Macalintal vs.

Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 651 SCRA 239, June 07, 2011 Facts: Macalintal, as the petitioner, argued that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional since Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of PET. Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Petitioner also argued that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus, its members violate the proscription in Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution,
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions. Issues: 1) Whether or not the establishment of PET is unconstitutional 2) Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power

1) PET is constitutional. The Supreme Court reiterate that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution. The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the specific wording required by petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality of the PET. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting enbanc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courts method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to promulgate its rules for the purpose. 2) The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.

At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively. At the higher levels city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals,which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Magdalo Para saPagbabago vs. Commission on Elections, 673 SCRA 651, June 19, 2012

Facts: Petitioner Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. On 26 October 2009, the COMELECSecond Division issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. In reference to Senator Antonio Trilianes IV as the partys organizer and his participation in the
Oakwood mutiny show that their purpose in employing violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of organized societies. Magdalo argued that it did not resort to violence when I took over Oakwood because (a) no one, either civilian or military, was held hostage; (b) its members immediately evacuated the guests and staff of the hotel; and (c) not a single shot was fired during the incident.

On 24 November 2010, the Preseident granted amnesty to those who particapted in the Oakwood Mutiny.
Issues: 1) Whether or not Magdalos disqualification on the ground of using violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals 2) Whether or not the subsequent grant of amnesty would relieve the Magdalo from the disqualification

1) Yes. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation. Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist. In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. 2) The Court held that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO. However, in view of the

subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration.
In People v. Patriarca, 341 SCRA 464 (2000), explained the concept of amnesty, to wit: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The 26 October 2009 and 4 January 2010 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the filing anew of a Petition for Registration by MAGDALO.

Maliksi vs. Commission on Elections Facts: Maliksi and Saquilian were both mayoralty candidates for the Municipality of Imus, Cavite during the 2010 Automated National and Local Election.

The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Saquilayan as the duly elected municipal mayor. Based on the MBCs canvass, Saquilayan won over Maliksi by 8,499 votes. Maliksi filed an election protest before the RTC. The trial court relying on the physical ballots ruled in favor of Maliksi. Based on the trial courts recount, Maliksi won over Saquilayan by a margin of 665 votes. Saquilayan filed an appeal before the COMELEC. Saquilayan also filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order or status quo order with prayer for early consideration. The COMELEC, after inspecting the ballot boxes, ruled that it was apparent that the integrity of the ballots had been compromised. To determine the true will of the electorate, and since there was an allegation of ballot tampering, the COMELEC examined the digital images of the contested ballots stored in the Compact Flash (CF) cards The COMELEC, relying on the digital images, found that Maliksi obtained a total of 40,092 votes while Saquilayan obtained a total of 48,521 votes. Saquilayan won over Maliksi by 8,429 votes. The COMELEC nullified the trial courts decision and declared Saquilayan as the duly-elected Municipal Mayor. Maliksi assailed the use by the COMELEC of the ballot images in the CF cards. He alleged that the best and most conclusive evidence are the physical ballots themselves, and when they cannot be produced or when they are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence of the votes cast. Issue
1) Whether or not COMELEC properly

ordered the decryption, printing, and examination

of the digital images

2) Whether the ballot images in the CF cards are mere secondary evidence that should only be used when the physical ballots are not available;

Held: 1)

Yes. The COMELEC ordered the decryption, printing, and examination of the

digital images because the COMELEC discovered upon inspection that the integrity of the ballots themselves was compromised and that the ballot boxes were tampered.

The COMELEC First Division properly invoked Section 6(f), Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which states:
Sec. 6. Powers and Duties of the Presiding Commissioner. The powers and duties of the Presiding Commissioner of a Division when discharging its functions in cases pending before the Division shall be as follows: xxxx (f) To take such other measures as he may deem proper upon consultation with the other members of the Division.

In this case, the COMELEC En Banc categorically stated that the recounting of the physical ballots in the revision before the trial court yielded dubious results. The tampering of the ballots and ballot boxes had been fully established and it justified the decryption of the ballot images in the CF cards.
2) The Court ruled that , the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. The Court declared that the printouts of the ballot images in the CF cards , are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest. In short, both the ballot images in the CF cards and the printouts of such images have the same evidentiary value as the official physical ballots filled up by the voters.

