Page 1 of 1

Yoel Tobin

From: Steve Dunne

Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2004 3:40 PM
To: 'pobrien3@leo.gov'
Cc: 'rikelly@leo.gov'; Dan.Levin@usdoj.gov; Dan Marcus; Team 1; Dianna Campagna
Subject: FBI document request no. 42

Pat: Attached as a Word document is FBI document request no. 42. Please call Yoel Tobin at 202-
331-4071 with any questions about this request and to arrange for production. Feel free to call Dan or
me as well if any issues arise. Thanks. Steve

4/27/2004
Thomas HKean
CHAIR FBI DOCUMENT REQUEST No. 42
Lee H. Hamikon
VICE CHAIR The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the
Richard Ben-Veniste
"Commission") requests that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or the
"respondent") provide the Commission with copies of the following documents no
Fred F. Fielding later than May 4, 2004:
Jamie S. Gorelick
1. To the extent it exists, a classified 1995 FBI analysis of global terrorism
Slade Gorton referenced on pages 278 and 279 of Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA,
Bob Keney Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.
(Copies of the referenced pages are attached.)
John Tollman

TimotbyJ. Roemer The Commission requests that the documents requested above be provided as soon as
they are available, even though all requested documents may not be provided at the
James R. Thompson
same tune, through means of a "rolling" production.

Philip D. Zelikow If any requested documents are withheld from production, even temporarily, based on
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
an alleged claim of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that
the respondent, as soon as possible and in no event later than the production date,
identify and describe each such document or class of documents, as well as the
alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to allow a meaningful
challenge to any such withholding.

If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of any requested
documents but has information about where such documents may be located, the
Commission requests that the respondent provide such information as soon as
possible and in no event later than the production date.

If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of
these document requests, the Commission requests that any such questions or
concerns be raised with the Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues
can be addressed and resolved prior to the production date.

April 27, 2004 Daniel Marcus

General Counsel

TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545
www.9-1 lcommission.gov
 Page 1 of 1

Yoel Tobin

From: Yoel Tobin

Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2004 11:05 AM
To: Steve Dunne
Subject: FW: FBI doc request (Ghost Wars) -- could we get this out very quickly?

P.S. I have placed the docs on your chair - the Ghost War pages should be faxed to the FBI. Thanks.

Original Message
From: Yoel Tobin
Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2004 11:00 AM
To: Steve Dunne
Cc: Team 1
Subject: FBI doc request (Ghost Wars) - could we get this out very quickly?

Steve:

Attached is a document request for the FBI. I have put down a production date of this Friday, because it is
relevant to my report chapter (which as you know is due Friday), and because it asks for a single, specific
document. If we could this out as quickly as possible, that would be great. I will give you by hand a copy of the
pages from the Ghost Wars book that are cited in the document request. Thanks.

Yoel

4/27/2004
 Page 1 of 1

Yoel Tobin

From: Yoel Tobin

Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2004 11:00 AM
To: Steve Dunne
Cc: Team 1
Subject: FBI doc request (Ghost Wars) -- could we get this out very quickly?

Steve:

Attached is a document request for the FBI. I have put down a production date of this Friday, because it is
relevant to my report chapter (which as you know is due Friday), and because it asks for a single, specific
document. If we could this out as quickly as possible, that would be great. I will give you by hand a copy of the
pages from the Ghost Wars book that are cited in the document request. Thanks.

Yoel

4/27/2004
 FBI DOCUMENT REQUEST NO.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the
"Commission") requests that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or "respondent")
provide the Commission with a copy of the following document no later than April 30,
2004 (the "production date"):

1. To the extent it exists, a classified 1995 FBI analysis of global terrorism

referenced on pages 278 and 279 of Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA,
Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.
(These pages are attached for your reference.)

The Commission requests that the document requested above be provided as soon as it is
available.

If the document is withheld from production, even temporarily, based on an alleged claim
of privilege or for any other reason, the Commission requests that the respondent, as soon
as possible and in no event later than the production date, identify and describe the
alleged basis for not producing it, with sufficient specificity to allow a meaningful
challenge to any such withholding.

If the respondent does not have possession, custody or control of the document but has
information about where such document may be located, the Commission requests that
the respondent provide such information as soon as possible and in no event later than the
production date.

If the respondent has any questions or concerns about the interpretation or scope of this
request, the Commission requests that any such questions or concerns be raised with the
Commission as soon as possible so that any such issues can be addressed and resolved
prior to the production date.

April _, 2004
Daniel Marcus

General Counsel
278 GHOST W A R S '

official channels. Several retired Riyadh station chiefs and senior I\ear i
Division managers went on the Saudi payroll as consultants during the n^j
1990s.32
American Arabists had studied the Middle East for decades thro
Cold War lens, their vision narrowed by continuous intimate contact withi
ular Arab elites. American spies and strategists rarely entered the lower-n
class mosques of Algiers, Tunis, Cairo, Karachi, or Jedda, where anti-Arnc
cassette tape sermons were for sale on folding tables at the door.
Despite all these limitations, American intelligence analysts deve
by mid-1995 a clearer picture of the new terrorist enemy. For the first j
the image of a global network began to emerge. The FBI and the CIA <
produced ambitious classified intelligence reports during the second?!
of 1995 that sifted the evidence in the Yousef case and pushed strong)
forecasts.
As part of a long review of global terrorism circulated by the FBI, (
fied Secret, the bureau's analysts assessed the emerging threat under the he
"Ramzi Ahmed Yousef: A New Generation of Sunni Islamic Terroris
The Yousef case "has led us to conclude that a new generation of terroril
has appeared on the world stage over the past few years," the FBI's anaty
wrote. Yousef and his associates "have access to a worldwide network of su
port for funding, training and safe haven." Increasingly, "Islamic extremist^
are working together to further their cause." It was "no coincidence" thlt
their terrorism increased as the anti-Soviet Afghan war ended. Afghanistan^
training camps were crucial to Yousef. The camps provided technical ie«#
sources and allowed him to meet and recruit like-minded radicals. Pakistan
and Bosnia had also become important bases for the jihadists.
The FBI's report noted the vulnerability of the American homeland to at-,
tacks. It specifically cited Murad's confessed plot to hijack a plane and fly it
into CIA headquarters as an example.
"Unlike traditional forms of terrorism, such as state-sponsored or tr.c
Iran/Hezbollah model, Sunni extremists are neither surrogates of nor
strongly influenced by one nation," the FBI's analysts wrote. "They are au-
tonomous and indigenous." There was now reason to "suspect Yousef and
his associates receive support from Osama bin Laden and may be able to tap
into bin Laden's mujahedin support network." In addition, they may also have
been able to draw on Islamic charities for support. The FBI analysis listed the
huge semiofficial Saudi Arabian charity, the International Islamic Relief Oi-j
ganization, and the largest government-sponsored Saudi religious proselyoz-
 "A New G e n e r a t i o n " 279

organization, the Muslim World League, as important resources for the

.fW terrorists. The cable concluded: "Yousef's group fits the mold for this
new generation of Sunni Islamic terrorists. . . . The WTC bombing, the
Manila plot, and the recent [Islamic Group] attack against Mubarak demon-
itrate that Islamic extremists can operate anywhere in the world. We believe J
the threat is not over."34
The CIA also saw Yousef's gang as independent from any hierachy. 'As far
n we know," reported a classified agency cable in 1995, "Yousef and his con-
federates ... are not allied with an organized terrorist group and cannot read-
iK call upon such an organized unit to execute retaliatory strikes against the
t'.S. or countries that have cooperated with the U.S. in the extradition of
Vousef and his associates." That same year, working through the National In-
telligence Council, the CIA circulated to Clinton's Cabinet an annual National
Inlclligence Estimate on terrorism classified Secret. The estimate drew on ca-
bles and analyses from across the American intelligence community. Echoing
the FBI's language, the estimate called Yousef's gang a "new breed" of radi-
Ctl Sunni Islamic terrorist. It then suggested what this plan might forecast
ibout future attacks inside the United States. "Several targets are especially at
8»k: national symbols such as the White House and the Capitol, and symbols
, Of US. capitalism such as Wall Street," the estimate predicted. "We assess that
CW aviation will figure prominently among possible terrorist targets in the
^united States. This stems from the increasing domestic threat posed by for-
i terrorists, the continuing appeal of civil aviation as a target, and a do-
•tatic aviation security system [whose weaknesses have] been the focus of
i*edia attention."35
was now clear that Yousef and his colleagues had developed their ter-
• plans by studying American airline security procedures. "If terrorists
; in this country are similarly methodical, they will identify serious
abilities in the security system for domestic flights." The National In-
-' Estimate made no mention of Osama bin Laden.36