Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176296

June 30, 2008

INDIRA R. FERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (First Division) and MARK ANTHONY B. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

For the resolution of the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the December 4, 2006 Resolution1 and the January 31, 2007 Order2 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First Division in EAC No. 14-2004.

The records disclose that, in the July 15, 2002 synchronized barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, respondent Rodriguez, who had obtained 27 votes, emerged as the winning candidate for SK chairman of Barangay Pandan del Sur, Pandan, Catanduanes, over his opponent, petitioner Fernandez, who had garnered only 25 votes. Discontented with the results, petitioner instituted an election protest docketed as Election Case No. P-192 with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Pandan-Caramoran.3

After the conduct of appropriate proceedings, the MCTC rendered its Decision4 on January 12, 2004, declaring petitioner the duly elected SK chairman of the said barangay and ordering her proclamation as such. The decision was premised on the results of the revision which showed that petitioner obtained 29 votes and respondent, 24.5

Adversely affected, respondent appealed the case to the COMELEC. On December 4, 2006, the COMELEC First Division rendered the assailed Resolution6 nullifying the MCTCs decision. It ruled that 3 ballots marked as Exhibits "1", "4" and "5" should not have been credited to the petitioner, given that they were tampered to show that they represented votes for Fernandez, when in truth they were for Rodriguez. It ruled that where a person other than the voter crossed out the originally written name of a candidate and replaced it with that of another, the vote should be admitted for the original candidate and rejected for the second. Thus, deducting the 3 votes from the 29 votes of the petitioner and adding the same to the 24 votes of the respondent, the result would be 26 for the petitioner and 27 for the respondent, with the latter winning by a single vote.7

On January 31, 2007, the COMELEC First Division, in the other assailed Order,8 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time and found no necessity to refer the same to the COMELEC en banc.

Petitioner, then, on February 6, 2007, filed the instant petition arguing in the main, as she had strongly argued before the COMELEC, that the latter has no appellate jurisdiction over contests involving SK officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Even granting that it does, she claimed that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in nullifying the decision of the trial court.9

The Court dismisses the instant petition.

Considering that the term of the contested office has already expired, the petition has been rendered moot and academic.10 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 916411 provides that the term of the SK officials elected in the July 15, 2002 synchronized barangay and SK

elections shall be 3 years, commencing on August 15, 2002, and ending at noon on November 30, 2005.12 R.A. 9340,13 however, amended the aforesaid law and reset the barangay and SK elections to October 2007, thereby extending the term of those elected in 2002 up to noon of November 30, 2007.14 On the latter date, therefore, the term of the barangay and SK officials elected in 2002 expired. It is thus an exercise in futility for the Court to indulge itself in a review of the records and in an academic discussion of the applicable legal principles to determine who really won the said elections, because whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.15

Be that as it may, we deem it necessary to discuss the issue of jurisdiction raised in the petition for the guidance of the bench and the bar.16

The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.17 Construed in relation to the provision in R.A. No. 716018 that includes in the enumeration of barangay officials the SK chairman,19 the constitutional provision indeed sanctions the appellate review by the COMELEC of election protests involving the position of SK chairman, as in the instant case. Hence, we find nothing improper in the COMELECs assumption of jurisdiction over respondents appeal.

Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors20 that contests involving the SK chairman do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code21 and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is misplaced. The doctrine therein, as we explained in the much later Marquez v. Commission on Elections,22 is no longer controlling. Thus, the rule at the present is that trial courts of limited jurisdiction have exclusive original jurisdiction over election protests involving barangay officials, which include the SK chairman, and that the COMELEC has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over such protests.23

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ, SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ, HARLIN CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G. MACUSI and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, Petitioners, Present:

G.R. No. 188920

Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, - versus Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Leonardo-De Castro,

Villarama, Jr., Perez, and Mendoza, JJ. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, FRANKLIN M. DRILON and J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA, Respondents. February 16, 2010 Promulgated:

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court involving a leadership dispute within a political party. In this case, the petitioners question their expulsion from that party and assail the validity of the election of new party leaders conducted by the respondents.

Statement of the Facts and the Case

For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of the preceding events is in order.

On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his partys withdrawal of support for the

administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party.

On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president . Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition[1] with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the partys electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, [2] party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.

On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs NECO and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion could be likened to people power, wherein the LP majority removed respondent Drilon as president by direct action . Atienza also said that the amendments[3] to the original LP Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006.

On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution,[4] partially granting respondent Drilons petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution . But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilons term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected.

Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution,[5] granting respondent Drilons petition and denying that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent Drilons term as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007.

Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilons term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly qualified to vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons associated with petitioner Atienza sought to clarify their membership status and raised issues regarding the composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.

On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia, Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast-Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction[6] before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition ought to have been based on a list appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the NECO had 103 members.

Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the status of guests during the meeting. Atienzas allies allegedly raised these issues but respondent Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and railroaded the proceedings. He suspended the meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienzas allies.

On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas election as LP president faithfully complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO members because supervening events changed the bodys number and composition. Some NECO members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after accepting positions in the government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run in the May 2007 elections, making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members who got elected to public office also became part of the NECO. Certain persons of national stature also became NECO members upon respondent Drilons nomination, a privilege granted the LP president under the amended LP Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership was not fixed or static; it changed due to supervening circumstances.

Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2, 2006. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their party membership when they ran under other political parties during the May 2007 elections. They were dropped from the roster of LP members.

On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners Atienza, et al.s petition. It noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed the composition of the NECO since the amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors and mayors members of that body. That some lost or won these positions in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO membership. Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president was not properly convened.

As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners Atienza, et al. filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The Issues Presented

Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:

1. Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party; and

2. Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the requisite legal standing to question Roxas election.

Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the following issues:

3. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO membership that elected respondent Roxas as LP president;

4. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; and

5. Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.s constitutional right to due process by the latters expulsion from the party.

The Courts Ruling

One. Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition for failure of petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an indispensable party. Roxas, et al. point out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the NECO, the controversy could not be adjudicated with finality without making the LP a party to the case.[7]

But petitioners Atienza, et al.s causes of action in this case consist in respondents Roxas, et al.s disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al. from the election of party leaders and in the illegal election of Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were supposedly excluded from the elections by a series of despotic acts of Roxas, et al., who controlled the proceedings. Among these acts are Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party, their exclusion from the NECO, and respondent Drilons railroading of election proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal and prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al.

Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought from it, the LP is not an indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.s prayer for the undoing of respondents Roxas, et al.s acts and the reconvening of the NECO are directed against Roxas, et al.

Two. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal standing to question the election of Roxas as LP president because they are no longer LP members, having been validly expelled from the party or having joined other political parties.[8] As non-members, they have no stake in the outcome of the action.

But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[9] legal standing in suits is governed by the real parties-in-interest rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This states that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. And real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. In raising petitioners Atienza, et al.s lack of standing as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al. would have the Court hypothetically assume the truth of the allegations in the petition.

Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.s allegations that respondents Roxas, et al. deprived them of their rights as LP members by summarily excluding them from the LP roster and not allowing them to take part in the election of its officers and that not all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If Atienza, et al.s allegations were correct, they would have been irregularly expelled from the party and the election of officers, void. Further, they would be entitled to recognition as members of good standing and to the holding of a new election of officers using the correct list of NECO members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, et al. who want to take part in another election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Courts decision in this case. Consequently, they have legal standing to pursue this petition.