Martinez III vs. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, 610 SCRA 53, January 12, 2010 Facts: Celestino Martinez III, Salimbangan and Edilito C.Martinez were candidates for the position of Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu. On April 3, 2007, Celistino Martinez III filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez as a nuisance candidate. However, it was only after the election when the COMELEC decided on the petition. On June 12, 2007, the COMELEC declared Edilito C. Martinez as a nuisance candidate. During the election, the name Edilito C. Martinez was still in the list of candidates. The Board of Election considered the ballots containing MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ as strayed votes. Salimbangon was proclaimed the winner of the election with a margin of 104 votes. Salimbangon got 67,277 while Celestino Martinez III got 67,173.

The HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: "Where only the first name of a candidate or only his surname is written, the vote for such candidate is valid, if there is no other candidate with the same first name or surname for the same office."
Celestino Martinez III filed an election protest before the HRET.

Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held that 5,401 ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" only written on the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter.
Issue:

What is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the elections?
Whether or not ballots with only MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ written on the line for Representative should be counted in favor of Celestino Martinez III Held: 1) Petitioner should

not be prejudiced by COMELEC's inefficiency and lethargy. Nor should the absence of objection over straying of votes during the actual counting bar petitioner from raising the issue in his election protest. The evidence clearly shows that Edilito C. Martinez, who did not even bother to file an answer and simply disappeared after filing his certificate of candidacy, was an unknown in politics within the district, a "habalhabal" driver who had neither the financial resources nor political support to sustain his candidacy. The similarity of his surname with that of petitioner was meant to cause confusion among the voters and spoil petitioner's chances of

winning the congressional race for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu. As it turned out, there were thousands of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative, votes considered stray by the BEI and not counted in favor of petitioner, and which the HRET affirmed to be invalid votes. Had the Commission timely resolved the petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate, all such ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" would have been counted in favor of petitioner and not considered stray.
2) Yes. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.

Petitioner Celestino A. Martinez III was declared by the Supreme Court as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu in the May 14, 2007 elections.

Mendoza vs. Commission on Election, 616 SCRA 443, March 25, 2010 Facts: Mendoza and Pagdangan were candidates for the gubernatorial election in Bulacan in 2007. Mendoza was proclaimed as the winner. Pagdangan filed an election protest which was raffled to COMELEC Second Division.

COMELEC Second Division decided the election protest and proclaimed Pagdanganan as the duly elected Governor of Bulacan. Aggrieved, Mendoza filed a
motion for reconsideration which directed the case to the COMELEC En Banc. COMELEC En Banc initially issued a resolution which dismissed the motion for reconsideration wherein only three Commissioners voted to deny his motion for reconsideration. A commissioner dissented while three others took no part. Mendoza argued that the

En Banc issued such resolution (a) without the concurrence of the majority of its members and (b) without conducting a rehearing. Mendoza also filed the instant Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Supreme Court. COMELEC En Banc issued an Order for the rehearing of the motion for reconsideration. Following the rehearing, the members of the COMELEC En Banc maintained their votes.COMELEC En Banc issued an order directing the immediate execution of the Second Divisions decision. Mendoza filed with the Supreme Court a Supplement to the Petition with a Most Urgent Reiterating Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Status Quo Order. It contended that Pagdangans protest should have been dismissed when no majority vote was obtained after the re-hearing in the case.
Issue: 1) What is the effect if no majority decision is reached in the banc? 2) Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc should have dismissed the election protest which was initially heard by the COMELEC Second Division

Held: 1) If no decision is reached after the case is reheard, there are two different remedies available to the COMELEC, to wit: (1) dismiss the action proceeding, if the case was originally commenced in the COMELEC;or

(2) consider as affirmed the judgment or order appealed from, in appealed cases. There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed. Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.

2) The Court granted the petition and nullified the resolution and order of the COMELEC En Banc. The election protest of respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan was

dismissed. Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. Procedure if Opinion is Equally

Divided.When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. As one pertaining to the election of the provincial governor of Bulacan, respondents Election Protest was originally commenced in the COMELEC, pursuant to its exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. Although initially raffled to the COMELEC Second Division, the elevation of said election protest on motion for reconsideration before the Commission En Banc cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered an appeal. Tersely put, there is no appeal within the COMELEC itself. As aptly observed in the lone dissent penned by COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, respondents Election Protest was filed with the Commission at the first instance and should be, accordingly, considered an action or proceeding originally commenced in the Commission.

Mitra vs. Commission on Election, 622 SCRA 744, July 02, 2010 Facts: