the two opposing sides. Only by viewing the coin in its entirety can sense be made of society (Ibid.) Additionally she incorporates the notion of temporality; that the duality of both concepts can only be understood by their interplay over time and that the interplay creates a dialectic progression with its own dynamic. It is useful to demonstrate this using Archers (1995) figure: Fig 1. The Morphogenetic Sequence (Archer: 1995, taken from Akram, 2010:2)

This model demonstrates how the interplay between structure and agent (at T2 and T3 creates structural elaboration, where emergent properties develop dialectically, altering both structure and agent, with a new order emerging from the interaction over time, creating new structures and modes of practice, whereby the process continues through interaction and elaboration into the future. 4

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Whilst this model certainly has innovative and compelling notions which appear useful in understanding the dynamics of social interaction in the structure-agency area, King (1999) argues that ironically, Archers very model can be used to deflate the premise of her theory. King argues that in every case, Archers appeals to emergentism can be reduced to the practises of other people . . . and that, therefore, the morphogenetic approach cannot defend itself from collapsing back into an interpretive ontology (1999:213). The irony of this conclusion can best be summed up by Archers issue with Giddens theory, as she is adamant that duality must be preserved in structureagency, and sees him as reducing structures into agents minds (Archer, 1995, Ritzer and Goodman, 2004). Consequently, being guilty of what she terms central conflation (Archer, 1995) something King argues she herself unwittingly performs. King, as well as Martin and Dennis (2010), question the validity of Archers agential emergent properties, with King stating they are unconvincing (King 1999.:210). He argues that the social interaction occurring between T2 and T3 reveals only interactions between individuals occur; that structural elaboration at T4, where Archer posits a new structure not reducible to agents emerges (Archer, 1995) is actually attributable to other agents: Thus on Archers own account of social reality, the structure which living individuals face, and which is supposed to be irreducible to other people is in fact, only these very other people interacting in the past. (King, 1999:210)

Kings is certainly a strong and compelling argument which infers that Archers Morphogenetic approach, somewhat similarly to Giddens falls from the fine line as King (1999) puts it into the agents side of the problematic. Another criticism of Archers is that by arguing that structure predates the agents that operate and change it (Archer, 1995) there exists an element of determinism to her theory which could be construed as alluding, perhaps tacitly to reification (Martin and Dennis, 2010, Akram, 2010, King 1999). Finally, whilst Archer finds much ground on which to criticise Giddens, one major strength in structuration is the understanding of consciousness in agent, as Akram cogently elaborates:

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In my view, Giddens understanding of agency allows us to conceptualise agency and, in particular, the impact of various degrees of consciousness and unconsciousness on the agent much more adequately than Archer or Hay do. Crucially, unlike Archer and Hay, Giddens recognises both that agents are not totally aware of the structural contexts within which they are located and that these structural contexts can still influence their actions. Akram (2010:20)

Giddens use of consciousness and a less-than-conscious level of thought in the agent provides a more adequate understanding of how agents utilise structures, suggesting behaviour is more than a simple calculation of their utilities (Ibid.) Thus structuration provides a more urbane conception of how agents experience differently mediated experiences of reality (Ibid.) This argument neatly leads us to the work of Bourdieu and his notion of habitus, with the intention of further elaboration of this perspective (Ibid.)

Bourdieus theory was prompted by his observation of the absurd opposition between individual and society (Bourdieu, 1990, quoted in Ritzer and Goodman 2004:517). Whilst his writings are not without their faults like for instance, Jenkins argues his most crucial weakness (quoted in Ritzer and Goodman, 2004:520) his difficulty in coping with subjectivity his notion of habitus and unconscious are compelling and offer a way forward for a dialectical synergy of some of the more salient ideas proffered by all three scholars under scrutiny. Bourdieu, whilst not elucidating directly a notion of unconscious, implicitly infers a level of unconscious determination in agency (Akram 2008, 2010). This unwitting level of action influencing the agent adds a dimension to the structure-agency debate and arguably, enables greater explanation of how the interplay between them pans out. Acknowledging such helps counteract the disempowering effect on structure which Archers oversight has enabled (Akram, 2008)

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Finally, there is a school of thought that the problem of removing dichotomy of structure and agent may be an academic misnomer which serves to inhibit understanding of society. Indeed Martin and Dennis new book Human agents and social structures (2010) centres on a theme of rejection of this problem even requires a solution: We argue that the structure-and-agency debate cannot reach conclusion because it is based upon a tendentious interpretation of the history and problematic of sociological theories. In particular, the assumption that prior theories can be simply and crudely divided between either agency or structure is false. (Sharrock and Button 2010)

In conclusion, we have seen how whilst critical realism is not without its merits, it has been demonstrated that by comparing CR to the stronger theoretical merits that aspects of Giddens and Bourdieu both demonstrate, in conjunction to the criticisms of King and the dialectical negation offered by Akram it is clear CR fails to adequately link structure and agency. Bringing to a close, ostensibly, any theory that is to link the structure-agency disconnect (if at all possible), will require a dialectical consideration of CR alongside other, competing theories.

1117509 Bibliography

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Bhaskar, R. (1978) A realist theory of science (second edition). The Harvester Press Limited: Sussex Archer, M. (1995) Realist social theory: the morphogenetic approach. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge Baert, P. (1998) Social Theory in the twentieth century Polity:Cambridge King, A.(1999) Against structure, a critique of morphogenetic social theory. The Sociological Review Vol. 47 Issue 2 pp 199-227 Cruickshank, J. (2004) A tale of two ontologies: an immanent critique of critical realism, The Sociological Review, Vol. 52 Issue 4 pp 567-585 Ritzer, G and Goodman, D. (2004) Sociological theory. McGraw-Hill, New York. Akram, S. (2008) Re-conceptualising the concept of Agency in the Structure/Agency Dialectic: The Importance of Habitus and the Unconscious. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/1266/2/Akram_10_PhD.pdf (Accessed online 28/02/11) Akram, S. (2010) Re-conceptualising the concept of Agency in the Structure/Agency Dialectic: The Importance of Habitus and the Unconscious. http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1644_1503.pdf (accessed online 18/02/11) Martin, P and Dennis, A (2010). Introduction: the opposition of structure and agency in Martin, P and Dennis, A (eds) Human Agents and Social Structures. Manchester University Press: Manchester Sharrock, W and Button, G (2010). The structure problem in the context of structure and agency controversies in Martin, P and Dennis, A (eds) Human Agents and Social Structures. Manchester University Press: Manchester