Three. In assailing respondent Roxas election as LP president, petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the NECO members allowed to take part in that election should have been limited to those in the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Atienza, et al. allege that respondent Drilon, as holdover LP president, adopted that list in the earlier cases before the COMELEC and it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The Courts decision in the earlier cases, said Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next party election. Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect defied the Courts ruling when they removed Atienza as party chairman and changed the NECOs composition.[10]

But the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program was drawn before the May 2007 elections. After the 2007 elections, changes in the NECO membership had to be redrawn to comply with what the amended LP Constitution required. Respondent Drilon adopted the souvenir program as common exhibit in the earlier cases only to prove that the NECO, which supposedly elected Atienza as new LP president on March 2, 2006, had been improperly convened. It cannot be regarded as an immutable list, given the nature and character of the NECO membership.

Nothing in the Courts resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO membership should be pegged to the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There would have been no basis for such a position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the NECO membership to be permanent. Its Section 27[11] provides that the NECO shall include all incumbent senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors, and mayors who were LP members in good standing for at least six months. It follows from this that with the national and local elections taking place in May 2007, the number

and composition of the NECO would have to yield to changes brought about by the elections.

Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them to membership had to be dropped. Newly elected ones who gained the privilege because of their offices had to come in. Furthermore, former NECO members who passed away, resigned from the party, or went on leave could not be expected to remain part of the NECO that convened and held elections on November 26, 2007. In addition, Section 27 of the amended LP Constitution expressly authorized the party president to nominate persons of national stature to the NECO. Thus, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot validly object to the admission of 12 NECO members nominated by respondent Drilon when he was LP president. Even if this move could be regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.s way of ensuring their election as party officers, there was certainly nothing irregular about the act under the amended LP Constitution.

The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP Constitution. Respondents Roxas, et al. explained in details how they arrived at the NECO composition for the purpose of electing the party leaders.[12] The explanation is logical and consistent with party rules. Consequently, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition of the NECO that elected Roxas as LP president.

Petitioner Atienza claims that the Courts resolution in the earlier cases recognized his right as party chairman with a term, like respondent Drilon, that would last up to November 30, 2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from that position violated the Courts resolution. But the Courts resolution in the earlier cases did not preclude the party from disciplining Atienza under Sections 29[13] and 46[14] of the amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him or any officer for cause as it saw fit.

Four. Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction when it ruled on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of the Court, they claim, categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party leadership disputes.[15]

But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the validity of the expulsion of petitioners Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly that elected respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELECs finding as upheld by this Court that the membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the party validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the election of officers that the NECO held.

While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to their faction, they did not specify who these members were and how their numbers could possibly affect the composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of party leaders. Atienza, et al. has not bothered to assail the individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al. present proof that the NECO had no quorum when it then assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et al. were totally unsupported by evidence.

Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts on the party leadership issue or on the election of respondent Roxas as president so that it was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be settled within the party . It is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.

What is more, some of petitioner Atienzas allies raised objections before the NECO assembly regarding the status of members from their faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with the election, implying that its membership, whose composition has been upheld, voted out those objections.

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections[16] that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case[17] that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts.[18] In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.

The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound to the benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered political parties that have to be carried out through their leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue is thus particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections.[19]

Five. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings[20] and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.[21]

But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative

bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function.[22] The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the states powers are found in Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the states powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.[23]

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.

But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v. Mula,[24] the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people.[25]

To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political parties.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC JAMELA SALIC MARUHOM, Petitioner, - versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and MOHAMMADALI Mericano A. ABINAL, Respondents. G. R. No. 179430 Promulgated:

July 27, 2009 x--------------------------------------------------x DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution[2] dated 21 August 2007 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc and Resolution[3] dated 8 May 2007 of the COMELEC First Division, both pertaining to SPA No. 07-093. The facts gathered from the records are as follows: Petitioner Jamela Salic Maruhom (Maruhom) and private respondent Mohammadali Mericano A. Abinal (Abinal) were mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Marantao, Lanao del Sur, for the 14 May 2007 national and local elections. Both Maruhom and Abinal filed their respective sworn Certificates of Candidacy (COCs) for the said position with the COMELEC Election Officer of Marantao. Abinal was then the incumbent Mayor of Marantao who was seeking re-election. On 1 April 2007, Abinal filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification and to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881,[4] otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (OEC),[5] against Maruhom, which was docketed as SPA No. 07-093. Abinal alleged that Maruhom was a double registrant, being a registered voter in

Precinct No. 0208A, Barangay Panggao Saduc, Marawi City and Precinct No. 0040A, Barangay Kialdan Proper, Marantao. Maruhom registered as a voter in Marawi on 26 July 2003. Only three days thereafter, on 29 July 2003, Maruhom registered again as a voter in Marantao, without canceling her Marawi registration. There being double registration, Maruhoms subsequent registration in Marantao was null and void ab initio. And, not being a registered voter in Marantao, Maruhom was disqualified from running for municipal mayor of said municipality.[6] Abinal also averred that Maruhom made false material representations in her registrations in Marawi and Marantao.[7] Maruhom stated in her Marawi registration that: (1) she was Jamela H. Salic Maruhom; (2) she was born on 5 April 1960; (3) she was born in Marawi; and (4) she had resided in Marawi for 43 years. On the other hand, Maruhom indicated in her Marantao registration that: (1) she was Hadja Jamelah Salic Abani; (2) she was born on 3 September 1960; (3) she was born in Marantao; and (4) she had resided in Marantao for 42 years.[8] Abinal further claimed that Maruhom also made false material representations in her COC. Maruhom wrote in her Marantao registration[9] that she was born on 3 September 1960; she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 0040A, Marantao; and her surname was Abani and her maiden/maternal name was Salic. In contrast, Maruhom declared[10] in her COC that she was born on 5 April 1960; she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 0042A, Marantao; and her surname was Salic and her maiden/maternal name was Abani, Mama, Esmail, Maruhom. Moreover, Maruhom was registered in Marantao as Hadja Jamelah Salic Abani. This was inconsistent with the Certificate of Nomination dated 23 March 2007, issued by Dr. Ombra A. Tamano, Lanao del Sur Provincial Chairman of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, stating that Maruhoms full name was Jamelah Abani Salic.

Abinal asserted that the aforementioned false material representations made by Maruhom were valid grounds for denying due course to, or cancellation of, the latters COC under Section 78 of the OEC.[11]

Maruhom filed before the COMELEC an Answer with Motion to Dismiss SPA No. 07093 contending that she was qualified to run as municipal mayor of Marantao, as she had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. A candidate could only be disqualified for a ground provided by law, and there was no law declaring double registration as a ground for disqualification. Maruhom also insisted that she did not make false material representations in her COC, because her complete name was Salic, Jamelah, Abani, Mama, Esmail, Maruhom. Maruhom explained that Salic was

her fathers surname; Jamelah was her first name; that Abani, Mama, Esmail were her paternal and maternal grandparents names; and Maruhom was her husbands surname. Hence, Maruhom asked the COMELEC to dismiss Abinals Petition in SPA No. 07-093.[12]

After submission of the parties Position Papers and Memoranda, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution in SPA No. 07-093 on 8 May 2007, granting Abinals Petition. The COMELEC First Division found that Maruhom had two subsisting registrations, one in Marawi, and another in Marantao. Maruhoms Marantao registration was void ab initio pursuant to COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 00-1513, issued on 25 July 2000.[13] Since Maruhom was not a registered voter in Marantao, she was disqualified from being a mayoralty candidate therein. Thus, the COMELEC First Division ordered the deletion of Maruhoms name from the list of official candidates for municipal mayor of Marantao.

Maruhom filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 8 May 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, to which Abinal filed an Opposition.[14] The COMELEC First Division then referred Maruhoms Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc for disposition.[15]

Meanwhile, the 14 May 2007 national and local elections were held, and Abinal won over Maruhom. Abinal was proclaimed the duly elected municipal mayor of Marantao and, thereupon, assumed office. Maruhom filed an election protest against Abinal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Branch 10, docketed as Election Case No. 1731-07.[16]

On 21 August 2007, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying Maruhoms Motion for Reconsideration and affirming in toto the 8 May 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC En Banc further ordered the referral of the case to the COMELEC Law Department for investigation on the possible commission of an election offense by Maruhom.

Aggrieved, Maruhom filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC, based on the following grounds:

I.

THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DECLARE NULL AND VOID THE REGISTRATION OF THE PETITIONER AS A REGISTERED VOTER OF MARANTAO, LANAO DEL SUR IN THE MAY 14, 2007 ELECTIONS;

II.

THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECLARED THE PETITIONER AS A DOUBLE REGISTRANT.[17]

The Petition at bar has no merit.

Maruhom challenges in her Petition the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in declaring her registration in Marantao void. She asserts that Section 2, Article IX(c) of the Constitution prohibits the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction or deciding issues involving the right to vote. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8189, or the Voters Registration Act of 1996 (VRA), confers upon the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs) original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities. Maruhom argues that the validity of her registration in Marantao can only be directly challenged in a petition for exclusion filed with the MTC of Marantao, and cannot be collaterally attacked in the Petition for Disqualification and to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Abinal before the COMELEC. Maruhom further contends that the reliance by COMELEC on its broad plenary powers to enforce and administer all laws relating to election is baseless in light of the aforementioned Section

33 of the VRA. The Resolution dated 8 May 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and Resolution dated 21 August 2007 of the COMELEC En Banc amount to judicial legislation, since the COMELEC has no authority to prescribe what the law does not provide, its functions not being legislative.[18]

Maruhom, whether intentionally or inadvertently, is muddling the issues in this case. The present case is not about her being denied her right to register as a voter, but is all about her making false material representations in her COC, which would warrant the cancellation of the same.

Abinals Petition in SPA No. 07-093 primarily prays that the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel Maruhoms COC under Section 78 of the OEC, alleging that Maruhom made false material representations in her COC.

Under Section 78 of the OEC, a false representation of material fact in the COC is a ground for the denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must pertain to a material fact that affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed his COC. Such material fact refers to a candidates eligibility or qualification for elective office like citizenship, residence or status as a registered voter.[19] Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public office.[20]

It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under Section 78 of the OEC.[21] In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the COC.[22]

If the candidate states a material representation in the COC that is false, the COMELEC is empowered to deny due course to or cancel the COC. The person whose COC is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 of the OEC is not treated as a candidate at all, as if such person never filed a COC.[23]

Evidence on record supports the following facts: Maruhom registered as a voter in Marawi on 26 July 2003;[24] only three days after, on 29 July 2003, Maruhom again registered as a voter in Marantao, without first canceling her registeration in Marawi;[25] and on 28 March 2007, Maruhom filed her COC declaring that she was a registered voter in Marantao and eligible to run as a candidate for the position of mayor of said municipality.[26]

Given Maruhoms double registration in Marawi and Marantao, then COMELEC should determine which registration was valid and which one was null. COMELEC could not consider both registrations valid because it would then give rise to the anomalous situation where Maruhom could vote in two precincts at the same time. This would be a dangerous precedent that would open the floodgates to massive election cheating and fraud. This was precisely the situation that the COMELEC intended to address when it issued its Minute Resolution No. 00-1513 on 25 July 2000, seven years prior to the 14 May 2007 elections in which Maruhom intended to run. To foster honesty and credibility in the registration of voters, so as to avoid the padding of vote registration, COMELEC laid down the rule in Minute Resolution No. 00-1513 that while the first registration of any voter subsists, any subsequent registration thereto is void ab initio.

Following the clear and plain words of Minute Resolution No. 00-1513, therefore, Maruhoms earlier registration in Marawi is deemed valid, while her subsequent registration in Marantao is void ab initio. Accordingly, Maruhom cannot be considered a registered voter in Marantao and, thus, she made a false representation in her COC when she claimed to be one.

Maruhoms voter registration constitutes a material fact because it affects her eligibility to be elected as municipal mayor of Marantao. Section 39(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,[27] requires that an elective local official must be, among other things, a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he intends to be elected.

Several circumstances convince us that Maruhom was aware that she had a subsisting registration in Marawi and deliberately attempted to conceal said fact, which would have rendered her ineligible to run as mayoralty candidate in Marantao. Before filing her COC, Maruhom requested the COMELEC to cancel her Marawi registration.[28] It is

undisputed that by the time Maruhom filed her COC, the COMELEC had not yet acted on her request for cancellation of her Marawi registration. Despite knowing that her request for cancellation of her Marawi registration was still pending before the COMELEC, Maruhom proceeded to declare, under oath, in her COC, that she was a registered voter in Marantao and that she was eligible to run for the position of mayor of said municipality. There is no showing that Maruhom informed or advised the election officer of Marantao of her subsisting Marawi registration and her pending request for cancellation of the same. Evidently, Maruhom would much rather sweep the fact of her Marawi registration under the carpet, than deal with the complications arising from it, which may very well put in jeopardy her intention to run for mayor of Marantao.

Indeed, Maruhom made false material representations in her COC that she was a registered voter in Marantao and that she was eligible to be a mayoralty candidate in said municipality.

Maruhoms insistence that only the MTC has jurisdiction to rule on her voter registration is specious. It must be underscored that in addition to the express jurisdiction of COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of COCs, on the ground of false material representations, under Section 78 of the OEC, the Constitution also extends to COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.[29] The determination, therefore, made by the COMELEC that Maruhoms Marawi registration is valid, while her Marantao registration is void, is only in accord with its explicit jurisdiction, or at the very least, its residual powers. Furthermore, as aptly pointed out by Abinal and COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General,[30] the 8 May 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and the 21 August 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc merely defeated Maruhoms intent to run for elective office, but it did not deprive her of her right to vote. Although Maruhoms registration in Marantao is void, her registration in Marawi still subsists. She may be barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but she may still exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter.

Maruhom does not deny at all that she registered twice. However, Maruhom calls our attention to the fact that on 30 December 2003, she made a written request to the election officer of Marawi to cancel her registration therein as a voter. On 20 March 2007, she reiterated her request to the same election officer. On 23 March 2007, she also informed the COMELEC Law Department of her request for cancellation of her

registration in Marawi. Thus, the failure of the election officer of Marawi to cancel Maruhoms voter registration in said municipality, despite repeated requests, should not be taken against the latter.[31]

It is true that Maruhom did make several requests for the cancellation of her Marawi registration, but without official action by the COMELEC thereon, they remain mere requests. They cannot simply be deemed granted. We take note that Maruhoms first request for cancellation of her Marawi registration was submitted on 30 December 2003, and her next request was made only on 20 March 2007. Maruhom subsequently filed her COC for the mayoralty position in Marantao on 28 March 2007. Far from convincing us that she had exercised due diligence in having her Marawi registration cancelled, we are more persuaded that Maruhom had not been assiduous in ensuring that her request for cancellation be acted upon by COMELEC. Maruhoms reiteration of her request for cancellation of her Marawi registration on 20 March 2007, three years and three months since her first request, and just a week prior to the filing of her COC for the mayoralty position in Marantao, reveals a harried attempt to comply with the eligibility requirements for her candidacy than a sincere desire to right a wrong. COMELEC, thus, had more than enough basis to support its conclusion of Maruhom being a double registrant whose subsequent registration in Marantao was null and void, rendering her unfit to run as municipal mayor therein.

Therefore, Maruhom, at the time she filed her COC, could not have honestly declared therein that she was a registered voter of Marantao and an eligible candidate for mayor of the said municipality. It is incumbent upon Maruhom to truthfully state her eligibility in her COC, especially so because the COC is filled up under oath.[32] An elective office is a public trust. He who aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing himself.[33]

The well-settled rule is that this Court will not interfere with a COMELEC decision/resolution unless the COMELEC is shown to have committed grave abuse of discretion. Correctly understood, grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law.[34] Given our foregoing discussion, we find no capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the COMELEC in rendering the assailed Resolutions in SPA No. 07-093.

WHEREFORE, after due deliberation, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 8 May 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated 21 August 2007 of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 07-093, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner Jamela Salic Maruhom.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

JEREMIAS V. ESTEVES, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 182374

Present:

PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, - versus CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO TINGA,

T. FERRER, in their respective Officer VELASCO, JR., and Member of the Second Division COMELEC, Manila and REYNALDO TEH BITONG, Respondents.

CHICO-NAZARIO, capacities as Presiding NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 11, 2008 x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition[1] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Resolution[2] of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPR No. 46-2007. Said resolution set aside the Order[3] dated 8 September 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 96, Baler, Aurora and consequently dismissed the election protest filed by herein petitioner Jeremias V. Esteves against private respondent Mayor Reynaldo Teh Bitong.

As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedent facts appear:

In the national and local elections conducted last 14 May 2007, petitioner and private respondent both ran for the position of municipal mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Aurora. On 15 May 2007, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor of Casiguran on the basis of the results of the

canvassing, which showed him having garnered 3,342 votes or with a margin of 48 votes over petitioner, who obtained 3,294 votes.[4]

On 25 May 2007, petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora. The protest was docketed as Election Protest Case (EPC) No. 99 and raffled to Branch 96 presided by Judge Corazon D. Soluren.[5]

The RTC then issued a precautionary protection order directing the Municipal Treasurer and Election Officer of Casiguran to take immediate steps to safeguard the integrity of all the ballot boxes, lists of voters and other paraphernalia used in the elections and thereafter directed that all the election paraphernalia, including the ballot boxes and lists of voters, subject of the protest be brought before the court.[6]

Private respondent then filed an answer, which the RTC admitted in an Order dated 2 August 2007. In the same order, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of private respondents counter-protest on the ground of non-payment of filing fee. Thereafter, the RTC ordered the creation of the revision committees.[7]

On 6 September 2007, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the election protest, arguing that it was defective in form and substance as it did not specify the precincts where fraud and irregularities were committed. On 8 September 2007, the RTC issued the order denying private respondents motion to dismiss for lack of merit.[8]

Thus, private respondent filed before the COMELEC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.[9] The petition sought to nullify the RTC Order dated 8 September 2007 denying private respondents motion to dismiss. It also prayed that the election protest filed by petitioner be dismissed and the proceedings thereon enjoined on the ground that the election protest failed to comply with the requirements of Section 11(f), Rule 2[10] of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. Petitioner filed an answer on 5 December 2007.

After hearing private respondents application, the COMELEC (Second Division) issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) on 06 December 2007, which directed Judge Soluren to desist from further proceeding with Election Protest Case No. 96 until further orders from the COMELEC.[11]

Thereafter, petitioner filed before this Court a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 180792, prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the COMELEC (Second Division) from taking cognizance of SPR Case No. 46-2007 and that the TRO issued by the COMELEC be ordered lifted.

On 15 January 2008, the Court resolved to dismiss G.R. No. 180792 for failure of the petition to state the material dates showing that the petition was filed on time, failure to submit the required competent proof of identity in the verification/certification, failure to give an explanation why service was not personally made and failure to show that any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC in rendering the challenged order.

On 29 February 2008, the COMELEC (Second Division) issued the assailed resolution penned by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer. The assailed resolution nullified the 8 September 2007 Order of the RTC and, accordingly, dismissed EPC No. 99.[12] The other member of the Second Division, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, wrote a dissenting opinion.[13] It appears that before the issuance of the assailed resolution, the third member of the Second Division, Presiding Commissioner Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. had retired from the service.

Hence, the instant petition, raising the following arguments: (1) the COMELEC (Second Division) has no jurisdiction to entertain special relief cases like petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus; (2) the challenged resolution did not comply with the constitutional requirement that it must be decided by a majority vote of all the members; and (3) the challenged resolution negated the spirit and very purpose of A.M. No. 07-415-SC.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that under Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, only the private respondent is required to appear and defend the case, both on his own behalf and on behalf of the public respondent COMELEC, and prayed that the COMELEC be excused from filing the required comment.[14] In a Resolution dated 12 August 2008, the Court granted the motion of the OSG.[15]

The petition deserves dismissal.

Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution expressly states:

SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

Also, Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions, the requirement that an aggrieved party must first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the Division to the COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of the Supreme Court. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.[16]

All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.[17] As held in Ambil v. Commission on Elections,[18] the power of review of the Supreme Court of the rulings of the COMELEC is limited only to the final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc and not the final resolution of its Division. The Supreme Court has no power to review, via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.

Moreover, pursuant to Section 5 (c), Rule 3[19] of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC must first be elevated to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory because the mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. It is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the order, resolution or decision of the tribunal, board or office is, subject to well-recognized exceptions, a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special civil action for certiorari. The rationale therefore is that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had.[20]

Since the COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the review of a resolution of the Division by the COMELEC en banc, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is premature. The petition does not allege that petitioner indeed filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of public respondent.[21] Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners own omission to file the required motion for reconsideration.[22] A litigant should first exhaust the administrative remedies provided by law before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide correctly the matter and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.[23] The premature invocation of judicial intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.[24]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

EDDIE T. PANLILIO, Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LILIA G. PINEDA, Respondents. G.R. No. 181478

Present:

PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, and BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 15, 2009 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the following issuances of the COMELEC:

(1) COMELEC Second Division Order[1] dated July 23, 2007 giving due course to respondent Lilia G. Pinedas election protest and, inter alia, directing the revision of ballots of the protested precincts of the Province of Pampanga;

(2) COMELEC Second Division Order[2] dated August 1, 2007 denying petitioner Governor Eddie T. Panlilios motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order; and

(3) COMELEC En Banc Order[3] dated February 6, 2008 denying petitioners omnibus motion to (a) certify his said motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc; and (b) stay Order dated August 7, 2007 directing the collection of ballot boxes in the contested precincts.

The parties herein were two of the contending gubernatorial candidates in the province of Pampanga during the May 14, 2007 national and local elections. On May 18, 2007, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected governor of Pampanga having garnered the highest number of votes of Two Hundred Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Six (219,706) votes[4] with a winning margin of One Thousand One Hundred Forty-Seven (1,147) votes over the 218,559 votes of private respondent.

On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed an election protest[5] against petitioner based on the following grounds:

a). Votes in the ballots lawfully and validly cast in favor of protestant were deliberately misread and/or mis-appreciated by the various chairmen of the different boards of election inspectors;

b). Thousands of votes of protestant such as NANAY BABY, her registered nickname were intentionally and/or erroneously not counted or tallied in the election returns as votes validly cast for the protestant;

c).

Valid votes legally cast in favor of protestant were considered stray;

d). Ballots containing valid votes for protestant were intentionally and erroneously mis-appreciated or considered as marked and declared as null and void;

e). Ballots with blank spaces in the line for governor were just the same read and counted in favor of protestee;

f). Ballots prepared by persons other than the voters themselves and fake or unofficial ballots wherein the name of protestee was written illegally, read and counted in favor of the latter;

g). Groups of ballots prepared by one (1) person and/or individual ballots prepared by two (2) persons were purposely considered as valid ballots and counted in favor of protestee;

h). Votes that are void because the ballots containing them were pasted with stickers or because of pattern markings appearing in them or because of other fraud and election anomalies, were unlawfully read and counted in favor of the protestee; and,

i). Votes reported in numerous election returns were unlawfully increased in favor of the protestee, while votes in said election returns for the protestant were unlawfully decreased (dagdag-bawas), such that the protestee appeared to have obtained more votes than those actually cast in his favor, while the protestant appeared to have obtained less votes than the actually cast in her (protestants) favor; and,

j). Moreover, buying of votes and other forms of vote-buying were resorted to by protestee in order to pressure voters to vote for him or not to cast their votes for the protestant herein.[6]

On June 12, 2007, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest and counterclaims.

On July 23, 2007, the COMELEC, Second Division, issued the first assailed order giving due course to private respondents election protest and directed among others, the revision of ballots pertaining to the protested precincts of the Province of Pampanga.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the same was denied by the same Division, in the second challenged Order dated August 1, 2007.

On August 1, 2007, private respondent filed her compliance stating that she deposited with the COMELEC Four Million Eight Hundred Eighty Six pesos (P4,000,886.00) pursuant to the July 23, 2007 Order.

On August 8, 2007, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (1) to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration at the COMELEC En Banc; and (2) to stay the COMELECs order

directing the collection of ballot boxes. Thereafter, on August 16, 2007, petitioner filed an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the retrieval and collection of ballot boxes.

On February 6, 2008, the COMELEC En Banc issued the third assailed Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, protestee Eddie Panlilios Omnibus Motion dated August 7, 2007 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Order of the Commission (Second Division) dated August 16, 2007 ordering the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Pampanga to defer the inventory, sealing and transmittal of the contested ballot boxes involved in this case is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

In arriving at such a disposition, the COMELEC En Banc ratiocinated that the assailed orders of the COMELEC Second Division were interlocutory orders, which are not one of the orders required by Section 5 (C) Rule 3 and Section 5 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure to be certified to the Commission en banc for resolution.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari contending that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his omnibus motion and in failing to dismiss the alleged sham election protest filed by private respondent against him:

I PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC (EN BANC) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS OMNIBUS MOTION ON THE BASIS OF SECTION 5 (C), RULE 3 IN RELATION TO SECTION 5, RULE 19 OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE

II PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC (EN BANC) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS OMNIBUS MOTION DESPITE THE SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES WHICH ATTENDED THE ISSUANCE OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC (SECOND DIVISION) OF THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED 1 AUGUST 2007, DENYING HIS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, AND WHICH RENDERED DOUBTFUL THE PROPRIETY OF SUCH DENIAL

III PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC (EN BANC) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS OMNIBUS MOTION AND REFUSING TO RULE ON PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE BASIS THAT SUCH WILL BE TANTAMOUNT TO SANCTIONING A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

IV PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC (EN BANC) AND SECOND DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DISMISS OUTRIGHT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SHAM PROTEST BELOW

The petition is without merit.

Petitioner insists that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion when it denied his omnibus motion to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration and to stay the order directing the collection of ballot boxes of the contested precincts in the province of Pampanga. He argues that Section 5, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, on which the omnibus motion was anchored, clearly mandates the Presiding Commissioner of the Division of the COMELEC to certify the case to the COMELEC En Banc once a motion for reconsideration is filed, regardless of whether the order or resolution sought to be reconsidered is an interlocutory order or a final one.

This issue has been squarely addressed in Repol v. COMELEC,[7] where the Court has declared that the remedy to assail an interlocutory order of the COMELEC in Division, which allegedly was issued with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction, is provided in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which pertinently reads: Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) x x x. (b) x x x. (c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the Division, which shall be resolved by the Division which issued the order.

In Repol, the Court held that since the COMELECs Division issued the interlocutory Order, the same COMELEC Division should resolve the motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In the same case the Court added that:

Section 5, Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure governs motions for reconsideration of decisions of a COMELEC Division, as follows:

SEC. 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.

In Gementiza v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the import of this rule in this wise:

Under the above-quoted rule, the acts of a Division that are subject of a motion for reconsideration must have a character of finality before the same can be elevated to the COMELEC en banc. The elementary rule is that an order is final in nature if it completely disposes of the entire case. But if there is something more to be done in the case after its issuance, that order is interlocutory.

Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc, thus:

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in Division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.

It is clear from the foregoing constitutional provision that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide motions for reconsideration only of decisions of a Division, meaning those acts having a final character. Here, the assailed Second Division order did not completely dispose of the case, as there was something more to be done, which was to decide the election protest. Being interlocutory, the assailed Second Division orders may not be resolved by the COMELEC En Banc.

Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any of the instances of which the COMELEC En Banc can take cognizance. Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

SEC. 2. The Commission En Banc. The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of the Commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous vote of all the Members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the Commission en banc.

This case is not among those specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in which the COMELEC may sit en banc. Neither is it one where a Division is not authorized to act nor one where the members of the Second Division have unanimously voted to refer the issue to the COMELEC En Banc. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc is not the proper forum where petitioner may bring the assailed interlocutory Orders for resolution.

The July 23, 2007 Second Division Order was not a final disposition of the case. It was an interlocutory order, which resolved an incidental matter and which did not put a complete end to the controversy. Accordingly, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said order was correctly resolved by the COMELEC Second Division, which issued the assailed order. Hence the COMELEC En Banc cannot be faulted for issuing its February 6, 2008 Order denying petitioners Omnibus Motion to certify his motion for reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc and to stay the order for the collection of ballot boxes.

Petitioner would next argue that the August 21, 2007 COMELEC Second Divisions Order denying his motion for reconsideration was attended by serious irregularities, warranting a closer review by the COMELEC En Banc. According to petitioner, despite his thirty-nine page motion for reconsideration filed on July 31, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division sweepingly disposed of the same motion and issued an order denying the subject motion the following day, or on August 1, 2007, an order that was signed by the Presiding Commissioner only.

A cursory reading of the motion for reconsideration[8] shows that the grounds raised therein were a mere rehash of the ground raised in his Answer,[9] which prayed for the dismissal of the election protest. There was no point in reiterating and discussing anew the issues previously resolved. Instead of assailing the COMELEC Second Division for immediately resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration, it should be commended for doing so.

This Court has emphasized that in this species of controversy involving the determination of the true will of the electorate, time is indeed of paramount importance second to none, perhaps, except the genuine will of the majority. To be sure, an election controversy, which by its very nature touches upon the ascertainment of the

peoples choice as gleaned from the medium of the ballot, should be resolved with utmost dispatch, precedence and regard to due process.[10] The considerations that dictate early on the expeditious disposition of election protests hold true today. The term of an elective office is short. There is the contestants personal stake which generates feuds and discords. Above all is the public interest. A title to public elective office must not be left long under a cloud. The efficiency of public administration should not be impaired. It is thus understandable why pitfalls that may retard the determination of election contests should be avoided. Courts should heed the imperative need for dispatch. Obstacles and technicalities that fetter the peoples will should not stand in the way of a prompt termination of election contests.[11] For the same reason, COMELECs rules of procedure for the verification of protests and certifications of nonforum shopping should be liberally construed, and COMELECs interpretation of such rules in accordance with its constitutional mandate should carry great weight.

Quintos v. Commission on Elections[12] ruled as follows:

We agree with the Solicitor General that the alleged lack of verification of private respondentss Manifestation and motion for Partial Reconsideration is merely a technicality that should not defeat the will of the electorate. The COMELEC may liberally construe or even suspend its rules of procedure on the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before the COMELEC.

