Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Herndon Command Center
Type of event: Interview with Jim Ratkus
Date: April 5, 2004
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: Herndon, Virginia
Participants - Non-Commission: Brook Lewis, Chief Consul's Office, FAA
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Lisa Sullivan, Geoffrey Brown
Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.

Background:

Ratkus began his career with the FAA in April of 1982. He worked at Washington
National until September of 1995 in various positions, including air traffic controller
(ATC) Supervisor and quality assurance (QA) Specialist, hi September of 1995 he went
to FAA Headquarters in the Air Traffic Investigations and Evaluations Group (then ATH
20, now AT 10). David John Cannoles was the head of this department, hi June of 1998
he moved into Terminal Procedures at Headquarters, hi June of 1999 he came to the
Herndon Command Center and he is an East Position Specialist.

He is also Controller in Charge (CIC) Qualified for the National Traffic

Management Operator (NTMO) East position.

September 11, 2001 (9/11):

On 9/11 he worked at Position 16 which covers Atlanta/Jackson/Miami En Route

Centers. Since Tuesdays are scheduled as training days for NTMO West Supervisors,
there were more supervisors present then normally during the week.

Ratkus recalls that the Position 15 Specialist, Tony Smith, who was working
Boston and Cleveland, was newly certified for that specialty. Smith called Ratkus over to
his position, and FAA Boston En Route Center (ZBW) was on an open microphone
explaining that they had a hijacked aircraft that had broadcast threatening
communications. Ratkus told Smith to call Tim Smith, who was working as a Temporary
Supervisor, working "for all purposes" as an NTMO. Ratkus recalls that ZBW passed
information that they were "pulling the tapes". Ratkus recalls Wanda Jordan and Bill
Broach operating the Position 14 area - New York En Route Center (ZNY). He believes
John White monitored a telecom with FAA Headquarters that morning.

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Ratkus clarified to Commission staff that when AA 11 was tagged to identify it as

a primary associated with a tail number the Traffic Display System at Herndon would not
have received that tag. Ratkus did no remember ever hearing reports that AA 11 did not
hit the World Trade Center (WTC) and was headed towards Washington, D.C.

Ratkus heard that an aircraft had hit the WTC from another controller who was
watching CNN. He saw the second aircraft (UAL 175) crash into the WTC live on CNN.
He recalls immediately connecting the events to terrorism.

Ratkus went back to his section and managed the air traffic he was responsible
for. He stated that he "may have" helped with the necessary calls that morning, but it was
his responsibility to continue working his assigned airspace. He recalls "chatter" in the
room about other threatened flights, but he recalls this "jabber" was not definitive.

Ratkus recalls watching from Smith TSD at Position 15 United Airlines Flight 93
(UAL 93) "turn around in Cleveland space" and thought it likely the flight was "headed
to Washington, D.C." Ratkus noted that the "computer will continue to project a track for
X amount of time". He does not know how the TSD would display a flight that had
stopped transponding and then turned off its flight plan. After further discussion, Ratkus
noted that he believes that "even after this plan crashed it may have shown it going on
and on". Ratkus noted that "unless you were sitting there watching it you wouldn't
know" that the hollow plane image that is displayed as a "ghost track" does not exist at
all after a crash.

Ratkus does not specifically recall any information regarding ZBW's suggestion
for Herndon to inform the airlines to "increase cockpit security".

Ratkus also noted that the he believed a helicopter had struck the Pentagon. This
information was based on the general reports he heard on the operations floor, but he
does not recall any details. Ratkus believes it was not until later in the day that he knew it
was a commercial airliner that struck the Pentagon (AA 77).

Position 16 covered airspace traveled by Air Force One on 9/11. Ratkus does not
recall any threat information to it.

Hijack protocol and training pre-9/11:

Ratkus explained that the yearly training received by operators at Herndon

teaches that a report of a hijack should be immediately passed to a supervisor and
upwards. He explained that every month he must review portions of a handbook, and he
must "sign off that he has reviewed it. Unlike the Centers and the training Commission
staff has learned ATC's receive, there is no computer based training or role play training
for hijack events.

Recommendations:

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Ratkus mentioned that Tim Grovak is in charge of the systems at Herndon, and may have
a technical suggestion. Raktus does not believe that a raw radar feed would be helpful at
Herndon. He explained that professional ATCs do not need "someone second guessing"
their decisions. Further, he commented that he does not believe having tracking ability at
Herndon would have been useful. Ratkus did explain that primary tracking capability is
essential for controllers, and believes that the military has the radar capability to
effectively intercept targets with the assistance of the Centers.

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