We also see no irregularity in the fact that the Order dated August 1, 2007 was signed only by the Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division. He acted within the authority vested in him by Section 6, Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:

SECTION 6. Powers and Duties of the Presiding Commissioner. The powers and duties of the Presiding Commissioner of a Division when discharging its functions in cases pending before the Division shall be as follows: (a) (b) (c) To issue calls for the sessions of the Division; To preside over the sessions of the Divisions; To preserve order and decorum during the sessions of the Division;

(d) To sign interlocutory resolutions, orders or ruling and temporary restraining orders in cases already assigned to the Division; (e) To decide all questions or order, subject to appeal to the full Division; and

(f) To take such other measures as he may deem proper upon consultation with the other members of the Division.

Petitioners claim that the COMELEC Second Divisions Order dated August 1, 2007 denying his motion for reconsideration is defective because the order does not contain the facts and the law on which it is based deserves scant consideration. The issuance of a minute order/ resolution has long been sanctioned in this jurisdiction. The minute Order of August 1, 2007, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, reiterated the COMELEC Second Divisions earlier Order dated July 23, 2007, which sufficiently stated the facts and the law on which it was based.

Petitioner likewise imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in giving due course to private respondents election protest. Petitioner insists that the election protest is a sham and is insufficient in form and substance.

In Miguel v. COMELEC,[13] the Court belittled the petitioners argument that the protestant had no cause of action, as the allegations of fraud and irregularities, which were couched in general terms, were not sufficient to order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots. The Court states the rules in election protests cognizable by the COMELEC and courts of general jurisdiction, as follows:

The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer. In a string of categorical pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that when there is an allegation in an election protest that would require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein.

In a kindred case, Homer Saquilayan v. COMELEC,[14] the Court considered the allegations in an election protest, similar to those in this case, as sufficient in form and substance.

Again, in Dayo v. COMELEC,[15] the Court declared that allegations of fraud and irregularities are sufficient grounds for opening the ballot boxes and examining the questioned ballots. The pronouncement is in accordance with Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads:

Judicial counting of votes in election contest. Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the court in the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the election be brought before it and that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted.

In this case, the COMELEC Second Division found that the allegations in the protest and counter-protest warranted the opening of the contested ballot boxes and the examination of their contents to settle at once the conflicting claims of petitioner and private respondent.

In an election case, the election tribunal has an imperative duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. Indeed, the Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of votes in an election, but also the correct ascertainment of the results.[16]

Lastly, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to the election protest, notwithstanding that private respondent failed to raise her objections first before the Board of Election Inspectors.

The filing of a protest before the Board of Election Inspectors is not a condition sine qua non before the COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over the present election protest. Jurisdiction is conferred only by law and cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties.

Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, reads:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

The COMELEC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials. Since the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitioners election protest, it has the authority to issue the assailed Orders.[17]

We quote with approval the COMELECs ratiocination on this matter:

As to the assertion of Protestee that objections should have been first raised before the Board of Election Inspectors, the same holds no water. Such failure is not fatal to her instant protest case as the same is not a requirement precedent to the acquisition by the Commission of jurisdiction over the case.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. We find none in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, and the status quo ante order issued by this Court on February 19, 2008 is lifted.

SO ORDERED.

BANAT v. COMELEC August 7, 2009 digested by Ms. Araceli Gloria

Facts: This is a petition for Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369)and enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the statute.

RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7 December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006.On 23 January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections.

On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369.According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.

Petitioner argues the following:

1. the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns.Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.

2. Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).According to petitioner, under the amended provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of President and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELECen banc as the National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for the election of Senatorsmay now entertain pre-proclamation cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators.Petitioner concludes that in entertaining preproclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.

3. Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses.

4. section 34 which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at Pon election day.Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.

Issue/s:

Whether or not RA 9369 is unconstitutional.

-Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution;

-Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution

-Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution

Ruling: The petition is denied.RA 9369 is constitutional.

1. RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881),Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections.The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and(2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881.Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter ofRA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others.

2. The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass.The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide that Congress and the COMELEC en bancmay now entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.

3. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified and explained.

4. The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only applies to previously perfected contracts.In this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be impaired. Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it will prevail over a contract.According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes.The role of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police power.The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare.The OSG also states that this was a reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts.

Note/s:

1. Section 34 which provides:

SEC. 34. Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to cralawread as follows:

SEC. 26. Official Watchers. - Every registered political party or coalition of political parties, and every candidate shall each be entitled to one watcher in every polling place and canvassing center: Provided That, candidates for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, or Sangguniang Bayan belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be entitled to only one watcher.

The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which the Commission shall determine in accordance with law, shall each be entitled to one official watcher who shall be paid a fixed per diem of four hundred pesos (400.00) There shall also recognized six principal watchers, representing the six accredited major political parties excluding the dominant majority and minority parties, who shall be designated by the Commission upon nomination of the said parties. These political parties shall be determined by the Commission upon notice and hearing on the basis of the following circumstances:

(a) The established record of the said parties, coalition of groups that now composed them, taking into account, among other things, their showing in past election; (b) The number of incumbent elective officials belonging to them ninety cralaw(90) days before the date of election;

(c) Their identifiable political organizations and strengths as evidenced by their organized/chapters;

(d) The ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal level to the position of President; and

(e) Other analogous circumstances that may determine their relative organizations and strengths.

Section 37 which provides:

SEC. 37.Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President and Vice President: The Commission en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators: Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. Congress and the Commission en banc shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass for president and vice president and senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for president and vice president or senator, as the case may be, and their corresponding votes in words and their corresponding votes in words and in figures; (3) there exits no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificates of canvass or any of its supporting documents such as statement of votes by city/municipality/by precinct or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificate; and (4) there exist no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificates of canvass against the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns of precincts covered by the certificate of canvass: Provided, That certified print copies of election returns or certificates of canvass may be used for the purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy.

When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province, city of district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate President or the Chairman of the Commission, as the case may be, shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery, the election returns form polling places that were not included in the certificate of canvass and supporting statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days from receipt of notice.

When it appears that any certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by city/municipality or by precinct bears erasures or alteration which may cast doubt as to

the veracity of the number of votes stated herein and may affect the result of the election, upon requested of the presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidate concerned or his party, Congress or the Commission en banc, as the case may be shall, for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast for president, vice president or senator, count the votes as they appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it.

In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration as mentioned above, the procedure on pre-proclamation controversies shall be adopted and applied as provided in Section 17,18,19 and 20.

Any person who present in evidence a simulated copy of an election return, certificate of canvass or statement of votes, or a printed copy of an election return, certificate of canvass or statement of votes bearing a simulated certification or a simulated image, shall be guilty of an election offense shall be penalized in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. cralaw

Section 38 which provides:

38. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as follows:

15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President, Vice President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for president, vice president, senator, and member of the House of Representatives, no preproclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may be, except as provided for in Section 30 hereof.However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.

Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the board ofcanvassers may be initiated in the board or directly with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.

Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial board of canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noticed in the minutes of the respective proceedings.

Section 43 which provides:

43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as follows:

SEC. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same.

EN BANC

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY-LIST, represented by SALVADOR B. BRITANICO, Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT. G.R. NO. 177508

PRESENT:

PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO-MORALES,

CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, AND BERSAMIN, JJ.

PROMULGATED: AUGUST 7, 2009 X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT IS A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION[1] WITH A PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION[2] FILED BY PETITIONER BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY LIST (PETITIONER) ASSAILING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9369

(RA 9369)[3] AND ENJOINING RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) FROM IMPLEMENTING THE STATUTE.

RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7 December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006. On 23 January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections, the President signed RA 9369. Two newspapers of general circulation, Malaya and Business Mirror, published RA 9369 on 26 January 2007. RA 9369 thus took effect on 10 February 2007.

On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.[4] Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.

The COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective Comments. At the outset, both maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, save for the prayer of the COMELEC to declare Section 43 as unconstitutional.

The Assailed Provisions of RA 9369

Petitioner assails the following provisions of RA 9369:

1. Section 34 which provides:

SEC. 34. Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to as follows:

read

SEC. 26. Official Watchers. - Every registered political party or coalition of political parties, and every candidate shall each be entitled to one watcher in every polling place and canvassing center: Provided That, candidates for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, or Sangguniang Bayan belonging to the same slate or ticket shall collectively be entitled to only one watcher.

The dominant majority party and dominant minority party, which the Commission shall determine in accordance with law, shall each be entitled to one official watcher who shall be paid a fixed per diem of four hundred pesos (400.00).

There shall also recognized six principal watchers, representing the six accredited major political parties excluding the dominant majority and minority parties, who shall be designated by the Commission upon nomination of the said parties. These political parties shall be determined by the Commission upon notice and hearing on the basis of the following circumstances: (a) The established record of the said parties, coalition of groups that now composed them, taking into account, among other things, their showing in past election; (b) The number of incumbent elective officials belonging to them ninety (90) days before the date of election; c) Their identifiable political organizations and strengths as evidenced by their organized/chapters; (d) The ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the municipal level to the position of President; and (e) Other analogous circumstances that may determine their relative organizations and strengths.

2. Section 37 which provides:

SEC. 37. Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended read as follows:

to

SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of President and Vice President: The Commission en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of senators: Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of Canvass. Congress and the Commission en banc shall determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificate of canvass for president and vice president and senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2) each certificate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for president and vice president or senator, as the case may be, and their corresponding votes in words and their corresponding votes in words and in figures; (3) there exits no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certificates of canvass or any of its supporting documents such as statement of votes by city/municipality/by precinct or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificate; and (4) there exist no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the certificates of canvass against the aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns of precincts covered by the certificate of canvass: Provided, That certified print copies of election returns or certificates of canvass may be used for the purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy.

WHEN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS, DULY CERTIFIED BY THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF EACH PROVINCE, CITY OF DISTRICT, APPEARS TO BE INCOMPLETE, THE SENATE PRESIDENT OR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE

COMMISSION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, SHALL REQUIRE THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS CONCERNED TO TRANSMIT BY PERSONAL DELIVERY, THE ELECTION RETURNS FORM POLLING PLACES THAT WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS AND SUPPORTING STATEMENTS. SAID ELECTION RETURNS SHALL BE SUBMITTED BY PERSONAL DELIVERY WITHIN TWO (2) DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE.

WHEN IT APPEARS THAT ANY CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OR SUPPORTING STATEMENT OF VOTES BY CITY/MUNICIPALITY OR BY PRECINCT BEARS ERASURES OR ALTERATION WHICH MAY CAST DOUBT AS TO THE VERACITY OF THE NUMBER OF VOTES STATED HEREIN AND MAY AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION, UPON REQUESTED OF THE PRESIDENTIAL, VICE PRESIDENTIAL OR SENATORIAL CANDIDATE CONCERNED OR HIS PARTY, CONGRESS OR THE COMMISSION EN BANC, AS THE CASE MAY BE SHALL, FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT OR SENATOR, COUNT THE VOTES AS THEY APPEAR IN THE COPIES OF THE ELECTION RETURNS SUBMITTED TO IT.

IN CASE OF ANY DISCREPANCY, INCOMPLETENESS, ERASURE OR ALTERATION AS MENTIONED ABOVE, THE PROCEDURE ON PREPROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES SHALL BE ADOPTED AND APPLIED AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 17,18,19 AND 20.

ANY PERSON WHO PRESENT IN EVIDENCE A SIMULATED COPY OF AN ELECTION RETURN, CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OR STATEMENT OF VOTES, OR A PRINTED COPY OF AN ELECTION RETURN, CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OR STATEMENT OF VOTES BEARING A SIMULATED CERTIFICATION OR A SIMULATED IMAGE, SHALL BE GUILTY OF AN ELECTION OFFENSE SHALL BE PENALIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881.

3. SECTION 38 WHICH PROVIDES:

SEC. 38. SECTION 15 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 IS HEREBY AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

SEC. 15. PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES IN ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, SENATOR, AND MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. - FOR PURPOSES OF THE ELECTIONS FOR PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, SENATOR, AND MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NO PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES SHALL BE ALLOWED ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE PREPARATION, TRANSMISSION, RECEIPT, CUSTODY AND APPRECIATION OF ELECTION RETURNS OR THE CERTIFICATES OF CANVASS, AS THE CASE MAY BE, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 30 HEREOF. HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE AUTHORITY OF THE APPROPRIATE CANVASSING BODY MOTU PROPRIO OR UPON WRITTEN COMPLAINT OF AN INTERESTED PERSON TO CORRECT MANIFEST ERRORS IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OR ELECTION RETURNS BEFORE IT.

QUESTIONS AFFECTING THE COMPOSITION OR PROCEEDINGS OF THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS MAY BE INITIATED IN THE BOARD OR DIRECTLY WITH THE COMMISSION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 19 HEREOF.

ANY OBJECTION ON THE ELECTION RETURNS BEFORE THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, OR ON THE MUNICIPAL CERTIFICATES OF CANVASS BEFORE THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OR DISTRICT BOARD OF CANVASSERS IN METRO MANILA AREA, SHALL BE SPECIFICALLY NOTICED IN THE MINUTES OF THE RESPECTIVE PROCEEDINGS.

4. SECTION 43 WHICH PROVIDES:

SEC. 43. SECTION 265 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881 IS HEREBY AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

SEC. 265. PROSECUTION. THE COMMISSION SHALL, THROUGH ITS DULY AUTHORIZED LEGAL OFFICERS, HAVE THE POWER, CONCURRENT WITH THE OTHER PROSECUTING ARMS OF THE GOVERNMENT, TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF ALL ELECTION OFFENSES PUNISHABLE UNDER THIS CODE, AND TO PROSECUTE THE SAME.

THE ISSUES

PETITIONER RAISES THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

1. WHETHER RA 9369 VIOLATES SECTION 26(1), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION; WHETHER SECTIONS 37 AND 38 VIOLATE SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI[5] AND PARAGRAPH 7, SECTION 4, ARTICLE VII[6] OF THE CONSTITUTION; Whether Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution;[7] and

WHETHER SECTION 34 VIOLATES SECTION 10, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.[8]

THE COURTS RULING

THE PETITION HAS NO MERIT.

IS SETTLED THAT EVERY STATUTE IS PRESUMED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL.[9] THE PRESUMPTION IS THAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO ENACT A VALID, SENSIBLE AND JUST LAW. THOSE WHO PETITION THE COURT TO DECLARE A LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL MUST SHOW THAT THERE IS A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL BREACH OF THE CONSTITUTION, NOT MERELY A DOUBTFUL, SPECULATIVE OR ARGUMENTATIVE ONE; OTHERWISE, THE PETITION MUST FAIL.[10] In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions should be declared unconstitutional.

RA 9369 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution

Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.

Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its purpose encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections. The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction.[11] The requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.[12] The title of a law does not have to be an index

of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.[13] Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.[14]

RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes. Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881),[15] Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),[16] and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others.

Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution

PETITIONER ARGUES THAT SECTIONS 37 AND 38 VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION BY IMPAIRING THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (PET) AND THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (SET). ACCORDING TO PETITIONER, UNDER THE AMENDED PROVISIONS, CONGRESS AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT (CONGRESS), AND THE COMELEC EN BANC AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS (COMELEC EN BANC), FOR THE ELECTION OF SENATORS MAY NOW ENTERTAIN PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES IN THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, AND SENATORS. PETITIONER CONCLUDES THAT IN ENTERTAINING PREPROCLAMATION CASES, CONGRESS AND THE COMELEC EN BANC UNDERMINE THE INDEPENDENCE AND ENCROACH UPON THE JURISDICTION OF THE PET AND THE SET.

The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass. The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide that Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.

OSG argues that the Constitution does not prohibit pre-proclamation cases involving national elective posts. According to the OSG, ONLY SECTION 15 OF RA 7166[17] EXPRESSLY DISALLOWS PREPROCLAMATION CASES INVOLVING NATIONAL ELECTIVE POSTS BUT THIS PROVISION WAS SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED BY SECTION 38 OF RA 9369. In Pimentel III v. COMELEC,[18] we already discussed the implications of the amendments introduced by Sections 37 and 38 to Sections 15 and 30[19] of RA 7166, respectively and we declared:

Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9369 to Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, preproclamation cases involving the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass are now allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, and Senators. The intention of Congress to treat a case falling under Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, as a pre-proclamation case is apparent in the fourth paragraph of the said provision which adopts and applies to such a case the same procedure provided under Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 7166 on pre-proclamation controversies.

In sum, in [the] elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule is still that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or proceeding of the board of

canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369.[20]

In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates.

Section 43 does not violate Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution

Both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Petitioner and the COMELEC allege that Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses.[21]

We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution gave the COMELEC the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws.

Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. This was an important innovation introduced by the Constitution because this provision was not in the 1935[22] or 1973[23] Constitutions.[24] The phrase [w]here appropriate leaves to the legislature the power to determine the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the government.

The grant of the exclusive power to the COMELEC can be found in Section 265 of BP 881, which provides: Sec. 265. Prosecution. - The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Emphasis supplied)

This was also an innovation introduced by BP 881. The history of election laws shows that prior to BP 881, no such exclusive power was ever bestowed on the COMELEC. [25]

We also note that while Section 265 of BP 881 vests in the COMELEC the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified and explained.[26] The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Rule 34 - Prosecution of Election Offenses

Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. - The Commission shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear that the grant of the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution were to give the COMELEC the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the framers would have expressly so stated in the Constitution. They did not.

In People v. Basilla,[27] we acknowledged that without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible.[28] In COMELEC v. Espaol,[29] we also stated that enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the COMELEC did not have a sufficient number of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such cases.[30] The prompt investigation, prosecution, and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.[31] Thus, given the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, if Congress passes a law amending Section 265 of BP 881, such law does not violate the Constitution. Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution

assails the constitutionality of the provision which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at Pon election day. Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.

The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only applies to previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be impaired.

Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it will prevail over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police power. The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare. The OSG also states that this was a reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts.

There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties.[32] There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.[33]

As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or demandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three months prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when the dominant majority and minority parties hired their respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they were deemed to have incorporated in their contracts all the provisions of RA 9369. Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. [34] The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1405[35] specifies the rights and duties of poll watchers:

THE WATCHERS SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO STAY IN THE SPACE RESERVED FOR THEM INSIDE THE POLLING PLACE. THEY SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITNESS AND INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE BOARD; TO TAKE NOTES OF WHAT THEY MAY SEE OR HEAR, TO TAKE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND INCIDENTS, IF ANY, DURING THE COUNTING OF VOTES, AS WELL AS THE ELECTION RETURNS, TALLY BOARD AND BALLOT BOXES; TO FILE A PROTEST AGAINST ANY IRREGULARITY OR VIOLATION OF LAW WHICH THEY BELIEVE MAY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BY THE BOARD OR BY ANY OF ITS MEMBERS OR BY ANY PERSON; TO OBTAIN FROM THE BOARD A CERTIFICATE AS TO THE FILING OF SUCH PROTEST AND/OR OF THE RESOLUTION THEREON; TO READ THE BALLOTS AFTER THEY SHALL HAVE BEEN READ BY THE CHAIRMAN, AS WELL AS THE ELECTION RETURNS AFTER THEY SHALL HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND SIGNED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD WITHOUT TOUCHING THEM, BUT THEY SHALL NOT SPEAK TO ANY MEMBER OF THE BOARD, OR TO ANY VOTER, OR AMONG THEMSELVES, IN SUCH A MANNER AS WOULD DISTURB THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE BOARD; AND TO BE FURNISHED, UPON REQUEST, WITH A CERTIFICATE OF VOTES FOR THE CANDIDATES, DULY SIGNED AND THUMBMARKED BY THE CHAIRMAN AND ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS.

Additionally, the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties in a precinct shall, if available, affix their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that precinct.[36] The dominant majority and minority parties shall also be given a copy of the certificates of canvass[37] and election returns[38] through their respective poll watchers. Clearly, poll watchers play an important role in the elections.

MOREOVER, WHILE THE CONTRACTING PARTIES MAY ESTABLISH SUCH STIPULATIONS, CLAUSES, TERMS, AND CONDITIONS AS THEY MAY DEEM CONVENIENT, SUCH STIPULATIONS SHOULD NOT BE CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC ORDER, OR PUBLIC POLICY.[39]

IN BELTRAN V. SECRETARY OF HEALTH,[40] WE SAID:

FURTHERMORE, THE FREEDOM TO CONTRACT IS NOT ABSOLUTE; ALL CONTRACTS AND ALL RIGHTS ARE SUBJECT TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE AND NOT ONLY MAY REGULATIONS WHICH AFFECT THEM BE ESTABLISHED BY THE STATE, BUT ALL SUCH REGULATIONS MUST BE SUBJECT TO CHANGE FROM TIME TO TIME, AS THE GENERAL WELL-BEING OF THE COMMUNITY MAY REQUIRE, OR AS THE CIRCUMSTANCES MAY CHANGE, OR AS EXPERIENCE MAY DEMONSTRATE THE NECESSITY.[41] (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)

THEREFORE, ASSUMING THERE WERE EXISTING CONTRACTS, SECTION 34 WOULD STILL BE CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THE LAW WAS ENACTED IN THE EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE TO PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE. WE AGREE WITH THE COMELEC THAT THE ROLE OF POLL WATCHERS IS INVESTED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST. IN FACT, EVEN PETITIONER CONCEDES THAT POLL WATCHERS NOT ONLY GUARD THE VOTES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CANDIDATES OR POLITICAL PARTIES BUT ALSO ENSURE THAT ALL THE VOTES ARE PROPERLY COUNTED. ULTIMATELY, POLL WATCHERS AID IN FAIR AND HONEST ELECTIONS. POLL WATCHERS HELP ENSURE THAT THE ELECTIONS ARE TRANSPARENT, CREDIBLE, FAIR, AND ACCURATE. THE REGULATION OF THE PER DIEM OF THE POLL WATCHERS OF THE DOMINANT MAJORITY AND MINORITY PARTIES PROMOTES THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY AND IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner, Present:

G.R. No. 189466

Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, - versus Brion, Leonardo-De Castro,

Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, and Mendoza, JJ. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents.

x ---------------------------------------------- x

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner,

G.R. No. 189506

- versus -

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR.,

CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ, Respondents. February 11, 2010 Promulgated:

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION

ABAD, J.:

These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.

The Facts and the Case

In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.

Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not

belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.

Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.

Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.

On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.[1] The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the same on September 17, 2009,[2] prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari.

In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner

Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.

On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparans qualifications.[3] Palparan moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009,[4] hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition.

Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation.

The Issue Presented

The common issue presented in these two cases is:

Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list

organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.

If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantays personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him.

But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,[5] identifies who the members of that House are:

Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts and those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. This means that, from the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are elected into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong.

Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms.

It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as members of the House of Representatives, thus:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied)

As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections,[6] a party-list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of Representatives. Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a

party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states:

Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as partylist representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent.[7]

It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them.[8] But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.

Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution[9] provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected members of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.[10]

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order

dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040.

SO ORDERED.